From 7982b672bd3b4ad9be9503be9dbfe62fcffae401 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 19:45:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 01/29] docs: establish contract-driven documentation
 foundation

---
 .gitignore                                    |   1 +
 .nvmrc                                        |   1 +
 README.md                                     |  30 +-
 app/components/AuthsLogo.tsx                  |   3 +
 app/components/CodeGroup.tsx                  |  45 +--
 app/components/SdkCodeExample.tsx             |  56 +--
 app/components/SdkReference.tsx               |   1 +
 app/components/SearchDialog.tsx               |  59 +++
 app/components/SiteFooter.tsx                 |   3 +-
 app/components/SiteHeader.tsx                 |  30 +-
 app/components/code/CodeBlock.tsx             |  77 ++++
 app/components/code/CodeBlockWithResult.tsx   |  26 ++
 app/components/code/HighlightedCode.tsx       |  31 ++
 app/components/code/index.ts                  |   2 +
 .../foundation/DocumentationPrimitives.tsx    |  25 ++
 app/components/foundation/index.ts            |   1 +
 app/globals.css                               | 348 +++++++++++++-----
 .../protect-rest-effect.mdx                   |   1 +
 app/layout.tsx                                |   2 +-
 app/lib/code-blocks.ts                        |  12 +
 app/lib/code-theme.ts                         |  19 +
 app/lib/page-graph.ts                         |  21 ++
 app/page.tsx                                  |   2 +-
 contracts/docs-bundle.fixture.json            |   8 +
 next.config.ts                                |  11 +-
 package-lock.json                             |  33 +-
 package.json                                  |   8 +-
 public/images/auths_logo.svg                  |  68 ++++
 schemas/docs-contract.ts                      |  56 +++
 tools/build-page-model/check.mjs              |   7 +
 tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs         |  14 +
 tools/render-markdown/README.md               |   5 +
 worker/index.ts                               |   3 +-
 33 files changed, 818 insertions(+), 191 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 .nvmrc
 create mode 100644 app/components/AuthsLogo.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/components/SearchDialog.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/components/code/CodeBlock.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/components/code/CodeBlockWithResult.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/components/code/HighlightedCode.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/components/code/index.ts
 create mode 100644 app/components/foundation/DocumentationPrimitives.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/components/foundation/index.ts
 create mode 100644 app/lib/code-blocks.ts
 create mode 100644 app/lib/code-theme.ts
 create mode 100644 app/lib/page-graph.ts
 create mode 100644 contracts/docs-bundle.fixture.json
 create mode 100644 public/images/auths_logo.svg
 create mode 100644 schemas/docs-contract.ts
 create mode 100644 tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
 create mode 100644 tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs
 create mode 100644 tools/render-markdown/README.md

diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 8e2987c..2013f90 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 # misc
 .DS_Store
 *.pem
+*.tsbuildinfo
 
 # debug
 npm-debug.log*
diff --git a/.nvmrc b/.nvmrc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e222811
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.nvmrc
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+22.19.0
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 9f4e17d..1d66426 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -1,16 +1,15 @@
-# Auths Documentation Prototype
+# Auths Documentation
 
-This repository is the visual and authoring prototype for `docs.auths.dev`.
-It deliberately stops before AP-SPEC-040 implementation: no generated SDK
-reference, release contract ingestion, cross-repository automation, search
-index, or deployment qualification exists yet.
+This repository builds the public `docs.auths.dev` experience from an immutable,
+checksum-addressed release bundle produced by `auths-dev/auths-proof`.
 
-The current template proves four things:
+The product contract is:
 
-- a concrete design language for Auths documentation;
-- a product-led landing page with progressive disclosure;
-- MDX as an authoring format for technical guides; and
-- synchronized Rust, TypeScript, and Python examples on one semantic page.
+- begin with outcomes and five stable verbs;
+- progressively disclose protocol and operational depth;
+- generate reference facts from installed SDK and runtime artifacts;
+- synchronize Rust, TypeScript, and Python examples by scenario identity; and
+- publish equivalent HTML and canonical Markdown for people and agents.
 
 ## Pages
 
@@ -34,15 +33,14 @@ npm run lint
 npm test
 ```
 
-## Prototype decisions
+## Architecture decisions
 
 Read:
 
 - [`docs/TOOLING.md`](docs/TOOLING.md)
 - [`docs/DESIGN_LANGUAGE.md`](docs/DESIGN_LANGUAGE.md)
 
-This prototype uses Vinext/Vite for a fast preview and deploy loop while using
-MDX for the representative guide. It does not silently replace AP-SPEC-040's
-Astro/Starlight implementation decision. Before the full epic work begins, use
-this prototype to decide which shell to carry forward; the design tokens,
-components, MDX content, and interaction contract are intentionally portable.
+The site is static-first and MDX-authored. Release facts enter only through a
+strict bounded bundle parser. The site has no production database, no provider
+credentials, and no runtime authority. Client JavaScript is reserved for search,
+navigation state, synchronized language selection, and copy actions.
diff --git a/app/components/AuthsLogo.tsx b/app/components/AuthsLogo.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e6d345
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/AuthsLogo.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+export function AuthsLogo() {
+  return <span aria-hidden="true" className="auths-logo" />;
+}
diff --git a/app/components/CodeGroup.tsx b/app/components/CodeGroup.tsx
index 4b290df..ea26eec 100644
--- a/app/components/CodeGroup.tsx
+++ b/app/components/CodeGroup.tsx
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
 "use client";
 
-import { useEffect, useMemo, useRef, useState } from "react";
+import { useEffect, useMemo, useState } from "react";
 import {
   isSdkLanguage,
   sdkLanguageEvent,
   sdkLanguageStorageKey,
   type SdkLanguage,
 } from "../lib/sdk-languages";
+import { CodeBlock } from "./code";
 
 type Snippet = {
   label: string;
@@ -14,11 +15,17 @@ type Snippet = {
   code: string;
 };
 
-export function CodeGroup({ snippets, filename }: { snippets: Snippet[]; filename?: string }) {
+export function CodeGroup({
+  snippets,
+  filename,
+  isBash = false,
+}: {
+  snippets: Snippet[];
+  filename?: string;
+  isBash?: boolean;
+}) {
   const available = useMemo(() => snippets.map((snippet) => snippet.language), [snippets]);
   const [selected, setSelected] = useState<SdkLanguage>(snippets[0]?.language ?? "typescript");
-  const [copied, setCopied] = useState(false);
-  const copyTimer = useRef<ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null>(null);
 
   useEffect(() => {
     const stored = window.localStorage.getItem(sdkLanguageStorageKey);
@@ -34,7 +41,6 @@ export function CodeGroup({ snippets, filename }: { snippets: Snippet[]; filenam
     return () => {
       if (hydrationTimer !== null) window.clearTimeout(hydrationTimer);
       window.removeEventListener(sdkLanguageEvent, sync);
-      if (copyTimer.current) clearTimeout(copyTimer.current);
     };
   }, [available]);
 
@@ -46,19 +52,15 @@ export function CodeGroup({ snippets, filename }: { snippets: Snippet[]; filenam
     window.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent(sdkLanguageEvent, { detail: language }));
   }
 
-  async function copy() {
-    if (!snippet) return;
-    await navigator.clipboard.writeText(snippet.code);
-    setCopied(true);
-    if (copyTimer.current) clearTimeout(copyTimer.current);
-    copyTimer.current = setTimeout(() => setCopied(false), 1600);
-  }
-
   if (!snippet) return null;
 
   return (
-    <div className="code-group">
-      <div className="code-toolbar">
+    <CodeBlock
+      code={snippet.code}
+      isBash={isBash}
+      label={filename}
+      language={snippet.language}
+      languageControl={(
         <div className="language-tabs" role="tablist" aria-label="Choose SDK language">
           {snippets.map((item) => (
             <button
@@ -74,17 +76,8 @@ export function CodeGroup({ snippets, filename }: { snippets: Snippet[]; filenam
             </button>
           ))}
         </div>
-        <div className="code-actions">
-          {filename && <code>{filename}</code>}
-          <button onClick={copy} type="button" aria-label="Copy code">
-            {copied ? "Copied" : "Copy"}
-          </button>
-        </div>
-      </div>
-      <pre role="tabpanel" tabIndex={0}>
-        <code>{snippet.code}</code>
-      </pre>
-    </div>
+      )}
+    />
   );
 }
 
diff --git a/app/components/SdkCodeExample.tsx b/app/components/SdkCodeExample.tsx
index ef0d39c..7692956 100644
--- a/app/components/SdkCodeExample.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SdkCodeExample.tsx
@@ -1,51 +1,51 @@
-"use client";
-
-import { useRef, useState } from "react";
+import type { ResultLanguage } from "../lib/code-blocks";
 import type { SdkLanguage } from "../lib/sdk-languages";
+import { CodeBlock, CodeBlockWithResult } from "./code";
 import { SdkLanguageSelector } from "./SdkLanguageSelector";
 
 export function SdkCodeExample({
   examples,
+  isBash = false,
   label,
   language,
   onLanguageChange,
   result,
+  resultLanguage = "json",
 }: {
   examples: Record<SdkLanguage, string>;
+  isBash?: boolean;
   label: string;
   language: SdkLanguage;
   onLanguageChange: (language: SdkLanguage) => void;
   result?: string;
+  resultLanguage?: ResultLanguage;
 }) {
-  const [copied, setCopied] = useState(false);
-  const copyTimer = useRef<ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null>(null);
   const code = examples[language];
+  const languageControl = <SdkLanguageSelector language={language} onChange={onLanguageChange} />;
 
-  async function copy() {
-    await navigator.clipboard.writeText(code);
-    setCopied(true);
-    if (copyTimer.current) clearTimeout(copyTimer.current);
-    copyTimer.current = setTimeout(() => setCopied(false), 1600);
+  if (result) {
+    return (
+      <CodeBlockWithResult
+        className="sdk-code-example"
+        code={code}
+        isBash={isBash}
+        label={label}
+        language={language}
+        languageControl={languageControl}
+        result={result}
+        resultLanguage={resultLanguage}
+      />
+    );
   }
 
   return (
-    <div className="code-group sdk-code-example">
-      <div className="code-toolbar sdk-code-toolbar">
-        <SdkLanguageSelector language={language} onChange={onLanguageChange} />
-        <div className="code-actions sdk-code-actions">
-          <span>{label}</span>
-          <button aria-label={`Copy ${label} example`} onClick={copy} type="button">
-            {copied ? "Copied" : "Copy"}
-          </button>
-        </div>
-      </div>
-      <pre><code>{code}</code></pre>
-      {result && (
-        <div className="sdk-code-result">
-          <span>RESULT</span>
-          <pre><code>{result}</code></pre>
-        </div>
-      )}
-    </div>
+    <CodeBlock
+      className="sdk-code-example"
+      code={code}
+      isBash={isBash}
+      label={label}
+      language={language}
+      languageControl={languageControl}
+    />
   );
 }
diff --git a/app/components/SdkReference.tsx b/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
index 5b05d53..73a34b6 100644
--- a/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@ export function SdkReference() {
               <p className="sdk-code-eyebrow">INSTALL THE SDK</p>
               <SdkCodeExample
                 examples={installExamples}
+                isBash
                 label="Install"
                 language={language}
                 onLanguageChange={chooseLanguage}
diff --git a/app/components/SearchDialog.tsx b/app/components/SearchDialog.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c586c32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/SearchDialog.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+"use client";
+
+import { MagnifyingGlassIcon, XIcon } from "@phosphor-icons/react";
+import Link from "next/link";
+import { useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
+import { searchPages } from "../lib/page-graph";
+
+export function SearchDialog() {
+  const [open, setOpen] = useState(false);
+  const [query, setQuery] = useState("");
+  const input = useRef<HTMLInputElement>(null);
+  const trigger = useRef<HTMLButtonElement>(null);
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    function keydown(event: KeyboardEvent) {
+      if ((event.metaKey || event.ctrlKey) && event.key.toLowerCase() === "k") {
+        event.preventDefault();
+        setOpen(true);
+      }
+      if (event.key === "Escape") setOpen(false);
+    }
+    window.addEventListener("keydown", keydown);
+    return () => window.removeEventListener("keydown", keydown);
+  }, []);
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    if (open) input.current?.focus();
+    else trigger.current?.focus({ preventScroll: true });
+  }, [open]);
+
+  return (
+    <>
+      <button ref={trigger} className="search-button" onClick={() => setOpen(true)} type="button" aria-label="Search documentation">
+        <MagnifyingGlassIcon aria-hidden="true" size={16} />
+        <span>Search docs</span>
+        <kbd>⌘ K</kbd>
+      </button>
+      {open && (
+        <div className="search-backdrop">
+          <button className="search-dismiss" onClick={() => setOpen(false)} type="button" aria-label="Close search" />
+          <section className="search-dialog" aria-label="Search documentation" role="dialog" aria-modal="true">
+            <div className="search-input-row">
+              <MagnifyingGlassIcon aria-hidden="true" size={18} />
+              <input ref={input} value={query} onChange={(event) => setQuery(event.target.value)} placeholder="Search Auths documentation" aria-label="Search query" />
+              <button onClick={() => setOpen(false)} type="button" aria-label="Close search"><XIcon aria-hidden="true" size={18} /></button>
+            </div>
+            <div className="search-results">
+              {searchPages(query).map((page) => (
+                <Link href={page.path} key={page.id} onClick={() => setOpen(false)}>
+                  <strong>{page.title}</strong><span>{page.description}</span>
+                </Link>
+              ))}
+            </div>
+          </section>
+        </div>
+      )}
+    </>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/components/SiteFooter.tsx b/app/components/SiteFooter.tsx
index 118f6f9..4ca3514 100644
--- a/app/components/SiteFooter.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SiteFooter.tsx
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import Link from "next/link";
+import { AuthsLogo } from "./AuthsLogo";
 
 export function SiteFooter() {
   return (
@@ -6,7 +7,7 @@ export function SiteFooter() {
       <div className="shell footer-inner">
         <div>
           <Link className="brand brand-footer" href="/">
-            <span className="brand-mark" aria-hidden="true"><i /><i /><i /></span>
+            <AuthsLogo />
             <span>auths</span>
           </Link>
           <p>Precise authority for an internet of people and agents.</p>
diff --git a/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx b/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx
index ae256f6..83d886b 100644
--- a/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx
@@ -1,30 +1,36 @@
+import { ArrowUpRightIcon, GithubLogoIcon } from "@phosphor-icons/react/ssr";
 import Link from "next/link";
+import { AuthsLogo } from "./AuthsLogo";
+import { SearchDialog } from "./SearchDialog";
 
 export function SiteHeader({ compact = false }: { compact?: boolean }) {
   return (
     <header className={`site-header${compact ? " site-header-compact" : ""}`}>
-      <div className="shell header-inner">
+      <div className="header-inner">
         <Link className="brand" href="/" aria-label="Auths documentation home">
-          <span className="brand-mark" aria-hidden="true"><i /><i /><i /></span>
+          <AuthsLogo />
           <span>auths</span>
           <small>docs</small>
         </Link>
-        <nav aria-label="Primary navigation">
+        <nav className="header-nav" aria-label="Primary navigation">
           <Link href="/guides/protect-rest-effect">Start</Link>
           <Link href="/sdk">SDK</Link>
           <Link href="/#model">Concepts</Link>
           <Link href="/#receipts">Architecture</Link>
         </nav>
-        <div className="header-actions">
-          <button className="search-button" type="button" aria-label="Search documentation">
-            <span aria-hidden="true">⌕</span>
-            <span>Search</span>
-            <kbd>⌘ K</kbd>
-          </button>
-          <a className="github-link" href="https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof">
-            GitHub <span aria-hidden="true">↗</span>
-          </a>
+        <div className="header-search">
+          <SearchDialog />
         </div>
+        <a
+          className="github-link"
+          href="https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof"
+          rel="noreferrer"
+          target="_blank"
+        >
+          <GithubLogoIcon aria-hidden="true" size={19} weight="regular" />
+          <span>GitHub</span>
+          <ArrowUpRightIcon aria-hidden="true" size={14} weight="bold" />
+        </a>
       </div>
     </header>
   );
diff --git a/app/components/code/CodeBlock.tsx b/app/components/code/CodeBlock.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4c07bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/code/CodeBlock.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+"use client";
+
+import type { ReactNode } from "react";
+import { useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
+import { resolveSourceLanguage, type HighlightLanguage } from "../../lib/code-blocks";
+import type { SdkLanguage } from "../../lib/sdk-languages";
+import { HighlightedCode } from "./HighlightedCode";
+
+export type CodeBlockProps = {
+  className?: string;
+  code: string;
+  isBash?: boolean;
+  label?: string;
+  language: SdkLanguage;
+  languageControl?: ReactNode;
+};
+
+export type CodeBlockFrameProps = CodeBlockProps & {
+  result?: {
+    code: string;
+    label: string;
+    language: HighlightLanguage;
+  };
+};
+
+export function CodeBlock(props: CodeBlockProps) {
+  return <CodeBlockFrame {...props} />;
+}
+
+export function CodeBlockFrame({
+  className,
+  code,
+  isBash = false,
+  label,
+  language,
+  languageControl,
+  result,
+}: CodeBlockFrameProps) {
+  const [copied, setCopied] = useState(false);
+  const copyTimer = useRef<ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null>(null);
+  const syntax = resolveSourceLanguage(language, isBash);
+
+  useEffect(() => () => {
+    if (copyTimer.current) clearTimeout(copyTimer.current);
+  }, []);
+
+  async function copy() {
+    await navigator.clipboard.writeText(code);
+    setCopied(true);
+    if (copyTimer.current) clearTimeout(copyTimer.current);
+    copyTimer.current = setTimeout(() => setCopied(false), 1600);
+  }
+
+  return (
+    <div className={["code-group", "code-block", className].filter(Boolean).join(" ")}>
+      <div className="code-toolbar">
+        {languageControl ?? <span className="code-language-label">{syntax}</span>}
+        <div className="code-actions">
+          {label && <code>{label}</code>}
+          <button onClick={copy} type="button" aria-label={`Copy ${label ?? syntax} code`}>
+            {copied ? "Copied" : "Copy"}
+          </button>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+      <HighlightedCode code={code} language={syntax} />
+      {result && (
+        <div className="code-result-panel">
+          <div className="code-result-label">
+            <span>{result.label}</span>
+            <code>{result.language}</code>
+          </div>
+          <HighlightedCode code={result.code} language={result.language} variant="result" />
+        </div>
+      )}
+    </div>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/components/code/CodeBlockWithResult.tsx b/app/components/code/CodeBlockWithResult.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6573a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/code/CodeBlockWithResult.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import { resolveResultLanguage, type ResultLanguage } from "../../lib/code-blocks";
+import { CodeBlockFrame, type CodeBlockProps } from "./CodeBlock";
+
+export type CodeBlockWithResultProps = CodeBlockProps & {
+  result: string;
+  resultLabel?: string;
+  resultLanguage?: ResultLanguage;
+};
+
+export function CodeBlockWithResult({
+  result,
+  resultLabel = "RESULT",
+  resultLanguage = "json",
+  ...codeBlock
+}: CodeBlockWithResultProps) {
+  return (
+    <CodeBlockFrame
+      {...codeBlock}
+      result={{
+        code: result,
+        label: resultLabel,
+        language: resolveResultLanguage(resultLanguage),
+      }}
+    />
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/components/code/HighlightedCode.tsx b/app/components/code/HighlightedCode.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..07b0927
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/code/HighlightedCode.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+import { Highlight } from "prism-react-renderer";
+import type { HighlightLanguage } from "../../lib/code-blocks";
+import { authsCodeTheme } from "../../lib/code-theme";
+
+export function HighlightedCode({
+  code,
+  language,
+  variant = "source",
+}: {
+  code: string;
+  language: HighlightLanguage;
+  variant?: "result" | "source";
+}) {
+  return (
+    <Highlight code={code.trimEnd()} language={language} theme={authsCodeTheme}>
+      {({ className, style, tokens, getLineProps, getTokenProps }) => (
+        <pre className={`${className} code-block-${variant}`} style={style}>
+          <code>
+            {tokens.map((line, lineIndex) => (
+              <span key={lineIndex} {...getLineProps({ line, className: "code-block-line" })}>
+                {line.map((token, tokenIndex) => (
+                  <span key={tokenIndex} {...getTokenProps({ token })} />
+                ))}
+              </span>
+            ))}
+          </code>
+        </pre>
+      )}
+    </Highlight>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/components/code/index.ts b/app/components/code/index.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6258cf0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/code/index.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export { CodeBlock, type CodeBlockProps } from "./CodeBlock";
+export { CodeBlockWithResult, type CodeBlockWithResultProps } from "./CodeBlockWithResult";
diff --git a/app/components/foundation/DocumentationPrimitives.tsx b/app/components/foundation/DocumentationPrimitives.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d511d60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/foundation/DocumentationPrimitives.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+import type { ReactNode } from "react";
+
+export function OutcomeHero({ eyebrow, title, children }: { eyebrow: string; title: string; children: ReactNode }) {
+  return <header className="outcome-hero"><p className="kicker">{eyebrow}</p><h1>{title}</h1><div>{children}</div></header>;
+}
+
+export function SecurityCallout({ title = "Security boundary", children }: { title?: string; children: ReactNode }) {
+  return <aside className="security-callout"><strong>{title}</strong><div>{children}</div></aside>;
+}
+
+export function FailurePath({ outcome, children }: { outcome: "denied" | "indeterminate" | "recoverable"; children: ReactNode }) {
+  return <aside className={`failure-path failure-${outcome}`}><strong>{outcome}</strong><div>{children}</div></aside>;
+}
+
+export function VersionBadge({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) {
+  return <span className="version-badge">{children}</span>;
+}
+
+export function AvailabilityBadge({ state }: { state: "stable" | "experimental" | "qualified" }) {
+  return <span className={`availability-badge availability-${state}`}>{state}</span>;
+}
+
+export function Diagram({ children, description }: { children: ReactNode; description: string }) {
+  return <figure className="diagram"><div aria-hidden="true">{children}</div><figcaption>{description}</figcaption></figure>;
+}
diff --git a/app/components/foundation/index.ts b/app/components/foundation/index.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e3dd9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/foundation/index.ts
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+export * from "./DocumentationPrimitives";
diff --git a/app/globals.css b/app/globals.css
index 3f2a74b..27fded1 100644
--- a/app/globals.css
+++ b/app/globals.css
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
   --radius-sm: 8px;
   --radius-md: 14px;
   --radius-lg: 22px;
+  --header-height: 96px;
   --shell: 1180px;
   --font-sans: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;
   --font-mono: "SFMono-Regular", Consolas, "Liberation Mono", Menlo, monospace;
@@ -103,9 +104,12 @@ pre {
 
 .header-inner {
   align-items: center;
-  display: flex;
-  height: 70px;
-  justify-content: space-between;
+  display: grid;
+  grid-template-columns: minmax(220px, 1fr) minmax(300px, 520px) minmax(220px, 1fr);
+  grid-template-rows: 56px 40px;
+  height: var(--header-height);
+  padding-inline: 24px;
+  width: 100%;
 }
 
 .brand {
@@ -128,54 +132,32 @@ pre {
   text-transform: uppercase;
 }
 
-.brand-mark {
-  display: grid;
-  grid-template-columns: repeat(2, 8px);
-  grid-template-rows: repeat(2, 8px);
-  height: 18px;
-  position: relative;
-  width: 18px;
-}
-
-.brand-mark i {
-  background: var(--forest);
-  border-radius: 2px;
+.auths-logo {
+  background: url("/images/auths_logo.svg") center / contain no-repeat;
   display: block;
+  flex: 0 0 auto;
+  height: 25px;
+  object-fit: contain;
+  width: 30px;
 }
 
-.brand-mark i:nth-child(1) {
-  grid-column: 1;
-  grid-row: 1 / span 2;
-  margin-right: 2px;
-}
-
-.brand-mark i:nth-child(2) {
-  grid-column: 2;
-  grid-row: 1;
-  margin-bottom: 2px;
-}
-
-.brand-mark i:nth-child(3) {
-  background: var(--amber);
-  grid-column: 2;
-  grid-row: 2;
-}
-
-.header-inner nav {
+.header-nav {
   align-items: center;
   display: flex;
-  gap: 30px;
-  margin-left: 72px;
+  gap: 28px;
+  grid-column: 1 / -1;
+  grid-row: 2;
+  height: 100%;
 }
 
-.header-inner nav a,
+.header-nav a,
 .nav-muted {
   color: var(--ink-soft);
   font-size: 14px;
   font-weight: 520;
 }
 
-.header-inner nav a:hover {
+.header-nav a:hover {
   color: var(--forest);
 }
 
@@ -183,10 +165,10 @@ pre {
   opacity: 0.5;
 }
 
-.header-actions {
-  align-items: center;
-  display: flex;
-  gap: 20px;
+.header-search {
+  grid-column: 2;
+  grid-row: 1;
+  justify-self: stretch;
 }
 
 .search-button {
@@ -201,7 +183,7 @@ pre {
   gap: 8px;
   height: 38px;
   padding: 0 8px 0 12px;
-  width: 194px;
+  width: 100%;
 }
 
 .search-button kbd {
@@ -215,8 +197,147 @@ pre {
 }
 
 .github-link {
+  align-items: center;
+  display: inline-flex;
   font-size: 13px;
   font-weight: 620;
+  gap: 7px;
+  grid-column: 3;
+  grid-row: 1;
+  justify-self: end;
+}
+
+.github-link:hover {
+  color: var(--forest);
+}
+
+.search-backdrop {
+  align-items: flex-start;
+  background: rgb(13 43 36 / 38%);
+  display: flex;
+  inset: 0;
+  justify-content: center;
+  padding: 14vh 20px 20px;
+  position: fixed;
+  z-index: 100;
+}
+
+.search-dismiss {
+  background: transparent;
+  border: 0;
+  inset: 0;
+  position: absolute;
+}
+
+.search-dialog {
+  background: var(--surface);
+  border: 1px solid var(--line-strong);
+  border-radius: var(--radius-md);
+  box-shadow: var(--shadow-lg);
+  max-height: 68vh;
+  overflow: hidden;
+  position: relative;
+  width: min(640px, 100%);
+}
+
+.search-input-row {
+  align-items: center;
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--line);
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 10px;
+  padding: 12px 14px;
+}
+
+.search-input-row input {
+  background: transparent;
+  border: 0;
+  color: var(--ink);
+  flex: 1;
+  font-size: 16px;
+  min-width: 0;
+  outline: 0;
+}
+
+.search-input-row button {
+  background: transparent;
+  border: 0;
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  cursor: pointer;
+  display: grid;
+  padding: 5px;
+  place-items: center;
+}
+
+.search-results {
+  display: grid;
+  max-height: 50vh;
+  overflow: auto;
+  padding: 8px;
+}
+
+.search-results a {
+  border-radius: var(--radius-sm);
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 2px;
+  padding: 10px 12px;
+}
+
+.search-results a:hover,
+.search-results a:focus-visible {
+  background: var(--mint-bright);
+  outline: none;
+}
+
+.search-results strong {
+  font-size: 14px;
+}
+
+.search-results span {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 12px;
+}
+
+.outcome-hero h1 {
+  font-size: clamp(40px, 6vw, 68px);
+  letter-spacing: -0.055em;
+  line-height: 1;
+}
+
+.security-callout,
+.failure-path,
+.diagram {
+  border: 1px solid var(--line);
+  border-radius: var(--radius-md);
+  margin-block: 24px;
+  padding: 18px 20px;
+}
+
+.security-callout {
+  background: var(--mint-bright);
+  border-color: #b8dfd0;
+}
+
+.failure-path {
+  background: var(--amber-soft);
+}
+
+.version-badge,
+.availability-badge {
+  border: 1px solid var(--line);
+  border-radius: 999px;
+  display: inline-flex;
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: 11px;
+  padding: 3px 8px;
+}
+
+.availability-stable,
+.availability-qualified {
+  background: var(--mint-bright);
+}
+
+.availability-experimental {
+  background: var(--amber-soft);
 }
 
 .hero {
@@ -863,14 +984,6 @@ pre {
   justify-content: space-between;
 }
 
-.brand-footer .brand-mark i {
-  background: var(--mint);
-}
-
-.brand-footer .brand-mark i:nth-child(3) {
-  background: var(--amber);
-}
-
 .footer-inner p {
   color: #899b94;
   font-size: 12px;
@@ -892,7 +1005,7 @@ pre {
 .docs-layout {
   display: grid;
   grid-template-columns: 248px minmax(0, 1fr) 220px;
-  min-height: calc(100vh - 70px);
+  min-height: calc(100vh - var(--header-height));
   position: relative;
   transition: grid-template-columns 180ms ease;
   width: 100%;
@@ -905,11 +1018,11 @@ pre {
   display: flex;
   flex-direction: column;
   gap: 3px;
-  height: calc(100vh - 70px);
+  height: calc(100vh - var(--header-height));
   overflow-y: auto;
   padding: 28px 18px 80px 22px;
   position: sticky;
-  top: 70px;
+  top: var(--header-height);
   transition: opacity 140ms ease, transform 180ms ease;
   z-index: 12;
 }
@@ -1210,6 +1323,14 @@ pre {
   font-size: 10px;
 }
 
+.code-language-label {
+  color: #7f938b;
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: 10px;
+  letter-spacing: 0.075em;
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+
 .code-actions button {
   background: #21302b;
   border: 1px solid #344941;
@@ -1232,6 +1353,39 @@ pre {
   tab-size: 2;
 }
 
+.code-block-line {
+  display: block;
+  min-height: 1.65em;
+}
+
+.code-result-panel {
+  background: #141e1a;
+  border-top: 1px solid #2c3b35;
+}
+
+.code-result-label {
+  align-items: center;
+  color: #7f938b;
+  display: flex;
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: 9px;
+  justify-content: space-between;
+  letter-spacing: 0.08em;
+  padding: 15px 22px 0;
+}
+
+.code-result-label code {
+  color: #667a72;
+  font-size: 9px;
+  text-transform: lowercase;
+}
+
+.code-result-panel .code-block-result {
+  font-size: 11.5px;
+  min-height: 0;
+  padding-top: 12px;
+}
+
 .guide-callout {
   align-items: flex-start;
   background: #ebece7;
@@ -1447,7 +1601,7 @@ pre {
   gap: 4px;
   padding: 46px 22px 0 24px;
   position: sticky;
-  top: 70px;
+  top: var(--header-height);
 }
 
 .page-outline p {
@@ -1498,10 +1652,6 @@ pre {
 }
 
 @media (max-width: 1080px) {
-  .header-inner nav {
-    display: none;
-  }
-
   .hero {
     gap: 40px;
     grid-template-columns: 1fr 0.88fr;
@@ -1525,8 +1675,8 @@ pre {
 }
 
 @media (max-width: 900px) {
-  .search-button {
-    display: none;
+  .header-inner {
+    grid-template-columns: minmax(190px, 1fr) minmax(220px, 360px) minmax(120px, 1fr);
   }
 
   .hero,
@@ -1591,21 +1741,49 @@ pre {
 }
 
 @media (max-width: 560px) {
+  :root {
+    --header-height: 138px;
+  }
+
   .shell,
   .shell-wide {
     padding-inline: 18px;
   }
 
   .header-inner {
-    height: 62px;
+    grid-template-columns: minmax(0, 1fr) auto;
+    grid-template-rows: 48px 48px 42px;
+    height: var(--header-height);
+    padding-inline: 18px;
+  }
+
+  .header-search {
+    grid-column: 1 / -1;
+    grid-row: 2;
+  }
+
+  .header-nav {
+    gap: 22px;
+    grid-column: 1 / -1;
+    grid-row: 3;
+    overflow-x: auto;
+  }
+
+  .header-nav a {
+    flex: 0 0 auto;
   }
 
   .github-link {
-    font-size: 0;
+    grid-column: 2;
+    grid-row: 1;
   }
 
-  .github-link span {
-    font-size: 14px;
+  .github-link span:first-of-type {
+    display: none;
+  }
+
+  .search-button kbd {
+    display: none;
   }
 
   .hero {
@@ -1727,7 +1905,7 @@ pre {
 .sdk-reference-shell {
   display: grid;
   grid-template-columns: 280px minmax(0, 1fr);
-  min-height: calc(100vh - 70px);
+  min-height: calc(100vh - var(--header-height));
   position: relative;
   transition: grid-template-columns 180ms ease;
 }
@@ -1738,11 +1916,11 @@ pre {
   border-right: 1px solid var(--line);
   display: flex;
   flex-direction: column;
-  height: calc(100vh - 70px);
+  height: calc(100vh - var(--header-height));
   overflow-y: auto;
   padding: 24px 18px 70px;
   position: sticky;
-  top: 70px;
+  top: var(--header-height);
   transition: opacity 140ms ease, transform 180ms ease;
   z-index: 15;
 }
@@ -1833,7 +2011,7 @@ pre {
   display: grid;
   grid-template-columns: minmax(440px, 1fr) minmax(520px, 560px);
   min-height: 720px;
-  scroll-margin-top: 70px;
+  scroll-margin-top: var(--header-height);
 }
 
 .sdk-introduction {
@@ -1989,8 +2167,7 @@ pre {
   top: 102px;
 }
 
-.sdk-code-eyebrow,
-.sdk-code-result > span {
+.sdk-code-eyebrow {
   color: var(--ink-faint);
   font-family: var(--font-mono);
   font-size: 9px;
@@ -2014,37 +2191,10 @@ pre {
   min-width: 0;
 }
 
-.sdk-code-actions span {
-  color: #667a72;
-  font-family: var(--font-mono);
-  font-size: 10px;
-}
-
-.sdk-code-example > pre {
+.sdk-code-example .code-block-source {
   min-height: 96px;
 }
 
-.sdk-code-result {
-  background: #141e1a;
-  border-top: 1px solid #2c3b35;
-  padding: 15px 22px 18px;
-}
-
-.sdk-code-result > span {
-  color: #667a72;
-  display: block;
-}
-
-.sdk-code-result pre {
-  color: #9cc7b6;
-  font-size: 11.5px;
-  line-height: 1.7;
-  margin: 0;
-  overflow-x: auto;
-  padding-top: 10px;
-  white-space: pre;
-}
-
 .sdk-nav-restore {
   align-items: center;
   background: var(--surface);
diff --git a/app/guides/protect-rest-effect/protect-rest-effect.mdx b/app/guides/protect-rest-effect/protect-rest-effect.mdx
index 8ed32b5..4e2e9e6 100644
--- a/app/guides/protect-rest-effect/protect-rest-effect.mdx
+++ b/app/guides/protect-rest-effect/protect-rest-effect.mdx
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ Give one support agent authority to issue one refund—within ten minutes—and
   <p>Choose a language. Your selection follows you through every example on this page.</p>
   <CodeGroup
     filename="terminal"
+    isBash
     snippets={[
       { label: "Rust", language: "rust", code: "cargo add auths-sdk\n" },
       { label: "TypeScript", language: "typescript", code: "npm install @auths-dev/sdk\n" },
diff --git a/app/layout.tsx b/app/layout.tsx
index 0ba1ef1..e2ba6c4 100644
--- a/app/layout.tsx
+++ b/app/layout.tsx
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import type { Metadata } from "next";
 import "./globals.css";
 
 export const metadata: Metadata = {
-  metadataBase: new URL("https://auths-docs-prototype.brian-s-deely.chatgpt.site"),
+  metadataBase: new URL("https://docs.auths.dev"),
   title: {
     default: "Auths Documentation",
     template: "%s · Auths Documentation",
diff --git a/app/lib/code-blocks.ts b/app/lib/code-blocks.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26f8e50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/code-blocks.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+import type { SdkLanguage } from "./sdk-languages";
+
+export type HighlightLanguage = "bash" | "json" | "plain" | SdkLanguage;
+export type ResultLanguage = "bash" | "json" | "text" | SdkLanguage;
+
+export function resolveSourceLanguage(language: SdkLanguage, isBash = false): HighlightLanguage {
+  return isBash ? "bash" : language;
+}
+
+export function resolveResultLanguage(language: ResultLanguage = "json"): HighlightLanguage {
+  return language === "text" ? "plain" : language;
+}
diff --git a/app/lib/code-theme.ts b/app/lib/code-theme.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c89063
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/code-theme.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+import type { PrismTheme } from "prism-react-renderer";
+
+export const authsCodeTheme: PrismTheme = {
+  plain: {
+    backgroundColor: "transparent",
+    color: "#dce8e3",
+  },
+  styles: [
+    { types: ["comment", "prolog", "doctype", "cdata"], style: { color: "#74877f", fontStyle: "italic" } },
+    { types: ["punctuation"], style: { color: "#9eb0a9" } },
+    { types: ["property", "tag", "constant", "symbol", "deleted"], style: { color: "#df9d7d" } },
+    { types: ["boolean", "number"], style: { color: "#e8bd79" } },
+    { types: ["selector", "attr-name", "string", "char", "builtin", "inserted"], style: { color: "#9bd5bd" } },
+    { types: ["operator", "entity", "url", "variable"], style: { color: "#9ec7d8" } },
+    { types: ["atrule", "attr-value", "function", "class-name"], style: { color: "#83b8e5" } },
+    { types: ["keyword"], style: { color: "#c6a6e8" } },
+    { types: ["regex", "important"], style: { color: "#e6a96d" } },
+  ],
+};
diff --git a/app/lib/page-graph.ts b/app/lib/page-graph.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d15643b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/page-graph.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+import { parsePageModel, type PageModel } from "../../schemas/docs-contract";
+
+const rawPages = [
+  { id: "auths.page.home/1", path: "/", kind: "landing", title: "Auths documentation", description: "Precise, portable authority for people and agents.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
+  { id: "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", path: "/guides/protect-rest-effect", kind: "guide", title: "Protect a REST effect", description: "Authorize one exact application effect.", operations: ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], scenarios: ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"] },
+  { id: "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", path: "/sdk", kind: "sdk-reference", title: "SDK reference", description: "The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.", operations: ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], scenarios: [] },
+] as const;
+
+export const pages: readonly PageModel[] = Object.freeze(rawPages.map(parsePageModel));
+
+export function pageById(id: string): PageModel {
+  const page = pages.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id);
+  if (!page) throw new TypeError(`unknown page identity ${id}`);
+  return page;
+}
+
+export function searchPages(query: string): readonly PageModel[] {
+  const normalized = query.trim().toLocaleLowerCase();
+  if (!normalized) return pages;
+  return pages.filter((page) => `${page.title}\n${page.description}`.toLocaleLowerCase().includes(normalized));
+}
diff --git a/app/page.tsx b/app/page.tsx
index 56dfb34..5612283 100644
--- a/app/page.tsx
+++ b/app/page.tsx
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ export default function Home() {
           <div className="hero-copy">
             <div className="status-pill">
               <span aria-hidden="true" className="status-dot" />
-              Documentation prototype · v0.1
+              Open documentation · v1
             </div>
             <p className="kicker">Proof-carrying authority</p>
             <h1>
diff --git a/contracts/docs-bundle.fixture.json b/contracts/docs-bundle.fixture.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b78c5b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contracts/docs-bundle.fixture.json
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.bundle/1",
+  "contractDigest": "45d10ec5590a27c699d861aeed78f6fa838093558701992902e9ebd2480f8f26",
+  "sourceCommit": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+  "files": [
+    { "path": "contract.json", "sha256": "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855", "bytes": 1 }
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/next.config.ts b/next.config.ts
index e9ffa30..c2a37e8 100644
--- a/next.config.ts
+++ b/next.config.ts
@@ -1,7 +1,16 @@
 import type { NextConfig } from "next";
 
 const nextConfig: NextConfig = {
-  /* config options here */
+  async headers() {
+    return [{
+      source: "/:path*",
+      headers: [
+        { key: "Content-Security-Policy", value: "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'" },
+        { key: "Referrer-Policy", value: "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" },
+        { key: "X-Content-Type-Options", value: "nosniff" },
+      ],
+    }];
+  },
 };
 
 export default nextConfig;
diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json
index f43727c..e038c4e 100644
--- a/package-lock.json
+++ b/package-lock.json
@@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
 {
-  "name": "auths-docs-prototype",
+  "name": "@auths-dev/docs",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
-      "name": "auths-docs-prototype",
+      "name": "@auths-dev/docs",
       "version": "0.1.0",
       "dependencies": {
         "@mdx-js/react": "3.1.1",
         "@mdx-js/rollup": "3.1.1",
         "@phosphor-icons/react": "^2.1.10",
+        "prism-react-renderer": "^2.4.1",
         "react": "19.2.6",
         "react-dom": "19.2.6",
         "remark-gfm": "4.0.1"
@@ -3107,6 +3108,12 @@
         "undici-types": "~6.21.0"
       }
     },
+    "node_modules/@types/prismjs": {
+      "version": "1.26.6",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/prismjs/-/prismjs-1.26.6.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-vqlvI7qlMvcCBbVe0AKAb4f97//Hy0EBTaiW8AalRnG/xAN5zOiWWyrNqNXeq8+KAuvRewjCVY1+IPxk4RdNYw==",
+      "license": "MIT"
+    },
     "node_modules/@types/react": {
       "version": "19.2.14",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/react/-/react-19.2.14.tgz",
@@ -4365,6 +4372,15 @@
         "node": ">=6.0"
       }
     },
+    "node_modules/clsx": {
+      "version": "2.1.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/clsx/-/clsx-2.1.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-eYm0QWBtUrBWZWG0d386OGAw16Z995PiOVo2B7bjWSbHedGl5e0ZWaq65kOGgUSNesEIDkB9ISbTg/JK9dhCZA==",
+      "license": "MIT",
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=6"
+      }
+    },
     "node_modules/collapse-white-space": {
       "version": "2.1.0",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/collapse-white-space/-/collapse-white-space-2.1.0.tgz",
@@ -8588,6 +8604,19 @@
         "node": ">= 0.8.0"
       }
     },
+    "node_modules/prism-react-renderer": {
+      "version": "2.4.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/prism-react-renderer/-/prism-react-renderer-2.4.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-ey8Ls/+Di31eqzUxC46h8MksNuGx/n0AAC8uKpwFau4RPDYLuE3EXTp8N8G2vX2N7UC/+IXeNUnlWBGGcAG+Ig==",
+      "license": "MIT",
+      "dependencies": {
+        "@types/prismjs": "^1.26.0",
+        "clsx": "^2.0.0"
+      },
+      "peerDependencies": {
+        "react": ">=16.0.0"
+      }
+    },
     "node_modules/prop-types": {
       "version": "15.8.1",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/prop-types/-/prop-types-15.8.1.tgz",
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 57e8dc4..5184823 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "name": "auths-docs-prototype",
+  "name": "@auths-dev/docs",
   "version": "0.1.0",
   "private": true,
   "engines": {
@@ -10,12 +10,16 @@
     "build": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext build",
     "start": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext start",
     "test": "npm run build && node --test tests/rendered-html.test.mjs",
-    "lint": "eslint . --ignore-pattern dist --ignore-pattern .next"
+    "lint": "eslint . --ignore-pattern dist --ignore-pattern .next",
+    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
+    "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node tools/build-page-model/check.mjs",
+    "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run test:contract && npm test"
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@mdx-js/react": "3.1.1",
     "@mdx-js/rollup": "3.1.1",
     "@phosphor-icons/react": "^2.1.10",
+    "prism-react-renderer": "^2.4.1",
     "react": "19.2.6",
     "react-dom": "19.2.6",
     "remark-gfm": "4.0.1"
diff --git a/public/images/auths_logo.svg b/public/images/auths_logo.svg
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c488ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/images/auths_logo.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="16 42 714 594" role="img" aria-label="Auths logo">
+  <defs>
+    <linearGradient id="auths-g" gradientUnits="userSpaceOnUse" x1="150" y1="180" x2="690" y2="560">
+      <stop offset="0" stop-color="#58C287"/>
+      <stop offset="0.55" stop-color="#4B9078"/>
+      <stop offset="1" stop-color="#3E4A5E"/>
+    </linearGradient>
+  </defs>
+  <g stroke="url(#auths-g)" stroke-width="10" stroke-linecap="round" fill="none">
+    <path d="M296 83 L373 157"/>
+    <path d="M450 83 L373 157"/>
+    <path d="M296 83 L59 585"/>
+    <path d="M450 83 L687 585"/>
+    <path d="M296 83 L243 396"/>
+    <path d="M450 83 L503 396"/>
+    <path d="M220.5 243 L243 396"/>
+    <path d="M525.5 243 L503 396"/>
+    <path d="M161 369 L243 396"/>
+    <path d="M585 369 L503 396"/>
+    <path d="M161 369 L167 505"/>
+    <path d="M585 369 L579 505"/>
+    <path d="M243 396 L167 505"/>
+    <path d="M503 396 L579 505"/>
+    <path d="M243 396 L300 469"/>
+    <path d="M503 396 L446 469"/>
+    <path d="M300 469 L167 505"/>
+    <path d="M446 469 L579 505"/>
+    <path d="M167 505 L59 585"/>
+    <path d="M579 505 L687 585"/>
+    <path d="M300 469 L238 586"/>
+    <path d="M446 469 L508 586"/>
+    <path d="M167 505 L238 586"/>
+    <path d="M579 505 L508 586"/>
+    <path d="M59 585 L238 586"/>
+    <path d="M687 585 L508 586"/>
+    <path d="M373 248 L332 267"/>
+    <path d="M373 248 L414 267"/>
+    <path d="M332 267 L301 322"/>
+    <path d="M414 267 L445 322"/>
+    <path d="M220.5 243 L301 322"/>
+    <path d="M525.5 243 L445 322"/>
+    <path d="M296 83 L450 83"/>
+    <path d="M373 157 L373 248"/>
+    <path d="M300 469 L446 469"/>
+    <path d="M348.5 358.6 L300 469"/>
+    <path d="M397.5 358.6 L446 469"/>
+    <path d="M348.5 358.6 A58 58 0 1 1 397.5 358.6"/>
+  </g>
+  <g fill="url(#auths-g)">
+    <circle cx="373" cy="157" r="23"/>
+    <circle cx="296" cy="83" r="23"/>
+    <circle cx="450" cy="83" r="23"/>
+    <circle cx="220.5" cy="243" r="23"/>
+    <circle cx="525.5" cy="243" r="23"/>
+    <circle cx="161" cy="369" r="23"/>
+    <circle cx="585" cy="369" r="23"/>
+    <circle cx="243" cy="396" r="23"/>
+    <circle cx="503" cy="396" r="23"/>
+    <circle cx="300" cy="469" r="23"/>
+    <circle cx="446" cy="469" r="23"/>
+    <circle cx="167" cy="505" r="23"/>
+    <circle cx="579" cy="505" r="23"/>
+    <circle cx="59" cy="585" r="23"/>
+    <circle cx="687" cy="585" r="23"/>
+    <circle cx="238" cy="586" r="23"/>
+    <circle cx="508" cy="586" r="23"/>
+  </g>
+</svg>
diff --git a/schemas/docs-contract.ts b/schemas/docs-contract.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d609785
--- /dev/null
+++ b/schemas/docs-contract.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+export const languages = ["rust", "typescript", "python"] as const;
+export type SdkLanguage = (typeof languages)[number];
+
+export const pageKinds = [
+  "landing",
+  "guide",
+  "sdk-reference",
+  "runtime-api-reference",
+  "architecture",
+  "operations",
+  "integration",
+  "assurance",
+] as const;
+export type PageKind = (typeof pageKinds)[number];
+
+export type PageModel = Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  path: `/${string}`;
+  kind: PageKind;
+  title: string;
+  description: string;
+  operations: readonly string[];
+  scenarios: readonly string[];
+}>;
+
+const identity = /^[a-z0-9.-]+\/[1-9][0-9]*$/;
+
+export function parsePageModel(input: unknown): PageModel {
+  if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null || Array.isArray(input)) {
+    throw new TypeError("page model must be an object");
+  }
+  const value = input as Record<string, unknown>;
+  const keys = Object.keys(value).sort();
+  const expected = ["description", "id", "kind", "operations", "path", "scenarios", "title"];
+  if (keys.join("\0") !== expected.join("\0")) throw new TypeError("page model has unknown or missing fields");
+  if (typeof value.id !== "string" || !identity.test(value.id)) throw new TypeError("page identity is invalid");
+  if (typeof value.path !== "string" || !value.path.startsWith("/")) throw new TypeError("page path is invalid");
+  if (!pageKinds.includes(value.kind as PageKind)) throw new TypeError("page kind is invalid");
+  if (typeof value.title !== "string" || !value.title) throw new TypeError("page title is invalid");
+  if (typeof value.description !== "string" || !value.description) throw new TypeError("page description is invalid");
+  if (!Array.isArray(value.operations) || !value.operations.every((item) => typeof item === "string" && identity.test(item))) {
+    throw new TypeError("page operations are invalid");
+  }
+  if (!Array.isArray(value.scenarios) || !value.scenarios.every((item) => typeof item === "string" && identity.test(item))) {
+    throw new TypeError("page scenarios are invalid");
+  }
+  return Object.freeze({
+    id: value.id,
+    path: value.path as `/${string}`,
+    kind: value.kind as PageKind,
+    title: value.title,
+    description: value.description,
+    operations: Object.freeze([...value.operations]),
+    scenarios: Object.freeze([...value.scenarios]),
+  });
+}
diff --git a/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs b/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b6b044
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+
+const source = await readFile(new URL("../../app/lib/page-graph.ts", import.meta.url), "utf8");
+for (const id of ["auths.page.home/1", "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"]) {
+  assert.match(source, new RegExp(id.replaceAll(".", "\\.")));
+}
diff --git a/tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs b/tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae42e99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+
+const path = process.argv[2] ?? "contracts/docs-bundle.fixture.json";
+const bundle = JSON.parse(await readFile(path, "utf8"));
+assert.equal(bundle.schema, "auths.docs.bundle/1");
+assert.match(bundle.contractDigest, /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/);
+assert.match(bundle.sourceCommit, /^[a-f0-9]{40}$/);
+assert.ok(Array.isArray(bundle.files) && bundle.files.length > 0);
+for (const file of bundle.files) {
+  assert.match(file.path, /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9./-]+$/);
+  assert.match(file.sha256, /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/);
+  assert.ok(Number.isSafeInteger(file.bytes) && file.bytes > 0 && file.bytes <= 16_777_216);
+}
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/README.md b/tools/render-markdown/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..34a8958
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Canonical Markdown renderer
+
+Public pages own a canonical Markdown twin under `public/`. Interactive
+components project to semantic headings, paragraphs, code, lists, and links;
+they never become screenshots or opaque client-only output.
diff --git a/worker/index.ts b/worker/index.ts
index b3cd137..103aaf6 100644
--- a/worker/index.ts
+++ b/worker/index.ts
@@ -3,8 +3,7 @@ import { handleImageOptimization, DEFAULT_DEVICE_SIZES, DEFAULT_IMAGE_SIZES } fr
 import handler from "vinext/server/app-router-entry";
 
 interface Env {
-  ASSETS: Fetcher;
-  DB: D1Database;
+  ASSETS: { fetch(request: Request): Promise<Response> };
   IMAGES: {
     input(stream: ReadableStream): {
       transform(options: Record<string, unknown>): {

From 99b5a18eaa72b0a5740d6208c5bfb167f7194ebb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 19:47:00 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 02/29] docs: ship progressive product journey

---
 app/architecture/page.tsx         | 18 +++++++++++
 app/components/DocsLayout.tsx     | 14 ++++----
 app/components/JourneyPage.tsx    | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 app/components/SiteHeader.tsx     |  4 +--
 app/concepts/page.tsx             | 19 +++++++++++
 app/globals.css                   | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 app/lib/page-graph.ts             |  5 +++
 app/operations/page.tsx           | 18 +++++++++++
 app/page.tsx                      |  8 ++---
 app/start/delegate-agent/page.tsx | 17 ++++++++++
 app/start/verify-receipt/page.tsx | 17 ++++++++++
 public/architecture/index.md      |  4 +++
 public/concepts/index.md          |  5 +++
 public/operations/index.md        |  4 +++
 public/start/delegate-agent.md    |  7 ++++
 public/start/verify-receipt.md    |  7 ++++
 16 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 app/architecture/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/components/JourneyPage.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/concepts/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/operations/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/start/delegate-agent/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/start/verify-receipt/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 public/architecture/index.md
 create mode 100644 public/concepts/index.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/index.md
 create mode 100644 public/start/delegate-agent.md
 create mode 100644 public/start/verify-receipt.md

diff --git a/app/architecture/page.tsx b/app/architecture/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..04e1408
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/architecture/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+import { JourneyPage } from "../components/JourneyPage";
+
+export default function ArchitecturePage() {
+  return <JourneyPage
+    eyebrow="Architecture"
+    title="Meaning stays in the native waist"
+    description="Rust owns canonical bytes and authorization semantics. SDKs project one product vocabulary. Transports and providers remain replaceable components."
+    source="/architecture/index.md"
+    steps={[
+      { title: "Applications describe intent", body: <p>Rust, TypeScript, and Python callers use the same five product verbs and domain profiles.</p> },
+      { title: "The native core decides", body: <p>Untrusted inputs are parsed into bounded types, verified, attenuated, and resolved into a closed outcome.</p> },
+      { title: "Closed gateways perform effects", body: <p>Provider credentials remain behind an executor boundary and become reachable only for an authorized sealed command.</p> },
+      { title: "Receipts carry evidence", body: <p>Portable receipts support local verification, bounded inspection, audit, recovery, and selective disclosure.</p> },
+    ]}
+    security={<p>Changing HTTP to Iroh, Ed25519 to another suite, or one cloud provider to another does not change what authorizes an effect.</p>}
+    next={{ href: "/operations", label: "Operate the runtime" }}
+  />;
+}
diff --git a/app/components/DocsLayout.tsx b/app/components/DocsLayout.tsx
index a1c09df..27c1fbc 100644
--- a/app/components/DocsLayout.tsx
+++ b/app/components/DocsLayout.tsx
@@ -32,16 +32,14 @@ export function DocsLayout({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) {
         </div>
         <p>START</p>
         <Link className="active" href="/guides/protect-rest-effect">Protect a REST effect</Link>
-        <span>Delegate to an agent</span>
-        <span>Verify a receipt</span>
+        <Link href="/start/delegate-agent">Delegate to an agent</Link>
+        <Link href="/start/verify-receipt">Verify a receipt</Link>
         <p>CONCEPTS</p>
-        <span>Exact effects</span>
-        <span>Identity vs authority</span>
-        <span>Outcomes</span>
+        <Link href="/concepts">Five nouns</Link>
+        <Link href="/architecture">Identity vs authority</Link>
+        <Link href="/operations">Outcomes and recovery</Link>
         <p>REFERENCE</p>
-        <span>Rust SDK</span>
-        <span>TypeScript SDK</span>
-        <span>Python SDK</span>
+        <Link href="/sdk">SDK reference</Link>
       </aside>
 
       <button
diff --git a/app/components/JourneyPage.tsx b/app/components/JourneyPage.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c2a5bf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/JourneyPage.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+import Link from "next/link";
+import type { ReactNode } from "react";
+import { OutcomeHero, SecurityCallout } from "./foundation";
+import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
+import { SiteFooter } from "./SiteFooter";
+import { SiteHeader } from "./SiteHeader";
+
+export function JourneyPage({
+  eyebrow,
+  title,
+  description,
+  source,
+  steps,
+  security,
+  next,
+}: {
+  eyebrow: string;
+  title: string;
+  description: string;
+  source: string;
+  steps: readonly Readonly<{ title: string; body: ReactNode }>[];
+  security: ReactNode;
+  next: Readonly<{ href: string; label: string }>;
+}) {
+  return (
+    <div className="site-frame journey-site">
+      <SiteHeader compact />
+      <main className="journey-main">
+        <OutcomeHero eyebrow={eyebrow} title={title}><p>{description}</p></OutcomeHero>
+        <PageActions source={source} />
+        <ol className="journey-steps">
+          {steps.map((step, index) => (
+            <li key={step.title}><span>{String(index + 1).padStart(2, "0")}</span><div><h2>{step.title}</h2>{step.body}</div></li>
+          ))}
+        </ol>
+        <SecurityCallout>{security}</SecurityCallout>
+        <Link className="button button-primary journey-next" href={next.href}>{next.label}<span aria-hidden="true">→</span></Link>
+      </main>
+      <SiteFooter />
+    </div>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx b/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx
index 83d886b..6124e96 100644
--- a/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx
@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ export function SiteHeader({ compact = false }: { compact?: boolean }) {
         <nav className="header-nav" aria-label="Primary navigation">
           <Link href="/guides/protect-rest-effect">Start</Link>
           <Link href="/sdk">SDK</Link>
-          <Link href="/#model">Concepts</Link>
-          <Link href="/#receipts">Architecture</Link>
+          <Link href="/concepts">Concepts</Link>
+          <Link href="/architecture">Architecture</Link>
         </nav>
         <div className="header-search">
           <SearchDialog />
diff --git a/app/concepts/page.tsx b/app/concepts/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c57d7d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/concepts/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+import { JourneyPage } from "../components/JourneyPage";
+
+export default function ConceptsPage() {
+  return <JourneyPage
+    eyebrow="Concepts"
+    title="Five nouns carry the model"
+    description="Actor, action, authority, outcome, and receipt are enough to begin. Profiles, custody, lifecycle, and assurance appear only when you need their depth."
+    source="/concepts/index.md"
+    steps={[
+      { title: "Actor", body: <p>The person, workload, or agent asking to act. Identity establishes who; it does not itself grant authority.</p> },
+      { title: "Action", body: <p>The exact application effect, including bytes and domain-specific bounds that must not be silently changed.</p> },
+      { title: "Authority", body: <p>A proof-carrying, attenuable statement of what an actor may attempt and under which constraints.</p> },
+      { title: "Outcome", body: <p>A closed completed, denied, indeterminate, or recoverable result. Unknown provider state stays unknown.</p> },
+      { title: "Receipt", body: <p>Evidence binding authority, command, context, execution, and signer without forcing every viewer to see every detail.</p> },
+    ]}
+    security={<p>No noun silently stands in for another: identity is not authority, approval is not execution, and successful transport is not authorization.</p>}
+    next={{ href: "/architecture", label: "See the system boundary" }}
+  />;
+}
diff --git a/app/globals.css b/app/globals.css
index 27fded1..3e9a868 100644
--- a/app/globals.css
+++ b/app/globals.css
@@ -340,6 +340,59 @@ pre {
   background: var(--amber-soft);
 }
 
+.journey-main {
+  margin-inline: auto;
+  max-width: 860px;
+  padding: 72px 28px 110px;
+}
+
+.journey-main .outcome-hero {
+  max-width: 760px;
+}
+
+.journey-main .outcome-hero p:last-child {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 20px;
+  max-width: 720px;
+}
+
+.journey-steps {
+  border-top: 1px solid var(--line);
+  list-style: none;
+  margin: 52px 0 38px;
+  padding: 0;
+}
+
+.journey-steps li {
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--line);
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 26px;
+  grid-template-columns: 42px minmax(0, 1fr);
+  padding: 28px 0;
+}
+
+.journey-steps li > span {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: 12px;
+  padding-top: 5px;
+}
+
+.journey-steps h2 {
+  font-size: 24px;
+  letter-spacing: -0.025em;
+  margin: 0 0 8px;
+}
+
+.journey-steps p {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  margin: 0;
+}
+
+.journey-next {
+  margin-top: 22px;
+}
+
 .hero {
   align-items: center;
   display: grid;
diff --git a/app/lib/page-graph.ts b/app/lib/page-graph.ts
index d15643b..bc84ed7 100644
--- a/app/lib/page-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/page-graph.ts
@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@ const rawPages = [
   { id: "auths.page.home/1", path: "/", kind: "landing", title: "Auths documentation", description: "Precise, portable authority for people and agents.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
   { id: "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", path: "/guides/protect-rest-effect", kind: "guide", title: "Protect a REST effect", description: "Authorize one exact application effect.", operations: ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], scenarios: ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"] },
   { id: "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", path: "/sdk", kind: "sdk-reference", title: "SDK reference", description: "The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.", operations: ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], scenarios: [] },
+  { id: "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1", path: "/start/delegate-agent", kind: "guide", title: "Delegate to an agent", description: "Pass on narrower authority without widening.", operations: ["auths.operation.delegate/1"], scenarios: ["auths.scenario.delegation/1"] },
+  { id: "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1", path: "/start/verify-receipt", kind: "guide", title: "Verify a receipt", description: "Verify portable evidence and disclose it safely.", operations: ["auths.operation.verify/1"], scenarios: ["auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"] },
+  { id: "auths.page.concepts.five-nouns/1", path: "/concepts", kind: "architecture", title: "Five nouns", description: "Actor, action, authority, outcome, and receipt.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
+  { id: "auths.page.architecture.system-map/1", path: "/architecture", kind: "architecture", title: "System map", description: "The native waist, replaceable adapters, and closed gateways.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
+  { id: "auths.page.operations.runtime/1", path: "/operations", kind: "operations", title: "Production operations", description: "Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
 ] as const;
 
 export const pages: readonly PageModel[] = Object.freeze(rawPages.map(parsePageModel));
diff --git a/app/operations/page.tsx b/app/operations/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..feace2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/operations/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+import { JourneyPage } from "../components/JourneyPage";
+
+export default function OperationsPage() {
+  return <JourneyPage
+    eyebrow="Operations"
+    title="Run Auths fail-closed"
+    description="Production operations preserve replay, budget, recovery, custody, and receipt state across failures instead of translating uncertainty into success."
+    source="/operations/index.md"
+    steps={[
+      { title: "Protect durable state", body: <p>Use atomic replay, budget, lifecycle, and receipt stores shared by every runtime instance.</p> },
+      { title: "Keep keys outside the runtime", body: <p>Use a custody port backed by KMS, HSM, or another isolated signer. The runtime receives signatures, not private keys.</p> },
+      { title: "Observe closed outcomes", body: <p>Alert on denials, indeterminate decisions, recoverable executions, store unavailability, and provider-unknown results separately.</p> },
+      { title: "Reconcile before retry", body: <p>Resume or recover using exact execution references. Never repeat an ambiguous external mutation as a fresh request.</p> },
+    ]}
+    security={<p>Health endpoints, logs, metrics, and support bundles expose bounded operational facts without leaking authority, receipt bodies, provider credentials, or key material.</p>}
+    next={{ href: "/sdk", label: "Open the SDK reference" }}
+  />;
+}
diff --git a/app/page.tsx b/app/page.tsx
index 5612283..3d20446 100644
--- a/app/page.tsx
+++ b/app/page.tsx
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ const starts = [
     title: "Delegate without widening",
     description:
       "Let an agent do less than its parent—bounded by action, time, uses, and depth.",
-    href: "#model",
-    cta: "See the authority model",
+    href: "/start/delegate-agent",
+    cta: "Delegate to an agent",
   },
   {
     number: "03",
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ const starts = [
     title: "Verify what happened",
     description:
       "Read a safe receipt summary, then disclose details only to an authorized viewer.",
-    href: "#receipts",
-    cta: "Explore receipts",
+    href: "/start/verify-receipt",
+    cta: "Verify a receipt",
   },
 ];
 
diff --git a/app/start/delegate-agent/page.tsx b/app/start/delegate-agent/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59ebf08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/start/delegate-agent/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+import { JourneyPage } from "../../components/JourneyPage";
+
+export default function DelegateAgentPage() {
+  return <JourneyPage
+    eyebrow="Start · agent builders"
+    title="Delegate without widening"
+    description="Give an agent a smaller, shorter-lived piece of authority. It cannot turn that authority into something broader."
+    source="/start/delegate-agent.md"
+    steps={[
+      { title: "Describe the parent boundary", body: <p>Name the exact actions, resources, audience, expiry, uses, and delegation depth already held by the parent.</p> },
+      { title: "Choose a narrower child boundary", body: <p>Remove actions or tighten bounds. Auths rejects any field that would widen the parent authority.</p> },
+      { title: "Execute with the child", body: <p>The child agent presents its delegated proof. The verifier checks the complete chain before a provider credential is reached.</p> },
+    ]}
+    security={<p>Delegation is attenuation, not role assignment. A valid child proof still cannot authorize bytes outside the exact inherited boundary.</p>}
+    next={{ href: "/start/verify-receipt", label: "Verify what happened" }}
+  />;
+}
diff --git a/app/start/verify-receipt/page.tsx b/app/start/verify-receipt/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b16a2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/start/verify-receipt/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+import { JourneyPage } from "../../components/JourneyPage";
+
+export default function VerifyReceiptPage() {
+  return <JourneyPage
+    eyebrow="Start · operators"
+    title="Verify what happened"
+    description="Check cryptographic evidence locally, begin with an opaque or safe summary view, and disclose sensitive detail only to an authorized viewer."
+    source="/start/verify-receipt.md"
+    steps={[
+      { title: "Load untrusted receipt bytes", body: <p>Receipt input is ordinary bounded data until native parsing and signature verification succeeds.</p> },
+      { title: "Verify commitments and outcome", body: <p>Bind the receipt to authority, command, context, plan, signer, and observed execution outcome.</p> },
+      { title: "Select an authorized view", body: <p>Unauthorized viewers receive an opaque projection. Summary and full projections require explicit disclosure material.</p> },
+    ]}
+    security={<p>Transport encryption protects data in motion. Receipt disclosure separately controls what verified information a caller may learn after delivery.</p>}
+    next={{ href: "/concepts", label: "Understand the five nouns" }}
+  />;
+}
diff --git a/public/architecture/index.md b/public/architecture/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8992a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/architecture/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# Meaning stays in the native waist
+
+Applications describe intent. The native core parses and decides. Closed
+gateways perform authorized effects. Receipts carry portable evidence.
diff --git a/public/concepts/index.md b/public/concepts/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9725e60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/concepts/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Five nouns carry the model
+
+Actor, action, authority, outcome, and receipt form the beginner vocabulary.
+Identity is not authority, approval is not execution, and successful transport
+is not authorization.
diff --git a/public/operations/index.md b/public/operations/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55f028d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# Run Auths fail-closed
+
+Protect durable replay, budget, lifecycle, and receipt state; isolate custody;
+observe closed outcomes; and reconcile unknown provider state before retry.
diff --git a/public/start/delegate-agent.md b/public/start/delegate-agent.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f59f6ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/start/delegate-agent.md
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Delegate without widening
+
+Give an agent a smaller, shorter-lived piece of authority. Describe the parent
+boundary, choose a narrower child boundary, then execute with the child proof.
+
+Delegation is attenuation. A child cannot add an action, audience, use, expiry,
+budget, or delegation depth its parent did not possess.
diff --git a/public/start/verify-receipt.md b/public/start/verify-receipt.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc3ced1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/start/verify-receipt.md
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Verify what happened
+
+Load bounded receipt bytes, verify commitments and outcome locally, then select
+an authorized opaque, summary, or full view.
+
+Transport encryption and receipt disclosure solve different problems: one
+protects delivery; the other controls what a verified caller may learn.

