Merge tag 'keys-next-6.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd

Pull keys update from Jarkko Sakkinen:
 "This contains only three fixes"

* tag 'keys-next-6.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
  keys: Fix grammar and formatting in 'struct key_type' comments
  keys: Replace deprecated strncpy in ecryptfs_fill_auth_tok
  keys: Remove redundant less-than-zero checks

Author: torvalds

include/linux/key-type.h

@@ -107,11 +107,14 @@ struct key_type {
 	 */
 	int (*match_preparse)(struct key_match_data *match_data);
 
-	/* Free preparsed match data (optional).  This should be supplied it
-	 * ->match_preparse() is supplied. */
+	/*
+	 * Free preparsed match data (optional).  This should be supplied if
+	 * ->match_preparse() is supplied.
+	 */
 	void (*match_free)(struct key_match_data *match_data);
 
-	/* clear some of the data from a key on revokation (optional)
+	/*
+	 * Clear some of the data from a key on revocation (optional).
 	 * - the key's semaphore will be write-locked by the caller
 	 */
 	void (*revoke)(struct key *key);

security/keys/big_key.c

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*payload) != sizeof(prep->payload.data));
 
-	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data)
+	if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Set an arbitrary quota */

security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c

@@ -54,8 +54,7 @@ int ecryptfs_fill_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
 	auth_tok->version = (((uint16_t)(major << 8) & 0xFF00)
 			     | ((uint16_t)minor & 0x00FF));
 	auth_tok->token_type = ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD;
-	strncpy((char *)auth_tok->token.password.signature, key_desc,
-		ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD_SIG_SIZE);
+	strscpy_pad(auth_tok->token.password.signature, key_desc);
 	auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes =
 		ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES;
 	/*

security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c

@@ -795,7 +795,7 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
 	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
 	int ret;
 
-	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
+	if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -856,7 +856,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 
 	if (key_is_negative(key))
 		return -ENOKEY;
-	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
+	if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	buf = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);

security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c

@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
 	int key_cmd;
 	size_t key_len;
 
-	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
+	if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	orig_datablob = datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	p = key->payload.data[0];
 	if (!p->migratable)
 		return -EPERM;
-	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
+	if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	orig_datablob = datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);

security/keys/user_defined.c

@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ int user_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	struct user_key_payload *upayload;
 	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
 
-	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
+	if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + datalen, GFP_KERNEL);