Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.8_rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:

 - Make sure clearing CPU buffers using VERW happens at the latest
   possible point in the return-to-userspace path, otherwise memory
   accesses after the VERW execution could cause data to land in CPU
   buffers again

* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.8_rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  KVM/VMX: Move VERW closer to VMentry for MDS mitigation
  KVM/VMX: Use BT+JNC, i.e. EFLAGS.CF to select VMRESUME vs. VMLAUNCH
  x86/bugs: Use ALTERNATIVE() instead of mds_user_clear static key
  x86/entry_32: Add VERW just before userspace transition
  x86/entry_64: Add VERW just before userspace transition
  x86/bugs: Add asm helpers for executing VERW

Author: torvalds

Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst

@@ -95,6 +95,9 @@ The kernel provides a function to invoke the buffer clearing:
 
     mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
 
+Also macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS can be used in ASM late in exit-to-user path.
+Other than CFLAGS.ZF, this macro doesn't clobber any registers.
+
 The mitigation is invoked on kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state
 (idle) transitions.
 
@@ -138,17 +141,30 @@ Mitigation points
 
    When transitioning from kernel to user space the CPU buffers are flushed
    on affected CPUs when the mitigation is not disabled on the kernel
-   command line. The migitation is enabled through the static key
-   mds_user_clear.
-
-   The mitigation is invoked in prepare_exit_to_usermode() which covers
-   all but one of the kernel to user space transitions.  The exception
-   is when we return from a Non Maskable Interrupt (NMI), which is
-   handled directly in do_nmi().
-
-   (The reason that NMI is special is that prepare_exit_to_usermode() can
-    enable IRQs.  In NMI context, NMIs are blocked, and we don't want to
-    enable IRQs with NMIs blocked.)
+   command line. The mitigation is enabled through the feature flag
+   X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF.
+
+   The mitigation is invoked just before transitioning to userspace after
+   user registers are restored. This is done to minimize the window in
+   which kernel data could be accessed after VERW e.g. via an NMI after
+   VERW.
+
+   **Corner case not handled**
+   Interrupts returning to kernel don't clear CPUs buffers since the
+   exit-to-user path is expected to do that anyways. But, there could be
+   a case when an NMI is generated in kernel after the exit-to-user path
+   has cleared the buffers. This case is not handled and NMI returning to
+   kernel don't clear CPU buffers because:
+
+   1. It is rare to get an NMI after VERW, but before returning to userspace.
+   2. For an unprivileged user, there is no known way to make that NMI
+      less rare or target it.
+   3. It would take a large number of these precisely-timed NMIs to mount
+      an actual attack.  There's presumably not enough bandwidth.
+   4. The NMI in question occurs after a VERW, i.e. when user state is
+      restored and most interesting data is already scrubbed. Whats left
+      is only the data that NMI touches, and that may or may not be of
+      any interest.
 
 
 2. C-State transition

arch/x86/entry/entry.S

@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/msr-index.h>
+#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
+#include <asm/segment.h>
+#include <asm/cache.h>
 
 .pushsection .noinstr.text, "ax"
 
@@ -20,3 +23,23 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(entry_ibpb)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(entry_ibpb);
 
 .popsection
+
+/*
+ * Define the VERW operand that is disguised as entry code so that
+ * it can be referenced with KPTI enabled. This ensure VERW can be
+ * used late in exit-to-user path after page tables are switched.
+ */
+.pushsection .entry.text, "ax"
+
+.align L1_CACHE_BYTES, 0xcc
+SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(mds_verw_sel)
+	UNWIND_HINT_UNDEFINED
+	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+	.word __KERNEL_DS
+.align L1_CACHE_BYTES, 0xcc
+SYM_CODE_END(mds_verw_sel);
+/* For KVM */
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_verw_sel);
+
+.popsection
+

arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S

@@ -885,6 +885,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(entry_SYSENTER_32)
 	BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 no_user_check=1
 	popfl
 	popl	%eax
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
 
 	/*
 	 * Return back to the vDSO, which will pop ecx and edx.
@@ -954,6 +955,7 @@ restore_all_switch_stack:
 
 	/* Restore user state */
 	RESTORE_REGS pop=4			# skip orig_eax/error_code
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
 .Lirq_return:
 	/*
 	 * ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE rely on IRET core serialization
@@ -1146,6 +1148,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi)
 