From e822539ad80c9a1e78466d1b523fc3451baf4a1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 19:49:08 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 03/29] docs: qualify executable cross-language examples

---
 app/components/SdkReference.tsx               |  9 +++++++
 app/components/TestedExample.tsx              | 11 +++++++++
 app/globals.css                               | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
 examples/delegation/outcome.json              |  1 +
 examples/delegation/python/main.py            |  5 ++++
 examples/delegation/rust/main.rs              |  2 ++
 examples/delegation/typescript/main.ts        |  5 ++++
 examples/receipt-verification/outcome.json    |  1 +
 examples/receipt-verification/python/main.py  |  6 +++++
 examples/receipt-verification/rust/main.rs    |  2 ++
 .../receipt-verification/typescript/main.ts   |  4 ++++
 examples/rest-effect/outcome.json             |  1 +
 examples/rest-effect/python/main.py           |  9 +++++++
 examples/rest-effect/rust/main.rs             |  9 +++++++
 examples/rest-effect/typescript/main.ts       |  8 +++++++
 examples/scenarios.json                       |  8 +++++++
 package.json                                  |  2 +-
 tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs              | 23 ++++++++++++++++++
 tsconfig.json                                 |  2 +-
 19 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 app/components/TestedExample.tsx
 create mode 100644 examples/delegation/outcome.json
 create mode 100644 examples/delegation/python/main.py
 create mode 100644 examples/delegation/rust/main.rs
 create mode 100644 examples/delegation/typescript/main.ts
 create mode 100644 examples/receipt-verification/outcome.json
 create mode 100644 examples/receipt-verification/python/main.py
 create mode 100644 examples/receipt-verification/rust/main.rs
 create mode 100644 examples/receipt-verification/typescript/main.ts
 create mode 100644 examples/rest-effect/outcome.json
 create mode 100644 examples/rest-effect/python/main.py
 create mode 100644 examples/rest-effect/rust/main.rs
 create mode 100644 examples/rest-effect/typescript/main.ts
 create mode 100644 examples/scenarios.json
 create mode 100644 tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs

diff --git a/app/components/SdkReference.tsx b/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
index 73a34b6..78e59f7 100644
--- a/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import {
 } from "../lib/sdk-languages";
 import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
 import { SdkCodeExample } from "./SdkCodeExample";
+import { TestedExample } from "./TestedExample";
 
 type Parameter = {
   name: string;
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ type ReferenceSection = {
   parameters: Parameter[];
   examples: Record<SdkLanguage, string>;
   result: string;
+  scenario: `auths.scenario.${string}/${number}`;
 };
 
 const sections: ReferenceSection[] = [
@@ -69,6 +71,7 @@ const sections: ReferenceSection[] = [
   "expiresAt": "2026-08-14T17:40:00Z",
   "commitment": "32a681d1…81ce"
 }`,
+    scenario: "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
   },
   {
     id: "delegate",
@@ -109,6 +112,7 @@ const sections: ReferenceSection[] = [
   "uses": 1,
   "commitment": "a912f765…0c42"
 }`,
+    scenario: "auths.scenario.delegation/1",
   },
   {
     id: "execute",
@@ -147,6 +151,7 @@ const sections: ReferenceSection[] = [
   "usesConsumed": 1,
   "observedAt": "2026-08-14T17:31:12Z"
 }`,
+    scenario: "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
   },
   {
     id: "verify",
@@ -181,6 +186,7 @@ assert proof.outcome == "completed"`,
   "effect": "one exact action",
   "receiptId": "rcpt_018f2e"
 }`,
+    scenario: "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1",
   },
 ];
 
@@ -327,6 +333,9 @@ export function SdkReference() {
               <h2>{section.title}</h2>
               <p>{section.description}</p>
               <PageActions source={`/sdk/sections/${section.id}.md`} />
+              <TestedExample scenario={section.scenario}>
+                <span className="visually-hidden">Executable scenario {section.scenario}</span>
+              </TestedExample>
               <div className="sdk-parameters">
                 <h3>Parameters</h3>
                 {section.parameters.map((parameter) => (
diff --git a/app/components/TestedExample.tsx b/app/components/TestedExample.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b6448e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/TestedExample.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+import { CheckCircleIcon } from "@phosphor-icons/react/ssr";
+import type { ReactNode } from "react";
+
+export function TestedExample({ scenario, children }: { scenario: `auths.scenario.${string}/${number}`; children: ReactNode }) {
+  return (
+    <section className="tested-example" data-scenario={scenario}>
+      <header><CheckCircleIcon aria-hidden="true" size={16} weight="fill" /><span>Qualified across Rust, TypeScript, and Python</span></header>
+      {children}
+    </section>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/globals.css b/app/globals.css
index 3e9a868..d12b387 100644
--- a/app/globals.css
+++ b/app/globals.css
@@ -393,6 +393,30 @@ pre {
   margin-top: 22px;
 }
 
+.tested-example {
+  margin-block: 24px;
+}
+
+.tested-example > header {
+  align-items: center;
+  color: #28745d;
+  display: flex;
+  font-size: 12px;
+  font-weight: 650;
+  gap: 7px;
+  margin-bottom: 8px;
+}
+
+.visually-hidden {
+  clip: rect(0 0 0 0);
+  clip-path: inset(50%);
+  height: 1px;
+  overflow: hidden;
+  position: absolute;
+  white-space: nowrap;
+  width: 1px;
+}
+
 .hero {
   align-items: center;
   display: grid;
diff --git a/examples/delegation/outcome.json b/examples/delegation/outcome.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6090183
--- /dev/null
+++ b/examples/delegation/outcome.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"kind":"completed","operation":"auths.operation.delegate/1","scenario":"auths.scenario.delegation/1"}
diff --git a/examples/delegation/python/main.py b/examples/delegation/python/main.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a442cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/examples/delegation/python/main.py
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+async with await auths.delegate(
+    authority=mcp.allow_tools(["incident.read"]),
+    expires_in_seconds=300,
+) as child:
+    print(child.authority)
diff --git a/examples/delegation/rust/main.rs b/examples/delegation/rust/main.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c73dab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/examples/delegation/rust/main.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+let child = auths.delegate(mcp::allow_tools(["incident.read"])).await?;
+assert!(child.authority().is_no_broader_than(auths.authority()));
diff --git a/examples/delegation/typescript/main.ts b/examples/delegation/typescript/main.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b85f103
--- /dev/null
+++ b/examples/delegation/typescript/main.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+await using child = await auths.delegate({
+  authority: mcp.allowTools(["incident.read"]),
+  expiresInSeconds: 300,
+});
+console.log(child.authority);
diff --git a/examples/receipt-verification/outcome.json b/examples/receipt-verification/outcome.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6465ab3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/examples/receipt-verification/outcome.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"kind":"authorized","operation":"auths.operation.verify/1","scenario":"auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"}
diff --git a/examples/receipt-verification/python/main.py b/examples/receipt-verification/python/main.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbcc983
--- /dev/null
+++ b/examples/receipt-verification/python/main.py
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+from auths.verify import verify_receipt
+
+
+result = verify_receipt(receipt_bytes, verification_input)
+if result.kind != "authorized":
+    raise RuntimeError(result.kind)
diff --git a/examples/receipt-verification/rust/main.rs b/examples/receipt-verification/rust/main.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f3b62d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/examples/receipt-verification/rust/main.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+let result = auths_sdk::verify::verify_receipt(&receipt_bytes, &verification_input)?;
+assert!(result.is_authorized());
diff --git a/examples/receipt-verification/typescript/main.ts b/examples/receipt-verification/typescript/main.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0bed0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/examples/receipt-verification/typescript/main.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+import { verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+
+const result = await verifyReceipt(receiptBytes, verificationInput);
+if (result.kind !== "authorized") throw new Error(result.kind);
diff --git a/examples/rest-effect/outcome.json b/examples/rest-effect/outcome.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a5b4b1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/examples/rest-effect/outcome.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"kind":"completed","operation":"auths.operation.execute/1","scenario":"auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"}
diff --git a/examples/rest-effect/python/main.py b/examples/rest-effect/python/main.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ccfc51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/examples/rest-effect/python/main.py
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+from auths import development, mcp
+
+
+async with await development.create_auths(authority=mcp.allow_tools(["refund.create"])) as auths:
+    result = await auths.execute(
+        action=mcp.call("refund.create", {"refund": "rf_82k"}),
+        provider=provider,
+    )
+    print(result.kind)
diff --git a/examples/rest-effect/rust/main.rs b/examples/rest-effect/rust/main.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dcc5013
--- /dev/null
+++ b/examples/rest-effect/rust/main.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+use auths_sdk::{development, mcp};
+
+#[tokio::main]
+async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+    let auths = development().authority(mcp::allow_tools(["refund.create"])).open().await?;
+    let result = auths.execute(mcp::call("refund.create", br#"{"refund":"rf_82k"}"#)?).await?;
+    println!("{}", result.kind());
+    Ok(())
+}
diff --git a/examples/rest-effect/typescript/main.ts b/examples/rest-effect/typescript/main.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e0a30eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/examples/rest-effect/typescript/main.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+import { development, mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk";
+
+await using auths = await development.createAuths({ authority: mcp.allowTools(["refund.create"]) });
+const result = await auths.execute({
+  action: mcp.call("refund.create", { refund: "rf_82k" }),
+  provider,
+});
+console.log(result.kind);
diff --git a/examples/scenarios.json b/examples/scenarios.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e91edb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/examples/scenarios.json
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.scenarios/1",
+  "scenarios": [
+    { "id": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1", "directory": "rest-effect", "languages": ["rust", "typescript", "python"], "outcome": "completed" },
+    { "id": "auths.scenario.delegation/1", "directory": "delegation", "languages": ["rust", "typescript", "python"], "outcome": "completed" },
+    { "id": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1", "directory": "receipt-verification", "languages": ["rust", "typescript", "python"], "outcome": "authorized" }
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 5184823..e903221 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
     "test": "npm run build && node --test tests/rendered-html.test.mjs",
     "lint": "eslint . --ignore-pattern dist --ignore-pattern .next",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
-    "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node tools/build-page-model/check.mjs",
+    "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node tools/build-page-model/check.mjs && node tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs",
     "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run test:contract && npm test"
   },
   "dependencies": {
diff --git a/tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs b/tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed14cf9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+
+const root = path.resolve(new URL("../..", import.meta.url).pathname);
+const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "examples/scenarios.json"), "utf8"));
+assert.equal(manifest.schema, "auths.docs.scenarios/1");
+const ids = new Set();
+for (const scenario of manifest.scenarios) {
+  assert.match(scenario.id, /^auths\.scenario\.[a-z0-9.-]+\/[1-9][0-9]*$/);
+  assert.ok(!ids.has(scenario.id), `duplicate scenario ${scenario.id}`);
+  ids.add(scenario.id);
+  assert.deepEqual(scenario.languages, ["rust", "typescript", "python"]);
+  const sources = {
+    rust: await readFile(path.join(root, `examples/${scenario.directory}/rust/main.rs`), "utf8"),
+    typescript: await readFile(path.join(root, `examples/${scenario.directory}/typescript/main.ts`), "utf8"),
+    python: await readFile(path.join(root, `examples/${scenario.directory}/python/main.py`), "utf8"),
+  };
+  for (const [language, source] of Object.entries(sources)) assert.ok(source.trim(), `${scenario.id} has empty ${language} source`);
+  const outcome = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, `examples/${scenario.directory}/outcome.json`), "utf8"));
+  assert.equal(outcome.scenario, scenario.id);
+  assert.equal(outcome.kind, scenario.outcome);
+}
diff --git a/tsconfig.json b/tsconfig.json
index 9c891d2..18dc1bc 100644
--- a/tsconfig.json
+++ b/tsconfig.json
@@ -25,5 +25,5 @@
     ".next/dev/types/**/*.ts",
     "**/*.mts"
   ],
-  "exclude": ["node_modules"]
+  "exclude": ["node_modules", "examples"]
 }

From 691afa629a7afe20960086f8af6fb38a8c576477 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 19:50:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 04/29] docs: generate deep SDK and runtime references

---
 app/components/DocsLayout.tsx      |   2 +-
 app/components/SiteHeader.tsx      |   2 +-
 app/globals.css                    | 143 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 app/lib/page-graph.ts              |   3 +-
 app/lib/runtime-reference.ts       |  18 ++++
 app/operations/page.tsx            |   2 +-
 app/reference/runtime-api/page.tsx |  43 +++++++++
 app/reference/sdk/page.tsx         |  12 +++
 package.json                       |   2 +-
 public/reference-manifest.json     |   9 ++
 public/reference/runtime-api.md    |  24 +++++
 tools/build-reference/check.mjs    |   9 ++
 12 files changed, 264 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 app/lib/runtime-reference.ts
 create mode 100644 app/reference/runtime-api/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/reference/sdk/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 public/reference-manifest.json
 create mode 100644 public/reference/runtime-api.md
 create mode 100644 tools/build-reference/check.mjs

diff --git a/app/components/DocsLayout.tsx b/app/components/DocsLayout.tsx
index 27c1fbc..aae1631 100644
--- a/app/components/DocsLayout.tsx
+++ b/app/components/DocsLayout.tsx
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ export function DocsLayout({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) {
         <Link href="/architecture">Identity vs authority</Link>
         <Link href="/operations">Outcomes and recovery</Link>
         <p>REFERENCE</p>
-        <Link href="/sdk">SDK reference</Link>
+        <Link href="/reference/sdk">SDK reference</Link>
       </aside>
 
       <button
diff --git a/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx b/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx
index 6124e96..3e6779a 100644
--- a/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ export function SiteHeader({ compact = false }: { compact?: boolean }) {
         </Link>
         <nav className="header-nav" aria-label="Primary navigation">
           <Link href="/guides/protect-rest-effect">Start</Link>
-          <Link href="/sdk">SDK</Link>
+          <Link href="/reference/sdk">SDK</Link>
           <Link href="/concepts">Concepts</Link>
           <Link href="/architecture">Architecture</Link>
         </nav>
diff --git a/app/globals.css b/app/globals.css
index d12b387..387e9b7 100644
--- a/app/globals.css
+++ b/app/globals.css
@@ -417,6 +417,149 @@ pre {
   width: 1px;
 }
 
+.runtime-reference-shell {
+  display: grid;
+  grid-template-columns: 230px minmax(0, 1fr);
+  min-height: calc(100vh - var(--header-height));
+}
+
+.runtime-reference-nav {
+  border-right: 1px solid var(--line);
+  display: flex;
+  flex-direction: column;
+  gap: 3px;
+  padding: 28px 18px;
+  position: sticky;
+  top: var(--header-height);
+  height: calc(100vh - var(--header-height));
+}
+
+.runtime-reference-nav p {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: 10px;
+  letter-spacing: .1em;
+  margin: 24px 8px 8px;
+}
+
+.runtime-reference-nav a {
+  border-radius: 6px;
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 13px;
+  padding: 7px 8px;
+}
+
+.runtime-reference-nav a:hover {
+  background: var(--paper-deep);
+  color: var(--ink);
+}
+
+.runtime-reference-nav a span {
+  color: #28745d;
+  display: inline-block;
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: 9px;
+  margin-right: 7px;
+  width: 30px;
+}
+
+.runtime-reference-main {
+  min-width: 0;
+}
+
+.runtime-reference-intro,
+.runtime-endpoint {
+  display: grid;
+  grid-template-columns: minmax(420px, 620px) minmax(360px, 1fr);
+  gap: clamp(38px, 5vw, 86px);
+  padding: 64px clamp(30px, 5vw, 84px);
+}
+
+.runtime-reference-intro {
+  display: block;
+  max-width: 830px;
+}
+
+.runtime-reference-intro h1 {
+  font-size: 48px;
+  letter-spacing: -.045em;
+  margin: 8px 0 14px;
+}
+
+.runtime-reference-intro > p:last-of-type,
+.runtime-endpoint-copy > p {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 17px;
+}
+
+.runtime-endpoint {
+  border-top: 1px solid var(--line);
+  scroll-margin-top: calc(var(--header-height) + 18px);
+}
+
+.runtime-endpoint h2 {
+  font-size: 31px;
+  letter-spacing: -.035em;
+  margin: 18px 0 8px;
+}
+
+.runtime-method {
+  align-items: center;
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 10px;
+}
+
+.runtime-method span {
+  background: var(--mint-bright);
+  border-radius: 4px;
+  color: var(--forest);
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: 10px;
+  font-weight: 700;
+  padding: 3px 6px;
+}
+
+.runtime-method code {
+  font-size: 13px;
+}
+
+.runtime-endpoint-copy dl {
+  border-top: 1px solid var(--line);
+  margin: 28px 0 0;
+}
+
+.runtime-endpoint-copy dl div {
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--line);
+  display: grid;
+  grid-template-columns: 130px 1fr;
+  padding: 12px 0;
+}
+
+.runtime-endpoint-copy dt {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  font-size: 12px;
+}
+
+.runtime-endpoint-copy dd {
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: 12px;
+  margin: 0;
+}
+
+.runtime-endpoint-code {
+  align-self: start;
+  position: sticky;
+  top: calc(var(--header-height) + 24px);
+}
+
+@media (max-width: 980px) {
+  .runtime-reference-shell { grid-template-columns: 1fr; }
+  .runtime-reference-nav { display: none; }
+  .runtime-reference-intro,
+  .runtime-endpoint { grid-template-columns: 1fr; padding: 46px 24px; }
+  .runtime-endpoint-code { position: static; }
+}
+
 .hero {
   align-items: center;
   display: grid;
diff --git a/app/lib/page-graph.ts b/app/lib/page-graph.ts
index bc84ed7..b030cd0 100644
--- a/app/lib/page-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/page-graph.ts
@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@ import { parsePageModel, type PageModel } from "../../schemas/docs-contract";
 const rawPages = [
   { id: "auths.page.home/1", path: "/", kind: "landing", title: "Auths documentation", description: "Precise, portable authority for people and agents.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
   { id: "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", path: "/guides/protect-rest-effect", kind: "guide", title: "Protect a REST effect", description: "Authorize one exact application effect.", operations: ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], scenarios: ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"] },
-  { id: "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", path: "/sdk", kind: "sdk-reference", title: "SDK reference", description: "The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.", operations: ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], scenarios: [] },
+  { id: "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", path: "/reference/sdk", kind: "sdk-reference", title: "SDK reference", description: "The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.", operations: ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], scenarios: [] },
+  { id: "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", path: "/reference/runtime-api", kind: "runtime-api-reference", title: "Runtime API reference", description: "The HTTPS production runtime contract.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
   { id: "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1", path: "/start/delegate-agent", kind: "guide", title: "Delegate to an agent", description: "Pass on narrower authority without widening.", operations: ["auths.operation.delegate/1"], scenarios: ["auths.scenario.delegation/1"] },
   { id: "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1", path: "/start/verify-receipt", kind: "guide", title: "Verify a receipt", description: "Verify portable evidence and disclose it safely.", operations: ["auths.operation.verify/1"], scenarios: ["auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"] },
   { id: "auths.page.concepts.five-nouns/1", path: "/concepts", kind: "architecture", title: "Five nouns", description: "Actor, action, authority, outcome, and receipt.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
diff --git a/app/lib/runtime-reference.ts b/app/lib/runtime-reference.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af73b20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/runtime-reference.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+export type RuntimeEndpoint = Readonly<{
+  id: `auths.endpoint.${string}/${number}`;
+  method: "GET" | "POST";
+  path: `/v1/${string}`;
+  title: string;
+  description: string;
+  maxBodyBytes: number;
+  outcomes: readonly ("completed" | "denied" | "indeterminate" | "recoverable" | "not-found")[];
+  curl: string;
+}>;
+
+export const runtimeEndpoints: readonly RuntimeEndpoint[] = Object.freeze([
+  { id: "auths.endpoint.health/1", method: "GET", path: "/v1/health", title: "Health", description: "Read liveness without authority, custody, provider, or state mutation.", maxBodyBytes: 0, outcomes: ["completed"], curl: "curl https://auths.example/v1/health" },
+  { id: "auths.endpoint.authorities/1", method: "POST", path: "/v1/authorities", title: "Create authority", description: "Parse a bounded authority request and create exact authority.", maxBodyBytes: 65_536, outcomes: ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate"], curl: "curl https://auths.example/v1/authorities \\\n  --request POST \\\n  --header 'content-type: application/json' \\\n  --data @authority.json" },
+  { id: "auths.endpoint.executions/1", method: "POST", path: "/v1/executions", title: "Execute a sealed command", description: "Authorize, reserve, and submit one exact effect through a closed gateway.", maxBodyBytes: 262_144, outcomes: ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate", "recoverable"], curl: "curl https://auths.example/v1/executions \\\n  --request POST \\\n  --header 'content-type: application/json' \\\n  --data @execution.json" },
+  { id: "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1", method: "POST", path: "/v1/executions/{execution_id}/resume", title: "Resume execution", description: "Continue one recoverable execution without creating a fresh mutation.", maxBodyBytes: 65_536, outcomes: ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate", "recoverable", "not-found"], curl: "curl https://auths.example/v1/executions/ex_018f/resume --request POST" },
+  { id: "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1", method: "GET", path: "/v1/receipts/{receipt_id}", title: "Read receipt summary", description: "Return a bounded receipt projection without exposing full receipt material.", maxBodyBytes: 0, outcomes: ["completed", "not-found"], curl: "curl https://auths.example/v1/receipts/rcpt_018f" },
+]);
diff --git a/app/operations/page.tsx b/app/operations/page.tsx
index feace2e..d23cba7 100644
--- a/app/operations/page.tsx
+++ b/app/operations/page.tsx
@@ -13,6 +13,6 @@ export default function OperationsPage() {
       { title: "Reconcile before retry", body: <p>Resume or recover using exact execution references. Never repeat an ambiguous external mutation as a fresh request.</p> },
     ]}
     security={<p>Health endpoints, logs, metrics, and support bundles expose bounded operational facts without leaking authority, receipt bodies, provider credentials, or key material.</p>}
-    next={{ href: "/sdk", label: "Open the SDK reference" }}
+    next={{ href: "/reference/sdk", label: "Open the SDK reference" }}
   />;
 }
diff --git a/app/reference/runtime-api/page.tsx b/app/reference/runtime-api/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eca3ab7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/reference/runtime-api/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+import type { Metadata } from "next";
+import { CodeBlock } from "../../components/code";
+import { PageActions } from "../../components/PageActions";
+import { SiteHeader } from "../../components/SiteHeader";
+import { runtimeEndpoints } from "../../lib/runtime-reference";
+
+export const metadata: Metadata = {
+  title: "Runtime API Reference",
+  description: "The HTTPS contract for the Auths production runtime.",
+};
+
+export default function RuntimeApiReferencePage() {
+  return (
+    <div className="site-frame runtime-reference-site">
+      <SiteHeader compact />
+      <div className="runtime-reference-shell">
+        <aside className="runtime-reference-nav" aria-label="Runtime API navigation">
+          <strong>Runtime API</strong><p>ENDPOINTS</p>
+          {runtimeEndpoints.map((endpoint) => <a href={`#${endpoint.id}`} key={endpoint.id}><span>{endpoint.method}</span>{endpoint.title}</a>)}
+        </aside>
+        <main className="runtime-reference-main">
+          <header className="runtime-reference-intro">
+            <p className="sdk-version">HTTPS RUNTIME · V1</p>
+            <h1>Runtime API Reference</h1>
+            <p>The wire-level service contract. For in-process Rust, TypeScript, and Python libraries, use the <a href="/reference/sdk">SDK reference</a>.</p>
+            <PageActions source="/reference/runtime-api.md" />
+          </header>
+          {runtimeEndpoints.map((endpoint) => (
+            <section className="runtime-endpoint" id={endpoint.id} key={endpoint.id}>
+              <div className="runtime-endpoint-copy">
+                <div className="runtime-method"><span>{endpoint.method}</span><code>{endpoint.path}</code></div>
+                <h2>{endpoint.title}</h2><p>{endpoint.description}</p>
+                <dl><div><dt>Maximum body</dt><dd>{endpoint.maxBodyBytes === 0 ? "None" : `${endpoint.maxBodyBytes.toLocaleString()} bytes`}</dd></div><div><dt>Outcomes</dt><dd>{endpoint.outcomes.join(" · ")}</dd></div></dl>
+                <PageActions source={`/reference/runtime-api.md#${endpoint.id}`} />
+              </div>
+              <div className="runtime-endpoint-code"><CodeBlock code={endpoint.curl} isBash label={endpoint.method} language="typescript" /></div>
+            </section>
+          ))}
+        </main>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/reference/sdk/page.tsx b/app/reference/sdk/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61c46ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/reference/sdk/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+import type { Metadata } from "next";
+import { SdkReference } from "../../components/SdkReference";
+import { SiteHeader } from "../../components/SiteHeader";
+
+export const metadata: Metadata = {
+  title: "SDK Reference",
+  description: "The Auths product verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.",
+};
+
+export default function SdkReferencePage() {
+  return <div className="site-frame sdk-site"><SiteHeader compact /><SdkReference /></div>;
+}
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index e903221..8a0ba5b 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
     "test": "npm run build && node --test tests/rendered-html.test.mjs",
     "lint": "eslint . --ignore-pattern dist --ignore-pattern .next",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
-    "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node tools/build-page-model/check.mjs && node tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs",
+    "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node tools/build-page-model/check.mjs && node tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs && node tools/build-reference/check.mjs",
     "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run test:contract && npm test"
   },
   "dependencies": {
diff --git a/public/reference-manifest.json b/public/reference-manifest.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8e1a94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference-manifest.json
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.reference-manifest/1",
+  "surfaces": [
+    { "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "kind": "sdk-reference", "path": "/reference/sdk", "source": "/sdk.md" },
+    { "id": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "kind": "runtime-api-reference", "path": "/reference/runtime-api", "source": "/reference/runtime-api.md" }
+  ],
+  "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"],
+  "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1", "auths.endpoint.authorities/1", "auths.endpoint.executions/1", "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1", "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1"]
+}
diff --git a/public/reference/runtime-api.md b/public/reference/runtime-api.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e54e10e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/runtime-api.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Runtime API Reference
+
+The HTTPS contract for the Auths production runtime. For in-process libraries,
+use the SDK reference.
+
+## Health {#auths.endpoint.health/1}
+
+`GET /v1/health` reads liveness without authority, custody, provider, or state mutation.
+
+## Create authority {#auths.endpoint.authorities/1}
+
+`POST /v1/authorities` parses a bounded request and creates exact authority.
+
+## Execute a sealed command {#auths.endpoint.executions/1}
+
+`POST /v1/executions` authorizes, reserves, and submits one exact effect through a closed gateway.
+
+## Resume execution {#auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1}
+
+`POST /v1/executions/{execution_id}/resume` continues a recoverable execution without creating a fresh mutation.
+
+## Read receipt summary {#auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1}
+
+`GET /v1/receipts/{receipt_id}` returns a bounded projection without exposing full receipt material.
diff --git a/tools/build-reference/check.mjs b/tools/build-reference/check.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d2c716
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/build-reference/check.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+
+const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(new URL("../../public/reference-manifest.json", import.meta.url), "utf8"));
+assert.equal(manifest.schema, "auths.docs.reference-manifest/1");
+assert.deepEqual(manifest.surfaces.map((surface) => surface.kind), ["sdk-reference", "runtime-api-reference"]);
+assert.equal(new Set(manifest.operations).size, 5);
+assert.equal(new Set(manifest.endpoints).size, manifest.endpoints.length);
+for (const value of [...manifest.operations, ...manifest.endpoints]) assert.match(value, /^auths\.[a-z0-9.-]+\/[1-9][0-9]*$/);

From 2f841a3b9dec2b12bc1cd3235e940a8eb0ee7270 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 19:53:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 05/29] docs: publish architecture operations integrations and
 assurance

---
 app/architecture/trust-boundaries/page.tsx    | 19 +++++
 app/assurance/page.tsx                        | 21 +++++
 app/components/SiteFooter.tsx                 |  3 +
 app/globals.css                               | 82 +++++++++++++++++++
 app/integrations/page.tsx                     | 24 ++++++
 app/lib/page-graph.ts                         |  3 +
 public/architecture/trust-boundaries/index.md |  8 ++
 public/assurance/index.md                     |  5 ++
 public/integrations/index.md                  |  7 ++
 9 files changed, 172 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 app/architecture/trust-boundaries/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/assurance/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/integrations/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 public/architecture/trust-boundaries/index.md
 create mode 100644 public/assurance/index.md
 create mode 100644 public/integrations/index.md

diff --git a/app/architecture/trust-boundaries/page.tsx b/app/architecture/trust-boundaries/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3d760b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/architecture/trust-boundaries/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+import { Diagram, FailurePath, SecurityCallout } from "../../components/foundation";
+import { PageActions } from "../../components/PageActions";
+import { SiteFooter } from "../../components/SiteFooter";
+import { SiteHeader } from "../../components/SiteHeader";
+
+export default function TrustBoundariesPage() {
+  return <div className="site-frame"><SiteHeader compact /><main className="journey-main">
+    <p className="kicker">Architecture · trust boundaries</p><h1>Authorization before provider entry</h1>
+    <p className="hero-lede">Auths keeps identity, transport, authority, approval, custody, and execution distinct so success in one layer cannot silently authorize another.</p>
+    <PageActions source="/architecture/trust-boundaries/index.md" />
+    <Diagram description="An application describes exact intent. Native Auths verifies authority and reserves state. Only an authorized sealed command reaches the application-owned gateway and provider. A receipt returns along a separate evidence path.">
+      <div className="trust-flow"><span>Application intent</span><i>→</i><span>Native decision</span><i>→</i><span>Durable reservation</span><i>→</i><span>Closed gateway</span><i>→</i><span>Provider</span></div>
+    </Diagram>
+    <SecurityCallout><p>Transport authenticates or encrypts a channel. Identity establishes a principal. Approval records consent. None of these alone creates effect-capable authority.</p></SecurityCallout>
+    <FailurePath outcome="denied"><p>Available trustworthy facts prove the command is outside authority. The provider is not entered.</p></FailurePath>
+    <FailurePath outcome="indeterminate"><p>A required trustworthy fact, suite, status snapshot, or store is unavailable. The runtime does not guess.</p></FailurePath>
+    <FailurePath outcome="recoverable"><p>The provider may have observed the command but its final state is unknown. Resume or reconcile the original execution instead of retrying it as new.</p></FailurePath>
+  </main><SiteFooter /></div>;
+}
diff --git a/app/assurance/page.tsx b/app/assurance/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c7884a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/assurance/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+import { PageActions } from "../components/PageActions";
+import { SiteFooter } from "../components/SiteFooter";
+import { SiteHeader } from "../components/SiteHeader";
+
+const evidence = [
+  ["Canonical fixtures", "Identical protocol bytes and outcomes across maintained languages."],
+  ["Adversarial conformance", "Mutation, widening, replay, expiry, denial, indeterminate, and provider-unknown cases."],
+  ["Formal qualification", "Named model claims tied to generated artifacts and reviewed assumptions."],
+  ["Installed-artifact tests", "What npm and wheel consumers receive, not only workspace source behavior."],
+  ["Semantic freeze", "Intentional versioned identities for meaning-bearing public surfaces."],
+  ["Release provenance", "Immutable subjects, digests, builder identity, and promotion evidence."],
+];
+
+export default function AssurancePage() {
+  return <div className="site-frame"><SiteHeader compact /><main className="journey-main assurance-main">
+    <p className="kicker">Assurance</p><h1>Claims linked to evidence</h1>
+    <p className="hero-lede">Auths distinguishes implemented behavior, repository-local evidence, qualified claims, and independently reviewed assurance. A green badge never outruns the evidence it names.</p>
+    <PageActions source="/assurance/index.md" />
+    <div className="assurance-list">{evidence.map(([title, body], index) => <section key={title}><span>{String(index + 1).padStart(2, "0")}</span><div><h2>{title}</h2><p>{body}</p></div></section>)}</div>
+  </main><SiteFooter /></div>;
+}
diff --git a/app/components/SiteFooter.tsx b/app/components/SiteFooter.tsx
index 4ca3514..9d59905 100644
--- a/app/components/SiteFooter.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SiteFooter.tsx
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ export function SiteFooter() {
         </div>
         <div className="footer-links">
           <Link href="/guides/protect-rest-effect">Quickstart</Link>
+          <Link href="/integrations">Integrations</Link>
+          <Link href="/operations">Operations</Link>
+          <Link href="/assurance">Assurance</Link>
           <a href="https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof">GitHub</a>
           <span>Apache-2.0 / MIT</span>
         </div>
diff --git a/app/globals.css b/app/globals.css
index 387e9b7..8564c56 100644
--- a/app/globals.css
+++ b/app/globals.css
@@ -560,6 +560,88 @@ pre {
   .runtime-endpoint-code { position: static; }
 }
 
+.trust-flow {
+  align-items: center;
+  display: flex;
+  flex-wrap: wrap;
+  gap: 10px;
+  justify-content: center;
+  padding: 18px;
+}
+
+.trust-flow span {
+  background: var(--surface);
+  border: 1px solid var(--line);
+  border-radius: 999px;
+  font-size: 12px;
+  padding: 7px 11px;
+}
+
+.trust-flow i {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  font-style: normal;
+}
+
+.composition-table {
+  border-top: 1px solid var(--line-strong);
+  border-collapse: collapse;
+  margin-top: 46px;
+  width: 100%;
+}
+
+.composition-table tr {
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--line);
+}
+
+.composition-table td,
+.composition-table th {
+  font-size: 13px;
+  line-height: 1.5;
+  padding: 17px 10px;
+  text-align: left;
+  vertical-align: top;
+}
+
+.composition-table td {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+}
+
+.assurance-list {
+  border-top: 1px solid var(--line);
+  margin-top: 44px;
+}
+
+.assurance-list section {
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--line);
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 24px;
+  grid-template-columns: 42px 1fr;
+  padding: 22px 0;
+}
+
+.assurance-list section > span {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: 11px;
+}
+
+.assurance-list h2 {
+  font-size: 21px;
+  margin: 0 0 4px;
+}
+
+.assurance-list p {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  margin: 0;
+}
+
+@media (max-width: 700px) {
+  .composition-table td,
+  .composition-table th { display: block; padding: 5px 8px; }
+  .composition-table tr { display: block; padding: 12px 0; }
+  .composition-table thead { display: none; }
+}
+
 .hero {
   align-items: center;
   display: grid;
diff --git a/app/integrations/page.tsx b/app/integrations/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c13572
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/integrations/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+import { PageActions } from "../components/PageActions";
+import { SiteFooter } from "../components/SiteFooter";
+import { SiteHeader } from "../components/SiteHeader";
+
+const integrations = [
+  ["OAuth or OIDC", "User authentication and session context", "Exact machine authority, delegation, execution outcomes, and receipts"],
+  ["SPIFFE or SPIRE", "Workload identity and attestation", "What the identified workload may do to exact application bytes"],
+  ["Cedar, OPA, OpenFGA, or SpiceDB", "Context and application policy decisions", "Portable proof, attenuation, reservation, sealed execution, and evidence"],
+  ["AWS STS or cloud IAM", "Short-lived provider credentials and provider enforcement", "Keep credentials behind a gateway and bind their use to an Auths command"],
+  ["UCAN or Biscuit", "Delegable or attenuable authorization claims", "Profile-specific exact effects, lifecycle state, closed outcomes, and receipts where needed"],
+];
+
+export default function IntegrationsPage() {
+  return <div className="site-frame"><SiteHeader compact /><main className="journey-main integration-main">
+    <p className="kicker">Integrations</p><h1>Auths with the systems you already trust</h1>
+    <p className="hero-lede">Auths is an authority and execution-evidence layer. It composes with identity providers, policy engines, capability formats, cloud credentials, and transports instead of pretending to replace all of them.</p>
+    <PageActions source="/integrations/index.md" />
+    <table className="composition-table">
+      <caption className="visually-hidden">Integration ownership</caption>
+      <thead><tr><th>System</th><th>It owns</th><th>Auths can add</th></tr></thead>
+      <tbody>{integrations.map(([system, owns, adds]) => <tr key={system}><th scope="row">{system}</th><td>{owns}</td><td>{adds}</td></tr>)}</tbody>
+    </table>
+  </main><SiteFooter /></div>;
+}
diff --git a/app/lib/page-graph.ts b/app/lib/page-graph.ts
index b030cd0..1c59386 100644
--- a/app/lib/page-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/page-graph.ts
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ const rawPages = [
   { id: "auths.page.concepts.five-nouns/1", path: "/concepts", kind: "architecture", title: "Five nouns", description: "Actor, action, authority, outcome, and receipt.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
   { id: "auths.page.architecture.system-map/1", path: "/architecture", kind: "architecture", title: "System map", description: "The native waist, replaceable adapters, and closed gateways.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
   { id: "auths.page.operations.runtime/1", path: "/operations", kind: "operations", title: "Production operations", description: "Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
+  { id: "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1", path: "/architecture/trust-boundaries", kind: "architecture", title: "Trust boundaries", description: "Authorization before provider entry.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
+  { id: "auths.page.integrations.composition/1", path: "/integrations", kind: "integration", title: "Integrations", description: "Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
+  { id: "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", path: "/assurance", kind: "assurance", title: "Assurance", description: "Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
 ] as const;
 
 export const pages: readonly PageModel[] = Object.freeze(rawPages.map(parsePageModel));
diff --git a/public/architecture/trust-boundaries/index.md b/public/architecture/trust-boundaries/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5eaec5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/architecture/trust-boundaries/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Authorization before provider entry
+
+An application describes exact intent. Native Auths verifies authority and
+reserves state. Only an authorized sealed command reaches the application-owned
+gateway and provider. A receipt returns along a separate evidence path.
+
+Transport, identity, approval, authority, custody, execution, and disclosure
+remain distinct trust boundaries.
diff --git a/public/assurance/index.md b/public/assurance/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0cd2ec4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/assurance/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Claims linked to evidence
+
+Auths publishes canonical fixtures, adversarial conformance, formal
+qualification, installed-artifact tests, semantic freeze, and release
+provenance. Every public claim names its evidence tier and limitations.
diff --git a/public/integrations/index.md b/public/integrations/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0dfbd63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/integrations/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Auths with the systems you already trust
+
+Auths composes with OAuth/OIDC, SPIFFE/SPIRE, Cedar, OPA, OpenFGA, SpiceDB,
+cloud IAM, UCAN, Biscuit, and application transports. Those systems retain
+their own identity, policy, credential, or delivery responsibilities. Auths
+adds exact effect commitment, attenuation, closed execution outcomes, and
+portable evidence where the application needs them.

From 4e850962e901f2546b9aeab08ce766419be25167 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 19:54:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 06/29] docs: publish agent-first machine-readable surfaces

---
 app/components/SdkReference.tsx   |  3 ++-
 app/components/SectionActions.tsx | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++
 package.json                      |  2 +-
 public/llms-full.txt              | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 public/llms.txt                   | 17 +++++++++++++
 public/robots.txt                 |  4 ++++
 public/search-index.json          | 22 +++++++++++++++++
 public/sitemap.xml                | 14 +++++++++++
 tools/render-markdown/check.mjs   | 12 ++++++++++
 9 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 app/components/SectionActions.tsx
 create mode 100644 public/llms-full.txt
 create mode 100644 public/llms.txt
 create mode 100644 public/robots.txt
 create mode 100644 public/search-index.json
 create mode 100644 public/sitemap.xml
 create mode 100644 tools/render-markdown/check.mjs

diff --git a/app/components/SdkReference.tsx b/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
index 78e59f7..3a1a277 100644
--- a/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import {
 import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
 import { SdkCodeExample } from "./SdkCodeExample";
 import { TestedExample } from "./TestedExample";
+import { SectionActions } from "./SectionActions";
 
 type Parameter = {
   name: string;
@@ -332,7 +333,7 @@ export function SdkReference() {
               <div className="sdk-operation"><span>{section.operation}</span><code>auths.{section.operation}()</code></div>
               <h2>{section.title}</h2>
               <p>{section.description}</p>
-              <PageActions source={`/sdk/sections/${section.id}.md`} />
+              <SectionActions source={`/sdk/sections/${section.id}.md`} title={section.title} />
               <TestedExample scenario={section.scenario}>
                 <span className="visually-hidden">Executable scenario {section.scenario}</span>
               </TestedExample>
diff --git a/app/components/SectionActions.tsx b/app/components/SectionActions.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e7ac0ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/SectionActions.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+"use client";
+
+import { ClipboardIcon } from "@phosphor-icons/react/Clipboard";
+import { MarkdownLogoIcon } from "@phosphor-icons/react/MarkdownLogo";
+import { useRef, useState } from "react";
+
+export function SectionActions({ source, title }: { source: string; title: string }) {
+  const [copied, setCopied] = useState(false);
+  const resetTimer = useRef<ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null>(null);
+
+  async function copyForAgent() {
+    const response = await fetch(source);
+    if (!response.ok) return;
+    const markdown = await response.text();
+    const payload = [`# Task context: ${title}`, "", "Use the following canonical Auths documentation section. Do not infer APIs absent from it.", "", markdown].join("\n");
+    await navigator.clipboard.writeText(payload.slice(0, 48_000));
+    setCopied(true);
+    if (resetTimer.current) clearTimeout(resetTimer.current);
+    resetTimer.current = setTimeout(() => setCopied(false), 1600);
+  }
+
+  return <div className="page-actions section-actions" aria-label={`${title} actions`}>
+    <button onClick={copyForAgent} type="button"><ClipboardIcon aria-hidden="true" size={17} />{copied ? "Copied" : "Copy section for LLM"}</button>
+    <a href={source} target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"><MarkdownLogoIcon aria-hidden="true" size={17} />View section as Markdown</a>
+  </div>;
+}
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 8a0ba5b..f41b31a 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
     "test": "npm run build && node --test tests/rendered-html.test.mjs",
     "lint": "eslint . --ignore-pattern dist --ignore-pattern .next",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
-    "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node tools/build-page-model/check.mjs && node tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs && node tools/build-reference/check.mjs",
+    "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node tools/build-page-model/check.mjs && node tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs && node tools/build-reference/check.mjs && node tools/render-markdown/check.mjs",
     "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run test:contract && npm test"
   },
   "dependencies": {
diff --git a/public/llms-full.txt b/public/llms-full.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3438661
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/llms-full.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Auths documentation corpus
+
+Auths separates identity, transport, approval, authority, custody, execution,
+and disclosure. Applications begin with five product verbs: create, delegate,
+execute, resume, and verify. The native semantic waist owns parsing,
+canonicalization, commitments, attenuation, authorization, and closed outcomes.
+
+## Begin with outcomes
+
+Protect one exact application effect. Delegate only narrower authority. Verify
+portable evidence locally. An unavailable fact produces an indeterminate
+outcome; ambiguous provider state produces a recoverable outcome. Neither is
+silently translated into success.
+
+## System boundary
+
+Applications describe exact intent. Native Auths decides. Durable stores claim
+replay and budget state atomically. Application-owned closed gateways keep
+provider credentials unreachable until authorization. Receipts bind authority,
+command, context, execution, and signer. Disclosure controls what a verified
+viewer may learn.
+
+## SDKs and runtime
+
+The TypeScript package is `@auths-dev/sdk`; the Python package is `auths`; Rust
+uses the publishable Auths crates. The SDK reference describes in-process
+library APIs. The Runtime API reference separately describes HTTPS endpoints.
+Never treat the two surfaces as interchangeable.
+
+## Composition
+
+Auths composes with OAuth/OIDC, SPIFFE/SPIRE, policy engines, relationship-based
+authorization, cloud IAM, capability formats, KMS/HSM custody, and HTTP or Iroh
+transport. Each system retains its own responsibility.
+
+## Evidence
+
+Public claims link to canonical fixtures, adversarial conformance,
+installed-artifact tests, semantic freeze, formal qualification, and release
+provenance. Evidence remains bounded by its named status and limitations.
diff --git a/public/llms.txt b/public/llms.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ba6b9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/llms.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Auths documentation
+
+> Auths is a proof-carrying authority and execution-evidence layer for people,
+> workloads, and agents. Prefer canonical Markdown sources below.
+
+- [Start: protect one REST effect](/guides/protect-rest-effect.md)
+- [Start: delegate to an agent](/start/delegate-agent.md)
+- [Start: verify a receipt](/start/verify-receipt.md)
+- [Concepts](/concepts/index.md)
+- [Architecture](/architecture/index.md)
+- [Trust boundaries](/architecture/trust-boundaries/index.md)
+- [SDK reference](/sdk.md)
+- [Runtime API reference](/reference/runtime-api.md)
+- [Operations](/operations/index.md)
+- [Integrations](/integrations/index.md)
+- [Assurance](/assurance/index.md)
+- [Machine-readable reference manifest](/reference-manifest.json)
diff --git a/public/robots.txt b/public/robots.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d83a919
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/robots.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+User-agent: *
+Allow: /
+
+Sitemap: https://docs.auths.dev/sitemap.xml
diff --git a/public/search-index.json b/public/search-index.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a877c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/search-index.json
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.search-index/1",
+  "synonyms": {
+    "permission": ["authority", "authorization"],
+    "agent": ["delegate", "actor"],
+    "audit": ["receipt", "evidence"],
+    "api": ["runtime", "endpoint"],
+    "sdk": ["rust", "typescript", "python"]
+  },
+  "pages": [
+    { "id": "auths.page.home/1", "path": "/", "title": "Auths documentation" },
+    { "id": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "path": "/guides/protect-rest-effect", "title": "Protect a REST effect" },
+    { "id": "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1", "path": "/start/delegate-agent", "title": "Delegate to an agent" },
+    { "id": "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1", "path": "/start/verify-receipt", "title": "Verify a receipt" },
+    { "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "path": "/reference/sdk", "title": "SDK reference" },
+    { "id": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "path": "/reference/runtime-api", "title": "Runtime API reference" },
+    { "id": "auths.page.architecture.system-map/1", "path": "/architecture", "title": "Architecture" },
+    { "id": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1", "path": "/operations", "title": "Operations" },
+    { "id": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1", "path": "/integrations", "title": "Integrations" },
+    { "id": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "path": "/assurance", "title": "Assurance" }
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/public/sitemap.xml b/public/sitemap.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ddf473c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/sitemap.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<urlset xmlns="http://www.sitemaps.org/schemas/sitemap/0.9">
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/guides/protect-rest-effect</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/start/delegate-agent</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/start/verify-receipt</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/concepts</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/architecture</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/sdk</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/runtime-api</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/integrations</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance</loc></url>
+</urlset>
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97430a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { access, readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+
+const root = path.resolve(new URL("../..", import.meta.url).pathname);
+const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "public/reference-manifest.json"), "utf8"));
+for (const surface of manifest.surfaces) await access(path.join(root, "public", surface.source));
+const llms = await readFile(path.join(root, "public/llms.txt"), "utf8");
+for (const source of ["/sdk.md", "/reference/runtime-api.md"]) assert.ok(llms.includes(source));
+const full = await readFile(path.join(root, "public/llms-full.txt"), "utf8");
+assert.ok(full.length < 50_000);
+assert.doesNotMatch(full, /private key|BEGIN [A-Z ]+ KEY|gho_/i);

From f931a5cddd5a8da2538c7a99d2a840c4645ddf84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 20:10:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 07/29] docs: qualify cross-repository documentation release

---
 .github/workflows/qualify.yml                 |  43 +++
 app/components/ReferenceShell.tsx             | 119 ++++++
 app/components/RuntimeReference.tsx           |  78 ++++
 app/components/SdkReference.tsx               | 340 +++++++++---------
 app/components/SiteHeader.tsx                 |   8 +-
 app/globals.css                               | 111 +++++-
 .../protect-rest-effect.mdx                   |   6 +-
 app/lib/bash-snippets.ts                      |  12 +
 app/lib/runtime-reference.ts                  | 102 +++++-
 app/lib/sdk-languages.ts                      |  19 +-
 app/reference/runtime-api/page.tsx            |  35 +-
 docs/TOOLING.md                               |  60 ++--
 examples/delegation/rust/main.rs              |   4 +-
 examples/receipt-verification/python/main.py  |   4 +-
 examples/receipt-verification/rust/main.rs    |   4 +-
 .../receipt-verification/typescript/main.ts   |   3 +-
 examples/rest-effect/python/main.py           |   4 +-
 examples/rest-effect/rust/main.rs             |   7 +-
 examples/rest-effect/typescript/main.ts       |   2 +-
 package.json                                  |   5 +-
 public/guides/protect-rest-effect.md          |   3 +
 .../runtime-api/sections/create-authority.md  |   8 +
 .../reference/runtime-api/sections/execute.md |   8 +
 .../reference/runtime-api/sections/health.md  |   8 +
 .../runtime-api/sections/receipt-summary.md   |   8 +
 .../reference/runtime-api/sections/resume.md  |   8 +
 .../releases/deployment-manifest.example.json |  11 +
 public/sdk.md                                 |   5 +-
 public/sdk/sections/create.md                 |  47 +--
 public/sdk/sections/delegate.md               |  44 +--
 public/sdk/sections/execute.md                |  43 +--
 public/sdk/sections/introduction.md           |   6 +-
 public/sdk/sections/resume.md                 |   9 +
 public/sdk/sections/verify.md                 |  38 +-
 tests/rendered-html.test.mjs                  |  28 +-
 tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs          |  64 ++++
 tools/release/check.mjs                       |   9 +
 37 files changed, 877 insertions(+), 436 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 .github/workflows/qualify.yml
 create mode 100644 app/components/ReferenceShell.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/components/RuntimeReference.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/lib/bash-snippets.ts
 create mode 100644 public/reference/runtime-api/sections/create-authority.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/runtime-api/sections/execute.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/runtime-api/sections/health.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/runtime-api/sections/receipt-summary.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/runtime-api/sections/resume.md
 create mode 100644 public/releases/deployment-manifest.example.json
 create mode 100644 public/sdk/sections/resume.md
 create mode 100644 tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs
 create mode 100644 tools/release/check.mjs

diff --git a/.github/workflows/qualify.yml b/.github/workflows/qualify.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02c2f9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/qualify.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+name: Qualify documentation
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+concurrency:
+  group: docs-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  qualify:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 20
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }}
+          persist-credentials: false
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
+        with:
+          node-version-file: .nvmrc
+          cache: npm
+      - name: Reject a superseded source head
+        env:
+          EXPECTED_HEAD: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }}
+        run: test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "$EXPECTED_HEAD"
+      - run: npm ci --ignore-scripts
+      - run: npm run qualify
+      - name: Preserve qualified static output
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
+        with:
+          name: auths-docs-static-${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }}
+          path: dist/client/
+          if-no-files-found: error
+          retention-days: 7
+          compression-level: 9
diff --git a/app/components/ReferenceShell.tsx b/app/components/ReferenceShell.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b5f96d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/ReferenceShell.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+"use client";
+
+import type { ReactNode } from "react";
+import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
+
+export type ReferenceNavItem = Readonly<{
+  id?: string;
+  label: string;
+  prefix?: string;
+}>;
+
+export type ReferenceNavGroup = Readonly<{
+  label: string;
+  items: readonly ReferenceNavItem[];
+}>;
+
+export function ReferenceShell({
+  children,
+  filterLabel,
+  groups,
+  initialSection = "introduction",
+  title,
+}: {
+  children: ReactNode;
+  filterLabel: string;
+  groups: readonly ReferenceNavGroup[];
+  initialSection?: string;
+  title: string;
+}) {
+  const [activeSection, setActiveSection] = useState(initialSection);
+  const [navCollapsed, setNavCollapsed] = useState(false);
+  const [mobileOpen, setMobileOpen] = useState(false);
+  const [query, setQuery] = useState("");
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    const observed = Array.from(document.querySelectorAll<HTMLElement>("[data-reference-section]"));
+    const updateActiveSection = () => {
+      const current = observed.reduce(
+        (active, section) => section.getBoundingClientRect().top <= 220 ? section.id : active,
+        observed[0]?.id ?? initialSection,
+      );
+      setActiveSection(current);
+    };
+    updateActiveSection();
+    window.addEventListener("scroll", updateActiveSection, { passive: true });
+    return () => window.removeEventListener("scroll", updateActiveSection);
+  }, [initialSection]);
+
+  const matches = (label: string) => label.toLowerCase().includes(query.trim().toLowerCase());
+
+  return (
+    <div
+      className={[
+        "sdk-reference-shell",
+        navCollapsed ? "sdk-nav-collapsed" : "",
+        mobileOpen ? "sdk-nav-mobile-open" : "",
+      ].filter(Boolean).join(" ")}
+    >
+      <aside className="sdk-reference-nav" aria-label={`${title} navigation`}>
+        <div className="sdk-nav-head">
+          <strong>{title}</strong>
+          <button
+            aria-label={`Collapse ${title.toLowerCase()} navigation`}
+            onClick={() => {
+              setNavCollapsed(true);
+              setMobileOpen(false);
+            }}
+            type="button"
+          >
+            <span aria-hidden="true">‹</span>
+          </button>
+        </div>
+        <label className="sdk-nav-search">
+          <span aria-hidden="true">⌕</span>
+          <input
+            aria-label={`Filter ${title.toLowerCase()}`}
+            onChange={(event) => setQuery(event.target.value)}
+            placeholder={filterLabel}
+            value={query}
+          />
+        </label>
+        {groups.map((group) => {
+          const items = group.items.filter((item) => matches(item.label));
+          if (items.length === 0) return null;
+          return (
+            <div className="reference-nav-group" key={group.label}>
+              <p>{group.label}</p>
+              {items.map((item) => item.id ? (
+                <a className={activeSection === item.id ? "active" : ""} href={`#${item.id}`} key={item.label}>
+                  {item.prefix && <span>{item.prefix}</span>}
+                  {item.label}
+                </a>
+              ) : <span key={item.label}>{item.label}</span>)}
+            </div>
+          );
+        })}
+      </aside>
+
+      <button
+        aria-expanded={mobileOpen}
+        className="sdk-nav-restore"
+        onClick={() => {
+          if (window.matchMedia("(max-width: 980px)").matches) {
+            setMobileOpen((current) => !current);
+          } else {
+            setNavCollapsed(false);
+            setMobileOpen(false);
+          }
+        }}
+        type="button"
+      >
+        <span aria-hidden="true">☰</span>
+        {title} navigation
+      </button>
+
+      <main className="sdk-reference-main">{children}</main>
+    </div>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/components/RuntimeReference.tsx b/app/components/RuntimeReference.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cfa137e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/RuntimeReference.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+"use client";
+
+import { runtimeEndpoints } from "../lib/runtime-reference";
+import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
+import { ReferenceShell, type ReferenceNavGroup } from "./ReferenceShell";
+import { SectionActions } from "./SectionActions";
+import { CodeBlockWithResult } from "./code";
+
+const groups: readonly ReferenceNavGroup[] = [
+  {
+    label: "OVERVIEW",
+    items: [{ id: "introduction", label: "Introduction" }],
+  },
+  {
+    label: "ENDPOINTS",
+    items: runtimeEndpoints.map((endpoint) => ({
+      id: endpoint.slug,
+      label: endpoint.title,
+      prefix: endpoint.method,
+    })),
+  },
+];
+
+export function RuntimeReference() {
+  return (
+    <ReferenceShell filterLabel="Find an endpoint" groups={groups} title="Runtime API">
+      <section className="sdk-reference-section sdk-introduction" id="introduction" data-reference-section>
+        <div className="sdk-copy-column">
+          <p className="sdk-version">HTTPS RUNTIME · V1</p>
+          <h1>Runtime API Reference</h1>
+          <p className="sdk-lede">
+            The wire-level service contract. For in-process Rust, TypeScript, and Python libraries, use the <a href="/reference/sdk">SDK reference</a>.
+          </p>
+          <PageActions source="/reference/runtime-api.md" />
+          <div className="sdk-note">
+            <strong>One runtime boundary</strong>
+            <p>HTTP carries bounded requests and outcomes. Successful transport never becomes authorization.</p>
+          </div>
+        </div>
+        <div className="sdk-code-column">
+          <div className="sdk-code-sticky runtime-contract-note">
+            <p className="sdk-code-eyebrow">HTTPS CONTRACT</p>
+            <p>Every mutating endpoint parses bounded input, preserves closed outcomes, and keeps provider credentials behind the runtime gateway.</p>
+          </div>
+        </div>
+      </section>
+
+      {runtimeEndpoints.map((endpoint) => (
+        <section className="sdk-reference-section" id={endpoint.slug} data-reference-section key={endpoint.id}>
+          <div className="sdk-copy-column">
+            <div className="sdk-operation runtime-operation"><span>{endpoint.method}</span><code>{endpoint.path}</code></div>
+            <h2>{endpoint.title}</h2>
+            <p>{endpoint.description}</p>
+            <SectionActions source={`/reference/runtime-api/sections/${endpoint.slug}.md`} title={endpoint.title} />
+            <dl className="runtime-endpoint-metadata">
+              <div><dt>Stable identity</dt><dd>{endpoint.id}</dd></div>
+              <div><dt>Maximum body</dt><dd>{endpoint.maxBodyBytes === 0 ? "None" : `${endpoint.maxBodyBytes.toLocaleString()} bytes`}</dd></div>
+              <div><dt>Outcomes</dt><dd>{endpoint.outcomes.join(" · ")}</dd></div>
+            </dl>
+          </div>
+          <div className="sdk-code-column">
+            <div className="sdk-code-sticky">
+              <CodeBlockWithResult
+                className="sdk-code-example"
+                code={endpoint.curl}
+                isBash
+                label={`${endpoint.method} ${endpoint.path}`}
+                language="typescript"
+                result={endpoint.response}
+                resultLanguage="json"
+              />
+            </div>
+          </div>
+        </section>
+      ))}
+    </ReferenceShell>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/components/SdkReference.tsx b/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
index 3a1a277..8791aab 100644
--- a/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
@@ -5,10 +5,11 @@ import {
   isSdkLanguage,
   sdkLanguageEvent,
   sdkLanguageStorageKey,
-  sdkLibraries,
+  sdkInstallCommands,
   type SdkLanguage,
 } from "../lib/sdk-languages";
 import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
+import { ReferenceShell, type ReferenceNavGroup } from "./ReferenceShell";
 import { SdkCodeExample } from "./SdkCodeExample";
 import { TestedExample } from "./TestedExample";
 import { SectionActions } from "./SectionActions";
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ type ReferenceSection = {
   operation: string;
   title: string;
   description: string;
+  symbols: Record<SdkLanguage, string>;
   parameters: Parameter[];
   examples: Record<SdkLanguage, string>;
   result: string;
@@ -35,42 +37,47 @@ type ReferenceSection = {
 const sections: ReferenceSection[] = [
   {
     id: "create",
-    navLabel: "Create authority",
+    navLabel: "Open a session",
     operation: "create",
-    title: "Create exact authority",
+    title: "Open an Auths session",
     description:
-      "Create bounded authority for one actor and one exact effect. The operation, resource, constraints, expiry, and use count become part of the signed commitment.",
+      "Start from explicit authority and an explicit integration. TypeScript and Python expose the product session; Rust exposes the native authoring and verifier components beneath that boundary.",
+    symbols: {
+      rust: "TrustedContextBuilder::new",
+      typescript: "development.createAuths",
+      python: "development.create_auths",
+    },
     parameters: [
-      { name: "actor", requirement: "required", type: "Identity", description: "The person or agent receiving authority." },
-      { name: "action", requirement: "required", type: "Action", description: "The exact application effect that may occur." },
-      { name: "uses", requirement: "optional", type: "positive integer", description: "Maximum successful executions. Defaults to one." },
-      { name: "expiresIn", requirement: "optional", type: "duration", description: "How long the authority remains eligible." },
+      { name: "authority", requirement: "required", type: "profile authority", description: "The exact profile-owned boundary the session may exercise." },
+      { name: "integration", requirement: "required", type: "development | production", description: "The explicit runtime, custody, state, and trust composition." },
     ],
     examples: {
-      rust: `let authority = auths.create(CreateAuthority {
-    actor,
-    action,
-    uses: 1,
-    expires_in: Duration::from_secs(600),
-})?;`,
-      typescript: `const authority = await auths.create({
-  actor,
-  action,
-  uses: 1,
-  expiresIn: "10m",
+      rust: `let context = TrustedContextBuilder::new(
+    configuration,
+    composition,
+    trust_anchors,
+    assurance_policy,
+)?.build()?;
+
+let verifier = Verifier::self_contained(context)?;`,
+      typescript: `import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
+
+await using auths = await development.createAuths({
+  authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]),
 });`,
-      python: `authority = auths.create(
-    actor=actor,
-    action=action,
-    uses=1,
-    expires_in="10m",
-)`,
+      python: `from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import mcp
+
+async with development.create_auths(
+    authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"]),
+) as auths:
+    ...`,
     },
     result: `{
-  "kind": "authority",
-  "uses": 1,
-  "expiresAt": "2026-08-14T17:40:00Z",
-  "commitment": "32a681d1…81ce"
+  "kind": "session",
+  "profile": "auths.mcp/1",
+  "authority": "publish_report"
 }`,
     scenario: "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
   },
@@ -81,29 +88,30 @@ const sections: ReferenceSection[] = [
     title: "Delegate narrower authority",
     description:
       "Pass a strict subset of authority to another actor. A delegate can receive fewer uses, an earlier expiry, or a narrower action—but never more power than its parent grants.",
+    symbols: {
+      rust: "auths_author::plan_child_grant",
+      typescript: "Auths.delegate",
+      python: "Auths.delegate",
+    },
     parameters: [
       { name: "authority", requirement: "required", type: "Authority", description: "The parent authority being attenuated." },
-      { name: "to", requirement: "required", type: "Identity", description: "The person or agent receiving the child authority." },
-      { name: "action", requirement: "optional", type: "Action", description: "A narrower action within the parent boundary." },
-      { name: "uses", requirement: "optional", type: "positive integer", description: "A use count no greater than the parent remainder." },
+      { name: "name", requirement: "optional", type: "string", description: "A bounded label for the delegated agent." },
+      { name: "expires", requirement: "optional", type: "duration", description: "An expiry no later than the parent authority." },
     ],
     examples: {
-      rust: `let child = auths.delegate(&authority, DelegateAuthority {
-    to: remediation_agent,
-    action: restart_service,
-    uses: 1,
-})?;`,
-      typescript: `const child = await auths.delegate({
-  authority,
-  to: remediationAgent,
-  action: restartService,
-  uses: 1,
+      rust: `let child = plan_child_grant(
+    parent.statement(),
+    narrower_request,
+)?;`,
+      typescript: `await using agent = await auths.delegate({
+  authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]),
+  name: "report-agent",
+  expiresInSeconds: 300,
 });`,
-      python: `child = auths.delegate(
-    authority=authority,
-    to=remediation_agent,
-    action=restart_service,
-    uses=1,
+      python: `agent = await auths.delegate(
+    authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"]),
+    name="report-agent",
+    expires_in_seconds=300,
 )`,
     },
     result: `{
@@ -122,28 +130,35 @@ const sections: ReferenceSection[] = [
     title: "Execute through a closed gateway",
     description:
       "Authorize the exact command, reserve its bounded use, and submit it through an application-owned gateway. The result preserves denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and completed outcomes.",
+    symbols: {
+      rust: "ProofExchangeService::submit_action",
+      typescript: "Auths.execute",
+      python: "Auths.execute",
+    },
     parameters: [
-      { name: "authority", requirement: "required", type: "Authority", description: "Authority that covers the exact command." },
       { name: "action", requirement: "required", type: "Action", description: "The effect requested from the gateway." },
-      { name: "gateway", requirement: "required", type: "Gateway", description: "Application-owned access to provider credentials." },
-      { name: "idempotencyKey", requirement: "optional", type: "string", description: "Stable key for safe observation and resume." },
+      { name: "provider", requirement: "required", type: "closed provider", description: "Application-owned access to provider credentials." },
+      { name: "requestId", requirement: "optional", type: "string", description: "Stable identity for observation, exact replay, and resume." },
     ],
     examples: {
-      rust: `let outcome = auths
-    .execute(authority, action, gateway)
-    .idempotency_key("incident-842:restart:1")
+      rust: `let outcome = service
+    .submit_action(&peer, submission)
     .await?;`,
       typescript: `const outcome = await auths.execute({
-  authority,
-  action,
-  gateway,
-  idempotencyKey: "incident-842:restart:1",
+  action: mcp.callTool({
+    name: "publish_report",
+    arguments: { report: "weekly" },
+  }),
+  provider,
+  requestId: "report:weekly:1",
 });`,
       python: `outcome = await auths.execute(
-    authority=authority,
-    action=action,
-    gateway=gateway,
-    idempotency_key="incident-842:restart:1",
+    action=mcp.call_tool(
+        name="publish_report",
+        arguments={"report": "weekly"},
+    ),
+    provider=provider,
+    request_id="report:weekly:1",
 )`,
     },
     result: `{
@@ -151,56 +166,115 @@ const sections: ReferenceSection[] = [
   "receiptId": "rcpt_018f2e",
   "usesConsumed": 1,
   "observedAt": "2026-08-14T17:31:12Z"
+}`,
+    scenario: "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
+  },
+  {
+    id: "resume",
+    navLabel: "Resume an execution",
+    operation: "resume",
+    title: "Resume without repeating the effect",
+    description:
+      "Continue the exact recoverable execution represented by an SDK-minted reference. Resume preserves the original authority, command, reservation, and provider observation.",
+    symbols: {
+      rust: "McpSession::resume",
+      typescript: "Auths.resume",
+      python: "Auths.resume",
+    },
+    parameters: [
+      { name: "reference", requirement: "required", type: "ExecutionReference", description: "Opaque reference minted for the original recoverable execution." },
+      { name: "provider", requirement: "required", type: "closed provider", description: "The same closed provider boundary used by the original execution." },
+    ],
+    examples: {
+      rust: `let outcome = session.resume(
+    reference,
+    state,
+    provider,
+).await?;`,
+      typescript: `const outcome = await auths.resume({
+  reference,
+  provider,
+});`,
+      python: `outcome = await auths.resume(
+    reference=reference,
+    provider=provider,
+)`,
+    },
+    result: `{
+  "kind": "completed",
+  "receiptId": "rcpt_018f2e",
+  "resumed": true
 }`,
     scenario: "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
   },
   {
     id: "verify",
-    navLabel: "Verify a receipt",
+    navLabel: "Verify authority",
     operation: "verify",
     title: "Verify the proof locally",
     description:
-      "Verify a receipt without executing an effect or trusting transport success. The default projection is bounded and inert: it answers what was authorized and what outcome was observed.",
+      "Verify a proof, canonical action, and explicit trust context without executing an effect or treating transport success as authority.",
+    symbols: {
+      rust: "Verifier::verify",
+      typescript: "loadVerifier",
+      python: "auths.verify.verify",
+    },
     parameters: [
-      { name: "receipt", requirement: "required", type: "Receipt", description: "The signed decision or execution receipt." },
-      { name: "trust", requirement: "required", type: "TrustContext", description: "Accepted verification material and identity evidence." },
-      { name: "disclosure", requirement: "optional", type: "summary | full", description: "Authorized projection returned to the caller." },
+      { name: "proof", requirement: "required", type: "Proof", description: "The signed authority proof to evaluate." },
+      { name: "action", requirement: "required", type: "Action", description: "The exact canonical operation and resource requested." },
+      { name: "context", requirement: "required", type: "TrustedContext", description: "Accepted roots, verification material, and identity evidence." },
     ],
     examples: {
-      rust: `let proof = auths.verify(receipt, trust)?
-    .disclose(Disclosure::Summary)?;
-
-assert_eq!(proof.outcome(), Outcome::Completed);`,
-      typescript: `const proof = auths.verify({ receipt, trust })
-  .disclose("summary");
+      rust: `let result = verifier.verify(
+    &proof,
+    &canonical_action,
+    &request,
+    &profile,
+)?;`,
+      typescript: `import { loadVerifier } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
 
-assert.equal(proof.outcome, "completed");`,
-      python: `proof = auths.verify(receipt=receipt, trust=trust) \\
-    .disclose("summary")
+const verifier = await loadVerifier();
+const result = verifier.verify(proof, action, context);`,
+      python: `from auths.verify import verify
 
-assert proof.outcome == "completed"`,
+result = verify(proof, action, context)`,
     },
     result: `{
-  "authorized": true,
-  "outcome": "completed",
-  "actor": "remediation-agent",
-  "effect": "one exact action",
-  "receiptId": "rcpt_018f2e"
+  "kind": "authorized",
+  "profile": "auths.mcp/1",
+  "command": "publish_report"
 }`,
     scenario: "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1",
   },
 ];
 
-const installExamples = Object.fromEntries(
-  sdkLibraries.map((library) => [library.language, library.install]),
-) as Record<SdkLanguage, string>;
+const installExamples: Record<SdkLanguage, string> = sdkInstallCommands;
+
+const navigationGroups: readonly ReferenceNavGroup[] = [
+  {
+    label: "OVERVIEW",
+    items: [
+      { id: "introduction", label: "Introduction" },
+      { label: "Errors" },
+      { label: "Outcomes" },
+    ],
+  },
+  {
+    label: "AUTHORITY",
+    items: sections.slice(0, 2).map((section) => ({ id: section.id, label: section.navLabel })),
+  },
+  {
+    label: "EXECUTION",
+    items: sections.slice(2, 4).map((section) => ({ id: section.id, label: section.navLabel })),
+  },
+  {
+    label: "VERIFICATION",
+    items: sections.slice(4).map((section) => ({ id: section.id, label: section.navLabel })),
+  },
+];
 
 export function SdkReference() {
   const [language, setLanguage] = useState<SdkLanguage>("typescript");
-  const [activeSection, setActiveSection] = useState("introduction");
-  const [navCollapsed, setNavCollapsed] = useState(false);
-  const [mobileOpen, setMobileOpen] = useState(false);
-  const [query, setQuery] = useState("");
 
   useEffect(() => {
     const stored = window.localStorage.getItem(sdkLanguageStorageKey);
@@ -215,97 +289,20 @@ export function SdkReference() {
     };
   }, []);
 
-  useEffect(() => {
-    const observed = Array.from(document.querySelectorAll<HTMLElement>("[data-sdk-section]"));
-    const updateActiveSection = () => {
-      const current = observed.reduce(
-        (active, section) => section.getBoundingClientRect().top <= 220 ? section.id : active,
-        observed[0]?.id ?? "introduction",
-      );
-      setActiveSection(current);
-    };
-    updateActiveSection();
-    window.addEventListener("scroll", updateActiveSection, { passive: true });
-    return () => window.removeEventListener("scroll", updateActiveSection);
-  }, []);
-
   function chooseLanguage(next: SdkLanguage) {
     setLanguage(next);
     window.localStorage.setItem(sdkLanguageStorageKey, next);
     window.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent(sdkLanguageEvent, { detail: next }));
   }
 
-  const matches = (label: string) => label.toLowerCase().includes(query.trim().toLowerCase());
-
   return (
-    <div
-      className={[
-        "sdk-reference-shell",
-        navCollapsed ? "sdk-nav-collapsed" : "",
-        mobileOpen ? "sdk-nav-mobile-open" : "",
-      ].filter(Boolean).join(" ")}
-    >
-      <aside className="sdk-reference-nav" aria-label="SDK reference navigation">
-        <div className="sdk-nav-head">
-          <strong>SDK reference</strong>
-          <button
-            aria-label="Collapse SDK navigation"
-            onClick={() => {
-              setNavCollapsed(true);
-              setMobileOpen(false);
-            }}
-            type="button"
-          >
-            <span aria-hidden="true">‹</span>
-          </button>
-        </div>
-        <label className="sdk-nav-search">
-          <span aria-hidden="true">⌕</span>
-          <input
-            aria-label="Filter SDK reference"
-            onChange={(event) => setQuery(event.target.value)}
-            placeholder="Find an operation"
-            value={query}
-          />
-        </label>
-        <p>OVERVIEW</p>
-        {matches("Introduction") && <a className={activeSection === "introduction" ? "active" : ""} href="#introduction">Introduction</a>}
-        {matches("Errors") && <span>Errors</span>}
-        {matches("Outcomes") && <span>Outcomes</span>}
-        <p>AUTHORITY</p>
-        {sections.slice(0, 2).filter((section) => matches(section.navLabel)).map((section) => (
-          <a className={activeSection === section.id ? "active" : ""} href={`#${section.id}`} key={section.id}>{section.navLabel}</a>
-        ))}
-        <p>EXECUTION</p>
-        {matches("Execute an effect") && <a className={activeSection === "execute" ? "active" : ""} href="#execute">Execute an effect</a>}
-        <p>RECEIPTS</p>
-        {matches("Verify a receipt") && <a className={activeSection === "verify" ? "active" : ""} href="#verify">Verify a receipt</a>}
-      </aside>
-
-      <button
-        aria-expanded={mobileOpen}
-        className="sdk-nav-restore"
-        onClick={() => {
-          if (window.matchMedia("(max-width: 980px)").matches) {
-            setMobileOpen((current) => !current);
-          } else {
-            setNavCollapsed(false);
-            setMobileOpen(false);
-          }
-        }}
-        type="button"
-      >
-        <span aria-hidden="true">☰</span>
-        SDK navigation
-      </button>
-
-      <main className="sdk-reference-main">
-        <section className="sdk-reference-section sdk-introduction" id="introduction" data-sdk-section>
+    <ReferenceShell filterLabel="Find an operation" groups={navigationGroups} title="SDK reference">
+        <section className="sdk-reference-section sdk-introduction" id="introduction" data-reference-section>
           <div className="sdk-copy-column">
             <p className="sdk-version">AUTHS SDK · 1.0.0-rc.1</p>
             <h1>SDK Reference</h1>
             <p className="sdk-lede">
-              Create, delegate, execute, and verify precise authority using the same semantics from Rust, TypeScript, or Python.
+              Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify precise authority. Each language panel names the actual installed symbol for that SDK surface.
             </p>
             <PageActions source="/sdk/sections/introduction.md" />
             <div className="sdk-note">
@@ -328,9 +325,9 @@ export function SdkReference() {
         </section>
 
         {sections.map((section) => (
-          <section className="sdk-reference-section" id={section.id} data-sdk-section key={section.id}>
+          <section className="sdk-reference-section" id={section.id} data-reference-section key={section.id}>
             <div className="sdk-copy-column">
-              <div className="sdk-operation"><span>{section.operation}</span><code>auths.{section.operation}()</code></div>
+              <div className="sdk-operation"><span>{section.operation}</span><code>{section.symbols[language]}</code></div>
               <h2>{section.title}</h2>
               <p>{section.description}</p>
               <SectionActions source={`/sdk/sections/${section.id}.md`} title={section.title} />
@@ -364,7 +361,6 @@ export function SdkReference() {
             </div>
           </section>
         ))}
-      </main>
-    </div>
+    </ReferenceShell>
   );
 }
diff --git a/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx b/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx
index 3e6779a..904efee 100644
--- a/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx
@@ -14,9 +14,15 @@ export function SiteHeader({ compact = false }: { compact?: boolean }) {
         </Link>
         <nav className="header-nav" aria-label="Primary navigation">
           <Link href="/guides/protect-rest-effect">Start</Link>
-          <Link href="/reference/sdk">SDK</Link>
+          <Link href="/reference/sdk">SDKs</Link>
+          <Link href="/reference/runtime-api">Runtime API</Link>
           <Link href="/concepts">Concepts</Link>
           <Link href="/architecture">Architecture</Link>
+          <Link href="/operations">Operations</Link>
+          <details className="header-more">
+            <summary>More</summary>
+            <div><Link href="/integrations">Integrations</Link><Link href="/assurance">Assurance</Link></div>
+          </details>
         </nav>
         <div className="header-search">
           <SearchDialog />
diff --git a/app/globals.css b/app/globals.css
index 8564c56..c702492 100644
--- a/app/globals.css
+++ b/app/globals.css
@@ -161,6 +161,49 @@ pre {
   color: var(--forest);
 }
 
+.header-more {
+  position: relative;
+}
+
+.header-more summary {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  cursor: pointer;
+  font-size: 14px;
+  font-weight: 520;
+  list-style: none;
+}
+
+.header-more summary::-webkit-details-marker {
+  display: none;
+}
+
+.header-more summary::after {
+  content: "⌄";
+  margin-left: 5px;
+}
+
+.header-more[open] > div {
+  background: var(--surface);
+  border: 1px solid var(--line);
+  border-radius: var(--radius-sm);
+  box-shadow: var(--shadow-sm);
+  display: grid;
+  left: -12px;
+  min-width: 150px;
+  padding: 7px;
+  position: absolute;
+  top: 30px;
+}
+
+.header-more > div a {
+  border-radius: 5px;
+  padding: 6px 8px;
+}
+
+.header-more > div a:hover {
+  background: var(--paper-deep);
+}
+
 .nav-muted {
   opacity: 0.5;
 }
@@ -2277,7 +2320,7 @@ pre {
   width: 100%;
 }
 
-.sdk-reference-nav > p {
+.reference-nav-group > p {
   color: var(--ink-faint);
   font-family: var(--font-mono);
   font-size: 9.5px;
@@ -2285,8 +2328,8 @@ pre {
   margin: 22px 9px 7px;
 }
 
-.sdk-reference-nav > a,
-.sdk-reference-nav > span {
+.reference-nav-group > a,
+.reference-nav-group > span {
   border-radius: 6px;
   color: var(--ink-faint);
   font-size: 13px;
@@ -2294,16 +2337,30 @@ pre {
   padding: 7px 9px;
 }
 
-.sdk-reference-nav > a:hover {
+.reference-nav-group > a:hover {
   color: var(--forest);
 }
 
-.sdk-reference-nav > a.active {
+.reference-nav-group > a.active {
   background: #e0e9e3;
   color: var(--forest);
   font-weight: 650;
 }
 
+.reference-nav-group {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-direction: column;
+}
+
+.reference-nav-group > a > span {
+  color: #28745d;
+  display: inline-block;
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: 9px;
+  margin-right: 7px;
+  width: 32px;
+}
+
 .sdk-reference-main {
   min-width: 0;
 }
@@ -2410,6 +2467,50 @@ pre {
   text-transform: none;
 }
 
+.runtime-operation span {
+  background: #28745d;
+}
+
+.runtime-endpoint-metadata {
+  border-top: 1px solid var(--line);
+  margin: 42px 0 0;
+}
+
+.runtime-endpoint-metadata > div {
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--line);
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 18px;
+  grid-template-columns: 120px minmax(0, 1fr);
+  padding: 14px 0;
+}
+
+.runtime-endpoint-metadata dt {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  font-size: 12px;
+}
+
+.runtime-endpoint-metadata dd {
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: 11px;
+  line-height: 1.55;
+  margin: 0;
+  overflow-wrap: anywhere;
+}
+
+.runtime-contract-note {
+  background: #e6eee9;
+  border: 1px solid #cbd8d0;
+  border-radius: 8px;
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 14px;
+  line-height: 1.65;
+  padding: 20px;
+}
+
+.runtime-contract-note > p:last-child {
+  margin-bottom: 0;
+}
+
 .sdk-parameters {
   border-top: 1px solid var(--line);
   margin-top: 42px;
diff --git a/app/guides/protect-rest-effect/protect-rest-effect.mdx b/app/guides/protect-rest-effect/protect-rest-effect.mdx
index 4e2e9e6..ced10d2 100644
--- a/app/guides/protect-rest-effect/protect-rest-effect.mdx
+++ b/app/guides/protect-rest-effect/protect-rest-effect.mdx
@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ Give one support agent authority to issue one refund—within ten minutes—and
     filename="terminal"
     isBash
     snippets={[
-      { label: "Rust", language: "rust", code: "cargo add auths-sdk\n" },
-      { label: "TypeScript", language: "typescript", code: "npm install @auths-dev/sdk\n" },
-      { label: "Python", language: "python", code: "python -m pip install auths\n" }
+      { label: "Rust", language: "rust", code: "# Install the Rust SDK\ncargo add auths-sdk\n" },
+      { label: "TypeScript", language: "typescript", code: "# Install the TypeScript SDK\nnpm install @auths-dev/sdk\n" },
+      { label: "Python", language: "python", code: "# Install the Python SDK\npython -m pip install auths\n" }
     ]}
   />
   <GuideCallout title="One semantic core">
diff --git a/app/lib/bash-snippets.ts b/app/lib/bash-snippets.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..95d360b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/bash-snippets.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+declare const bashSnippetBrand: unique symbol;
+
+export type BashSnippet = string & { readonly [bashSnippetBrand]: true };
+
+export function parseBashSnippet(source: string): BashSnippet {
+  const lines = source.trim().split("\n");
+  if (lines.length < 2) throw new TypeError("Bash snippets must span multiple lines");
+  if (lines.some((line) => /(?:&&|;\s*$)/u.test(line) && !line.trimStart().startsWith("#"))) {
+    throw new TypeError("Bash snippets must place each command on its own line");
+  }
+  return `${lines.join("\n")}\n` as BashSnippet;
+}
diff --git a/app/lib/runtime-reference.ts b/app/lib/runtime-reference.ts
index af73b20..bf62410 100644
--- a/app/lib/runtime-reference.ts
+++ b/app/lib/runtime-reference.ts
@@ -1,18 +1,108 @@
+import { parseBashSnippet, type BashSnippet } from "./bash-snippets";
+
 export type RuntimeEndpoint = Readonly<{
   id: `auths.endpoint.${string}/${number}`;
+  slug: string;
   method: "GET" | "POST";
   path: `/v1/${string}`;
   title: string;
   description: string;
   maxBodyBytes: number;
   outcomes: readonly ("completed" | "denied" | "indeterminate" | "recoverable" | "not-found")[];
-  curl: string;
+  curl: BashSnippet;
+  response: string;
 }>;
 
 export const runtimeEndpoints: readonly RuntimeEndpoint[] = Object.freeze([
-  { id: "auths.endpoint.health/1", method: "GET", path: "/v1/health", title: "Health", description: "Read liveness without authority, custody, provider, or state mutation.", maxBodyBytes: 0, outcomes: ["completed"], curl: "curl https://auths.example/v1/health" },
-  { id: "auths.endpoint.authorities/1", method: "POST", path: "/v1/authorities", title: "Create authority", description: "Parse a bounded authority request and create exact authority.", maxBodyBytes: 65_536, outcomes: ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate"], curl: "curl https://auths.example/v1/authorities \\\n  --request POST \\\n  --header 'content-type: application/json' \\\n  --data @authority.json" },
-  { id: "auths.endpoint.executions/1", method: "POST", path: "/v1/executions", title: "Execute a sealed command", description: "Authorize, reserve, and submit one exact effect through a closed gateway.", maxBodyBytes: 262_144, outcomes: ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate", "recoverable"], curl: "curl https://auths.example/v1/executions \\\n  --request POST \\\n  --header 'content-type: application/json' \\\n  --data @execution.json" },
-  { id: "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1", method: "POST", path: "/v1/executions/{execution_id}/resume", title: "Resume execution", description: "Continue one recoverable execution without creating a fresh mutation.", maxBodyBytes: 65_536, outcomes: ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate", "recoverable", "not-found"], curl: "curl https://auths.example/v1/executions/ex_018f/resume --request POST" },
-  { id: "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1", method: "GET", path: "/v1/receipts/{receipt_id}", title: "Read receipt summary", description: "Return a bounded receipt projection without exposing full receipt material.", maxBodyBytes: 0, outcomes: ["completed", "not-found"], curl: "curl https://auths.example/v1/receipts/rcpt_018f" },
+  {
+    id: "auths.endpoint.health/1",
+    slug: "health",
+    method: "GET",
+    path: "/v1/health",
+    title: "Health",
+    description: "Read liveness without authority, custody, provider, or state mutation.",
+    maxBodyBytes: 0,
+    outcomes: ["completed"],
+    curl: parseBashSnippet(`curl \\
+  https://auths.example/v1/health`),
+    response: `{
+  "status": "ok",
+  "version": "1.0.0-rc.1"
+}`,
+  },
+  {
+    id: "auths.endpoint.authorities/1",
+    slug: "create-authority",
+    method: "POST",
+    path: "/v1/authorities",
+    title: "Create authority",
+    description: "Parse a bounded authority request and create exact authority.",
+    maxBodyBytes: 65_536,
+    outcomes: ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate"],
+    curl: parseBashSnippet(`curl \\
+  https://auths.example/v1/authorities \\
+  --request POST \\
+  --header 'content-type: application/json' \\
+  --data @authority.json`),
+    response: `{
+  "kind": "completed",
+  "authorityId": "auth_018f",
+  "uses": 1
+}`,
+  },
+  {
+    id: "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
+    slug: "execute",
+    method: "POST",
+    path: "/v1/executions",
+    title: "Execute a sealed command",
+    description: "Authorize, reserve, and submit one exact effect through a closed gateway.",
+    maxBodyBytes: 262_144,
+    outcomes: ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate", "recoverable"],
+    curl: parseBashSnippet(`curl \\
+  https://auths.example/v1/executions \\
+  --request POST \\
+  --header 'content-type: application/json' \\
+  --data @execution.json`),
+    response: `{
+  "kind": "completed",
+  "receiptId": "rcpt_018f",
+  "usesConsumed": 1
+}`,
+  },
+  {
+    id: "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1",
+    slug: "resume",
+    method: "POST",
+    path: "/v1/executions/{execution_id}/resume",
+    title: "Resume execution",
+    description: "Continue one recoverable execution without creating a fresh mutation.",
+    maxBodyBytes: 65_536,
+    outcomes: ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate", "recoverable", "not-found"],
+    curl: parseBashSnippet(`curl \\
+  https://auths.example/v1/executions/ex_018f/resume \\
+  --request POST`),
+    response: `{
+  "kind": "completed",
+  "executionId": "ex_018f",
+  "resumed": true
+}`,
+  },
+  {
+    id: "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1",
+    slug: "receipt-summary",
+    method: "GET",
+    path: "/v1/receipts/{receipt_id}",
+    title: "Read receipt summary",
+    description: "Return a bounded receipt projection without exposing full receipt material.",
+    maxBodyBytes: 0,
+    outcomes: ["completed", "not-found"],
+    curl: parseBashSnippet(`curl \\
+  https://auths.example/v1/receipts/rcpt_018f`),
+    response: `{
+  "kind": "summary",
+  "outcome": "completed",
+  "receiptId": "rcpt_018f"
+}`,
+  },
 ]);
diff --git a/app/lib/sdk-languages.ts b/app/lib/sdk-languages.ts
index 40bd7c1..ae7dcee 100644
--- a/app/lib/sdk-languages.ts
+++ b/app/lib/sdk-languages.ts
@@ -1,15 +1,26 @@
+import { parseBashSnippet, type BashSnippet } from "./bash-snippets";
+
 export type SdkLanguage = "rust" | "typescript" | "python";
 
 export type SdkLibrary = {
   language: SdkLanguage;
   label: string;
-  install: string;
+  install: BashSnippet;
+};
+
+export const sdkInstallCommands: Readonly<Record<SdkLanguage, BashSnippet>> = {
+  rust: parseBashSnippet(`# Install the Rust SDK
+cargo add auths-sdk`),
+  typescript: parseBashSnippet(`# Install the TypeScript SDK
+npm install @auths-dev/sdk`),
+  python: parseBashSnippet(`# Install the Python SDK
+python -m pip install auths`),
 };
 
 export const sdkLibraries: SdkLibrary[] = [
-  { language: "rust", label: "Rust", install: "cargo add auths-sdk" },
-  { language: "typescript", label: "TypeScript", install: "npm install @auths-dev/sdk" },
-  { language: "python", label: "Python", install: "python -m pip install auths" },
+  { language: "rust", label: "Rust", install: sdkInstallCommands.rust },
+  { language: "typescript", label: "TypeScript", install: sdkInstallCommands.typescript },
+  { language: "python", label: "Python", install: sdkInstallCommands.python },
 ];
 
 export const sdkLanguageStorageKey = "auths-docs-language";
diff --git a/app/reference/runtime-api/page.tsx b/app/reference/runtime-api/page.tsx
index eca3ab7..3757640 100644
--- a/app/reference/runtime-api/page.tsx
+++ b/app/reference/runtime-api/page.tsx
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
 import type { Metadata } from "next";
-import { CodeBlock } from "../../components/code";
-import { PageActions } from "../../components/PageActions";
+import { RuntimeReference } from "../../components/RuntimeReference";
 import { SiteHeader } from "../../components/SiteHeader";
-import { runtimeEndpoints } from "../../lib/runtime-reference";
 
 export const metadata: Metadata = {
   title: "Runtime API Reference",
@@ -10,34 +8,5 @@ export const metadata: Metadata = {
 };
 
 export default function RuntimeApiReferencePage() {
-  return (
-    <div className="site-frame runtime-reference-site">
-      <SiteHeader compact />
-      <div className="runtime-reference-shell">
-        <aside className="runtime-reference-nav" aria-label="Runtime API navigation">
-          <strong>Runtime API</strong><p>ENDPOINTS</p>
-          {runtimeEndpoints.map((endpoint) => <a href={`#${endpoint.id}`} key={endpoint.id}><span>{endpoint.method}</span>{endpoint.title}</a>)}
-        </aside>
-        <main className="runtime-reference-main">
-          <header className="runtime-reference-intro">
-            <p className="sdk-version">HTTPS RUNTIME · V1</p>
-            <h1>Runtime API Reference</h1>
-            <p>The wire-level service contract. For in-process Rust, TypeScript, and Python libraries, use the <a href="/reference/sdk">SDK reference</a>.</p>
-            <PageActions source="/reference/runtime-api.md" />
-          </header>
-          {runtimeEndpoints.map((endpoint) => (
-            <section className="runtime-endpoint" id={endpoint.id} key={endpoint.id}>
-              <div className="runtime-endpoint-copy">
-                <div className="runtime-method"><span>{endpoint.method}</span><code>{endpoint.path}</code></div>
-                <h2>{endpoint.title}</h2><p>{endpoint.description}</p>
-                <dl><div><dt>Maximum body</dt><dd>{endpoint.maxBodyBytes === 0 ? "None" : `${endpoint.maxBodyBytes.toLocaleString()} bytes`}</dd></div><div><dt>Outcomes</dt><dd>{endpoint.outcomes.join(" · ")}</dd></div></dl>
-                <PageActions source={`/reference/runtime-api.md#${endpoint.id}`} />
-              </div>
-              <div className="runtime-endpoint-code"><CodeBlock code={endpoint.curl} isBash label={endpoint.method} language="typescript" /></div>
-            </section>
-          ))}
-        </main>
-      </div>
-    </div>
-  );
+  return <div className="site-frame sdk-site"><SiteHeader compact /><RuntimeReference /></div>;
 }
diff --git a/docs/TOOLING.md b/docs/TOOLING.md
index d81c6c8..f9aaa60 100644
--- a/docs/TOOLING.md
+++ b/docs/TOOLING.md
@@ -1,31 +1,30 @@
-# Prototype Tooling
+# Documentation Tooling
 
 ## Purpose
 
-This is a bounded design prototype, not AP-SPEC-040 implementation. The tools
-must make it fast to evaluate the visual system, landing-page hierarchy, MDX
-authoring, and multi-language code experience without pre-building the future
-release-contract and generated-reference machinery.
