Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.13_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
 "A bunch of things accumulated for x86 in the last two weeks:

   - Fix guest vtime accounting so that ticks happening while the guest
     is running can also be accounted to it. Along with a consolidation
     to the guest-specific context tracking helpers.

   - Provide for the host NMI handler running after a VMX VMEXIT to be
     able to run on the kernel stack correctly.

   - Initialize MSR_TSC_AUX when RDPID is supported and not RDTSCP (virt
     relevant - real hw supports both)

   - A code generation improvement to TASK_SIZE_MAX through the use of
     alternatives

   - The usual misc and related cleanups and improvements"

* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.13_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  KVM: x86: Consolidate guest enter/exit logic to common helpers
  context_tracking: KVM: Move guest enter/exit wrappers to KVM's domain
  context_tracking: Consolidate guest enter/exit wrappers
  sched/vtime: Move guest enter/exit vtime accounting to vtime.h
  sched/vtime: Move vtime accounting external declarations above inlines
  KVM: x86: Defer vtime accounting 'til after IRQ handling
  context_tracking: Move guest exit vtime accounting to separate helpers
  context_tracking: Move guest exit context tracking to separate helpers
  KVM/VMX: Invoke NMI non-IST entry instead of IST entry
  x86/cpu: Remove write_tsc() and write_rdtscp_aux() wrappers
  x86/cpu: Initialize MSR_TSC_AUX if RDTSCP *or* RDPID is supported
  x86/resctrl: Fix init const confusion
  x86: Delete UD0, UD1 traces
  x86/smpboot: Remove duplicate includes
  x86/cpu: Use alternative to generate the TASK_SIZE_MAX constant

Author: torvalds

arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h

@@ -7,18 +7,9 @@
 
 /*
  * Despite that some emulators terminate on UD2, we use it for WARN().
- *
- * Since various instruction decoders/specs disagree on the encoding of
- * UD0/UD1.
  */
-
-#define ASM_UD0		".byte 0x0f, 0xff" /* + ModRM (for Intel) */
-#define ASM_UD1		".byte 0x0f, 0xb9" /* + ModRM */
 #define ASM_UD2		".byte 0x0f, 0x0b"
-
-#define INSN_UD0	0xff0f
 #define INSN_UD2	0x0b0f
-
 #define LEN_UD2		2
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG

arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h

@@ -588,6 +588,21 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_MC,	xenpv_exc_machine_check);
 #endif
 
 /* NMI */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+/*
+ * Special NOIST entry point for VMX which invokes this on the kernel
+ * stack. asm_exc_nmi() requires an IST to work correctly vs. the NMI
+ * 'executing' marker.
+ *
+ * On 32bit this just uses the regular NMI entry point because 32-bit does
+ * not have ISTs.
+ */
+DECLARE_IDTENTRY(X86_TRAP_NMI,		exc_nmi_noist);
+#else
+#define asm_exc_nmi_noist		asm_exc_nmi
+#endif
+
 DECLARE_IDTENTRY_NMI(X86_TRAP_NMI,	exc_nmi);
 #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
 DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_NMI,	xenpv_exc_nmi);

arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h

@@ -324,10 +324,6 @@ static inline int wrmsrl_safe(u32 msr, u64 val)
 	return wrmsr_safe(msr, (u32)val,  (u32)(val >> 32));
 }
 
-#define write_tsc(low, high) wrmsr(MSR_IA32_TSC, (low), (high))
-
-#define write_rdtscp_aux(val) wrmsr(MSR_TSC_AUX, (val), 0)
-
 struct msr *msrs_alloc(void);
 void msrs_free(struct msr *msrs);
 int msr_set_bit(u32 msr, u8 bit);

arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h

@@ -56,6 +56,39 @@ static inline void clear_page(void *page)
 
 void copy_page(void *to, void *from);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
+/*
+ * User space process size.  This is the first address outside the user range.
+ * There are a few constraints that determine this:
+ *
+ * On Intel CPUs, if a SYSCALL instruction is at the highest canonical
+ * address, then that syscall will enter the kernel with a
+ * non-canonical return address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.
+ * We avoid this particular problem by preventing anything
+ * from being mapped at the maximum canonical address.
+ *
+ * On AMD CPUs in the Ryzen family, there's a nasty bug in which the
+ * CPUs malfunction if they execute code from the highest canonical page.
+ * They'll speculate right off the end of the canonical space, and
+ * bad things happen.  This is worked around in the same way as the
+ * Intel problem.
+ *
+ * With page table isolation enabled, we map the LDT in ... [stay tuned]
+ */
+static inline unsigned long task_size_max(void)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+
+	alternative_io("movq %[small],%0","movq %[large],%0",
+			X86_FEATURE_LA57,
+			"=r" (ret),
+			[small] "i" ((1ul << 47)-PAGE_SIZE),
+			[large] "i" ((1ul << 56)-PAGE_SIZE));
+
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif	/* CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL */
+
 #endif	/* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION

arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h

@@ -55,30 +55,13 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
 #define __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT	(pgtable_l5_enabled() ? 56 : 47)
+/* See task_size_max() in <asm/page_64.h> */
 #else
 #define __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT	47
+#define task_size_max()		((_AC(1,UL) << __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT) - PAGE_SIZE)
 #endif
 
