Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.13_rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:

 - Fix how SEV handles MMIO accesses by forwarding potential page faults
   instead of killing the machine and by using the accessors with the
   exact functionality needed when accessing memory.

 - Fix a confusion with Clang LTO compiler switches passed to the it

 - Handle the case gracefully when VMGEXIT has been executed in
   userspace

* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.13_rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/sev-es: Use __put_user()/__get_user() for data accesses
  x86/sev-es: Forward page-faults which happen during emulation
  x86/sev-es: Don't return NULL from sev_es_get_ghcb()
  x86/build: Fix location of '-plugin-opt=' flags
  x86/sev-es: Invalidate the GHCB after completing VMGEXIT
  x86/sev-es: Move sev_es_put_ghcb() in prep for follow on patch

Author: torvalds

arch/x86/Makefile

@@ -178,11 +178,6 @@ ifeq ($(ACCUMULATE_OUTGOING_ARGS), 1)
 	KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-maccumulate-outgoing-args,)
 endif
 
-ifdef CONFIG_LTO_CLANG
-KBUILD_LDFLAGS	+= -plugin-opt=-code-model=kernel \
-		   -plugin-opt=-stack-alignment=$(if $(CONFIG_X86_32),4,8)
-endif
-
 # Workaround for a gcc prelease that unfortunately was shipped in a suse release
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-sign-compare
 #
@@ -202,7 +197,12 @@ ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
   endif
 endif
 
-KBUILD_LDFLAGS := -m elf_$(UTS_MACHINE)
+KBUILD_LDFLAGS += -m elf_$(UTS_MACHINE)
+
+ifdef CONFIG_LTO_CLANG
+KBUILD_LDFLAGS	+= -plugin-opt=-code-model=kernel \
+		   -plugin-opt=-stack-alignment=$(if $(CONFIG_X86_32),4,8)
+endif
 
 ifdef CONFIG_X86_NEED_RELOCS
 LDFLAGS_vmlinux := --emit-relocs --discard-none

arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c

@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static bool sev_es_negotiate_protocol(void)
 
 static __always_inline void vc_ghcb_invalidate(struct ghcb *ghcb)
 {
+	ghcb->save.sw_exit_code = 0;
 	memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
 }
 

arch/x86/kernel/sev.c

@@ -203,8 +203,18 @@ static __always_inline struct ghcb *sev_es_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
 	if (unlikely(data->ghcb_active)) {
 		/* GHCB is already in use - save its contents */
 
-		if (unlikely(data->backup_ghcb_active))
-			return NULL;
+		if (unlikely(data->backup_ghcb_active)) {
+			/*
+			 * Backup-GHCB is also already in use. There is no way
+			 * to continue here so just kill the machine. To make
+			 * panic() work, mark GHCBs inactive so that messages
+			 * can be printed out.
+			 */
+			data->ghcb_active        = false;
+			data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
+
+			panic("Unable to handle #VC exception! GHCB and Backup GHCB are already in use");
+		}
 
 		/* Mark backup_ghcb active before writing to it */
 		data->backup_ghcb_active = true;
@@ -221,24 +231,6 @@ static __always_inline struct ghcb *sev_es_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
 	return ghcb;
 }
 
-static __always_inline void sev_es_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
-{
-	struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
-	struct ghcb *ghcb;
-
-	data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
-	ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
-
-	if (state->ghcb) {
-		/* Restore GHCB from Backup */
-		*ghcb = *state->ghcb;
-		data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
-		state->ghcb = NULL;
-	} else {
-		data->ghcb_active = false;
-	}
-}
-
 /* Needed in vc_early_forward_exception */
 void do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr);
 
@@ -323,31 +315,44 @@ static enum es_result vc_write_mem(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
 	u16 d2;
 	u8  d1;
 