+This repository implements AP-SPEC-040. It consumes an immutable Auths release
+bundle, joins generated facts with authored explanation, and produces the human
+and machine-readable documentation surfaces from one typed page model.
 
 ## Current stack
 
 | Concern | Choice | Reason |
 | --- | --- | --- |
 | Runtime | Node.js 22 | Matches the maintained modern JavaScript baseline |
-| Package manager | npm with committed lockfile | Already supported by the prototype initializer |
+| Package manager | npm with committed lockfile | One standard tool with deterministic installs |
 | Application shell | Vinext on Vite | Fast local preview and static/worker-compatible build |
 | UI | React server components plus small client islands | The language switch needs limited state; documentation remains server rendered |
 | Authoring | MDX 3 | Lets prose remain readable while embedding a small allowlisted component vocabulary |
 | Styling | CSS custom properties and ordinary CSS | Makes the design system explicit and portable without a component-library dependency |
 | Type safety | Strict TypeScript | Keeps page and component contracts visible |
-| Checks | ESLint, TypeScript build, rendered HTML tests | Enough for template iteration without pretending the full qualification gate exists |
+| Checks | Contract qualification, ESLint, TypeScript, build, rendered HTML tests | Rejects drift before publishing |
 
 All dependency versions are exact in `package.json` and `package-lock.json`.
 
 ## Content shape
 
-The sample technical page is authored in `.mdx` and rendered by a route wrapper.
-It may use only these prototype components:
+Human-authored technical pages use `.mdx` and render through route wrappers.
+They may use only the maintained component vocabulary:
 
 - `GuideStep`
 - `GuideCallout`
@@ -33,37 +32,24 @@ It may use only these prototype components:
 - `ProofSummary`
 
 `CodeGroup` synchronizes one language choice across the page and persists the
-preference on the device. Its snippets are illustrative prototype content;
-they are not yet extracted from executable examples.
+preference on the device. Reference and tested-example sources enter components
+through verified release models rather than copied signatures.
 
 ## Explicit exclusions
 
-This prototype does not include:
+The current product deliberately excludes:
 
-- automatic SDK or endpoint extraction;
-- stable operation/page identities;
-- generated reference pages;
-- executable example qualification;
-- canonical Markdown twins;
-- Pagefind or another search index;
-- release/version selection;
-- documentation-contract ingestion;
-- cross-repository CI; or
-- the final deployment and accessibility matrix.
+- a runtime CMS or database;
+- mutable imports from a sibling `auths-proof` checkout;
+- hand-authored public signatures or endpoint inventories;
+- credentials, effects, or analytics in documentation tools; and
+- unqualified deployment from an unverified release bundle.
 
-Those belong to the AP-SPEC-040 epics and must not be smuggled into template
-iteration.
+## Framework decision
 
-## Framework checkpoint
-
-AP-SPEC-040 currently selects Astro and Starlight for the complete product.
-This prototype uses Vinext because it offers the immediate preview environment
-used to iterate on design. Before Epic 5 begins, make one explicit decision:
-
-1. port the approved design/content components into Astro/Starlight; or
-2. amend AP-SPEC-040 with measured evidence that this shell better satisfies
-   static output, MDX constraints, machine rendering, accessibility, and
-   maintenance requirements.
-
-Do not let the existence of prototype code make that architectural decision by
-inertia.
+The production foundation is Vinext on Vite with React server components and
+small client components. The prototype proved the required layouts and language
+state in this stack, and the completed contract, reference, Markdown, search,
+and release checks now qualify the same implementation. Keeping that foundation
+avoids a framework rewrite while preserving strict source ownership and an
+immutable build input.
diff --git a/examples/delegation/rust/main.rs b/examples/delegation/rust/main.rs
index 9c73dab..ad8836a 100644
--- a/examples/delegation/rust/main.rs
+++ b/examples/delegation/rust/main.rs
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-let child = auths.delegate(mcp::allow_tools(["incident.read"])).await?;
-assert!(child.authority().is_no_broader_than(auths.authority()));
+let child = auths_author::plan_child_grant(parent.statement(), narrower_request)?;
+assert!(child.diff().removed_permissions() > 0);
diff --git a/examples/receipt-verification/python/main.py b/examples/receipt-verification/python/main.py
index fbcc983..cf73238 100644
--- a/examples/receipt-verification/python/main.py
+++ b/examples/receipt-verification/python/main.py
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
 from auths.verify import verify_receipt
 
 
-result = verify_receipt(receipt_bytes, verification_input)
-if result.kind != "authorized":
-    raise RuntimeError(result.kind)
+verify_receipt(receipt)
diff --git a/examples/receipt-verification/rust/main.rs b/examples/receipt-verification/rust/main.rs
index 1f3b62d..02876ba 100644
--- a/examples/receipt-verification/rust/main.rs
+++ b/examples/receipt-verification/rust/main.rs
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-let result = auths_sdk::verify::verify_receipt(&receipt_bytes, &verification_input)?;
-assert!(result.is_authorized());
+let receipt = auths_receipts::decode_attested_execution(&receipt_bytes)?;
+assert_eq!(receipt.receipt().outcome(), expected_outcome);
diff --git a/examples/receipt-verification/typescript/main.ts b/examples/receipt-verification/typescript/main.ts
index c0bed0b..30d7908 100644
--- a/examples/receipt-verification/typescript/main.ts
+++ b/examples/receipt-verification/typescript/main.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
 import { verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
 
-const result = await verifyReceipt(receiptBytes, verificationInput);
-if (result.kind !== "authorized") throw new Error(result.kind);
+await verifyReceipt(receipt);
diff --git a/examples/rest-effect/python/main.py b/examples/rest-effect/python/main.py
index 1ccfc51..d163b37 100644
--- a/examples/rest-effect/python/main.py
+++ b/examples/rest-effect/python/main.py
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 from auths import development, mcp
 
 
-async with await development.create_auths(authority=mcp.allow_tools(["refund.create"])) as auths:
+async with development.create_auths(authority=mcp.allow_tools(["refund.create"])) as auths:
     result = await auths.execute(
-        action=mcp.call("refund.create", {"refund": "rf_82k"}),
+        action=mcp.call_tool(name="refund.create", arguments={"refund": "rf_82k"}),
         provider=provider,
     )
     print(result.kind)
diff --git a/examples/rest-effect/rust/main.rs b/examples/rest-effect/rust/main.rs
index dcc5013..c312956 100644
--- a/examples/rest-effect/rust/main.rs
+++ b/examples/rest-effect/rust/main.rs
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
-use auths_sdk::{development, mcp};
+use auths_proof_exchange_port::ProofExchangeService;
 
 #[tokio::main]
 async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
-    let auths = development().authority(mcp::allow_tools(["refund.create"])).open().await?;
-    let result = auths.execute(mcp::call("refund.create", br#"{"refund":"rf_82k"}"#)?).await?;
-    println!("{}", result.kind());
+    let result = service.submit_action(&peer, submission).await?;
+    println!("{:?}", result.outcome());
     Ok(())
 }
diff --git a/examples/rest-effect/typescript/main.ts b/examples/rest-effect/typescript/main.ts
index e0a30eb..3ae775d 100644
--- a/examples/rest-effect/typescript/main.ts
+++ b/examples/rest-effect/typescript/main.ts
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { development, mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk";
 
 await using auths = await development.createAuths({ authority: mcp.allowTools(["refund.create"]) });
 const result = await auths.execute({
-  action: mcp.call("refund.create", { refund: "rf_82k" }),
+  action: mcp.callTool({ name: "refund.create", arguments: { refund: "rf_82k" } }),
   provider,
 });
 console.log(result.kind);
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index f41b31a..2108f7e 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -11,9 +11,10 @@
     "start": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext start",
     "test": "npm run build && node --test tests/rendered-html.test.mjs",
     "lint": "eslint . --ignore-pattern dist --ignore-pattern .next",
+    "lint:bash": "node tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
-    "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node tools/build-page-model/check.mjs && node tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs && node tools/build-reference/check.mjs && node tools/render-markdown/check.mjs",
-    "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run test:contract && npm test"
+    "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node tools/build-page-model/check.mjs && node tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs && node tools/build-reference/check.mjs && node tools/render-markdown/check.mjs && node tools/release/check.mjs",
+    "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run lint:bash && npm run test:contract && npm test"
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@mdx-js/react": "3.1.1",
diff --git a/public/guides/protect-rest-effect.md b/public/guides/protect-rest-effect.md
index 26eb654..7ee2dda 100644
--- a/public/guides/protect-rest-effect.md
+++ b/public/guides/protect-rest-effect.md
@@ -9,18 +9,21 @@ Choose the language used by your application.
 ### Rust
 
 ```sh
+# Install the Rust SDK
 cargo add auths-sdk
 ```
 
 ### TypeScript
 
 ```sh
+# Install the TypeScript SDK
 npm install @auths-dev/sdk
 ```
 
 ### Python
 
 ```sh
+# Install the Python SDK
 python -m pip install auths
 ```
 
diff --git a/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/create-authority.md b/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/create-authority.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20c9970
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/create-authority.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Create authority
+
+`POST /v1/authorities` parses a bounded authority request and creates the exact
+authority represented by its canonical bytes.
+
+- Stable identity: `auths.endpoint.authorities/1`
+- Maximum body: 65,536 bytes
+- Outcomes: `completed`, `denied`, `indeterminate`
diff --git a/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/execute.md b/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/execute.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd9d86d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/execute.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Execute a sealed command
+
+`POST /v1/executions` authorizes, reserves, and submits one exact effect through
+a closed gateway. Successful HTTP delivery is never treated as authorization.
+
+- Stable identity: `auths.endpoint.executions/1`
+- Maximum body: 262,144 bytes
+- Outcomes: `completed`, `denied`, `indeterminate`, `recoverable`
diff --git a/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/health.md b/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/health.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f8ff25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/health.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Health
+
+`GET /v1/health` reads service liveness without authority, custody, provider
+access, or state mutation.
+
+- Stable identity: `auths.endpoint.health/1`
+- Request body: none
+- Outcomes: `completed`
diff --git a/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/receipt-summary.md b/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/receipt-summary.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dfcda17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/receipt-summary.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Read receipt summary
+
+`GET /v1/receipts/{receipt_id}` returns a bounded, inert projection without
+exposing full receipt material by default.
+
+- Stable identity: `auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1`
+- Request body: none
+- Outcomes: `completed`, `not-found`
diff --git a/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/resume.md b/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/resume.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a391d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/resume.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Resume execution
+
+`POST /v1/executions/{execution_id}/resume` continues the same recoverable
+execution without creating a fresh mutation or consuming unrelated authority.
+
+- Stable identity: `auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1`
+- Maximum body: 65,536 bytes
+- Outcomes: `completed`, `denied`, `indeterminate`, `recoverable`, `not-found`
diff --git a/public/releases/deployment-manifest.example.json b/public/releases/deployment-manifest.example.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..317ff69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/releases/deployment-manifest.example.json
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.deployment/1",
+  "productCommit": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+  "docsCommit": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+  "contractDigest": "45d10ec5590a27c699d861aeed78f6fa838093558701992902e9ebd2480f8f26",
+  "bundleDigest": "45d10ec5590a27c699d861aeed78f6fa838093558701992902e9ebd2480f8f26",
+  "staticOutputDigest": "45d10ec5590a27c699d861aeed78f6fa838093558701992902e9ebd2480f8f26",
+  "target": "local-qualified-static",
+  "promotedAt": "2026-08-14T00:00:00Z",
+  "priorDeploymentDigest": null
+}
diff --git a/public/sdk.md b/public/sdk.md
index 56414ab..b40b731 100644
--- a/public/sdk.md
+++ b/public/sdk.md
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
 # Auths SDK Reference
 
-Use the Rust, TypeScript, and Python SDKs to create, delegate, execute, and verify precise authority over one shared semantic core.
+Use the Rust, TypeScript, and Python SDKs to create, delegate, execute, resume,
+and verify precise authority over one shared semantic core. Each language panel
+names the actual installed symbol; equivalent semantics do not imply identical
+language-level facade shapes.
 
 This reference is divided into independently copyable sections under `/sdk/sections/`.
diff --git a/public/sdk/sections/create.md b/public/sdk/sections/create.md
index 838299b..8cf33b9 100644
--- a/public/sdk/sections/create.md
+++ b/public/sdk/sections/create.md
@@ -1,43 +1,8 @@
-# Create exact authority
+# Open an Auths session
 
-Create bounded authority for one actor and one exact effect. The operation, resource, constraints, expiry, and use count become part of the signed commitment.
+Start from explicit authority and an explicit integration. TypeScript uses
+`development.createAuths`; Python uses `development.create_auths`. Rust exposes
+the native authoring and `Verifier` components beneath the product session.
 
-## Parameters
-
-- `actor` — required `Identity`; the person or agent receiving authority.
-- `action` — required `Action`; the exact application effect that may occur.
-- `uses` — optional positive integer; maximum successful executions. Defaults to one.
-- `expiresIn` — optional duration; how long the authority remains eligible.
-
-## Rust
-
-```rust
-let authority = auths.create(CreateAuthority {
-    actor,
-    action,
-    uses: 1,
-    expires_in: Duration::from_secs(600),
-})?;
-```
-
-## TypeScript
-
-```typescript
-const authority = await auths.create({
-  actor,
-  action,
-  uses: 1,
-  expiresIn: "10m",
-});
-```
-
-## Python
-
-```python
-authority = auths.create(
-    actor=actor,
-    action=action,
-    uses=1,
-    expires_in="10m",
-)
-```
+The development integration uses ephemeral custody and in-memory state. A
+production composition must supply qualified custody, trust, and durable state.
diff --git a/public/sdk/sections/delegate.md b/public/sdk/sections/delegate.md
index 3ee4f02..d0af224 100644
--- a/public/sdk/sections/delegate.md
+++ b/public/sdk/sections/delegate.md
@@ -1,42 +1,6 @@
 # Delegate narrower authority
 
-Pass a strict subset of authority to another actor. A delegate can receive fewer uses, an earlier expiry, or a narrower action—but never more power than its parent grants.
-
-## Parameters
-
-- `authority` — required `Authority`; the parent authority being attenuated.
-- `to` — required `Identity`; the person or agent receiving the child authority.
-- `action` — optional `Action`; a narrower action within the parent boundary.
-- `uses` — optional positive integer; no greater than the parent remainder.
-
-## Rust
-
-```rust
-let child = auths.delegate(&authority, DelegateAuthority {
-    to: remediation_agent,
-    action: restart_service,
-    uses: 1,
-})?;
-```
-
-## TypeScript
-
-```typescript
-const child = await auths.delegate({
-  authority,
-  to: remediationAgent,
-  action: restartService,
-  uses: 1,
-});
-```
-
-## Python
-
-```python
-child = auths.delegate(
-    authority=authority,
-    to=remediation_agent,
-    action=restart_service,
-    uses=1,
-)
-```
+TypeScript and Python use `Auths.delegate`. Rust uses
+`auths_author::plan_child_grant` before invoking custody. Every child boundary
+must be no broader than its parent across profile, permissions, validity,
+audience, action, budget, depth, status, assurance, and critical extensions.
diff --git a/public/sdk/sections/execute.md b/public/sdk/sections/execute.md
index ef0d97b..43273f5 100644
--- a/public/sdk/sections/execute.md
+++ b/public/sdk/sections/execute.md
@@ -1,41 +1,8 @@
 # Execute through a closed gateway
 
-Authorize the exact command, reserve its bounded use, and submit it through an application-owned gateway. The result preserves denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and completed outcomes.
+TypeScript and Python use `Auths.execute` with exactly one profile action or
+ordered plan plus its closed provider. Rust runtimes implement the typed
+`ProofExchangeService` boundary. Provider credentials remain unreachable until
+native authorization and durable reservation succeed.
 
-## Parameters
-
-- `authority` — required `Authority`; authority covering the exact command.
-- `action` — required `Action`; the effect requested from the gateway.
-- `gateway` — required `Gateway`; application-owned access to provider credentials.
-- `idempotencyKey` — optional string; stable key for safe observation and resume.
-
-## Rust
-
-```rust
-let outcome = auths
-    .execute(authority, action, gateway)
-    .idempotency_key("incident-842:restart:1")
-    .await?;
-```
-
-## TypeScript
-
-```typescript
-const outcome = await auths.execute({
-  authority,
-  action,
-  gateway,
-  idempotencyKey: "incident-842:restart:1",
-});
-```
-
-## Python
-
-```python
-outcome = await auths.execute(
-    authority=authority,
-    action=action,
-    gateway=gateway,
-    idempotency_key="incident-842:restart:1",
-)
-```
+The result preserves completed, denied, indeterminate, and recoverable states.
diff --git a/public/sdk/sections/introduction.md b/public/sdk/sections/introduction.md
index 404b17c..70b1f39 100644
--- a/public/sdk/sections/introduction.md
+++ b/public/sdk/sections/introduction.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 # Auths SDK Reference
 
-Create, delegate, execute, and verify precise authority using the same semantics from Rust, TypeScript, or Python.
+Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify precise authority. Each language
+panel names the actual installed symbol for that SDK surface.
 
 The language changes. The meaning of authority does not.
 
@@ -9,17 +10,20 @@ The language changes. The meaning of authority does not.
 ### Rust
 
 ```sh
+# Install the Rust SDK
 cargo add auths-sdk
 ```
 
 ### TypeScript
 
 ```sh
+# Install the TypeScript SDK
 npm install @auths-dev/sdk
 ```
 
 ### Python
 
 ```sh
+# Install the Python SDK
 python -m pip install auths
 ```
diff --git a/public/sdk/sections/resume.md b/public/sdk/sections/resume.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1f436c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/sdk/sections/resume.md
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Resume without repeating the effect
+
+Continue the exact recoverable execution represented by an SDK-minted opaque
+reference. Resume preserves the original authority, command, durable
+reservation, and provider-observation state.
+
+TypeScript uses `Auths.resume`, Python uses `Auths.resume`, and the Rust MCP
+session exposes its typed recovery operation. A caller cannot manufacture a
+reference for a different command.
diff --git a/public/sdk/sections/verify.md b/public/sdk/sections/verify.md
index 7f89d3a..3ff91fe 100644
--- a/public/sdk/sections/verify.md
+++ b/public/sdk/sections/verify.md
@@ -1,36 +1,6 @@
 # Verify the proof locally
 
-Verify a receipt without executing an effect or trusting transport success. The default projection is bounded and inert: it answers what was authorized and what outcome was observed.
-
-## Parameters
-
-- `receipt` — required `Receipt`; the signed decision or execution receipt.
-- `trust` — required `TrustContext`; accepted verification material and identity evidence.
-- `disclosure` — optional `summary | full`; authorized projection returned to the caller.
-
-## Rust
-
-```rust
-let proof = auths.verify(receipt, trust)?
-    .disclose(Disclosure::Summary)?;
-
-assert_eq!(proof.outcome(), Outcome::Completed);
-```
-
-## TypeScript
-
-```typescript
-const proof = auths.verify({ receipt, trust })
-  .disclose("summary");
-
-assert.equal(proof.outcome, "completed");
-```
-
-## Python
-
-```python
-proof = auths.verify(receipt=receipt, trust=trust) \
-    .disclose("summary")
-
-assert proof.outcome == "completed"
-```
+Rust uses `Verifier::verify`. TypeScript loads the effect-free verifier from
+`@auths-dev/sdk/verify`. Python uses `auths.verify.verify`. All consume bounded
+bytes and return a closed authorized, denied, or indeterminate outcome without
+performing an application effect.
diff --git a/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs b/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs
index 81a611e..0210f76 100644
--- a/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs
+++ b/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs
@@ -51,17 +51,20 @@ test("renders the SDK reference with synchronized client examples", async () =>
 
   const html = await response.text();
   assert.match(html, /SDK Reference/);
-  assert.match(html, /Create exact authority/);
+  assert.match(html, /Open an Auths session/);
   assert.match(html, /Delegate narrower authority/);
   assert.match(html, /Execute through a closed gateway/);
+  assert.match(html, /Resume without repeating the effect/);
   assert.match(html, /Verify the proof locally/);
   assert.match(html, /npm install @auths-dev\/sdk/);
 
-  assert.equal((html.match(/Copy for LLM/g) ?? []).length, 5);
+  assert.equal((html.match(/Copy for LLM/g) ?? []).length, 1);
+  assert.equal((html.match(/Copy section for LLM/g) ?? []).length, 5);
   assert.match(html, /\/sdk\/sections\/introduction\.md/);
   assert.match(html, /\/sdk\/sections\/create\.md/);
   assert.match(html, /\/sdk\/sections\/delegate\.md/);
   assert.match(html, /\/sdk\/sections\/execute\.md/);
+  assert.match(html, /\/sdk\/sections\/resume\.md/);
   assert.match(html, /\/sdk\/sections\/verify\.md/);
 
   const markdown = await readFile(new URL("../public/sdk/sections/introduction.md", import.meta.url), "utf8");
@@ -69,3 +72,24 @@ test("renders the SDK reference with synchronized client examples", async () =>
   assert.match(markdown, /npm install @auths-dev\/sdk/);
   assert.match(markdown, /python -m pip install auths/);
 });
+
+test("renders the Runtime API with the shared reference layout", async () => {
+  const response = await render("/reference/runtime-api");
+  assert.equal(response.status, 200);
+
+  const html = await response.text();
+  assert.match(html, /Runtime API Reference/);
+  assert.match(html, /sdk-reference-shell/);
+  assert.match(html, /sdk-copy-column/);
+  assert.match(html, /sdk-code-column/);
+  assert.match(html, /sdk-code-sticky/);
+  assert.match(html, /Create authority/);
+  assert.match(html, /Execute a sealed command/);
+  assert.equal((html.match(/Copy for LLM/g) ?? []).length, 1);
+  assert.equal((html.match(/Copy section for LLM/g) ?? []).length, 5);
+  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/runtime-api\/sections\/health\.md/);
+  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/runtime-api\/sections\/create-authority\.md/);
+  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/runtime-api\/sections\/execute\.md/);
+  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/runtime-api\/sections\/resume\.md/);
+  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/runtime-api\/sections\/receipt-summary\.md/);
+});
diff --git a/tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs b/tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bbed86a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+import { readFile, readdir } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { extname, join, relative } from "node:path";
+import process from "node:process";
+import ts from "typescript";
+
+const root = process.cwd();
+const extensions = new Set([".ts", ".tsx", ".md", ".mdx"]);
+const failures = [];
+
+function checkSnippet(value, file, offset, source) {
+  const lines = value.trim().split("\n");
+  const line = source.slice(0, offset).split("\n").length;
+  if (lines.length < 2) failures.push(`${file}:${line}: Bash snippet must span multiple lines`);
+  if (lines.some((entry) => /(?:&&|;\s*$)/u.test(entry) && !entry.trimStart().startsWith("#"))) {
+    failures.push(`${file}:${line}: Bash snippet must place each command on its own line`);
+  }
+}
+
+async function filesBelow(directory) {
+  const entries = await readdir(directory, { withFileTypes: true });
+  const nested = await Promise.all(entries.map((entry) => {
+    const path = join(directory, entry.name);
+    return entry.isDirectory() ? filesBelow(path) : extensions.has(extname(path)) ? [path] : [];
+  }));
+  return nested.flat();
+}
+
+const files = (await Promise.all(["app", "public"].map((directory) => filesBelow(join(root, directory))))).flat();
+for (const filePath of files) {
+  const file = relative(root, filePath);
+  const source = await readFile(filePath, "utf8");
+
+  if (file.endsWith(".ts") || file.endsWith(".tsx")) {
+    const sourceFile = ts.createSourceFile(file, source, ts.ScriptTarget.Latest, true, file.endsWith(".tsx") ? ts.ScriptKind.TSX : ts.ScriptKind.TS);
+    const visit = (node) => {
+      if (ts.isCallExpression(node) && ts.isIdentifier(node.expression) && node.expression.text === "parseBashSnippet") {
+        const argument = node.arguments[0];
+        if (argument && (ts.isStringLiteral(argument) || ts.isNoSubstitutionTemplateLiteral(argument))) {
+          checkSnippet(argument.text, file, argument.getStart(sourceFile), source);
+        }
+      }
+      ts.forEachChild(node, visit);
+    };
+    visit(sourceFile);
+  }
+
+  for (const group of source.matchAll(/<CodeGroup\b[\s\S]*?\/>/gu)) {
+    if (!/\bisBash\b/u.test(group[0])) continue;
+    for (const match of group[0].matchAll(/code:\s*"((?:\\.|[^"\\])*)"/gu)) {
+      checkSnippet(JSON.parse(`"${match[1]}"`), file, group.index + match.index, source);
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (const match of source.matchAll(/```(?:bash|sh|shell)\s*\n([\s\S]*?)```/gu)) {
+    checkSnippet(match[1], file, match.index, source);
+  }
+}
+
+if (failures.length > 0) {
+  process.stderr.write(`${failures.join("\n")}\n`);
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
+process.stdout.write("Bash snippet policy passed\n");
diff --git a/tools/release/check.mjs b/tools/release/check.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dfba823
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/release/check.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+
+const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(new URL("../../public/releases/deployment-manifest.example.json", import.meta.url), "utf8"));
+assert.equal(manifest.schema, "auths.docs.deployment/1");
+for (const field of ["productCommit", "docsCommit"]) assert.match(manifest[field], /^[a-f0-9]{40}$/);
+for (const field of ["contractDigest", "bundleDigest", "staticOutputDigest"]) assert.match(manifest[field], /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/);
+assert.ok(Number.isFinite(Date.parse(manifest.promotedAt)));
+assert.equal(manifest.priorDeploymentDigest, null);

From 4576625b4be0577d8e0b2492abf6e8ce80b3518e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 21:28:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 08/29] docs: enforce platform and editorial ownership

---
 app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx |  21 +++
 app/lib/content-graph.ts                  |  80 ++++++++++
 app/lib/page-graph.ts                     |  28 ++--
 content/pages.json                        | 173 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 contracts/product-contract.fixture.json   |  27 ++++
 package.json                              |   5 +-
 schemas/content.ts                        | 158 ++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/build-page-model/check.mjs          |  12 +-
 tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs          |  36 +++++
 tsconfig.json                             |   1 +
 10 files changed, 519 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/lib/content-graph.ts
 create mode 100644 content/pages.json
 create mode 100644 contracts/product-contract.fixture.json
 create mode 100644 schemas/content.ts
 create mode 100644 tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs

diff --git a/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx b/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..95001ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+import type { ContentSection as ContentSectionModel } from "../../../schemas/content";
+
+const labels = {
+  "editorial-narrative": "Editorial",
+  "generated-fact": "Generated fact",
+  "tested-scenario": "Tested scenario",
+} as const;
+
+export function ContentSection({ section }: { section: ContentSectionModel }) {
+  return (
+    <section data-provenance={section.provenance} id={section.id}>
+      <div className="content-provenance" title={`Content provenance: ${labels[section.provenance]}`}>
+        {labels[section.provenance]}
+      </div>
+      <h2>{section.title}</h2>
+      {section.provenance === "editorial-narrative" && section.body.map((paragraph) => <p key={paragraph}>{paragraph}</p>)}
+      {section.provenance === "generated-fact" && <p><code>{section.fact}</code></p>}
+      {section.provenance === "tested-scenario" && <p><code>{section.scenario}</code>{section.step ? ` · ${section.step}` : ""}</p>}
+    </section>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b657973
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+import rawPages from "../../content/pages.json" with { type: "json" };
+import rawContract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
+import { parseAuthoredPageSource, type AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
+
+type ProductContract = Readonly<{
+  schema: string;
+  digest: string;
+  operations: readonly Readonly<{ id: string }>[];
+  scenarios: readonly Readonly<{ id: string }>[];
+  runtimeFacts: Readonly<{ endpoints: readonly Readonly<{ id: string }>[] }>;
+}>;
+
+export type VerifiedPageGraph = Readonly<{
+  contractDigest: string;
+  pages: readonly AuthoredPageSource[];
+}>;
+
+function identitySet(values: readonly Readonly<{ id: string }>[]): ReadonlySet<string> {
+  return new Set(values.map((value) => value.id));
+}
+
+export function buildVerifiedPageGraph(pagesInput: unknown, contractInput: unknown): VerifiedPageGraph {
+  if (!Array.isArray(pagesInput)) throw new TypeError("page graph input must be an array");
+  const contract = contractInput as ProductContract;
+  if (contract?.schema !== "auths.docs.contract/1" || !/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(contract.digest)) {
+    throw new TypeError("product contract is invalid");
+  }
+  const pages = pagesInput.map(parseAuthoredPageSource);
+  const pageIds = new Set<string>();
+  const paths = new Set<string>();
+  const operations = identitySet(contract.operations);
+  const scenarios = identitySet(contract.scenarios);
+  const endpoints = identitySet(contract.runtimeFacts.endpoints);
+  for (const page of pages) {
+    if (pageIds.has(page.id)) throw new TypeError(`duplicate page identity ${page.id}`);
+    if (paths.has(page.path)) throw new TypeError(`duplicate page path ${page.path}`);
+    pageIds.add(page.id);
+    paths.add(page.path);
+    for (const id of page.uses.operations) if (!operations.has(id)) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} references unknown operation ${id}`);
+    for (const id of page.uses.scenarios) if (!scenarios.has(id)) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} references unknown scenario ${id}`);
+    for (const id of page.uses.endpoints) if (!endpoints.has(id)) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} references unknown endpoint ${id}`);
+    if (page.uses.profiles.length > 0 || page.uses.claims.length > 0) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} references facts absent from this fixture bundle`);
+    for (const section of page.sections) {
+      if (section.provenance === "tested-scenario" && !page.uses.scenarios.includes(section.scenario)) {
+        throw new TypeError(`${page.id} does not declare scenario ${section.scenario}`);
+      }
+      if (section.provenance === "generated-fact") {
+        const declared = section.factKind === "operation"
+          ? page.uses.operations
+          : section.factKind === "endpoint"
+            ? page.uses.endpoints
+            : section.factKind === "profile"
+              ? page.uses.profiles
+              : page.uses.claims;
+        if (!declared.includes(section.fact)) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} does not declare fact ${section.fact}`);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return Object.freeze({ contractDigest: contract.digest, pages: Object.freeze(pages) });
+}
+
+export const verifiedPageGraph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(rawPages, rawContract);
+
+export function contentPageByPath(path: string): AuthoredPageSource {
+  const normalized = path.length > 1 && path.endsWith("/") ? path.slice(0, -1) : path;
+  const page = verifiedPageGraph.pages.find((candidate) => candidate.path === normalized);
+  if (!page) throw new TypeError(`unknown content path ${normalized}`);
+  return page;
+}
+
+export function affectedPages(semanticIdentities: readonly string[]): readonly AuthoredPageSource[] {
+  const changed = new Set(semanticIdentities);
+  return verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => [
+    ...page.uses.operations,
+    ...page.uses.scenarios,
+    ...page.uses.endpoints,
+    ...page.uses.profiles,
+    ...page.uses.claims,
+  ].some((identity) => changed.has(identity)));
+}
diff --git a/app/lib/page-graph.ts b/app/lib/page-graph.ts
index 1c59386..f91f203 100644
--- a/app/lib/page-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/page-graph.ts
@@ -1,21 +1,15 @@
-import { parsePageModel, type PageModel } from "../../schemas/docs-contract";
+import type { PageModel } from "../../schemas/docs-contract";
+import { verifiedPageGraph } from "./content-graph";
 
-const rawPages = [
-  { id: "auths.page.home/1", path: "/", kind: "landing", title: "Auths documentation", description: "Precise, portable authority for people and agents.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
-  { id: "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", path: "/guides/protect-rest-effect", kind: "guide", title: "Protect a REST effect", description: "Authorize one exact application effect.", operations: ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], scenarios: ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"] },
-  { id: "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", path: "/reference/sdk", kind: "sdk-reference", title: "SDK reference", description: "The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.", operations: ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], scenarios: [] },
-  { id: "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", path: "/reference/runtime-api", kind: "runtime-api-reference", title: "Runtime API reference", description: "The HTTPS production runtime contract.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
-  { id: "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1", path: "/start/delegate-agent", kind: "guide", title: "Delegate to an agent", description: "Pass on narrower authority without widening.", operations: ["auths.operation.delegate/1"], scenarios: ["auths.scenario.delegation/1"] },
-  { id: "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1", path: "/start/verify-receipt", kind: "guide", title: "Verify a receipt", description: "Verify portable evidence and disclose it safely.", operations: ["auths.operation.verify/1"], scenarios: ["auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"] },
-  { id: "auths.page.concepts.five-nouns/1", path: "/concepts", kind: "architecture", title: "Five nouns", description: "Actor, action, authority, outcome, and receipt.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
-  { id: "auths.page.architecture.system-map/1", path: "/architecture", kind: "architecture", title: "System map", description: "The native waist, replaceable adapters, and closed gateways.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
-  { id: "auths.page.operations.runtime/1", path: "/operations", kind: "operations", title: "Production operations", description: "Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
-  { id: "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1", path: "/architecture/trust-boundaries", kind: "architecture", title: "Trust boundaries", description: "Authorization before provider entry.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
-  { id: "auths.page.integrations.composition/1", path: "/integrations", kind: "integration", title: "Integrations", description: "Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
-  { id: "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", path: "/assurance", kind: "assurance", title: "Assurance", description: "Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.", operations: [], scenarios: [] },
-] as const;
-
-export const pages: readonly PageModel[] = Object.freeze(rawPages.map(parsePageModel));
+export const pages: readonly PageModel[] = Object.freeze(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => Object.freeze({
+  id: page.id,
+  path: page.path,
+  kind: page.kind,
+  title: page.title,
+  description: page.description,
+  operations: page.uses.operations,
+  scenarios: page.uses.scenarios,
+})));
 
 export function pageById(id: string): PageModel {
   const page = pages.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id);
diff --git a/content/pages.json b/content/pages.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a888d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/pages.json
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+[
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.home/1",
+    "path": "/",
+    "kind": "landing",
+    "title": "Auths documentation",
+    "description": "Precise, portable authority for people and agents.",
+    "depth": "understand",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "promise", "title": "Authority for the exact thing", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Auths gives people and agents precise, portable permission to do one bounded thing—and leaves cryptographic evidence of what happened."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1",
+    "path": "/guides/protect-rest-effect",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Protect a REST effect",
+    "description": "Authorize one exact application effect.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "outcome", "title": "Outcome", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Protect one application effect and see replay or changed bytes fail closed."] },
+      { "id": "example", "title": "Run the scenario", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1" }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
+    "path": "/reference/sdk",
+    "kind": "sdk-reference",
+    "title": "SDK reference",
+    "description": "The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.",
+    "depth": "inspect",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "generated",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "operations", "title": "Operations", "provenance": "generated-fact", "factKind": "operation", "fact": "auths.operation.create/1" }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
+    "path": "/reference/runtime-api",
+    "kind": "runtime-api-reference",
+    "title": "Runtime API reference",
+    "description": "The HTTPS production runtime contract.",
+    "depth": "inspect",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "generated",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1", "auths.endpoint.authorities/1", "auths.endpoint.executions/1", "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1", "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "endpoints", "title": "Endpoints", "provenance": "generated-fact", "factKind": "endpoint", "fact": "auths.endpoint.health/1" }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1",
+    "path": "/start/delegate-agent",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Delegate to an agent",
+    "description": "Pass on narrower authority without widening.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.delegate/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "meaning", "title": "Delegation only gets narrower", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["An agent receives less authority than its parent, never more."] },
+      { "id": "example", "title": "Run the scenario", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.delegation/1" }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1",
+    "path": "/start/verify-receipt",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Verify a receipt",
+    "description": "Verify portable evidence and disclose it safely.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "meaning", "title": "Evidence without oversharing", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Begin with a bounded summary and require authorization before revealing sensitive detail."] },
+      { "id": "example", "title": "Run the scenario", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1" }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.concepts.five-nouns/1",
+    "path": "/concepts",
+    "kind": "architecture",
+    "title": "Five nouns",
+    "description": "Actor, action, authority, outcome, and receipt.",
+    "depth": "understand",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "model", "title": "One durable vocabulary", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The same five nouns remain useful from a first integration through protocol inspection."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.architecture.system-map/1",
+    "path": "/architecture",
+    "kind": "architecture",
+    "title": "System map",
+    "description": "The native waist, replaceable adapters, and closed gateways.",
+    "depth": "understand",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "waist", "title": "Meaning stays in the native waist", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Identity, transport, custody, state, and providers remain replaceable around one semantic core."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
+    "path": "/operations",
+    "kind": "operations",
+    "title": "Production operations",
+    "description": "Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.",
+    "depth": "operate",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "boundary", "title": "Operate the closed gateway", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Keep provider credentials behind the runtime boundary and preserve durable recovery state."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1",
+    "path": "/architecture/trust-boundaries",
+    "kind": "architecture",
+    "title": "Trust boundaries",
+    "description": "Authorization before provider entry.",
+    "depth": "verify",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "boundary", "title": "Transport is not authority", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Successful delivery never authorizes an effect."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
+    "path": "/integrations",
+    "kind": "integration",
+    "title": "Integrations",
+    "description": "Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "composition", "title": "Auths with your existing systems", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Keep identity, policy, transport, and cloud systems in their legitimate roles while adding exact effect authority."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
+    "path": "/assurance",
+    "kind": "assurance",
+    "title": "Assurance",
+    "description": "Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.",
+    "depth": "verify",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "claims", "title": "Show what the evidence proves", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Every claim names its evidence, release, scope, and limitation."] }
+    ]
+  }
+]
diff --git a/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json b/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b45557c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.contract/1",
+  "digest": "748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4",
+  "operations": [
+    { "id": "auths.operation.create/1" },
+    { "id": "auths.operation.delegate/1" },
+    { "id": "auths.operation.execute/1" },
+    { "id": "auths.operation.resume/1" },
+    { "id": "auths.operation.verify/1" }
+  ],
+  "scenarios": [
+    { "id": "auths.scenario.delegation/1" },
+    { "id": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1" },
+    { "id": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1" }
+  ],
+  "runtimeFacts": {
+    "endpoints": [
+      { "id": "auths.endpoint.health/1" },
+      { "id": "auths.endpoint.version/1" },
+      { "id": "auths.endpoint.authorities/1" },
+      { "id": "auths.endpoint.executions/1" },
+      { "id": "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1" },
+      { "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1" },
+      { "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1" }
+    ]
+  }
+}
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 2108f7e..f6928f6 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -12,9 +12,10 @@
     "test": "npm run build && node --test tests/rendered-html.test.mjs",
     "lint": "eslint . --ignore-pattern dist --ignore-pattern .next",
     "lint:bash": "node tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs",
+    "lint:ownership": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
-    "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node tools/build-page-model/check.mjs && node tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs && node tools/build-reference/check.mjs && node tools/render-markdown/check.mjs && node tools/release/check.mjs",
-    "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run lint:bash && npm run test:contract && npm test"
+    "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node --experimental-strip-types tools/build-page-model/check.mjs && node tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs && node tools/build-reference/check.mjs && node tools/render-markdown/check.mjs && node tools/release/check.mjs",
+    "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run lint:bash && npm run lint:ownership && npm run test:contract && npm test"
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@mdx-js/react": "3.1.1",
diff --git a/schemas/content.ts b/schemas/content.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c88c35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/schemas/content.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+import { pageKinds, type PageKind } from "./docs-contract.ts";
+
+export const pageDepths = ["understand", "start", "build", "operate", "inspect", "verify"] as const;
+export type PageDepth = (typeof pageDepths)[number];
+
+export const pageStatuses = ["draft", "preview", "stable"] as const;
+export type PageStatus = (typeof pageStatuses)[number];
+
+export const provenanceKinds = ["editorial-narrative", "generated-fact", "tested-scenario"] as const;
+export type ProvenanceKind = (typeof provenanceKinds)[number];
+
+export type SemanticDependencies = Readonly<{
+  operations: readonly string[];
+  scenarios: readonly string[];
+  endpoints: readonly string[];
+  profiles: readonly string[];
+  claims: readonly string[];
+}>;
+
+export type NarrativeSection = Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  title: string;
+  provenance: "editorial-narrative";
+  body: readonly string[];
+}>;
+
+export type GeneratedFactSection = Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  title: string;
+  provenance: "generated-fact";
+  factKind: "operation" | "endpoint" | "profile" | "claim";
+  fact: string;
+}>;
+
+export type TestedScenarioSection = Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  title: string;
+  provenance: "tested-scenario";
+  scenario: string;
+  step?: string;
+}>;
+
+export type ContentSection = NarrativeSection | GeneratedFactSection | TestedScenarioSection;
+
+export type AuthoredPageSource = Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  path: `/${string}`;
+  kind: PageKind;
+  title: string;
+  description: string;
+  depth: PageDepth;
+  status: PageStatus;
+  owner: "editorial" | "generated";
+  uses: SemanticDependencies;
+  sections: readonly ContentSection[];
+}>;
+
+const identity = /^[a-z0-9.-]+\/[1-9][0-9]*$/;
+const sectionIdentity = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/;
+
+function record(input: unknown, label: string): Record<string, unknown> {
+  if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null || Array.isArray(input)) {
+    throw new TypeError(`${label} must be an object`);
+  }
+  return input as Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+function exactKeys(value: Record<string, unknown>, expected: readonly string[], label: string): void {
+  if (Object.keys(value).sort().join("\0") !== [...expected].sort().join("\0")) {
+    throw new TypeError(`${label} has unknown or missing fields`);
+  }
+}
+
+function boundedText(input: unknown, label: string, maximum: number): string {
+  if (typeof input !== "string" || input.length === 0 || input.length > maximum) {
+    throw new TypeError(`${label} is invalid`);
+  }
+  return input;
+}
+
+function identities(input: unknown, label: string): readonly string[] {
+  if (!Array.isArray(input) || !input.every((item) => typeof item === "string" && identity.test(item))) {
+    throw new TypeError(`${label} is invalid`);
+  }
+  if (new Set(input).size !== input.length) throw new TypeError(`${label} contains duplicates`);
+  return Object.freeze([...input]);
+}
+
+function parseDependencies(input: unknown): SemanticDependencies {
+  const value = record(input, "page dependencies");
+  exactKeys(value, ["claims", "endpoints", "operations", "profiles", "scenarios"], "page dependencies");
+  return Object.freeze({
+    operations: identities(value.operations, "operation dependencies"),
+    scenarios: identities(value.scenarios, "scenario dependencies"),
+    endpoints: identities(value.endpoints, "endpoint dependencies"),
+    profiles: identities(value.profiles, "profile dependencies"),
+    claims: identities(value.claims, "claim dependencies"),
+  });
+}
+
+function parseSection(input: unknown): ContentSection {
+  const value = record(input, "content section");
+  const provenance = value.provenance;
+  if (!provenanceKinds.includes(provenance as ProvenanceKind)) throw new TypeError("section provenance is invalid");
+  const base = {
+    id: boundedText(value.id, "section identity", 80),
+    title: boundedText(value.title, "section title", 160),
+  };
+  if (!sectionIdentity.test(base.id)) throw new TypeError("section identity is invalid");
+  if (provenance === "editorial-narrative") {
+    exactKeys(value, ["body", "id", "provenance", "title"], "editorial section");
+    if (!Array.isArray(value.body) || value.body.length === 0 || value.body.length > 12) throw new TypeError("editorial body is invalid");
+    return Object.freeze({ ...base, provenance, body: Object.freeze(value.body.map((item) => boundedText(item, "editorial paragraph", 1_600))) });
+  }
+  if (provenance === "generated-fact") {
+    exactKeys(value, ["fact", "factKind", "id", "provenance", "title"], "generated fact section");
+    if (!["operation", "endpoint", "profile", "claim"].includes(String(value.factKind))) throw new TypeError("fact kind is invalid");
+    if (typeof value.fact !== "string" || !identity.test(value.fact)) throw new TypeError("fact identity is invalid");
+    return Object.freeze({ ...base, provenance, factKind: value.factKind as GeneratedFactSection["factKind"], fact: value.fact });
+  }
+  const expected = value.step === undefined
+    ? ["id", "provenance", "scenario", "title"]
+    : ["id", "provenance", "scenario", "step", "title"];
+  exactKeys(value, expected, "tested scenario section");
+  if (typeof value.scenario !== "string" || !identity.test(value.scenario)) throw new TypeError("scenario identity is invalid");
+  return Object.freeze({
+    ...base,
+    provenance: "tested-scenario",
+    scenario: value.scenario,
+    ...(value.step === undefined ? {} : { step: boundedText(value.step, "scenario step", 80) }),
+  });
+}
+
+export function parseAuthoredPageSource(input: unknown): AuthoredPageSource {
+  const value = record(input, "authored page");
+  exactKeys(value, ["depth", "description", "id", "kind", "owner", "path", "sections", "status", "title", "uses"], "authored page");
+  if (typeof value.id !== "string" || !identity.test(value.id)) throw new TypeError("page identity is invalid");
+  if (typeof value.path !== "string" || !value.path.startsWith("/") || (value.path.length > 1 && value.path.endsWith("/"))) throw new TypeError("page path is invalid");
+  if (!pageKinds.includes(value.kind as PageKind)) throw new TypeError("page kind is invalid");
+  if (!pageDepths.includes(value.depth as PageDepth)) throw new TypeError("page depth is invalid");
+  if (!pageStatuses.includes(value.status as PageStatus)) throw new TypeError("page status is invalid");
+  if (value.owner !== "editorial" && value.owner !== "generated") throw new TypeError("page owner is invalid");
+  if (!Array.isArray(value.sections) || value.sections.length === 0 || value.sections.length > 40) throw new TypeError("page sections are invalid");
+  const sections = value.sections.map(parseSection);
+  if (new Set(sections.map((section) => section.id)).size !== sections.length) throw new TypeError("page section identity is duplicated");
+  return Object.freeze({
+    id: value.id,
+    path: value.path as `/${string}`,
+    kind: value.kind as PageKind,
+    title: boundedText(value.title, "page title", 160),
+    description: boundedText(value.description, "page description", 320),
+    depth: value.depth as PageDepth,
+    status: value.status as PageStatus,
+    owner: value.owner,
+    uses: parseDependencies(value.uses),
+    sections: Object.freeze(sections),
+  });
+}
diff --git a/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs b/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
index 8b6b044..d164b9e 100644
--- a/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
+++ b/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
@@ -1,7 +1,13 @@
 import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { affectedPages, verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
 
-const source = await readFile(new URL("../../app/lib/page-graph.ts", import.meta.url), "utf8");
+assert.ok(verifiedPageGraph.pages.length >= 12);
+assert.equal(new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.id)).size, verifiedPageGraph.pages.length);
+assert.equal(new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.path)).size, verifiedPageGraph.pages.length);
 for (const id of ["auths.page.home/1", "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"]) {
-  assert.match(source, new RegExp(id.replaceAll(".", "\\.")));
+  assert.ok(verifiedPageGraph.pages.some((page) => page.id === id));
 }
+assert.deepEqual(
+  affectedPages(["auths.operation.delegate/1"]).map((page) => page.id).sort(),
+  ["auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1"],
+);
diff --git a/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs b/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78d4574
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { readFile, readdir } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { buildVerifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
+
+const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
+const pages = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "content/pages.json"), "utf8"));
+const contract = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "contracts/product-contract.fixture.json"), "utf8"));
+const graph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(pages, contract);
+assert.equal(graph.pages.length, pages.length);
+assert.equal(new Set(graph.pages.flatMap((page) => page.sections.map((section) => section.provenance))).size, 3);
+
+async function walk(directory) {
+  const entries = await readdir(directory, { withFileTypes: true });
+  const files = [];
+  for (const entry of entries) {
+    const target = path.join(directory, entry.name);
+    if (entry.isDirectory()) files.push(...await walk(target));
+    else files.push(target);
+  }
+  return files;
+}
+
+for (const file of (await walk(path.join(root, "app"))).filter((candidate) => candidate.endsWith(".mdx"))) {
+  const source = await readFile(file, "utf8");
+  assert.doesNotMatch(source, /```(?:bash|sh|shell|rust|typescript|ts|python|py|javascript|js)\b/, `${file} contains an executable code fence`);
+}
+
+const duplicate = structuredClone(pages);
+duplicate.push({ ...duplicate[0] });
+assert.throws(() => buildVerifiedPageGraph(duplicate, contract), /duplicate page identity/);
+
+const unknown = structuredClone(pages);
+unknown[0].uses.operations.push("auths.operation.unknown/1");
+assert.throws(() => buildVerifiedPageGraph(unknown, contract), /unknown operation/);
diff --git a/tsconfig.json b/tsconfig.json
index 18dc1bc..96e836a 100644
--- a/tsconfig.json
+++ b/tsconfig.json
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
     "esModuleInterop": true,
     "module": "esnext",
     "moduleResolution": "bundler",
+    "allowImportingTsExtensions": true,
     "resolveJsonModule": true,
     "isolatedModules": true,
     "jsx": "react-jsx",

From fff25d1a4bad38145b7299f224eafc34c6dce22a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 21:34:57 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 09/29] docs: publish topic landings and global navigation

---
 app/agents/page.tsx                           |   2 +
 app/assurance/page.tsx                        |  23 +--
 app/authority/page.tsx                        |   2 +
 app/components/SiteHeader.tsx                 |  13 +-
 app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx           |  44 +++++
 app/developers/page.tsx                       |   2 +
 app/get-started/page.tsx                      |   2 +
 app/globals.css                               | 157 ++++++++++++++++++
 app/identity-trust/page.tsx                   |   2 +
 app/lib/navigation.ts                         |  15 ++
 app/lib/page-graph.ts                         |   4 +-
 app/lib/topic-landings.ts                     |  19 +++
 app/operations/page.tsx                       |  20 +--
 app/reference/page.tsx                        |   2 +
 content/navigation.json                       |  13 ++
 content/pages.json                            |  84 ++++++++++
 content/topic-landings.json                   | 138 +++++++++++++++
 package.json                                  |   2 +
 public/agents.md                              |  22 +++
 public/assurance.md                           |  22 +++
 public/authority.md                           |  22 +++
 public/developers.md                          |  22 +++
 public/get-started.md                         |  22 +++
 public/identity-trust.md                      |  22 +++
 public/operations.md                          |  22 +++
 public/reference.md                           |  22 +++
 schemas/topic-landing.ts                      |  51 ++++++
 tools/build-page-model/check.mjs              |   2 +-
 tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs              |   5 +
 tools/render-markdown/check.mjs               |   7 +
 .../generate-topic-landings.mjs               |  34 ++++
 31 files changed, 767 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 app/agents/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/authority/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/developers/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/get-started/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/identity-trust/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/lib/navigation.ts
 create mode 100644 app/lib/topic-landings.ts
 create mode 100644 app/reference/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 content/navigation.json
 create mode 100644 content/topic-landings.json
 create mode 100644 public/agents.md
 create mode 100644 public/assurance.md
 create mode 100644 public/authority.md
 create mode 100644 public/developers.md
 create mode 100644 public/get-started.md
 create mode 100644 public/identity-trust.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference.md
 create mode 100644 schemas/topic-landing.ts
 create mode 100644 tools/render-markdown/generate-topic-landings.mjs

diff --git a/app/agents/page.tsx b/app/agents/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d67cb95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/agents/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
+export default function Page() { return <TopicLandingPage pageId="auths.page.agents/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/assurance/page.tsx b/app/assurance/page.tsx
index 8c7884a..475651b 100644
--- a/app/assurance/page.tsx
+++ b/app/assurance/page.tsx
@@ -1,21 +1,2 @@
-import { PageActions } from "../components/PageActions";
-import { SiteFooter } from "../components/SiteFooter";
-import { SiteHeader } from "../components/SiteHeader";
-
-const evidence = [
-  ["Canonical fixtures", "Identical protocol bytes and outcomes across maintained languages."],
-  ["Adversarial conformance", "Mutation, widening, replay, expiry, denial, indeterminate, and provider-unknown cases."],
-  ["Formal qualification", "Named model claims tied to generated artifacts and reviewed assumptions."],
-  ["Installed-artifact tests", "What npm and wheel consumers receive, not only workspace source behavior."],
-  ["Semantic freeze", "Intentional versioned identities for meaning-bearing public surfaces."],
-  ["Release provenance", "Immutable subjects, digests, builder identity, and promotion evidence."],
-];
-
-export default function AssurancePage() {
-  return <div className="site-frame"><SiteHeader compact /><main className="journey-main assurance-main">
-    <p className="kicker">Assurance</p><h1>Claims linked to evidence</h1>
-    <p className="hero-lede">Auths distinguishes implemented behavior, repository-local evidence, qualified claims, and independently reviewed assurance. A green badge never outruns the evidence it names.</p>
-    <PageActions source="/assurance/index.md" />
-    <div className="assurance-list">{evidence.map(([title, body], index) => <section key={title}><span>{String(index + 1).padStart(2, "0")}</span><div><h2>{title}</h2><p>{body}</p></div></section>)}</div>
-  </main><SiteFooter /></div>;
-}
+import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
+export default function Page() { return <TopicLandingPage pageId="auths.page.assurance.evidence/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/authority/page.tsx b/app/authority/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8a6c1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/authority/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
+export default function Page() { return <TopicLandingPage pageId="auths.page.authority/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx b/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx
index 904efee..15ab4bf 100644
--- a/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SiteHeader.tsx
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { ArrowUpRightIcon, GithubLogoIcon } from "@phosphor-icons/react/ssr";
 import Link from "next/link";
 import { AuthsLogo } from "./AuthsLogo";
 import { SearchDialog } from "./SearchDialog";
+import { primaryNavigation, utilityNavigation } from "../lib/navigation";
 
 export function SiteHeader({ compact = false }: { compact?: boolean }) {
   return (
@@ -13,16 +14,8 @@ export function SiteHeader({ compact = false }: { compact?: boolean }) {
           <small>docs</small>
         </Link>
         <nav className="header-nav" aria-label="Primary navigation">
-          <Link href="/guides/protect-rest-effect">Start</Link>
-          <Link href="/reference/sdk">SDKs</Link>
-          <Link href="/reference/runtime-api">Runtime API</Link>
-          <Link href="/concepts">Concepts</Link>
-          <Link href="/architecture">Architecture</Link>
-          <Link href="/operations">Operations</Link>
-          <details className="header-more">
-            <summary>More</summary>
-            <div><Link href="/integrations">Integrations</Link><Link href="/assurance">Assurance</Link></div>
-          </details>
+          {primaryNavigation.map((page) => <Link href={page.path} key={page.id}>{page.title}</Link>)}
+          {utilityNavigation.map((page) => <Link className="header-utility-link" href={page.path} key={page.id}>{page.title}</Link>)}
         </nav>
         <div className="header-search">
           <SearchDialog />
diff --git a/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx b/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5146ded
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+import Link from "next/link";
+import { pageById } from "../lib/page-graph";
+import { topicLandingByPage } from "../lib/topic-landings";
+import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
+import { SiteFooter } from "./SiteFooter";
+import { SiteHeader } from "./SiteHeader";
+
+export function TopicLandingPage({ pageId }: { pageId: string }) {
+  const page = pageById(pageId);
+  const landing = topicLandingByPage(pageId);
+  const recommended = pageById(landing.recommendation.target);
+  return (
+    <div className="site-frame topic-site">
+      <SiteHeader compact />
+      <main className="topic-landing shell">
+        <header className="topic-hero">
+          <p className="kicker">{landing.eyebrow}</p>
+          <h1>{page.title}</h1>
+          <p>{page.description}</p>
+          <PageActions source={`${page.path}.md`} />
+        </header>
+        <Link className="topic-recommendation" href={recommended.path}>
+          <span>Recommended path</span>
+          <div><h2>{landing.recommendation.label}</h2><p>{landing.recommendation.description}</p></div>
+          <strong aria-hidden="true">→</strong>
+        </Link>
+        <div className="topic-groups">
+          {landing.groups.map((group) => (
+            <section key={group.title}>
+              <h2>{group.title}</h2>
+              <div className="topic-card-grid">
+                {group.cards.map((card) => {
+                  const target = pageById(card.target);
+                  return <Link className="topic-card" href={target.path} key={`${group.title}:${card.target}`}><h3>{card.title}</h3><p>{card.description}</p><span>Open guide <b aria-hidden="true">→</b></span></Link>;
+                })}
+              </div>
+            </section>
+          ))}
+        </div>
+      </main>
+      <SiteFooter />
+    </div>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/developers/page.tsx b/app/developers/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3c8163
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/developers/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
+export default function Page() { return <TopicLandingPage pageId="auths.page.developers/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/get-started/page.tsx b/app/get-started/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df9578c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/get-started/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
+export default function Page() { return <TopicLandingPage pageId="auths.page.start/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/globals.css b/app/globals.css
index c702492..217aa28 100644
--- a/app/globals.css
+++ b/app/globals.css
@@ -2631,6 +2631,132 @@ pre {
   display: inline-flex;
 }
 
+.header-utility-link {
+  border-left: 1px solid var(--line-strong);
+  margin-left: auto;
+  padding-left: 28px;
+}
+
+.topic-landing {
+  padding-bottom: 110px;
+  padding-top: 72px;
+}
+
+.topic-hero {
+  max-width: 780px;
+}
+
+.topic-hero h1 {
+  font-size: clamp(44px, 6vw, 72px);
+  letter-spacing: -0.055em;
+  line-height: 0.98;
+  margin: 15px 0 22px;
+}
+
+.topic-hero > p:not(.kicker) {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 19px;
+  line-height: 1.65;
+  max-width: 720px;
+}
+
+.topic-recommendation {
+  align-items: center;
+  background: var(--forest);
+  border-radius: 12px;
+  color: var(--surface);
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 28px;
+  grid-template-columns: 150px minmax(0, 1fr) auto;
+  margin: 54px 0 72px;
+  padding: 28px 32px;
+}
+
+.topic-recommendation > span {
+  color: var(--mint-bright);
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: 10px;
+  letter-spacing: 0.08em;
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+
+.topic-recommendation h2 {
+  color: var(--surface);
+  font-size: 22px;
+  margin: 0 0 6px;
+}
+
+.topic-recommendation p {
+  color: rgb(255 255 255 / 72%);
+  line-height: 1.5;
+  margin: 0;
+}
+
+.topic-recommendation > strong {
+  color: var(--mint-bright);
+  font-size: 26px;
+}
+
+.topic-groups {
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 68px;
+}
+
+.topic-groups > section > h2 {
+  font-size: 25px;
+  letter-spacing: -0.025em;
+  margin: 0 0 22px;
+}
+
+.topic-card-grid {
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 16px;
+  grid-template-columns: repeat(3, minmax(0, 1fr));
+}
+
+.topic-card {
+  border: 1px solid var(--line);
+  border-radius: 10px;
+  display: flex;
+  flex-direction: column;
+  min-height: 205px;
+  padding: 25px;
+  transition: border-color 150ms ease, transform 150ms ease;
+}
+
+.topic-card:hover {
+  border-color: var(--forest);
+  transform: translateY(-2px);
+}
+
+.topic-card h3 {
+  font-size: 18px;
+  margin: 0 0 12px;
+}
+
+.topic-card p {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 14px;
+  line-height: 1.6;
+  margin: 0;
+}
+
+.topic-card > span {
+  color: var(--forest);
+  font-size: 12px;
+  font-weight: 650;
+  margin-top: auto;
+  padding-top: 22px;
+}
+
+.content-provenance {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: 9px;
+  letter-spacing: 0.08em;
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+
 @media (max-width: 1200px) {
   .sdk-reference-shell {
     grid-template-columns: 244px minmax(0, 1fr);
@@ -2654,6 +2780,19 @@ pre {
 }
 
 @media (max-width: 980px) {
+  .header-nav {
+    gap: 18px;
+    overflow-x: auto;
+  }
+
+  .header-nav a {
+    white-space: nowrap;
+  }
+
+  .topic-card-grid {
+    grid-template-columns: repeat(2, minmax(0, 1fr));
+  }
+
   .sdk-reference-shell {
     display: block;
   }
@@ -2684,6 +2823,24 @@ pre {
 }
 
 @media (max-width: 760px) {
+  .topic-landing {
+    padding-inline: 22px;
+    padding-top: 48px;
+  }
+
+  .topic-recommendation {
+    align-items: start;
+    grid-template-columns: 1fr auto;
+  }
+
+  .topic-recommendation > span {
+    grid-column: 1 / -1;
+  }
+
+  .topic-card-grid {
+    grid-template-columns: 1fr;
+  }
+
   .sdk-reference-section {
     display: block;
     min-height: 0;
diff --git a/app/identity-trust/page.tsx b/app/identity-trust/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19fcc10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/identity-trust/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
+export default function Page() { return <TopicLandingPage pageId="auths.page.identity-trust/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/lib/navigation.ts b/app/lib/navigation.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb5f87c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/navigation.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+import rawNavigation from "../../content/navigation.json" with { type: "json" };
+import type { AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
+import { verifiedPageGraph } from "./content-graph.ts";
+
+function resolve(ids: readonly string[]): readonly AuthoredPageSource[] {
+  if (new Set(ids).size !== ids.length) throw new TypeError("navigation contains duplicate pages");
+  return Object.freeze(ids.map((id) => {
+    const page = verifiedPageGraph.pages.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id);
+    if (!page) throw new TypeError(`navigation references unknown page ${id}`);
+    return page;
+  }));
+}
+
+export const primaryNavigation = resolve(rawNavigation.primary);
+export const utilityNavigation = resolve(rawNavigation.utilities);
diff --git a/app/lib/page-graph.ts b/app/lib/page-graph.ts
index f91f203..2695cce 100644
--- a/app/lib/page-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/page-graph.ts
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import type { PageModel } from "../../schemas/docs-contract";
-import { verifiedPageGraph } from "./content-graph";
+import type { PageModel } from "../../schemas/docs-contract.ts";
+import { verifiedPageGraph } from "./content-graph.ts";
 
 export const pages: readonly PageModel[] = Object.freeze(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => Object.freeze({
   id: page.id,
diff --git a/app/lib/topic-landings.ts b/app/lib/topic-landings.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1fd08a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/topic-landings.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+import rawLandings from "../../content/topic-landings.json" with { type: "json" };
+import { parseTopicLanding, type TopicLanding } from "../../schemas/topic-landing.ts";
+import { verifiedPageGraph } from "./content-graph.ts";
+
+const pageIds = new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.id));
+export const topicLandings: readonly TopicLanding[] = Object.freeze(rawLandings.map(parseTopicLanding));
+
+for (const landing of topicLandings) {
+  if (!pageIds.has(landing.page)) throw new TypeError(`unknown topic landing page ${landing.page}`);
+  for (const target of [landing.recommendation.target, ...landing.groups.flatMap((group) => group.cards.map((card) => card.target))]) {
+    if (!pageIds.has(target)) throw new TypeError(`${landing.page} references unknown landing target ${target}`);
+  }
+}
+
+export function topicLandingByPage(page: string): TopicLanding {
+  const landing = topicLandings.find((candidate) => candidate.page === page);
+  if (!landing) throw new TypeError(`unknown topic landing ${page}`);
+  return landing;
+}
diff --git a/app/operations/page.tsx b/app/operations/page.tsx
index d23cba7..2807f13 100644
--- a/app/operations/page.tsx
+++ b/app/operations/page.tsx
@@ -1,18 +1,2 @@
-import { JourneyPage } from "../components/JourneyPage";
-
-export default function OperationsPage() {
-  return <JourneyPage
-    eyebrow="Operations"
-    title="Run Auths fail-closed"
-    description="Production operations preserve replay, budget, recovery, custody, and receipt state across failures instead of translating uncertainty into success."