 	/* Not on SYSENTER stack. */
 	call	exc_nmi
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
 	jmp	.Lnmi_return
 
 .Lnmi_from_sysenter_stack:

arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S

@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ syscall_return_via_sysret:
 SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETQ_unsafe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
 	swapgs
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
 	sysretq
 SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETQ_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
@@ -573,6 +574,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 
 .Lswapgs_and_iret:
 	swapgs
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
 	/* Assert that the IRET frame indicates user mode. */
 	testb	$3, 8(%rsp)
 	jnz	.Lnative_iret
@@ -723,6 +725,8 @@ native_irq_return_ldt:
 	 */
 	popq	%rax				/* Restore user RAX */
 
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
+
 	/*
 	 * RSP now points to an ordinary IRET frame, except that the page
 	 * is read-only and RSP[31:16] are preloaded with the userspace
@@ -1449,6 +1453,12 @@ nmi_restore:
 	std
 	movq	$0, 5*8(%rsp)		/* clear "NMI executing" */
 
+	/*
+	 * Skip CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS here, since it only helps in rare cases like
+	 * NMI in kernel after user state is restored. For an unprivileged user
+	 * these conditions are hard to meet.
+	 */
+
 	/*
 	 * iretq reads the "iret" frame and exits the NMI stack in a
 	 * single instruction.  We are returning to kernel mode, so this
@@ -1466,6 +1476,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL32_ignore)
 	UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
 	ENDBR
 	mov	$-ENOSYS, %eax
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
 	sysretl
 SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSCALL32_ignore)
 

arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S

@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_unsafe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	xorl	%r9d, %r9d
 	xorl	%r10d, %r10d
 	swapgs
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
 	sysretl
 SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR

arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32		( 3*32+15) /* "" sysenter in IA32 userspace */
 #define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD		( 3*32+16) /* REP microcode works well */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2		( 3*32+17) /* AMD Last Branch Record Extension Version 2 */
-/* FREE, was #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC		( 3*32+18) "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF	( 3*32+18) /* "" Clear CPU buffers using VERW */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER		( 3*32+19) /* AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */
 #define X86_FEATURE_NOPL		( 3*32+20) /* The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS		( 3*32+21) /* "" Always-present feature */

arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h

@@ -91,7 +91,6 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
 
 static __always_inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode(void)
 {
-	mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	amd_clear_divider();
 }
 #define arch_exit_to_user_mode arch_exit_to_user_mode

arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h

@@ -315,6 +315,17 @@
 #endif
 .endm
 
+/*
+ * Macro to execute VERW instruction that mitigate transient data sampling
+ * attacks such as MDS. On affected systems a microcode update overloaded VERW
+ * instruction to also clear the CPU buffers. VERW clobbers CFLAGS.ZF.
+ *
+ * Note: Only the memory operand variant of VERW clears the CPU buffers.
+ */
+.macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
+	ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(verw _ASM_RIP(mds_verw_sel)), X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
+.endm
+
 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\
@@ -529,13 +540,14 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
-DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
 
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
 
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
 
+extern u16 mds_verw_sel;
+
 #include <asm/segment.h>
 
 /**
@@ -561,17 +573,6 @@ static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
 	asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc");
 }
 
-/**
- * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
- *
- * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
- */
-static __always_inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
-{
-	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear))
-		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
-}
-
 /**
  * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
  *

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

@@ -111,9 +111,6 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 /* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
-/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
-DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
 /* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
@@ -252,7 +249,7 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
 			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
 
-		static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
 
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
 		    (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
@@ -356,7 +353,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
 	 * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is
 	 * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
 	 */
-	static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
 
 	if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
 		cpu_smt_disable(false);
@@ -424,7 +421,7 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
 	 */
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) &&
 					      boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)))
-		static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
 	else
 		static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
 
@@ -484,12 +481,12 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
 	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return;
 
-	if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear))
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
 		goto out;
 
 	/*
-	 * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
-	 * mitigation, if necessary.
+	 * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO
+	 * Stale Data mitigation, if necessary.
 	 */
 	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
 	    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {

arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c

@@ -563,9 +563,6 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi)
 	}
 	if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state))
 		goto nmi_restart;
-
-	if (user_mode(regs))
-		mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 }
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)