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Commit f2807d4
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fix(sdk-core): bind GG18 offline shares to signable, enforce single use
An attacker reaching the signer's tssshare port could replay one encryptedOShare with
different signables or D-shares: since sign() computes s = m*k + r*omicron with r derived
from oShare.Gamma + dShare.Gamma, two signatures solve for k and omicron, and with an
attacker-supplied Paillier modulus yield the user's key share.
wShare/oShare envelopes now carry adata binding <state>:<createdEpochMs>:<sha256(signable)>:
<derivationPath>, validated (binding and age, with v1 escape decoding) before decryption;
counterparty Paillier moduli (challenge n, A-share n) must match the signer's own
bitgoNShare.n; the express signer marks MuDelta/S ciphertexts consumed exactly once in a
file-backed registry that survives restarts, keyed on the canonical decoded bytes that
decryption consumes (v1 iv truncated to the effective CCM nonce), with consumption recorded
only after the envelope fully authenticates so junk requests never reach the registry.
Legacy relay bodies and legacy direct callers keep working; the oShare inherits the
wShare's binding when no txRequest is available.
References: WAL-24591 parent c954133 commit f2807d4
7 files changed
Lines changed: 1148 additions & 39 deletions
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- modules
- bitgo/test/v2/unit/internal/tssUtils
- express
- src
- test/unit/clientRoutes
- sdk-core/src/bitgo/utils/tss
- ecdsa
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