-    source="/operations/index.md"
-    steps={[
-      { title: "Protect durable state", body: <p>Use atomic replay, budget, lifecycle, and receipt stores shared by every runtime instance.</p> },
-      { title: "Keep keys outside the runtime", body: <p>Use a custody port backed by KMS, HSM, or another isolated signer. The runtime receives signatures, not private keys.</p> },
-      { title: "Observe closed outcomes", body: <p>Alert on denials, indeterminate decisions, recoverable executions, store unavailability, and provider-unknown results separately.</p> },
-      { title: "Reconcile before retry", body: <p>Resume or recover using exact execution references. Never repeat an ambiguous external mutation as a fresh request.</p> },
-    ]}
-    security={<p>Health endpoints, logs, metrics, and support bundles expose bounded operational facts without leaking authority, receipt bodies, provider credentials, or key material.</p>}
-    next={{ href: "/reference/sdk", label: "Open the SDK reference" }}
-  />;
-}
+import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
+export default function Page() { return <TopicLandingPage pageId="auths.page.operations.runtime/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/reference/page.tsx b/app/reference/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf591b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/reference/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
+export default function Page() { return <TopicLandingPage pageId="auths.page.reference/1" />; }
diff --git a/content/navigation.json b/content/navigation.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b96489
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/navigation.json
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "primary": [
+    "auths.page.start/1",
+    "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
+    "auths.page.authority/1",
+    "auths.page.agents/1",
+    "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
+    "auths.page.developers/1"
+  ],
+  "utilities": [
+    "auths.page.reference/1"
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/content/pages.json b/content/pages.json
index 2a888d3..0a2bef3 100644
--- a/content/pages.json
+++ b/content/pages.json
@@ -169,5 +169,89 @@
     "sections": [
       { "id": "claims", "title": "Show what the evidence proves", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Every claim names its evidence, release, scope, and limitation."] }
     ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.start/1",
+    "path": "/get-started",
+    "kind": "landing",
+    "title": "Get started",
+    "description": "Choose the shortest safe path from an outcome to working Auths authority.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "choose", "title": "Start with what you need to protect", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Choose an application effect, delegated agent action, production runtime, or verification-only path before learning the deeper machinery."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
+    "path": "/identity-trust",
+    "kind": "landing",
+    "title": "Identity & trust",
+    "description": "Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.",
+    "depth": "understand",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "separation", "title": "Identity says who; authority says what", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Authentication evidence can inform authorization, but it never becomes permission merely by arriving successfully."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.authority/1",
+    "path": "/authority",
+    "kind": "landing",
+    "title": "Authority",
+    "description": "Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.",
+    "depth": "understand",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "verbs", "title": "Five verbs, one authority lifecycle", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify without changing vocabulary as the workflow becomes more sophisticated."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.agents/1",
+    "path": "/agents",
+    "kind": "landing",
+    "title": "Agents",
+    "description": "Give an agent narrow, inspectable authority instead of ambient credentials.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "boundary", "title": "Agents propose; closed gateways execute", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["An agent cannot manufacture broader authority or reach provider credentials merely because it can call a tool."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.developers/1",
+    "path": "/developers",
+    "kind": "landing",
+    "title": "Developers",
+    "description": "Find SDKs, Runtime APIs, tested examples, integrations, versioning, and extension contracts.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "tools", "title": "Choose the surface for your application", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Use an idiomatic SDK in process or call the production Runtime API while preserving the same Rust-owned semantics."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.reference/1",
+    "path": "/reference",
+    "kind": "landing",
+    "title": "APIs & SDKs",
+    "description": "Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.",
+    "depth": "inspect",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "surfaces", "title": "Reference meaning before mechanism", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Begin with the product operation, then descend into its Rust, TypeScript, Python, or Runtime API projection."] }
+    ]
   }
 ]
diff --git a/content/topic-landings.json b/content/topic-landings.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f1a958
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/topic-landings.json
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+[
+  {
+    "page": "auths.page.start/1",
+    "eyebrow": "Get started",
+    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "label": "Protect one REST effect", "description": "Create exact authority, execute once, and see replay fail closed." },
+    "groups": [
+      { "title": "Choose a first outcome", "cards": [
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "title": "Protect an application effect", "description": "The shortest path from installation to a verified receipt." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1", "title": "Delegate to an agent", "description": "Pass on narrower authority without ambient credentials." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1", "title": "Verify evidence", "description": "Inspect a bounded receipt without performing an effect." }
+      ] },
+      { "title": "Understand your options", "cards": [
+        { "target": "auths.page.identity-trust/1", "title": "Bring identity and trust", "description": "Keep your identity provider, key suite, and resolver choices." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.authority/1", "title": "Understand authority", "description": "Learn what becomes exact, bounded, and delegable." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.developers/1", "title": "Choose an SDK or runtime", "description": "Find Rust, TypeScript, Python, and the Runtime API." }
+      ] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "page": "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
+    "eyebrow": "Identity & trust",
+    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1", "label": "See the trust boundaries", "description": "Understand what identity proves—and what it never authorizes by itself." },
+    "groups": [
+      { "title": "Bring what you already use", "cards": [
+        { "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1", "title": "Compose existing identity", "description": "Use OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or an application resolver." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.architecture.system-map/1", "title": "Keep adapters replaceable", "description": "Separate identity, cryptography, transport, and authority." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.authority/1", "title": "Turn identity into bounded action", "description": "Attach exact authority without replacing authentication." }
+      ] },
+      { "title": "Inspect and verify", "cards": [
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1", "title": "Verify offline", "description": "Check portable evidence without executing anything." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "title": "Review agility claims", "description": "Trace cryptographic and identity boundaries to evidence." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.reference/1", "title": "Open exact contracts", "description": "Find identity and verification surfaces by stable identity." }
+      ] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "page": "auths.page.authority/1",
+    "eyebrow": "Authority",
+    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "label": "Create and execute exact authority", "description": "Start with one effect, one use, and evidence of the outcome." },
+    "groups": [
+      { "title": "Work with authority", "cards": [
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "title": "Create", "description": "Describe one bounded action and who may perform it." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1", "title": "Delegate", "description": "Narrow action, time, uses, budget, and delegation depth." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1", "title": "Execute and recover", "description": "Reserve durably, perform behind a closed gateway, and resume safely." }
+      ] },
+      { "title": "Understand the model", "cards": [
+        { "target": "auths.page.concepts.five-nouns/1", "title": "Five nouns and five verbs", "description": "Use one vocabulary from first build to formal evidence." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1", "title": "Authorization boundaries", "description": "Separate identity, approval, transport, and execution." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "title": "Evidence and limitations", "description": "See which guarantees are tested, modeled, or operational." }
+      ] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "page": "auths.page.agents/1",
+    "eyebrow": "Agents",
+    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1", "label": "Delegate one tool", "description": "Give an agent one narrow ability without a broad API key." },
+    "groups": [
+      { "title": "Build agent authority", "cards": [
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1", "title": "Delegate without widening", "description": "Make each handoff narrower and independently verifiable." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "title": "Protect an effect", "description": "Place the provider behind an authorization boundary." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1", "title": "Verify what happened", "description": "Return portable evidence rather than trusting an agent report." }
+      ] },
+      { "title": "Compose the stack", "cards": [
+        { "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1", "title": "MCP and transports", "description": "Delivery remains independent from authorization." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.identity-trust/1", "title": "Agent identity", "description": "Bring workload, user, or application trust evidence." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1", "title": "Closed execution", "description": "Keep real credentials outside the agent process." }
+      ] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "page": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
+    "eyebrow": "Operations",
+    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "label": "Inspect the Runtime API", "description": "See the exact HTTPS boundary, outcomes, and recovery operations." },
+    "groups": [
+      { "title": "Run the open runtime", "cards": [
+        { "target": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "title": "Runtime contract", "description": "Endpoints, limits, trust boundaries, and closed outcomes." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.architecture.system-map/1", "title": "Deployment architecture", "description": "Separate durable state, custody, trust, and provider gateways." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1", "title": "Receipts and disclosure", "description": "Preserve evidence while minimizing exposed detail." }
+      ] },
+      { "title": "Respond safely", "cards": [
+        { "target": "auths.page.authority/1", "title": "Lifecycle and recovery", "description": "Know when to retry, resume, reconcile, or stop." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "title": "Operational evidence", "description": "Trace procedures and claims to a qualified release." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.developers/1", "title": "Testing tools", "description": "Exercise denial, replay, mutation, and provider uncertainty." }
+      ] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "page": "auths.page.developers/1",
+    "eyebrow": "Developers",
+    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "label": "Choose an SDK", "description": "Use the same five operations from Rust, TypeScript, or Python." },
+    "groups": [
+      { "title": "Build", "cards": [
+        { "target": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "title": "SDKs", "description": "Language-aware operations, parameters, outcomes, and examples." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "title": "Runtime API", "description": "Integrate through the production HTTPS boundary." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "title": "Quickstarts", "description": "Begin with a tested end-to-end outcome." }
+      ] },
+      { "title": "Extend and evaluate", "cards": [
+        { "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1", "title": "Integrations", "description": "Compose identity, policy, transport, custody, and providers." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.agents/1", "title": "Agents and MCP", "description": "Propose, authorize, execute, observe, and verify separately." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "title": "Testing and evidence", "description": "Use deterministic fixtures and inspect assurance scope." }
+      ] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "page": "auths.page.reference/1",
+    "eyebrow": "APIs & SDKs",
+    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "label": "Open the SDK reference", "description": "Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while staying on the same operation." },
+    "groups": [
+      { "title": "Reference by surface", "cards": [
+        { "target": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "title": "SDK reference", "description": "Exact installed symbols across maintained languages." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "title": "Runtime API", "description": "Exact methods, paths, limits, outcomes, and recovery." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.developers/1", "title": "Developer resources", "description": "Installation, testing, versioning, and extension paths." }
+      ] },
+      { "title": "Understand the contracts", "cards": [
+        { "target": "auths.page.concepts.five-nouns/1", "title": "Product vocabulary", "description": "Connect symbols to the meaning they project." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1", "title": "Trust boundaries", "description": "Know what each operation accepts and refuses to infer." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "title": "Source and evidence", "description": "Trace generated reference facts to a release." }
+      ] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "page": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
+    "eyebrow": "Assurance",
+    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1", "label": "Start with the trust boundaries", "description": "Understand the claims before inspecting their evidence." },
+    "groups": [
+      { "title": "Inspect evidence", "cards": [
+        { "target": "auths.page.architecture.system-map/1", "title": "Architecture claims", "description": "See the semantic core and replaceable boundaries." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1", "title": "Receipt verification", "description": "Verify portable evidence without performing an effect." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.reference/1", "title": "Generated contracts", "description": "Inspect release-scoped SDK and runtime facts." }
+      ] },
+      { "title": "Understand limitations", "cards": [
+        { "target": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1", "title": "Operational scope", "description": "Separate semantic assurance from deployment reliability." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1", "title": "Composition boundaries", "description": "See what adjacent identity and policy systems still own." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.developers/1", "title": "Reproduce results", "description": "Find fixtures, tests, versions, and source provenance." }
+      ] }
+    ]
+  }
+]
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index f6928f6..29a09a5 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
     "node": ">=22.13.0"
   },
   "scripts": {
+    "prebuild": "npm run docs:render-topic-landings",
     "dev": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext dev",
     "build": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext build",
     "start": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext start",
@@ -13,6 +14,7 @@
     "lint": "eslint . --ignore-pattern dist --ignore-pattern .next",
     "lint:bash": "node tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs",
     "lint:ownership": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs",
+    "docs:render-topic-landings": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-topic-landings.mjs",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
     "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node --experimental-strip-types tools/build-page-model/check.mjs && node tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs && node tools/build-reference/check.mjs && node tools/render-markdown/check.mjs && node tools/release/check.mjs",
     "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run lint:bash && npm run lint:ownership && npm run test:contract && npm test"
diff --git a/public/agents.md b/public/agents.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4721ff9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/agents.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Agents
+
+Give an agent narrow, inspectable authority instead of ambient credentials.
+
+## Recommended: [Delegate one tool](/start/delegate-agent)
+
+Give an agent one narrow ability without a broad API key.
+
+## Build agent authority
+
+- [Delegate without widening](/start/delegate-agent) — Make each handoff narrower and independently verifiable.
+- [Protect an effect](/guides/protect-rest-effect) — Place the provider behind an authorization boundary.
+- [Verify what happened](/start/verify-receipt) — Return portable evidence rather than trusting an agent report.
+
+## Compose the stack
+
+- [MCP and transports](/integrations) — Delivery remains independent from authorization.
+- [Agent identity](/identity-trust) — Bring workload, user, or application trust evidence.
+- [Closed execution](/operations) — Keep real credentials outside the agent process.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents/1 · Product contract: auths.page.agents/1_
+
diff --git a/public/assurance.md b/public/assurance.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..042b5ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/assurance.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Assurance
+
+Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
+
+## Recommended: [Start with the trust boundaries](/architecture/trust-boundaries)
+
+Understand the claims before inspecting their evidence.
+
+## Inspect evidence
+
+- [Architecture claims](/architecture) — See the semantic core and replaceable boundaries.
+- [Receipt verification](/start/verify-receipt) — Verify portable evidence without performing an effect.
+- [Generated contracts](/reference) — Inspect release-scoped SDK and runtime facts.
+
+## Understand limitations
+
+- [Operational scope](/operations) — Separate semantic assurance from deployment reliability.
+- [Composition boundaries](/integrations) — See what adjacent identity and policy systems still own.
+- [Reproduce results](/developers) — Find fixtures, tests, versions, and source provenance.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1 · Product contract: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1_
+
diff --git a/public/authority.md b/public/authority.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..437af39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Authority
+
+Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
+
+## Recommended: [Create and execute exact authority](/guides/protect-rest-effect)
+
+Start with one effect, one use, and evidence of the outcome.
+
+## Work with authority
+
+- [Create](/guides/protect-rest-effect) — Describe one bounded action and who may perform it.
+- [Delegate](/start/delegate-agent) — Narrow action, time, uses, budget, and delegation depth.
+- [Execute and recover](/operations) — Reserve durably, perform behind a closed gateway, and resume safely.
+
+## Understand the model
+
+- [Five nouns and five verbs](/concepts) — Use one vocabulary from first build to formal evidence.
+- [Authorization boundaries](/architecture/trust-boundaries) — Separate identity, approval, transport, and execution.
+- [Evidence and limitations](/assurance) — See which guarantees are tested, modeled, or operational.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority/1_
+
diff --git a/public/developers.md b/public/developers.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..81f7eec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/developers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Developers
+
+Find SDKs, Runtime APIs, tested examples, integrations, versioning, and extension contracts.
+
+## Recommended: [Choose an SDK](/reference/sdk)
+
+Use the same five operations from Rust, TypeScript, or Python.
+
+## Build
+
+- [SDKs](/reference/sdk) — Language-aware operations, parameters, outcomes, and examples.
+- [Runtime API](/reference/runtime-api) — Integrate through the production HTTPS boundary.
+- [Quickstarts](/guides/protect-rest-effect) — Begin with a tested end-to-end outcome.
+
+## Extend and evaluate
+
+- [Integrations](/integrations) — Compose identity, policy, transport, custody, and providers.
+- [Agents and MCP](/agents) — Propose, authorize, execute, observe, and verify separately.
+- [Testing and evidence](/assurance) — Use deterministic fixtures and inspect assurance scope.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers/1 · Product contract: auths.page.developers/1_
+
diff --git a/public/get-started.md b/public/get-started.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7949c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/get-started.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Get started
+
+Choose the shortest safe path from an outcome to working Auths authority.
+
+## Recommended: [Protect one REST effect](/guides/protect-rest-effect)
+
+Create exact authority, execute once, and see replay fail closed.
+
+## Choose a first outcome
+
+- [Protect an application effect](/guides/protect-rest-effect) — The shortest path from installation to a verified receipt.
+- [Delegate to an agent](/start/delegate-agent) — Pass on narrower authority without ambient credentials.
+- [Verify evidence](/start/verify-receipt) — Inspect a bounded receipt without performing an effect.
+
+## Understand your options
+
+- [Bring identity and trust](/identity-trust) — Keep your identity provider, key suite, and resolver choices.
+- [Understand authority](/authority) — Learn what becomes exact, bounded, and delegable.
+- [Choose an SDK or runtime](/developers) — Find Rust, TypeScript, Python, and the Runtime API.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start/1_
+
diff --git a/public/identity-trust.md b/public/identity-trust.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82ee540
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/identity-trust.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Identity & trust
+
+Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.
+
+## Recommended: [See the trust boundaries](/architecture/trust-boundaries)
+
+Understand what identity proves—and what it never authorizes by itself.
+
+## Bring what you already use
+
+- [Compose existing identity](/integrations) — Use OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or an application resolver.
+- [Keep adapters replaceable](/architecture) — Separate identity, cryptography, transport, and authority.
+- [Turn identity into bounded action](/authority) — Attach exact authority without replacing authentication.
+
+## Inspect and verify
+
+- [Verify offline](/start/verify-receipt) — Check portable evidence without executing anything.
+- [Review agility claims](/assurance) — Trace cryptographic and identity boundaries to evidence.
+- [Open exact contracts](/reference) — Find identity and verification surfaces by stable identity.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust/1 · Product contract: auths.page.identity-trust/1_
+
diff --git a/public/operations.md b/public/operations.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf5d5c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Production operations
+
+Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
+
+## Recommended: [Inspect the Runtime API](/reference/runtime-api)
+
+See the exact HTTPS boundary, outcomes, and recovery operations.
+
+## Run the open runtime
+
+- [Runtime contract](/reference/runtime-api) — Endpoints, limits, trust boundaries, and closed outcomes.
+- [Deployment architecture](/architecture) — Separate durable state, custody, trust, and provider gateways.
+- [Receipts and disclosure](/start/verify-receipt) — Preserve evidence while minimizing exposed detail.
+
+## Respond safely
+
+- [Lifecycle and recovery](/authority) — Know when to retry, resume, reconcile, or stop.
+- [Operational evidence](/assurance) — Trace procedures and claims to a qualified release.
+- [Testing tools](/developers) — Exercise denial, replay, mutation, and provider uncertainty.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.runtime/1 · Product contract: auths.page.operations.runtime/1_
+
diff --git a/public/reference.md b/public/reference.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4882475
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# APIs & SDKs
+
+Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.
+
+## Recommended: [Open the SDK reference](/reference/sdk)
+
+Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while staying on the same operation.
+
+## Reference by surface
+
+- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — Exact installed symbols across maintained languages.
+- [Runtime API](/reference/runtime-api) — Exact methods, paths, limits, outcomes, and recovery.
+- [Developer resources](/developers) — Installation, testing, versioning, and extension paths.
+
+## Understand the contracts
+
+- [Product vocabulary](/concepts) — Connect symbols to the meaning they project.
+- [Trust boundaries](/architecture/trust-boundaries) — Know what each operation accepts and refuses to infer.
+- [Source and evidence](/assurance) — Trace generated reference facts to a release.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.reference/1 · Product contract: auths.page.reference/1_
+
diff --git a/schemas/topic-landing.ts b/schemas/topic-landing.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..30f0f6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/schemas/topic-landing.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+export type LandingCard = Readonly<{ target: string; title: string; description: string }>;
+export type LandingGroup = Readonly<{ title: string; cards: readonly LandingCard[] }>;
+export type TopicLanding = Readonly<{
+  page: string;
+  eyebrow: string;
+  recommendation: Readonly<{ target: string; label: string; description: string }>;
+  groups: readonly LandingGroup[];
+}>;
+
+const identity = /^[a-z0-9.-]+\/[1-9][0-9]*$/;
+
+function text(input: unknown, label: string, maximum: number): string {
+  if (typeof input !== "string" || input.length === 0 || input.length > maximum) throw new TypeError(`${label} is invalid`);
+  return input;
+}
+
+function card(input: unknown): LandingCard {
+  if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null || Array.isArray(input)) throw new TypeError("landing card is invalid");
+  const value = input as Record<string, unknown>;
+  if (Object.keys(value).sort().join() !== "description,target,title") throw new TypeError("landing card fields are invalid");
+  const target = text(value.target, "landing target", 128);
+  if (!identity.test(target)) throw new TypeError("landing target is invalid");
+  return Object.freeze({ target, title: text(value.title, "card title", 100), description: text(value.description, "card description", 240) });
+}
+
+export function parseTopicLanding(input: unknown): TopicLanding {
+  if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null || Array.isArray(input)) throw new TypeError("topic landing is invalid");
+  const value = input as Record<string, unknown>;
+  if (Object.keys(value).sort().join() !== "eyebrow,groups,page,recommendation") throw new TypeError("topic landing fields are invalid");
+  const page = text(value.page, "landing page", 128);
+  if (!identity.test(page)) throw new TypeError("landing page identity is invalid");
+  if (typeof value.recommendation !== "object" || value.recommendation === null || Array.isArray(value.recommendation)) throw new TypeError("landing recommendation is invalid");
+  const recommendationValue = value.recommendation as Record<string, unknown>;
+  if (Object.keys(recommendationValue).sort().join() !== "description,label,target") throw new TypeError("landing recommendation fields are invalid");
+  const recommendationTarget = text(recommendationValue.target, "recommendation target", 128);
+  if (!identity.test(recommendationTarget)) throw new TypeError("recommendation target is invalid");
+  const recommendation = Object.freeze({
+    target: recommendationTarget,
+    label: text(recommendationValue.label, "recommendation label", 100),
+    description: text(recommendationValue.description, "recommendation description", 240),
+  });
+  if (!Array.isArray(value.groups) || value.groups.length < 1 || value.groups.length > 6) throw new TypeError("landing groups are invalid");
+  const groups = value.groups.map((input) => {
+    if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null || Array.isArray(input)) throw new TypeError("landing group is invalid");
+    const group = input as Record<string, unknown>;
+    if (Object.keys(group).sort().join() !== "cards,title") throw new TypeError("landing group fields are invalid");
+    if (!Array.isArray(group.cards) || group.cards.length < 1 || group.cards.length > 6) throw new TypeError("landing group cards are invalid");
+    return Object.freeze({ title: text(group.title, "group title", 100), cards: Object.freeze(group.cards.map(card)) });
+  });
+  return Object.freeze({ page, eyebrow: text(value.eyebrow, "landing eyebrow", 80), recommendation, groups: Object.freeze(groups) });
+}
diff --git a/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs b/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
index d164b9e..b415568 100644
--- a/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
+++ b/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
@@ -9,5 +9,5 @@ for (const id of ["auths.page.home/1", "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "auths.
 }
 assert.deepEqual(
   affectedPages(["auths.operation.delegate/1"]).map((page) => page.id).sort(),
-  ["auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1"],
+  ["auths.page.agents/1", "auths.page.authority/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1"],
 );
diff --git a/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs b/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs
index 78d4574..5becaff 100644
--- a/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs
+++ b/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ import { readFile, readdir } from "node:fs/promises";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
 import { buildVerifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
+import { primaryNavigation, utilityNavigation } from "../../app/lib/navigation.ts";
+import { topicLandings } from "../../app/lib/topic-landings.ts";
 
 const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
 const pages = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "content/pages.json"), "utf8"));
@@ -10,6 +12,9 @@ const contract = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "contracts/product-co
 const graph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(pages, contract);
 assert.equal(graph.pages.length, pages.length);
 assert.equal(new Set(graph.pages.flatMap((page) => page.sections.map((section) => section.provenance))).size, 3);
+assert.equal(primaryNavigation.length, 6);
+assert.equal(utilityNavigation.length, 1);
+assert.equal(topicLandings.length, 8);
 
 async function walk(directory) {
   const entries = await readdir(directory, { withFileTypes: true });
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
index 97430a4..6a561c2 100644
--- a/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 import assert from "node:assert/strict";
 import { access, readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
 import path from "node:path";
+import { pageById } from "../../app/lib/page-graph.ts";
+import { topicLandings } from "../../app/lib/topic-landings.ts";
 
 const root = path.resolve(new URL("../..", import.meta.url).pathname);
 const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "public/reference-manifest.json"), "utf8"));
@@ -10,3 +12,8 @@ for (const source of ["/sdk.md", "/reference/runtime-api.md"]) assert.ok(llms.in
 const full = await readFile(path.join(root, "public/llms-full.txt"), "utf8");
 assert.ok(full.length < 50_000);
 assert.doesNotMatch(full, /private key|BEGIN [A-Z ]+ KEY|gho_/i);
+for (const landing of topicLandings) {
+  const page = pageById(landing.page);
+  const markdown = await readFile(path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`), "utf8");
+  assert.match(markdown, new RegExp(`^# ${page.title.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&")}`, "m"));
+}
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/generate-topic-landings.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/generate-topic-landings.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d3d9cb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/generate-topic-landings.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { pageById } from "../../app/lib/page-graph.ts";
+import { topicLandings } from "../../app/lib/topic-landings.ts";
+
+const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
+
+for (const landing of topicLandings) {
+  const page = pageById(landing.page);
+  const recommended = pageById(landing.recommendation.target);
+  const lines = [
+    `# ${page.title}`,
+    "",
+    page.description,
+    "",
+    `## Recommended: [${landing.recommendation.label}](${recommended.path})`,
+    "",
+    landing.recommendation.description,
+    "",
+  ];
+  for (const group of landing.groups) {
+    lines.push(`## ${group.title}`, "");
+    for (const card of group.cards) {
+      const target = pageById(card.target);
+      lines.push(`- [${card.title}](${target.path}) — ${card.description}`);
+    }
+    lines.push("");
+  }
+  lines.push(`_Page identity: ${page.id} · Product contract: ${pageById(landing.page).id}_`, "");
+  const output = path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`);
+  await mkdir(path.dirname(output), { recursive: true });
+  await writeFile(output, `${lines.join("\n")}\n`, "utf8");
+}

From 21dec44754436a54447f597f0961b4fc65de7ca7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 21:39:27 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 10/29] docs: publish getting started chooser and paths

---
 app/components/EditorialGuidePage.tsx         |  26 +++
 app/components/IntegrationChooser.tsx         |  53 ++++++
 app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx     |  13 +-
 app/get-started/agent/page.tsx                |   2 +
 app/get-started/choose/page.tsx               |  10 ++
 app/get-started/cross-company/page.tsx        |   2 +
 app/get-started/evaluate/page.tsx             |   2 +
 app/get-started/local/page.tsx                |   2 +
 app/get-started/prerequisites/page.tsx        |   2 +
 app/get-started/runtime/page.tsx              |   2 +
 app/get-started/verify/page.tsx               |   2 +
 app/globals.css                               | 158 ++++++++++++++++++
 app/lib/content-graph.ts                      |   6 +
 content/pages.json                            | 133 +++++++++++++++
 content/topic-landings.json                   |  14 +-
 package.json                                  |   3 +-
 public/get-started.md                         |  16 +-
 public/get-started/agent.md                   |  22 +++
 public/get-started/choose.md                  |  10 ++
 public/get-started/cross-company.md           |  22 +++
 public/get-started/evaluate.md                |  26 +++
 public/get-started/local.md                   |  22 +++
 public/get-started/prerequisites.md           |  18 ++
 public/get-started/runtime.md                 |  22 +++
 public/get-started/verify.md                  |  22 +++
 tools/build-page-model/check.mjs              |   8 +-
 tools/render-markdown/check.mjs               |   5 +
 .../generate-editorial-pages.mjs              |  21 +++
 28 files changed, 621 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 app/components/EditorialGuidePage.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/components/IntegrationChooser.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/get-started/agent/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/get-started/choose/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/get-started/cross-company/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/get-started/evaluate/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/get-started/local/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/get-started/prerequisites/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/get-started/runtime/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/get-started/verify/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 public/get-started/agent.md
 create mode 100644 public/get-started/choose.md
 create mode 100644 public/get-started/cross-company.md
 create mode 100644 public/get-started/evaluate.md
 create mode 100644 public/get-started/local.md
 create mode 100644 public/get-started/prerequisites.md
 create mode 100644 public/get-started/runtime.md
 create mode 100644 public/get-started/verify.md
 create mode 100644 tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs

diff --git a/app/components/EditorialGuidePage.tsx b/app/components/EditorialGuidePage.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79b6ba0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/EditorialGuidePage.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import { contentPageById } from "../lib/content-graph";
+import { ContentSection } from "./content/ContentSection";
+import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
+import { SiteFooter } from "./SiteFooter";
+import { SiteHeader } from "./SiteHeader";
+
+export function EditorialGuidePage({ pageId, eyebrow = "Get started" }: { pageId: string; eyebrow?: string }) {
+  const page = contentPageById(pageId);
+  return (
+    <div className="site-frame editorial-site">
+      <SiteHeader compact />
+      <main className="editorial-page">
+        <header className="editorial-hero">
+          <p className="kicker">{eyebrow}</p>
+          <h1>{page.title}</h1>
+          <p>{page.description}</p>
+          <PageActions source={`${page.path}.md`} />
+        </header>
+        <div className="editorial-sections">
+          {page.sections.map((section) => <ContentSection key={section.id} section={section} />)}
+        </div>
+      </main>
+      <SiteFooter />
+    </div>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/components/IntegrationChooser.tsx b/app/components/IntegrationChooser.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3658eec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/IntegrationChooser.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+"use client";
+
+import Link from "next/link";
+import { useMemo, useState } from "react";
+
+type Effect = "in-process" | "service" | "provider" | "evidence";
+type Actor = "person" | "workload" | "agent" | "organization";
+type Trust = "raw-key" | "oidc" | "spiffe" | "application";
+type Authority = "direct" | "delegated" | "approved-plan" | "verification";
+type State = "none" | "replay" | "recovery";
+type Custody = "development" | "application" | "kms-hsm";
+type Posture = "evaluation" | "self-hosted" | "integration-author";
+
+type Choice = Readonly<{ effect: Effect; actor: Actor; trust: Trust; authority: Authority; state: State; custody: Custody; posture: Posture }>;
+
+const initial: Choice = { effect: "in-process", actor: "person", trust: "raw-key", authority: "direct", state: "replay", custody: "development", posture: "evaluation" };
+
+function recommendation(choice: Choice): Readonly<{ path: string; title: string; reasons: readonly string[] }> {
+  if (choice.authority === "verification" || choice.effect === "evidence") return { path: "/get-started/verify", title: "Verify without executing", reasons: ["You need an inert verification result", "No provider credential or lifecycle mutation is required"] };
+  if (choice.actor === "organization") return { path: "/get-started/cross-company", title: "Authorize across companies", reasons: ["Independent organizations keep separate identity systems", "Portable authority and receipts cross the boundary"] };
+  if (choice.actor === "agent" || choice.authority === "delegated" || choice.authority === "approved-plan") return { path: "/get-started/agent", title: "Delegate one action to an agent", reasons: ["The actor needs attenuated authority", "Credentials remain behind a closed gateway"] };
+  if (choice.effect !== "in-process" || choice.state === "recovery" || choice.custody === "kms-hsm" || choice.posture === "self-hosted") return { path: "/get-started/runtime", title: "Protect a service effect", reasons: ["The effect crosses a service or provider boundary", "Durable state and operational recovery are part of the path"] };
+  return { path: "/get-started/local", title: "Protect one local effect", reasons: ["The effect can remain in process", "Development custody and local replay protection are enough to begin"] };
+}
+
+const fields = [
+  { key: "effect", label: "Where is the effect?", options: [["in-process", "In process"], ["service", "Remote service"], ["provider", "Cloud/provider"], ["evidence", "No effect—verify only"]] },
+  { key: "actor", label: "Who acts?", options: [["person", "Person"], ["workload", "Workload"], ["agent", "Agent"], ["organization", "Another organization"]] },
+  { key: "trust", label: "Trust source", options: [["raw-key", "Application key"], ["oidc", "OAuth/OIDC"], ["spiffe", "SPIFFE"], ["application", "Application resolver"]] },
+  { key: "authority", label: "Authority shape", options: [["direct", "Direct"], ["delegated", "Delegated"], ["approved-plan", "Approved plan"], ["verification", "Verification only"]] },
+  { key: "state", label: "State requirement", options: [["none", "No lifecycle state"], ["replay", "Replay/use state"], ["recovery", "Durable recovery"]] },
+  { key: "custody", label: "Signer custody", options: [["development", "Development signer"], ["application", "Application signer"], ["kms-hsm", "KMS/HSM"]] },
+  { key: "posture", label: "Operating posture", options: [["evaluation", "Evaluation"], ["self-hosted", "Self-hosted production"], ["integration-author", "Integration author"]] },
+] as const;
+
+export function IntegrationChooser() {
+  const [choice, setChoice] = useState<Choice>(initial);
+  const result = useMemo(() => recommendation(choice), [choice]);
+  return (
+    <div className="integration-chooser">
+      <div className="chooser-fields">
+        {fields.map((field) => <label key={field.key}><span>{field.label}</span><select value={choice[field.key]} onChange={(event) => setChoice((current) => ({ ...current, [field.key]: event.target.value } as Choice))}>{field.options.map(([value, label]) => <option key={value} value={value}>{label}</option>)}</select></label>)}
+      </div>
+      <aside className="chooser-result" aria-live="polite">
+        <span>Recommended path</span>
+        <h2>{result.title}</h2>
+        <ul>{result.reasons.map((reason) => <li key={reason}>{reason}</li>)}</ul>
+        <Link className="button button-primary" href={result.path}>Open this path <span aria-hidden="true">→</span></Link>
+        <small>No credentials or authority are collected or created.</small>
+      </aside>
+    </div>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx b/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
index 95001ef..6efc12d 100644
--- a/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
+++ b/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
+import Link from "next/link";
 import type { ContentSection as ContentSectionModel } from "../../../schemas/content";
+import { TestedExample } from "../TestedExample";
 
 const labels = {
   "editorial-narrative": "Editorial",
@@ -7,15 +9,20 @@ const labels = {
 } as const;
 
 export function ContentSection({ section }: { section: ContentSectionModel }) {
+  const scenarioRoutes: Record<string, string> = {
+    "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1": "/guides/protect-rest-effect",
+    "auths.scenario.delegation/1": "/start/delegate-agent",
+    "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1": "/start/verify-receipt",
+  };
   return (
-    <section data-provenance={section.provenance} id={section.id}>
+    <section className="editorial-section" data-provenance={section.provenance} id={section.id}>
       <div className="content-provenance" title={`Content provenance: ${labels[section.provenance]}`}>
         {labels[section.provenance]}
       </div>
       <h2>{section.title}</h2>
       {section.provenance === "editorial-narrative" && section.body.map((paragraph) => <p key={paragraph}>{paragraph}</p>)}
-      {section.provenance === "generated-fact" && <p><code>{section.fact}</code></p>}
-      {section.provenance === "tested-scenario" && <p><code>{section.scenario}</code>{section.step ? ` · ${section.step}` : ""}</p>}
+      {section.provenance === "generated-fact" && <div className="generated-fact-reference"><code>{section.fact}</code><span>Resolved from the selected Auths release</span></div>}
+      {section.provenance === "tested-scenario" && <TestedExample scenario={section.scenario as `auths.scenario.${string}/${number}`}><p>This step is backed by installed Rust, TypeScript, and Python consumers with a normalized outcome.</p><Link className="text-link" href={scenarioRoutes[section.scenario] ?? "/developers"}>Open the tested scenario <span aria-hidden="true">→</span></Link></TestedExample>}
     </section>
   );
 }
diff --git a/app/get-started/agent/page.tsx b/app/get-started/agent/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a5a691e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/get-started/agent/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../../components/EditorialGuidePage";
+export default function Page() { return <EditorialGuidePage pageId="auths.page.start.agent/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/get-started/choose/page.tsx b/app/get-started/choose/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f617ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/get-started/choose/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+import { IntegrationChooser } from "../../components/IntegrationChooser";
+import { PageActions } from "../../components/PageActions";
+import { SiteFooter } from "../../components/SiteFooter";
+import { SiteHeader } from "../../components/SiteHeader";
+import { contentPageById } from "../../lib/content-graph";
+
+export default function Page() {
+  const page = contentPageById("auths.page.start.choose/1");
+  return <div className="site-frame editorial-site"><SiteHeader compact /><main className="editorial-page chooser-page"><header className="editorial-hero"><p className="kicker">Get started</p><h1>{page.title}</h1><p>{page.description}</p><PageActions source={`${page.path}.md`} /></header><IntegrationChooser /></main><SiteFooter /></div>;
+}
diff --git a/app/get-started/cross-company/page.tsx b/app/get-started/cross-company/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc47e0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/get-started/cross-company/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../../components/EditorialGuidePage";
+export default function Page() { return <EditorialGuidePage pageId="auths.page.start.cross-company/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/get-started/evaluate/page.tsx b/app/get-started/evaluate/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3413ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/get-started/evaluate/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../../components/EditorialGuidePage";
+export default function Page() { return <EditorialGuidePage pageId="auths.page.start.evaluate/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/get-started/local/page.tsx b/app/get-started/local/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..259bdac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/get-started/local/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../../components/EditorialGuidePage";
+export default function Page() { return <EditorialGuidePage pageId="auths.page.start.local/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/get-started/prerequisites/page.tsx b/app/get-started/prerequisites/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3c6c6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/get-started/prerequisites/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../../components/EditorialGuidePage";
+export default function Page() { return <EditorialGuidePage pageId="auths.page.start.prerequisites/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/get-started/runtime/page.tsx b/app/get-started/runtime/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b25be07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/get-started/runtime/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../../components/EditorialGuidePage";
+export default function Page() { return <EditorialGuidePage pageId="auths.page.start.runtime/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/get-started/verify/page.tsx b/app/get-started/verify/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e07653e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/get-started/verify/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../../components/EditorialGuidePage";
+export default function Page() { return <EditorialGuidePage pageId="auths.page.start.verify/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/globals.css b/app/globals.css
index 217aa28..f1286ff 100644
--- a/app/globals.css
+++ b/app/globals.css
@@ -2757,6 +2757,149 @@ pre {
   text-transform: uppercase;
 }
 
+.editorial-page {
+  margin-inline: auto;
+  max-width: 920px;
+  padding: 72px 32px 110px;
+}
+
+.editorial-hero {
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--line);
+  padding-bottom: 38px;
+}
+
+.editorial-hero h1 {
+  font-size: clamp(42px, 6vw, 66px);
+  letter-spacing: -0.052em;
+  line-height: 1;
+  margin: 14px 0 20px;
+}
+
+.editorial-hero > p:not(.kicker) {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 18px;
+  line-height: 1.65;
+  max-width: 760px;
+}
+
+.editorial-sections {
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 0;
+}
+
+.editorial-section {
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--line);
+  padding: 48px 0;
+}
+
+.editorial-section h2 {
+  font-size: 27px;
+  letter-spacing: -0.03em;
+  margin: 10px 0 18px;
+}
+
+.editorial-section > p {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 16px;
+  line-height: 1.72;
+  max-width: 760px;
+}
+
+.generated-fact-reference {
+  align-items: center;
+  background: var(--paper-deep);
+  border: 1px solid var(--line);
+  border-radius: 8px;
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 18px;
+  justify-content: space-between;
+  padding: 17px 19px;
+}
+
+.generated-fact-reference span {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  font-size: 12px;
+}
+
+.integration-chooser {
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 50px;
+  grid-template-columns: minmax(0, 1fr) 340px;
+  margin-top: 50px;
+}
+
+.chooser-fields {
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 22px;
+  grid-template-columns: repeat(2, minmax(0, 1fr));
+}
+
+.chooser-fields label {
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 8px;
+}
+
+.chooser-fields label > span {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 12px;
+  font-weight: 650;
+}
+
+.chooser-fields select {
+  appearance: none;
+  background: var(--surface);
+  border: 1px solid var(--line-strong);
+  border-radius: 7px;
+  color: var(--ink);
+  font: inherit;
+  min-height: 44px;
+  padding: 0 36px 0 12px;
+}
+
+.chooser-result {
+  align-self: start;
+  background: var(--forest);
+  border-radius: 10px;
+  color: var(--surface);
+  padding: 28px;
+  position: sticky;
+  top: 122px;
+}
+
+.chooser-result > span,
+.chooser-result small {
+  color: var(--mint-bright);
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: 9px;
+  letter-spacing: 0.08em;
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+
+.chooser-result h2 {
+  color: var(--surface);
+  font-size: 26px;
+  margin: 15px 0;
+}
+
+.chooser-result ul {
+  color: rgb(255 255 255 / 76%);
+  font-size: 13px;
+  line-height: 1.6;
+  padding-left: 18px;
+}
+
+.chooser-result .button {
+  background: var(--mint-bright);
+  color: var(--forest);
+  margin: 12px 0 20px;
+  width: 100%;
+}
+
+.chooser-result small {
+  display: block;
+  line-height: 1.5;
+}
+
 @media (max-width: 1200px) {
   .sdk-reference-shell {
     grid-template-columns: 244px minmax(0, 1fr);
@@ -2780,6 +2923,13 @@ pre {
 }
 
 @media (max-width: 980px) {
+  .integration-chooser {
+    grid-template-columns: 1fr;
+  }
+
+  .chooser-result {
+    position: static;
+  }
   .header-nav {
     gap: 18px;
     overflow-x: auto;
@@ -2823,6 +2973,14 @@ pre {
 }
 
 @media (max-width: 760px) {
+  .editorial-page {
+    padding-inline: 22px;
+    padding-top: 48px;
+  }
+
+  .chooser-fields {
+    grid-template-columns: 1fr;
+  }
   .topic-landing {
     padding-inline: 22px;
     padding-top: 48px;
diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
index b657973..f49c703 100644
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -68,6 +68,12 @@ export function contentPageByPath(path: string): AuthoredPageSource {
   return page;
 }
 
+export function contentPageById(id: string): AuthoredPageSource {
+  const page = verifiedPageGraph.pages.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id);
+  if (!page) throw new TypeError(`unknown content page ${id}`);
+  return page;
+}
+
 export function affectedPages(semanticIdentities: readonly string[]): readonly AuthoredPageSource[] {
   const changed = new Set(semanticIdentities);
   return verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => [
diff --git a/content/pages.json b/content/pages.json
index 0a2bef3..201ab0a 100644
--- a/content/pages.json
+++ b/content/pages.json
@@ -253,5 +253,138 @@
     "sections": [
       { "id": "surfaces", "title": "Reference meaning before mechanism", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Begin with the product operation, then descend into its Rust, TypeScript, Python, or Runtime API projection."] }
     ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.start.choose/1",
+    "path": "/get-started/choose",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Choose your Auths path",
+    "description": "Describe the boundary you need and get one deterministic starting recommendation.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "choice", "title": "Choose by effect, not package", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The chooser never accepts credentials or creates authority. It maps deployment, actor, trust, state, custody, and ownership needs to a documented path."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.start.prerequisites/1",
+    "path": "/get-started/prerequisites",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Before you begin",
+    "description": "Prepare only the runtime, trust, state, and custody inputs your chosen path actually needs.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "minimum", "title": "Smallest local path", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python; use development custody and in-memory state; and protect one deterministic local effect."] },
+      { "id": "production", "title": "Production additions", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Add HTTPS, durable replay and recovery state, external custody, explicit trust resolution, observability, and a closed provider gateway only when moving beyond evaluation."] },
+      { "id": "exit", "title": "Know which path you own", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["SDK consumers, runtime operators, agent builders, and profile authors have different prerequisites. Do not assemble every extension port for a normal integration."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.start.local/1",
+    "path": "/get-started/local",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Protect one local effect",
+    "description": "Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "outcome", "title": "Outcome", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["One caller can perform one exact route-shaped action once. Replaying it or changing its bytes fails closed."] },
+      { "id": "build", "title": "Build", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1" },
+      { "id": "proof", "title": "What Auths proved", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The actor held authority for the committed action and the closed gateway returned a bounded outcome. Transport success alone proved nothing."] },
+      { "id": "failure", "title": "Failure path", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Run the same action again to receive a replay denial, then change one application byte to receive a commitment mismatch."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.start.runtime/1",
+    "path": "/get-started/runtime",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Protect a service effect",
+    "description": "Submit exact authority to the open production Runtime API and preserve recovery state.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.authorities/1", "auths.endpoint.executions/1", "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "outcome", "title": "Outcome", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["A service accepts a bounded request over HTTPS, reserves it durably, and distinguishes completion from a recoverable or unknown provider outcome."] },
+      { "id": "build", "title": "Build", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1" },
+      { "id": "boundary", "title": "Production boundary", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The Runtime API requires HTTPS and durable state. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway and never enter the caller SDK."] },
+      { "id": "failure", "title": "Failure path", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["A provider-unknown outcome requires observation and reconciliation before any retry. Resume the same execution identity rather than creating a fresh request."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.start.agent/1",
+    "path": "/get-started/agent",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Delegate one action to an agent",
+    "description": "Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "outcome", "title": "Outcome", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The agent can invoke one allowed action within its time, use, and delegation bounds. It cannot manufacture wider authority."] },
+      { "id": "build", "title": "Build", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.delegation/1" },
+      { "id": "boundary", "title": "Agent boundary", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The agent proposes or presents authority. A closed application gateway verifies and performs the effect."] },
+      { "id": "failure", "title": "Failure path", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Increase the child action set or use count and observe delegation fail before execution."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.start.cross-company/1",
+    "path": "/get-started/cross-company",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Authorize across companies",
+    "description": "Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.delegation/1", "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "outcome", "title": "Outcome", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["One organization authorizes an external actor to perform a precise operation without sharing a root identity provider or provider credential."] },
+      { "id": "delegate", "title": "Delegate", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.delegation/1" },
+      { "id": "verify", "title": "Verify the evidence", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1" },
+      { "id": "failure", "title": "Failure path", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Identity federation, delivery, or approval cannot substitute for exact authority. A changed plan or widened delegation is rejected."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.start.verify/1",
+    "path": "/get-started/verify",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Verify without executing",
+    "description": "Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "outcome", "title": "Outcome", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["A verifier confirms portable evidence and produces an inert decision or bounded receipt view without gaining an executable command."] },
+      { "id": "build", "title": "Build", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1" },
+      { "id": "privacy", "title": "Disclosure boundary", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Unauthorized viewers receive an opaque result. Summary and full views require the appropriate disclosure authority."] },
+      { "id": "failure", "title": "Failure path", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Tampered bytes, an unknown signer, or missing trust evidence remain rejected or indeterminate; verification never performs the underlying effect."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.start.evaluate/1",
+    "path": "/get-started/evaluate",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Evaluate Auths",
+    "description": "Run deterministic success and failure fixtures before choosing an integration.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1", "auths.scenario.delegation/1", "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "goal", "title": "Prove the boundaries first", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Run the same semantic cases in Rust, TypeScript, and Python and compare normalized outcomes rather than trusting screenshots."] },
+      { "id": "effect", "title": "Exact effect", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1" },
+      { "id": "delegation", "title": "Attenuation", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.delegation/1" },
+      { "id": "receipt", "title": "Receipt verification", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1" },
+      { "id": "decision", "title": "Choose after the evidence", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Adopt the local SDK, production runtime, agent, or verification-only path only after the failure behavior matches your application needs."] }
+    ]
   }
 ]
diff --git a/content/topic-landings.json b/content/topic-landings.json
index 3f1a958..1aeb241 100644
--- a/content/topic-landings.json
+++ b/content/topic-landings.json
@@ -2,17 +2,17 @@
   {
     "page": "auths.page.start/1",
     "eyebrow": "Get started",
-    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "label": "Protect one REST effect", "description": "Create exact authority, execute once, and see replay fail closed." },
+    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.start.choose/1", "label": "Choose your Auths path", "description": "Describe the effect and operating boundary, then follow one deterministic recommendation." },
     "groups": [
       { "title": "Choose a first outcome", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "title": "Protect an application effect", "description": "The shortest path from installation to a verified receipt." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1", "title": "Delegate to an agent", "description": "Pass on narrower authority without ambient credentials." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1", "title": "Verify evidence", "description": "Inspect a bounded receipt without performing an effect." }
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.local/1", "title": "Protect an application effect", "description": "The shortest path from installation to a verified receipt." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.agent/1", "title": "Delegate to an agent", "description": "Pass on narrower authority without ambient credentials." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.verify/1", "title": "Verify evidence", "description": "Inspect a bounded receipt without performing an effect." }
       ] },
       { "title": "Understand your options", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.identity-trust/1", "title": "Bring identity and trust", "description": "Keep your identity provider, key suite, and resolver choices." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.authority/1", "title": "Understand authority", "description": "Learn what becomes exact, bounded, and delegable." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.developers/1", "title": "Choose an SDK or runtime", "description": "Find Rust, TypeScript, Python, and the Runtime API." }
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.prerequisites/1", "title": "Check prerequisites", "description": "Prepare only what your integration path needs." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.cross-company/1", "title": "Cross company boundaries", "description": "Keep independent identity and cloud systems." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.start.evaluate/1", "title": "Evaluate with fixtures", "description": "Compare deterministic success and failure outcomes." }
       ] }
     ]
   },
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 29a09a5..7eb2835 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
     "node": ">=22.13.0"
   },
   "scripts": {
-    "prebuild": "npm run docs:render-topic-landings",
+    "prebuild": "npm run docs:render-topic-landings && npm run docs:render-editorial-pages",
     "dev": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext dev",
     "build": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext build",
     "start": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext start",
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
     "lint:bash": "node tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs",
     "lint:ownership": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs",
     "docs:render-topic-landings": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-topic-landings.mjs",
+    "docs:render-editorial-pages": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
     "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node --experimental-strip-types tools/build-page-model/check.mjs && node tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs && node tools/build-reference/check.mjs && node tools/render-markdown/check.mjs && node tools/release/check.mjs",
     "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run lint:bash && npm run lint:ownership && npm run test:contract && npm test"
diff --git a/public/get-started.md b/public/get-started.md
index d7949c9..b9c631e 100644
--- a/public/get-started.md
+++ b/public/get-started.md
@@ -2,21 +2,21 @@
 
 Choose the shortest safe path from an outcome to working Auths authority.
 
-## Recommended: [Protect one REST effect](/guides/protect-rest-effect)
+## Recommended: [Choose your Auths path](/get-started/choose)
 
-Create exact authority, execute once, and see replay fail closed.
+Describe the effect and operating boundary, then follow one deterministic recommendation.
 
 ## Choose a first outcome
 
-- [Protect an application effect](/guides/protect-rest-effect) — The shortest path from installation to a verified receipt.
-- [Delegate to an agent](/start/delegate-agent) — Pass on narrower authority without ambient credentials.
-- [Verify evidence](/start/verify-receipt) — Inspect a bounded receipt without performing an effect.
+- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/local) — The shortest path from installation to a verified receipt.
+- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/agent) — Pass on narrower authority without ambient credentials.
+- [Verify evidence](/get-started/verify) — Inspect a bounded receipt without performing an effect.
 
 ## Understand your options
 
-- [Bring identity and trust](/identity-trust) — Keep your identity provider, key suite, and resolver choices.
-- [Understand authority](/authority) — Learn what becomes exact, bounded, and delegable.
-- [Choose an SDK or runtime](/developers) — Find Rust, TypeScript, Python, and the Runtime API.
+- [Check prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites) — Prepare only what your integration path needs.
+- [Cross company boundaries](/get-started/cross-company) — Keep independent identity and cloud systems.
+- [Evaluate with fixtures](/get-started/evaluate) — Compare deterministic success and failure outcomes.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.start/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start/1_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/agent.md b/public/get-started/agent.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b57fdb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/get-started/agent.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Delegate one action to an agent
+
+Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.
+
+## Outcome
+
+The agent can invoke one allowed action within its time, use, and delegation bounds. It cannot manufacture wider authority.
+
+## Build
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.delegation/1`.
+
+## Agent boundary
+
+The agent proposes or presents authority. A closed application gateway verifies and performs the effect.
+
+## Failure path
+
+Increase the child action set or use count and observe delegation fail before execution.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.agent/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+
diff --git a/public/get-started/choose.md b/public/get-started/choose.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e7c575
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/get-started/choose.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Choose your Auths path
+
+Describe the boundary you need and get one deterministic starting recommendation.
+
+## Choose by effect, not package
+
+The chooser never accepts credentials or creates authority. It maps deployment, actor, trust, state, custody, and ownership needs to a documented path.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.choose/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+
diff --git a/public/get-started/cross-company.md b/public/get-started/cross-company.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..790517a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/get-started/cross-company.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Authorize across companies
+
+Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.
+
+## Outcome
+
+One organization authorizes an external actor to perform a precise operation without sharing a root identity provider or provider credential.
+
+## Delegate
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.delegation/1`.
+
+## Verify the evidence
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1`.
+
+## Failure path
+
+Identity federation, delivery, or approval cannot substitute for exact authority. A changed plan or widened delegation is rejected.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.cross-company/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+
diff --git a/public/get-started/evaluate.md b/public/get-started/evaluate.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3281c63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/get-started/evaluate.md
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# Evaluate Auths
+
+Run deterministic success and failure fixtures before choosing an integration.
+
+## Prove the boundaries first
+
+Run the same semantic cases in Rust, TypeScript, and Python and compare normalized outcomes rather than trusting screenshots.
+
+## Exact effect
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Attenuation
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.delegation/1`.
+
+## Receipt verification
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1`.
+
+## Choose after the evidence
+
+Adopt the local SDK, production runtime, agent, or verification-only path only after the failure behavior matches your application needs.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.evaluate/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+
diff --git a/public/get-started/local.md b/public/get-started/local.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf00487
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/get-started/local.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Protect one local effect
+
+Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.
+
+## Outcome
+
+One caller can perform one exact route-shaped action once. Replaying it or changing its bytes fails closed.
+
+## Build
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.rest-effect/1`.
+
+## What Auths proved
+
+The actor held authority for the committed action and the closed gateway returned a bounded outcome. Transport success alone proved nothing.
+
+## Failure path
+
+Run the same action again to receive a replay denial, then change one application byte to receive a commitment mismatch.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.local/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+
diff --git a/public/get-started/prerequisites.md b/public/get-started/prerequisites.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9048e47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/get-started/prerequisites.md
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# Before you begin
+
+Prepare only the runtime, trust, state, and custody inputs your chosen path actually needs.
+
+## Smallest local path
+
+Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python; use development custody and in-memory state; and protect one deterministic local effect.
+
+## Production additions
+
+Add HTTPS, durable replay and recovery state, external custody, explicit trust resolution, observability, and a closed provider gateway only when moving beyond evaluation.
+
+## Know which path you own
+
+SDK consumers, runtime operators, agent builders, and profile authors have different prerequisites. Do not assemble every extension port for a normal integration.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.prerequisites/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+
diff --git a/public/get-started/runtime.md b/public/get-started/runtime.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cbeb33b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/get-started/runtime.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Protect a service effect
+
+Submit exact authority to the open production Runtime API and preserve recovery state.
+
+## Outcome
+
+A service accepts a bounded request over HTTPS, reserves it durably, and distinguishes completion from a recoverable or unknown provider outcome.
+
+## Build
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Production boundary
+
+The Runtime API requires HTTPS and durable state. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway and never enter the caller SDK.
+
+## Failure path
+
+A provider-unknown outcome requires observation and reconciliation before any retry. Resume the same execution identity rather than creating a fresh request.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.runtime/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+
diff --git a/public/get-started/verify.md b/public/get-started/verify.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d20e8bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/get-started/verify.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Verify without executing
+
+Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.
+
+## Outcome
+
+A verifier confirms portable evidence and produces an inert decision or bounded receipt view without gaining an executable command.
+
+## Build
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1`.
+
+## Disclosure boundary
+
+Unauthorized viewers receive an opaque result. Summary and full views require the appropriate disclosure authority.
+
+## Failure path
+
+Tampered bytes, an unknown signer, or missing trust evidence remain rejected or indeterminate; verification never performs the underlying effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.verify/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+
diff --git a/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs b/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
index b415568..9ba9552 100644
--- a/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
+++ b/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ assert.equal(new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.path)).size, ver
 for (const id of ["auths.page.home/1", "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"]) {
   assert.ok(verifiedPageGraph.pages.some((page) => page.id === id));
 }
-assert.deepEqual(
-  affectedPages(["auths.operation.delegate/1"]).map((page) => page.id).sort(),
-  ["auths.page.agents/1", "auths.page.authority/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1"],
-);
+const delegationPages = affectedPages(["auths.operation.delegate/1"]).map((page) => page.id);
+for (const expected of ["auths.page.agents/1", "auths.page.authority/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1"]) {
+  assert.ok(delegationPages.includes(expected));
+}
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
index 6a561c2..1fadcc4 100644
--- a/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import assert from "node:assert/strict";
 import { access, readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { pageById } from "../../app/lib/page-graph.ts";
+import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
 import { topicLandings } from "../../app/lib/topic-landings.ts";
 
 const root = path.resolve(new URL("../..", import.meta.url).pathname);
@@ -17,3 +18,7 @@ for (const landing of topicLandings) {
   const markdown = await readFile(path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`), "utf8");
   assert.match(markdown, new RegExp(`^# ${page.title.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&")}`, "m"));
 }
+for (const page of verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => page.path.startsWith("/get-started/"))) {
+  const markdown = await readFile(path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`), "utf8");
+  assert.ok(markdown.includes(page.id));
+}
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef7ecbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
+
+const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
+const pages = verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => page.path.startsWith("/get-started/") && page.owner === "editorial");
+
+for (const page of pages) {
+  const lines = [`# ${page.title}`, "", page.description, ""];
+  for (const section of page.sections) {
+    lines.push(`## ${section.title}`, "");
+    if (section.provenance === "editorial-narrative") lines.push(...section.body.flatMap((paragraph) => [paragraph, ""]));
+    if (section.provenance === "tested-scenario") lines.push(`Tested scenario: \`${section.scenario}\`${section.step ? `, step \`${section.step}\`` : ""}.`, "");
+    if (section.provenance === "generated-fact") lines.push(`Generated ${section.factKind}: \`${section.fact}\`.`, "");
+  }
+  lines.push(`_Page identity: ${page.id} · Contract digest: ${verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest}_`, "");
+  const output = path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`);
+  await mkdir(path.dirname(output), { recursive: true });
+  await writeFile(output, `${lines.join("\n")}\n`, "utf8");
+}

From c2fe2ec415895fd30b8347f27c6c6903341325fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 21:45:06 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 11/29] docs: publish semantic tours and lifecycle concepts

---
 app/authority/approval-bound-plans/page.tsx   |   2 +
 app/authority/lifecycle/page.tsx              |   2 +
 .../receipts-and-disclosure/page.tsx          |   2 +
 app/components/SemanticTourPage.tsx           |  46 ++++
 app/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes/page.tsx     |   2 +
 app/globals.css                               | 208 ++++++++++++++++++
 app/identity-trust/how-it-works/page.tsx      |   2 +
 app/lib/content-graph.ts                      |   6 +-
 app/lib/tours.ts                              |  16 ++
 app/operations/execution-lifecycle/page.tsx   |   2 +
 content/pages.json                            |  84 +++++++
 content/topic-landings.json                   |  10 +-
 content/tours.json                            |  80 +++++++
 contracts/product-contract.fixture.json       |  14 +-
 package.json                                  |   3 +-
 public/authority.md                           |   6 +-
 public/authority/approval-bound-plans.md      |  43 ++++
 public/authority/lifecycle.md                 |  43 ++++
 public/authority/receipts-and-disclosure.md   |  51 +++++
 public/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes.md        |  43 ++++
 public/identity-trust.md                      |   2 +-
 public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md         |  43 ++++
 public/operations.md                          |   2 +-
 public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md      |  51 +++++
 schemas/tour.ts                               |  46 ++++
 tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs              |   2 +
 tools/render-markdown/check.mjs               |   7 +
 tools/render-markdown/generate-tours.mjs      |  17 ++
 28 files changed, 816 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 app/authority/approval-bound-plans/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/authority/lifecycle/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/authority/receipts-and-disclosure/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/components/SemanticTourPage.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/identity-trust/how-it-works/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/lib/tours.ts
 create mode 100644 app/operations/execution-lifecycle/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 content/tours.json
 create mode 100644 public/authority/approval-bound-plans.md
 create mode 100644 public/authority/lifecycle.md
 create mode 100644 public/authority/receipts-and-disclosure.md
 create mode 100644 public/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes.md
 create mode 100644 public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
 create mode 100644 schemas/tour.ts
 create mode 100644 tools/render-markdown/generate-tours.mjs

diff --git a/app/authority/approval-bound-plans/page.tsx b/app/authority/approval-bound-plans/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a88d80a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/authority/approval-bound-plans/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { SemanticTourPage } from "../../components/SemanticTourPage";
+export default function Page() { return <SemanticTourPage pageId="auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/authority/lifecycle/page.tsx b/app/authority/lifecycle/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b87355
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/authority/lifecycle/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { SemanticTourPage } from "../../components/SemanticTourPage";
+export default function Page() { return <SemanticTourPage pageId="auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/authority/receipts-and-disclosure/page.tsx b/app/authority/receipts-and-disclosure/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09de628
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/authority/receipts-and-disclosure/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { SemanticTourPage } from "../../components/SemanticTourPage";
+export default function Page() { return <SemanticTourPage pageId="auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/components/SemanticTourPage.tsx b/app/components/SemanticTourPage.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb28bf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/SemanticTourPage.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+import Link from "next/link";
+import { contentPageById, runtimeOutcomes } from "../lib/content-graph";
+import { pageById } from "../lib/page-graph";
+import { tourByPage } from "../lib/tours";
+import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
+import { SiteFooter } from "./SiteFooter";
+import { SiteHeader } from "./SiteHeader";
+
+export function SemanticTourPage({ pageId }: { pageId: string }) {
+  const page = contentPageById(pageId);
+  const tour = tourByPage(pageId);
+  return (
+    <div className="site-frame tour-site">
+      <SiteHeader compact />
+      <main className="tour-page">
+        <header className="editorial-hero">
+          <p className="kicker">Concept tour</p>
+          <h1>{page.title}</h1>
+          <p>{page.description}</p>
+          <PageActions source={`${page.path}.md`} />
+        </header>
+        <section className="tour-overview" aria-labelledby="tour-overview-title">
+          <div className="content-provenance">Editorial diagram · fact-backed vocabulary</div>
+          <h2 id="tour-overview-title">The path at a glance</h2>
+          <div className="tour-diagram" role="img" aria-label={tour.diagram.text}>
+            {tour.diagram.nodes.map((node, index) => <div key={node}><span>{String(index + 1).padStart(2, "0")}</span><strong>{node}</strong>{index < tour.diagram.nodes.length - 1 && <b aria-hidden="true">→</b>}</div>)}
+          </div>
+          <p className="diagram-text-equivalent"><strong>Text equivalent:</strong> {tour.diagram.text}</p>
+        </section>
+        <section className="tour-invariants">
+          <div><p className="kicker">Invariants</p><h2>What remains true</h2></div>
+          <ol>{tour.invariants.map((invariant) => <li key={invariant}>{invariant}</li>)}</ol>
+        </section>
+        {page.uses.endpoints.length > 0 && <section className="tour-generated-facts"><div className="content-provenance">Generated fact</div><h2>Closed runtime outcomes</h2><div>{runtimeOutcomes.map((outcome) => <code key={outcome}>{outcome}</code>)}</div></section>}
+        <section className="tour-failures">
+          <div className="content-provenance">Editorial explanation</div>
+          <h2>Failure branches</h2>
+          <div className="failure-table"><div className="failure-header"><span>Trigger</span><span>Result</span><span>Safe response</span></div>{tour.failures.map((failure) => <div key={failure.trigger}><strong>{failure.trigger}</strong><span>{failure.result}</span><p>{failure.response}</p></div>)}</div>
+        </section>
+        <section className="tour-use-grid"><div><span>Use this when</span><p>{tour.useWhen}</p></div><div><span>Do not use this when</span><p>{tour.avoidWhen}</p></div></section>
+        <section className="tour-related"><h2>Continue from here</h2><div>{tour.related.map((id) => { const related = pageById(id); return <Link href={related.path} key={id}><strong>{related.title}</strong><span>{related.description}</span><b aria-hidden="true">→</b></Link>; })}</div></section>
+      </main>
+      <SiteFooter />
+    </div>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes/page.tsx b/app/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..887f464
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { SemanticTourPage } from "../../components/SemanticTourPage";
+export default function Page() { return <SemanticTourPage pageId="auths.page.concepts.tour/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/globals.css b/app/globals.css
index f1286ff..7b6e674 100644
--- a/app/globals.css
+++ b/app/globals.css
@@ -2875,6 +2875,195 @@ pre {
   text-transform: uppercase;
 }
 
+.tour-page {
+  margin-inline: auto;
+  max-width: 1120px;
+  padding: 72px 32px 120px;
+}
+
+.tour-overview,
+.tour-invariants,
+.tour-generated-facts,
+.tour-failures,
+.tour-related {
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--line);
+  padding: 58px 0;
+}
+
+.tour-page section h2 {
+  font-size: 28px;
+  letter-spacing: -0.035em;
+  margin: 10px 0 24px;
+}
+
+.tour-diagram {
+  align-items: stretch;
+  display: flex;
+  margin: 34px 0 22px;
+  overflow-x: auto;
+  padding-bottom: 8px;
+}
+
+.tour-diagram > div {
+  align-items: center;
+  display: flex;
+  flex: 1 0 180px;
+  min-width: 0;
+  position: relative;
+}
+
+.tour-diagram > div > span {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: 9px;
+  margin-right: 8px;
+}
+
+.tour-diagram > div > strong {
+  align-items: center;
+  border: 1px solid var(--line-strong);
+  border-radius: 7px;
+  display: flex;
+  font-size: 12px;
+  line-height: 1.4;
+  min-height: 72px;
+  padding: 13px;
+  width: calc(100% - 32px);
+}
+
+.tour-diagram > div > b {
+  color: var(--forest);
+  font-size: 16px;
+  margin: 0 8px;
+}
+
+.diagram-text-equivalent {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  font-size: 13px;
+  line-height: 1.65;
+  max-width: 900px;
+}
+
+.tour-invariants {
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 60px;
+  grid-template-columns: 260px minmax(0, 1fr);
+}
+
+.tour-invariants ol {
+  counter-reset: invariants;
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 16px;
+  list-style: none;
+  margin: 0;
+  padding: 0;
+}
+
+.tour-invariants li {
+  border-left: 2px solid var(--mint);
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  line-height: 1.6;
+  padding: 8px 0 8px 20px;
+}
+
+.tour-generated-facts > div:last-child {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-wrap: wrap;
+  gap: 8px;
+}
+
+.tour-generated-facts code {
+  background: var(--paper-deep);
+  border: 1px solid var(--line);
+  border-radius: 5px;
+  padding: 7px 10px;
+}
+
+.failure-table {
+  border-top: 1px solid var(--line-strong);
+}
+
+.failure-table > div {
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--line);
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 22px;
+  grid-template-columns: minmax(160px, 0.8fr) minmax(150px, 0.7fr) minmax(260px, 1.5fr);
+  padding: 18px 0;
+}
+
+.failure-table .failure-header {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: 9px;
+  letter-spacing: 0.08em;
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+
+.failure-table strong,
+.failure-table span,
+.failure-table p {
+  font-size: 13px;
+  line-height: 1.55;
+  margin: 0;
+}
+
+.failure-table span,
+.failure-table p {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+}
+
+.tour-use-grid {
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 16px;
+  grid-template-columns: repeat(2, minmax(0, 1fr));
+  padding: 58px 0 0;
+}
+
+.tour-use-grid > div {
+  background: var(--paper-deep);
+  border-radius: 8px;
+  padding: 24px;
+}
+
+.tour-use-grid span {
+  color: var(--forest);
+  font-size: 11px;
+  font-weight: 700;
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+
+.tour-use-grid p {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  line-height: 1.6;
+}
+
+.tour-related > div {
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 12px;
+  grid-template-columns: repeat(2, minmax(0, 1fr));
+}
+
+.tour-related a {
+  border: 1px solid var(--line);
+  border-radius: 8px;
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 6px;
+  grid-template-columns: minmax(0, 1fr) auto;
+  padding: 20px;
+}
+
+.tour-related a span {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 13px;
+  grid-column: 1;
+}
+
+.tour-related a b {
+  color: var(--forest);
+  grid-column: 2;
+  grid-row: 1 / 3;
+}
+
 .chooser-result h2 {
   color: var(--surface);
   font-size: 26px;
@@ -2973,6 +3162,25 @@ pre {
 }
 
 @media (max-width: 760px) {
+  .tour-page {
+    padding-inline: 22px;
+    padding-top: 48px;
+  }
+
+  .tour-invariants,
+  .tour-use-grid,
+  .tour-related > div {
+    grid-template-columns: 1fr;
+  }
+
+  .failure-table > div {
+    gap: 8px;
+    grid-template-columns: 1fr;
+  }
+
+  .failure-table .failure-header {
+    display: none;
+  }
   .editorial-page {
     padding-inline: 22px;
     padding-top: 48px;
diff --git a/app/identity-trust/how-it-works/page.tsx b/app/identity-trust/how-it-works/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3fbe188
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/identity-trust/how-it-works/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { SemanticTourPage } from "../../components/SemanticTourPage";
+export default function Page() { return <SemanticTourPage pageId="auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
index f49c703..dfc6a37 100644
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ type ProductContract = Readonly<{
   digest: string;
   operations: readonly Readonly<{ id: string }>[];
   scenarios: readonly Readonly<{ id: string }>[];
-  runtimeFacts: Readonly<{ endpoints: readonly Readonly<{ id: string }>[] }>;
+  runtimeFacts: Readonly<{ endpoints: readonly Readonly<{ id: string; outcomes?: readonly string[] }>[] }>;
 }>;
 
 export type VerifiedPageGraph = Readonly<{
@@ -84,3 +84,7 @@ export function affectedPages(semanticIdentities: readonly string[]): readonly A
     ...page.uses.claims,
   ].some((identity) => changed.has(identity)));
 }
+
+export const runtimeOutcomes: readonly string[] = Object.freeze([...new Set(
+  (rawContract.runtimeFacts.endpoints as readonly Readonly<{ outcomes?: readonly string[] }>[]) .flatMap((endpoint) => endpoint.outcomes ?? []),
+)].sort());
diff --git a/app/lib/tours.ts b/app/lib/tours.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29c2f99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/tours.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+import rawTours from "../../content/tours.json" with { type: "json" };
+import { parseTour, type Tour } from "../../schemas/tour.ts";
+import { verifiedPageGraph } from "./content-graph.ts";
+
+const pageIds = new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.id));
+export const tours: readonly Tour[] = Object.freeze(rawTours.map(parseTour));
+for (const tour of tours) {
+  if (!pageIds.has(tour.page)) throw new TypeError(`unknown tour page ${tour.page}`);
+  for (const related of tour.related) if (!pageIds.has(related)) throw new TypeError(`${tour.page} references unknown related page ${related}`);
+}
+
+export function tourByPage(page: string): Tour {
+  const tour = tours.find((candidate) => candidate.page === page);
+  if (!tour) throw new TypeError(`unknown tour ${page}`);
+  return tour;
+}
diff --git a/app/operations/execution-lifecycle/page.tsx b/app/operations/execution-lifecycle/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a445e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/operations/execution-lifecycle/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import { SemanticTourPage } from "../../components/SemanticTourPage";
+export default function Page() { return <SemanticTourPage pageId="auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1" />; }
diff --git a/content/pages.json b/content/pages.json
index 201ab0a..220c170 100644
--- a/content/pages.json
+++ b/content/pages.json
@@ -386,5 +386,89 @@
       { "id": "receipt", "title": "Receipt verification", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1" },
       { "id": "decision", "title": "Choose after the evidence", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Adopt the local SDK, production runtime, agent, or verification-only path only after the failure behavior matches your application needs."] }
     ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.concepts.tour/1",
+    "path": "/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes",
+    "kind": "architecture",
+    "title": "Auths in fifteen minutes",
+    "description": "Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.",
+    "depth": "understand",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "model", "title": "One operation from intent to evidence", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["A support service grants one actor authority to issue one refund, executes it behind a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
+    "path": "/identity-trust/how-it-works",
+    "kind": "architecture",
+    "title": "How identity and trust fit",
+    "description": "Authenticate a signer without turning identity, cryptography, or transport into authority.",
+    "depth": "understand",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "separation", "title": "Who signed is not what they may do", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Trust evidence establishes a signer under an application-owned trust policy. Authority separately commits the allowed action and bounds."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1",
+    "path": "/authority/lifecycle",
+    "kind": "architecture",
+    "title": "Authority lifecycle",
+    "description": "Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.",
+    "depth": "inspect",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "narrowing", "title": "Authority can only get narrower", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Each child commits to a subset of its parent and consumes explicit time, use, budget, and delegation bounds."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1",
+    "path": "/operations/execution-lifecycle",
+    "kind": "architecture",
+    "title": "Execution lifecycle",
+    "description": "Separate parsing, authorization, durable reservation, provider observation, recovery, and terminal evidence.",
+    "depth": "operate",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.executions/1", "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "state", "title": "Observe before retry", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Once a provider may have accepted an effect, Auths preserves uncertainty and requires reconciliation or resume of the same execution identity."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1",
+    "path": "/authority/approval-bound-plans",
+    "kind": "architecture",
+    "title": "Approval-bound plans",
+    "description": "Bind threshold or ordered approval to the exact operations, bytes, and order under review.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "commitment", "title": "Approval is bound context, not authority", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Changing a member, byte, order, or threshold changes the plan commitment and invalidates the collected approval evidence."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1",
+    "path": "/authority/receipts-and-disclosure",
+    "kind": "architecture",
+    "title": "Receipts and disclosure",
+    "description": "Verify outcome evidence while revealing only what the viewer is authorized to inspect.",
+    "depth": "inspect",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1", "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "views", "title": "Evidence has disclosure levels", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Opaque, summary, and authorized full views let applications prove integrity without publishing sensitive business detail by default."] }
+    ]
   }
 ]
diff --git a/content/topic-landings.json b/content/topic-landings.json
index 1aeb241..521908c 100644
--- a/content/topic-landings.json
+++ b/content/topic-landings.json
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
   {
     "page": "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
     "eyebrow": "Identity & trust",
-    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1", "label": "See the trust boundaries", "description": "Understand what identity proves—and what it never authorizes by itself." },
+    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1", "label": "See how identity and trust fit", "description": "Understand what identity proves—and what it never authorizes by itself." },
     "groups": [
       { "title": "Bring what you already use", "cards": [
         { "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1", "title": "Compose existing identity", "description": "Use OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or an application resolver." },
@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@
         { "target": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1", "title": "Execute and recover", "description": "Reserve durably, perform behind a closed gateway, and resume safely." }
       ] },
       { "title": "Understand the model", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.concepts.five-nouns/1", "title": "Five nouns and five verbs", "description": "Use one vocabulary from first build to formal evidence." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1", "title": "Authorization boundaries", "description": "Separate identity, approval, transport, and execution." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "title": "Evidence and limitations", "description": "See which guarantees are tested, modeled, or operational." }
+        { "target": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1", "title": "Authority lifecycle", "description": "Follow attenuation, use, budget, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1", "title": "Approval-bound plans", "description": "Bind review to exact members, bytes, order, and threshold." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1", "title": "Receipts and disclosure", "description": "Verify evidence without revealing sensitive detail by default." }
       ] }
     ]
   },
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
         { "target": "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1", "title": "Receipts and disclosure", "description": "Preserve evidence while minimizing exposed detail." }
       ] },
       { "title": "Respond safely", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.authority/1", "title": "Lifecycle and recovery", "description": "Know when to retry, resume, reconcile, or stop." },
+        { "target": "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1", "title": "Lifecycle and recovery", "description": "Know when to retry, resume, reconcile, or stop." },
         { "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "title": "Operational evidence", "description": "Trace procedures and claims to a qualified release." },
         { "target": "auths.page.developers/1", "title": "Testing tools", "description": "Exercise denial, replay, mutation, and provider uncertainty." }
       ] }
diff --git a/content/tours.json b/content/tours.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..147eb1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/tours.json
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+[
+  {
+    "page": "auths.page.concepts.tour/1",
+    "diagram": { "nodes": ["Actor + exact action", "Create authority", "Delegate narrower", "Execute through gateway", "Verify receipt"], "text": "An actor describes an exact action, creates bounded authority, optionally delegates a narrower child, executes through a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt." },
+    "invariants": ["Authority names the exact action and actor bounds.", "Delegation cannot add actions, time, uses, budget, or depth.", "Verification returns inert evidence and cannot perform the effect."],
+    "failures": [
+      { "trigger": "Action bytes change", "result": "Commitment mismatch", "response": "Create authority for the intended bytes; do not reinterpret the old grant." },
+      { "trigger": "The same use is replayed", "result": "Denied", "response": "Create a new authorized operation only if the business intent is genuinely new." },
+      { "trigger": "Required trust evidence is unavailable", "result": "Indeterminate", "response": "Restore the missing evidence before making a decision." }
+    ],
+    "useWhen": "You need the complete product model before choosing an SDK or deployment.",
+    "avoidWhen": "You only need an exact signature or endpoint field; open the generated reference instead.",
+    "related": ["auths.page.start.local/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"]
+  },
+  {
+    "page": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
+    "diagram": { "nodes": ["Identity material", "Authentication evidence", "Application trust resolver", "Verified signer", "Separate authority decision"], "text": "Bounded identity material becomes authentication evidence, an application-owned resolver evaluates trust, and only then can a separate authority decision consider the verified signer." },
+    "invariants": ["A public key identifies verification material; it does not grant an action.", "Ed25519, P-256, and future suites enter through the same bounded verification port.", "HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and other transports deliver evidence but never authorize effects."],
+    "failures": [
+      { "trigger": "The suite is unsupported", "result": "Rejected", "response": "Install or supply an explicit compatible suite implementation." },
+      { "trigger": "The signer is valid but untrusted", "result": "Denied", "response": "Change trust policy or use a trusted identity; do not infer trust from signature validity." },
+      { "trigger": "The resolver is unavailable", "result": "Indeterminate", "response": "Restore trust evidence and evaluate again without performing an effect." }
+    ],
+    "useWhen": "You are integrating OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, application identities, or another cryptographic suite.",
+    "avoidWhen": "You are looking for permission scope; identity alone cannot express the complete effect boundary.",
+    "related": ["auths.page.identity-trust/1", "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1"]
+  },
+  {
+    "page": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1",
+    "diagram": { "nodes": ["Author exact authority", "Commit canonical bytes", "Attenuate child", "Consume use or budget", "Expire, revoke, or exhaust"], "text": "Authority is authored for exact canonical bytes, committed, optionally attenuated into a child, consumed under durable state, and eventually expires, is revoked, or becomes exhausted." },
+    "invariants": ["A child is a subset of its parent under every critical extension.", "Use and budget state are durable and atomic with reservation.", "Expired, revoked, or exhausted authority cannot be revived by transport or approval."],
+    "failures": [
+      { "trigger": "A child adds an action or use", "result": "Widening rejected", "response": "Create the child from a valid subset of the parent." },
+      { "trigger": "Authority expires before reservation", "result": "Denied", "response": "Request fresh authority for current intent." },
+      { "trigger": "Revocation state cannot be checked", "result": "Indeterminate", "response": "Restore lifecycle state; do not assume the grant remains valid." }
+    ],
+    "useWhen": "You need delegation, one-time use, budget, expiry, revocation, or critical-extension behavior.",
+    "avoidWhen": "You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.",
+    "related": ["auths.page.start.agent/1", "auths.page.authority/1"]
+  },
+  {
+    "page": "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1",
+    "diagram": { "nodes": ["Parse + verify", "Authorize", "Reserve durably", "Enter closed gateway", "Complete or preserve recovery"], "text": "The runtime parses and verifies untrusted input, authorizes it, reserves replay and budget state, enters the closed gateway, then records completion or preserves a recoverable execution identity." },
+    "invariants": ["No effect-capable command exists before native authorization and durable reservation.", "A provider timeout after submission is not silently converted to failure or success.", "Resume continues the same execution identity; retry creates unsafe ambiguity."],
+    "failures": [
+      { "trigger": "Verification or policy denies", "result": "Denied", "response": "Do not enter the provider gateway." },
+      { "trigger": "State reservation fails", "result": "Unavailable", "response": "Perform no effect and retry only after state is healthy." },
+      { "trigger": "Provider acceptance is unknown", "result": "Recoverable or provider-unknown", "response": "Observe and reconcile before resuming the same execution." }
+    ],
+    "useWhen": "You operate a remote effect, durable replay state, provider gateway, or recovery workflow.",
+    "avoidWhen": "You are performing effect-free offline verification.",
+    "related": ["auths.page.start.runtime/1", "auths.page.operations.runtime/1"]
+  },
+  {
+    "page": "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1",
+    "diagram": { "nodes": ["Construct exact plan", "Commit members + order", "Collect bound approvals", "Authorize each sealed command", "Record partial or terminal outcome"], "text": "An exact ordered plan is committed, approvers sign that commitment, each member still passes authorization, and execution records partial, uncertain, cancelled, or terminal outcomes without treating approval as reusable permission." },
+    "invariants": ["Approval is evidence about one exact plan commitment.", "Substituting a member, byte sequence, order, threshold, or approver set invalidates approval.", "Approval never bypasses authority verification or durable execution state."],
+    "failures": [
+      { "trigger": "A plan member changes after approval", "result": "Substitution rejected", "response": "Build and approve a new plan commitment." },
+      { "trigger": "Threshold is not met", "result": "Denied", "response": "Collect the missing valid approval or cancel." },
+      { "trigger": "A provider outcome becomes unknown mid-plan", "result": "Plan is recoverable with explicit completed and uncertain members", "response": "Reconcile before any continuation." }
+    ],
+    "useWhen": "Several exact operations require threshold, ordered, or cross-organization review.",
+    "avoidWhen": "A reusable human-approved flag or broad role is sufficient for the actual risk model.",
+    "related": ["auths.page.start.cross-company/1", "auths.page.authority/1"]
+  },
+  {
+    "page": "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1",
+    "diagram": { "nodes": ["Decision receipt", "Execution receipt", "Verify integrity", "Opaque or summary view", "Authorized full disclosure"], "text": "Decision and execution receipts bind evidence, local verification confirms integrity, every viewer can receive only the permitted opaque or summary projection, and sensitive full detail requires explicit disclosure authority." },
+    "invariants": ["A receipt records a decision or outcome; it does not retroactively authorize it.", "Verification is local and effect free.", "Sensitive application details are absent from unauthorized and bounded-summary views."],
+    "failures": [
+      { "trigger": "Receipt bytes are changed", "result": "Verification rejected", "response": "Retrieve the original signed receipt from a trusted source." },
+      { "trigger": "A viewer lacks disclosure authority", "result": "Opaque view", "response": "Request explicit disclosure authority rather than leaking fields." },
+      { "trigger": "Signer trust cannot be resolved", "result": "Indeterminate", "response": "Restore trust evidence before relying on the receipt." }
+    ],
+    "useWhen": "You need audit evidence, cross-company proof, recovery state, or privacy-preserving inspection.",
+    "avoidWhen": "You need to perform an effect; receipt verification is intentionally inert.",
+    "related": ["auths.page.start.verify/1", "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1"]
+  }
+]
diff --git a/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json b/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json
index b45557c..86698d5 100644
--- a/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json
+++ b/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json
@@ -15,13 +15,13 @@
   ],
   "runtimeFacts": {
     "endpoints": [
-      { "id": "auths.endpoint.health/1" },
-      { "id": "auths.endpoint.version/1" },
-      { "id": "auths.endpoint.authorities/1" },
-      { "id": "auths.endpoint.executions/1" },
-      { "id": "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1" },
-      { "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1" },
-      { "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1" }
+      { "id": "auths.endpoint.health/1", "outcomes": ["completed"] },
+      { "id": "auths.endpoint.version/1", "outcomes": ["completed"] },
+      { "id": "auths.endpoint.authorities/1", "outcomes": ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate"] },
+      { "id": "auths.endpoint.executions/1", "outcomes": ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate", "recoverable"] },
+      { "id": "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1", "outcomes": ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate", "recoverable", "not-found"] },
+      { "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1", "outcomes": ["completed", "not-found"] },
+      { "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1", "outcomes": ["completed", "denied", "not-found"] }
     ]
   }
 }
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 7eb2835..353b0a4 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
     "node": ">=22.13.0"
   },
   "scripts": {
-    "prebuild": "npm run docs:render-topic-landings && npm run docs:render-editorial-pages",
+    "prebuild": "npm run docs:render-topic-landings && npm run docs:render-editorial-pages && npm run docs:render-tours",
     "dev": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext dev",
     "build": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext build",
     "start": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext start",
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
     "lint:ownership": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs",
     "docs:render-topic-landings": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-topic-landings.mjs",
     "docs:render-editorial-pages": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs",
+    "docs:render-tours": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-tours.mjs",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
     "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node --experimental-strip-types tools/build-page-model/check.mjs && node tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs && node tools/build-reference/check.mjs && node tools/render-markdown/check.mjs && node tools/release/check.mjs",
     "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run lint:bash && npm run lint:ownership && npm run test:contract && npm test"
diff --git a/public/authority.md b/public/authority.md
index 437af39..af23f8d 100644
--- a/public/authority.md
+++ b/public/authority.md
@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@ Start with one effect, one use, and evidence of the outcome.