-	/* If instruction ran in kernel mode and the I/O buffer is in kernel space */
-	if (!user_mode(ctxt->regs) && !access_ok(target, size)) {
-		memcpy(dst, buf, size);
-		return ES_OK;
-	}
-
+	/*
+	 * This function uses __put_user() independent of whether kernel or user
+	 * memory is accessed. This works fine because __put_user() does no
+	 * sanity checks of the pointer being accessed. All that it does is
+	 * to report when the access failed.
+	 *
+	 * Also, this function runs in atomic context, so __put_user() is not
+	 * allowed to sleep. The page-fault handler detects that it is running
+	 * in atomic context and will not try to take mmap_sem and handle the
+	 * fault, so additional pagefault_enable()/disable() calls are not
+	 * needed.
+	 *
+	 * The access can't be done via copy_to_user() here because
+	 * vc_write_mem() must not use string instructions to access unsafe
+	 * memory. The reason is that MOVS is emulated by the #VC handler by
+	 * splitting the move up into a read and a write and taking a nested #VC
+	 * exception on whatever of them is the MMIO access. Using string
+	 * instructions here would cause infinite nesting.
+	 */
 	switch (size) {
 	case 1:
 		memcpy(&d1, buf, 1);
-		if (put_user(d1, target))
+		if (__put_user(d1, target))
 			goto fault;
 		break;
 	case 2:
 		memcpy(&d2, buf, 2);
-		if (put_user(d2, target))
+		if (__put_user(d2, target))
 			goto fault;
 		break;
 	case 4:
 		memcpy(&d4, buf, 4);
-		if (put_user(d4, target))
+		if (__put_user(d4, target))
 			goto fault;
 		break;
 	case 8:
 		memcpy(&d8, buf, 8);
-		if (put_user(d8, target))
+		if (__put_user(d8, target))
 			goto fault;
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -378,30 +383,43 @@ static enum es_result vc_read_mem(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
 	u16 d2;
 	u8  d1;
 
-	/* If instruction ran in kernel mode and the I/O buffer is in kernel space */
-	if (!user_mode(ctxt->regs) && !access_ok(s, size)) {
-		memcpy(buf, src, size);
-		return ES_OK;
-	}
-
+	/*
+	 * This function uses __get_user() independent of whether kernel or user
+	 * memory is accessed. This works fine because __get_user() does no
+	 * sanity checks of the pointer being accessed. All that it does is
+	 * to report when the access failed.
+	 *
+	 * Also, this function runs in atomic context, so __get_user() is not
+	 * allowed to sleep. The page-fault handler detects that it is running
+	 * in atomic context and will not try to take mmap_sem and handle the
+	 * fault, so additional pagefault_enable()/disable() calls are not
+	 * needed.
+	 *
+	 * The access can't be done via copy_from_user() here because
+	 * vc_read_mem() must not use string instructions to access unsafe
+	 * memory. The reason is that MOVS is emulated by the #VC handler by
+	 * splitting the move up into a read and a write and taking a nested #VC
+	 * exception on whatever of them is the MMIO access. Using string
+	 * instructions here would cause infinite nesting.
+	 */
 	switch (size) {
 	case 1:
-		if (get_user(d1, s))
+		if (__get_user(d1, s))
 			goto fault;
 		memcpy(buf, &d1, 1);
 		break;
 	case 2:
-		if (get_user(d2, s))
+		if (__get_user(d2, s))
 			goto fault;
 		memcpy(buf, &d2, 2);
 		break;
 	case 4:
-		if (get_user(d4, s))
+		if (__get_user(d4, s))
 			goto fault;
 		memcpy(buf, &d4, 4);
 		break;
 	case 8:
-		if (get_user(d8, s))
+		if (__get_user(d8, s))
 			goto fault;
 		memcpy(buf, &d8, 8);
 		break;
@@ -461,6 +479,29 @@ static enum es_result vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt
 /* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
 #include "sev-shared.c"
 
+static __always_inline void sev_es_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
+{
+	struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+	struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+	data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
+	ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
+
+	if (state->ghcb) {
+		/* Restore GHCB from Backup */
+		*ghcb = *state->ghcb;
+		data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
+		state->ghcb = NULL;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Invalidate the GHCB so a VMGEXIT instruction issued
+		 * from userspace won't appear to be valid.
+		 */
+		vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+		data->ghcb_active = false;
+	}
+}
+
 void noinstr __sev_es_nmi_complete(void)
 {
 	struct ghcb_state state;
@@ -1255,6 +1296,10 @@ static __always_inline void vc_forward_exception(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
 	case X86_TRAP_UD:
 		exc_invalid_op(ctxt->regs);
 		break;
+	case X86_TRAP_PF:
+		write_cr2(ctxt->fi.cr2);
+		exc_page_fault(ctxt->regs, error_code);
+		break;
 	case X86_TRAP_AC:
 		exc_alignment_check(ctxt->regs, error_code);
 		break;
@@ -1284,7 +1329,6 @@ static __always_inline bool on_vc_fallback_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
  */
 DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communication)
 {
-	struct sev_es_runtime_data *data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
 	irqentry_state_t irq_state;
 	struct ghcb_state state;
 	struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
@@ -1310,16 +1354,6 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communication)
 	 */
 
 	ghcb = sev_es_get_ghcb(&state);
-	if (!ghcb) {
-		/*
-		 * Mark GHCBs inactive so that panic() is able to print the
-		 * message.
-		 */
-		data->ghcb_active        = false;
-		data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
-
-		panic("Unable to handle #VC exception! GHCB and Backup GHCB are already in use");
-	}
 
 	vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
 	result = vc_init_em_ctxt(&ctxt, regs, error_code);