Merge drm/drm-fixes into drm-misc-fixes

Backmerging drm/drm-fixes for commit 3755d35 ("drm/panel: Select
DRM_DP_HELPER for DRM_PANEL_EDP").

Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>

Author: tdz

.mailmap

@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ Boris Brezillon <bbrezillon@kernel.org> <boris.brezillon@bootlin.com>
 Boris Brezillon <bbrezillon@kernel.org> <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com>
 Brian Avery <b.avery@hp.com>
 Brian King <brking@us.ibm.com>
+Brian Silverman <bsilver16384@gmail.com> <brian.silverman@bluerivertech.com>
 Changbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com> <changbin.du@gmail.com>
 Changbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com> <changbin.du@intel.com>
 Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> <chao2.yu@samsung.com>
@@ -79,6 +80,9 @@ Chris Chiu <chris.chiu@canonical.com> <chiu@endlessos.org>
 Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
 Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> <cborntra@de.ibm.com>
 Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> <borntrae@de.ibm.com>
+Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> <christian@brauner.io>
+Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> <christian.brauner@canonical.com>
+Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
 Christophe Ricard <christophe.ricard@gmail.com>
 Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
 Colin Ian King <colin.king@intel.com> <colin.king@canonical.com>
@@ -183,6 +187,8 @@ Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org> <jslaby@novell.com>
 Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org> <jslaby@suse.com>
 Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org> <jslaby@suse.cz>
 Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org> <xslaby@fi.muni.cz>
+Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org> <jszhang@marvell.com>
+Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org> <Jisheng.Zhang@synaptics.com>
 Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> <jhovold@gmail.com>
 Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> <johan@hovoldconsulting.com>
 John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
@@ -212,6 +218,7 @@ Koushik <raghavendra.koushik@neterion.com>
 Krishna Manikandan <quic_mkrishn@quicinc.com> <mkrishn@codeaurora.org>
 Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> <k.kozlowski.k@gmail.com>
 Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> <k.kozlowski@samsung.com>
+Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
 Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
 Kuogee Hsieh <quic_khsieh@quicinc.com> <khsieh@codeaurora.org>
 Leonardo Bras <leobras.c@gmail.com> <leonardo@linux.ibm.com>
@@ -329,6 +336,9 @@ Rémi Denis-Courmont <rdenis@simphalempin.com>
 Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@kernel.org> <ricardo@ribalda.com>
 Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@kernel.org> Ricardo Ribalda Delgado <ribalda@kernel.org>
 Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@kernel.org> <ricardo.ribalda@gmail.com>
+Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> <guro@fb.com>
+Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> <guroan@gmail.com>
+Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
 Ross Zwisler <zwisler@kernel.org> <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
 Rudolf Marek <R.Marek@sh.cvut.cz>
 Rui Saraiva <rmps@joel.ist.utl.pt>

CREDITS

@@ -895,6 +895,12 @@ S: 3000 FORE Drive
 S: Warrendale, Pennsylvania 15086
 S: USA
 
+N: Ludovic Desroches
+E: ludovic.desroches@microchip.com
+D: Maintainer for ARM/Microchip (AT91) SoC support
+D: Author of ADC, pinctrl, XDMA and SDHCI drivers for this platform
+S: France
+
 N: Martin Devera
 E: devik@cdi.cz
 W: http://luxik.cdi.cz/~devik/qos/

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-power

@@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ Description:
 			auto:            Charge normally, respect thresholds
 			inhibit-charge:  Do not charge while AC is attached
 			force-discharge: Force discharge while AC is attached
+			================ ====================================
 
 What:		/sys/class/power_supply/<supply_name>/technology
 Date:		May 2007

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-aspeed-uart-routing

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-What:		/sys/bus/platform/drivers/aspeed-uart-routing/*/uart*
+What:		/sys/bus/platform/drivers/aspeed-uart-routing/\*/uart\*
 Date:		September 2021
 Contact:	Oskar Senft <osk@google.com>
 		Chia-Wei Wang <chiawei_wang@aspeedtech.com>
@@ -9,15 +9,15 @@ Description:	Selects the RX source of the UARTx device.
 		depends on the selected file.
 
 		e.g.
-		cat /sys/bus/platform/drivers/aspeed-uart-routing/*.uart_routing/uart1
+		cat /sys/bus/platform/drivers/aspeed-uart-routing/\*.uart_routing/uart1
 		[io1] io2 io3 io4 uart2 uart3 uart4 io6
 
 		In this case, UART1 gets its input from IO1 (physical serial port 1).
 