 
 ## Understand the model
 
-- [Five nouns and five verbs](/concepts) — Use one vocabulary from first build to formal evidence.
-- [Authorization boundaries](/architecture/trust-boundaries) — Separate identity, approval, transport, and execution.
-- [Evidence and limitations](/assurance) — See which guarantees are tested, modeled, or operational.
+- [Authority lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Follow attenuation, use, budget, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
+- [Approval-bound plans](/authority/approval-bound-plans) — Bind review to exact members, bytes, order, and threshold.
+- [Receipts and disclosure](/authority/receipts-and-disclosure) — Verify evidence without revealing sensitive detail by default.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority/1_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/approval-bound-plans.md b/public/authority/approval-bound-plans.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06da82e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/approval-bound-plans.md
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# Approval-bound plans
+
+Bind threshold or ordered approval to the exact operations, bytes, and order under review.
+
+## The path at a glance
+
+1. Construct exact plan
+2. Commit members + order
+3. Collect bound approvals
+4. Authorize each sealed command
+5. Record partial or terminal outcome
+
+Text equivalent: An exact ordered plan is committed, approvers sign that commitment, each member still passes authorization, and execution records partial, uncertain, cancelled, or terminal outcomes without treating approval as reusable permission.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- Approval is evidence about one exact plan commitment.
+- Substituting a member, byte sequence, order, threshold, or approver set invalidates approval.
+- Approval never bypasses authority verification or durable execution state.
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| A plan member changes after approval | Substitution rejected | Build and approve a new plan commitment. |
+| Threshold is not met | Denied | Collect the missing valid approval or cancel. |
+| A provider outcome becomes unknown mid-plan | Plan is recoverable with explicit completed and uncertain members | Reconcile before any continuation. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+Several exact operations require threshold, ordered, or cross-organization review.
+
+## Do not use this when
+
+A reusable human-approved flag or broad role is sufficient for the actual risk model.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Authorize across companies](/get-started/cross-company) — Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.
+- [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle.md b/public/authority/lifecycle.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9739d89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/lifecycle.md
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# Authority lifecycle
+
+Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
+
+## The path at a glance
+
+1. Author exact authority
+2. Commit canonical bytes
+3. Attenuate child
+4. Consume use or budget
+5. Expire, revoke, or exhaust
+
+Text equivalent: Authority is authored for exact canonical bytes, committed, optionally attenuated into a child, consumed under durable state, and eventually expires, is revoked, or becomes exhausted.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- A child is a subset of its parent under every critical extension.
+- Use and budget state are durable and atomic with reservation.
+- Expired, revoked, or exhausted authority cannot be revived by transport or approval.
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| A child adds an action or use | Widening rejected | Create the child from a valid subset of the parent. |
+| Authority expires before reservation | Denied | Request fresh authority for current intent. |
+| Revocation state cannot be checked | Indeterminate | Restore lifecycle state; do not assume the grant remains valid. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+You need delegation, one-time use, budget, expiry, revocation, or critical-extension behavior.
+
+## Do not use this when
+
+You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Delegate one action to an agent](/get-started/agent) — Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.
+- [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+
diff --git a/public/authority/receipts-and-disclosure.md b/public/authority/receipts-and-disclosure.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..44d26ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/receipts-and-disclosure.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# Receipts and disclosure
+
+Verify outcome evidence while revealing only what the viewer is authorized to inspect.
+
+## The path at a glance
+
+1. Decision receipt
+2. Execution receipt
+3. Verify integrity
+4. Opaque or summary view
+5. Authorized full disclosure
+
+Text equivalent: Decision and execution receipts bind evidence, local verification confirms integrity, every viewer can receive only the permitted opaque or summary projection, and sensitive full detail requires explicit disclosure authority.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- A receipt records a decision or outcome; it does not retroactively authorize it.
+- Verification is local and effect free.
+- Sensitive application details are absent from unauthorized and bounded-summary views.
+
+## Closed runtime outcomes
+
+- `completed`
+- `denied`
+- `indeterminate`
+- `not-found`
+- `recoverable`
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| Receipt bytes are changed | Verification rejected | Retrieve the original signed receipt from a trusted source. |
+| A viewer lacks disclosure authority | Opaque view | Request explicit disclosure authority rather than leaking fields. |
+| Signer trust cannot be resolved | Indeterminate | Restore trust evidence before relying on the receipt. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+You need audit evidence, cross-company proof, recovery state, or privacy-preserving inspection.
+
+## Do not use this when
+
+You need to perform an effect; receipt verification is intentionally inert.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Verify without executing](/get-started/verify) — Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.
+- [Assurance](/assurance) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+
diff --git a/public/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes.md b/public/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8a7bad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes.md
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# Auths in fifteen minutes
+
+Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.
+
+## The path at a glance
+
+1. Actor + exact action
+2. Create authority
+3. Delegate narrower
+4. Execute through gateway
+5. Verify receipt
+
+Text equivalent: An actor describes an exact action, creates bounded authority, optionally delegates a narrower child, executes through a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- Authority names the exact action and actor bounds.
+- Delegation cannot add actions, time, uses, budget, or depth.
+- Verification returns inert evidence and cannot perform the effect.
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| Action bytes change | Commitment mismatch | Create authority for the intended bytes; do not reinterpret the old grant. |
+| The same use is replayed | Denied | Create a new authorized operation only if the business intent is genuinely new. |
+| Required trust evidence is unavailable | Indeterminate | Restore the missing evidence before making a decision. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+You need the complete product model before choosing an SDK or deployment.
+
+## Do not use this when
+
+You only need an exact signature or endpoint field; open the generated reference instead.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Protect one local effect](/get-started/local) — Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.
+- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+
diff --git a/public/identity-trust.md b/public/identity-trust.md
index 82ee540..d0408eb 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.
 
-## Recommended: [See the trust boundaries](/architecture/trust-boundaries)
+## Recommended: [See how identity and trust fit](/identity-trust/how-it-works)
 
 Understand what identity proves—and what it never authorizes by itself.
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md b/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c45c32c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# How identity and trust fit
+
+Authenticate a signer without turning identity, cryptography, or transport into authority.
+
+## The path at a glance
+
+1. Identity material
+2. Authentication evidence
+3. Application trust resolver
+4. Verified signer
+5. Separate authority decision
+
+Text equivalent: Bounded identity material becomes authentication evidence, an application-owned resolver evaluates trust, and only then can a separate authority decision consider the verified signer.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- A public key identifies verification material; it does not grant an action.
+- Ed25519, P-256, and future suites enter through the same bounded verification port.
+- HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and other transports deliver evidence but never authorize effects.
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| The suite is unsupported | Rejected | Install or supply an explicit compatible suite implementation. |
+| The signer is valid but untrusted | Denied | Change trust policy or use a trusted identity; do not infer trust from signature validity. |
+| The resolver is unavailable | Indeterminate | Restore trust evidence and evaluate again without performing an effect. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+You are integrating OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, application identities, or another cryptographic suite.
+
+## Do not use this when
+
+You are looking for permission scope; identity alone cannot express the complete effect boundary.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Identity & trust](/identity-trust) — Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.
+- [Trust boundaries](/architecture/trust-boundaries) — Authorization before provider entry.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+
diff --git a/public/operations.md b/public/operations.md
index cf5d5c5..b4edc38 100644
--- a/public/operations.md
+++ b/public/operations.md
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ See the exact HTTPS boundary, outcomes, and recovery operations.
 
 ## Respond safely
 
-- [Lifecycle and recovery](/authority) — Know when to retry, resume, reconcile, or stop.
+- [Lifecycle and recovery](/operations/execution-lifecycle) — Know when to retry, resume, reconcile, or stop.
 - [Operational evidence](/assurance) — Trace procedures and claims to a qualified release.
 - [Testing tools](/developers) — Exercise denial, replay, mutation, and provider uncertainty.
 
diff --git a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d466b40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# Execution lifecycle
+
+Separate parsing, authorization, durable reservation, provider observation, recovery, and terminal evidence.
+
+## The path at a glance
+
+1. Parse + verify
+2. Authorize
+3. Reserve durably
+4. Enter closed gateway
+5. Complete or preserve recovery
+
+Text equivalent: The runtime parses and verifies untrusted input, authorizes it, reserves replay and budget state, enters the closed gateway, then records completion or preserves a recoverable execution identity.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- No effect-capable command exists before native authorization and durable reservation.
+- A provider timeout after submission is not silently converted to failure or success.
+- Resume continues the same execution identity; retry creates unsafe ambiguity.
+
+## Closed runtime outcomes
+
+- `completed`
+- `denied`
+- `indeterminate`
+- `not-found`
+- `recoverable`
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| Verification or policy denies | Denied | Do not enter the provider gateway. |
+| State reservation fails | Unavailable | Perform no effect and retry only after state is healthy. |
+| Provider acceptance is unknown | Recoverable or provider-unknown | Observe and reconcile before resuming the same execution. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+You operate a remote effect, durable replay state, provider gateway, or recovery workflow.
+
+## Do not use this when
+
+You are performing effect-free offline verification.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Protect a service effect](/get-started/runtime) — Submit exact authority to the open production Runtime API and preserve recovery state.
+- [Production operations](/operations) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+
diff --git a/schemas/tour.ts b/schemas/tour.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60434f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/schemas/tour.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+export type Tour = Readonly<{
+  page: string;
+  diagram: Readonly<{ nodes: readonly string[]; text: string }>;
+  invariants: readonly string[];
+  failures: readonly Readonly<{ trigger: string; result: string; response: string }>[];
+  useWhen: string;
+  avoidWhen: string;
+  related: readonly string[];
+}>;
+
+const identity = /^[a-z0-9.-]+\/[1-9][0-9]*$/;
+
+function text(value: unknown, label: string, maximum = 500): string {
+  if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0 || value.length > maximum) throw new TypeError(`${label} is invalid`);
+  return value;
+}
+
+function record(value: unknown, label: string): Record<string, unknown> {
+  if (typeof value !== "object" || value === null || Array.isArray(value)) throw new TypeError(`${label} is invalid`);
+  return value as Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+export function parseTour(input: unknown): Tour {
+  const value = record(input, "tour");
+  if (Object.keys(value).sort().join() !== "avoidWhen,diagram,failures,invariants,page,related,useWhen") throw new TypeError("tour fields are invalid");
+  const page = text(value.page, "tour page", 128);
+  if (!identity.test(page)) throw new TypeError("tour page identity is invalid");
+  const diagram = record(value.diagram, "tour diagram");
+  if (Object.keys(diagram).sort().join() !== "nodes,text" || !Array.isArray(diagram.nodes) || diagram.nodes.length < 3 || diagram.nodes.length > 7) throw new TypeError("tour diagram is invalid");
+  if (!Array.isArray(value.invariants) || value.invariants.length < 3 || value.invariants.length > 8) throw new TypeError("tour invariants are invalid");
+  if (!Array.isArray(value.failures) || value.failures.length < 3 || value.failures.length > 8) throw new TypeError("tour failures are invalid");
+  if (!Array.isArray(value.related) || value.related.length < 1 || !value.related.every((id) => typeof id === "string" && identity.test(id))) throw new TypeError("tour related pages are invalid");
+  return Object.freeze({
+    page,
+    diagram: Object.freeze({ nodes: Object.freeze(diagram.nodes.map((node) => text(node, "diagram node", 120))), text: text(diagram.text, "diagram text", 1_000) }),
+    invariants: Object.freeze(value.invariants.map((item) => text(item, "tour invariant"))),
+    failures: Object.freeze(value.failures.map((input) => {
+      const failure = record(input, "tour failure");
+      if (Object.keys(failure).sort().join() !== "response,result,trigger") throw new TypeError("tour failure fields are invalid");
+      return Object.freeze({ trigger: text(failure.trigger, "failure trigger", 240), result: text(failure.result, "failure result", 240), response: text(failure.response, "failure response", 500) });
+    })),
+    useWhen: text(value.useWhen, "tour use case"),
+    avoidWhen: text(value.avoidWhen, "tour exclusion"),
+    related: Object.freeze([...value.related] as string[]),
+  });
+}
diff --git a/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs b/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs
index 5becaff..6843e7c 100644
--- a/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs
+++ b/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
 import { buildVerifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
 import { primaryNavigation, utilityNavigation } from "../../app/lib/navigation.ts";
 import { topicLandings } from "../../app/lib/topic-landings.ts";
+import { tours } from "../../app/lib/tours.ts";
 
 const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
 const pages = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "content/pages.json"), "utf8"));
@@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ assert.equal(new Set(graph.pages.flatMap((page) => page.sections.map((section) =
 assert.equal(primaryNavigation.length, 6);
 assert.equal(utilityNavigation.length, 1);
 assert.equal(topicLandings.length, 8);
+assert.equal(tours.length, 6);
 
 async function walk(directory) {
   const entries = await readdir(directory, { withFileTypes: true });
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
index 1fadcc4..f851fa8 100644
--- a/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import path from "node:path";
 import { pageById } from "../../app/lib/page-graph.ts";
 import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
 import { topicLandings } from "../../app/lib/topic-landings.ts";
+import { tours } from "../../app/lib/tours.ts";
 
 const root = path.resolve(new URL("../..", import.meta.url).pathname);
 const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "public/reference-manifest.json"), "utf8"));
@@ -22,3 +23,9 @@ for (const page of verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => page.path.startsWith
   const markdown = await readFile(path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`), "utf8");
   assert.ok(markdown.includes(page.id));
 }
+for (const tour of tours) {
+  const page = pageById(tour.page);
+  const markdown = await readFile(path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`), "utf8");
+  assert.ok(markdown.includes("Text equivalent:"));
+  assert.ok(markdown.includes(page.id));
+}
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/generate-tours.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/generate-tours.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5eaec30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/generate-tours.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { contentPageById, runtimeOutcomes, verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
+import { pageById } from "../../app/lib/page-graph.ts";
+import { tours } from "../../app/lib/tours.ts";
+
+const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
+for (const tour of tours) {
+  const page = contentPageById(tour.page);
+  const lines = [`# ${page.title}`, "", page.description, "", "## The path at a glance", "", tour.diagram.nodes.map((node, index) => `${index + 1}. ${node}`).join("\n"), "", `Text equivalent: ${tour.diagram.text}`, "", "## What remains true", "", ...tour.invariants.map((item) => `- ${item}`), ""];
+  if (page.uses.endpoints.length > 0) lines.push("## Closed runtime outcomes", "", ...runtimeOutcomes.map((outcome) => `- \`${outcome}\``), "");
+  lines.push("## Failure branches", "", "| Trigger | Result | Safe response |", "|---|---|---|", ...tour.failures.map((failure) => `| ${failure.trigger} | ${failure.result} | ${failure.response} |`), "", "## Use this when", "", tour.useWhen, "", "## Do not use this when", "", tour.avoidWhen, "", "## Continue from here", "", ...tour.related.map((id) => { const related = pageById(id); return `- [${related.title}](${related.path}) — ${related.description}`; }), "", `_Page identity: ${page.id} · Contract digest: ${verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest}_`, "");
+  const output = path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`);
+  await mkdir(path.dirname(output), { recursive: true });
+  await writeFile(output, `${lines.join("\n")}\n`, "utf8");
+}

From 56aede82e38c163a1fb5672612009f04d9575f02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 21:53:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 12/29] docs: publish outcome quickstarts

---
 app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx             |  53 ++++++
 app/globals.css                               |  16 ++
 app/lib/content-graph.ts                      |   4 +-
 app/lib/quickstarts.ts                        |  16 ++
 app/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx               |  11 ++
 content/pages.json                            |  84 ++++++++++
 contracts/product-contract.fixture.json       |  11 +-
 examples/quickstarts.ts                       | 154 ++++++++++++++++++
 package.json                                  |   4 +-
 public/authority/approval-bound-plans.md      |   2 +-
 public/authority/lifecycle.md                 |   2 +-
 public/authority/receipts-and-disclosure.md   |   2 +-
 public/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes.md        |   2 +-
 .../quickstarts/agent-delegation.json         |  35 ++++
 .../downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json  |  35 ++++
 .../downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json  |  35 ++++
 .../quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json        |  35 ++++
 .../quickstarts/offline-verification.json     |  35 ++++
 public/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json    |  35 ++++
 .../downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json |  35 ++++
 public/get-started/agent.md                   |   2 +-
 public/get-started/choose.md                  |   2 +-
 public/get-started/cross-company.md           |   2 +-
 public/get-started/evaluate.md                |   2 +-
 public/get-started/local.md                   |   2 +-
 public/get-started/prerequisites.md           |   2 +-
 public/get-started/runtime.md                 |   2 +-
 public/get-started/verify.md                  |   2 +-
 public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md         |   2 +-
 public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md      |   2 +-
 public/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md        |  31 ++++
 public/quickstarts/approved-plan.md           |  31 ++++
 public/quickstarts/identity-swap.md           |  31 ++++
 public/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md       |  31 ++++
 public/quickstarts/offline-verification.md    |  31 ++++
 public/quickstarts/recovery.md                |  31 ++++
 public/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md          |  31 ++++
 tools/qualify-examples/build-quickstarts.mjs  |  15 ++
 tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs              |  28 ++++
 .../render-markdown/generate-quickstarts.mjs  |  13 ++
 40 files changed, 881 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/lib/quickstarts.ts
 create mode 100644 app/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 examples/quickstarts.ts
 create mode 100644 public/downloads/quickstarts/agent-delegation.json
 create mode 100644 public/downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json
 create mode 100644 public/downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json
 create mode 100644 public/downloads/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json
 create mode 100644 public/downloads/quickstarts/offline-verification.json
 create mode 100644 public/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json
 create mode 100644 public/downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json
 create mode 100644 public/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
 create mode 100644 public/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
 create mode 100644 public/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
 create mode 100644 public/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
 create mode 100644 public/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
 create mode 100644 public/quickstarts/recovery.md
 create mode 100644 public/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
 create mode 100644 tools/qualify-examples/build-quickstarts.mjs
 create mode 100644 tools/render-markdown/generate-quickstarts.mjs

diff --git a/app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx b/app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8036d24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+"use client";
+
+import Link from "next/link";
+import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
+import type { Quickstart } from "../lib/quickstarts";
+import { isSdkLanguage, sdkLanguageEvent, sdkLanguageStorageKey, type SdkLanguage } from "../lib/sdk-languages";
+import { CodeBlock, CodeBlockWithResult } from "./code";
+import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
+import { SdkLanguageSelector } from "./SdkLanguageSelector";
+import { SiteFooter } from "./SiteFooter";
+import { SiteHeader } from "./SiteHeader";
+
+export function QuickstartPage({ quickstart }: { quickstart: Quickstart }) {
+  const [language, setLanguage] = useState<SdkLanguage>("typescript");
+  useEffect(() => {
+    const stored = window.localStorage.getItem(sdkLanguageStorageKey);
+    const hydrationTimer = isSdkLanguage(stored) ? window.setTimeout(() => setLanguage(stored), 0) : null;
+    const sync = (event: Event) => setLanguage((event as CustomEvent<SdkLanguage>).detail);
+    window.addEventListener(sdkLanguageEvent, sync);
+    return () => {
+      if (hydrationTimer !== null) window.clearTimeout(hydrationTimer);
+      window.removeEventListener(sdkLanguageEvent, sync);
+    };
+  }, []);
+  function choose(next: SdkLanguage) {
+    setLanguage(next);
+    window.localStorage.setItem(sdkLanguageStorageKey, next);
+    window.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent(sdkLanguageEvent, { detail: next }));
+  }
+  const result = JSON.stringify({ scenario: quickstart.id, kind: quickstart.success, effect: quickstart.effect }, null, 2);
+  const failure = JSON.stringify({ scenario: quickstart.id, kind: "denied", code: quickstart.failure, providerReached: false }, null, 2);
+  return <div className="site-frame quickstart-site">
+    <SiteHeader compact />
+    <main className="quickstart-page">
+      <header className="editorial-hero quickstart-hero">
+        <p className="kicker">Quickstart · {quickstart.minutes} minutes</p>
+        <h1>{quickstart.title}</h1>
+        <p>{quickstart.description}</p>
+        <PageActions source={`/quickstarts/${quickstart.slug}.md`} />
+        <div className="quickstart-meta"><span>Scenario <code>{quickstart.id}</code></span><span>Rust-owned semantics</span><Link href={`/downloads/quickstarts/${quickstart.slug}.json`} download>Download exact project ↓</Link></div>
+      </header>
+      <div className="quickstart-language"><span>Use one language for every step</span><SdkLanguageSelector language={language} onChange={choose} /></div>
+      <div className="quickstart-steps">
+        <section id="prerequisites"><div><b>01</b><p className="kicker">Prerequisites</p><h2>Start from a clean consumer</h2><p>Use a supported runtime and keep all provider credentials behind the application-owned gateway.</p></div><CodeBlock code={quickstart.sources.install[language]} isBash label="Install" language={language} /></section>
+        <section id="compose"><div><b>02</b><p className="kicker">Compose</p><h2>Name the exact boundary</h2><p><strong>Allowed:</strong> {quickstart.permitted}.</p><p><strong>Prohibited:</strong> {quickstart.prohibited}.</p></div><div className="quickstart-boundary"><span>Identity</span><span>Authority</span><span>Closed gateway</span><span>Effect</span></div></section>
+        <section id="execute"><div><b>03</b><p className="kicker">Execute</p><h2>Perform the permitted effect</h2><p>The selected SDK reaches the same native semantic decision and returns a closed outcome.</p></div><CodeBlockWithResult code={quickstart.sources.execute[language]} label="Permitted path" language={language} result={result} /></section>
+        <section id="fail-closed"><div><b>04</b><p className="kicker">Break safely</p><h2>Try the prohibited variant</h2><p>The provider remains untouched. The stable denial explains which invariant rejected the request.</p></div><CodeBlockWithResult code={quickstart.sources.failure[language]} label="Adversarial path" language={language} result={failure} /></section>
+        <section id="next"><div><b>05</b><p className="kicker">Continue</p><h2>Move from proof to your architecture</h2><p>Keep this scenario as a conformance fixture while you replace development adapters one boundary at a time.</p><div className="quickstart-links"><Link href="/developers/testing">Test more failures →</Link><Link href="/operations">Operate the runtime →</Link></div></div></section>
+      </div>
+    </main>
+    <SiteFooter />
+  </div>;
+}
diff --git a/app/globals.css b/app/globals.css
index 7b6e674..b41741b 100644
--- a/app/globals.css
+++ b/app/globals.css
@@ -2805,6 +2805,22 @@ pre {
   max-width: 760px;
 }
 
+.quickstart-page { max-width: 1280px; margin: 0 auto; padding: 64px 48px 120px; }
+.quickstart-hero { max-width: 820px; }
+.quickstart-meta { display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 10px 22px; margin-top: 22px; color: var(--muted); font-size: 13px; }
+.quickstart-meta a, .quickstart-links a { color: var(--accent); text-decoration: none; }
+.quickstart-language { position: sticky; top: 64px; z-index: 8; display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: space-between; gap: 24px; margin: 44px 0 0; padding: 12px 16px; border: 1px solid var(--line); border-radius: 12px; background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--surface) 92%, transparent); backdrop-filter: blur(14px); }
+.quickstart-language > span { font-size: 13px; color: var(--muted); }
+.quickstart-steps > section { display: grid; grid-template-columns: minmax(0, .92fr) minmax(380px, 1.08fr); gap: 72px; align-items: start; padding: 72px 0; border-bottom: 1px solid var(--line); }
+.quickstart-steps > section > div:first-child > b { display: inline-grid; place-items: center; width: 34px; height: 34px; border-radius: 50%; background: var(--accent-soft); color: var(--accent); font-size: 12px; margin-bottom: 22px; }
+.quickstart-steps h2 { margin: 6px 0 14px; font-size: clamp(28px, 3vw, 40px); letter-spacing: -.035em; }
+.quickstart-steps p { max-width: 620px; color: var(--muted); line-height: 1.7; }
+.quickstart-boundary { display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 10px; padding-top: 54px; }
+.quickstart-boundary span { padding: 11px 14px; border: 1px solid var(--line); border-radius: 999px; background: var(--surface); }
+.quickstart-boundary span:not(:last-child)::after { content: " →"; color: var(--accent); margin-left: 10px; }
+.quickstart-links { display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 22px; margin-top: 24px; }
+@media (max-width: 860px) { .quickstart-page { padding: 44px 20px 80px; } .quickstart-steps > section { grid-template-columns: 1fr; gap: 28px; padding: 52px 0; } .quickstart-language { align-items: flex-start; flex-direction: column; } }
+
 .generated-fact-reference {
   align-items: center;
   background: var(--paper-deep);
diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
index dfc6a37..a486eae 100644
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -86,5 +86,7 @@ export function affectedPages(semanticIdentities: readonly string[]): readonly A
 }
 
 export const runtimeOutcomes: readonly string[] = Object.freeze([...new Set(
-  (rawContract.runtimeFacts.endpoints as readonly Readonly<{ outcomes?: readonly string[] }>[]) .flatMap((endpoint) => endpoint.outcomes ?? []),
+  (rawContract.runtimeFacts.endpoints as readonly Readonly<{ outcomes?: readonly string[] }>[]).flatMap((endpoint) => endpoint.outcomes ?? []),
 )].sort());
+
+export const contractScenarioIds: ReadonlySet<string> = identitySet(rawContract.scenarios);
diff --git a/app/lib/quickstarts.ts b/app/lib/quickstarts.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3a65b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/quickstarts.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+import { quickstartDefinitions, quickstartSources, type QuickstartDefinition } from "../../examples/quickstarts.ts";
+import { contractScenarioIds } from "./content-graph.ts";
+
+for (const definition of quickstartDefinitions) {
+  if (!contractScenarioIds.has(definition.id)) throw new TypeError(`quickstart scenario is absent from the product contract: ${definition.id}`);
+  if (quickstartDefinitions.filter((candidate) => candidate.slug === definition.slug).length !== 1) throw new TypeError(`duplicate quickstart slug: ${definition.slug}`);
+}
+
+export type Quickstart = QuickstartDefinition & Readonly<{ sources: ReturnType<typeof quickstartSources> }>;
+export const quickstarts: readonly Quickstart[] = Object.freeze(quickstartDefinitions.map((definition) => Object.freeze({ ...definition, sources: quickstartSources(definition) })));
+
+export function quickstartBySlug(slug: string): Quickstart {
+  const quickstart = quickstarts.find((candidate) => candidate.slug === slug);
+  if (!quickstart) throw new TypeError(`unknown quickstart ${slug}`);
+  return quickstart;
+}
diff --git a/app/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx b/app/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b146c32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+import { QuickstartPage } from "../../components/QuickstartPage";
+import { quickstartBySlug, quickstarts } from "../../lib/quickstarts";
+
+export function generateStaticParams() {
+  return quickstarts.map((quickstart) => ({ slug: quickstart.slug }));
+}
+
+export default async function Page({ params }: { params: Promise<{ slug: string }> }) {
+  const { slug } = await params;
+  return <QuickstartPage quickstart={quickstartBySlug(slug)} />;
+}
diff --git a/content/pages.json b/content/pages.json
index 220c170..ec6e917 100644
--- a/content/pages.json
+++ b/content/pages.json
@@ -470,5 +470,89 @@
     "sections": [
       { "id": "views", "title": "Evidence has disclosure levels", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Opaque, summary, and authorized full views let applications prove integrity without publishing sensitive business detail by default."] }
     ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
+    "path": "/quickstarts/local-rest-effect",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Protect one REST effect locally",
+    "description": "Complete one exact REST-shaped effect and prove changed bytes fail closed.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "outcome", "title": "One bounded local effect", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1" }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1",
+    "path": "/quickstarts/runtime-effect",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Execute through the open runtime",
+    "description": "Complete one runtime effect and prove exact replay is denied.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.executions/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "outcome", "title": "One runtime effect", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1" }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1",
+    "path": "/quickstarts/agent-delegation",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Delegate one tool to an agent",
+    "description": "Give an agent one narrow tool and reject widening.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "outcome", "title": "One delegated tool", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1" }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1",
+    "path": "/quickstarts/approved-plan",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Run one approved plan",
+    "description": "Bind approval to an exact ordered plan and reject substitution.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "outcome", "title": "One exact approved plan", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1" }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
+    "path": "/quickstarts/offline-verification",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Verify authority offline",
+    "description": "Verify proof and receipt bytes without a network dependency.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "outcome", "title": "Local deterministic verification", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1" }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1",
+    "path": "/quickstarts/recovery",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Resume uncertain execution safely",
+    "description": "Resume an opaque execution reference and prohibit a fresh retry.",
+    "depth": "operate",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "outcome", "title": "Recover without repeating", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.recovery/1" }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1",
+    "path": "/quickstarts/identity-swap",
+    "kind": "guide",
+    "title": "Swap identity suites",
+    "description": "Keep authority semantics stable across identity suites.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "outcome", "title": "Cryptographic agility without semantic drift", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1" }]
   }
 ]
diff --git a/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json b/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json
index 86698d5..ab3cbf6 100644
--- a/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json
+++ b/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "schema": "auths.docs.contract/1",
-  "digest": "748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4",
+  "digest": "14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3",
   "operations": [
     { "id": "auths.operation.create/1" },
     { "id": "auths.operation.delegate/1" },
@@ -11,7 +11,14 @@
   "scenarios": [
     { "id": "auths.scenario.delegation/1" },
     { "id": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1" },
-    { "id": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1" }
+    { "id": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1" },
+    { "id": "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1" },
+    { "id": "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1" },
+    { "id": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1" },
+    { "id": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1" },
+    { "id": "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1" },
+    { "id": "auths.scenario.recovery/1" },
+    { "id": "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1" }
   ],
   "runtimeFacts": {
     "endpoints": [
diff --git a/examples/quickstarts.ts b/examples/quickstarts.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf65d33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/examples/quickstarts.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+import type { SdkLanguage } from "../app/lib/sdk-languages.ts";
+
+export type QuickstartDefinition = Readonly<{
+  id: `auths.scenario.${string}/${number}`;
+  slug: string;
+  title: string;
+  description: string;
+  minutes: number;
+  effect: string;
+  permitted: string;
+  prohibited: string;
+  success: string;
+  failure: string;
+  next: readonly string[];
+}>;
+
+export const quickstartDefinitions: readonly QuickstartDefinition[] = Object.freeze([
+  {
+    id: "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
+    slug: "local-rest-effect",
+    title: "Protect one REST effect locally",
+    description: "Complete one exact REST-shaped effect and prove that changed application bytes fail closed.",
+    minutes: 8,
+    effect: "publish_report",
+    permitted: "Publish report weekly",
+    prohibited: "Publish report monthly",
+    success: "completed",
+    failure: "action_mismatch",
+    next: ["auths.page.operations.runtime/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
+    slug: "runtime-effect",
+    title: "Execute through the open runtime",
+    description: "Send one sealed command through the HTTPS runtime and prove that exact replay is denied.",
+    minutes: 12,
+    effect: "publish_report",
+    permitted: "Request report weekly once",
+    prohibited: "Replay request report weekly",
+    success: "completed",
+    failure: "exact_replay",
+    next: ["auths.page.operations.runtime/1", "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1"],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
+    slug: "agent-delegation",
+    title: "Delegate one tool to an agent",
+    description: "Give an agent one narrow tool and prove it cannot widen itself into a second tool.",
+    minutes: 12,
+    effect: "publish_report",
+    permitted: "Agent publishes one report",
+    prohibited: "Agent deletes a report",
+    success: "completed",
+    failure: "authority_widening",
+    next: ["auths.page.agents/1", "auths.page.authority/1"],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1",
+    slug: "approved-plan",
+    title: "Run one approved plan",
+    description: "Bind approval to an exact ordered plan and prove that replacing a member invalidates it.",
+    minutes: 18,
+    effect: "quarantine_then_rotate",
+    permitted: "Quarantine service, then rotate token",
+    prohibited: "Replace rotate token with delete service",
+    success: "completed",
+    failure: "approval_substitution",
+    next: ["auths.page.tour.approval-bound-plans/1", "auths.page.operations.runtime/1"],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
+    slug: "offline-verification",
+    title: "Verify authority offline",
+    description: "Verify proof and receipt bytes locally and prove that the wrong trusted context is denied.",
+    minutes: 7,
+    effect: "verify_receipt",
+    permitted: "Verify with the committed trusted context",
+    prohibited: "Verify under an unrelated trust root",
+    success: "authorized",
+    failure: "untrusted_context",
+    next: ["auths.page.tour.receipts-disclosure/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
+    slug: "recovery",
+    title: "Resume uncertain execution safely",
+    description: "Resume one opaque execution reference and prove that a fresh retry cannot repeat the effect.",
+    minutes: 15,
+    effect: "rotate_token",
+    permitted: "Resume the original execution reference",
+    prohibited: "Create a fresh retry after provider uncertainty",
+    success: "completed",
+    failure: "fresh_retry_prohibited",
+    next: ["auths.page.tour.execution-lifecycle/1", "auths.page.operations.runtime/1"],
+  },
+  {
+    id: "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1",
+    slug: "identity-swap",
+    title: "Swap identity suites without changing authority",
+    description: "Run the same authority workflow with two suites and prove that a mislabelled suite fails verification.",
+    minutes: 14,
+    effect: "publish_report",
+    permitted: "Verify Ed25519 and P-256 projections",
+    prohibited: "Label Ed25519 material as P-256",
+    success: "authorized",
+    failure: "suite_mismatch",
+    next: ["auths.page.identity-trust/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"],
+  },
+]);
+
+function install(language: SdkLanguage): string {
+  if (language === "rust") return "cargo add auths-sdk";
+  if (language === "typescript") return "npm install @auths-dev/sdk";
+  return "python -m pip install auths";
+}
+
+function execute(definition: QuickstartDefinition, language: SdkLanguage): string {
+  if (language === "rust") return `let action = profile.action("${definition.effect}", canonical_input)?;
+let outcome = verifier.authorize(&proof, &action, &trusted_context)?;
+assert_eq!(outcome.kind(), "${definition.success}");`;
+  if (language === "typescript") return `const action = mcp.callTool({
+  name: "${definition.effect}",
+  arguments: canonicalInput,
+});
+const outcome = await auths.execute({ action, provider });
+if (outcome.kind !== "${definition.success}") throw new Error(outcome.kind);`;
+  return `action = mcp.call_tool(
+    name="${definition.effect}",
+    arguments=canonical_input,
+)
+outcome = await auths.execute(action=action, provider=provider)
+if outcome.kind != "${definition.success}":
+    raise RuntimeError(outcome.kind)`;
+}
+
+function failClosed(definition: QuickstartDefinition, language: SdkLanguage): string {
+  if (language === "rust") return `let denied = verifier.authorize(&proof, &prohibited_action, &trusted_context)?;
+assert_eq!(denied.code(), "${definition.failure}");`;
+  if (language === "typescript") return `const denied = await auths.execute({ action: prohibitedAction, provider });
+if (denied.kind !== "denied" || denied.code !== "${definition.failure}") {
+  throw new Error("effect did not fail closed");
+}`;
+  return `denied = await auths.execute(action=prohibited_action, provider=provider)
+if denied.kind != "denied" or denied.code != "${definition.failure}":
+    raise RuntimeError("effect did not fail closed")`;
+}
+
+export function quickstartSources(definition: QuickstartDefinition): Readonly<Record<"install" | "execute" | "failure", Readonly<Record<SdkLanguage, string>>>> {
+  return Object.freeze({
+    install: Object.freeze({ rust: install("rust"), typescript: install("typescript"), python: install("python") }),
+    execute: Object.freeze({ rust: execute(definition, "rust"), typescript: execute(definition, "typescript"), python: execute(definition, "python") }),
+    failure: Object.freeze({ rust: failClosed(definition, "rust"), typescript: failClosed(definition, "typescript"), python: failClosed(definition, "python") }),
+  });
+}
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 353b0a4..fb31090 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
     "node": ">=22.13.0"
   },
   "scripts": {
-    "prebuild": "npm run docs:render-topic-landings && npm run docs:render-editorial-pages && npm run docs:render-tours",
+    "prebuild": "npm run examples:prepare && npm run docs:render-topic-landings && npm run docs:render-editorial-pages && npm run docs:render-tours && npm run docs:render-quickstarts",
     "dev": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext dev",
     "build": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext build",
     "start": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext start",
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
     "docs:render-topic-landings": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-topic-landings.mjs",
     "docs:render-editorial-pages": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs",
     "docs:render-tours": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-tours.mjs",
+    "docs:render-quickstarts": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-quickstarts.mjs",
+    "examples:prepare": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/qualify-examples/build-quickstarts.mjs",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
     "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node --experimental-strip-types tools/build-page-model/check.mjs && node tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs && node tools/build-reference/check.mjs && node tools/render-markdown/check.mjs && node tools/release/check.mjs",
     "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run lint:bash && npm run lint:ownership && npm run test:contract && npm test"
diff --git a/public/authority/approval-bound-plans.md b/public/authority/approval-bound-plans.md
index 06da82e..5629839 100644
--- a/public/authority/approval-bound-plans.md
+++ b/public/authority/approval-bound-plans.md
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ A reusable human-approved flag or broad role is sufficient for the actual risk m
 - [Authorize across companies](/get-started/cross-company) — Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.
 - [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle.md b/public/authority/lifecycle.md
index 9739d89..c923bae 100644
--- a/public/authority/lifecycle.md
+++ b/public/authority/lifecycle.md
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.
 - [Delegate one action to an agent](/get-started/agent) — Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.
 - [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/receipts-and-disclosure.md b/public/authority/receipts-and-disclosure.md
index 44d26ff..d44cde2 100644
--- a/public/authority/receipts-and-disclosure.md
+++ b/public/authority/receipts-and-disclosure.md
@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ You need to perform an effect; receipt verification is intentionally inert.
 - [Verify without executing](/get-started/verify) — Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.
 - [Assurance](/assurance) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes.md b/public/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes.md
index a8a7bad..20117c5 100644
--- a/public/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes.md
+++ b/public/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes.md
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ You only need an exact signature or endpoint field; open the generated reference
 - [Protect one local effect](/get-started/local) — Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.
 - [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+_Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/downloads/quickstarts/agent-delegation.json b/public/downloads/quickstarts/agent-delegation.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a6d604
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/downloads/quickstarts/agent-delegation.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.quickstart/1",
+  "id": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
+  "slug": "agent-delegation",
+  "title": "Delegate one tool to an agent",
+  "description": "Give an agent one narrow tool and prove it cannot widen itself into a second tool.",
+  "minutes": 12,
+  "effect": "publish_report",
+  "permitted": "Agent publishes one report",
+  "prohibited": "Agent deletes a report",
+  "success": "completed",
+  "failure": "authority_widening",
+  "next": [
+    "auths.page.agents/1",
+    "auths.page.authority/1"
+  ],
+  "sources": {
+    "install": {
+      "rust": "cargo add auths-sdk",
+      "typescript": "npm install @auths-dev/sdk",
+      "python": "python -m pip install auths"
+    },
+    "execute": {
+      "rust": "let action = profile.action(\"publish_report\", canonical_input)?;\nlet outcome = verifier.authorize(&proof, &action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(outcome.kind(), \"completed\");",
+      "typescript": "const action = mcp.callTool({\n  name: \"publish_report\",\n  arguments: canonicalInput,\n});\nconst outcome = await auths.execute({ action, provider });\nif (outcome.kind !== \"completed\") throw new Error(outcome.kind);",
+      "python": "action = mcp.call_tool(\n    name=\"publish_report\",\n    arguments=canonical_input,\n)\noutcome = await auths.execute(action=action, provider=provider)\nif outcome.kind != \"completed\":\n    raise RuntimeError(outcome.kind)"
+    },
+    "failure": {
+      "rust": "let denied = verifier.authorize(&proof, &prohibited_action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(denied.code(), \"authority_widening\");",
+      "typescript": "const denied = await auths.execute({ action: prohibitedAction, provider });\nif (denied.kind !== \"denied\" || denied.code !== \"authority_widening\") {\n  throw new Error(\"effect did not fail closed\");\n}",
+      "python": "denied = await auths.execute(action=prohibited_action, provider=provider)\nif denied.kind != \"denied\" or denied.code != \"authority_widening\":\n    raise RuntimeError(\"effect did not fail closed\")"
+    }
+  },
+  "digest": "d9f5760ec67f907751c908391e712f50776a5472338b0a1d529ad22485f2fd94"
+}
diff --git a/public/downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json b/public/downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..737e6dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.quickstart/1",
+  "id": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1",
+  "slug": "approved-plan",
+  "title": "Run one approved plan",
+  "description": "Bind approval to an exact ordered plan and prove that replacing a member invalidates it.",
+  "minutes": 18,
+  "effect": "quarantine_then_rotate",
+  "permitted": "Quarantine service, then rotate token",
+  "prohibited": "Replace rotate token with delete service",
+  "success": "completed",
+  "failure": "approval_substitution",
+  "next": [
+    "auths.page.tour.approval-bound-plans/1",
+    "auths.page.operations.runtime/1"
+  ],
+  "sources": {
+    "install": {
+      "rust": "cargo add auths-sdk",
+      "typescript": "npm install @auths-dev/sdk",
+      "python": "python -m pip install auths"
+    },
+    "execute": {
+      "rust": "let action = profile.action(\"quarantine_then_rotate\", canonical_input)?;\nlet outcome = verifier.authorize(&proof, &action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(outcome.kind(), \"completed\");",
+      "typescript": "const action = mcp.callTool({\n  name: \"quarantine_then_rotate\",\n  arguments: canonicalInput,\n});\nconst outcome = await auths.execute({ action, provider });\nif (outcome.kind !== \"completed\") throw new Error(outcome.kind);",
+      "python": "action = mcp.call_tool(\n    name=\"quarantine_then_rotate\",\n    arguments=canonical_input,\n)\noutcome = await auths.execute(action=action, provider=provider)\nif outcome.kind != \"completed\":\n    raise RuntimeError(outcome.kind)"
+    },
+    "failure": {
+      "rust": "let denied = verifier.authorize(&proof, &prohibited_action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(denied.code(), \"approval_substitution\");",
+      "typescript": "const denied = await auths.execute({ action: prohibitedAction, provider });\nif (denied.kind !== \"denied\" || denied.code !== \"approval_substitution\") {\n  throw new Error(\"effect did not fail closed\");\n}",
+      "python": "denied = await auths.execute(action=prohibited_action, provider=provider)\nif denied.kind != \"denied\" or denied.code != \"approval_substitution\":\n    raise RuntimeError(\"effect did not fail closed\")"
+    }
+  },
+  "digest": "5db83135dc1f611bb4377fb9f925c7379c62ac1ba28cb388d202eeb631c727ab"
+}
diff --git a/public/downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json b/public/downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cf3815
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.quickstart/1",
+  "id": "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1",
+  "slug": "identity-swap",
+  "title": "Swap identity suites without changing authority",
+  "description": "Run the same authority workflow with two suites and prove that a mislabelled suite fails verification.",
+  "minutes": 14,
+  "effect": "publish_report",
+  "permitted": "Verify Ed25519 and P-256 projections",
+  "prohibited": "Label Ed25519 material as P-256",
+  "success": "authorized",
+  "failure": "suite_mismatch",
+  "next": [
+    "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
+    "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"
+  ],
+  "sources": {
+    "install": {
+      "rust": "cargo add auths-sdk",
+      "typescript": "npm install @auths-dev/sdk",
+      "python": "python -m pip install auths"
+    },
+    "execute": {
+      "rust": "let action = profile.action(\"publish_report\", canonical_input)?;\nlet outcome = verifier.authorize(&proof, &action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(outcome.kind(), \"authorized\");",
+      "typescript": "const action = mcp.callTool({\n  name: \"publish_report\",\n  arguments: canonicalInput,\n});\nconst outcome = await auths.execute({ action, provider });\nif (outcome.kind !== \"authorized\") throw new Error(outcome.kind);",
+      "python": "action = mcp.call_tool(\n    name=\"publish_report\",\n    arguments=canonical_input,\n)\noutcome = await auths.execute(action=action, provider=provider)\nif outcome.kind != \"authorized\":\n    raise RuntimeError(outcome.kind)"
+    },
+    "failure": {
+      "rust": "let denied = verifier.authorize(&proof, &prohibited_action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(denied.code(), \"suite_mismatch\");",
+      "typescript": "const denied = await auths.execute({ action: prohibitedAction, provider });\nif (denied.kind !== \"denied\" || denied.code !== \"suite_mismatch\") {\n  throw new Error(\"effect did not fail closed\");\n}",
+      "python": "denied = await auths.execute(action=prohibited_action, provider=provider)\nif denied.kind != \"denied\" or denied.code != \"suite_mismatch\":\n    raise RuntimeError(\"effect did not fail closed\")"
+    }
+  },
+  "digest": "ae24625766e585ed21864eae56c3ac537f1c9869515ae448c98c2b33c8ac89f0"
+}
diff --git a/public/downloads/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json b/public/downloads/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22daa76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/downloads/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.quickstart/1",
+  "id": "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
+  "slug": "local-rest-effect",
+  "title": "Protect one REST effect locally",
+  "description": "Complete one exact REST-shaped effect and prove that changed application bytes fail closed.",
+  "minutes": 8,
+  "effect": "publish_report",
+  "permitted": "Publish report weekly",
+  "prohibited": "Publish report monthly",
+  "success": "completed",
+  "failure": "action_mismatch",
+  "next": [
+    "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
+    "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"
+  ],
+  "sources": {
+    "install": {
+      "rust": "cargo add auths-sdk",
+      "typescript": "npm install @auths-dev/sdk",
+      "python": "python -m pip install auths"
+    },
+    "execute": {
+      "rust": "let action = profile.action(\"publish_report\", canonical_input)?;\nlet outcome = verifier.authorize(&proof, &action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(outcome.kind(), \"completed\");",
+      "typescript": "const action = mcp.callTool({\n  name: \"publish_report\",\n  arguments: canonicalInput,\n});\nconst outcome = await auths.execute({ action, provider });\nif (outcome.kind !== \"completed\") throw new Error(outcome.kind);",
+      "python": "action = mcp.call_tool(\n    name=\"publish_report\",\n    arguments=canonical_input,\n)\noutcome = await auths.execute(action=action, provider=provider)\nif outcome.kind != \"completed\":\n    raise RuntimeError(outcome.kind)"
+    },
+    "failure": {
+      "rust": "let denied = verifier.authorize(&proof, &prohibited_action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(denied.code(), \"action_mismatch\");",
+      "typescript": "const denied = await auths.execute({ action: prohibitedAction, provider });\nif (denied.kind !== \"denied\" || denied.code !== \"action_mismatch\") {\n  throw new Error(\"effect did not fail closed\");\n}",
+      "python": "denied = await auths.execute(action=prohibited_action, provider=provider)\nif denied.kind != \"denied\" or denied.code != \"action_mismatch\":\n    raise RuntimeError(\"effect did not fail closed\")"
+    }
+  },
+  "digest": "df24cd1f8736e53ae2d3ca9d2f0c3d43184ed5012a9fc4689815be2b59d8f4ff"
+}
diff --git a/public/downloads/quickstarts/offline-verification.json b/public/downloads/quickstarts/offline-verification.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94b305c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/downloads/quickstarts/offline-verification.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.quickstart/1",
+  "id": "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
+  "slug": "offline-verification",
+  "title": "Verify authority offline",
+  "description": "Verify proof and receipt bytes locally and prove that the wrong trusted context is denied.",
+  "minutes": 7,
+  "effect": "verify_receipt",
+  "permitted": "Verify with the committed trusted context",
+  "prohibited": "Verify under an unrelated trust root",
+  "success": "authorized",
+  "failure": "untrusted_context",
+  "next": [
+    "auths.page.tour.receipts-disclosure/1",
+    "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"
+  ],
+  "sources": {
+    "install": {
+      "rust": "cargo add auths-sdk",
+      "typescript": "npm install @auths-dev/sdk",
+      "python": "python -m pip install auths"
+    },
+    "execute": {
+      "rust": "let action = profile.action(\"verify_receipt\", canonical_input)?;\nlet outcome = verifier.authorize(&proof, &action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(outcome.kind(), \"authorized\");",
+      "typescript": "const action = mcp.callTool({\n  name: \"verify_receipt\",\n  arguments: canonicalInput,\n});\nconst outcome = await auths.execute({ action, provider });\nif (outcome.kind !== \"authorized\") throw new Error(outcome.kind);",
+      "python": "action = mcp.call_tool(\n    name=\"verify_receipt\",\n    arguments=canonical_input,\n)\noutcome = await auths.execute(action=action, provider=provider)\nif outcome.kind != \"authorized\":\n    raise RuntimeError(outcome.kind)"
+    },
+    "failure": {
+      "rust": "let denied = verifier.authorize(&proof, &prohibited_action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(denied.code(), \"untrusted_context\");",
+      "typescript": "const denied = await auths.execute({ action: prohibitedAction, provider });\nif (denied.kind !== \"denied\" || denied.code !== \"untrusted_context\") {\n  throw new Error(\"effect did not fail closed\");\n}",
+      "python": "denied = await auths.execute(action=prohibited_action, provider=provider)\nif denied.kind != \"denied\" or denied.code != \"untrusted_context\":\n    raise RuntimeError(\"effect did not fail closed\")"
+    }
+  },
+  "digest": "c9503d96108a4cf9805287c5613a6e14521013ad3b7f312096438db4c3dccd87"
+}
diff --git a/public/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json b/public/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a299eee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.quickstart/1",
+  "id": "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
+  "slug": "recovery",
+  "title": "Resume uncertain execution safely",
+  "description": "Resume one opaque execution reference and prove that a fresh retry cannot repeat the effect.",
+  "minutes": 15,
+  "effect": "rotate_token",
+  "permitted": "Resume the original execution reference",
+  "prohibited": "Create a fresh retry after provider uncertainty",
+  "success": "completed",
+  "failure": "fresh_retry_prohibited",
+  "next": [
+    "auths.page.tour.execution-lifecycle/1",
+    "auths.page.operations.runtime/1"
+  ],
+  "sources": {
+    "install": {
+      "rust": "cargo add auths-sdk",
+      "typescript": "npm install @auths-dev/sdk",
+      "python": "python -m pip install auths"
+    },
+    "execute": {
+      "rust": "let action = profile.action(\"rotate_token\", canonical_input)?;\nlet outcome = verifier.authorize(&proof, &action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(outcome.kind(), \"completed\");",
+      "typescript": "const action = mcp.callTool({\n  name: \"rotate_token\",\n  arguments: canonicalInput,\n});\nconst outcome = await auths.execute({ action, provider });\nif (outcome.kind !== \"completed\") throw new Error(outcome.kind);",
+      "python": "action = mcp.call_tool(\n    name=\"rotate_token\",\n    arguments=canonical_input,\n)\noutcome = await auths.execute(action=action, provider=provider)\nif outcome.kind != \"completed\":\n    raise RuntimeError(outcome.kind)"
+    },
+    "failure": {
+      "rust": "let denied = verifier.authorize(&proof, &prohibited_action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(denied.code(), \"fresh_retry_prohibited\");",
+      "typescript": "const denied = await auths.execute({ action: prohibitedAction, provider });\nif (denied.kind !== \"denied\" || denied.code !== \"fresh_retry_prohibited\") {\n  throw new Error(\"effect did not fail closed\");\n}",
+      "python": "denied = await auths.execute(action=prohibited_action, provider=provider)\nif denied.kind != \"denied\" or denied.code != \"fresh_retry_prohibited\":\n    raise RuntimeError(\"effect did not fail closed\")"
+    }
+  },
+  "digest": "6fe1e70a4ac19266e8c2a55442ec287bbd098036a2b1fe3e8ab680020d5ccc77"
+}
diff --git a/public/downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json b/public/downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9da68b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.quickstart/1",
+  "id": "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
+  "slug": "runtime-effect",
+  "title": "Execute through the open runtime",
+  "description": "Send one sealed command through the HTTPS runtime and prove that exact replay is denied.",
+  "minutes": 12,
+  "effect": "publish_report",
+  "permitted": "Request report weekly once",
+  "prohibited": "Replay request report weekly",
+  "success": "completed",
+  "failure": "exact_replay",
+  "next": [
+    "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
+    "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1"
+  ],
+  "sources": {
+    "install": {
+      "rust": "cargo add auths-sdk",
+      "typescript": "npm install @auths-dev/sdk",
+      "python": "python -m pip install auths"
+    },
+    "execute": {
+      "rust": "let action = profile.action(\"publish_report\", canonical_input)?;\nlet outcome = verifier.authorize(&proof, &action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(outcome.kind(), \"completed\");",
+      "typescript": "const action = mcp.callTool({\n  name: \"publish_report\",\n  arguments: canonicalInput,\n});\nconst outcome = await auths.execute({ action, provider });\nif (outcome.kind !== \"completed\") throw new Error(outcome.kind);",
+      "python": "action = mcp.call_tool(\n    name=\"publish_report\",\n    arguments=canonical_input,\n)\noutcome = await auths.execute(action=action, provider=provider)\nif outcome.kind != \"completed\":\n    raise RuntimeError(outcome.kind)"
+    },
+    "failure": {
+      "rust": "let denied = verifier.authorize(&proof, &prohibited_action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(denied.code(), \"exact_replay\");",
+      "typescript": "const denied = await auths.execute({ action: prohibitedAction, provider });\nif (denied.kind !== \"denied\" || denied.code !== \"exact_replay\") {\n  throw new Error(\"effect did not fail closed\");\n}",
+      "python": "denied = await auths.execute(action=prohibited_action, provider=provider)\nif denied.kind != \"denied\" or denied.code != \"exact_replay\":\n    raise RuntimeError(\"effect did not fail closed\")"
+    }
+  },
+  "digest": "5cff2daf16a286db9bc0f72b22353bb81b1da58be070c5dfd8e702c62873cb9f"
+}
diff --git a/public/get-started/agent.md b/public/get-started/agent.md
index 3b57fdb..8e906fa 100644
--- a/public/get-started/agent.md
+++ b/public/get-started/agent.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ The agent proposes or presents authority. A closed application gateway verifies
 
 Increase the child action set or use count and observe delegation fail before execution.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.agent/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.agent/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/choose.md b/public/get-started/choose.md
index 7e7c575..d8dfb7f 100644
--- a/public/get-started/choose.md
+++ b/public/get-started/choose.md
@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@ Describe the boundary you need and get one deterministic starting recommendation
 
 The chooser never accepts credentials or creates authority. It maps deployment, actor, trust, state, custody, and ownership needs to a documented path.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.choose/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.choose/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/cross-company.md b/public/get-started/cross-company.md
index 790517a..2442992 100644
--- a/public/get-started/cross-company.md
+++ b/public/get-started/cross-company.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1`.
 
 Identity federation, delivery, or approval cannot substitute for exact authority. A changed plan or widened delegation is rejected.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.cross-company/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.cross-company/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/evaluate.md b/public/get-started/evaluate.md
index 3281c63..8ff3d25 100644
--- a/public/get-started/evaluate.md
+++ b/public/get-started/evaluate.md
@@ -22,5 +22,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1`.
 
 Adopt the local SDK, production runtime, agent, or verification-only path only after the failure behavior matches your application needs.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.evaluate/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.evaluate/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/local.md b/public/get-started/local.md
index cf00487..1efbc0b 100644
--- a/public/get-started/local.md
+++ b/public/get-started/local.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ The actor held authority for the committed action and the closed gateway returne
 
 Run the same action again to receive a replay denial, then change one application byte to receive a commitment mismatch.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.local/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.local/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/prerequisites.md b/public/get-started/prerequisites.md
index 9048e47..893ae72 100644
--- a/public/get-started/prerequisites.md
+++ b/public/get-started/prerequisites.md
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ Add HTTPS, durable replay and recovery state, external custody, explicit trust r
 
 SDK consumers, runtime operators, agent builders, and profile authors have different prerequisites. Do not assemble every extension port for a normal integration.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.prerequisites/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.prerequisites/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/runtime.md b/public/get-started/runtime.md
index cbeb33b..f59b317 100644
--- a/public/get-started/runtime.md
+++ b/public/get-started/runtime.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ The Runtime API requires HTTPS and durable state. Provider credentials stay behi
 
 A provider-unknown outcome requires observation and reconciliation before any retry. Resume the same execution identity rather than creating a fresh request.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.runtime/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.runtime/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/verify.md b/public/get-started/verify.md
index d20e8bf..7e40ab4 100644
--- a/public/get-started/verify.md
+++ b/public/get-started/verify.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Unauthorized viewers receive an opaque result. Summary and full views require th
 
 Tampered bytes, an unknown signer, or missing trust evidence remain rejected or indeterminate; verification never performs the underlying effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.verify/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.verify/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md b/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
index c45c32c..27fb33d 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ You are looking for permission scope; identity alone cannot express the complete
 - [Identity & trust](/identity-trust) — Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.
 - [Trust boundaries](/architecture/trust-boundaries) — Authorization before provider entry.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
index d466b40..adf8c20 100644
--- a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
+++ b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ You are performing effect-free offline verification.
 - [Protect a service effect](/get-started/runtime) — Submit exact authority to the open production Runtime API and preserve recovery state.
 - [Production operations](/operations) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 748877813ac4250d18cb846bb1c751182796c10967cc92b73c5f56f0295169a4_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md b/public/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..760239b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Delegate one tool to an agent
+
+Give an agent one narrow tool and prove it cannot widen itself into a second tool.
+
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1` · Expected time: 12 minutes
+
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Agent publishes one report
+- Prohibited: Agent deletes a report
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `completed`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `authority_widening`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/agent-delegation.json)
+
+_Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/quickstarts/approved-plan.md b/public/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..17f4b25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Run one approved plan
+
+Bind approval to an exact ordered plan and prove that replacing a member invalidates it.
+
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1` · Expected time: 18 minutes
+
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Quarantine service, then rotate token
+- Prohibited: Replace rotate token with delete service
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `completed`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `approval_substitution`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json)
+
+_Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/quickstarts/identity-swap.md b/public/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b8a6dd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Swap identity suites without changing authority
+
+Run the same authority workflow with two suites and prove that a mislabelled suite fails verification.
+
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1` · Expected time: 14 minutes
+
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Verify Ed25519 and P-256 projections
+- Prohibited: Label Ed25519 material as P-256
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `authorized`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `suite_mismatch`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json)
+
+_Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md b/public/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68a45c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Protect one REST effect locally
+
+Complete one exact REST-shaped effect and prove that changed application bytes fail closed.
+
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1` · Expected time: 8 minutes
+
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Publish report weekly
+- Prohibited: Publish report monthly
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `completed`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `action_mismatch`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json)
+
+_Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/quickstarts/offline-verification.md b/public/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..251f930
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Verify authority offline
+
+Verify proof and receipt bytes locally and prove that the wrong trusted context is denied.
+
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1` · Expected time: 7 minutes
+
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Verify with the committed trusted context
+- Prohibited: Verify under an unrelated trust root
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `authorized`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `untrusted_context`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/offline-verification.json)
+
+_Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/quickstarts/recovery.md b/public/quickstarts/recovery.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b5bef7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/quickstarts/recovery.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Resume uncertain execution safely
+
+Resume one opaque execution reference and prove that a fresh retry cannot repeat the effect.
+
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1` · Expected time: 15 minutes
+
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Resume the original execution reference
+- Prohibited: Create a fresh retry after provider uncertainty
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `completed`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `fresh_retry_prohibited`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json)
+
+_Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md b/public/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8dbcbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Execute through the open runtime
+
+Send one sealed command through the HTTPS runtime and prove that exact replay is denied.
+
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1` · Expected time: 12 minutes
+
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Request report weekly once
+- Prohibited: Replay request report weekly
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `completed`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `exact_replay`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json)
+
+_Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/tools/qualify-examples/build-quickstarts.mjs b/tools/qualify-examples/build-quickstarts.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a5b9532
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/qualify-examples/build-quickstarts.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { quickstartDefinitions, quickstartSources } from "../../examples/quickstarts.ts";
+
+const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
+for (const definition of quickstartDefinitions) {
+  const payload = { schema: "auths.docs.quickstart/1", ...definition, sources: quickstartSources(definition) };
+  const canonical = `${JSON.stringify(payload, null, 2)}\n`;
+  const digest = createHash("sha256").update(canonical).digest("hex");
+  const output = path.join(root, "public", "downloads", "quickstarts", `${definition.slug}.json`);
+  await mkdir(path.dirname(output), { recursive: true });
+  await writeFile(output, `${JSON.stringify({ ...payload, digest }, null, 2)}\n`, "utf8");
+}
diff --git a/tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs b/tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs
index ed14cf9..36f97fa 100644
--- a/tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs
+++ b/tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import assert from "node:assert/strict";
 import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
 import path from "node:path";
+import { quickstartDefinitions, quickstartSources } from "../../examples/quickstarts.ts";
 
 const root = path.resolve(new URL("../..", import.meta.url).pathname);
 const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "examples/scenarios.json"), "utf8"));
@@ -21,3 +22,30 @@ for (const scenario of manifest.scenarios) {
   assert.equal(outcome.scenario, scenario.id);
   assert.equal(outcome.kind, scenario.outcome);
 }
+
+assert.equal(quickstartDefinitions.length, 7);
+const expected = new Set([
+  "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
+  "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
+  "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
+  "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1",
+  "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
+  "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
+  "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1",
+]);
+for (const definition of quickstartDefinitions) {
+  assert.ok(expected.delete(definition.id), `unexpected or duplicate quickstart ${definition.id}`);
+  assert.ok(definition.minutes > 0 && definition.minutes <= 20);
+  const sources = quickstartSources(definition);
+  for (const projection of Object.values(sources)) {
+    assert.deepEqual(Object.keys(projection), ["rust", "typescript", "python"]);
+    for (const source of Object.values(projection)) {
+      assert.ok(source.trim());
+      assert.doesNotMatch(source, /TODO|placeholder|your[-_ ](?:key|token|secret)/i);
+    }
+  }
+  assert.match(sources.failure.typescript, new RegExp(definition.failure));
+  assert.match(sources.failure.python, new RegExp(definition.failure));
+  assert.match(sources.failure.rust, new RegExp(definition.failure));
+}
+assert.equal(expected.size, 0);
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/generate-quickstarts.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/generate-quickstarts.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ccc0142
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/generate-quickstarts.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { quickstarts } from "../../app/lib/quickstarts.ts";
+import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
+
+const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
+for (const quickstart of quickstarts) {
+  const lines = [`# ${quickstart.title}`, "", quickstart.description, "", `Scenario: \`${quickstart.id}\` · Expected time: ${quickstart.minutes} minutes`, "", "## 1. Start from a clean consumer", "", "Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.", "", "## 2. Name the exact boundary", "", `- Allowed: ${quickstart.permitted}`, `- Prohibited: ${quickstart.prohibited}`, "", "## 3. Execute the permitted effect", "", `Expected outcome: \`${quickstart.success}\`.`, "", "## 4. Break safely", "", `Expected stable denial: \`${quickstart.failure}\`. The provider is not reached.`, "", "## 5. Continue", "", "Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.", "", `[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/${quickstart.slug}.json)`, "", `_Contract digest: ${verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest}_`, ""];
+  const output = path.join(root, "public", "quickstarts", `${quickstart.slug}.md`);
+  await mkdir(path.dirname(output), { recursive: true });
+  await writeFile(output, `${lines.join("\n")}\n`, "utf8");
+}

From 0ab30838ad1e8030386e3744951c522084965a58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 21:56:22 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 13/29] docs: publish developer resources and reference guides

---
 app/[...slug]/page.tsx                        |  14 ++
 app/components/RuntimeReference.tsx           |   3 +-
 app/lib/content-graph.ts                      |   4 +-
 content/developer-pages.json                  |  75 +++++++++++
 package.json                                  |   2 +-
 public/architecture.md                        |  10 ++
 public/architecture/trust-boundaries.md       |  10 ++
 public/concepts.md                            |  10 ++
 public/developers/cli.md                      |  14 ++
 public/developers/errors.md                   |  14 ++
 public/developers/runtime-api.md              |  14 ++
 public/developers/sdks.md                     |  16 +++
 public/developers/testing.md                  |  14 ++
 public/developers/versioning.md               |  14 ++
 public/guides/protect-rest-effect.md          | 120 +-----------------
 public/integrations.md                        |  10 ++
 public/reference/errors.md                    |  10 ++
 public/reference/evidence.md                  |  10 ++
 public/reference/profiles.md                  |  10 ++
 public/reference/schemas.md                   |  10 ++
 public/start/delegate-agent.md                |  17 ++-
 public/start/verify-receipt.md                |  17 ++-
 tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs              |   4 +-
 .../generate-editorial-pages.mjs              |   2 +-
 24 files changed, 295 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 app/[...slug]/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 content/developer-pages.json
 create mode 100644 public/architecture.md
 create mode 100644 public/architecture/trust-boundaries.md
 create mode 100644 public/concepts.md
 create mode 100644 public/developers/cli.md
 create mode 100644 public/developers/errors.md
 create mode 100644 public/developers/runtime-api.md
 create mode 100644 public/developers/sdks.md
 create mode 100644 public/developers/testing.md
 create mode 100644 public/developers/versioning.md
 create mode 100644 public/integrations.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/errors.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/evidence.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/profiles.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/schemas.md

diff --git a/app/[...slug]/page.tsx b/app/[...slug]/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06be1c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/[...slug]/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../components/EditorialGuidePage";
+import { contentPageByPath, verifiedPageGraph } from "../lib/content-graph";
+
+export function generateStaticParams() {
+  return verifiedPageGraph.pages
+    .filter((page) => page.owner === "editorial")
+    .map((page) => ({ slug: page.path.slice(1).split("/") }));
+}
+
+export default async function Page({ params }: { params: Promise<{ slug: string[] }> }) {
+  const { slug } = await params;
+  const page = contentPageByPath(`/${slug.join("/")}`);
+  return <EditorialGuidePage pageId={page.id} eyebrow={page.depth === "operate" ? "Operations" : page.depth === "inspect" ? "Reference" : "Guide"} />;
+}
diff --git a/app/components/RuntimeReference.tsx b/app/components/RuntimeReference.tsx
index cfa137e..338b164 100644
--- a/app/components/RuntimeReference.tsx
+++ b/app/components/RuntimeReference.tsx
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 "use client";
 
+import Link from "next/link";
 import { runtimeEndpoints } from "../lib/runtime-reference";
 import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
 import { ReferenceShell, type ReferenceNavGroup } from "./ReferenceShell";
@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ export function RuntimeReference() {
           <p className="sdk-version">HTTPS RUNTIME · V1</p>
           <h1>Runtime API Reference</h1>
           <p className="sdk-lede">
-            The wire-level service contract. For in-process Rust, TypeScript, and Python libraries, use the <a href="/reference/sdk">SDK reference</a>.
+            The wire-level service contract. For in-process Rust, TypeScript, and Python libraries, use the <Link href="/reference/sdk">SDK reference</Link>.
           </p>
           <PageActions source="/reference/runtime-api.md" />
           <div className="sdk-note">
diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
index a486eae..73ce7f4 100644
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import rawPages from "../../content/pages.json" with { type: "json" };
+import rawDeveloperPages from "../../content/developer-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import rawContract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
 import { parseAuthoredPageSource, type AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
 
@@ -59,7 +60,8 @@ export function buildVerifiedPageGraph(pagesInput: unknown, contractInput: unkno
   return Object.freeze({ contractDigest: contract.digest, pages: Object.freeze(pages) });
 }
 
-export const verifiedPageGraph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(rawPages, rawContract);
+export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([...rawPages, ...rawDeveloperPages]);
+export const verifiedPageGraph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(authoredPageInputs, rawContract);
 
 export function contentPageByPath(path: string): AuthoredPageSource {
   const normalized = path.length > 1 && path.endsWith("/") ? path.slice(0, -1) : path;
diff --git a/content/developer-pages.json b/content/developer-pages.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8d8e93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/developer-pages.json
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+[
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks/1", "path": "/developers/sdks", "kind": "guide", "title": "Choose an Auths SDK", "description": "Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "choose", "title": "Choose for your application, not for semantics", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["TypeScript and Python expose the same product workflow. Rust owns the protocol meaning and also exposes lower-level components for native applications.", "Start with the product facade. Descend into profile, verification, inspection, and runtime surfaces only when the application needs that control."] },
+      { "id": "lifecycle", "title": "One lifecycle in every language", "provenance": "generated-fact", "factKind": "operation", "fact": "auths.operation.create/1" }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1", "path": "/developers/runtime-api", "kind": "guide", "title": "Use the Runtime API", "description": "Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1", "auths.endpoint.authorities/1", "auths.endpoint.executions/1", "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1", "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "when", "title": "Use a runtime when effects cross a trust boundary", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The runtime is appropriate when signing keys, replay state, receipts, or provider credentials must stay outside the caller process. It does not replace your application API or identity provider."] },
+      { "id": "entry", "title": "Runtime entry points", "provenance": "generated-fact", "factKind": "endpoint", "fact": "auths.endpoint.executions/1" }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.developers.cli/1", "path": "/developers/cli", "kind": "guide", "title": "Auths CLI", "description": "Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "role", "title": "The CLI is an interface, not ambient permission", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["CLI commands parse explicit inputs and use the same native semantic owners as the SDKs. A successful command invocation does not bypass trust, authority, state, or gateway checks."] },
+      { "id": "verify", "title": "Verification remains effect-free", "provenance": "generated-fact", "factKind": "operation", "fact": "auths.operation.verify/1" }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.developers.testing/1", "path": "/developers/testing", "kind": "guide", "title": "Test Auths outcomes", "description": "Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1", "auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "matrix", "title": "Test the boundary, not only the happy path", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Keep fixtures for byte mutation, widening, expiry, revocation, replay, approval substitution, provider uncertainty, resume, and receipt disclosure. Assert that a denied path never reaches the provider."] },
+      { "id": "recovery", "title": "Prove safe recovery", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.recovery/1" }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.developers.errors/1", "path": "/developers/errors", "kind": "guide", "title": "Outcomes and errors", "description": "Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.", "depth": "inspect", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "closed", "title": "Closed outcomes preserve what is known", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Denied means the request must change. Indeterminate means a required decision input was unavailable. Recoverable means resume the same opaque reference. Provider-unknown means reconcile before retrying."] },
+      { "id": "unsafe", "title": "Never flatten uncertainty into an exception retry", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Blind retry can repeat a real-world effect. Keep outcome class, correlation evidence, and the permitted next action together."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.developers.versioning/1", "path": "/developers/versioning", "kind": "guide", "title": "Versions and compatibility", "description": "Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.", "depth": "inspect", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "prelaunch", "title": "Prelaunch means one clean surface", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Auths does not carry deprecated entry points, migration shims, or compatibility aliases before launch. Breaking changes replace the preview contract and are reported explicitly."] },
+      { "id": "identity", "title": "Semantic changes receive new identities", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["A release bundle binds documentation to exact operations, scenarios, endpoints, and evidence. Contract drift either regenerates the affected page or fails qualification."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.reference.cli/1", "path": "/reference/cli", "kind": "guide", "title": "CLI reference", "description": "Command contracts generated from the compiled Auths command graph.", "depth": "inspect", "status": "preview", "owner": "generated",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "contract", "title": "Effect-free verification", "provenance": "generated-fact", "factKind": "operation", "fact": "auths.operation.verify/1" }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.reference.profiles/1", "path": "/reference/profiles", "kind": "guide", "title": "Profiles", "description": "Closed and application-owned profiles that map domain actions into Auths semantics.", "depth": "inspect", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "boundary", "title": "Profiles own domain meaning", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["A profile defines canonical application actions and resource matching. It does not choose identity, transport, custody, or provider credentials."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.reference.errors/1", "path": "/reference/errors", "kind": "guide", "title": "Stable error reference", "description": "Machine-stable error identities grouped by the caller's safe response.", "depth": "inspect", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "contract", "title": "Error codes are behavior contracts", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Use stable codes for program flow and bounded diagnostics for people. Never infer that an effect failed merely because the caller received an error."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.reference.schemas/1", "path": "/reference/schemas", "kind": "guide", "title": "Schemas", "description": "Canonical inputs, bounded wire forms, receipts, and disclosure views.", "depth": "inspect", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "parse", "title": "Parse into bounded types", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Public inputs are parsed once into closed native types. Unknown fields, oversized bytes, unsupported versions, and invalid combinations are rejected before semantic evaluation."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.reference.evidence/1", "path": "/reference/evidence", "kind": "guide", "title": "Evidence manifest", "description": "Resolve public claims to exact release evidence and limitations.", "depth": "verify", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "scope", "title": "Evidence is bounded", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Each assessment states which release bytes it covers, what the check proves, what it does not prove, and how to reproduce it."] }]
+  }
+]
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index fb31090..b755d0a 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
     "node": ">=22.13.0"
   },
   "scripts": {
-    "prebuild": "npm run examples:prepare && npm run docs:render-topic-landings && npm run docs:render-editorial-pages && npm run docs:render-tours && npm run docs:render-quickstarts",
+    "prebuild": "npm run examples:prepare && npm run docs:render-editorial-pages && npm run docs:render-topic-landings && npm run docs:render-tours && npm run docs:render-quickstarts",
     "dev": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext dev",
     "build": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext build",
     "start": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext start",
diff --git a/public/architecture.md b/public/architecture.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91c443c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/architecture.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# System map
+
+The native waist, replaceable adapters, and closed gateways.
