powerpc: Don't use %pK through printk

In the past %pK was preferable to %p as it would not leak raw pointer
values into the kernel log.
Since commit ad67b74 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p")
the regular %p has been improved to avoid this issue.
Furthermore, restricted pointers ("%pK") were never meant to be used
through printk(). They can still unintentionally leak raw pointers or
acquire sleeping locks in atomic contexts.

Switch to the regular pointer formatting which is safer and
easier to reason about.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250113171731-dc10e3c1-da64-4af0-b767-7c7070468023@linutronix.de/
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250718-restricted-pointers-powerpc-v2-1-fd7bddd809f3@linutronix.de

Author: t-8ch

arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_driver.c

@@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ void eeh_handle_normal_event(struct eeh_pe *pe)
 		/* FIXME: Use the same format as dump_stack() */
 		pr_err("EEH: Call Trace:\n");
 		for (i = 0; i < pe->trace_entries; i++)
-			pr_err("EEH: [%pK] %pS\n", ptrs[i], ptrs[i]);
+			pr_err("EEH: [%p] %pS\n", ptrs[i], ptrs[i]);
 
 		pe->trace_entries = 0;
 	}

arch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c

@@ -713,27 +713,27 @@ static ssize_t catalog_event_len_validate(struct hv_24x7_event_data *event,
 	ev_len = be16_to_cpu(event->length);
 
 	if (ev_len % 16)
-		pr_info("event %zu has length %zu not divisible by 16: event=%pK\n",
+		pr_info("event %zu has length %zu not divisible by 16: event=%p\n",
 				event_idx, ev_len, event);
 
 	ev_end = (__u8 *)event + ev_len;
 	if (ev_end > end) {
-		pr_warn("event %zu has .length=%zu, ends after buffer end: ev_end=%pK > end=%pK, offset=%zu\n",
+		pr_warn("event %zu has .length=%zu, ends after buffer end: ev_end=%p > end=%p, offset=%zu\n",
 				event_idx, ev_len, ev_end, end,
 				offset);
 		return -1;
 	}
 
 	calc_ev_end = event_end(event, end);
 	if (!calc_ev_end) {
-		pr_warn("event %zu has a calculated length which exceeds buffer length %zu: event=%pK end=%pK, offset=%zu\n",
+		pr_warn("event %zu has a calculated length which exceeds buffer length %zu: event=%p end=%p, offset=%zu\n",
 			event_idx, event_data_bytes, event, end,
 			offset);
 		return -1;
 	}
 
 	if (calc_ev_end > ev_end) {
-		pr_warn("event %zu exceeds its own length: event=%pK, end=%pK, offset=%zu, calc_ev_end=%pK\n",
+		pr_warn("event %zu exceeds its own length: event=%p, end=%p, offset=%zu, calc_ev_end=%p\n",
 			event_idx, event, ev_end, offset, calc_ev_end);
 		return -1;
 	}