 Users:		OpenBMC.  Proposed changes should be mailed to
 		openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org
 
-What:		/sys/bus/platform/drivers/aspeed-uart-routing/*/io*
+What:		/sys/bus/platform/drivers/aspeed-uart-routing/\*/io\*
 Date:		September 2021
 Contact:	Oskar Senft <osk@google.com>
 		Chia-Wei Wang <chiawei_wang@aspeedtech.com>

Documentation/accounting/psi.rst

@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ Triggers can be set on more than one psi metric and more than one trigger
 for the same psi metric can be specified. However for each trigger a separate
 file descriptor is required to be able to poll it separately from others,
 therefore for each trigger a separate open() syscall should be made even
-when opening the same psi interface file.
+when opening the same psi interface file. Write operations to a file descriptor
+with an already existing psi trigger will fail with EBUSY.
 
 Monitors activate only when system enters stall state for the monitored
 psi metric and deactivates upon exit from the stall state. While system is

Documentation/admin-guide/gpio/index.rst

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ gpio
     gpio-aggregator
     sysfs
     gpio-mockup
+    gpio-sim
 
 .. only::  subproject and html
 

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst

@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ privileged data touched during the speculative execution.
 Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
 conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
 execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
-See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
-:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[6] <spec_ref6>`
+:ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>` :ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
 
 Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
 ---------------------------------------
@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the
 speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the
 victim's data.
 
+Yet another variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
+Branch History Buffer (BHB) to speculatively steer an indirect branch
+to a specific Branch Target Buffer (BTB) entry, even if the entry isn't
+associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically,
+the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of
+Enhanced IBRS.
+
+Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via
+unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable
+unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines).
+For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use
+retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines).
+
 Attack scenarios
 ----------------
 
@@ -364,13 +377,15 @@ The possible values in this file are:
 
   - Kernel status:
 
-  ====================================  =================================
-  'Not affected'                        The processor is not vulnerable
-  'Vulnerable'                          Vulnerable, no mitigation
-  'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline'  Software-focused mitigation
-  'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline'      AMD-specific software mitigation
-  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS'           Hardware-focused mitigation
-  ====================================  =================================
+  ========================================  =================================
+  'Not affected'                            The processor is not vulnerable
+  'Mitigation: None'                        Vulnerable, no mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Retpolines'                  Use Retpoline thunks
+  'Mitigation: LFENCE'                      Use LFENCE instructions
+  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS'               Hardware-focused mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines'  Hardware-focused + Retpolines
+  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE'      Hardware-focused + LFENCE
+  ========================================  =================================
 
   - Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is
     used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only).
@@ -583,12 +598,13 @@ kernel command line.
 
 		Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
 
-		retpoline
-					replace indirect branches
-		retpoline,generic
-					google's original retpoline
-		retpoline,amd
-					AMD-specific minimal thunk
+                retpoline               auto pick between generic,lfence
+                retpoline,generic       Retpolines
+                retpoline,lfence        LFENCE; indirect branch
+                retpoline,amd           alias for retpoline,lfence
+                eibrs                   enhanced IBRS
+                eibrs,retpoline         enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
+                eibrs,lfence            enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
 
 		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 		spectre_v2=auto.
@@ -599,7 +615,7 @@ kernel command line.
 		spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
 		cannot be disabled.
 
-For spectre_v2_user see :doc:`/admin-guide/kernel-parameters`.
+For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
 
 Mitigation selection guide
 --------------------------
@@ -681,7 +697,7 @@ AMD white papers:
 
 .. _spec_ref6:
 
-[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Managing-Speculation-on-AMD-Processors.pdf>`_.
 
 ARM white papers:
 

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -5361,8 +5361,12 @@
 			Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
 
 			retpoline	  - replace indirect branches
-			retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline
-			retpoline,amd     - AMD-specific minimal thunk
+			retpoline,generic - Retpolines
+			retpoline,lfence  - LFENCE; indirect branch
+			retpoline,amd     - alias for retpoline,lfence
+			eibrs		  - enhanced IBRS
+			eibrs,retpoline   - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
+			eibrs,lfence      - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
 
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			spectre_v2=auto.

Documentation/admin-guide/mm/pagemap.rst

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ There are four components to pagemap:
     * Bit  56    page exclusively mapped (since 4.2)
     * Bit  57    pte is uffd-wp write-protected (since 5.13) (see
       :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/mm/userfaultfd.rst <userfaultfd>`)
-    * Bits 57-60 zero
+    * Bits 58-60 zero
     * Bit  61    page is file-page or shared-anon (since 3.5)
     * Bit  62    page swapped
     * Bit  63    page present

Documentation/arm/marvell.rst

@@ -266,10 +266,12 @@ Avanta family
 -------------
 
   Flavors:
+       - 88F6500
        - 88F6510
        - 88F6530P
        - 88F6550
        - 88F6560
+       - 88F6601
 
   Homepage:
 	https://web.archive.org/web/20181005145041/http://www.marvell.com/broadband/