+
+## Meaning stays in the native waist
+
+Identity, transport, custody, state, and providers remain replaceable around one semantic core.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.architecture.system-map/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/architecture/trust-boundaries.md b/public/architecture/trust-boundaries.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e38390f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/architecture/trust-boundaries.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Trust boundaries
+
+Authorization before provider entry.
+
+## Transport is not authority
+
+Successful delivery never authorizes an effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/concepts.md b/public/concepts.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0189a7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/concepts.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Five nouns
+
+Actor, action, authority, outcome, and receipt.
+
+## One durable vocabulary
+
+The same five nouns remain useful from a first integration through protocol inspection.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.concepts.five-nouns/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/developers/cli.md b/public/developers/cli.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e6cd33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/developers/cli.md
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Auths CLI
+
+Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.
+
+## The CLI is an interface, not ambient permission
+
+CLI commands parse explicit inputs and use the same native semantic owners as the SDKs. A successful command invocation does not bypass trust, authority, state, or gateway checks.
+
+## Verification remains effect-free
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.verify/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.cli/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/developers/errors.md b/public/developers/errors.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d4b658
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/developers/errors.md
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Outcomes and errors
+
+Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.
+
+## Closed outcomes preserve what is known
+
+Denied means the request must change. Indeterminate means a required decision input was unavailable. Recoverable means resume the same opaque reference. Provider-unknown means reconcile before retrying.
+
+## Never flatten uncertainty into an exception retry
+
+Blind retry can repeat a real-world effect. Keep outcome class, correlation evidence, and the permitted next action together.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.errors/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/developers/runtime-api.md b/public/developers/runtime-api.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e4f58ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/developers/runtime-api.md
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Use the Runtime API
+
+Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.
+
+## Use a runtime when effects cross a trust boundary
+
+The runtime is appropriate when signing keys, replay state, receipts, or provider credentials must stay outside the caller process. It does not replace your application API or identity provider.
+
+## Runtime entry points
+
+Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.executions/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/developers/sdks.md b/public/developers/sdks.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bbd5a20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/developers/sdks.md
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# Choose an Auths SDK
+
+Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
+
+## Choose for your application, not for semantics
+
+TypeScript and Python expose the same product workflow. Rust owns the protocol meaning and also exposes lower-level components for native applications.
+
+Start with the product facade. Descend into profile, verification, inspection, and runtime surfaces only when the application needs that control.
+
+## One lifecycle in every language
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/developers/testing.md b/public/developers/testing.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b24679
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/developers/testing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Test Auths outcomes
+
+Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.
+
+## Test the boundary, not only the happy path
+
+Keep fixtures for byte mutation, widening, expiry, revocation, replay, approval substitution, provider uncertainty, resume, and receipt disclosure. Assert that a denied path never reaches the provider.
+
+## Prove safe recovery
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.testing/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/developers/versioning.md b/public/developers/versioning.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e7dabd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/developers/versioning.md
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Versions and compatibility
+
+Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
+
+## Prelaunch means one clean surface
+
+Auths does not carry deprecated entry points, migration shims, or compatibility aliases before launch. Breaking changes replace the preview contract and are reported explicitly.
+
+## Semantic changes receive new identities
+
+A release bundle binds documentation to exact operations, scenarios, endpoints, and evidence. Contract drift either regenerates the affected page or fails qualification.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.versioning/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/guides/protect-rest-effect.md b/public/guides/protect-rest-effect.md
index 7ee2dda..6de5544 100644
--- a/public/guides/protect-rest-effect.md
+++ b/public/guides/protect-rest-effect.md
@@ -1,120 +1,14 @@
-# Protect one exact REST effect
+# Protect a REST effect
 
-Give one support agent authority to issue one refund—within ten minutes—and prove the outcome without sharing a root credential.
+Authorize one exact application effect.
 
-## 1. Install your SDK
+## Outcome
 
-Choose the language used by your application.
+Protect one application effect and see replay or changed bytes fail closed.
 
-### Rust
+## Run the scenario
 
-```sh
-# Install the Rust SDK
-cargo add auths-sdk
-```
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.rest-effect/1`.
 
-### TypeScript
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.rest-effect/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-```sh
-# Install the TypeScript SDK
-npm install @auths-dev/sdk
-```
-
-### Python
-
-```sh
-# Install the Python SDK
-python -m pip install auths
-```
-
-## 2. Describe the exact effect
-
-Auths commits to the operation, resource, amount, and region. A changed byte is a different action.
-
-### Rust
-
-```rust
-let action = RestAction::post("/v1/refunds/rf_82k")?
-    .json(&Refund { amount: 4_200, currency: "gbp" })?
-    .in_region("eu-west")?;
-
-let authority = auths.create(actor, action)
-    .uses(1)
-    .expires_in(Duration::from_secs(600))
-    .issue()?;
-```
-
-### TypeScript
-
-```typescript
-const action = rest.post("/v1/refunds/rf_82k", {
-  amount: 4200,
-  currency: "gbp",
-}).inRegion("eu-west");
-
-const authority = await auths.create({
-  actor, action, uses: 1, expiresIn: "10m",
-});
-```
-
-### Python
-
-```python
-action = rest.post("/v1/refunds/rf_82k", json={
-    "amount": 4200,
-    "currency": "gbp",
-}).in_region("eu-west")
-
-authority = auths.create(
-    actor=actor, action=action, uses=1, expires_in="10m"
-)
-```
-
-## 3. Execute once
-
-Only `completed` means the effect is confirmed. A `recoverable` result means observe and resume rather than retry.
-
-### Rust
-
-```rust
-match auths.execute(authority, action).await? {
-    Outcome::Completed { receipt } => save(receipt),
-    Outcome::Denied { code } => report(code),
-    Outcome::Recoverable { reference, .. } => queue_resume(reference),
-    Outcome::Indeterminate { code } => investigate(code),
-}
-```
-
-### TypeScript
-
-```typescript
-const outcome = await auths.execute({ authority, action });
-
-if (outcome.kind === "completed") save(outcome.receipt);
-if (outcome.kind === "denied") report(outcome.code);
-if (outcome.kind === "recoverable") queueResume(outcome.reference);
-if (outcome.kind === "indeterminate") investigate(outcome.code);
-```
-
-### Python
-
-```python
-outcome = await auths.execute(authority=authority, action=action)
-
-match outcome.kind:
-    case "completed": save(outcome.receipt)
-    case "denied": report(outcome.code)
-    case "recoverable": queue_resume(outcome.reference)
-    case "indeterminate": investigate(outcome.code)
-```
-
-## 4. Verify what Auths proved
-
-The default receipt view answers the operational question without exposing action bodies, credentials, or raw proof bytes.
-
-- Authority: one exact REST effect
-- Actor: `support-agent`
-- Uses: 1 of 1 consumed
-- Outcome: effect confirmed
-
-Replaying the request returns `replay-detected`. Changing the amount or resource returns `commitment-mismatch`.
diff --git a/public/integrations.md b/public/integrations.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c4296d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/integrations.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Integrations
+
+Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
+
+## Auths with your existing systems
+
+Keep identity, policy, transport, and cloud systems in their legitimate roles while adding exact effect authority.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.composition/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/reference/errors.md b/public/reference/errors.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8eccf33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/errors.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Stable error reference
+
+Machine-stable error identities grouped by the caller's safe response.
+
+## Error codes are behavior contracts
+
+Use stable codes for program flow and bounded diagnostics for people. Never infer that an effect failed merely because the caller received an error.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.reference.errors/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/reference/evidence.md b/public/reference/evidence.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3c14d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/evidence.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Evidence manifest
+
+Resolve public claims to exact release evidence and limitations.
+
+## Evidence is bounded
+
+Each assessment states which release bytes it covers, what the check proves, what it does not prove, and how to reproduce it.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.reference.evidence/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/reference/profiles.md b/public/reference/profiles.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..770833f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/profiles.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Profiles
+
+Closed and application-owned profiles that map domain actions into Auths semantics.
+
+## Profiles own domain meaning
+
+A profile defines canonical application actions and resource matching. It does not choose identity, transport, custody, or provider credentials.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.reference.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/reference/schemas.md b/public/reference/schemas.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2e51fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/schemas.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Schemas
+
+Canonical inputs, bounded wire forms, receipts, and disclosure views.
+
+## Parse into bounded types
+
+Public inputs are parsed once into closed native types. Unknown fields, oversized bytes, unsupported versions, and invalid combinations are rejected before semantic evaluation.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.reference.schemas/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/start/delegate-agent.md b/public/start/delegate-agent.md
index f59f6ba..014f28d 100644
--- a/public/start/delegate-agent.md
+++ b/public/start/delegate-agent.md
@@ -1,7 +1,14 @@
-# Delegate without widening
+# Delegate to an agent
 
-Give an agent a smaller, shorter-lived piece of authority. Describe the parent
-boundary, choose a narrower child boundary, then execute with the child proof.
+Pass on narrower authority without widening.
+
+## Delegation only gets narrower
+
+An agent receives less authority than its parent, never more.
+
+## Run the scenario
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.delegation/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-Delegation is attenuation. A child cannot add an action, audience, use, expiry,
-budget, or delegation depth its parent did not possess.
diff --git a/public/start/verify-receipt.md b/public/start/verify-receipt.md
index fc3ced1..a4e3953 100644
--- a/public/start/verify-receipt.md
+++ b/public/start/verify-receipt.md
@@ -1,7 +1,14 @@
-# Verify what happened
+# Verify a receipt
 
-Load bounded receipt bytes, verify commitments and outcome locally, then select
-an authorized opaque, summary, or full view.
+Verify portable evidence and disclose it safely.
+
+## Evidence without oversharing
+
+Begin with a bounded summary and require authorization before revealing sensitive detail.
+
+## Run the scenario
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-Transport encryption and receipt disclosure solve different problems: one
-protects delivery; the other controls what a verified caller may learn.
diff --git a/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs b/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs
index 6843e7c..6b8edd5 100644
--- a/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs
+++ b/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs
@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ import assert from "node:assert/strict";
 import { readFile, readdir } from "node:fs/promises";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-import { buildVerifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
+import { authoredPageInputs, buildVerifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
 import { primaryNavigation, utilityNavigation } from "../../app/lib/navigation.ts";
 import { topicLandings } from "../../app/lib/topic-landings.ts";
 import { tours } from "../../app/lib/tours.ts";
 
 const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
-const pages = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "content/pages.json"), "utf8"));
+const pages = structuredClone(authoredPageInputs);
 const contract = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "contracts/product-contract.fixture.json"), "utf8"));
 const graph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(pages, contract);
 assert.equal(graph.pages.length, pages.length);
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs
index ef7ecbc..ad29bc8 100644
--- a/tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
 import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
 
 const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
-const pages = verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => page.path.startsWith("/get-started/") && page.owner === "editorial");
+const pages = verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => page.owner === "editorial" && page.path !== "/");
 
 for (const page of pages) {
   const lines = [`# ${page.title}`, "", page.description, ""];

From 8e99dc6432a48002a80d249c1bc3ac217ed01c54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 21:57:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 14/29] docs: publish agent and integration journeys

---
 app/lib/content-graph.ts              |  3 +-
 content/agent-integration-pages.json  | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 public/agents/approved-plan.md        | 10 ++++
 public/agents/delegate-one-tool.md    | 10 ++++
 public/agents/how-auths-works.md      | 12 +++++
 public/agents/mcp-client.md           | 10 ++++
 public/agents/multi-agent.md          | 10 ++++
 public/agents/protect-mcp-server.md   | 10 ++++
 public/agents/skills.md               | 10 ++++
 public/integrations/capabilities.md   | 10 ++++
 public/integrations/cloud.md          | 10 ++++
 public/integrations/identity-trust.md | 10 ++++
 public/integrations/policy.md         | 10 ++++
 public/integrations/profile-kit.md    | 10 ++++
 public/integrations/transport.md      | 10 ++++
 15 files changed, 201 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 content/agent-integration-pages.json
 create mode 100644 public/agents/approved-plan.md
 create mode 100644 public/agents/delegate-one-tool.md
 create mode 100644 public/agents/how-auths-works.md
 create mode 100644 public/agents/mcp-client.md
 create mode 100644 public/agents/multi-agent.md
 create mode 100644 public/agents/protect-mcp-server.md
 create mode 100644 public/agents/skills.md
 create mode 100644 public/integrations/capabilities.md
 create mode 100644 public/integrations/cloud.md
 create mode 100644 public/integrations/identity-trust.md
 create mode 100644 public/integrations/policy.md
 create mode 100644 public/integrations/profile-kit.md
 create mode 100644 public/integrations/transport.md

diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
index 73ce7f4..0536eb4 100644
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import rawPages from "../../content/pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import rawDeveloperPages from "../../content/developer-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
+import rawAgentIntegrationPages from "../../content/agent-integration-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import rawContract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
 import { parseAuthoredPageSource, type AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
 
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ export function buildVerifiedPageGraph(pagesInput: unknown, contractInput: unkno
   return Object.freeze({ contractDigest: contract.digest, pages: Object.freeze(pages) });
 }
 
-export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([...rawPages, ...rawDeveloperPages]);
+export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([...rawPages, ...rawDeveloperPages, ...rawAgentIntegrationPages]);
 export const verifiedPageGraph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(authoredPageInputs, rawContract);
 
 export function contentPageByPath(path: string): AuthoredPageSource {
diff --git a/content/agent-integration-pages.json b/content/agent-integration-pages.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd99a1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/agent-integration-pages.json
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+[
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1", "path": "/agents/how-auths-works", "kind": "architecture", "title": "How Auths works for agents", "description": "Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.", "depth": "understand", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "roles", "title": "An agent is a bounded actor, not a trusted process", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["An agent can propose an action and present delegated authority. Native verification decides whether the exact action is allowed; an application-owned closed gateway alone can reach provider credentials.", "Identity, transport, authority, approval, state, custody, and the provider adapter remain independent components."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1", "path": "/agents/delegate-one-tool", "kind": "guide", "title": "Delegate one tool", "description": "Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.", "depth": "start", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "scenario", "title": "Narrow authority in practice", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1" }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1", "path": "/agents/approved-plan", "kind": "guide", "title": "Require approval for an agent plan", "description": "Bind human or organizational approval to exact ordered plan bytes.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "plan", "title": "Approval cannot be reused for a changed plan", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1" }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1", "path": "/agents/multi-agent", "kind": "guide", "title": "Handoff across agents", "description": "Attenuate authority at every agent boundary.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.delegate/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "handoff", "title": "Every hop gets narrower", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["A coordinating agent may delegate a smaller action set, earlier expiry, lower use count, and shallower remaining depth. A child cannot manufacture omitted critical extensions or widen any parent bound."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1", "path": "/agents/mcp-client", "kind": "guide", "title": "Use Auths from an MCP client", "description": "Let an agent harness propose bounded tool calls without receiving provider credentials.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "client", "title": "MCP transports intent, not permission", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The client supplies the requested tool call and proof material. The receiving verifier decides authority independently of whether MCP delivery succeeded."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1", "path": "/agents/protect-mcp-server", "kind": "guide", "title": "Protect an MCP server", "description": "Place provider access behind an opaque verified-command boundary.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "server", "title": "Verify before entering the provider", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Parse bounded input, authorize it natively, reserve state durably, then hand only an opaque verified command to the provider adapter. Keep denial and uncertainty outside the effect boundary."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.agents.skills/1", "path": "/agents/skills", "kind": "guide", "title": "Agent skills and plugins", "description": "Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "safety", "title": "Skills explain and invoke public tools", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["A maintained skill may help an agent compose a request, inspect a closed outcome, or locate evidence. It cannot mint native authorization objects, contain secrets, or bypass runtime checks."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1", "path": "/integrations/identity-trust", "kind": "integration", "title": "Identity and trust integrations", "description": "Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "ownership", "title": "Your trust policy owns who is accepted", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Auths supplies bounded evidence parsing and suite-labelled verification. Your application supplies accepted roots and resolver policy. The identity system supplies authentication evidence; none of these alone grants an effect."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.integrations.policy/1", "path": "/integrations/policy", "kind": "integration", "title": "Policy engine integrations", "description": "Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "ownership", "title": "Policy supplies context; Auths binds the exact effect", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The policy engine evaluates application relationships and attributes. Auths commits the resulting bounded decision context to the action and preserves execution state and receipts."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.integrations.cloud/1", "path": "/integrations/cloud", "kind": "integration", "title": "Cloud IAM integrations", "description": "Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "ownership", "title": "Cloud IAM remains the provider boundary", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Cloud IAM supplies workload identity and restricted provider credentials. Auths supplies exact effect authority, durable use accounting, closed outcomes, and portable receipts. Credentials never enter the agent or proof."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.integrations.transport/1", "path": "/integrations/transport", "kind": "integration", "title": "Transport integrations", "description": "Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "separation", "title": "Delivery is never authority", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Transport authenticates or delivers peers and bytes according to its own contract. Auths verifies those bounded bytes under explicit trust and authority. Iroh can be used without capabilities; Auths can be used without Iroh."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1", "path": "/integrations/capabilities", "kind": "integration", "title": "Capability integrations", "description": "Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "bridge", "title": "Preserve the source capability's legitimate role", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["An import profile states which external claims map into Auths authority and which require external state. It must reject any mapping that silently invents stronger bounds or execution guarantees."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1", "path": "/integrations/profile-kit", "kind": "integration", "title": "Build an application profile", "description": "Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "contract", "title": "A profile defines domain meaning", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Define bounded canonical actions, resource matching, attenuation, and inspection projections. Keep identity, transport, state, custody, approval providers, and execution adapters outside the profile."] }]
+  }
+]
diff --git a/public/agents/approved-plan.md b/public/agents/approved-plan.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..094aeb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/agents/approved-plan.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Require approval for an agent plan
+
+Bind human or organizational approval to exact ordered plan bytes.
+
+## Approval cannot be reused for a changed plan
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/agents/delegate-one-tool.md b/public/agents/delegate-one-tool.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cdf686a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/agents/delegate-one-tool.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Delegate one tool
+
+Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.
+
+## Narrow authority in practice
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/agents/how-auths-works.md b/public/agents/how-auths-works.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8b5410
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/agents/how-auths-works.md
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# How Auths works for agents
+
+Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
+
+## An agent is a bounded actor, not a trusted process
+
+An agent can propose an action and present delegated authority. Native verification decides whether the exact action is allowed; an application-owned closed gateway alone can reach provider credentials.
+
+Identity, transport, authority, approval, state, custody, and the provider adapter remain independent components.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/agents/mcp-client.md b/public/agents/mcp-client.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0959833
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/agents/mcp-client.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Use Auths from an MCP client
+
+Let an agent harness propose bounded tool calls without receiving provider credentials.
+
+## MCP transports intent, not permission
+
+The client supplies the requested tool call and proof material. The receiving verifier decides authority independently of whether MCP delivery succeeded.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/agents/multi-agent.md b/public/agents/multi-agent.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..462e570
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/agents/multi-agent.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Handoff across agents
+
+Attenuate authority at every agent boundary.
+
+## Every hop gets narrower
+
+A coordinating agent may delegate a smaller action set, earlier expiry, lower use count, and shallower remaining depth. A child cannot manufacture omitted critical extensions or widen any parent bound.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/agents/protect-mcp-server.md b/public/agents/protect-mcp-server.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb4021f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/agents/protect-mcp-server.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Protect an MCP server
+
+Place provider access behind an opaque verified-command boundary.
+
+## Verify before entering the provider
+
+Parse bounded input, authorize it natively, reserve state durably, then hand only an opaque verified command to the provider adapter. Keep denial and uncertainty outside the effect boundary.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/agents/skills.md b/public/agents/skills.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b301cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/agents/skills.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Agent skills and plugins
+
+Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.
+
+## Skills explain and invoke public tools
+
+A maintained skill may help an agent compose a request, inspect a closed outcome, or locate evidence. It cannot mint native authorization objects, contain secrets, or bypass runtime checks.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.skills/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/integrations/capabilities.md b/public/integrations/capabilities.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15a3a50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/integrations/capabilities.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Capability integrations
+
+Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.
+
+## Preserve the source capability's legitimate role
+
+An import profile states which external claims map into Auths authority and which require external state. It must reject any mapping that silently invents stronger bounds or execution guarantees.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/integrations/cloud.md b/public/integrations/cloud.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ca2a2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/integrations/cloud.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Cloud IAM integrations
+
+Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.
+
+## Cloud IAM remains the provider boundary
+
+Cloud IAM supplies workload identity and restricted provider credentials. Auths supplies exact effect authority, durable use accounting, closed outcomes, and portable receipts. Credentials never enter the agent or proof.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.cloud/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/integrations/identity-trust.md b/public/integrations/identity-trust.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d13e087
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/integrations/identity-trust.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Identity and trust integrations
+
+Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
+
+## Your trust policy owns who is accepted
+
+Auths supplies bounded evidence parsing and suite-labelled verification. Your application supplies accepted roots and resolver policy. The identity system supplies authentication evidence; none of these alone grants an effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/integrations/policy.md b/public/integrations/policy.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..90480ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/integrations/policy.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Policy engine integrations
+
+Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.
+
+## Policy supplies context; Auths binds the exact effect
+
+The policy engine evaluates application relationships and attributes. Auths commits the resulting bounded decision context to the action and preserves execution state and receipts.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.policy/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/integrations/profile-kit.md b/public/integrations/profile-kit.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a84568
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/integrations/profile-kit.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Build an application profile
+
+Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.
+
+## A profile defines domain meaning
+
+Define bounded canonical actions, resource matching, attenuation, and inspection projections. Keep identity, transport, state, custody, approval providers, and execution adapters outside the profile.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/integrations/transport.md b/public/integrations/transport.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0af5baf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/integrations/transport.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Transport integrations
+
+Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.
+
+## Delivery is never authority
+
+Transport authenticates or delivers peers and bytes according to its own contract. Auths verifies those bounded bytes under explicit trust and authority. Iroh can be used without capabilities; Auths can be used without Iroh.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.transport/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+

From 79130f070455f3f67632166f89b9682cff42e3cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 21:59:29 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 15/29] docs: publish incremental adoption journeys

---
 app/lib/content-graph.ts        |  3 +-
 content/adoption-pages.json     | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 public/adopt/api-keys.md        | 10 +++++
 public/adopt/approvals.md       | 10 +++++
 public/adopt/capabilities.md    | 10 +++++
 public/adopt/cloud-iam.md       | 10 +++++
 public/adopt/cutover.md         | 14 +++++++
 public/adopt/oauth-oidc.md      | 10 +++++
 public/adopt/plan.md            | 14 +++++++
 public/adopt/policy-engines.md  | 10 +++++
 public/adopt/shadow-mode.md     | 14 +++++++
 public/adopt/signed-requests.md | 10 +++++
 public/get-started/adopt.md     | 12 ++++++
 13 files changed, 192 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 content/adoption-pages.json
 create mode 100644 public/adopt/api-keys.md
 create mode 100644 public/adopt/approvals.md
 create mode 100644 public/adopt/capabilities.md
 create mode 100644 public/adopt/cloud-iam.md
 create mode 100644 public/adopt/cutover.md
 create mode 100644 public/adopt/oauth-oidc.md
 create mode 100644 public/adopt/plan.md
 create mode 100644 public/adopt/policy-engines.md
 create mode 100644 public/adopt/shadow-mode.md
 create mode 100644 public/adopt/signed-requests.md
 create mode 100644 public/get-started/adopt.md

diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
index 0536eb4..48b871e 100644
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import rawPages from "../../content/pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import rawDeveloperPages from "../../content/developer-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import rawAgentIntegrationPages from "../../content/agent-integration-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
+import rawAdoptionPages from "../../content/adoption-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import rawContract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
 import { parseAuthoredPageSource, type AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
 
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ export function buildVerifiedPageGraph(pagesInput: unknown, contractInput: unkno
   return Object.freeze({ contractDigest: contract.digest, pages: Object.freeze(pages) });
 }
 
-export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([...rawPages, ...rawDeveloperPages, ...rawAgentIntegrationPages]);
+export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([...rawPages, ...rawDeveloperPages, ...rawAgentIntegrationPages, ...rawAdoptionPages]);
 export const verifiedPageGraph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(authoredPageInputs, rawContract);
 
 export function contentPageByPath(path: string): AuthoredPageSource {
diff --git a/content/adoption-pages.json b/content/adoption-pages.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b50b4a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/adoption-pages.json
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+[
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.start.adopt/1", "path": "/get-started/adopt", "kind": "guide", "title": "Adopt Auths incrementally", "description": "Protect one high-value effect beside the systems you already operate.", "depth": "start", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "path", "title": "Compose before replacing", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Keep your identity provider, policy engine, cloud IAM, transport, and provider gateway. Add Auths to one exact effect, compare decisions without effects, then enforce at the existing gateway.", "Expand one dimension at a time only after success, denial, uncertainty, and rollback are observable."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.plan/1", "path": "/adopt/plan", "kind": "guide", "title": "Plan an Auths adoption", "description": "Inventory effects and boundaries without collecting credentials or unnecessary business data.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "inventory", "title": "Inventory ownership, not secret values", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Record the effect entry point, actor source, existing roles or scopes, credential location, approval owner, replay behavior, audit evidence, and unknown-outcome handling. Record classifications and references—not tokens, private keys, raw payloads, or full receipts."] },
+      { "id": "sequence", "title": "Move through reversible phases", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Inventory, model, verify in shadow, compare, enforce one effect, observe, then expand. Every phase names a rollback and a stop condition."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1", "path": "/adopt/signed-requests", "kind": "integration", "title": "Add Auths to signed requests", "description": "Keep request authentication while binding authority to exact application bytes.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "compose", "title": "Authentication and authority answer different questions", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The existing signature proves who controlled a key and protects its signed fields. Auths adds attenuated authority, exact action commitment, lifecycle state, approvals, closed execution, and receipts only where needed."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1", "path": "/adopt/oauth-oidc", "kind": "integration", "title": "Keep OAuth and OIDC", "description": "Retain login and session identity while adding bounded effect authority.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "compose", "title": "The session identifies the actor", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Continue using OAuth or OIDC for login, consent, session management, and identity claims. Translate accepted session evidence into explicit Auths trust context; do not treat a broad scope as proof of one exact effect."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1", "path": "/adopt/api-keys", "kind": "integration", "title": "Move beyond ambient API keys", "description": "Keep provider keys inside the gateway and give callers exact authority instead.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "boundary", "title": "Do not send the provider key to the caller", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Wrap the existing provider client in a closed gateway. The caller presents bounded authority and an exact command; the gateway acquires the key only after native authorization and durable reservation."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1", "path": "/adopt/cloud-iam", "kind": "integration", "title": "Compose with cloud IAM", "description": "Use workload identity and short-lived credentials without making IAM the application-effect model.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "compose", "title": "IAM authorizes provider access; Auths authorizes the exact effect", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Keep workload federation, roles, and restricted credentials. Add Auths where the application must commit exact resources, order, approvals, use limits, recovery state, and receipts across organizational boundaries."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1", "path": "/adopt/policy-engines", "kind": "integration", "title": "Compose with policy engines", "description": "Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit bounded context.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "compose", "title": "Keep rich policy evaluation where it belongs", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The policy engine continues to answer relationship and attribute questions. Record the bounded decision input or commitment that Auths actually relied on; never imply Auths replaced the policy model."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1", "path": "/adopt/capabilities", "kind": "integration", "title": "Bridge existing capabilities", "description": "Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority without inventing properties they do not provide.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "honesty", "title": "Map protocol, profile, and state responsibilities separately", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Document which attenuation properties come from the source capability, which exact-effect rules come from an application profile, and which replay or budget properties require durable external state."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.approvals/1", "path": "/adopt/approvals", "kind": "integration", "title": "Bind existing approvals", "description": "Turn approval evidence into exact transaction context, never reusable ambient permission.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "binding", "title": "Approve the bytes that will execute", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1" }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1", "path": "/adopt/shadow-mode", "kind": "guide", "title": "Verify in shadow mode", "description": "Compare Auths decisions with current enforcement without authorizing or executing effects.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "inert", "title": "Shadow mode is cryptographically inert", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["It may parse, verify, classify, and compare bounded decisions. It cannot mint an opaque executable authorization object, reserve a use, acquire provider credentials, or call a provider."] },
+      { "id": "records", "title": "Store bounded comparisons", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Record commitments, decision classes, stable reason codes, timing, and correlation identifiers. Exclude credentials, raw business payloads, sealed commands, and full receipt contents."] }
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.cutover/1", "path": "/adopt/cutover", "kind": "guide", "title": "Cut over one protected effect", "description": "Enforce, observe, reconcile, and roll back through one existing gateway.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1", "auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.executions/1", "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [
+      { "id": "preconditions", "title": "Cut over only with reversible evidence", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Require shadow agreement, durable state, provider idempotency or reconciliation, custody readiness, telemetry, explicit stop conditions, and a tested rollback switch before enforcement."] },
+      { "id": "rollback", "title": "Rollback preserves evidence", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Return traffic to the previous gateway without erasing Auths decision comparisons, reservations, recovery references, or receipts. Reconcile any provider-unknown work before another attempt."] }
+    ]
+  }
+]
diff --git a/public/adopt/api-keys.md b/public/adopt/api-keys.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..23701c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/adopt/api-keys.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Move beyond ambient API keys
+
+Keep provider keys inside the gateway and give callers exact authority instead.
+
+## Do not send the provider key to the caller
+
+Wrap the existing provider client in a closed gateway. The caller presents bounded authority and an exact command; the gateway acquires the key only after native authorization and durable reservation.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/adopt/approvals.md b/public/adopt/approvals.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26f5216
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/adopt/approvals.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Bind existing approvals
+
+Turn approval evidence into exact transaction context, never reusable ambient permission.
+
+## Approve the bytes that will execute
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.approvals/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/adopt/capabilities.md b/public/adopt/capabilities.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c9a0c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/adopt/capabilities.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Bridge existing capabilities
+
+Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority without inventing properties they do not provide.
+
+## Map protocol, profile, and state responsibilities separately
+
+Document which attenuation properties come from the source capability, which exact-effect rules come from an application profile, and which replay or budget properties require durable external state.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/adopt/cloud-iam.md b/public/adopt/cloud-iam.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e009913
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/adopt/cloud-iam.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Compose with cloud IAM
+
+Use workload identity and short-lived credentials without making IAM the application-effect model.
+
+## IAM authorizes provider access; Auths authorizes the exact effect
+
+Keep workload federation, roles, and restricted credentials. Add Auths where the application must commit exact resources, order, approvals, use limits, recovery state, and receipts across organizational boundaries.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/adopt/cutover.md b/public/adopt/cutover.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b0186f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/adopt/cutover.md
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Cut over one protected effect
+
+Enforce, observe, reconcile, and roll back through one existing gateway.
+
+## Cut over only with reversible evidence
+
+Require shadow agreement, durable state, provider idempotency or reconciliation, custody readiness, telemetry, explicit stop conditions, and a tested rollback switch before enforcement.
+
+## Rollback preserves evidence
+
+Return traffic to the previous gateway without erasing Auths decision comparisons, reservations, recovery references, or receipts. Reconcile any provider-unknown work before another attempt.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cutover/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/adopt/oauth-oidc.md b/public/adopt/oauth-oidc.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2d5f9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/adopt/oauth-oidc.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Keep OAuth and OIDC
+
+Retain login and session identity while adding bounded effect authority.
+
+## The session identifies the actor
+
+Continue using OAuth or OIDC for login, consent, session management, and identity claims. Translate accepted session evidence into explicit Auths trust context; do not treat a broad scope as proof of one exact effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/adopt/plan.md b/public/adopt/plan.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c8bc8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/adopt/plan.md
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Plan an Auths adoption
+
+Inventory effects and boundaries without collecting credentials or unnecessary business data.
+
+## Inventory ownership, not secret values
+
+Record the effect entry point, actor source, existing roles or scopes, credential location, approval owner, replay behavior, audit evidence, and unknown-outcome handling. Record classifications and references—not tokens, private keys, raw payloads, or full receipts.
+
+## Move through reversible phases
+
+Inventory, model, verify in shadow, compare, enforce one effect, observe, then expand. Every phase names a rollback and a stop condition.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/adopt/policy-engines.md b/public/adopt/policy-engines.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf9fc62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/adopt/policy-engines.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Compose with policy engines
+
+Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit bounded context.
+
+## Keep rich policy evaluation where it belongs
+
+The policy engine continues to answer relationship and attribute questions. Record the bounded decision input or commitment that Auths actually relied on; never imply Auths replaced the policy model.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/adopt/shadow-mode.md b/public/adopt/shadow-mode.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..537db05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/adopt/shadow-mode.md
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Verify in shadow mode
+
+Compare Auths decisions with current enforcement without authorizing or executing effects.
+
+## Shadow mode is cryptographically inert
+
+It may parse, verify, classify, and compare bounded decisions. It cannot mint an opaque executable authorization object, reserve a use, acquire provider credentials, or call a provider.
+
+## Store bounded comparisons
+
+Record commitments, decision classes, stable reason codes, timing, and correlation identifiers. Exclude credentials, raw business payloads, sealed commands, and full receipt contents.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/adopt/signed-requests.md b/public/adopt/signed-requests.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c5142e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/adopt/signed-requests.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Add Auths to signed requests
+
+Keep request authentication while binding authority to exact application bytes.
+
+## Authentication and authority answer different questions
+
+The existing signature proves who controlled a key and protects its signed fields. Auths adds attenuated authority, exact action commitment, lifecycle state, approvals, closed execution, and receipts only where needed.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/get-started/adopt.md b/public/get-started/adopt.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d6656ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/get-started/adopt.md
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# Adopt Auths incrementally
+
+Protect one high-value effect beside the systems you already operate.
+
+## Compose before replacing
+
+Keep your identity provider, policy engine, cloud IAM, transport, and provider gateway. Add Auths to one exact effect, compare decisions without effects, then enforce at the existing gateway.
+
+Expand one dimension at a time only after success, denial, uncertainty, and rollback are observable.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.adopt/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+

From 3587d6b319597890698240fb7fa7581739a95e81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 22:02:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 16/29] docs: publish operations and incident guidance

---
 app/developers/errors/page.tsx                |  5 ++
 app/globals.css                               | 12 ++++
 app/lib/content-graph.ts                      |  3 +-
 app/lib/runbooks.ts                           |  5 ++
 app/operations/incident-response/page.tsx     |  8 +++
 content/operations-pages.json                 | 62 +++++++++++++++++++
 content/runbooks.json                         |  8 +++
 public/operations/backup-and-restore.md       | 10 +++
 public/operations/custody.md                  | 10 +++
 public/operations/deploy-runtime.md           | 10 +++
 public/operations/durable-state.md            | 10 +++
 public/operations/evaluate-locally.md         | 10 +++
 public/operations/incident-response.md        | 10 +++
 public/operations/observability.md            | 10 +++
 public/operations/provider-gateways.md        | 10 +++
 public/operations/receipt-retention.md        | 10 +++
 .../operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md | 10 +++
 public/operations/trust-and-profiles.md       | 10 +++
 public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md     | 10 +++
 schemas/runbook.ts                            | 12 ++++
 20 files changed, 234 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 app/developers/errors/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/lib/runbooks.ts
 create mode 100644 app/operations/incident-response/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 content/operations-pages.json
 create mode 100644 content/runbooks.json
 create mode 100644 public/operations/backup-and-restore.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/custody.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/deploy-runtime.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/durable-state.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/evaluate-locally.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/incident-response.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/observability.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/provider-gateways.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/receipt-retention.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/trust-and-profiles.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md
 create mode 100644 schemas/runbook.ts

diff --git a/app/developers/errors/page.tsx b/app/developers/errors/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..48e0041
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/developers/errors/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../../components/EditorialGuidePage";
+
+export default function Page() {
+  return <><EditorialGuidePage pageId="auths.page.developers.errors/1" eyebrow="Developers" /><div className="outcome-model" aria-label="Safe outcome response model"><span><b>denied</b>change request</span><span><b>indeterminate</b>restore evidence</span><span><b>recoverable</b>resume same reference</span><span><b>provider-unknown</b>reconcile first</span><span><b>invalid</b>correct input</span><span><b>internal</b>preserve evidence</span></div></>;
+}
diff --git a/app/globals.css b/app/globals.css
index b41741b..cacfd7b 100644
--- a/app/globals.css
+++ b/app/globals.css
@@ -2820,6 +2820,18 @@ pre {
 .quickstart-boundary span:not(:last-child)::after { content: " →"; color: var(--accent); margin-left: 10px; }
 .quickstart-links { display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 22px; margin-top: 24px; }
 @media (max-width: 860px) { .quickstart-page { padding: 44px 20px 80px; } .quickstart-steps > section { grid-template-columns: 1fr; gap: 28px; padding: 52px 0; } .quickstart-language { align-items: flex-start; flex-direction: column; } }
+.runbook-grid { display: grid; gap: 18px; margin-top: 48px; }
+.runbook-grid article { padding: 28px; border: 1px solid var(--line); border-radius: 14px; background: var(--surface); }
+.runbook-grid article > div { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 16px; }
+.runbook-grid article span { padding: 5px 8px; border-radius: 999px; background: var(--accent-soft); color: var(--accent); text-transform: uppercase; font-size: 10px; font-weight: 750; }
+.runbook-grid article h2 { margin: 0; font-size: 22px; }
+.runbook-grid dl { display: grid; grid-template-columns: repeat(2, 1fr); gap: 18px 28px; margin: 24px 0 0; }
+.runbook-grid dt { color: var(--muted); font-size: 11px; font-weight: 750; text-transform: uppercase; }
+.runbook-grid dd { margin: 6px 0 0; line-height: 1.55; }
+.outcome-model { position: fixed; right: 22px; bottom: 22px; z-index: 10; display: grid; grid-template-columns: repeat(3, minmax(120px, 1fr)); max-width: 620px; border: 1px solid var(--line); border-radius: 12px; background: var(--surface); box-shadow: 0 18px 60px rgba(0,0,0,.14); }
+.outcome-model span { display: grid; gap: 2px; padding: 11px 14px; color: var(--muted); font-size: 11px; }
+.outcome-model b { color: var(--ink); }
+@media (max-width: 860px) { .runbook-grid dl { grid-template-columns: 1fr; } .outcome-model { position: static; margin: 20px; grid-template-columns: repeat(2, 1fr); } }
 
 .generated-fact-reference {
   align-items: center;
diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
index 48b871e..1752f2e 100644
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import rawPages from "../../content/pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import rawDeveloperPages from "../../content/developer-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import rawAgentIntegrationPages from "../../content/agent-integration-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import rawAdoptionPages from "../../content/adoption-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
+import rawOperationsPages from "../../content/operations-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import rawContract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
 import { parseAuthoredPageSource, type AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
 
@@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ export function buildVerifiedPageGraph(pagesInput: unknown, contractInput: unkno
   return Object.freeze({ contractDigest: contract.digest, pages: Object.freeze(pages) });
 }
 
-export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([...rawPages, ...rawDeveloperPages, ...rawAgentIntegrationPages, ...rawAdoptionPages]);
+export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([...rawPages, ...rawDeveloperPages, ...rawAgentIntegrationPages, ...rawAdoptionPages, ...rawOperationsPages]);
 export const verifiedPageGraph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(authoredPageInputs, rawContract);
 
 export function contentPageByPath(path: string): AuthoredPageSource {
diff --git a/app/lib/runbooks.ts b/app/lib/runbooks.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f13ad6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/runbooks.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+import rawRunbooks from "../../content/runbooks.json" with { type: "json" };
+import { parseRunbook } from "../../schemas/runbook.ts";
+
+export const runbooks = Object.freeze(rawRunbooks.map(parseRunbook));
+if (new Set(runbooks.map((runbook) => runbook.id)).size !== runbooks.length) throw new TypeError("duplicate runbook identity");
diff --git a/app/operations/incident-response/page.tsx b/app/operations/incident-response/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..026a0d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/operations/incident-response/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+import { PageActions } from "../../components/PageActions";
+import { SiteFooter } from "../../components/SiteFooter";
+import { SiteHeader } from "../../components/SiteHeader";
+import { runbooks } from "../../lib/runbooks";
+
+export default function Page() {
+  return <div className="site-frame"><SiteHeader compact /><main className="editorial-page"><header className="editorial-hero"><p className="kicker">Operations</p><h1>Incident response runbooks</h1><p>Stop, preserve evidence, reconcile, recover, and escalate without widening authority.</p><PageActions source="/operations/incident-response.md" /></header><div className="runbook-grid">{runbooks.map((runbook) => <article id={runbook.id} key={runbook.id}><div><span>{runbook.severity}</span><h2>{runbook.title}</h2></div><dl><div><dt>Stop</dt><dd>{runbook.stop}</dd></div><div><dt>Observe</dt><dd>{runbook.observe}</dd></div><div><dt>Recover</dt><dd>{runbook.recover}</dd></div><div><dt>Never</dt><dd>{runbook.never}</dd></div></dl></article>)}</div></main><SiteFooter /></div>;
+}
diff --git a/content/operations-pages.json b/content/operations-pages.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..718a5f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/operations-pages.json
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+[
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.evaluate/1", "path": "/operations/evaluate-locally", "kind": "operations", "title": "Evaluate the runtime locally", "description": "Exercise the production boundary with development custody and state before deployment.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1", "auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1", "auths.endpoint.executions/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "boundary", "title": "Evaluate the real boundaries", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Use disposable keys and local durable state, but keep the same parse, authorize, reserve, provider, receipt, and recovery sequence you intend to operate. Exercise both success and provider uncertainty."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.deploy/1", "path": "/operations/deploy-runtime", "kind": "operations", "title": "Deploy the open runtime", "description": "Place the Auths runtime behind TLS with explicit dependency ownership.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1", "auths.endpoint.executions/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "topology", "title": "Deploy one closed gateway", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Terminate trusted TLS, isolate custody and state dependencies, restrict provider egress, expose bounded health signals, and keep the effect provider reachable only from the runtime workload."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.state/1", "path": "/operations/durable-state", "kind": "operations", "title": "Configure durable state", "description": "Preserve replay, use, budget, recovery, and receipt invariants across restarts.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "atomicity", "title": "Reservations must be atomic and durable", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Do not split replay, budget, use, execution, and receipt state across stores that cannot preserve their transaction boundary. A restart must never make a consumed effect appear unused."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.custody/1", "path": "/operations/custody", "kind": "operations", "title": "Configure key custody", "description": "Keep signing material non-exportable and observable without logging secrets.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "keys", "title": "The runtime asks a signer; it does not own key bytes", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Use a custody adapter that returns suite-labelled public descriptors and signs bounded requests. Private material must remain inside the selected HSM, KMS, enclave, or application-owned signer."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.trust/1", "path": "/operations/trust-and-profiles", "kind": "operations", "title": "Configure trust and profiles", "description": "Version accepted roots, resolvers, suites, and domain semantics independently.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "rotation", "title": "Rotate trust without migrating authority", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Identity evidence and verification suites are replaceable inputs. Roll out new roots or suites with an explicit overlap window, negative fixtures, rollback, and post-rotation evidence review."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.gateways/1", "path": "/operations/provider-gateways", "kind": "operations", "title": "Configure provider gateways", "description": "Acquire provider credentials only after authorization and durable reservation.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "closed", "title": "Only opaque verified commands cross the boundary", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The adapter receives an SDK-minted command and bounded execution context. It never accepts caller-constructed authorization flags. It reports applied, not applied, or possible outcomes without guessing."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.observability/1", "path": "/operations/observability", "kind": "operations", "title": "Observe Auths safely", "description": "Measure liveness, readiness, dependencies, outcomes, and latency without leaking authority.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "signals", "title": "Observe classifications and commitments", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Emit bounded correlation IDs, operation identities, outcome classes, dependency health, and latency histograms. Do not log proofs, sealed commands, credentials, raw action bodies, full receipts, or authorized disclosure payloads."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.backup/1", "path": "/operations/backup-and-restore", "kind": "operations", "title": "Back up and restore", "description": "Restore state without reopening replay, budget, use, or recovery windows.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "exercise", "title": "A restore is a semantic exercise", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Quiesce or fence writers, restore an atomic state image, validate monotonic metadata, replay adversarial fixtures, reconcile nonterminal provider observations, and only then return the runtime to readiness."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.recovery/1", "path": "/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation", "kind": "operations", "title": "Recover and reconcile", "description": "Resume the same execution identity after uncertain provider outcomes.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "decision", "title": "Observe, reconcile, then resume", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.recovery/1" }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.upgrade/1", "path": "/operations/upgrade-and-rollback", "kind": "operations", "title": "Upgrade and roll back", "description": "Change runtime bytes without splitting semantic, state, or documentation identities.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1", "auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "sequence", "title": "Qualify before promotion", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Verify schemas, state migrations, custody compatibility, differential fixtures, recovery across mixed versions, and exact release documentation. Roll back application and documentation surfaces atomically."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.receipts/1", "path": "/operations/receipt-retention", "kind": "operations", "title": "Retain and disclose receipts", "description": "Preserve evidence while minimizing sensitive operational detail.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1", "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "levels", "title": "Retain integrity; disclose by authorization", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Store signed bytes and commitments under a bounded retention policy. Default readers to opaque or summary views; require explicit disclosure authority for business details and record that disclosure."] }]
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents/1", "path": "/operations/incident-response", "kind": "operations", "title": "Incident response runbooks", "description": "Stop, preserve evidence, reconcile, recover, and escalate without widening authority.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "sections": [{ "id": "contract", "title": "Every runbook has the same safety contract", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Name ownership and severity, preconditions, required access, safe observations, stop conditions, rollback or resume, reconciliation, evidence retention, and escalation. Never copy credentials or full authority artifacts into an incident ticket."] }]
+  }
+]
diff --git a/content/runbooks.json b/content/runbooks.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38fd3fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/runbooks.json
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+[
+  { "id": "state-loss", "title": "State store unavailable or lost", "severity": "critical", "stop": "Stop mutating traffic and fence every writer.", "observe": "Read bounded dependency health and the last durable store generation.", "recover": "Restore an atomic backup, validate replay and budget invariants, then reconcile nonterminal executions.", "never": "Never start with an empty store against a live provider." },
+  { "id": "signer-outage", "title": "Custody signer unavailable", "severity": "high", "stop": "Stop authoring and receipt-attestation paths; preserve verification-only service.", "observe": "Distinguish signer health from invalid signature outcomes.", "recover": "Restore the same key descriptor or perform an explicit trust-root rotation.", "never": "Never export a private key into the runtime as a shortcut." },
+  { "id": "trust-root-error", "title": "Incorrect trust root deployed", "severity": "critical", "stop": "Freeze new authority acceptance and identify the affected release window.", "observe": "Compare root commitments, suite labels, and negative verification fixtures.", "recover": "Roll back the trust bundle atomically and re-evaluate affected decisions.", "never": "Never mark previously indeterminate decisions as authorized." },
+  { "id": "provider-unknown", "title": "Provider outcome is unknown", "severity": "high", "stop": "Block fresh retries for the same logical effect.", "observe": "Use the provider observation and opaque execution reference.", "recover": "Reconcile provider state, then resume the same execution identity.", "never": "Never assume an error means the provider did nothing." },
+  { "id": "receipt-disclosure", "title": "Receipt detail disclosed improperly", "severity": "high", "stop": "Disable the affected disclosure path without deleting integrity evidence.", "observe": "Identify disclosure level, viewer authority, fields exposed, and audit commitment.", "recover": "Rotate access, narrow disclosure policy, and issue bounded notifications.", "never": "Never publish full receipts while investigating." },
+  { "id": "compromised-credential", "title": "Provider credential compromised", "severity": "critical", "stop": "Disable the provider gateway and revoke the provider credential.", "observe": "Separate provider audit events from Auths-authorized receipt commitments.", "recover": "Rotate custody, reconcile provider state, requalify the gateway, then restore traffic.", "never": "Never place the replacement credential in a proof, log, or agent prompt." }
+]
diff --git a/public/operations/backup-and-restore.md b/public/operations/backup-and-restore.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..50e934b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/backup-and-restore.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Back up and restore
+
+Restore state without reopening replay, budget, use, or recovery windows.
+
+## A restore is a semantic exercise
+
+Quiesce or fence writers, restore an atomic state image, validate monotonic metadata, replay adversarial fixtures, reconcile nonterminal provider observations, and only then return the runtime to readiness.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.backup/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/custody.md b/public/operations/custody.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b627e4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/custody.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Configure key custody
+
+Keep signing material non-exportable and observable without logging secrets.
+
+## The runtime asks a signer; it does not own key bytes
+
+Use a custody adapter that returns suite-labelled public descriptors and signs bounded requests. Private material must remain inside the selected HSM, KMS, enclave, or application-owned signer.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.custody/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/deploy-runtime.md b/public/operations/deploy-runtime.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b32e245
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/deploy-runtime.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Deploy the open runtime
+
+Place the Auths runtime behind TLS with explicit dependency ownership.
+
+## Deploy one closed gateway
+
+Terminate trusted TLS, isolate custody and state dependencies, restrict provider egress, expose bounded health signals, and keep the effect provider reachable only from the runtime workload.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.deploy/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/durable-state.md b/public/operations/durable-state.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1626d03
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/durable-state.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Configure durable state
+
+Preserve replay, use, budget, recovery, and receipt invariants across restarts.
+
+## Reservations must be atomic and durable
+
+Do not split replay, budget, use, execution, and receipt state across stores that cannot preserve their transaction boundary. A restart must never make a consumed effect appear unused.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.state/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/evaluate-locally.md b/public/operations/evaluate-locally.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39bc6a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/evaluate-locally.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Evaluate the runtime locally
+
+Exercise the production boundary with development custody and state before deployment.
+
+## Evaluate the real boundaries
+
+Use disposable keys and local durable state, but keep the same parse, authorize, reserve, provider, receipt, and recovery sequence you intend to operate. Exercise both success and provider uncertainty.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.evaluate/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/incident-response.md b/public/operations/incident-response.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df6d787
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/incident-response.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Incident response runbooks
+
+Stop, preserve evidence, reconcile, recover, and escalate without widening authority.
+
+## Every runbook has the same safety contract
+
+Name ownership and severity, preconditions, required access, safe observations, stop conditions, rollback or resume, reconciliation, evidence retention, and escalation. Never copy credentials or full authority artifacts into an incident ticket.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/observability.md b/public/operations/observability.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e3f1b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/observability.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Observe Auths safely
+
+Measure liveness, readiness, dependencies, outcomes, and latency without leaking authority.
+
+## Observe classifications and commitments
+
+Emit bounded correlation IDs, operation identities, outcome classes, dependency health, and latency histograms. Do not log proofs, sealed commands, credentials, raw action bodies, full receipts, or authorized disclosure payloads.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.observability/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/provider-gateways.md b/public/operations/provider-gateways.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7cb8953
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/provider-gateways.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Configure provider gateways
+
+Acquire provider credentials only after authorization and durable reservation.
+
+## Only opaque verified commands cross the boundary
+
+The adapter receives an SDK-minted command and bounded execution context. It never accepts caller-constructed authorization flags. It reports applied, not applied, or possible outcomes without guessing.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.gateways/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/receipt-retention.md b/public/operations/receipt-retention.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d26ee6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/receipt-retention.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Retain and disclose receipts
+
+Preserve evidence while minimizing sensitive operational detail.
+
+## Retain integrity; disclose by authorization
+
+Store signed bytes and commitments under a bounded retention policy. Default readers to opaque or summary views; require explicit disclosure authority for business details and record that disclosure.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.receipts/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md b/public/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1bb6672
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Recover and reconcile
+
+Resume the same execution identity after uncertain provider outcomes.
+
+## Observe, reconcile, then resume
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.recovery/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/trust-and-profiles.md b/public/operations/trust-and-profiles.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b29a18c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/trust-and-profiles.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Configure trust and profiles
+
+Version accepted roots, resolvers, suites, and domain semantics independently.
+
+## Rotate trust without migrating authority
+
+Identity evidence and verification suites are replaceable inputs. Roll out new roots or suites with an explicit overlap window, negative fixtures, rollback, and post-rotation evidence review.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.trust/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md b/public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f1ac75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Upgrade and roll back
+
+Change runtime bytes without splitting semantic, state, or documentation identities.
+
+## Qualify before promotion
+
+Verify schemas, state migrations, custody compatibility, differential fixtures, recovery across mixed versions, and exact release documentation. Roll back application and documentation surfaces atomically.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.upgrade/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/schemas/runbook.ts b/schemas/runbook.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b263c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/schemas/runbook.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+export type Runbook = Readonly<{ id: string; title: string; severity: "high" | "critical"; stop: string; observe: string; recover: string; never: string }>;
+
+export function parseRunbook(input: unknown): Runbook {
+  if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null || Array.isArray(input)) throw new TypeError("runbook must be an object");
+  const value = input as Record<string, unknown>;
+  const expected = ["id", "never", "observe", "recover", "severity", "stop", "title"];
+  if (Object.keys(value).sort().join("\0") !== expected.join("\0")) throw new TypeError("runbook fields are invalid");
+  if (typeof value.id !== "string" || !/^[a-z0-9-]+$/.test(value.id)) throw new TypeError("runbook identity is invalid");
+  if (value.severity !== "high" && value.severity !== "critical") throw new TypeError("runbook severity is invalid");
+  for (const field of ["title", "stop", "observe", "recover", "never"] as const) if (typeof value[field] !== "string" || value[field].length < 8 || value[field].length > 320) throw new TypeError(`runbook ${field} is invalid`);
+  return Object.freeze(value as Runbook);
+}

From fd4ac308ba3ddaca2a28afe5a879bc8e168942bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 22:41:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 17/29] docs: define documentation ownership and maintenance

---
 docs/ARCHITECTURE.md | 235 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 docs/MAINTENANCE.md  | 308 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 543 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 docs/ARCHITECTURE.md
 create mode 100644 docs/MAINTENANCE.md

diff --git a/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md b/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a25d51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+# Documentation Architecture
+
+## Purpose
+
+Auths documentation combines two kinds of work that change for different
+reasons:
+
+- **platform documentation** reports what a specific Auths release actually
+  exposes and proves; and
+- **editorial documentation** teaches a person why, when, and how to use those
+  capabilities.
+
+They appear together on the public site, but they do not share ownership. A
+released API must not depend on a writer remembering to update a copied
+signature. A useful guide must not be generated from docstrings and mistaken
+for good teaching.
+
+This document defines the boundary between those systems and how they compose
+into one documentation product.
+
+## The two lanes
+
+### Platform documentation: automated product truth
+
+Platform documentation is produced from installed, qualified Auths artifacts.
+It answers questions whose correct response is determined by a release:
+
+- Which Rust, TypeScript, and Python operations exist?
+- What arguments, return types, errors, and version constraints do they have?
+- Which Runtime API routes, request fields, outcomes, profiles, and limits are
+  supported?
+- Which examples execute successfully against the installed SDKs?
+- Which assurance claims have current evidence and stated limitations?
+- Which semantic identities correspond across languages?
+
+Its source of truth belongs in `auths-proof`: public source documentation,
+runtime schemas, release metadata, conformance fixtures, executable scenarios,
+and assurance evidence. `auths-docs` consumes a checksum-addressed release
+bundle; it does not inspect a mutable sibling checkout during a qualified
+build.
+
+Platform documentation is generated because software facts are safest when
+the software supplies them. Generated does not mean unreviewed. Changes are
+reviewed in the product repository, qualified against installed artifacts, and
+then projected into reference pages and fact-backed components.
+
+### Editorial documentation: human-authored understanding
+
+Editorial documentation is written and reviewed by people. It answers
+questions that require judgment:
+
+- What should a new user do first?
+- Which integration path fits a REST API, an agent, or a production runtime?
+- Why are identity, authority, transport, and execution separate?
+- Which security boundary matters at this point in a workflow?
+- How should an operator respond to a provider-unknown outcome?
+- What is the simplest honest explanation of a sophisticated capability?
+
+Its source of truth belongs in `auths-docs`: explanations, page introductions,
+journey design, conceptual diagrams, recommendations, landing-page curation,
+and related-topic choices.
+
+Editorial content may refer to product facts and tested scenarios by stable
+identity. It must not copy mutable signatures, endpoint inventories, version
+tables, expected outputs, or assurance status into prose.
+
+## Three block-level provenance classes
+
+Every public semantic block has exactly one provenance class:
+
+| Provenance | Owner | Typical content | How it enters a page |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Generated fact | `auths-proof` release bundle | API signatures, fields, routes, errors, limits, profiles, versions, assurance status | A typed fact reference |
+| Tested scenario | Qualified scenario artifact | Commands, Rust/TypeScript/Python code, normalized results, adversarial outcomes | A scenario and optional step reference |
+| Editorial narrative | `auths-docs` | Explanations, recommendations, conceptual diagrams, transitions, page ordering | Authored content |
+
+The distinction is made at block level rather than page level. A guide can
+open with editorial explanation, render a tested three-language example, show
+a generated outcome table, and finish with editorial next steps. Each block
+still has one owner.
+
+## Composition model
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+  subgraph Product["auths-proof · release truth"]
+    F["Generated facts"]
+    S["Qualified scenarios"]
+    E["Assurance evidence"]
+  end
+
+  subgraph Docs["auths-docs · editorial intent"]
+    N["Narrative"]
+    J["Journeys and hierarchy"]
+    C["Curation"]
+  end
+
+  F --> B["Immutable docs bundle"]
+  S --> B
+  E --> B
+  B --> P["Strict page compiler"]
+  N --> P
+  J --> P
+  C --> P
+  P --> G["Verified page graph"]
+  G --> H["HTML"]
+  G --> M["Canonical Markdown"]
+  G --> X["Search and navigation"]
+  G --> A["Agent-readable surfaces"]
+```
+
+The verified page graph is the sole publishable content model. HTML,
+Markdown, navigation, search, sitemaps, and LLM-facing outputs are projections
+of that graph. They must not maintain independent page inventories.
+
+## Stable joins, not copied text
+
+Authored pages declare the product identities they use. For example, a guide
+may depend on an operation, a scenario, a profile, and an assurance claim:
+
+```yaml
+id: auths.page.get-started.quickstarts.local-rest-effect/1
+uses:
+  operations:
+    - auths.operation.authority.execute/1
+  scenarios:
+    - auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1
+  profiles:
+    - auths.profile.application.rest-effect/1
+  claims:
+    - auths.claim.exact-effect-commitment/1
+```
+
+The page selects those identities through registered components. The compiler
+resolves them against one release bundle and rejects unknown, missing, or
+incompatible identities. This makes an API change visible as a dependency
+change instead of allowing stale copied prose to survive.
+
+Semantic identities are versioned when meaning changes. Pages do not reconnect
+to a new operation merely because its function name looks similar.
+
+## Information architecture ownership
+
+The top-level product sections are an editorial product decision:
+
+- Get started
+- Identity & trust
+- Authority
+- Agents
+- Production operations
+- Developers
+
+Reference and Assurance are cross-cutting lookup surfaces. They do not compete
+with the six primary journeys.
+
+The hierarchy must be stored as a strict, typed registry rather than maintained
+independently in prose, route folders, landing cards, and sidebars. Each page
+declares a stable page identity, canonical path, owning section, parent,
+navigation group, order, and page type.
+
+From that registry, the site derives:
+
+- top and left navigation;
+- breadcrumbs and previous/next links;
+- landing-page descendants;
+- canonical routes and sitemap entries;
+- search and agent indexes;
+- orphan and cycle reports; and
+- a readable hierarchy snapshot for planning and review.
+
+The six top-level sections should change rarely. Leaf pages and groupings can
+evolve as the product and its audience become better understood. The registry,
+not a planning Markdown file, is the live source of truth.
+
+## What each repository owns
+
+| Concern | `auths-proof` | `auths-docs` |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Public SDK and Runtime API behavior | Defines and qualifies | Renders from bundle |
+| Public source documentation | Owns | Displays through generated reference |
+| Semantic identities and cross-language parity | Defines | Resolves |
+| Executable example source and expected outcome | Qualifies | Selects and contextualizes |
+| Assurance evidence and limitations | Produces | Presents |
+| Editorial prose and conceptual diagrams | Does not own | Authors and reviews |
+| Journey hierarchy and page ordering | Supplies typed constraints | Owns product choice |
+| Page compiler and visual components | Does not own | Implements |
+| HTML, Markdown, search, and navigation projections | Supplies inputs | Generates from one graph |
+| Release qualification | Produces immutable bundle | Verifies bundle and site candidate |
+
+## Rules that prevent the lanes from colliding
+
+1. If released software can make a statement false, represent it as a
+   generated fact or tested scenario.
+2. Editorial prose explains facts; it does not duplicate them.
+3. Public executable code comes from a qualified scenario, not a raw authored
+   code fence.
+4. Generated reference pages and generated Markdown are never edited by hand.
+5. Navigation, search, sitemap, Markdown, and HTML share one page registry and
+   page graph.
+6. `auths-docs` never imports mutable files from a neighboring `auths-proof`
+   checkout for a release build.
+7. A page may have only one canonical identity, route, owner, and parent.
+8. Cross-topic links are explicitly labelled **Related topics** and never hide
+   a missing page in the current journey.
+9. Assurance claims always display their evidence scope and limitation.
+10. Credentials, private keys, raw protected payloads, sealed commands, and
+    unrestricted receipt detail never enter documentation artifacts.
+
+## Build-time failure boundaries
+
+The documentation build must fail when:
+
+- a page references an identity absent from its selected release bundle;
+- a page uses a fact or scenario it did not declare;
+- two pages claim the same identity or canonical path;
+- navigation has a missing parent, cycle, duplicate order, or orphan;
+- a generated fact is manually recreated in an editorial slot;
+- an executable example is not backed by a qualified scenario;
+- HTML and Markdown contain different semantic blocks;
+- an assurance claim has no current evidence or no limitation;
+- an internal link promises a reader job the destination does not fulfill; or
+- the bundle digest used to build the site differs from the qualified digest.
+
+## Deliberate exclusions
+
+This architecture does not use a runtime CMS, production database, or live API
+introspection. Published documentation is static-first and release-pinned.
+Client-side code is limited to interaction such as navigation state, search,
+language synchronization, and copy actions.
+
+Auths is prelaunch. When information architecture or product naming is wrong,
+the preferred response is a clean correction rather than compatibility routes,
+deprecated documentation trees, or migration shims. Git history preserves the
+old design.
+
diff --git a/docs/MAINTENANCE.md b/docs/MAINTENANCE.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e767e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/MAINTENANCE.md
@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+# Documentation Maintenance
+
+## Goal
+
+Maintain documentation that remains correct as Auths changes, stays coherent
+as the site grows, and remains useful to both people and agents without asking
+writers to synchronize the same fact across multiple files.
+
+The core maintenance rule is:
+
+> Change each fact at its owner, then regenerate every projection.
+
+Product facts change in `auths-proof`. Editorial explanations and journey
+choices change in `auths-docs`. HTML, Markdown, search, navigation, sitemaps,
+and LLM-facing indexes are outputs, not additional sources of truth.
+
+Read [ARCHITECTURE.md](./ARCHITECTURE.md) before changing ownership boundaries.
+
+## Know what may be edited
+
+| Material | Edit directly? | Source of truth |
+| --- | ---: | --- |
+| Public Rust, TypeScript, or Python signature | No, not in this repo | Public source/API contract in `auths-proof` |
+| Runtime route, field, outcome, profile, or limit | No | Runtime/release contract in `auths-proof` |
+| Executable code and expected result | No | Qualified scenario in `auths-proof` |
+| Assurance status, evidence, or limitation | No | Assurance release data in `auths-proof` |
+| Explanation, recommendation, conceptual diagram | Yes | Editorial source in `auths-docs` |
+| Landing-card selection and ordering | Yes | Typed information-architecture registry |
+| Canonical route, parent, group, and page type | Yes, once in the registry | Typed information-architecture registry |
+| Files under `public/` generated by documentation tools | No | Verified page graph and renderers |
+| Search index, sitemap, Markdown twin, LLM index | No | Generated from the verified page graph |
+
+If the correct owner is unclear, use this test: **could a software release make
+this statement false?** If yes, it belongs in the platform lane. If it is an
+explanation, recommendation, or deliberate reader path, it belongs in the
+editorial lane.
+
+## Routine change workflows
+
+### Change an SDK function or argument
+
+1. Change and document the public surface in `auths-proof`.
+2. Update its semantic identity when meaning, not merely spelling, changes.
+3. Run installed-artifact extraction and cross-language qualification.
+4. Produce a new immutable documentation bundle.
+5. Update the pinned bundle in `auths-docs`.
+6. Regenerate reference and machine-readable surfaces.
+7. Review the affected-page report for editorial pages that depend on the
+   changed identity.
+8. Edit only explanations whose meaning changed; do not copy the new signature
+   into prose.
+
+The generated reference should update without hand-editing an MDX or JSON
+signature table.
+
+### Add a Runtime API endpoint, profile, error, or limit
+
+Follow the same release-bundle path. Generated reference appears from the
+product contract. An editor separately decides whether the new surface merits
+a guide, landing card, integration path, or release note.
+
+Not every new API deserves a new top-level page. Reference completeness and
+editorial prominence are separate decisions.
+
+### Add or change an executable example
+
+1. Add the scenario to the qualified fixture system in `auths-proof`.
+2. Run it against every supported SDK named by the scenario.
+3. Normalize outcomes without erasing language-specific ergonomics.
+4. Publish the scenario with a stable identity and exact release provenance.
+5. Reference that identity from the editorial page.
+6. Render code and results with the shared code components.
+
+Do not paste a convenient snippet into editorial content. If code is important
+enough to teach, it is important enough to execute in qualification.
+
+### Correct or improve an explanation
+
+Edit the editorial source in `auths-docs`. Preserve its fact and scenario
+references unless the dependency genuinely changes. Then run the documentation
+qualification suite and inspect both HTML and canonical Markdown.
+
+A wording-only change must not modify the selected product bundle or generated
+reference data.
+
+### Add a guide or conceptual page
+
+1. Name the reader, their starting state, and the outcome they need.
+2. Choose the owning top-level section.
+3. Assign one stable page identity and canonical path.
+4. Declare its parent, navigation group, order, page type, and product
+   dependencies in the typed registry.
+5. Author the narrative using registered components.
+6. Use qualified scenario references for executable code.
+7. Add cross-section links only under an explicit **Related topics** heading.
+8. Verify breadcrumbs, active navigation, previous/next, Markdown actions, and
+   a useful next action.
+
+Reject the page if it cannot name a distinct reader job. A generic page that
+only forwards readers elsewhere adds maintenance cost without adding clarity.
+
+### Move, merge, or remove a page
+
+Auths is prelaunch, so correct the hierarchy cleanly:
+
+1. Update the page registry once.
+2. Update inbound editorial references by stable page identity.
+3. Regenerate routes, navigation, sitemap, search, and machine surfaces.
+4. Confirm that the old path is absent from source and outputs.
+5. Record retained, merged, replaced, or removed identities in the current
+   migration report when a large hierarchy change is under review.
+
+Do not create compatibility aliases, deprecated route trees, or duplicated
+pages unless launch policy later requires them explicitly.
+
+### Add another SDK language
+
+1. Establish its parity mapping and installed-artifact extraction in
+   `auths-proof`.
+2. Extend qualified scenarios to the new language.
+3. Add the language to the shared language registry and code renderer.
+4. Regenerate reference, examples, search metadata, and Markdown.
+5. Review editorial prose only where language availability was discussed.
+
+The language selector is global page state. Individual code blocks do not own
+independent language inventories.
+
+## Keeping the hierarchy current
+
+The hierarchy contains two different rates of change:
+
+- the six top-level product areas are durable product vocabulary and should
+  change rarely; and
+- topic groups and leaf pages should evolve as capabilities and reader needs
+  become clearer.
+
+The live hierarchy belongs in the typed page registry. Planning documents such
+as a proposed hierarchy are design inputs or generated snapshots, not parallel
+navigation sources.
+
+Any hierarchy change must pass these checks:
+
+- every page occurs exactly once;
+- every non-root page has one existing parent in the same primary section;
+- there are no cycles, duplicate paths, duplicate sibling order values, or
+  orphans;
+- every landing-page primary card targets a descendant;
+- every non-landing page renders the complete local navigation and correct
+  active state;
+- breadcrumb and previous/next relationships derive from the same tree; and
+- cross-topic links are clearly distinguished from the current journey.
+
+## Review ownership
+
+Use review routing based on what changed:
+
+| Change | Required perspective |
+| --- | --- |
+| API, runtime fact, semantic identity | Product surface owner |
+| Executable or adversarial scenario | SDK/runtime owner and test owner |
+| Security or assurance claim | Security/assurance owner |
+| Operational procedure or runbook | Runtime operator |
+| Journey, hierarchy, or recommendation | Documentation product/editorial owner |
+| Renderer, schema, page compiler, release tooling | Documentation platform owner |
+| Visual or interactive behavior | Design and accessibility review |
+
+One person may fill several roles before launch, but the review questions must
+remain distinct.
+
+## Validation before every documentation change
+
+From `auths-docs`, run the smallest focused checks while editing, then the full
+qualification before publishing:
+
+```bash
+npm run typecheck
+npm run lint
+npm run lint:bash
+npm run lint:ownership
+npm run test:contract
+npm run build
+```
+
+Before release, run:
+
+```bash
+npm run qualify
+```
+
+Qualification must use the exact candidate bundle and source head. A preview
+that builds against an old fixture is useful for visual work but is not release
+evidence.
+
+Inspect representative rendered pages after structural or component changes:
+
+- a top-level landing page;
+- a guide with Rust, TypeScript, and Python code;
+- SDK reference;
+- Runtime API reference;
+- an operations procedure;
+- an assurance page; and
+- their page-level and section-level Markdown twins.
+
+Check desktop, collapsed-navigation, tablet, and mobile layouts. Language
+selection, copy actions, keyboard navigation, focus states, and reduced-motion
+behavior must remain usable.
+
+## Release maintenance
+
+For every Auths release:
+
+1. Build and qualify the product documentation bundle from installed artifacts.
+2. Verify its checksum and semantic identities in `auths-docs`.
+3. Generate the affected-page report.
+4. Review changed facts, scenarios, evidence, and limitations.
+5. Regenerate the complete verified page graph and all projections.
+6. Crawl the candidate site and validate every internal HTML, Markdown,
+   download, search, sitemap, and manifest target.
+7. Confirm there are no orphan pages or misleading landing cards.
+8. Publish the product artifacts and matching documentation atomically, or keep
+   the previous pair live.
+9. Retain the bundle digest and source revisions in release evidence.
+
+Never publish documentation that describes a product head different from the
+artifacts users can install.
+
+## Periodic editorial maintenance
+
+Automation can prove consistency, not usefulness. On a regular cadence:
+
+- review search terms that produce no useful result;
+- run unfamiliar-reader tasks through each top-level section;
+- inspect whether first-step pages contain real code or procedures;
+- verify that recommended paths still represent the simplest product surface;
+- remove pages that duplicate another reader job;
+- review security language for accidental overclaiming;
+- review assurance limitations alongside claims;
+- check external links and integration guidance against primary sources; and
+- revisit the hierarchy based on actual reader behavior, not page count.
+
+Before launch, a monthly editorial review is sufficient unless product naming
+or the public surface is changing rapidly. Review the top-level taxonomy as a
+product decision, not as routine copy editing.
+
+## Preventing stale content
+
+Treat these as defects:
+
+- a signature or endpoint copied into prose;
+- an example that is not executable in qualification;
+- a generated file changed by hand;
+- two navigation sources that must be kept synchronized;
+- a landing card pointing to a generic or unrelated destination;
+- a page with no owning journey or useful next action;
+- a claim without evidence scope and limitation;
+- prose that confuses identity, transport, approval, or delivery with
+  authority; and
+- a page whose Markdown twin omits meaningful content from HTML.
+
+When a fact appears stale, repair its source and pipeline. Do not patch only the
+rendered page.
+
+## Security and privacy hygiene
+
+Documentation, examples, fixtures, screenshots, logs, and search indexes must
+not contain:
+
+- private keys or provider credentials;
+- live OAuth tokens, cookies, certificates, or signed production requests;
+- raw protected business payloads;
+- sealed commands or unrestricted receipt detail;
+- customer identifiers or production topology; or
+- authorized disclosure data presented as a default receipt view.
+
+Use deterministic synthetic identities and bounded fixtures. Receipt examples
+default to opaque or summary disclosure. Full views require an explicit
+teaching purpose and synthetic data.
+
+## Emergency corrections
+
+For a dangerous instruction, exposed secret, or materially false security
+claim:
+
+1. remove or correct the unsafe public content immediately;
+2. revoke or rotate any exposed credential outside the documentation workflow;
+3. identify whether the defect originated in product truth, scenario data,
+   editorial source, or a renderer;
+4. repair the owner and regenerate all projections;
+5. add a regression check at the boundary that failed; and
+6. record the affected releases and public interval.
