Merge branch 'for-5.16-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup

Pull cgroup fixes from Tejun Heo:
 "This contains the cgroup.procs permission check fixes so that they use
  the credentials at the time of open rather than write, which also
  fixes the cgroup namespace lifetime bug"

* 'for-5.16-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
  selftests: cgroup: Test open-time cgroup namespace usage for migration checks
  selftests: cgroup: Test open-time credential usage for migration checks
  selftests: cgroup: Make cg_create() use 0755 for permission instead of 0644
  cgroup: Use open-time cgroup namespace for process migration perm checks
  cgroup: Allocate cgroup_file_ctx for kernfs_open_file->priv
  cgroup: Use open-time credentials for process migraton perm checks

Author: torvalds

kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h

@@ -65,6 +65,25 @@ static inline struct cgroup_fs_context *cgroup_fc2context(struct fs_context *fc)
 	return container_of(kfc, struct cgroup_fs_context, kfc);
 }
 
+struct cgroup_pidlist;
+
+struct cgroup_file_ctx {
+	struct cgroup_namespace	*ns;
+
+	struct {
+		void			*trigger;
+	} psi;
+
+	struct {
+		bool			started;
+		struct css_task_iter	iter;
+	} procs;
+
+	struct {
+		struct cgroup_pidlist	*pidlist;
+	} procs1;
+};
+
 /*
  * A cgroup can be associated with multiple css_sets as different tasks may
  * belong to different cgroups on different hierarchies.  In the other

kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c

@@ -394,6 +394,7 @@ static void *cgroup_pidlist_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
 	 * next pid to display, if any
 	 */
 	struct kernfs_open_file *of = s->private;
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
 	struct cgroup *cgrp = seq_css(s)->cgroup;
 	struct cgroup_pidlist *l;
 	enum cgroup_filetype type = seq_cft(s)->private;
@@ -403,25 +404,24 @@ static void *cgroup_pidlist_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
 	mutex_lock(&cgrp->pidlist_mutex);
 
 	/*
-	 * !NULL @of->priv indicates that this isn't the first start()
-	 * after open.  If the matching pidlist is around, we can use that.
-	 * Look for it.  Note that @of->priv can't be used directly.  It
-	 * could already have been destroyed.
+	 * !NULL @ctx->procs1.pidlist indicates that this isn't the first
+	 * start() after open. If the matching pidlist is around, we can use
+	 * that. Look for it. Note that @ctx->procs1.pidlist can't be used
+	 * directly. It could already have been destroyed.
 	 */
-	if (of->priv)
-		of->priv = cgroup_pidlist_find(cgrp, type);
+	if (ctx->procs1.pidlist)
+		ctx->procs1.pidlist = cgroup_pidlist_find(cgrp, type);
 
 	/*
 	 * Either this is the first start() after open or the matching
 	 * pidlist has been destroyed inbetween.  Create a new one.
 	 */
-	if (!of->priv) {
-		ret = pidlist_array_load(cgrp, type,
-					 (struct cgroup_pidlist **)&of->priv);
+	if (!ctx->procs1.pidlist) {
+		ret = pidlist_array_load(cgrp, type, &ctx->procs1.pidlist);
 		if (ret)
 			return ERR_PTR(ret);
 	}
-	l = of->priv;
+	l = ctx->procs1.pidlist;
 
 	if (pid) {
 		int end = l->length;
@@ -449,7 +449,8 @@ static void *cgroup_pidlist_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
 static void cgroup_pidlist_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 {
 	struct kernfs_open_file *of = s->private;
-	struct cgroup_pidlist *l = of->priv;
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
+	struct cgroup_pidlist *l = ctx->procs1.pidlist;
 
