Merge tag 'hardening-v6.17-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull hardening updates from Kees Cook:

 - Introduce and start using TRAILING_OVERLAP() helper for fixing
   embedded flex array instances (Gustavo A. R. Silva)

 - mux: Convert mux_control_ops to a flex array member in mux_chip
   (Thorsten Blum)

 - string: Group str_has_prefix() and strstarts() (Andy Shevchenko)

 - Remove KCOV instrumentation from __init and __head (Ritesh Harjani,
   Kees Cook)

 - Refactor and rename stackleak feature to support Clang

 - Add KUnit test for seq_buf API

 - Fix KUnit fortify test under LTO

* tag 'hardening-v6.17-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (22 commits)
  sched/task_stack: Add missing const qualifier to end_of_stack()
  kstack_erase: Support Clang stack depth tracking
  kstack_erase: Add -mgeneral-regs-only to silence Clang warnings
  init.h: Disable sanitizer coverage for __init and __head
  kstack_erase: Disable kstack_erase for all of arm compressed boot code
  x86: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches
  arm64: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches
  s390: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches
  arm: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches
  mips: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatch
  powerpc/mm/book3s64: Move kfence and debug_pagealloc related calls to __init section
  configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
  configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE
  stackleak: Split KSTACK_ERASE_CFLAGS from GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS
  stackleak: Rename stackleak_track_stack to __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth
  stackleak: Rename STACKLEAK to KSTACK_ERASE
  seq_buf: Introduce KUnit tests
  string: Group str_has_prefix() and strstarts()
  kunit/fortify: Add back "volatile" for sizeof() constants
  acpi: nfit: intel: avoid multiple -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warnings
  ...

Author: torvalds

Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst

@@ -1465,15 +1465,15 @@ stack_erasing
 =============
 
 This parameter can be used to control kernel stack erasing at the end
-of syscalls for kernels built with ``CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK``.
+of syscalls for kernels built with ``CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE``.
 
 That erasing reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs
 can reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
 The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel
 compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary.
 
 = ====================================================================
-0 Kernel stack erasing is disabled, STACKLEAK_METRICS are not updated.
+0 Kernel stack erasing is disabled, KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS are not updated.
 1 Kernel stack erasing is enabled (default), it is performed before
   returning to the userspace at the end of syscalls.
 = ====================================================================

Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst

@@ -176,5 +176,5 @@ Be very careful vs. KASLR when changing anything here. The KASLR address
 range must not overlap with anything except the KASAN shadow area, which is
 correct as KASAN disables KASLR.
 
-For both 4- and 5-level layouts, the STACKLEAK_POISON value in the last 2MB
+For both 4- and 5-level layouts, the KSTACK_ERASE_POISON value in the last 2MB
 hole: ffffffffffff4111

Documentation/security/self-protection.rst

@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ Memory poisoning
 
 When releasing memory, it is best to poison the contents, to avoid reuse
 attacks that rely on the old contents of memory. E.g., clear stack on a
-syscall return (``CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK``), wipe heap memory on a
+syscall return (``CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE``), wipe heap memory on a
 free. This frustrates many uninitialized variable attacks, stack content
 exposures, heap content exposures, and use-after-free attacks.
 

Documentation/translations/zh_CN/security/self-protection.rst

@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ KALLSYSM，则会直接打印原始地址。
 --------
 
 在释放内存时，最好对内存内容进行清除处理，以防止攻击者重用内存中以前
-的内容。例如，在系统调用返回时清除堆栈（CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK）,
+的内容。例如，在系统调用返回时清除堆栈（CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE）,
 在释放堆内容是清除其内容。这有助于防止许多未初始化变量攻击、堆栈内容
 泄露、堆内容泄露以及使用后释放攻击（user-after-free）。
 

MAINTAINERS

@@ -9997,8 +9997,6 @@ L:	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Maintained
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git for-next/hardening
 F:	Documentation/kbuild/gcc-plugins.rst
-F:	include/linux/stackleak.h
-F:	kernel/stackleak.c
 F:	scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
 F:	scripts/gcc-plugins/
 
@@ -13094,13 +13092,17 @@ T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git for-next/har
 F:	Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count
 F:	Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
 F:	arch/*/configs/hardening.config
+F:	include/linux/kstack_erase.h
 F:	include/linux/overflow.h
 F:	include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
 F:	include/linux/ucopysize.h
 F:	kernel/configs/hardening.config
+F:	kernel/kstack_erase.c
 F:	lib/tests/randstruct_kunit.c
 F:	lib/tests/usercopy_kunit.c
 F:	mm/usercopy.c
+F:	scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase
+F:	scripts/Makefile.randstruct
 F:	security/Kconfig.hardening
 K:	\b(add|choose)_random_kstack_offset\b
 K:	\b__check_(object_size|heap_object)\b

Makefile

@@ -1086,6 +1086,7 @@ include-$(CONFIG_KMSAN)		+= scripts/Makefile.kmsan
 include-$(CONFIG_UBSAN)		+= scripts/Makefile.ubsan
 include-$(CONFIG_KCOV)		+= scripts/Makefile.kcov
 include-$(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT)	+= scripts/Makefile.randstruct
+include-$(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE)	+= scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase
 include-$(CONFIG_AUTOFDO_CLANG)	+= scripts/Makefile.autofdo
 include-$(CONFIG_PROPELLER_CLANG)	+= scripts/Makefile.propeller
 include-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS)	+= scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins

arch/Kconfig

@@ -630,11 +630,11 @@ config SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
-config HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
+config HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE
 	bool
 	help
 	  An architecture should select this if it has the code which
-	  fills the used part of the kernel stack with the STACKLEAK_POISON
+	  fills the used part of the kernel stack with the KSTACK_ERASE_POISON
 	  value before returning from system calls.
 
 config HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR

arch/arm/Kconfig

@@ -87,11 +87,11 @@ config ARM
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if !CPU_ENDIAN_BE32 && MMU
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if MMU && !XIP_KERNEL
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if HAVE_ARCH_KASAN
+	select HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU
 	select HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER if AEABI && !OABI_COMPAT
-	select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE if ARM_LPAE

arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ OBJS		=
 
 HEAD	= head.o
 OBJS	+= misc.o decompress.o
-CFLAGS_decompress.o += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_DEBUG_UNCOMPRESS),y)
 OBJS	+= debug.o
 AFLAGS_head.o += -DDEBUG
@@ -96,6 +95,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
 
 ccflags-y := -fpic $(call cc-option,-mno-single-pic-base,) -fno-builtin \
 	     -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt -fno-stack-protector \
+	     $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) \
 	     -I$(obj)
 ccflags-remove-$(CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER) += -pg
 asflags-y := -DZIMAGE

arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S

@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ no_work_pending:
 
 	ct_user_enter save = 0
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE
 	bl	stackleak_erase_on_task_stack
 #endif
 	restore_user_regs fast = 0, offset = 0