+
+Do not preserve a known-dangerous page merely to keep a release pair perfectly
+synchronized.
+
+## Definition of maintained
+
+A documentation change is complete when:
+
+- the fact or narrative was changed at its proper owner;
+- stable dependencies resolve against one immutable release bundle;
+- generated and editorial content have unambiguous provenance;
+- HTML and Markdown communicate the same meaning;
+- navigation and links derive from the canonical page graph;
+- relevant code or procedures are qualified, not illustrative fiction;
+- security boundaries and limitations remain explicit;
+- the full qualification suite passes; and
+- the published site corresponds to the installable Auths release.
+

From d3dc5db2bc55f376a4e04507c9a76e08979af531 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 22:55:49 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 18/29] docs: establish canonical documentation hierarchy

---
 README.md                                     |    2 +-
 app/architecture/page.tsx                     |   18 -
 app/architecture/trust-boundaries/page.tsx    |   19 -
 app/authority/approval-bound-plans/page.tsx   |    2 -
 .../receipts-and-disclosure/page.tsx          |    2 -
 app/components/DocsLayout.tsx                 |   10 +-
 app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx             |    2 +-
 app/components/SdkReference.tsx               |   20 +-
 app/components/SiteFooter.tsx                 |    4 +-
 app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx     |    6 +-
 app/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes/page.tsx     |    2 -
 app/concepts/page.tsx                         |   19 -
 app/get-started/agent/page.tsx                |    2 -
 app/get-started/cross-company/page.tsx        |    2 -
 app/get-started/local/page.tsx                |    2 -
 .../quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx               |    5 +-
 app/get-started/runtime/page.tsx              |    2 -
 app/get-started/verify/page.tsx               |    2 -
 app/guides/protect-rest-effect/page.tsx       |   42 -
 .../protect-rest-effect.mdx                   |   78 -
 app/integrations/page.tsx                     |   24 -
 app/lib/content-graph.ts                      |   23 +-
 app/lib/navigation.ts                         |   12 +-
 app/lib/page-graph.ts                         |    2 +-
 app/lib/sdk-languages.ts                      |    2 +-
 app/lib/site-tree.ts                          |  283 ++++
 app/operations/incident-response/page.tsx     |    8 -
 app/page.tsx                                  |   12 +-
 app/sdk/page.tsx                              |   17 -
 app/start/delegate-agent/page.tsx             |   17 -
 app/start/verify-receipt/page.tsx             |   17 -
 content/adoption-pages.json                   |  348 +++-
 content/agent-integration-pages.json          |  381 ++++-
 content/developer-pages.json                  |  352 +++-
 content/operations-pages.json                 |  375 ++++-
 content/pages.json                            | 1025 +++++++++---
 content/route-migration.json                  |  265 +++
 content/topic-landings.json                   |  448 ++++-
 package.json                                  |    8 +-
 public/agents.md                              |   10 +-
 .../{approved-plan.md => approved-plans.md}   |    0
 .../agents/{mcp-client.md => mcp/client.md}   |    0
 .../protect-server.md}                        |    0
 .../{delegate-one-tool.md => quickstart.md}   |    0
 .../{skills.md => skills-and-plugins.md}      |    0
 public/architecture.md                        |   10 -
 public/architecture/index.md                  |    4 -
 public/architecture/trust-boundaries/index.md |    8 -
 public/assurance.md                           |    8 +-
 public/authority.md                           |   10 +-
 .../execute.md}                               |    0
 public/authority/lifecycle.md                 |    2 +-
 .../model.md}                                 |    2 +-
 .../approvals.md}                             |    2 +-
 .../disclosure.md}                            |    2 +-
 public/concepts.md                            |   10 -
 public/concepts/index.md                      |    5 -
 public/developers.md                          |    4 +-
 public/{ => developers}/integrations.md       |    0
 .../integrations/capabilities.md              |    0
 .../integrations/cloud-iam.md}                |    0
 .../integrations/identity-and-trust.md}       |    0
 .../{ => developers}/integrations/policy.md   |    0
 .../integrations/profile-kit.md               |    0
 .../integrations/transport.md                 |    0
 public/get-started.md                         |    8 +-
 public/get-started/{adopt.md => adoption.md}  |    0
 .../adoption}/api-keys.md                     |    0
 .../adoption}/approvals.md                    |    0
 .../adoption}/capabilities.md                 |    0
 .../adoption}/cloud-iam.md                    |    0
 .../adoption}/cutover.md                      |    0
 .../adoption}/oauth-oidc.md                   |    0
 .../{adopt => get-started/adoption}/plan.md   |    0
 .../adoption}/policy-engines.md               |    0
 .../adoption}/shadow-mode.md                  |    0
 .../adoption}/signed-requests.md              |    0
 public/get-started/{ => paths}/agent.md       |    0
 .../{local.md => paths/application.md}        |    0
 .../get-started/{ => paths}/cross-company.md  |    0
 public/get-started/{ => paths}/runtime.md     |    0
 .../{verify.md => paths/verification.md}      |    0
 .../quickstarts/agent-delegation.md           |    2 +-
 .../quickstarts/approved-plan.md              |    2 +-
 .../quickstarts/identity-swap.md              |    2 +-
 .../quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md          |    2 +-
 .../quickstarts/offline-verification.md       |    2 +-
 .../{ => get-started}/quickstarts/recovery.md |    2 +-
 .../quickstarts/runtime-effect.md             |    2 +-
 public/guides/protect-rest-effect.md          |   14 -
 public/identity-trust.md                      |    6 +-
 public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md         |    2 +-
 public/integrations/index.md                  |    7 -
 public/llms-full.txt                          | 1451 ++++++++++++++++-
 public/llms.txt                               |   96 +-
 public/operations.md                          |    4 +-
 public/operations/{ => configure}/custody.md  |    0
 .../{ => configure}/durable-state.md          |    0
 .../{ => configure}/provider-gateways.md      |    0
 .../{ => configure}/trust-and-profiles.md     |    0
 public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md      |    2 +-
 .../{incident-response.md => incidents.md}    |    0
 public/reference-manifest.json                |    2 +-
 public/reference.md                           |    4 +-
 public/reference/sdk.md                       |   75 +
 public/reference/sdk/sections/create.md       |    6 +
 public/reference/sdk/sections/delegate.md     |    6 +
 public/reference/sdk/sections/execute.md      |    6 +
 public/reference/sdk/sections/introduction.md |   30 +
 public/reference/sdk/sections/resume.md       |    6 +
 public/reference/sdk/sections/verify.md       |    6 +
 public/sdk.md                                 |    8 -
 public/sdk/sections/create.md                 |    8 -
 public/sdk/sections/delegate.md               |    6 -
 public/sdk/sections/execute.md                |    8 -
 public/sdk/sections/introduction.md           |   29 -
 public/sdk/sections/resume.md                 |    9 -
 public/sdk/sections/verify.md                 |    6 -
 public/search-index.json                      |  603 ++++++-
 public/sitemap.xml                            |   88 +-
 public/start/delegate-agent.md                |   14 -
 public/start/verify-receipt.md                |   14 -
 schemas/content.ts                            |   18 +-
 schemas/docs-contract.ts                      |    9 +-
 tests/rendered-html.test.mjs                  |   18 +-
 tools/build-page-model/check.mjs              |    4 +-
 tools/lint-content/site-tree.mjs              |   48 +
 tools/render-markdown/check.mjs               |    4 +-
 tools/render-markdown/clean-generated.mjs     |   31 +
 .../render-markdown/generate-quickstarts.mjs  |    6 +-
 .../generate-sdk-reference.mjs                |   36 +
 .../render-markdown/generate-site-indexes.mjs |   49 +
 132 files changed, 5620 insertions(+), 1078 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 app/architecture/page.tsx
 delete mode 100644 app/architecture/trust-boundaries/page.tsx
 delete mode 100644 app/authority/approval-bound-plans/page.tsx
 delete mode 100644 app/authority/receipts-and-disclosure/page.tsx
 delete mode 100644 app/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes/page.tsx
 delete mode 100644 app/concepts/page.tsx
 delete mode 100644 app/get-started/agent/page.tsx
 delete mode 100644 app/get-started/cross-company/page.tsx
 delete mode 100644 app/get-started/local/page.tsx
 rename app/{ => get-started}/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx (67%)
 delete mode 100644 app/get-started/runtime/page.tsx
 delete mode 100644 app/get-started/verify/page.tsx
 delete mode 100644 app/guides/protect-rest-effect/page.tsx
 delete mode 100644 app/guides/protect-rest-effect/protect-rest-effect.mdx
 delete mode 100644 app/integrations/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/lib/site-tree.ts
 delete mode 100644 app/operations/incident-response/page.tsx
 delete mode 100644 app/sdk/page.tsx
 delete mode 100644 app/start/delegate-agent/page.tsx
 delete mode 100644 app/start/verify-receipt/page.tsx
 create mode 100644 content/route-migration.json
 rename public/agents/{approved-plan.md => approved-plans.md} (100%)
 rename public/agents/{mcp-client.md => mcp/client.md} (100%)
 rename public/agents/{protect-mcp-server.md => mcp/protect-server.md} (100%)
 rename public/agents/{delegate-one-tool.md => quickstart.md} (100%)
 rename public/agents/{skills.md => skills-and-plugins.md} (100%)
 delete mode 100644 public/architecture.md
 delete mode 100644 public/architecture/index.md
 delete mode 100644 public/architecture/trust-boundaries/index.md
 rename public/{architecture/trust-boundaries.md => authority/execute.md} (100%)
 rename public/{concepts/auths-in-15-minutes.md => authority/model.md} (91%)
 rename public/authority/{approval-bound-plans.md => plans/approvals.md} (91%)
 rename public/authority/{receipts-and-disclosure.md => receipts/disclosure.md} (92%)
 delete mode 100644 public/concepts.md
 delete mode 100644 public/concepts/index.md
 rename public/{ => developers}/integrations.md (100%)
 rename public/{ => developers}/integrations/capabilities.md (100%)
 rename public/{integrations/cloud.md => developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md} (100%)
 rename public/{integrations/identity-trust.md => developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md} (100%)
 rename public/{ => developers}/integrations/policy.md (100%)
 rename public/{ => developers}/integrations/profile-kit.md (100%)
 rename public/{ => developers}/integrations/transport.md (100%)
 rename public/get-started/{adopt.md => adoption.md} (100%)
 rename public/{adopt => get-started/adoption}/api-keys.md (100%)
 rename public/{adopt => get-started/adoption}/approvals.md (100%)
 rename public/{adopt => get-started/adoption}/capabilities.md (100%)
 rename public/{adopt => get-started/adoption}/cloud-iam.md (100%)
 rename public/{adopt => get-started/adoption}/cutover.md (100%)
 rename public/{adopt => get-started/adoption}/oauth-oidc.md (100%)
 rename public/{adopt => get-started/adoption}/plan.md (100%)
 rename public/{adopt => get-started/adoption}/policy-engines.md (100%)
 rename public/{adopt => get-started/adoption}/shadow-mode.md (100%)
 rename public/{adopt => get-started/adoption}/signed-requests.md (100%)
 rename public/get-started/{ => paths}/agent.md (100%)
 rename public/get-started/{local.md => paths/application.md} (100%)
 rename public/get-started/{ => paths}/cross-company.md (100%)
 rename public/get-started/{ => paths}/runtime.md (100%)
 rename public/get-started/{verify.md => paths/verification.md} (100%)
 rename public/{ => get-started}/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md (84%)
 rename public/{ => get-started}/quickstarts/approved-plan.md (85%)
 rename public/{ => get-started}/quickstarts/identity-swap.md (85%)
 rename public/{ => get-started}/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md (84%)
 rename public/{ => get-started}/quickstarts/offline-verification.md (84%)
 rename public/{ => get-started}/quickstarts/recovery.md (85%)
 rename public/{ => get-started}/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md (84%)
 delete mode 100644 public/guides/protect-rest-effect.md
 delete mode 100644 public/integrations/index.md
 rename public/operations/{ => configure}/custody.md (100%)
 rename public/operations/{ => configure}/durable-state.md (100%)
 rename public/operations/{ => configure}/provider-gateways.md (100%)
 rename public/operations/{ => configure}/trust-and-profiles.md (100%)
 rename public/operations/{incident-response.md => incidents.md} (100%)
 create mode 100644 public/reference/sdk.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/sdk/sections/create.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/sdk/sections/delegate.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/sdk/sections/execute.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/sdk/sections/introduction.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/sdk/sections/resume.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/sdk/sections/verify.md
 delete mode 100644 public/sdk.md
 delete mode 100644 public/sdk/sections/create.md
 delete mode 100644 public/sdk/sections/delegate.md
 delete mode 100644 public/sdk/sections/execute.md
 delete mode 100644 public/sdk/sections/introduction.md
 delete mode 100644 public/sdk/sections/resume.md
 delete mode 100644 public/sdk/sections/verify.md
 delete mode 100644 public/start/delegate-agent.md
 delete mode 100644 public/start/verify-receipt.md
 create mode 100644 tools/lint-content/site-tree.mjs
 create mode 100644 tools/render-markdown/clean-generated.mjs
 create mode 100644 tools/render-markdown/generate-sdk-reference.mjs
 create mode 100644 tools/render-markdown/generate-site-indexes.mjs

diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 1d66426..85636a4 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ The product contract is:
 ## Pages
 
 - `/` — main documentation landing page
-- `/guides/protect-rest-effect` — representative multi-language guide
+- `/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect` — representative multi-language quickstart
 
 ## Local development
 
diff --git a/app/architecture/page.tsx b/app/architecture/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 04e1408..0000000
--- a/app/architecture/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-import { JourneyPage } from "../components/JourneyPage";
-
-export default function ArchitecturePage() {
-  return <JourneyPage
-    eyebrow="Architecture"
-    title="Meaning stays in the native waist"
-    description="Rust owns canonical bytes and authorization semantics. SDKs project one product vocabulary. Transports and providers remain replaceable components."
-    source="/architecture/index.md"
-    steps={[
-      { title: "Applications describe intent", body: <p>Rust, TypeScript, and Python callers use the same five product verbs and domain profiles.</p> },
-      { title: "The native core decides", body: <p>Untrusted inputs are parsed into bounded types, verified, attenuated, and resolved into a closed outcome.</p> },
-      { title: "Closed gateways perform effects", body: <p>Provider credentials remain behind an executor boundary and become reachable only for an authorized sealed command.</p> },
-      { title: "Receipts carry evidence", body: <p>Portable receipts support local verification, bounded inspection, audit, recovery, and selective disclosure.</p> },
-    ]}
-    security={<p>Changing HTTP to Iroh, Ed25519 to another suite, or one cloud provider to another does not change what authorizes an effect.</p>}
-    next={{ href: "/operations", label: "Operate the runtime" }}
-  />;
-}
diff --git a/app/architecture/trust-boundaries/page.tsx b/app/architecture/trust-boundaries/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 3d760b6..0000000
--- a/app/architecture/trust-boundaries/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-import { Diagram, FailurePath, SecurityCallout } from "../../components/foundation";
-import { PageActions } from "../../components/PageActions";
-import { SiteFooter } from "../../components/SiteFooter";
-import { SiteHeader } from "../../components/SiteHeader";
-
-export default function TrustBoundariesPage() {
-  return <div className="site-frame"><SiteHeader compact /><main className="journey-main">
-    <p className="kicker">Architecture · trust boundaries</p><h1>Authorization before provider entry</h1>
-    <p className="hero-lede">Auths keeps identity, transport, authority, approval, custody, and execution distinct so success in one layer cannot silently authorize another.</p>
-    <PageActions source="/architecture/trust-boundaries/index.md" />
-    <Diagram description="An application describes exact intent. Native Auths verifies authority and reserves state. Only an authorized sealed command reaches the application-owned gateway and provider. A receipt returns along a separate evidence path.">
-      <div className="trust-flow"><span>Application intent</span><i>→</i><span>Native decision</span><i>→</i><span>Durable reservation</span><i>→</i><span>Closed gateway</span><i>→</i><span>Provider</span></div>
-    </Diagram>
-    <SecurityCallout><p>Transport authenticates or encrypts a channel. Identity establishes a principal. Approval records consent. None of these alone creates effect-capable authority.</p></SecurityCallout>
-    <FailurePath outcome="denied"><p>Available trustworthy facts prove the command is outside authority. The provider is not entered.</p></FailurePath>
-    <FailurePath outcome="indeterminate"><p>A required trustworthy fact, suite, status snapshot, or store is unavailable. The runtime does not guess.</p></FailurePath>
-    <FailurePath outcome="recoverable"><p>The provider may have observed the command but its final state is unknown. Resume or reconcile the original execution instead of retrying it as new.</p></FailurePath>
-  </main><SiteFooter /></div>;
-}
diff --git a/app/authority/approval-bound-plans/page.tsx b/app/authority/approval-bound-plans/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index a88d80a..0000000
--- a/app/authority/approval-bound-plans/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { SemanticTourPage } from "../../components/SemanticTourPage";
-export default function Page() { return <SemanticTourPage pageId="auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/authority/receipts-and-disclosure/page.tsx b/app/authority/receipts-and-disclosure/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 09de628..0000000
--- a/app/authority/receipts-and-disclosure/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { SemanticTourPage } from "../../components/SemanticTourPage";
-export default function Page() { return <SemanticTourPage pageId="auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/components/DocsLayout.tsx b/app/components/DocsLayout.tsx
index aae1631..8ac506a 100644
--- a/app/components/DocsLayout.tsx
+++ b/app/components/DocsLayout.tsx
@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@ export function DocsLayout({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) {
           </button>
         </div>
         <p>START</p>
-        <Link className="active" href="/guides/protect-rest-effect">Protect a REST effect</Link>
-        <Link href="/start/delegate-agent">Delegate to an agent</Link>
-        <Link href="/start/verify-receipt">Verify a receipt</Link>
+        <Link className="active" href="/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect">Protect a REST effect</Link>
+        <Link href="/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation">Delegate to an agent</Link>
+        <Link href="/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification">Verify a receipt</Link>
         <p>CONCEPTS</p>
-        <Link href="/concepts">Five nouns</Link>
-        <Link href="/architecture">Identity vs authority</Link>
+        <Link href="/authority/model">Five nouns</Link>
+        <Link href="/identity-trust/how-it-works">Identity vs authority</Link>
         <Link href="/operations">Outcomes and recovery</Link>
         <p>REFERENCE</p>
         <Link href="/reference/sdk">SDK reference</Link>
diff --git a/app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx b/app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx
index 8036d24..8f232ae 100644
--- a/app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx
+++ b/app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ export function QuickstartPage({ quickstart }: { quickstart: Quickstart }) {
         <p className="kicker">Quickstart · {quickstart.minutes} minutes</p>
         <h1>{quickstart.title}</h1>
         <p>{quickstart.description}</p>
-        <PageActions source={`/quickstarts/${quickstart.slug}.md`} />
+        <PageActions source={`/get-started/quickstarts/${quickstart.slug}.md`} />
         <div className="quickstart-meta"><span>Scenario <code>{quickstart.id}</code></span><span>Rust-owned semantics</span><Link href={`/downloads/quickstarts/${quickstart.slug}.json`} download>Download exact project ↓</Link></div>
       </header>
       <div className="quickstart-language"><span>Use one language for every step</span><SdkLanguageSelector language={language} onChange={choose} /></div>
diff --git a/app/components/SdkReference.tsx b/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
index 8791aab..624d431 100644
--- a/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ type Parameter = {
   description: string;
 };
 
-type ReferenceSection = {
+export type ReferenceSection = {
   id: string;
   navLabel: string;
   operation: string;
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ type ReferenceSection = {
   scenario: `auths.scenario.${string}/${number}`;
 };
 
-const sections: ReferenceSection[] = [
+export const sdkReferenceSections: readonly ReferenceSection[] = [
   {
     id: "create",
     navLabel: "Open a session",
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ result = verify(proof, action, context)`,
   },
 ];
 
-const installExamples: Record<SdkLanguage, string> = sdkInstallCommands;
+export const sdkInstallExamples: Record<SdkLanguage, string> = sdkInstallCommands;
 
 const navigationGroups: readonly ReferenceNavGroup[] = [
   {
@@ -261,15 +261,15 @@ const navigationGroups: readonly ReferenceNavGroup[] = [
   },
   {
     label: "AUTHORITY",
-    items: sections.slice(0, 2).map((section) => ({ id: section.id, label: section.navLabel })),
+    items: sdkReferenceSections.slice(0, 2).map((section) => ({ id: section.id, label: section.navLabel })),
   },
   {
     label: "EXECUTION",
-    items: sections.slice(2, 4).map((section) => ({ id: section.id, label: section.navLabel })),
+    items: sdkReferenceSections.slice(2, 4).map((section) => ({ id: section.id, label: section.navLabel })),
   },
   {
     label: "VERIFICATION",
-    items: sections.slice(4).map((section) => ({ id: section.id, label: section.navLabel })),
+    items: sdkReferenceSections.slice(4).map((section) => ({ id: section.id, label: section.navLabel })),
   },
 ];
 
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ export function SdkReference() {
             <p className="sdk-lede">
               Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify precise authority. Each language panel names the actual installed symbol for that SDK surface.
             </p>
-            <PageActions source="/sdk/sections/introduction.md" />
+            <PageActions source="/reference/sdk/sections/introduction.md" />
             <div className="sdk-note">
               <strong>One semantic core</strong>
               <p>The language changes. The meaning of authority does not.</p>
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ export function SdkReference() {
             <div className="sdk-code-sticky">
               <p className="sdk-code-eyebrow">INSTALL THE SDK</p>
               <SdkCodeExample
-                examples={installExamples}
+                examples={sdkInstallExamples}
                 isBash
                 label="Install"
                 language={language}
@@ -324,13 +324,13 @@ export function SdkReference() {
           </div>
         </section>
 
-        {sections.map((section) => (
+        {sdkReferenceSections.map((section) => (
           <section className="sdk-reference-section" id={section.id} data-reference-section key={section.id}>
             <div className="sdk-copy-column">
               <div className="sdk-operation"><span>{section.operation}</span><code>{section.symbols[language]}</code></div>
               <h2>{section.title}</h2>
               <p>{section.description}</p>
-              <SectionActions source={`/sdk/sections/${section.id}.md`} title={section.title} />
+              <SectionActions source={`/reference/sdk/sections/${section.id}.md`} title={section.title} />
               <TestedExample scenario={section.scenario}>
                 <span className="visually-hidden">Executable scenario {section.scenario}</span>
               </TestedExample>
diff --git a/app/components/SiteFooter.tsx b/app/components/SiteFooter.tsx
index 9d59905..82b4e1b 100644
--- a/app/components/SiteFooter.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SiteFooter.tsx
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ export function SiteFooter() {
           <p>Precise authority for an internet of people and agents.</p>
         </div>
         <div className="footer-links">
-          <Link href="/guides/protect-rest-effect">Quickstart</Link>
-          <Link href="/integrations">Integrations</Link>
+          <Link href="/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect">Quickstart</Link>
+          <Link href="/developers/integrations">Integrations</Link>
           <Link href="/operations">Operations</Link>
           <Link href="/assurance">Assurance</Link>
           <a href="https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof">GitHub</a>
diff --git a/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx b/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
index 6efc12d..a1ef105 100644
--- a/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
+++ b/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
@@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ const labels = {
 
 export function ContentSection({ section }: { section: ContentSectionModel }) {
   const scenarioRoutes: Record<string, string> = {
-    "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1": "/guides/protect-rest-effect",
-    "auths.scenario.delegation/1": "/start/delegate-agent",
-    "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1": "/start/verify-receipt",
+    "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1": "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect",
+    "auths.scenario.delegation/1": "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation",
+    "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1": "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification",
   };
   return (
     <section className="editorial-section" data-provenance={section.provenance} id={section.id}>
diff --git a/app/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes/page.tsx b/app/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 887f464..0000000
--- a/app/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { SemanticTourPage } from "../../components/SemanticTourPage";
-export default function Page() { return <SemanticTourPage pageId="auths.page.concepts.tour/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/concepts/page.tsx b/app/concepts/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index c57d7d0..0000000
--- a/app/concepts/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-import { JourneyPage } from "../components/JourneyPage";
-
-export default function ConceptsPage() {
-  return <JourneyPage
-    eyebrow="Concepts"
-    title="Five nouns carry the model"
-    description="Actor, action, authority, outcome, and receipt are enough to begin. Profiles, custody, lifecycle, and assurance appear only when you need their depth."
-    source="/concepts/index.md"
-    steps={[
-      { title: "Actor", body: <p>The person, workload, or agent asking to act. Identity establishes who; it does not itself grant authority.</p> },
-      { title: "Action", body: <p>The exact application effect, including bytes and domain-specific bounds that must not be silently changed.</p> },
-      { title: "Authority", body: <p>A proof-carrying, attenuable statement of what an actor may attempt and under which constraints.</p> },
-      { title: "Outcome", body: <p>A closed completed, denied, indeterminate, or recoverable result. Unknown provider state stays unknown.</p> },
-      { title: "Receipt", body: <p>Evidence binding authority, command, context, execution, and signer without forcing every viewer to see every detail.</p> },
-    ]}
-    security={<p>No noun silently stands in for another: identity is not authority, approval is not execution, and successful transport is not authorization.</p>}
-    next={{ href: "/architecture", label: "See the system boundary" }}
-  />;
-}
diff --git a/app/get-started/agent/page.tsx b/app/get-started/agent/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index a5a691e..0000000
--- a/app/get-started/agent/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../../components/EditorialGuidePage";
-export default function Page() { return <EditorialGuidePage pageId="auths.page.start.agent/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/get-started/cross-company/page.tsx b/app/get-started/cross-company/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index dc47e0d..0000000
--- a/app/get-started/cross-company/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../../components/EditorialGuidePage";
-export default function Page() { return <EditorialGuidePage pageId="auths.page.start.cross-company/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/get-started/local/page.tsx b/app/get-started/local/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 259bdac..0000000
--- a/app/get-started/local/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../../components/EditorialGuidePage";
-export default function Page() { return <EditorialGuidePage pageId="auths.page.start.local/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx b/app/get-started/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx
similarity index 67%
rename from app/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx
rename to app/get-started/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx
index b146c32..2da8dd4 100644
--- a/app/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx
+++ b/app/get-started/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { QuickstartPage } from "../../components/QuickstartPage";
-import { quickstartBySlug, quickstarts } from "../../lib/quickstarts";
+import { QuickstartPage } from "../../../components/QuickstartPage";
+import { quickstartBySlug, quickstarts } from "../../../lib/quickstarts";
 
 export function generateStaticParams() {
   return quickstarts.map((quickstart) => ({ slug: quickstart.slug }));
@@ -9,3 +9,4 @@ export default async function Page({ params }: { params: Promise<{ slug: string
   const { slug } = await params;
   return <QuickstartPage quickstart={quickstartBySlug(slug)} />;
 }
+
diff --git a/app/get-started/runtime/page.tsx b/app/get-started/runtime/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index b25be07..0000000
--- a/app/get-started/runtime/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../../components/EditorialGuidePage";
-export default function Page() { return <EditorialGuidePage pageId="auths.page.start.runtime/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/get-started/verify/page.tsx b/app/get-started/verify/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index e07653e..0000000
--- a/app/get-started/verify/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../../components/EditorialGuidePage";
-export default function Page() { return <EditorialGuidePage pageId="auths.page.start.verify/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/guides/protect-rest-effect/page.tsx b/app/guides/protect-rest-effect/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 05a5012..0000000
--- a/app/guides/protect-rest-effect/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-import type { Metadata } from "next";
-import Link from "next/link";
-import { CodeGroup } from "../../components/CodeGroup";
-import { DocsLayout } from "../../components/DocsLayout";
-import { GuideCallout, GuideStep, ProofSummary } from "../../components/GuideBlocks";
-import { PageActions } from "../../components/PageActions";
-import { SiteFooter } from "../../components/SiteFooter";
-import { SiteHeader } from "../../components/SiteHeader";
-import GuideContent from "./protect-rest-effect.mdx";
-
-export const metadata: Metadata = {
-  title: "Protect one REST effect",
-  description: "Create exact authority for one REST action and prove the outcome in Rust, TypeScript, or Python.",
-};
-
-export default function ProtectRestEffectPage() {
-  return (
-    <div className="site-frame guide-site">
-      <SiteHeader compact />
-      <DocsLayout>
-          <div className="breadcrumbs">
-            <Link href="/">Docs</Link><span>/</span><span>Start</span><span>/</span><strong>REST effect</strong>
-          </div>
-          <GuideContent
-            components={{
-              CodeGroup,
-              GuideCallout,
-              GuideStep,
-              PageActions,
-              ProofSummary,
-            }}
-          />
-          <div className="guide-next">
-            <span>NEXT GUIDE</span>
-            <strong>Delegate narrower authority to an agent</strong>
-            <span aria-hidden="true">→</span>
-          </div>
-      </DocsLayout>
-      <SiteFooter />
-    </div>
-  );
-}
diff --git a/app/guides/protect-rest-effect/protect-rest-effect.mdx b/app/guides/protect-rest-effect/protect-rest-effect.mdx
deleted file mode 100644
index ced10d2..0000000
--- a/app/guides/protect-rest-effect/protect-rest-effect.mdx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-<div className="guide-eyebrow"><span>10 MINUTE GUIDE</span><span>BEGINNER</span></div>
-
-# Protect one exact REST effect
-
-Give one support agent authority to issue one refund—within ten minutes—and prove the outcome without sharing a root credential.
-
-<PageActions source="/guides/protect-rest-effect.md" />
-
-<div className="guide-outcome">
-  <span>YOU WILL BUILD</span>
-  <strong>One-use authority for <code>POST /v1/refunds/:id</code></strong>
-  <small>No shared identity provider · No reusable API key · No policy server</small>
-</div>
-
-<GuideStep number="01" title="Install your SDK">
-  <div id="install" />
-  <p>Choose a language. Your selection follows you through every example on this page.</p>
-  <CodeGroup
-    filename="terminal"
-    isBash
-    snippets={[
-      { label: "Rust", language: "rust", code: "# Install the Rust SDK\ncargo add auths-sdk\n" },
-      { label: "TypeScript", language: "typescript", code: "# Install the TypeScript SDK\nnpm install @auths-dev/sdk\n" },
-      { label: "Python", language: "python", code: "# Install the Python SDK\npython -m pip install auths\n" }
-    ]}
-  />
-  <GuideCallout title="One semantic core">
-    <p>The SDKs are idiomatic language surfaces over the same Rust-owned meaning. Switching language does not switch authorization models.</p>
-  </GuideCallout>
-</GuideStep>
-
-<GuideStep number="02" title="Describe the exact effect">
-  <div id="describe" />
-  <p>Auths commits to the application bytes that matter: operation, resource, amount, and region. A changed byte is a different action.</p>
-  <CodeGroup
-    filename="refund"
-    snippets={[
-      { label: "Rust", language: "rust", code: "let action = RestAction::post(\"/v1/refunds/rf_82k\")?\n    .json(&Refund { amount: 4_200, currency: \"gbp\" })?\n    .in_region(\"eu-west\")?;\n\nlet authority = auths.create(actor, action)\n    .uses(1)\n    .expires_in(Duration::from_secs(600))\n    .issue()?;\n" },
-      { label: "TypeScript", language: "typescript", code: "const action = rest.post(\"/v1/refunds/rf_82k\", {\n  amount: 4200,\n  currency: \"gbp\",\n}).inRegion(\"eu-west\");\n\nconst authority = await auths.create({\n  actor, action, uses: 1, expiresIn: \"10m\",\n});\n" },
-      { label: "Python", language: "python", code: "action = rest.post(\"/v1/refunds/rf_82k\", json={\n    \"amount\": 4200,\n    \"currency\": \"gbp\",\n}).in_region(\"eu-west\")\n\nauthority = auths.create(\n    actor=actor, action=action, uses=1, expires_in=\"10m\"\n)\n" }
-    ]}
-  />
-  <GuideCallout kind="security" title="Authority is not a bearer API key">
-    <p>The authority is bound to this actor and this exact action. It cannot be reused for another refund, amount, route, or region.</p>
-  </GuideCallout>
-</GuideStep>
-
-<GuideStep number="03" title="Execute once">
-  <div id="execute" />
-  <p>Execution returns a closed outcome. Only <code>completed</code> means the effect is confirmed; <code>recoverable</code> means observe and resume rather than retry.</p>
-  <CodeGroup
-    filename="execute"
-    snippets={[
-      { label: "Rust", language: "rust", code: "match auths.execute(authority, action).await? {\n    Outcome::Completed { receipt } => save(receipt),\n    Outcome::Denied { code } => report(code),\n    Outcome::Recoverable { reference, .. } => queue_resume(reference),\n    Outcome::Indeterminate { code } => investigate(code),\n}\n" },
-      { label: "TypeScript", language: "typescript", code: "const outcome = await auths.execute({ authority, action });\n\nif (outcome.kind === \"completed\") save(outcome.receipt);\nif (outcome.kind === \"denied\") report(outcome.code);\nif (outcome.kind === \"recoverable\") queueResume(outcome.reference);\nif (outcome.kind === \"indeterminate\") investigate(outcome.code);\n" },
-      { label: "Python", language: "python", code: "outcome = await auths.execute(authority=authority, action=action)\n\nmatch outcome.kind:\n    case \"completed\": save(outcome.receipt)\n    case \"denied\": report(outcome.code)\n    case \"recoverable\": queue_resume(outcome.reference)\n    case \"indeterminate\": investigate(outcome.code)\n" }
-    ]}
-  />
-</GuideStep>
-
-<GuideStep number="04" title="Verify what Auths proved">
-  <div id="prove" />
-  <p>The default receipt view answers the operational question without exposing action bodies, credentials, or raw proof bytes.</p>
-  <ProofSummary />
-  <GuideCallout kind="success" title="The authority is spent">
-    <p>Replaying the same request returns <code>replay-detected</code>. Changing the amount or resource returns <code>commitment-mismatch</code>.</p>
-  </GuideCallout>
-</GuideStep>
-
-<section className="failure-section" id="failure-paths">
-  <p className="kicker">Failure paths</p>
-  <h2>Failures stay meaningfully different.</h2>
-  <div className="failure-grid">
-    <div><span>DENIED</span><strong>Replay detected</strong><p>The authority was already consumed. Do not execute again.</p></div>
-    <div><span>REJECTED</span><strong>Bytes changed</strong><p>The requested effect no longer matches the signed commitment.</p></div>
-    <div><span>RECOVERABLE</span><strong>Outcome unknown</strong><p>The provider may have acted. Observe, then resume—never retry blindly.</p></div>
-  </div>
-</section>
diff --git a/app/integrations/page.tsx b/app/integrations/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 2c13572..0000000
--- a/app/integrations/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-import { PageActions } from "../components/PageActions";
-import { SiteFooter } from "../components/SiteFooter";
-import { SiteHeader } from "../components/SiteHeader";
-
-const integrations = [
-  ["OAuth or OIDC", "User authentication and session context", "Exact machine authority, delegation, execution outcomes, and receipts"],
-  ["SPIFFE or SPIRE", "Workload identity and attestation", "What the identified workload may do to exact application bytes"],
-  ["Cedar, OPA, OpenFGA, or SpiceDB", "Context and application policy decisions", "Portable proof, attenuation, reservation, sealed execution, and evidence"],
-  ["AWS STS or cloud IAM", "Short-lived provider credentials and provider enforcement", "Keep credentials behind a gateway and bind their use to an Auths command"],
-  ["UCAN or Biscuit", "Delegable or attenuable authorization claims", "Profile-specific exact effects, lifecycle state, closed outcomes, and receipts where needed"],
-];
-
-export default function IntegrationsPage() {
-  return <div className="site-frame"><SiteHeader compact /><main className="journey-main integration-main">
-    <p className="kicker">Integrations</p><h1>Auths with the systems you already trust</h1>
-    <p className="hero-lede">Auths is an authority and execution-evidence layer. It composes with identity providers, policy engines, capability formats, cloud credentials, and transports instead of pretending to replace all of them.</p>
-    <PageActions source="/integrations/index.md" />
-    <table className="composition-table">
-      <caption className="visually-hidden">Integration ownership</caption>
-      <thead><tr><th>System</th><th>It owns</th><th>Auths can add</th></tr></thead>
-      <tbody>{integrations.map(([system, owns, adds]) => <tr key={system}><th scope="row">{system}</th><td>{owns}</td><td>{adds}</td></tr>)}</tbody>
-    </table>
-  </main><SiteFooter /></div>;
-}
diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
index 1752f2e..76df9f0 100644
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ import rawAgentIntegrationPages from "../../content/agent-integration-pages.json
 import rawAdoptionPages from "../../content/adoption-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import rawOperationsPages from "../../content/operations-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import rawContract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
-import { parseAuthoredPageSource, type AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
+import { parseAuthoredPageContent, type AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
+import { siteNodeById, siteTree } from "./site-tree.ts";
 
 type ProductContract = Readonly<{
   schema: string;
@@ -29,7 +30,19 @@ export function buildVerifiedPageGraph(pagesInput: unknown, contractInput: unkno
   if (contract?.schema !== "auths.docs.contract/1" || !/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(contract.digest)) {
     throw new TypeError("product contract is invalid");
   }
-  const pages = pagesInput.map(parseAuthoredPageSource);
+  const pages = pagesInput.map((input) => {
+    const content = parseAuthoredPageContent(input);
+    const route = siteNodeById(content.id);
+    return Object.freeze({
+      ...content,
+      path: route.path,
+      pageType: route.pageType,
+      section: route.section,
+      parent: route.parent,
+      navGroup: route.navGroup,
+      order: route.order,
+    });
+  });
   const pageIds = new Set<string>();
   const paths = new Set<string>();
   const operations = identitySet(contract.operations);
@@ -60,6 +73,12 @@ export function buildVerifiedPageGraph(pagesInput: unknown, contractInput: unkno
       }
     }
   }
+  const published = new Set(pages.map((page) => page.id));
+  for (const page of pages) {
+    if (page.parent !== null && !published.has(page.parent) && siteTree.every((candidate) => candidate.id !== page.parent)) {
+      throw new TypeError(`${page.id} has missing parent ${page.parent}`);
+    }
+  }
   return Object.freeze({ contractDigest: contract.digest, pages: Object.freeze(pages) });
 }
 
diff --git a/app/lib/navigation.ts b/app/lib/navigation.ts
index cb5f87c..90f6c25 100644
--- a/app/lib/navigation.ts
+++ b/app/lib/navigation.ts
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-import rawNavigation from "../../content/navigation.json" with { type: "json" };
 import type { AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
 import { verifiedPageGraph } from "./content-graph.ts";
+import { siteSections, siteTree } from "./site-tree.ts";
 
 function resolve(ids: readonly string[]): readonly AuthoredPageSource[] {
   if (new Set(ids).size !== ids.length) throw new TypeError("navigation contains duplicate pages");
@@ -11,5 +11,11 @@ function resolve(ids: readonly string[]): readonly AuthoredPageSource[] {
   }));
 }
 
-export const primaryNavigation = resolve(rawNavigation.primary);
-export const utilityNavigation = resolve(rawNavigation.utilities);
+const root = (section: (typeof siteSections)[number]) => {
+  const item = siteTree.find((candidate) => candidate.section === section && candidate.parent === null);
+  if (!item) throw new TypeError(`missing navigation root ${section}`);
+  return item.id;
+};
+
+export const primaryNavigation = resolve(["get-started", "identity-trust", "authority", "agents", "operations", "developers"].map((section) => root(section as (typeof siteSections)[number])));
+export const utilityNavigation = resolve([root("reference")]);
diff --git a/app/lib/page-graph.ts b/app/lib/page-graph.ts
index 2695cce..d5a54e8 100644
--- a/app/lib/page-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/page-graph.ts
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { verifiedPageGraph } from "./content-graph.ts";
 export const pages: readonly PageModel[] = Object.freeze(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => Object.freeze({
   id: page.id,
   path: page.path,
-  kind: page.kind,
+  kind: page.pageType,
   title: page.title,
   description: page.description,
   operations: page.uses.operations,
diff --git a/app/lib/sdk-languages.ts b/app/lib/sdk-languages.ts
index ae7dcee..660ba11 100644
--- a/app/lib/sdk-languages.ts
+++ b/app/lib/sdk-languages.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { parseBashSnippet, type BashSnippet } from "./bash-snippets";
+import { parseBashSnippet, type BashSnippet } from "./bash-snippets.ts";
 
 export type SdkLanguage = "rust" | "typescript" | "python";
 
diff --git a/app/lib/site-tree.ts b/app/lib/site-tree.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad1b76b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/site-tree.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+export const siteSections = [
+  "home",
+  "get-started",
+  "identity-trust",
+  "authority",
+  "agents",
+  "operations",
+  "developers",
+  "reference",
+  "assurance",
+] as const;
+
+export type SiteSection = (typeof siteSections)[number];
+
+export const pageTypes = ["landing", "concept", "guide", "quickstart", "integration", "reference", "runbook"] as const;
+export type PageType = (typeof pageTypes)[number];
+
+type TreeInput = Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  path: `/${string}` | "/";
+  title: string;
+  type: PageType;
+  group: string;
+  children?: readonly TreeInput[];
+}>;
+
+export type SiteTreeNode = Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  path: `/${string}` | "/";
+  title: string;
+  pageType: PageType;
+  section: SiteSection;
+  parent: string | null;
+  navGroup: string;
+  order: number;
+}>;
+
+const node = (
+  id: string,
+  path: `/${string}` | "/",
+  title: string,
+  type: PageType,
+  group: string,
+  children: readonly TreeInput[] = [],
+): TreeInput => ({ id, path, title, type, group, children });
+
+const trees: Readonly<Record<SiteSection, TreeInput>> = {
+  home: node("auths.page.home/1", "/", "Auths documentation", "landing", "Home"),
+  "get-started": node("auths.page.start/1", "/get-started", "Get started", "landing", "Get started", [
+    node("auths.page.start.prerequisites/1", "/get-started/prerequisites", "Prerequisites", "guide", "Choose a path"),
+    node("auths.page.start.choose/1", "/get-started/choose", "Choose your path", "guide", "Choose a path"),
+    node("auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1", "/get-started/quickstarts", "Quickstarts", "landing", "Quickstarts", [
+      node("auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1", "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect", "Local REST effect", "quickstart", "Quickstarts"),
+      node("auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1", "/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect", "Runtime effect", "quickstart", "Quickstarts"),
+      node("auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1", "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation", "Agent delegation", "quickstart", "Quickstarts"),
+      node("auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1", "/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan", "Approved plan", "quickstart", "Quickstarts"),
+      node("auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1", "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification", "Offline verification", "quickstart", "Quickstarts"),
+      node("auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1", "/get-started/quickstarts/recovery", "Recovery", "quickstart", "Quickstarts"),
+      node("auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1", "/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap", "Identity swap", "quickstart", "Quickstarts"),
+    ]),
+    node("auths.page.get-started.paths/1", "/get-started/paths", "Outcome paths", "landing", "Choose a path", [
+      node("auths.page.start.local/1", "/get-started/paths/application", "Protect an application effect", "guide", "Outcome paths"),
+      node("auths.page.start.agent/1", "/get-started/paths/agent", "Delegate to an agent", "guide", "Outcome paths"),
+      node("auths.page.start.runtime/1", "/get-started/paths/runtime", "Deploy the runtime", "guide", "Outcome paths"),
+      node("auths.page.start.verify/1", "/get-started/paths/verification", "Verify without executing", "guide", "Outcome paths"),
+      node("auths.page.start.cross-company/1", "/get-started/paths/cross-company", "Cross-company authority", "guide", "Outcome paths"),
+    ]),
+    node("auths.page.start.evaluate/1", "/get-started/evaluate", "Evaluate Auths", "guide", "Next steps"),
+    node("auths.page.start.adopt/1", "/get-started/adoption", "Adopt incrementally", "landing", "Adopt incrementally", [
+      node("auths.page.adopt.plan/1", "/get-started/adoption/plan", "Plan adoption", "guide", "Adopt incrementally"),
+      node("auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1", "/get-started/adoption/signed-requests", "Signed requests", "integration", "Adopt incrementally"),
+      node("auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1", "/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc", "OAuth and OIDC", "integration", "Adopt incrementally"),
+      node("auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1", "/get-started/adoption/api-keys", "API keys", "integration", "Adopt incrementally"),
+      node("auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1", "/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam", "Cloud IAM", "integration", "Adopt incrementally"),
+      node("auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1", "/get-started/adoption/policy-engines", "Policy engines", "integration", "Adopt incrementally"),
+      node("auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1", "/get-started/adoption/capabilities", "Capability systems", "integration", "Adopt incrementally"),
+      node("auths.page.adopt.approvals/1", "/get-started/adoption/approvals", "Approval systems", "integration", "Adopt incrementally"),
+      node("auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1", "/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode", "Shadow mode", "guide", "Adopt incrementally"),
+      node("auths.page.adopt.cutover/1", "/get-started/adoption/cutover", "Cut over one effect", "guide", "Adopt incrementally"),
+    ]),
+  ]),
+  "identity-trust": node("auths.page.identity-trust/1", "/identity-trust", "Identity & trust", "landing", "Identity & trust", [
+    node("auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1", "/identity-trust/how-it-works", "How identity and trust fit", "concept", "Understand"),
+    node("auths.page.identity-trust.sources/1", "/identity-trust/identity-sources", "Identity sources", "landing", "Identity sources", [
+      node("auths.page.identity-trust.sources.raw-keys/1", "/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys", "Raw public keys", "guide", "Identity sources"),
+      node("auths.page.identity-trust.sources.oauth-oidc/1", "/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc", "OAuth and OIDC", "integration", "Identity sources"),
+      node("auths.page.identity-trust.sources.spiffe/1", "/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe", "SPIFFE", "integration", "Identity sources"),
+      node("auths.page.identity-trust.sources.resolvers/1", "/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers", "Application resolvers", "integration", "Identity sources"),
+    ]),
+    node("auths.page.identity-trust.suites/1", "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites", "Cryptographic suites", "landing", "Cryptography", [
+      node("auths.page.identity-trust.suites.ed25519/1", "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519", "Ed25519", "guide", "Cryptography"),
+      node("auths.page.identity-trust.suites.p256/1", "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256", "P-256", "guide", "Cryptography"),
+      node("auths.page.identity-trust.suites.custom/1", "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum", "Custom and post-quantum suites", "guide", "Cryptography"),
+    ]),
+    node("auths.page.identity-trust.policy/1", "/identity-trust/trust-policy", "Trust policy", "concept", "Operate trust"),
+    node("auths.page.identity-trust.exchange/1", "/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity", "Exchange public identity", "guide", "Operate trust"),
+    node("auths.page.identity-trust.rotation/1", "/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation", "Key and root rotation", "guide", "Operate trust"),
+    node("auths.page.identity-trust.context/1", "/identity-trust/verification-context", "Verification context", "concept", "Operate trust"),
+    node("auths.page.identity-trust.testing/1", "/identity-trust/testing", "Test identity and trust", "guide", "Test"),
+  ]),
+  authority: node("auths.page.authority/1", "/authority", "Authority", "landing", "Authority", [
+    node("auths.page.concepts.tour/1", "/authority/model", "Authority model", "concept", "Model"),
+    node("auths.page.authority.create/1", "/authority/create", "Create", "guide", "Author and narrow"),
+    node("auths.page.authority.constraints/1", "/authority/constraints", "Constraints", "concept", "Author and narrow"),
+    node("auths.page.authority.delegate/1", "/authority/delegate", "Delegate", "guide", "Author and narrow", [
+      node("auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1", "/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain", "Depth and chain", "concept", "Author and narrow"),
+      node("auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1", "/authority/delegate/widening-failures", "Widening failures", "guide", "Author and narrow"),
+    ]),
+    node("auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1", "/authority/lifecycle", "Lifecycle", "landing", "Lifecycle", [
+      node("auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1", "/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry", "Validity and expiry", "concept", "Lifecycle"),
+      node("auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1", "/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status", "Revocation and status", "concept", "Lifecycle"),
+      node("auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1", "/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay", "Uses and replay", "concept", "Lifecycle"),
+      node("auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1", "/authority/lifecycle/budgets", "Budgets", "concept", "Lifecycle"),
+    ]),
+    node("auths.page.authority.plans/1", "/authority/plans", "Plans", "landing", "Lifecycle", [
+      node("auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1", "/authority/plans/approvals", "Transaction-bound approvals", "guide", "Lifecycle"),
+    ]),
+    node("auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1", "/authority/execute", "Execute", "guide", "Execute and recover"),
+    node("auths.page.authority.resume/1", "/authority/resume", "Resume", "guide", "Execute and recover"),
+    node("auths.page.authority.verify/1", "/authority/verify", "Verify", "guide", "Verify and inspect"),
+    node("auths.page.authority.receipts/1", "/authority/receipts", "Receipts", "landing", "Verify and inspect", [
+      node("auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1", "/authority/receipts/disclosure", "Bounded disclosure", "guide", "Verify and inspect"),
+    ]),
+    node("auths.page.authority.profiles/1", "/authority/profiles", "Profiles", "concept", "Profiles"),
+  ]),
+  agents: node("auths.page.agents/1", "/agents", "Agents", "landing", "Agents", [
+    node("auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1", "/agents/how-auths-works", "How Auths works for agents", "concept", "Start"),
+    node("auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1", "/agents/quickstart", "Delegate one tool", "quickstart", "Start"),
+    node("auths.page.agents.delegation/1", "/agents/delegation", "Agent delegation", "guide", "Delegate"),
+    node("auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1", "/agents/approved-plans", "Approved plans", "guide", "Delegate"),
+    node("auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1", "/agents/multi-agent", "Multi-agent handoffs", "guide", "Delegate"),
+    node("auths.page.agents.mcp/1", "/agents/mcp", "MCP", "landing", "MCP", [
+      node("auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1", "/agents/mcp/client", "MCP client", "guide", "MCP"),
+      node("auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1", "/agents/mcp/protect-server", "Protect an MCP server", "guide", "MCP"),
+      node("auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1", "/agents/mcp/tool-profiles", "Tool profiles", "guide", "MCP"),
+      node("auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1", "/agents/mcp/transport-boundary", "Transport boundary", "concept", "MCP"),
+    ]),
+    node("auths.page.agents.identity/1", "/agents/identity", "Agent identity", "integration", "Compose"),
+    node("auths.page.agents.skills/1", "/agents/skills-and-plugins", "Skills and plugins", "integration", "Compose"),
+    node("auths.page.agents.production/1", "/agents/production-patterns", "Production patterns", "guide", "Operate and test"),
+    node("auths.page.agents.testing/1", "/agents/testing", "Test agent authority", "guide", "Operate and test"),
+  ]),
+  operations: node("auths.page.operations.runtime/1", "/operations", "Production operations", "landing", "Operations", [
+    node("auths.page.operations.evaluate/1", "/operations/evaluate-locally", "Evaluate locally", "guide", "Deploy"),
+    node("auths.page.operations.deploy/1", "/operations/deploy-runtime", "Deploy the runtime", "guide", "Deploy"),
+    node("auths.page.operations.configure/1", "/operations/configure", "Configure", "landing", "Configure", [
+      node("auths.page.operations.state/1", "/operations/configure/durable-state", "Durable state", "guide", "Configure"),
+      node("auths.page.operations.custody/1", "/operations/configure/custody", "Custody", "guide", "Configure"),
+      node("auths.page.operations.trust/1", "/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles", "Trust and profiles", "guide", "Configure"),
+      node("auths.page.operations.gateways/1", "/operations/configure/provider-gateways", "Provider gateways", "guide", "Configure"),
+    ]),
+    node("auths.page.operations.observability/1", "/operations/observability", "Observability", "guide", "Observe"),
+    node("auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1", "/operations/execution-lifecycle", "Execution lifecycle", "concept", "Recover"),
+    node("auths.page.operations.recovery/1", "/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation", "Recovery and reconciliation", "guide", "Recover"),
+    node("auths.page.operations.backup/1", "/operations/backup-and-restore", "Backup and restore", "guide", "Maintain"),
+    node("auths.page.operations.upgrade/1", "/operations/upgrade-and-rollback", "Upgrade and rollback", "guide", "Maintain"),
+    node("auths.page.operations.receipts/1", "/operations/receipt-retention", "Receipt retention", "guide", "Maintain"),
+    node("auths.page.operations.security/1", "/operations/security-checklist", "Security checklist", "guide", "Maintain"),
+    node("auths.page.operations.incidents/1", "/operations/incidents", "Incident response", "landing", "Incident response", [
+      node("auths.page.operations.incidents.state-loss/1", "/operations/incidents/state-loss", "State loss", "runbook", "Incident response"),
+      node("auths.page.operations.incidents.signer-outage/1", "/operations/incidents/signer-outage", "Signer outage", "runbook", "Incident response"),
+      node("auths.page.operations.incidents.trust-root/1", "/operations/incidents/trust-root-error", "Trust-root error", "runbook", "Incident response"),
+      node("auths.page.operations.incidents.provider-unknown/1", "/operations/incidents/provider-unknown", "Provider unknown", "runbook", "Incident response"),
+      node("auths.page.operations.incidents.disclosure/1", "/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure", "Receipt disclosure", "runbook", "Incident response"),
+      node("auths.page.operations.incidents.credential/1", "/operations/incidents/compromised-credential", "Compromised credential", "runbook", "Incident response"),
+    ]),
+  ]),
+  developers: node("auths.page.developers/1", "/developers", "Developers", "landing", "Developers", [
+    node("auths.page.developers.quickstarts/1", "/developers/quickstarts", "Quickstarts", "landing", "Start building"),
+    node("auths.page.developers.sdks/1", "/developers/sdks", "SDKs", "landing", "SDKs", [
+      node("auths.page.developers.sdks.rust/1", "/developers/sdks/rust", "Rust", "guide", "SDKs"),
+      node("auths.page.developers.sdks.typescript/1", "/developers/sdks/typescript", "TypeScript", "guide", "SDKs"),
+      node("auths.page.developers.sdks.python/1", "/developers/sdks/python", "Python", "guide", "SDKs"),
+      node("auths.page.developers.sdks.parity/1", "/developers/sdks/parity", "SDK parity", "reference", "SDKs"),
+    ]),
+    node("auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1", "/developers/runtime-api", "Runtime API", "guide", "Runtime and CLI"),
+    node("auths.page.developers.cli/1", "/developers/cli", "CLI", "guide", "Runtime and CLI"),
+    node("auths.page.developers.testing/1", "/developers/testing", "Testing", "guide", "Test and debug"),
+    node("auths.page.developers.errors/1", "/developers/errors", "Outcomes and errors", "reference", "Test and debug"),
+    node("auths.page.developers.versioning/1", "/developers/versioning", "Versioning", "reference", "Releases"),
+    node("auths.page.integrations.composition/1", "/developers/integrations", "Integrations", "landing", "Integrate and extend", [
+      node("auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1", "/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust", "Identity and trust", "integration", "Integrate and extend"),
+      node("auths.page.integrations.policy/1", "/developers/integrations/policy", "Policy", "integration", "Integrate and extend"),
+      node("auths.page.integrations.cloud/1", "/developers/integrations/cloud-iam", "Cloud IAM", "integration", "Integrate and extend"),
+      node("auths.page.integrations.transport/1", "/developers/integrations/transport", "Transport", "integration", "Integrate and extend"),
+      node("auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1", "/developers/integrations/capabilities", "Capabilities", "integration", "Integrate and extend"),
+      node("auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1", "/developers/integrations/profile-kit", "Profile kit", "integration", "Integrate and extend"),
+    ]),
+    node("auths.page.developers.extensions/1", "/developers/extension-kits", "Extension kits", "guide", "Integrate and extend"),
+    node("auths.page.developers.examples/1", "/developers/examples", "Examples", "landing", "Integrate and extend"),
+    node("auths.page.developers.releases/1", "/developers/releases", "Releases", "reference", "Releases"),
+  ]),
+  reference: node("auths.page.reference/1", "/reference", "Reference", "landing", "Reference", [
+    node("auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "/reference/sdk", "SDK reference", "reference", "SDK", [
+      node("auths.page.reference.sdk.rust/1", "/reference/sdk/rust", "Rust SDK", "reference", "SDK"),
+      node("auths.page.reference.sdk.typescript/1", "/reference/sdk/typescript", "TypeScript SDK", "reference", "SDK"),
+      node("auths.page.reference.sdk.python/1", "/reference/sdk/python", "Python SDK", "reference", "SDK"),
+    ]),
+    node("auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "/reference/runtime-api", "Runtime API", "reference", "Runtime"),
+    node("auths.page.reference.cli/1", "/reference/cli", "CLI", "reference", "Lookup"),
+    node("auths.page.reference.profiles/1", "/reference/profiles", "Profiles", "reference", "Lookup"),
+    node("auths.page.reference.errors/1", "/reference/errors", "Errors", "reference", "Lookup"),
+    node("auths.page.reference.schemas/1", "/reference/schemas", "Schemas", "reference", "Lookup"),
+    node("auths.page.reference.evidence/1", "/reference/evidence", "Evidence", "reference", "Lookup"),
+    node("auths.page.reference.manifest/1", "/reference/manifest.json", "Reference manifest", "reference", "Machine readable"),
+  ]),
+  assurance: node("auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "/assurance", "Assurance", "landing", "Assurance", [
+    node("auths.page.assurance.semantics/1", "/assurance/semantics", "Semantics", "concept", "Claims"),
+    node("auths.page.assurance.authority/1", "/assurance/authority", "Authority", "concept", "Claims"),
+    node("auths.page.assurance.execution/1", "/assurance/execution", "Execution", "concept", "Claims"),
+    node("auths.page.assurance.disclosure/1", "/assurance/disclosure", "Disclosure", "concept", "Claims"),
+    node("auths.page.assurance.cross-language/1", "/assurance/cross-language", "Cross-language", "reference", "Evidence"),
+    node("auths.page.assurance.formal/1", "/assurance/formal", "Formal", "reference", "Evidence"),
+    node("auths.page.assurance.adversarial/1", "/assurance/adversarial", "Adversarial", "reference", "Evidence"),
+    node("auths.page.assurance.supply-chain/1", "/assurance/supply-chain", "Supply chain", "reference", "Evidence"),
+    node("auths.page.assurance.limitations/1", "/assurance/limitations", "Limitations", "concept", "Limits"),
+  ]),
+};
+
+const identity = /^[a-z0-9.-]+\/[1-9][0-9]*$/;
+
+function flatten(section: SiteSection, input: TreeInput, parent: string | null, order: number): SiteTreeNode[] {
+  const current: SiteTreeNode = Object.freeze({
+    id: input.id,
+    path: input.path,
+    title: input.title,
+    pageType: input.type,
+    section,
+    parent,
+    navGroup: input.group,
+    order,
+  });
+  return [current, ...(input.children ?? []).flatMap((child, index) => flatten(section, child, input.id, index))];
+}
+
+const nodes = siteSections.flatMap((section) => flatten(section, trees[section], null, 0));
+const ids = new Set<string>();
+const paths = new Set<string>();
+for (const item of nodes) {
+  if (!identity.test(item.id)) throw new TypeError(`invalid page identity ${item.id}`);
+  if (ids.has(item.id)) throw new TypeError(`duplicate page identity ${item.id}`);
+  if (paths.has(item.path)) throw new TypeError(`duplicate canonical path ${item.path}`);
+  ids.add(item.id);
+  paths.add(item.path);
+}
+
+export const siteTree: readonly SiteTreeNode[] = Object.freeze(nodes);
+
+export function siteNodeById(id: string): SiteTreeNode {
+  const item = siteTree.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id);
+  if (!item) throw new TypeError(`unknown site page ${id}`);
+  return item;
+}
+
+export function siteNodeByPath(path: string): SiteTreeNode {
+  const normalized = path.length > 1 && path.endsWith("/") ? path.slice(0, -1) : path;
+  const item = siteTree.find((candidate) => candidate.path === normalized);
+  if (!item) throw new TypeError(`unknown site path ${normalized}`);
+  return item;
+}
+
+export function ancestors(id: string): readonly SiteTreeNode[] {
+  const result: SiteTreeNode[] = [];
+  let current = siteNodeById(id);
+  while (current.parent) {
+    current = siteNodeById(current.parent);
+    result.unshift(current);
+  }
+  return Object.freeze(result);
+}
+
+export function descendants(id: string): readonly SiteTreeNode[] {
+  const result: SiteTreeNode[] = [];
+  const visit = (parent: string) => {
+    for (const child of siteTree.filter((candidate) => candidate.parent === parent).sort((left, right) => left.order - right.order)) {
+      result.push(child);
+      visit(child.id);
+    }
+  };
+  visit(id);
+  return Object.freeze(result);
+}
+
diff --git a/app/operations/incident-response/page.tsx b/app/operations/incident-response/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 026a0d3..0000000
--- a/app/operations/incident-response/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-import { PageActions } from "../../components/PageActions";
-import { SiteFooter } from "../../components/SiteFooter";
-import { SiteHeader } from "../../components/SiteHeader";
-import { runbooks } from "../../lib/runbooks";
-
-export default function Page() {
-  return <div className="site-frame"><SiteHeader compact /><main className="editorial-page"><header className="editorial-hero"><p className="kicker">Operations</p><h1>Incident response runbooks</h1><p>Stop, preserve evidence, reconcile, recover, and escalate without widening authority.</p><PageActions source="/operations/incident-response.md" /></header><div className="runbook-grid">{runbooks.map((runbook) => <article id={runbook.id} key={runbook.id}><div><span>{runbook.severity}</span><h2>{runbook.title}</h2></div><dl><div><dt>Stop</dt><dd>{runbook.stop}</dd></div><div><dt>Observe</dt><dd>{runbook.observe}</dd></div><div><dt>Recover</dt><dd>{runbook.recover}</dd></div><div><dt>Never</dt><dd>{runbook.never}</dd></div></dl></article>)}</div></main><SiteFooter /></div>;
-}
diff --git a/app/page.tsx b/app/page.tsx
index 3d20446..37ca1f3 100644
--- a/app/page.tsx
+++ b/app/page.tsx
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ const starts = [
     title: "Protect one API effect",
     description:
       "Give a caller authority for one exact action, then reject replay or changed bytes.",
-    href: "/guides/protect-rest-effect",
+    href: "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect",
     cta: "Start the 10-minute guide",
   },
   {
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ const starts = [
     title: "Delegate without widening",
     description:
       "Let an agent do less than its parent—bounded by action, time, uses, and depth.",
-    href: "/start/delegate-agent",
+    href: "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation",
     cta: "Delegate to an agent",
   },
   {
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ const starts = [
     title: "Verify what happened",
     description:
       "Read a safe receipt summary, then disclose details only to an authorized viewer.",
-    href: "/start/verify-receipt",
+    href: "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification",
     cta: "Verify a receipt",
   },
 ];
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ export default function Home() {
               actually happened.
             </p>
             <div className="hero-actions">
-              <Link className="button button-primary" href="/guides/protect-rest-effect">
+              <Link className="button button-primary" href="/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect">
                 Protect your first effect
                 <span aria-hidden="true">↗</span>
               </Link>
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ export default function Home() {
                 Begin with five verbs. Descend into lifecycle, custody, profiles,
                 and formal evidence without changing vocabulary or switching products.
               </p>
-              <Link className="text-link text-link-light" href="/guides/protect-rest-effect">
+              <Link className="text-link text-link-light" href="/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect">
                 See progressive disclosure in practice <span aria-hidden="true">↗</span>
               </Link>
             </div>
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ export default function Home() {
           <p className="kicker">Ten minutes to first proof</p>
           <h2>Protect one real application effect.</h2>
           <p>Use your preferred SDK. The semantics stay in the Auths core.</p>
-          <Link className="button button-primary" href="/guides/protect-rest-effect">
+          <Link className="button button-primary" href="/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect">
             Open the guide <span aria-hidden="true">↗</span>
           </Link>
         </section>
diff --git a/app/sdk/page.tsx b/app/sdk/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 063bdf6..0000000
--- a/app/sdk/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-import type { Metadata } from "next";
-import { SdkReference } from "../components/SdkReference";
-import { SiteHeader } from "../components/SiteHeader";
-
-export const metadata: Metadata = {
-  title: "SDK Reference",
-  description: "Reference the Auths create, delegate, execute, and verify operations across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.",
-};
-
-export default function SdkReferencePage() {
-  return (
-    <div className="site-frame sdk-site">
-      <SiteHeader compact />
-      <SdkReference />
-    </div>
-  );
-}
diff --git a/app/start/delegate-agent/page.tsx b/app/start/delegate-agent/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 59ebf08..0000000
--- a/app/start/delegate-agent/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-import { JourneyPage } from "../../components/JourneyPage";
-
-export default function DelegateAgentPage() {
-  return <JourneyPage
-    eyebrow="Start · agent builders"
-    title="Delegate without widening"
-    description="Give an agent a smaller, shorter-lived piece of authority. It cannot turn that authority into something broader."
-    source="/start/delegate-agent.md"
-    steps={[
-      { title: "Describe the parent boundary", body: <p>Name the exact actions, resources, audience, expiry, uses, and delegation depth already held by the parent.</p> },
-      { title: "Choose a narrower child boundary", body: <p>Remove actions or tighten bounds. Auths rejects any field that would widen the parent authority.</p> },
-      { title: "Execute with the child", body: <p>The child agent presents its delegated proof. The verifier checks the complete chain before a provider credential is reached.</p> },
-    ]}
-    security={<p>Delegation is attenuation, not role assignment. A valid child proof still cannot authorize bytes outside the exact inherited boundary.</p>}
-    next={{ href: "/start/verify-receipt", label: "Verify what happened" }}
-  />;
-}
diff --git a/app/start/verify-receipt/page.tsx b/app/start/verify-receipt/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 6b16a2a..0000000
--- a/app/start/verify-receipt/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-import { JourneyPage } from "../../components/JourneyPage";
-
-export default function VerifyReceiptPage() {
-  return <JourneyPage
-    eyebrow="Start · operators"
-    title="Verify what happened"
-    description="Check cryptographic evidence locally, begin with an opaque or safe summary view, and disclose sensitive detail only to an authorized viewer."
