Security: unrestricted URL fetch in load_api_specification (CWE-918 class)

[pureacech]

Summary

src/mockloop_mcp/parser.py → load_api_specification fetches arbitrary http(s) URLs via requests.get(spec_source) when the source is a URL string.

Impact

If untrusted input can reach spec_source, this is a classic SSRF-class surface (internal HTTP, link-local/metadata depending on deployment network).

Suggested fix direction

• Allowlist hosts or require explicit user confirmation for remote specs
• Block private/link-local/metadata CIDRs after DNS resolution
• Cap redirects and response size

I can draft a small hardening patch if welcome.

— pureace (@pureacech)

[pureacech]

Following up politely — happy to open a minimal fix PR (argv-only subprocess / path containment / URL allowlist as applicable) if that would help. No rush on your side.

— pureace (@pureacech)