-/*
- * User space process size.  This is the first address outside the user range.
- * There are a few constraints that determine this:
- *
- * On Intel CPUs, if a SYSCALL instruction is at the highest canonical
- * address, then that syscall will enter the kernel with a
- * non-canonical return address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.
- * We avoid this particular problem by preventing anything
- * from being mapped at the maximum canonical address.
- *
- * On AMD CPUs in the Ryzen family, there's a nasty bug in which the
- * CPUs malfunction if they execute code from the highest canonical page.
- * They'll speculate right off the end of the canonical space, and
- * bad things happen.  This is worked around in the same way as the
- * Intel problem.
- *
- * With page table isolation enabled, we map the LDT in ... [stay tuned]
- */
-#define TASK_SIZE_MAX	((_AC(1,UL) << __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT) - PAGE_SIZE)
-
+#define TASK_SIZE_MAX		task_size_max()
 #define DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW	((1UL << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
 
 /* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c

@@ -1851,8 +1851,8 @@ static inline void setup_getcpu(int cpu)
 	unsigned long cpudata = vdso_encode_cpunode(cpu, early_cpu_to_node(cpu));
 	struct desc_struct d = { };
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
-		write_rdtscp_aux(cpudata);
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDPID))
+		wrmsr(MSR_TSC_AUX, cpudata, 0);
 
 	/* Store CPU and node number in limit. */
 	d.limit0 = cpudata;

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ unsigned int resctrl_cqm_threshold;
 static const struct mbm_correction_factor_table {
 	u32 rmidthreshold;
 	u64 cf;
-} mbm_cf_table[] __initdata = {
+} mbm_cf_table[] __initconst = {
 	{7,	CF(1.000000)},
 	{15,	CF(1.000000)},
 	{15,	CF(0.969650)},

arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c

@@ -524,6 +524,16 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi)
 		mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 }
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi_noist)
+{
+	exc_nmi(regs);
+}
+#endif
+#if IS_MODULE(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asm_exc_nmi_noist);
+#endif
+
 void stop_nmi(void)
 {
 	ignore_nmis++;

arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c

@@ -1865,9 +1865,6 @@ static bool slv_set_max_freq_ratio(u64 *base_freq, u64 *turbo_freq)
 	return true;
 }
 
-#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
-#include <asm/intel-family.h>
-
 #define X86_MATCH(model)					\
 	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(INTEL, 6,		\
 		INTEL_FAM6_##model, X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, NULL)

arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c

@@ -3710,25 +3710,7 @@ static noinstr void svm_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
 	unsigned long vmcb_pa = svm->current_vmcb->pa;
 
-	/*
-	 * VMENTER enables interrupts (host state), but the kernel state is
-	 * interrupts disabled when this is invoked. Also tell RCU about
-	 * it. This is the same logic as for exit_to_user_mode().
-	 *
-	 * This ensures that e.g. latency analysis on the host observes
-	 * guest mode as interrupt enabled.
-	 *
-	 * guest_enter_irqoff() informs context tracking about the
-	 * transition to guest mode and if enabled adjusts RCU state
-	 * accordingly.
-	 */
-	instrumentation_begin();
-	trace_hardirqs_on_prepare();
-	lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare(CALLER_ADDR0);
-	instrumentation_end();
-
-	guest_enter_irqoff();
-	lockdep_hardirqs_on(CALLER_ADDR0);
+	kvm_guest_enter_irqoff();
 
 	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
 		__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run(vmcb_pa);
@@ -3748,24 +3730,7 @@ static noinstr void svm_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vmload(__sme_page_pa(sd->save_area));
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * VMEXIT disables interrupts (host state), but tracing and lockdep
-	 * have them in state 'on' as recorded before entering guest mode.
-	 * Same as enter_from_user_mode().
-	 *
-	 * guest_exit_irqoff() restores host context and reinstates RCU if
-	 * enabled and required.
-	 *
-	 * This needs to be done before the below as native_read_msr()
-	 * contains a tracepoint and x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() calls
-	 * into world and some more.
-	 */
-	lockdep_hardirqs_off(CALLER_ADDR0);
-	guest_exit_irqoff();
-
-	instrumentation_begin();
-	trace_hardirqs_off_finish();
-	instrumentation_end();
+	kvm_guest_exit_irqoff();
 }
 
 static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)