 	if (l)
 		mod_delayed_work(cgroup_pidlist_destroy_wq, &l->destroy_dwork,
@@ -460,7 +461,8 @@ static void cgroup_pidlist_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 static void *cgroup_pidlist_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
 {
 	struct kernfs_open_file *of = s->private;
-	struct cgroup_pidlist *l = of->priv;
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
+	struct cgroup_pidlist *l = ctx->procs1.pidlist;
 	pid_t *p = v;
 	pid_t *end = l->list + l->length;
 	/*
@@ -504,10 +506,11 @@ static ssize_t __cgroup1_procs_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	/*
-	 * Even if we're attaching all tasks in the thread group, we only
-	 * need to check permissions on one of them.
+	 * Even if we're attaching all tasks in the thread group, we only need
+	 * to check permissions on one of them. Check permissions using the
+	 * credentials from file open to protect against inherited fd attacks.
 	 */
-	cred = current_cred();
+	cred = of->file->f_cred;
 	tcred = get_task_cred(task);
 	if (!uid_eq(cred->euid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) &&
 	    !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->uid) &&

kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c

@@ -3630,6 +3630,7 @@ static int cgroup_cpu_pressure_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 static ssize_t cgroup_pressure_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf,
 					  size_t nbytes, enum psi_res res)
 {
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
 	struct psi_trigger *new;
 	struct cgroup *cgrp;
 	struct psi_group *psi;
@@ -3648,7 +3649,7 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_pressure_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf,
 		return PTR_ERR(new);
 	}
 
-	psi_trigger_replace(&of->priv, new);
+	psi_trigger_replace(&ctx->psi.trigger, new);
 
 	cgroup_put(cgrp);
 
@@ -3679,12 +3680,16 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_cpu_pressure_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 static __poll_t cgroup_pressure_poll(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 					  poll_table *pt)
 {
-	return psi_trigger_poll(&of->priv, of->file, pt);
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
+
+	return psi_trigger_poll(&ctx->psi.trigger, of->file, pt);
 }
 
 static void cgroup_pressure_release(struct kernfs_open_file *of)
 {
-	psi_trigger_replace(&of->priv, NULL);
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
+
+	psi_trigger_replace(&ctx->psi.trigger, NULL);
 }
 
 bool cgroup_psi_enabled(void)
@@ -3811,24 +3816,43 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_kill_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf,
 static int cgroup_file_open(struct kernfs_open_file *of)
 {
 	struct cftype *cft = of_cft(of);
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx;
+	int ret;
 
-	if (cft->open)
-		return cft->open(of);
-	return 0;
+	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ctx->ns = current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns;
+	get_cgroup_ns(ctx->ns);
+	of->priv = ctx;
+
+	if (!cft->open)
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = cft->open(of);
+	if (ret) {
+		put_cgroup_ns(ctx->ns);
+		kfree(ctx);
+	}
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static void cgroup_file_release(struct kernfs_open_file *of)
 {
 	struct cftype *cft = of_cft(of);
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
 
 	if (cft->release)
 		cft->release(of);
+	put_cgroup_ns(ctx->ns);
+	kfree(ctx);
 }
 
 static ssize_t cgroup_file_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf,
 				 size_t nbytes, loff_t off)
 {
-	struct cgroup_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns;
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
 	struct cgroup *cgrp = of->kn->parent->priv;
 	struct cftype *cft = of_cft(of);
 	struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
@@ -3845,7 +3869,7 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_file_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf,
 	 */
 	if ((cgrp->root->flags & CGRP_ROOT_NS_DELEGATE) &&
 	    !(cft->flags & CFTYPE_NS_DELEGATABLE) &&
-	    ns != &init_cgroup_ns && ns->root_cset->dfl_cgrp == cgrp)
+	    ctx->ns != &init_cgroup_ns && ctx->ns->root_cset->dfl_cgrp == cgrp)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (cft->write)
@@ -4751,43 +4775,40 @@ void css_task_iter_end(struct css_task_iter *it)
 
 static void cgroup_procs_release(struct kernfs_open_file *of)
 {
-	if (of->priv) {
-		css_task_iter_end(of->priv);
-		kfree(of->priv);
-	}
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
+
+	if (ctx->procs.started)
+		css_task_iter_end(&ctx->procs.iter);
 }
 
 static void *cgroup_procs_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
 {
 	struct kernfs_open_file *of = s->private;
-	struct css_task_iter *it = of->priv;
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
 
 	if (pos)
 		(*pos)++;
 
