KVM: TDX: KVM: TDX: Always honor guest PAT on TDX enabled guests

Always honor guest PAT in KVM-managed EPTs on TDX enabled guests by
making self-snoop feature a hard dependency for TDX and making quirk
KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT not a valid quirk once TDX is enabled.

The quirk KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT only affects memory type of
KVM-managed EPTs. For the TDX-module-managed private EPT, memory type is
always forced to WB now.

Honoring guest PAT in KVM-managed EPTs ensures KVM does not invoke
kvm_zap_gfn_range() when attaching/detaching non-coherent DMA devices,
which would cause mirrored EPTs for TDs to be zapped, leading to the
TDX-module-managed private EPT being incorrectly zapped.

As a new feature, TDX always comes with support for self-snoop, and does
not have to worry about unmodifiable but buggy guests. So, simply ignore
KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT on TDX guests just like kvm-amd.ko already
does.

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20250224071039.31511-1-yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
[Only apply to TDX guests. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Author: yanzhao56

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c

@@ -625,6 +625,7 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 
 	kvm->arch.has_protected_state = true;
 	kvm->arch.has_private_mem = true;
+	kvm->arch.disabled_quirks |= KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT;
 
 	/*
 	 * Because guest TD is protected, VMM can't parse the instruction in TD.
@@ -3475,6 +3476,11 @@ int __init tdx_bringup(void)
 		goto success_disable_tdx;
 	}
 
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SELFSNOOP)) {
+		pr_err("Self-snoop is required for TDX\n");
+		goto success_disable_tdx;
+	}
+
 	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM)) {
 		pr_err("tdx: no TDX private KeyIDs available\n");
 		goto success_disable_tdx;