-	return css_task_iter_next(it);
+	return css_task_iter_next(&ctx->procs.iter);
 }
 
 static void *__cgroup_procs_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos,
 				  unsigned int iter_flags)
 {
 	struct kernfs_open_file *of = s->private;
 	struct cgroup *cgrp = seq_css(s)->cgroup;
-	struct css_task_iter *it = of->priv;
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
+	struct css_task_iter *it = &ctx->procs.iter;
 
 	/*
 	 * When a seq_file is seeked, it's always traversed sequentially
 	 * from position 0, so we can simply keep iterating on !0 *pos.
 	 */
-	if (!it) {
+	if (!ctx->procs.started) {
 		if (WARN_ON_ONCE((*pos)))
 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-
-		it = kzalloc(sizeof(*it), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!it)
-			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-		of->priv = it;
 		css_task_iter_start(&cgrp->self, iter_flags, it);
+		ctx->procs.started = true;
 	} else if (!(*pos)) {
 		css_task_iter_end(it);
 		css_task_iter_start(&cgrp->self, iter_flags, it);
@@ -4838,9 +4859,9 @@ static int cgroup_may_write(const struct cgroup *cgrp, struct super_block *sb)
 
 static int cgroup_procs_write_permission(struct cgroup *src_cgrp,
 					 struct cgroup *dst_cgrp,
-					 struct super_block *sb)
+					 struct super_block *sb,
+					 struct cgroup_namespace *ns)
 {
-	struct cgroup_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns;
 	struct cgroup *com_cgrp = src_cgrp;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -4869,11 +4890,12 @@ static int cgroup_procs_write_permission(struct cgroup *src_cgrp,
 
 static int cgroup_attach_permissions(struct cgroup *src_cgrp,
 				     struct cgroup *dst_cgrp,
-				     struct super_block *sb, bool threadgroup)
+				     struct super_block *sb, bool threadgroup,
+				     struct cgroup_namespace *ns)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	ret = cgroup_procs_write_permission(src_cgrp, dst_cgrp, sb);
+	ret = cgroup_procs_write_permission(src_cgrp, dst_cgrp, sb, ns);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -4890,8 +4912,10 @@ static int cgroup_attach_permissions(struct cgroup *src_cgrp,
 static ssize_t __cgroup_procs_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf,
 				    bool threadgroup)
 {
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
 	struct cgroup *src_cgrp, *dst_cgrp;
 	struct task_struct *task;
+	const struct cred *saved_cred;
 	ssize_t ret;
 	bool locked;
 
@@ -4909,9 +4933,16 @@ static ssize_t __cgroup_procs_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf,
 	src_cgrp = task_cgroup_from_root(task, &cgrp_dfl_root);
 	spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock);
 
-	/* process and thread migrations follow same delegation rule */
+	/*
+	 * Process and thread migrations follow same delegation rule. Check
+	 * permissions using the credentials from file open to protect against
+	 * inherited fd attacks.
+	 */
+	saved_cred = override_creds(of->file->f_cred);
 	ret = cgroup_attach_permissions(src_cgrp, dst_cgrp,
-					of->file->f_path.dentry->d_sb, threadgroup);
+					of->file->f_path.dentry->d_sb,
+					threadgroup, ctx->ns);
+	revert_creds(saved_cred);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_finish;
 
@@ -6130,7 +6161,8 @@ static int cgroup_css_set_fork(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs)
 		goto err;
 
 	ret = cgroup_attach_permissions(cset->dfl_cgrp, dst_cgrp, sb,
-					!(kargs->flags & CLONE_THREAD));
+					!(kargs->flags & CLONE_THREAD),
+					current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns);
 	if (ret)
 		goto err;
 

tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/cgroup_util.c

@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ int cg_find_unified_root(char *root, size_t len)
 
 int cg_create(const char *cgroup)
 {
-	return mkdir(cgroup, 0644);
+	return mkdir(cgroup, 0755);
 }
 
 int cg_wait_for_proc_count(const char *cgroup, int count)