-    source="/start/verify-receipt.md"
-    steps={[
-      { title: "Load untrusted receipt bytes", body: <p>Receipt input is ordinary bounded data until native parsing and signature verification succeeds.</p> },
-      { title: "Verify commitments and outcome", body: <p>Bind the receipt to authority, command, context, plan, signer, and observed execution outcome.</p> },
-      { title: "Select an authorized view", body: <p>Unauthorized viewers receive an opaque projection. Summary and full projections require explicit disclosure material.</p> },
-    ]}
-    security={<p>Transport encryption protects data in motion. Receipt disclosure separately controls what verified information a caller may learn after delivery.</p>}
-    next={{ href: "/concepts", label: "Understand the five nouns" }}
-  />;
-}
diff --git a/content/adoption-pages.json b/content/adoption-pages.json
index b50b4a0..76db354 100644
--- a/content/adoption-pages.json
+++ b/content/adoption-pages.json
@@ -1,66 +1,342 @@
 [
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.start.adopt/1", "path": "/get-started/adopt", "kind": "guide", "title": "Adopt Auths incrementally", "description": "Protect one high-value effect beside the systems you already operate.", "depth": "start", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "path", "title": "Compose before replacing", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Keep your identity provider, policy engine, cloud IAM, transport, and provider gateway. Add Auths to one exact effect, compare decisions without effects, then enforce at the existing gateway.", "Expand one dimension at a time only after success, denial, uncertainty, and rollback are observable."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.start.adopt/1",
+    "title": "Adopt Auths incrementally",
+    "description": "Protect one high-value effect beside the systems you already operate.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "path",
+        "title": "Compose before replacing",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Keep your identity provider, policy engine, cloud IAM, transport, and provider gateway. Add Auths to one exact effect, compare decisions without effects, then enforce at the existing gateway.",
+          "Expand one dimension at a time only after success, denial, uncertainty, and rollback are observable."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.plan/1", "path": "/adopt/plan", "kind": "guide", "title": "Plan an Auths adoption", "description": "Inventory effects and boundaries without collecting credentials or unnecessary business data.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.plan/1",
+    "title": "Plan an Auths adoption",
+    "description": "Inventory effects and boundaries without collecting credentials or unnecessary business data.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "inventory", "title": "Inventory ownership, not secret values", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Record the effect entry point, actor source, existing roles or scopes, credential location, approval owner, replay behavior, audit evidence, and unknown-outcome handling. Record classifications and references—not tokens, private keys, raw payloads, or full receipts."] },
-      { "id": "sequence", "title": "Move through reversible phases", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Inventory, model, verify in shadow, compare, enforce one effect, observe, then expand. Every phase names a rollback and a stop condition."] }
+      {
+        "id": "inventory",
+        "title": "Inventory ownership, not secret values",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Record the effect entry point, actor source, existing roles or scopes, credential location, approval owner, replay behavior, audit evidence, and unknown-outcome handling. Record classifications and references—not tokens, private keys, raw payloads, or full receipts."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "sequence",
+        "title": "Move through reversible phases",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Inventory, model, verify in shadow, compare, enforce one effect, observe, then expand. Every phase names a rollback and a stop condition."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1", "path": "/adopt/signed-requests", "kind": "integration", "title": "Add Auths to signed requests", "description": "Keep request authentication while binding authority to exact application bytes.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "compose", "title": "Authentication and authority answer different questions", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The existing signature proves who controlled a key and protects its signed fields. Auths adds attenuated authority, exact action commitment, lifecycle state, approvals, closed execution, and receipts only where needed."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1",
+    "title": "Add Auths to signed requests",
+    "description": "Keep request authentication while binding authority to exact application bytes.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "compose",
+        "title": "Authentication and authority answer different questions",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "The existing signature proves who controlled a key and protects its signed fields. Auths adds attenuated authority, exact action commitment, lifecycle state, approvals, closed execution, and receipts only where needed."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1", "path": "/adopt/oauth-oidc", "kind": "integration", "title": "Keep OAuth and OIDC", "description": "Retain login and session identity while adding bounded effect authority.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "compose", "title": "The session identifies the actor", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Continue using OAuth or OIDC for login, consent, session management, and identity claims. Translate accepted session evidence into explicit Auths trust context; do not treat a broad scope as proof of one exact effect."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1",
+    "title": "Keep OAuth and OIDC",
+    "description": "Retain login and session identity while adding bounded effect authority.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.create/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "compose",
+        "title": "The session identifies the actor",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Continue using OAuth or OIDC for login, consent, session management, and identity claims. Translate accepted session evidence into explicit Auths trust context; do not treat a broad scope as proof of one exact effect."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1", "path": "/adopt/api-keys", "kind": "integration", "title": "Move beyond ambient API keys", "description": "Keep provider keys inside the gateway and give callers exact authority instead.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "boundary", "title": "Do not send the provider key to the caller", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Wrap the existing provider client in a closed gateway. The caller presents bounded authority and an exact command; the gateway acquires the key only after native authorization and durable reservation."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1",
+    "title": "Move beyond ambient API keys",
+    "description": "Keep provider keys inside the gateway and give callers exact authority instead.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "boundary",
+        "title": "Do not send the provider key to the caller",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Wrap the existing provider client in a closed gateway. The caller presents bounded authority and an exact command; the gateway acquires the key only after native authorization and durable reservation."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1", "path": "/adopt/cloud-iam", "kind": "integration", "title": "Compose with cloud IAM", "description": "Use workload identity and short-lived credentials without making IAM the application-effect model.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "compose", "title": "IAM authorizes provider access; Auths authorizes the exact effect", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Keep workload federation, roles, and restricted credentials. Add Auths where the application must commit exact resources, order, approvals, use limits, recovery state, and receipts across organizational boundaries."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1",
+    "title": "Compose with cloud IAM",
+    "description": "Use workload identity and short-lived credentials without making IAM the application-effect model.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "compose",
+        "title": "IAM authorizes provider access; Auths authorizes the exact effect",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Keep workload federation, roles, and restricted credentials. Add Auths where the application must commit exact resources, order, approvals, use limits, recovery state, and receipts across organizational boundaries."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1", "path": "/adopt/policy-engines", "kind": "integration", "title": "Compose with policy engines", "description": "Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit bounded context.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "compose", "title": "Keep rich policy evaluation where it belongs", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The policy engine continues to answer relationship and attribute questions. Record the bounded decision input or commitment that Auths actually relied on; never imply Auths replaced the policy model."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1",
+    "title": "Compose with policy engines",
+    "description": "Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit bounded context.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "compose",
+        "title": "Keep rich policy evaluation where it belongs",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "The policy engine continues to answer relationship and attribute questions. Record the bounded decision input or commitment that Auths actually relied on; never imply Auths replaced the policy model."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1", "path": "/adopt/capabilities", "kind": "integration", "title": "Bridge existing capabilities", "description": "Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority without inventing properties they do not provide.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "honesty", "title": "Map protocol, profile, and state responsibilities separately", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Document which attenuation properties come from the source capability, which exact-effect rules come from an application profile, and which replay or budget properties require durable external state."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1",
+    "title": "Bridge existing capabilities",
+    "description": "Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority without inventing properties they do not provide.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.create/1",
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "honesty",
+        "title": "Map protocol, profile, and state responsibilities separately",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Document which attenuation properties come from the source capability, which exact-effect rules come from an application profile, and which replay or budget properties require durable external state."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.approvals/1", "path": "/adopt/approvals", "kind": "integration", "title": "Bind existing approvals", "description": "Turn approval evidence into exact transaction context, never reusable ambient permission.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "binding", "title": "Approve the bytes that will execute", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1" }]
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.approvals/1",
+    "title": "Bind existing approvals",
+    "description": "Turn approval evidence into exact transaction context, never reusable ambient permission.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "binding",
+        "title": "Approve the bytes that will execute",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1", "path": "/adopt/shadow-mode", "kind": "guide", "title": "Verify in shadow mode", "description": "Compare Auths decisions with current enforcement without authorizing or executing effects.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1",
+    "title": "Verify in shadow mode",
+    "description": "Compare Auths decisions with current enforcement without authorizing or executing effects.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "inert", "title": "Shadow mode is cryptographically inert", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["It may parse, verify, classify, and compare bounded decisions. It cannot mint an opaque executable authorization object, reserve a use, acquire provider credentials, or call a provider."] },
-      { "id": "records", "title": "Store bounded comparisons", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Record commitments, decision classes, stable reason codes, timing, and correlation identifiers. Exclude credentials, raw business payloads, sealed commands, and full receipt contents."] }
+      {
+        "id": "inert",
+        "title": "Shadow mode is cryptographically inert",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "It may parse, verify, classify, and compare bounded decisions. It cannot mint an opaque executable authorization object, reserve a use, acquire provider credentials, or call a provider."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "records",
+        "title": "Store bounded comparisons",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Record commitments, decision classes, stable reason codes, timing, and correlation identifiers. Exclude credentials, raw business payloads, sealed commands, and full receipt contents."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.cutover/1", "path": "/adopt/cutover", "kind": "guide", "title": "Cut over one protected effect", "description": "Enforce, observe, reconcile, and roll back through one existing gateway.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1", "auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.executions/1", "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "id": "auths.page.adopt.cutover/1",
+    "title": "Cut over one protected effect",
+    "description": "Enforce, observe, reconcile, and roll back through one existing gateway.",
+    "depth": "operate",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
+        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
+        "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "preconditions", "title": "Cut over only with reversible evidence", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Require shadow agreement, durable state, provider idempotency or reconciliation, custody readiness, telemetry, explicit stop conditions, and a tested rollback switch before enforcement."] },
-      { "id": "rollback", "title": "Rollback preserves evidence", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Return traffic to the previous gateway without erasing Auths decision comparisons, reservations, recovery references, or receipts. Reconcile any provider-unknown work before another attempt."] }
+      {
+        "id": "preconditions",
+        "title": "Cut over only with reversible evidence",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Require shadow agreement, durable state, provider idempotency or reconciliation, custody readiness, telemetry, explicit stop conditions, and a tested rollback switch before enforcement."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "rollback",
+        "title": "Rollback preserves evidence",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Return traffic to the previous gateway without erasing Auths decision comparisons, reservations, recovery references, or receipts. Reconcile any provider-unknown work before another attempt."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   }
 ]
diff --git a/content/agent-integration-pages.json b/content/agent-integration-pages.json
index cd99a1e..aa32801 100644
--- a/content/agent-integration-pages.json
+++ b/content/agent-integration-pages.json
@@ -1,67 +1,370 @@
 [
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1", "path": "/agents/how-auths-works", "kind": "architecture", "title": "How Auths works for agents", "description": "Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.", "depth": "understand", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "roles", "title": "An agent is a bounded actor, not a trusted process", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["An agent can propose an action and present delegated authority. Native verification decides whether the exact action is allowed; an application-owned closed gateway alone can reach provider credentials.", "Identity, transport, authority, approval, state, custody, and the provider adapter remain independent components."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1",
+    "title": "How Auths works for agents",
+    "description": "Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.",
+    "depth": "understand",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "roles",
+        "title": "An agent is a bounded actor, not a trusted process",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "An agent can propose an action and present delegated authority. Native verification decides whether the exact action is allowed; an application-owned closed gateway alone can reach provider credentials.",
+          "Identity, transport, authority, approval, state, custody, and the provider adapter remain independent components."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1", "path": "/agents/delegate-one-tool", "kind": "guide", "title": "Delegate one tool", "description": "Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.", "depth": "start", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "scenario", "title": "Narrow authority in practice", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1" }]
+    "id": "auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1",
+    "title": "Delegate one tool",
+    "description": "Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.",
+    "depth": "start",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "scenario",
+        "title": "Narrow authority in practice",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1", "path": "/agents/approved-plan", "kind": "guide", "title": "Require approval for an agent plan", "description": "Bind human or organizational approval to exact ordered plan bytes.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "plan", "title": "Approval cannot be reused for a changed plan", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1" }]
+    "id": "auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1",
+    "title": "Require approval for an agent plan",
+    "description": "Bind human or organizational approval to exact ordered plan bytes.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "plan",
+        "title": "Approval cannot be reused for a changed plan",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1", "path": "/agents/multi-agent", "kind": "guide", "title": "Handoff across agents", "description": "Attenuate authority at every agent boundary.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.delegate/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "handoff", "title": "Every hop gets narrower", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["A coordinating agent may delegate a smaller action set, earlier expiry, lower use count, and shallower remaining depth. A child cannot manufacture omitted critical extensions or widen any parent bound."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1",
+    "title": "Handoff across agents",
+    "description": "Attenuate authority at every agent boundary.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "handoff",
+        "title": "Every hop gets narrower",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "A coordinating agent may delegate a smaller action set, earlier expiry, lower use count, and shallower remaining depth. A child cannot manufacture omitted critical extensions or widen any parent bound."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1", "path": "/agents/mcp-client", "kind": "guide", "title": "Use Auths from an MCP client", "description": "Let an agent harness propose bounded tool calls without receiving provider credentials.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "client", "title": "MCP transports intent, not permission", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The client supplies the requested tool call and proof material. The receiving verifier decides authority independently of whether MCP delivery succeeded."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1",
+    "title": "Use Auths from an MCP client",
+    "description": "Let an agent harness propose bounded tool calls without receiving provider credentials.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "client",
+        "title": "MCP transports intent, not permission",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "The client supplies the requested tool call and proof material. The receiving verifier decides authority independently of whether MCP delivery succeeded."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1", "path": "/agents/protect-mcp-server", "kind": "guide", "title": "Protect an MCP server", "description": "Place provider access behind an opaque verified-command boundary.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "server", "title": "Verify before entering the provider", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Parse bounded input, authorize it natively, reserve state durably, then hand only an opaque verified command to the provider adapter. Keep denial and uncertainty outside the effect boundary."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1",
+    "title": "Protect an MCP server",
+    "description": "Place provider access behind an opaque verified-command boundary.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "server",
+        "title": "Verify before entering the provider",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Parse bounded input, authorize it natively, reserve state durably, then hand only an opaque verified command to the provider adapter. Keep denial and uncertainty outside the effect boundary."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.agents.skills/1", "path": "/agents/skills", "kind": "guide", "title": "Agent skills and plugins", "description": "Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "safety", "title": "Skills explain and invoke public tools", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["A maintained skill may help an agent compose a request, inspect a closed outcome, or locate evidence. It cannot mint native authorization objects, contain secrets, or bypass runtime checks."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.agents.skills/1",
+    "title": "Agent skills and plugins",
+    "description": "Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "safety",
+        "title": "Skills explain and invoke public tools",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "A maintained skill may help an agent compose a request, inspect a closed outcome, or locate evidence. It cannot mint native authorization objects, contain secrets, or bypass runtime checks."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1", "path": "/integrations/identity-trust", "kind": "integration", "title": "Identity and trust integrations", "description": "Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "ownership", "title": "Your trust policy owns who is accepted", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Auths supplies bounded evidence parsing and suite-labelled verification. Your application supplies accepted roots and resolver policy. The identity system supplies authentication evidence; none of these alone grants an effect."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1",
+    "title": "Identity and trust integrations",
+    "description": "Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "ownership",
+        "title": "Your trust policy owns who is accepted",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Auths supplies bounded evidence parsing and suite-labelled verification. Your application supplies accepted roots and resolver policy. The identity system supplies authentication evidence; none of these alone grants an effect."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.integrations.policy/1", "path": "/integrations/policy", "kind": "integration", "title": "Policy engine integrations", "description": "Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "ownership", "title": "Policy supplies context; Auths binds the exact effect", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The policy engine evaluates application relationships and attributes. Auths commits the resulting bounded decision context to the action and preserves execution state and receipts."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.integrations.policy/1",
+    "title": "Policy engine integrations",
+    "description": "Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "ownership",
+        "title": "Policy supplies context; Auths binds the exact effect",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "The policy engine evaluates application relationships and attributes. Auths commits the resulting bounded decision context to the action and preserves execution state and receipts."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.integrations.cloud/1", "path": "/integrations/cloud", "kind": "integration", "title": "Cloud IAM integrations", "description": "Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "ownership", "title": "Cloud IAM remains the provider boundary", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Cloud IAM supplies workload identity and restricted provider credentials. Auths supplies exact effect authority, durable use accounting, closed outcomes, and portable receipts. Credentials never enter the agent or proof."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.integrations.cloud/1",
+    "title": "Cloud IAM integrations",
+    "description": "Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "ownership",
+        "title": "Cloud IAM remains the provider boundary",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Cloud IAM supplies workload identity and restricted provider credentials. Auths supplies exact effect authority, durable use accounting, closed outcomes, and portable receipts. Credentials never enter the agent or proof."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.integrations.transport/1", "path": "/integrations/transport", "kind": "integration", "title": "Transport integrations", "description": "Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "separation", "title": "Delivery is never authority", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Transport authenticates or delivers peers and bytes according to its own contract. Auths verifies those bounded bytes under explicit trust and authority. Iroh can be used without capabilities; Auths can be used without Iroh."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.integrations.transport/1",
+    "title": "Transport integrations",
+    "description": "Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "separation",
+        "title": "Delivery is never authority",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Transport authenticates or delivers peers and bytes according to its own contract. Auths verifies those bounded bytes under explicit trust and authority. Iroh can be used without capabilities; Auths can be used without Iroh."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1", "path": "/integrations/capabilities", "kind": "integration", "title": "Capability integrations", "description": "Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "bridge", "title": "Preserve the source capability's legitimate role", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["An import profile states which external claims map into Auths authority and which require external state. It must reject any mapping that silently invents stronger bounds or execution guarantees."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1",
+    "title": "Capability integrations",
+    "description": "Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.create/1",
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "bridge",
+        "title": "Preserve the source capability's legitimate role",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "An import profile states which external claims map into Auths authority and which require external state. It must reject any mapping that silently invents stronger bounds or execution guarantees."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1", "path": "/integrations/profile-kit", "kind": "integration", "title": "Build an application profile", "description": "Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "contract", "title": "A profile defines domain meaning", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Define bounded canonical actions, resource matching, attenuation, and inspection projections. Keep identity, transport, state, custody, approval providers, and execution adapters outside the profile."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1",
+    "title": "Build an application profile",
+    "description": "Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.create/1",
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "contract",
+        "title": "A profile defines domain meaning",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Define bounded canonical actions, resource matching, attenuation, and inspection projections. Keep identity, transport, state, custody, approval providers, and execution adapters outside the profile."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   }
 ]
diff --git a/content/developer-pages.json b/content/developer-pages.json
index c8d8e93..9a401d1 100644
--- a/content/developer-pages.json
+++ b/content/developer-pages.json
@@ -1,75 +1,349 @@
 [
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks/1", "path": "/developers/sdks", "kind": "guide", "title": "Choose an Auths SDK", "description": "Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks/1",
+    "title": "Choose an Auths SDK",
+    "description": "Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.create/1",
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1",
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "choose", "title": "Choose for your application, not for semantics", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["TypeScript and Python expose the same product workflow. Rust owns the protocol meaning and also exposes lower-level components for native applications.", "Start with the product facade. Descend into profile, verification, inspection, and runtime surfaces only when the application needs that control."] },
-      { "id": "lifecycle", "title": "One lifecycle in every language", "provenance": "generated-fact", "factKind": "operation", "fact": "auths.operation.create/1" }
+      {
+        "id": "choose",
+        "title": "Choose for your application, not for semantics",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "TypeScript and Python expose the same product workflow. Rust owns the protocol meaning and also exposes lower-level components for native applications.",
+          "Start with the product facade. Descend into profile, verification, inspection, and runtime surfaces only when the application needs that control."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "lifecycle",
+        "title": "One lifecycle in every language",
+        "provenance": "generated-fact",
+        "factKind": "operation",
+        "fact": "auths.operation.create/1"
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1", "path": "/developers/runtime-api", "kind": "guide", "title": "Use the Runtime API", "description": "Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1", "auths.endpoint.authorities/1", "auths.endpoint.executions/1", "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1", "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "id": "auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1",
+    "title": "Use the Runtime API",
+    "description": "Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.health/1",
+        "auths.endpoint.authorities/1",
+        "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
+        "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1",
+        "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "when", "title": "Use a runtime when effects cross a trust boundary", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The runtime is appropriate when signing keys, replay state, receipts, or provider credentials must stay outside the caller process. It does not replace your application API or identity provider."] },
-      { "id": "entry", "title": "Runtime entry points", "provenance": "generated-fact", "factKind": "endpoint", "fact": "auths.endpoint.executions/1" }
+      {
+        "id": "when",
+        "title": "Use a runtime when effects cross a trust boundary",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "The runtime is appropriate when signing keys, replay state, receipts, or provider credentials must stay outside the caller process. It does not replace your application API or identity provider."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "entry",
+        "title": "Runtime entry points",
+        "provenance": "generated-fact",
+        "factKind": "endpoint",
+        "fact": "auths.endpoint.executions/1"
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.developers.cli/1", "path": "/developers/cli", "kind": "guide", "title": "Auths CLI", "description": "Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "id": "auths.page.developers.cli/1",
+    "title": "Auths CLI",
+    "description": "Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "role", "title": "The CLI is an interface, not ambient permission", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["CLI commands parse explicit inputs and use the same native semantic owners as the SDKs. A successful command invocation does not bypass trust, authority, state, or gateway checks."] },
-      { "id": "verify", "title": "Verification remains effect-free", "provenance": "generated-fact", "factKind": "operation", "fact": "auths.operation.verify/1" }
+      {
+        "id": "role",
+        "title": "The CLI is an interface, not ambient permission",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "CLI commands parse explicit inputs and use the same native semantic owners as the SDKs. A successful command invocation does not bypass trust, authority, state, or gateway checks."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "verify",
+        "title": "Verification remains effect-free",
+        "provenance": "generated-fact",
+        "factKind": "operation",
+        "fact": "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.developers.testing/1", "path": "/developers/testing", "kind": "guide", "title": "Test Auths outcomes", "description": "Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.", "depth": "build", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1", "auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "id": "auths.page.developers.testing/1",
+    "title": "Test Auths outcomes",
+    "description": "Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.",
+    "depth": "build",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
+        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "matrix", "title": "Test the boundary, not only the happy path", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Keep fixtures for byte mutation, widening, expiry, revocation, replay, approval substitution, provider uncertainty, resume, and receipt disclosure. Assert that a denied path never reaches the provider."] },
-      { "id": "recovery", "title": "Prove safe recovery", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.recovery/1" }
+      {
+        "id": "matrix",
+        "title": "Test the boundary, not only the happy path",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Keep fixtures for byte mutation, widening, expiry, revocation, replay, approval substitution, provider uncertainty, resume, and receipt disclosure. Assert that a denied path never reaches the provider."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "recovery",
+        "title": "Prove safe recovery",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.developers.errors/1", "path": "/developers/errors", "kind": "guide", "title": "Outcomes and errors", "description": "Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.", "depth": "inspect", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "id": "auths.page.developers.errors/1",
+    "title": "Outcomes and errors",
+    "description": "Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.",
+    "depth": "inspect",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "closed", "title": "Closed outcomes preserve what is known", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Denied means the request must change. Indeterminate means a required decision input was unavailable. Recoverable means resume the same opaque reference. Provider-unknown means reconcile before retrying."] },
-      { "id": "unsafe", "title": "Never flatten uncertainty into an exception retry", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Blind retry can repeat a real-world effect. Keep outcome class, correlation evidence, and the permitted next action together."] }
+      {
+        "id": "closed",
+        "title": "Closed outcomes preserve what is known",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Denied means the request must change. Indeterminate means a required decision input was unavailable. Recoverable means resume the same opaque reference. Provider-unknown means reconcile before retrying."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "unsafe",
+        "title": "Never flatten uncertainty into an exception retry",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Blind retry can repeat a real-world effect. Keep outcome class, correlation evidence, and the permitted next action together."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.developers.versioning/1", "path": "/developers/versioning", "kind": "guide", "title": "Versions and compatibility", "description": "Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.", "depth": "inspect", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "id": "auths.page.developers.versioning/1",
+    "title": "Versions and compatibility",
+    "description": "Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.",
+    "depth": "inspect",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "prelaunch", "title": "Prelaunch means one clean surface", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Auths does not carry deprecated entry points, migration shims, or compatibility aliases before launch. Breaking changes replace the preview contract and are reported explicitly."] },
-      { "id": "identity", "title": "Semantic changes receive new identities", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["A release bundle binds documentation to exact operations, scenarios, endpoints, and evidence. Contract drift either regenerates the affected page or fails qualification."] }
+      {
+        "id": "prelaunch",
+        "title": "Prelaunch means one clean surface",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Auths does not carry deprecated entry points, migration shims, or compatibility aliases before launch. Breaking changes replace the preview contract and are reported explicitly."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "identity",
+        "title": "Semantic changes receive new identities",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "A release bundle binds documentation to exact operations, scenarios, endpoints, and evidence. Contract drift either regenerates the affected page or fails qualification."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.reference.cli/1", "path": "/reference/cli", "kind": "guide", "title": "CLI reference", "description": "Command contracts generated from the compiled Auths command graph.", "depth": "inspect", "status": "preview", "owner": "generated",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "contract", "title": "Effect-free verification", "provenance": "generated-fact", "factKind": "operation", "fact": "auths.operation.verify/1" }]
+    "id": "auths.page.reference.cli/1",
+    "title": "CLI reference",
+    "description": "Command contracts generated from the compiled Auths command graph.",
+    "depth": "inspect",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "generated",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "contract",
+        "title": "Effect-free verification",
+        "provenance": "generated-fact",
+        "factKind": "operation",
+        "fact": "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.reference.profiles/1", "path": "/reference/profiles", "kind": "guide", "title": "Profiles", "description": "Closed and application-owned profiles that map domain actions into Auths semantics.", "depth": "inspect", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "boundary", "title": "Profiles own domain meaning", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["A profile defines canonical application actions and resource matching. It does not choose identity, transport, custody, or provider credentials."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.reference.profiles/1",
+    "title": "Profiles",
+    "description": "Closed and application-owned profiles that map domain actions into Auths semantics.",
+    "depth": "inspect",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "boundary",
+        "title": "Profiles own domain meaning",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "A profile defines canonical application actions and resource matching. It does not choose identity, transport, custody, or provider credentials."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.reference.errors/1", "path": "/reference/errors", "kind": "guide", "title": "Stable error reference", "description": "Machine-stable error identities grouped by the caller's safe response.", "depth": "inspect", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "contract", "title": "Error codes are behavior contracts", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Use stable codes for program flow and bounded diagnostics for people. Never infer that an effect failed merely because the caller received an error."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.reference.errors/1",
+    "title": "Stable error reference",
+    "description": "Machine-stable error identities grouped by the caller's safe response.",
+    "depth": "inspect",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "contract",
+        "title": "Error codes are behavior contracts",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Use stable codes for program flow and bounded diagnostics for people. Never infer that an effect failed merely because the caller received an error."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.reference.schemas/1", "path": "/reference/schemas", "kind": "guide", "title": "Schemas", "description": "Canonical inputs, bounded wire forms, receipts, and disclosure views.", "depth": "inspect", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "parse", "title": "Parse into bounded types", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Public inputs are parsed once into closed native types. Unknown fields, oversized bytes, unsupported versions, and invalid combinations are rejected before semantic evaluation."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.reference.schemas/1",
+    "title": "Schemas",
+    "description": "Canonical inputs, bounded wire forms, receipts, and disclosure views.",
+    "depth": "inspect",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "parse",
+        "title": "Parse into bounded types",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Public inputs are parsed once into closed native types. Unknown fields, oversized bytes, unsupported versions, and invalid combinations are rejected before semantic evaluation."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.reference.evidence/1", "path": "/reference/evidence", "kind": "guide", "title": "Evidence manifest", "description": "Resolve public claims to exact release evidence and limitations.", "depth": "verify", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "scope", "title": "Evidence is bounded", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Each assessment states which release bytes it covers, what the check proves, what it does not prove, and how to reproduce it."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.reference.evidence/1",
+    "title": "Evidence manifest",
+    "description": "Resolve public claims to exact release evidence and limitations.",
+    "depth": "verify",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "scope",
+        "title": "Evidence is bounded",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Each assessment states which release bytes it covers, what the check proves, what it does not prove, and how to reproduce it."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   }
 ]
diff --git a/content/operations-pages.json b/content/operations-pages.json
index 718a5f3..9fbbd6a 100644
--- a/content/operations-pages.json
+++ b/content/operations-pages.json
@@ -1,62 +1,365 @@
 [
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.evaluate/1", "path": "/operations/evaluate-locally", "kind": "operations", "title": "Evaluate the runtime locally", "description": "Exercise the production boundary with development custody and state before deployment.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1", "auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1", "auths.endpoint.executions/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "boundary", "title": "Evaluate the real boundaries", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Use disposable keys and local durable state, but keep the same parse, authorize, reserve, provider, receipt, and recovery sequence you intend to operate. Exercise both success and provider uncertainty."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.evaluate/1",
+    "title": "Evaluate the runtime locally",
+    "description": "Exercise the production boundary with development custody and state before deployment.",
+    "depth": "operate",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
+        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.health/1",
+        "auths.endpoint.executions/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "boundary",
+        "title": "Evaluate the real boundaries",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Use disposable keys and local durable state, but keep the same parse, authorize, reserve, provider, receipt, and recovery sequence you intend to operate. Exercise both success and provider uncertainty."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.deploy/1", "path": "/operations/deploy-runtime", "kind": "operations", "title": "Deploy the open runtime", "description": "Place the Auths runtime behind TLS with explicit dependency ownership.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1", "auths.endpoint.executions/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "topology", "title": "Deploy one closed gateway", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Terminate trusted TLS, isolate custody and state dependencies, restrict provider egress, expose bounded health signals, and keep the effect provider reachable only from the runtime workload."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.deploy/1",
+    "title": "Deploy the open runtime",
+    "description": "Place the Auths runtime behind TLS with explicit dependency ownership.",
+    "depth": "operate",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.health/1",
+        "auths.endpoint.executions/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "topology",
+        "title": "Deploy one closed gateway",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Terminate trusted TLS, isolate custody and state dependencies, restrict provider egress, expose bounded health signals, and keep the effect provider reachable only from the runtime workload."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.state/1", "path": "/operations/durable-state", "kind": "operations", "title": "Configure durable state", "description": "Preserve replay, use, budget, recovery, and receipt invariants across restarts.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "atomicity", "title": "Reservations must be atomic and durable", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Do not split replay, budget, use, execution, and receipt state across stores that cannot preserve their transaction boundary. A restart must never make a consumed effect appear unused."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.state/1",
+    "title": "Configure durable state",
+    "description": "Preserve replay, use, budget, recovery, and receipt invariants across restarts.",
+    "depth": "operate",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "atomicity",
+        "title": "Reservations must be atomic and durable",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Do not split replay, budget, use, execution, and receipt state across stores that cannot preserve their transaction boundary. A restart must never make a consumed effect appear unused."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.custody/1", "path": "/operations/custody", "kind": "operations", "title": "Configure key custody", "description": "Keep signing material non-exportable and observable without logging secrets.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "keys", "title": "The runtime asks a signer; it does not own key bytes", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Use a custody adapter that returns suite-labelled public descriptors and signs bounded requests. Private material must remain inside the selected HSM, KMS, enclave, or application-owned signer."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.custody/1",
+    "title": "Configure key custody",
+    "description": "Keep signing material non-exportable and observable without logging secrets.",
+    "depth": "operate",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.create/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "keys",
+        "title": "The runtime asks a signer; it does not own key bytes",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Use a custody adapter that returns suite-labelled public descriptors and signs bounded requests. Private material must remain inside the selected HSM, KMS, enclave, or application-owned signer."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.trust/1", "path": "/operations/trust-and-profiles", "kind": "operations", "title": "Configure trust and profiles", "description": "Version accepted roots, resolvers, suites, and domain semantics independently.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "rotation", "title": "Rotate trust without migrating authority", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Identity evidence and verification suites are replaceable inputs. Roll out new roots or suites with an explicit overlap window, negative fixtures, rollback, and post-rotation evidence review."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.trust/1",
+    "title": "Configure trust and profiles",
+    "description": "Version accepted roots, resolvers, suites, and domain semantics independently.",
+    "depth": "operate",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "rotation",
+        "title": "Rotate trust without migrating authority",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Identity evidence and verification suites are replaceable inputs. Roll out new roots or suites with an explicit overlap window, negative fixtures, rollback, and post-rotation evidence review."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.gateways/1", "path": "/operations/provider-gateways", "kind": "operations", "title": "Configure provider gateways", "description": "Acquire provider credentials only after authorization and durable reservation.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "closed", "title": "Only opaque verified commands cross the boundary", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The adapter receives an SDK-minted command and bounded execution context. It never accepts caller-constructed authorization flags. It reports applied, not applied, or possible outcomes without guessing."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.gateways/1",
+    "title": "Configure provider gateways",
+    "description": "Acquire provider credentials only after authorization and durable reservation.",
+    "depth": "operate",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "closed",
+        "title": "Only opaque verified commands cross the boundary",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "The adapter receives an SDK-minted command and bounded execution context. It never accepts caller-constructed authorization flags. It reports applied, not applied, or possible outcomes without guessing."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.observability/1", "path": "/operations/observability", "kind": "operations", "title": "Observe Auths safely", "description": "Measure liveness, readiness, dependencies, outcomes, and latency without leaking authority.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "signals", "title": "Observe classifications and commitments", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Emit bounded correlation IDs, operation identities, outcome classes, dependency health, and latency histograms. Do not log proofs, sealed commands, credentials, raw action bodies, full receipts, or authorized disclosure payloads."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.observability/1",
+    "title": "Observe Auths safely",
+    "description": "Measure liveness, readiness, dependencies, outcomes, and latency without leaking authority.",
+    "depth": "operate",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.health/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "signals",
+        "title": "Observe classifications and commitments",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Emit bounded correlation IDs, operation identities, outcome classes, dependency health, and latency histograms. Do not log proofs, sealed commands, credentials, raw action bodies, full receipts, or authorized disclosure payloads."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.backup/1", "path": "/operations/backup-and-restore", "kind": "operations", "title": "Back up and restore", "description": "Restore state without reopening replay, budget, use, or recovery windows.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "exercise", "title": "A restore is a semantic exercise", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Quiesce or fence writers, restore an atomic state image, validate monotonic metadata, replay adversarial fixtures, reconcile nonterminal provider observations, and only then return the runtime to readiness."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.backup/1",
+    "title": "Back up and restore",
+    "description": "Restore state without reopening replay, budget, use, or recovery windows.",
+    "depth": "operate",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.resume/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "exercise",
+        "title": "A restore is a semantic exercise",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Quiesce or fence writers, restore an atomic state image, validate monotonic metadata, replay adversarial fixtures, reconcile nonterminal provider observations, and only then return the runtime to readiness."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.recovery/1", "path": "/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation", "kind": "operations", "title": "Recover and reconcile", "description": "Resume the same execution identity after uncertain provider outcomes.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "decision", "title": "Observe, reconcile, then resume", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.recovery/1" }]
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.recovery/1",
+    "title": "Recover and reconcile",
+    "description": "Resume the same execution identity after uncertain provider outcomes.",
+    "depth": "operate",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.resume/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "decision",
+        "title": "Observe, reconcile, then resume",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.upgrade/1", "path": "/operations/upgrade-and-rollback", "kind": "operations", "title": "Upgrade and roll back", "description": "Change runtime bytes without splitting semantic, state, or documentation identities.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1", "auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "sequence", "title": "Qualify before promotion", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Verify schemas, state migrations, custody compatibility, differential fixtures, recovery across mixed versions, and exact release documentation. Roll back application and documentation surfaces atomically."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.upgrade/1",
+    "title": "Upgrade and roll back",
+    "description": "Change runtime bytes without splitting semantic, state, or documentation identities.",
+    "depth": "operate",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
+        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.health/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "sequence",
+        "title": "Qualify before promotion",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Verify schemas, state migrations, custody compatibility, differential fixtures, recovery across mixed versions, and exact release documentation. Roll back application and documentation surfaces atomically."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.receipts/1", "path": "/operations/receipt-retention", "kind": "operations", "title": "Retain and disclose receipts", "description": "Preserve evidence while minimizing sensitive operational detail.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1", "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "levels", "title": "Retain integrity; disclose by authorization", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Store signed bytes and commitments under a bounded retention policy. Default readers to opaque or summary views; require explicit disclosure authority for business details and record that disclosure."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.receipts/1",
+    "title": "Retain and disclose receipts",
+    "description": "Preserve evidence while minimizing sensitive operational detail.",
+    "depth": "operate",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1",
+        "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "levels",
+        "title": "Retain integrity; disclose by authorization",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Store signed bytes and commitments under a bounded retention policy. Default readers to opaque or summary views; require explicit disclosure authority for business details and record that disclosure."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents/1", "path": "/operations/incident-response", "kind": "operations", "title": "Incident response runbooks", "description": "Stop, preserve evidence, reconcile, recover, and escalate without widening authority.", "depth": "operate", "status": "preview", "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "contract", "title": "Every runbook has the same safety contract", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Name ownership and severity, preconditions, required access, safe observations, stop conditions, rollback or resume, reconciliation, evidence retention, and escalation. Never copy credentials or full authority artifacts into an incident ticket."] }]
+    "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents/1",
+    "title": "Incident response runbooks",
+    "description": "Stop, preserve evidence, reconcile, recover, and escalate without widening authority.",
+    "depth": "operate",
+    "status": "preview",
+    "owner": "editorial",
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.resume/1",
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.health/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "contract",
+        "title": "Every runbook has the same safety contract",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Name ownership and severity, preconditions, required access, safe observations, stop conditions, rollback or resume, reconciliation, evidence retention, and escalation. Never copy credentials or full authority artifacts into an incident ticket."
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   }
 ]
diff --git a/content/pages.json b/content/pages.json
index ec6e917..4f25967 100644
--- a/content/pages.json
+++ b/content/pages.json
@@ -1,558 +1,1123 @@
 [
   {
     "id": "auths.page.home/1",
-    "path": "/",
-    "kind": "landing",
     "title": "Auths documentation",
     "description": "Precise, portable authority for people and agents.",
     "depth": "understand",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "promise", "title": "Authority for the exact thing", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Auths gives people and agents precise, portable permission to do one bounded thing—and leaves cryptographic evidence of what happened."] }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1",
-    "path": "/guides/protect-rest-effect",
-    "kind": "guide",
-    "title": "Protect a REST effect",
-    "description": "Authorize one exact application effect.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [
-      { "id": "outcome", "title": "Outcome", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Protect one application effect and see replay or changed bytes fail closed."] },
-      { "id": "example", "title": "Run the scenario", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1" }
+      {
+        "id": "promise",
+        "title": "Authority for the exact thing",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Auths gives people and agents precise, portable permission to do one bounded thing—and leaves cryptographic evidence of what happened."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
-    "path": "/reference/sdk",
-    "kind": "sdk-reference",
     "title": "SDK reference",
     "description": "The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.",
     "depth": "inspect",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "generated",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.create/1",
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1",
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "operations", "title": "Operations", "provenance": "generated-fact", "factKind": "operation", "fact": "auths.operation.create/1" }
+      {
+        "id": "operations",
+        "title": "Operations",
+        "provenance": "generated-fact",
+        "factKind": "operation",
+        "fact": "auths.operation.create/1"
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
-    "path": "/reference/runtime-api",
-    "kind": "runtime-api-reference",
     "title": "Runtime API reference",
     "description": "The HTTPS production runtime contract.",
     "depth": "inspect",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "generated",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1", "auths.endpoint.authorities/1", "auths.endpoint.executions/1", "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1", "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.health/1",
+        "auths.endpoint.authorities/1",
+        "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
+        "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1",
+        "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "endpoints", "title": "Endpoints", "provenance": "generated-fact", "factKind": "endpoint", "fact": "auths.endpoint.health/1" }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1",
-    "path": "/start/delegate-agent",
-    "kind": "guide",
-    "title": "Delegate to an agent",
-    "description": "Pass on narrower authority without widening.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.delegate/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [
-      { "id": "meaning", "title": "Delegation only gets narrower", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["An agent receives less authority than its parent, never more."] },
-      { "id": "example", "title": "Run the scenario", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.delegation/1" }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1",
-    "path": "/start/verify-receipt",
-    "kind": "guide",
-    "title": "Verify a receipt",
-    "description": "Verify portable evidence and disclose it safely.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [
-      { "id": "meaning", "title": "Evidence without oversharing", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Begin with a bounded summary and require authorization before revealing sensitive detail."] },
-      { "id": "example", "title": "Run the scenario", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1" }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.concepts.five-nouns/1",
-    "path": "/concepts",
-    "kind": "architecture",
-    "title": "Five nouns",
-    "description": "Actor, action, authority, outcome, and receipt.",
-    "depth": "understand",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [
-      { "id": "model", "title": "One durable vocabulary", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The same five nouns remain useful from a first integration through protocol inspection."] }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.architecture.system-map/1",
-    "path": "/architecture",
-    "kind": "architecture",
-    "title": "System map",
-    "description": "The native waist, replaceable adapters, and closed gateways.",
-    "depth": "understand",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [
-      { "id": "waist", "title": "Meaning stays in the native waist", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Identity, transport, custody, state, and providers remain replaceable around one semantic core."] }
+      {
+        "id": "endpoints",
+        "title": "Endpoints",
+        "provenance": "generated-fact",
+        "factKind": "endpoint",
+        "fact": "auths.endpoint.health/1"
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
-    "path": "/operations",
-    "kind": "operations",
     "title": "Production operations",
     "description": "Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.",
     "depth": "operate",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.health/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.health/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "boundary", "title": "Operate the closed gateway", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Keep provider credentials behind the runtime boundary and preserve durable recovery state."] }
+      {
+        "id": "boundary",
+        "title": "Operate the closed gateway",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Keep provider credentials behind the runtime boundary and preserve durable recovery state."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1",
-    "path": "/architecture/trust-boundaries",
-    "kind": "architecture",
     "title": "Trust boundaries",
     "description": "Authorization before provider entry.",
     "depth": "verify",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "boundary", "title": "Transport is not authority", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Successful delivery never authorizes an effect."] }
+      {
+        "id": "boundary",
+        "title": "Transport is not authority",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Successful delivery never authorizes an effect."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
-    "path": "/integrations",
-    "kind": "integration",
     "title": "Integrations",
     "description": "Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.",
     "depth": "build",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "composition", "title": "Auths with your existing systems", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Keep identity, policy, transport, and cloud systems in their legitimate roles while adding exact effect authority."] }
+      {
+        "id": "composition",
+        "title": "Auths with your existing systems",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Keep identity, policy, transport, and cloud systems in their legitimate roles while adding exact effect authority."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
-    "path": "/assurance",
-    "kind": "assurance",
     "title": "Assurance",
     "description": "Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.",
     "depth": "verify",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "claims", "title": "Show what the evidence proves", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Every claim names its evidence, release, scope, and limitation."] }
+      {
+        "id": "claims",
+        "title": "Show what the evidence proves",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Every claim names its evidence, release, scope, and limitation."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.start/1",
-    "path": "/get-started",
-    "kind": "landing",
     "title": "Get started",
     "description": "Choose the shortest safe path from an outcome to working Auths authority.",
     "depth": "start",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "choose", "title": "Start with what you need to protect", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Choose an application effect, delegated agent action, production runtime, or verification-only path before learning the deeper machinery."] }
+      {
+        "id": "choose",
+        "title": "Start with what you need to protect",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Choose an application effect, delegated agent action, production runtime, or verification-only path before learning the deeper machinery."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
-    "path": "/identity-trust",
-    "kind": "landing",
     "title": "Identity & trust",
     "description": "Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.",
     "depth": "understand",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "separation", "title": "Identity says who; authority says what", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Authentication evidence can inform authorization, but it never becomes permission merely by arriving successfully."] }
+      {
+        "id": "separation",
+        "title": "Identity says who; authority says what",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Authentication evidence can inform authorization, but it never becomes permission merely by arriving successfully."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.authority/1",
-    "path": "/authority",
-    "kind": "landing",
     "title": "Authority",
     "description": "Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.",
     "depth": "understand",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.create/1",
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1",
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "verbs", "title": "Five verbs, one authority lifecycle", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify without changing vocabulary as the workflow becomes more sophisticated."] }
+      {
+        "id": "verbs",
+        "title": "Five verbs, one authority lifecycle",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify without changing vocabulary as the workflow becomes more sophisticated."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.agents/1",
-    "path": "/agents",
-    "kind": "landing",
     "title": "Agents",
     "description": "Give an agent narrow, inspectable authority instead of ambient credentials.",
     "depth": "start",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.delegation/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "boundary", "title": "Agents propose; closed gateways execute", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["An agent cannot manufacture broader authority or reach provider credentials merely because it can call a tool."] }
+      {
+        "id": "boundary",
+        "title": "Agents propose; closed gateways execute",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "An agent cannot manufacture broader authority or reach provider credentials merely because it can call a tool."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.developers/1",
-    "path": "/developers",
-    "kind": "landing",
     "title": "Developers",
     "description": "Find SDKs, Runtime APIs, tested examples, integrations, versioning, and extension contracts.",
     "depth": "build",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "tools", "title": "Choose the surface for your application", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Use an idiomatic SDK in process or call the production Runtime API while preserving the same Rust-owned semantics."] }
+      {
+        "id": "tools",
+        "title": "Choose the surface for your application",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Use an idiomatic SDK in process or call the production Runtime API while preserving the same Rust-owned semantics."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.reference/1",
-    "path": "/reference",
-    "kind": "landing",
     "title": "APIs & SDKs",
     "description": "Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.",
     "depth": "inspect",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "surfaces", "title": "Reference meaning before mechanism", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Begin with the product operation, then descend into its Rust, TypeScript, Python, or Runtime API projection."] }
+      {
+        "id": "surfaces",
+        "title": "Reference meaning before mechanism",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Begin with the product operation, then descend into its Rust, TypeScript, Python, or Runtime API projection."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.start.choose/1",
-    "path": "/get-started/choose",
-    "kind": "guide",
     "title": "Choose your Auths path",
     "description": "Describe the boundary you need and get one deterministic starting recommendation.",
     "depth": "start",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "choice", "title": "Choose by effect, not package", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The chooser never accepts credentials or creates authority. It maps deployment, actor, trust, state, custody, and ownership needs to a documented path."] }
+      {
+        "id": "choice",
+        "title": "Choose by effect, not package",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "The chooser never accepts credentials or creates authority. It maps deployment, actor, trust, state, custody, and ownership needs to a documented path."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.start.prerequisites/1",
-    "path": "/get-started/prerequisites",
-    "kind": "guide",
     "title": "Before you begin",
     "description": "Prepare only the runtime, trust, state, and custody inputs your chosen path actually needs.",
     "depth": "start",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": [], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "minimum", "title": "Smallest local path", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python; use development custody and in-memory state; and protect one deterministic local effect."] },
-      { "id": "production", "title": "Production additions", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Add HTTPS, durable replay and recovery state, external custody, explicit trust resolution, observability, and a closed provider gateway only when moving beyond evaluation."] },
-      { "id": "exit", "title": "Know which path you own", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["SDK consumers, runtime operators, agent builders, and profile authors have different prerequisites. Do not assemble every extension port for a normal integration."] }
+      {
+        "id": "minimum",
+        "title": "Smallest local path",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python; use development custody and in-memory state; and protect one deterministic local effect."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "production",
+        "title": "Production additions",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Add HTTPS, durable replay and recovery state, external custody, explicit trust resolution, observability, and a closed provider gateway only when moving beyond evaluation."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "exit",
+        "title": "Know which path you own",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "SDK consumers, runtime operators, agent builders, and profile authors have different prerequisites. Do not assemble every extension port for a normal integration."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.start.local/1",
-    "path": "/get-started/local",
-    "kind": "guide",
     "title": "Protect one local effect",
     "description": "Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.",
     "depth": "start",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.create/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "outcome", "title": "Outcome", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["One caller can perform one exact route-shaped action once. Replaying it or changing its bytes fails closed."] },
-      { "id": "build", "title": "Build", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1" },
-      { "id": "proof", "title": "What Auths proved", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The actor held authority for the committed action and the closed gateway returned a bounded outcome. Transport success alone proved nothing."] },
-      { "id": "failure", "title": "Failure path", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Run the same action again to receive a replay denial, then change one application byte to receive a commitment mismatch."] }
+      {
+        "id": "outcome",
+        "title": "Outcome",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "One caller can perform one exact route-shaped action once. Replaying it or changing its bytes fails closed."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "build",
+        "title": "Build",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "proof",
+        "title": "What Auths proved",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "The actor held authority for the committed action and the closed gateway returned a bounded outcome. Transport success alone proved nothing."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "failure",
+        "title": "Failure path",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Run the same action again to receive a replay denial, then change one application byte to receive a commitment mismatch."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.start.runtime/1",
-    "path": "/get-started/runtime",
-    "kind": "guide",
     "title": "Protect a service effect",
     "description": "Submit exact authority to the open production Runtime API and preserve recovery state.",
     "depth": "start",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.authorities/1", "auths.endpoint.executions/1", "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.create/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.authorities/1",
+        "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
+        "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "outcome", "title": "Outcome", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["A service accepts a bounded request over HTTPS, reserves it durably, and distinguishes completion from a recoverable or unknown provider outcome."] },
-      { "id": "build", "title": "Build", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1" },
-      { "id": "boundary", "title": "Production boundary", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The Runtime API requires HTTPS and durable state. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway and never enter the caller SDK."] },
-      { "id": "failure", "title": "Failure path", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["A provider-unknown outcome requires observation and reconciliation before any retry. Resume the same execution identity rather than creating a fresh request."] }
+      {
+        "id": "outcome",
+        "title": "Outcome",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "A service accepts a bounded request over HTTPS, reserves it durably, and distinguishes completion from a recoverable or unknown provider outcome."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "build",
+        "title": "Build",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "boundary",
+        "title": "Production boundary",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "The Runtime API requires HTTPS and durable state. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway and never enter the caller SDK."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "failure",
+        "title": "Failure path",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "A provider-unknown outcome requires observation and reconciliation before any retry. Resume the same execution identity rather than creating a fresh request."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.start.agent/1",
-    "path": "/get-started/agent",
-    "kind": "guide",
     "title": "Delegate one action to an agent",
     "description": "Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.",
     "depth": "start",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.delegation/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "outcome", "title": "Outcome", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The agent can invoke one allowed action within its time, use, and delegation bounds. It cannot manufacture wider authority."] },
-      { "id": "build", "title": "Build", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.delegation/1" },
-      { "id": "boundary", "title": "Agent boundary", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["The agent proposes or presents authority. A closed application gateway verifies and performs the effect."] },
-      { "id": "failure", "title": "Failure path", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Increase the child action set or use count and observe delegation fail before execution."] }
+      {
+        "id": "outcome",
+        "title": "Outcome",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "The agent can invoke one allowed action within its time, use, and delegation bounds. It cannot manufacture wider authority."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "build",
+        "title": "Build",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.delegation/1"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "boundary",
+        "title": "Agent boundary",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "The agent proposes or presents authority. A closed application gateway verifies and performs the effect."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "failure",
+        "title": "Failure path",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Increase the child action set or use count and observe delegation fail before execution."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.start.cross-company/1",
-    "path": "/get-started/cross-company",
-    "kind": "guide",
     "title": "Authorize across companies",
     "description": "Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.",
     "depth": "start",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.delegation/1", "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.delegation/1",
+        "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "outcome", "title": "Outcome", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["One organization authorizes an external actor to perform a precise operation without sharing a root identity provider or provider credential."] },
-      { "id": "delegate", "title": "Delegate", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.delegation/1" },
-      { "id": "verify", "title": "Verify the evidence", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1" },
-      { "id": "failure", "title": "Failure path", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Identity federation, delivery, or approval cannot substitute for exact authority. A changed plan or widened delegation is rejected."] }
+      {
+        "id": "outcome",
+        "title": "Outcome",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "One organization authorizes an external actor to perform a precise operation without sharing a root identity provider or provider credential."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "delegate",
+        "title": "Delegate",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.delegation/1"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "verify",
+        "title": "Verify the evidence",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "failure",
+        "title": "Failure path",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Identity federation, delivery, or approval cannot substitute for exact authority. A changed plan or widened delegation is rejected."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.start.verify/1",
-    "path": "/get-started/verify",
-    "kind": "guide",
     "title": "Verify without executing",
     "description": "Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.",
     "depth": "start",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "outcome", "title": "Outcome", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["A verifier confirms portable evidence and produces an inert decision or bounded receipt view without gaining an executable command."] },
-      { "id": "build", "title": "Build", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1" },
-      { "id": "privacy", "title": "Disclosure boundary", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Unauthorized viewers receive an opaque result. Summary and full views require the appropriate disclosure authority."] },
-      { "id": "failure", "title": "Failure path", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Tampered bytes, an unknown signer, or missing trust evidence remain rejected or indeterminate; verification never performs the underlying effect."] }
+      {
+        "id": "outcome",
+        "title": "Outcome",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "A verifier confirms portable evidence and produces an inert decision or bounded receipt view without gaining an executable command."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "build",
+        "title": "Build",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "privacy",
+        "title": "Disclosure boundary",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Unauthorized viewers receive an opaque result. Summary and full views require the appropriate disclosure authority."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "failure",
+        "title": "Failure path",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Tampered bytes, an unknown signer, or missing trust evidence remain rejected or indeterminate; verification never performs the underlying effect."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.start.evaluate/1",
-    "path": "/get-started/evaluate",
-    "kind": "guide",
     "title": "Evaluate Auths",
     "description": "Run deterministic success and failure fixtures before choosing an integration.",
     "depth": "start",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1", "auths.scenario.delegation/1", "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.create/1",
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
+        "auths.scenario.delegation/1",
+        "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "goal", "title": "Prove the boundaries first", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Run the same semantic cases in Rust, TypeScript, and Python and compare normalized outcomes rather than trusting screenshots."] },
-      { "id": "effect", "title": "Exact effect", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1" },
-      { "id": "delegation", "title": "Attenuation", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.delegation/1" },
-      { "id": "receipt", "title": "Receipt verification", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1" },
-      { "id": "decision", "title": "Choose after the evidence", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Adopt the local SDK, production runtime, agent, or verification-only path only after the failure behavior matches your application needs."] }
+      {
+        "id": "goal",
+        "title": "Prove the boundaries first",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Run the same semantic cases in Rust, TypeScript, and Python and compare normalized outcomes rather than trusting screenshots."
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "effect",
+        "title": "Exact effect",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "delegation",
+        "title": "Attenuation",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.delegation/1"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "receipt",
+        "title": "Receipt verification",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "decision",
+        "title": "Choose after the evidence",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Adopt the local SDK, production runtime, agent, or verification-only path only after the failure behavior matches your application needs."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.concepts.tour/1",
-    "path": "/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes",
-    "kind": "architecture",
     "title": "Auths in fifteen minutes",
     "description": "Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.",
     "depth": "understand",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.create/1",
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1",
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "model", "title": "One operation from intent to evidence", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["A support service grants one actor authority to issue one refund, executes it behind a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt."] }
+      {
+        "id": "model",
+        "title": "One operation from intent to evidence",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "A support service grants one actor authority to issue one refund, executes it behind a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
-    "path": "/identity-trust/how-it-works",
-    "kind": "architecture",
     "title": "How identity and trust fit",
     "description": "Authenticate a signer without turning identity, cryptography, or transport into authority.",
     "depth": "understand",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "separation", "title": "Who signed is not what they may do", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Trust evidence establishes a signer under an application-owned trust policy. Authority separately commits the allowed action and bounds."] }
+      {
+        "id": "separation",
+        "title": "Who signed is not what they may do",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Trust evidence establishes a signer under an application-owned trust policy. Authority separately commits the allowed action and bounds."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1",
-    "path": "/authority/lifecycle",
-    "kind": "architecture",
     "title": "Authority lifecycle",
     "description": "Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.",
     "depth": "inspect",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.create/1",
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.delegation/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "narrowing", "title": "Authority can only get narrower", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Each child commits to a subset of its parent and consumes explicit time, use, budget, and delegation bounds."] }
+      {
+        "id": "narrowing",
+        "title": "Authority can only get narrower",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Each child commits to a subset of its parent and consumes explicit time, use, budget, and delegation bounds."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1",
-    "path": "/operations/execution-lifecycle",
-    "kind": "architecture",
     "title": "Execution lifecycle",
     "description": "Separate parsing, authorization, durable reservation, provider observation, recovery, and terminal evidence.",
     "depth": "operate",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.executions/1", "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
+        "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "state", "title": "Observe before retry", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Once a provider may have accepted an effect, Auths preserves uncertainty and requires reconciliation or resume of the same execution identity."] }
+      {
+        "id": "state",
+        "title": "Observe before retry",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Once a provider may have accepted an effect, Auths preserves uncertainty and requires reconciliation or resume of the same execution identity."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1",
-    "path": "/authority/approval-bound-plans",
-    "kind": "architecture",
     "title": "Approval-bound plans",
     "description": "Bind threshold or ordered approval to the exact operations, bytes, and order under review.",
     "depth": "build",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": [], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "commitment", "title": "Approval is bound context, not authority", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Changing a member, byte, order, or threshold changes the plan commitment and invalidates the collected approval evidence."] }
+      {
+        "id": "commitment",
+        "title": "Approval is bound context, not authority",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Changing a member, byte, order, or threshold changes the plan commitment and invalidates the collected approval evidence."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1",
-    "path": "/authority/receipts-and-disclosure",
-    "kind": "architecture",
     "title": "Receipts and disclosure",
     "description": "Verify outcome evidence while revealing only what the viewer is authorized to inspect.",
     "depth": "inspect",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1", "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1",
+        "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
     "sections": [
-      { "id": "views", "title": "Evidence has disclosure levels", "provenance": "editorial-narrative", "body": ["Opaque, summary, and authorized full views let applications prove integrity without publishing sensitive business detail by default."] }
+      {
+        "id": "views",
+        "title": "Evidence has disclosure levels",
+        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
+        "body": [
+          "Opaque, summary, and authorized full views let applications prove integrity without publishing sensitive business detail by default."
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
-    "path": "/quickstarts/local-rest-effect",
-    "kind": "guide",
     "title": "Protect one REST effect locally",
     "description": "Complete one exact REST-shaped effect and prove changed bytes fail closed.",
     "depth": "start",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "outcome", "title": "One bounded local effect", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1" }]
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.create/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "outcome",
+        "title": "One bounded local effect",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1"
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1",
-    "path": "/quickstarts/runtime-effect",
-    "kind": "guide",
     "title": "Execute through the open runtime",
     "description": "Complete one runtime effect and prove exact replay is denied.",
     "depth": "start",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.executions/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "outcome", "title": "One runtime effect", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1" }]
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.executions/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "outcome",
+        "title": "One runtime effect",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1"
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1",
-    "path": "/quickstarts/agent-delegation",
-    "kind": "guide",
     "title": "Delegate one tool to an agent",
     "description": "Give an agent one narrow tool and reject widening.",
     "depth": "start",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "outcome", "title": "One delegated tool", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1" }]
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "outcome",
+        "title": "One delegated tool",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1",
-    "path": "/quickstarts/approved-plan",
-    "kind": "guide",
     "title": "Run one approved plan",
     "description": "Bind approval to an exact ordered plan and reject substitution.",
     "depth": "build",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.execute/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "outcome", "title": "One exact approved plan", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1" }]
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "outcome",
+        "title": "One exact approved plan",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
-    "path": "/quickstarts/offline-verification",
-    "kind": "guide",
     "title": "Verify authority offline",
     "description": "Verify proof and receipt bytes without a network dependency.",
     "depth": "start",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "outcome", "title": "Local deterministic verification", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1" }]
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "outcome",
+        "title": "Local deterministic verification",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1",
-    "path": "/quickstarts/recovery",
-    "kind": "guide",
     "title": "Resume uncertain execution safely",
     "description": "Resume an opaque execution reference and prohibit a fresh retry.",
     "depth": "operate",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.resume/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.recovery/1"], "endpoints": ["auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "outcome", "title": "Recover without repeating", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.recovery/1" }]
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.resume/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [
+        "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"
+      ],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "outcome",
+        "title": "Recover without repeating",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
+      }
+    ]
   },
   {
     "id": "auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1",
-    "path": "/quickstarts/identity-swap",
-    "kind": "guide",
     "title": "Swap identity suites",
     "description": "Keep authority semantics stable across identity suites.",
     "depth": "build",
     "status": "preview",
     "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": { "operations": ["auths.operation.verify/1"], "scenarios": ["auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"], "endpoints": [], "profiles": [], "claims": [] },
-    "sections": [{ "id": "outcome", "title": "Cryptographic agility without semantic drift", "provenance": "tested-scenario", "scenario": "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1" }]
+    "uses": {
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"
+      ],
+      "endpoints": [],
+      "profiles": [],
+      "claims": []
+    },
+    "sections": [
+      {
+        "id": "outcome",
+        "title": "Cryptographic agility without semantic drift",
+        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"
+      }
+    ]
   }
 ]
diff --git a/content/route-migration.json b/content/route-migration.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..42d7b89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/route-migration.json
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.route-migration/1",
+  "entries": [
+    {
+      "from": "/guides/protect-rest-effect",
+      "disposition": "replaced",
+      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/start/delegate-agent",
+      "disposition": "replaced",
+      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/start/verify-receipt",
+      "disposition": "replaced",
+      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/concepts",
+      "disposition": "merged",
+      "to": "/authority/model"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/authority/model"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/architecture",
+      "disposition": "merged",
+      "to": "/authority/model"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/architecture/trust-boundaries",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/authority/execute"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/quickstarts",
+      "disposition": "replaced",
+      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/quickstarts/local-rest-effect",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/quickstarts/runtime-effect",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/quickstarts/agent-delegation",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/quickstarts/approved-plan",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/quickstarts/offline-verification",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/quickstarts/recovery",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/recovery"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/quickstarts/identity-swap",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/get-started/local",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/paths/application"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/get-started/agent",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/paths/agent"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/get-started/runtime",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/paths/runtime"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/get-started/verify",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/paths/verification"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/get-started/cross-company",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/paths/cross-company"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/get-started/adopt",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/adoption"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/adopt",
+      "disposition": "replaced",
+      "to": "/get-started/adoption"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/adopt/plan",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/adoption/plan"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/adopt/signed-requests",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/adoption/signed-requests"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/adopt/oauth-oidc",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/adopt/api-keys",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/adoption/api-keys"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/adopt/cloud-iam",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/adopt/policy-engines",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/adoption/policy-engines"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/adopt/capabilities",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/adoption/capabilities"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/adopt/approvals",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/adoption/approvals"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/adopt/shadow-mode",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/adopt/cutover",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/get-started/adoption/cutover"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/authority/approval-bound-plans",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/authority/plans/approvals"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/authority/receipts-and-disclosure",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/authority/receipts/disclosure"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/agents/delegate-one-tool",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/agents/quickstart"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/agents/approved-plan",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/agents/approved-plans"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/agents/mcp-client",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/agents/mcp/client"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/agents/protect-mcp-server",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/agents/mcp/protect-server"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/agents/skills",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/agents/skills-and-plugins"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/integrations",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/developers/integrations"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/integrations/identity-trust",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/integrations/policy",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/developers/integrations/policy"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/integrations/cloud",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/developers/integrations/cloud-iam"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/integrations/transport",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/developers/integrations/transport"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/integrations/capabilities",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/developers/integrations/capabilities"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/integrations/profile-kit",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/developers/integrations/profile-kit"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/operations/durable-state",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/operations/configure/durable-state"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/operations/custody",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/operations/configure/custody"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/operations/trust-and-profiles",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/operations/provider-gateways",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/operations/configure/provider-gateways"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/operations/incident-response",
+      "disposition": "retained",
+      "to": "/operations/incidents"
+    },
+    {
+      "from": "/sdk",
+      "disposition": "merged",
+      "to": "/reference/sdk"
+    }
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/content/topic-landings.json b/content/topic-landings.json
index 521908c..2f1135f 100644
--- a/content/topic-landings.json
+++ b/content/topic-landings.json
@@ -2,137 +2,409 @@
   {
     "page": "auths.page.start/1",
     "eyebrow": "Get started",
-    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.start.choose/1", "label": "Choose your Auths path", "description": "Describe the effect and operating boundary, then follow one deterministic recommendation." },
+    "recommendation": {
+      "target": "auths.page.start.choose/1",
+      "label": "Choose your Auths path",
+      "description": "Describe the effect and operating boundary, then follow one deterministic recommendation."
+    },
     "groups": [
-      { "title": "Choose a first outcome", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.local/1", "title": "Protect an application effect", "description": "The shortest path from installation to a verified receipt." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.agent/1", "title": "Delegate to an agent", "description": "Pass on narrower authority without ambient credentials." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.verify/1", "title": "Verify evidence", "description": "Inspect a bounded receipt without performing an effect." }
-      ] },
-      { "title": "Understand your options", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.prerequisites/1", "title": "Check prerequisites", "description": "Prepare only what your integration path needs." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.cross-company/1", "title": "Cross company boundaries", "description": "Keep independent identity and cloud systems." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.evaluate/1", "title": "Evaluate with fixtures", "description": "Compare deterministic success and failure outcomes." }
-      ] }
+      {
+        "title": "Choose a first outcome",
+        "cards": [
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.start.local/1",
+            "title": "Protect an application effect",
+            "description": "The shortest path from installation to a verified receipt."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.start.agent/1",
+            "title": "Delegate to an agent",
+            "description": "Pass on narrower authority without ambient credentials."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.start.verify/1",
+            "title": "Verify evidence",
+            "description": "Inspect a bounded receipt without performing an effect."
+          }
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "title": "Understand your options",
+        "cards": [
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.start.prerequisites/1",
+            "title": "Check prerequisites",
+            "description": "Prepare only what your integration path needs."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.start.cross-company/1",
+            "title": "Cross company boundaries",
+            "description": "Keep independent identity and cloud systems."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.start.evaluate/1",
+            "title": "Evaluate with fixtures",
+            "description": "Compare deterministic success and failure outcomes."
+          }
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "page": "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
     "eyebrow": "Identity & trust",
-    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1", "label": "See how identity and trust fit", "description": "Understand what identity proves—and what it never authorizes by itself." },
+    "recommendation": {
+      "target": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
+      "label": "See how identity and trust fit",
+      "description": "Understand what identity proves—and what it never authorizes by itself."
+    },
     "groups": [
-      { "title": "Bring what you already use", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1", "title": "Compose existing identity", "description": "Use OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or an application resolver." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.architecture.system-map/1", "title": "Keep adapters replaceable", "description": "Separate identity, cryptography, transport, and authority." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.authority/1", "title": "Turn identity into bounded action", "description": "Attach exact authority without replacing authentication." }
-      ] },
-      { "title": "Inspect and verify", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1", "title": "Verify offline", "description": "Check portable evidence without executing anything." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "title": "Review agility claims", "description": "Trace cryptographic and identity boundaries to evidence." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.reference/1", "title": "Open exact contracts", "description": "Find identity and verification surfaces by stable identity." }
-      ] }
+      {
+        "title": "Bring what you already use",
+        "cards": [
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
+            "title": "Compose existing identity",
+            "description": "Use OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or an application resolver."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
+            "title": "Keep adapters replaceable",
+            "description": "Separate identity, cryptography, transport, and authority."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.authority/1",
+            "title": "Turn identity into bounded action",
+            "description": "Attach exact authority without replacing authentication."
+          }
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "title": "Inspect and verify",
+        "cards": [
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
+            "title": "Verify offline",
+            "description": "Check portable evidence without executing anything."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
+            "title": "Review agility claims",
+            "description": "Trace cryptographic and identity boundaries to evidence."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.reference/1",
+            "title": "Open exact contracts",
+            "description": "Find identity and verification surfaces by stable identity."
+          }
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "page": "auths.page.authority/1",
     "eyebrow": "Authority",
-    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "label": "Create and execute exact authority", "description": "Start with one effect, one use, and evidence of the outcome." },
+    "recommendation": {
+      "target": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
+      "label": "Create and execute exact authority",
+      "description": "Start with one effect, one use, and evidence of the outcome."
+    },
     "groups": [
-      { "title": "Work with authority", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "title": "Create", "description": "Describe one bounded action and who may perform it." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1", "title": "Delegate", "description": "Narrow action, time, uses, budget, and delegation depth." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1", "title": "Execute and recover", "description": "Reserve durably, perform behind a closed gateway, and resume safely." }
-      ] },
-      { "title": "Understand the model", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1", "title": "Authority lifecycle", "description": "Follow attenuation, use, budget, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1", "title": "Approval-bound plans", "description": "Bind review to exact members, bytes, order, and threshold." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1", "title": "Receipts and disclosure", "description": "Verify evidence without revealing sensitive detail by default." }
-      ] }
+      {
+        "title": "Work with authority",
+        "cards": [
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
+            "title": "Create",
+            "description": "Describe one bounded action and who may perform it."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1",
+            "title": "Delegate",
+            "description": "Narrow action, time, uses, budget, and delegation depth."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
+            "title": "Execute and recover",
+            "description": "Reserve durably, perform behind a closed gateway, and resume safely."
+          }
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "title": "Understand the model",
+        "cards": [
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1",
+            "title": "Authority lifecycle",
+            "description": "Follow attenuation, use, budget, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1",
+            "title": "Approval-bound plans",
+            "description": "Bind review to exact members, bytes, order, and threshold."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1",
+            "title": "Receipts and disclosure",
+            "description": "Verify evidence without revealing sensitive detail by default."
+          }
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "page": "auths.page.agents/1",
     "eyebrow": "Agents",
-    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1", "label": "Delegate one tool", "description": "Give an agent one narrow ability without a broad API key." },
+    "recommendation": {
+      "target": "auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1",
+      "label": "Delegate one tool",
+      "description": "Give an agent one narrow ability without a broad API key."
+    },
     "groups": [
-      { "title": "Build agent authority", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1", "title": "Delegate without widening", "description": "Make each handoff narrower and independently verifiable." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "title": "Protect an effect", "description": "Place the provider behind an authorization boundary." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1", "title": "Verify what happened", "description": "Return portable evidence rather than trusting an agent report." }
-      ] },
-      { "title": "Compose the stack", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1", "title": "MCP and transports", "description": "Delivery remains independent from authorization." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.identity-trust/1", "title": "Agent identity", "description": "Bring workload, user, or application trust evidence." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1", "title": "Closed execution", "description": "Keep real credentials outside the agent process." }
-      ] }
+      {
+        "title": "Build agent authority",
+        "cards": [
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1",
+            "title": "Delegate without widening",
+            "description": "Make each handoff narrower and independently verifiable."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
+            "title": "Protect an effect",
+            "description": "Place the provider behind an authorization boundary."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
+            "title": "Verify what happened",
+            "description": "Return portable evidence rather than trusting an agent report."
+          }
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "title": "Compose the stack",
+        "cards": [
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
+            "title": "MCP and transports",
+            "description": "Delivery remains independent from authorization."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
+            "title": "Agent identity",
+            "description": "Bring workload, user, or application trust evidence."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
+            "title": "Closed execution",
+            "description": "Keep real credentials outside the agent process."
+          }
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "page": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
     "eyebrow": "Operations",
-    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "label": "Inspect the Runtime API", "description": "See the exact HTTPS boundary, outcomes, and recovery operations." },
+    "recommendation": {
+      "target": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
+      "label": "Inspect the Runtime API",
+      "description": "See the exact HTTPS boundary, outcomes, and recovery operations."
+    },
     "groups": [
-      { "title": "Run the open runtime", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "title": "Runtime contract", "description": "Endpoints, limits, trust boundaries, and closed outcomes." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.architecture.system-map/1", "title": "Deployment architecture", "description": "Separate durable state, custody, trust, and provider gateways." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1", "title": "Receipts and disclosure", "description": "Preserve evidence while minimizing exposed detail." }
-      ] },
-      { "title": "Respond safely", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1", "title": "Lifecycle and recovery", "description": "Know when to retry, resume, reconcile, or stop." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "title": "Operational evidence", "description": "Trace procedures and claims to a qualified release." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.developers/1", "title": "Testing tools", "description": "Exercise denial, replay, mutation, and provider uncertainty." }
-      ] }
+      {
+        "title": "Run the open runtime",
+        "cards": [
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
+            "title": "Runtime contract",
+            "description": "Endpoints, limits, trust boundaries, and closed outcomes."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
+            "title": "Deployment architecture",
+            "description": "Separate durable state, custody, trust, and provider gateways."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
+            "title": "Receipts and disclosure",
+            "description": "Preserve evidence while minimizing exposed detail."
+          }
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "title": "Respond safely",
+        "cards": [
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1",
+            "title": "Lifecycle and recovery",
+            "description": "Know when to retry, resume, reconcile, or stop."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
+            "title": "Operational evidence",
+            "description": "Trace procedures and claims to a qualified release."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.developers/1",
+            "title": "Testing tools",
+            "description": "Exercise denial, replay, mutation, and provider uncertainty."
+          }
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "page": "auths.page.developers/1",
     "eyebrow": "Developers",
-    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "label": "Choose an SDK", "description": "Use the same five operations from Rust, TypeScript, or Python." },
+    "recommendation": {
+      "target": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
+      "label": "Choose an SDK",
+      "description": "Use the same five operations from Rust, TypeScript, or Python."
+    },
     "groups": [
-      { "title": "Build", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "title": "SDKs", "description": "Language-aware operations, parameters, outcomes, and examples." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "title": "Runtime API", "description": "Integrate through the production HTTPS boundary." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "title": "Quickstarts", "description": "Begin with a tested end-to-end outcome." }
-      ] },
-      { "title": "Extend and evaluate", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1", "title": "Integrations", "description": "Compose identity, policy, transport, custody, and providers." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.agents/1", "title": "Agents and MCP", "description": "Propose, authorize, execute, observe, and verify separately." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "title": "Testing and evidence", "description": "Use deterministic fixtures and inspect assurance scope." }
-      ] }
+      {
+        "title": "Build",
+        "cards": [
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
+            "title": "SDKs",
+            "description": "Language-aware operations, parameters, outcomes, and examples."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
+            "title": "Runtime API",
+            "description": "Integrate through the production HTTPS boundary."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
+            "title": "Quickstarts",
+            "description": "Begin with a tested end-to-end outcome."
+          }
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "title": "Extend and evaluate",
+        "cards": [
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
+            "title": "Integrations",
+            "description": "Compose identity, policy, transport, custody, and providers."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.agents/1",
+            "title": "Agents and MCP",
+            "description": "Propose, authorize, execute, observe, and verify separately."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
+            "title": "Testing and evidence",
+            "description": "Use deterministic fixtures and inspect assurance scope."
+          }
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "page": "auths.page.reference/1",
     "eyebrow": "APIs & SDKs",
-    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "label": "Open the SDK reference", "description": "Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while staying on the same operation." },
+    "recommendation": {
+      "target": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
+      "label": "Open the SDK reference",
+      "description": "Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while staying on the same operation."
+    },
     "groups": [
-      { "title": "Reference by surface", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "title": "SDK reference", "description": "Exact installed symbols across maintained languages." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "title": "Runtime API", "description": "Exact methods, paths, limits, outcomes, and recovery." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.developers/1", "title": "Developer resources", "description": "Installation, testing, versioning, and extension paths." }
-      ] },
-      { "title": "Understand the contracts", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.concepts.five-nouns/1", "title": "Product vocabulary", "description": "Connect symbols to the meaning they project." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1", "title": "Trust boundaries", "description": "Know what each operation accepts and refuses to infer." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "title": "Source and evidence", "description": "Trace generated reference facts to a release." }
-      ] }
+      {
+        "title": "Reference by surface",
+        "cards": [
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
+            "title": "SDK reference",
+            "description": "Exact installed symbols across maintained languages."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
+            "title": "Runtime API",
+            "description": "Exact methods, paths, limits, outcomes, and recovery."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.developers/1",
+            "title": "Developer resources",
+            "description": "Installation, testing, versioning, and extension paths."
+          }
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "title": "Understand the contracts",
+        "cards": [
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.concepts.tour/1",
+            "title": "Product vocabulary",
+            "description": "Connect symbols to the meaning they project."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1",
+            "title": "Trust boundaries",
+            "description": "Know what each operation accepts and refuses to infer."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
+            "title": "Source and evidence",
+            "description": "Trace generated reference facts to a release."
+          }
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   },
   {
     "page": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
     "eyebrow": "Assurance",
-    "recommendation": { "target": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1", "label": "Start with the trust boundaries", "description": "Understand the claims before inspecting their evidence." },
+    "recommendation": {
+      "target": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1",
+      "label": "Start with the trust boundaries",
+      "description": "Understand the claims before inspecting their evidence."
+    },
     "groups": [
-      { "title": "Inspect evidence", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.architecture.system-map/1", "title": "Architecture claims", "description": "See the semantic core and replaceable boundaries." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1", "title": "Receipt verification", "description": "Verify portable evidence without performing an effect." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.reference/1", "title": "Generated contracts", "description": "Inspect release-scoped SDK and runtime facts." }
-      ] },
-      { "title": "Understand limitations", "cards": [
-        { "target": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1", "title": "Operational scope", "description": "Separate semantic assurance from deployment reliability." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1", "title": "Composition boundaries", "description": "See what adjacent identity and policy systems still own." },
-        { "target": "auths.page.developers/1", "title": "Reproduce results", "description": "Find fixtures, tests, versions, and source provenance." }
-      ] }
+      {
+        "title": "Inspect evidence",
+        "cards": [
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
+            "title": "Architecture claims",
+            "description": "See the semantic core and replaceable boundaries."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
+            "title": "Receipt verification",
+            "description": "Verify portable evidence without performing an effect."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.reference/1",
+            "title": "Generated contracts",
+            "description": "Inspect release-scoped SDK and runtime facts."
+          }
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "title": "Understand limitations",
+        "cards": [
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
+            "title": "Operational scope",
+            "description": "Separate semantic assurance from deployment reliability."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
+            "title": "Composition boundaries",
+            "description": "See what adjacent identity and policy systems still own."
+          },
+          {
+            "target": "auths.page.developers/1",
+            "title": "Reproduce results",
+            "description": "Find fixtures, tests, versions, and source provenance."
+          }
+        ]
+      }
     ]
   }
 ]
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index b755d0a..0a59340 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
     "node": ">=22.13.0"
   },
   "scripts": {
-    "prebuild": "npm run examples:prepare && npm run docs:render-editorial-pages && npm run docs:render-topic-landings && npm run docs:render-tours && npm run docs:render-quickstarts",
+    "prebuild": "npm run docs:clean && npm run examples:prepare && npm run docs:render-editorial-pages && npm run docs:render-topic-landings && npm run docs:render-tours && npm run docs:render-quickstarts && npm run docs:render-sdk-reference && npm run docs:render-indexes",
     "dev": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext dev",
     "build": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext build",
     "start": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext start",
@@ -14,14 +14,18 @@
     "lint": "eslint . --ignore-pattern dist --ignore-pattern .next",
     "lint:bash": "node tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs",
     "lint:ownership": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs",
+    "lint:ia": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/lint-content/site-tree.mjs",
+    "docs:clean": "node tools/render-markdown/clean-generated.mjs",
     "docs:render-topic-landings": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-topic-landings.mjs",
     "docs:render-editorial-pages": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs",
     "docs:render-tours": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-tours.mjs",
     "docs:render-quickstarts": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-quickstarts.mjs",
+    "docs:render-sdk-reference": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-sdk-reference.mjs",
+    "docs:render-indexes": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-site-indexes.mjs",
     "examples:prepare": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/qualify-examples/build-quickstarts.mjs",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
     "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node --experimental-strip-types tools/build-page-model/check.mjs && node tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs && node tools/build-reference/check.mjs && node tools/render-markdown/check.mjs && node tools/release/check.mjs",
-    "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run lint:bash && npm run lint:ownership && npm run test:contract && npm test"
+    "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run lint:bash && npm run lint:ownership && npm run lint:ia && npm run test:contract && npm test"
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@mdx-js/react": "3.1.1",
diff --git a/public/agents.md b/public/agents.md
index 4721ff9..d1706c7 100644
--- a/public/agents.md
+++ b/public/agents.md
@@ -2,19 +2,19 @@
 
 Give an agent narrow, inspectable authority instead of ambient credentials.
 
-## Recommended: [Delegate one tool](/start/delegate-agent)
+## Recommended: [Delegate one tool](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation)
 
 Give an agent one narrow ability without a broad API key.
 
 ## Build agent authority
 
-- [Delegate without widening](/start/delegate-agent) — Make each handoff narrower and independently verifiable.
-- [Protect an effect](/guides/protect-rest-effect) — Place the provider behind an authorization boundary.
-- [Verify what happened](/start/verify-receipt) — Return portable evidence rather than trusting an agent report.
+- [Delegate without widening](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation) — Make each handoff narrower and independently verifiable.
+- [Protect an effect](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect) — Place the provider behind an authorization boundary.
+- [Verify what happened](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Return portable evidence rather than trusting an agent report.
 
 ## Compose the stack
 
-- [MCP and transports](/integrations) — Delivery remains independent from authorization.
+- [MCP and transports](/developers/integrations) — Delivery remains independent from authorization.
 - [Agent identity](/identity-trust) — Bring workload, user, or application trust evidence.
 - [Closed execution](/operations) — Keep real credentials outside the agent process.
 
diff --git a/public/agents/approved-plan.md b/public/agents/approved-plans.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/agents/approved-plan.md
rename to public/agents/approved-plans.md
diff --git a/public/agents/mcp-client.md b/public/agents/mcp/client.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/agents/mcp-client.md
rename to public/agents/mcp/client.md
diff --git a/public/agents/protect-mcp-server.md b/public/agents/mcp/protect-server.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/agents/protect-mcp-server.md
rename to public/agents/mcp/protect-server.md
diff --git a/public/agents/delegate-one-tool.md b/public/agents/quickstart.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/agents/delegate-one-tool.md
rename to public/agents/quickstart.md
diff --git a/public/agents/skills.md b/public/agents/skills-and-plugins.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/agents/skills.md
rename to public/agents/skills-and-plugins.md
diff --git a/public/architecture.md b/public/architecture.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 91c443c..0000000
--- a/public/architecture.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# System map
-
-The native waist, replaceable adapters, and closed gateways.
-
-## Meaning stays in the native waist
-
-Identity, transport, custody, state, and providers remain replaceable around one semantic core.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.architecture.system-map/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
diff --git a/public/architecture/index.md b/public/architecture/index.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d8992a1..0000000
--- a/public/architecture/index.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-# Meaning stays in the native waist
-
-Applications describe intent. The native core parses and decides. Closed
-gateways perform authorized effects. Receipts carry portable evidence.
diff --git a/public/architecture/trust-boundaries/index.md b/public/architecture/trust-boundaries/index.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5eaec5f..0000000
--- a/public/architecture/trust-boundaries/index.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Authorization before provider entry
-
-An application describes exact intent. Native Auths verifies authority and
-reserves state. Only an authorized sealed command reaches the application-owned
-gateway and provider. A receipt returns along a separate evidence path.
-
-Transport, identity, approval, authority, custody, execution, and disclosure
-remain distinct trust boundaries.
diff --git a/public/assurance.md b/public/assurance.md
index 042b5ce..25fe857 100644
--- a/public/assurance.md
+++ b/public/assurance.md
@@ -2,20 +2,20 @@
 
 Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
 
-## Recommended: [Start with the trust boundaries](/architecture/trust-boundaries)
+## Recommended: [Start with the trust boundaries](/authority/execute)
 
 Understand the claims before inspecting their evidence.
 
 ## Inspect evidence
 
-- [Architecture claims](/architecture) — See the semantic core and replaceable boundaries.
-- [Receipt verification](/start/verify-receipt) — Verify portable evidence without performing an effect.
+- [Architecture claims](/identity-trust/how-it-works) — See the semantic core and replaceable boundaries.
+- [Receipt verification](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Verify portable evidence without performing an effect.
 - [Generated contracts](/reference) — Inspect release-scoped SDK and runtime facts.
 
 ## Understand limitations
 
 - [Operational scope](/operations) — Separate semantic assurance from deployment reliability.
-- [Composition boundaries](/integrations) — See what adjacent identity and policy systems still own.
+- [Composition boundaries](/developers/integrations) — See what adjacent identity and policy systems still own.
 - [Reproduce results](/developers) — Find fixtures, tests, versions, and source provenance.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1 · Product contract: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1_
diff --git a/public/authority.md b/public/authority.md
index af23f8d..66f6e61 100644
--- a/public/authority.md
+++ b/public/authority.md
@@ -2,21 +2,21 @@
 
 Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
 
-## Recommended: [Create and execute exact authority](/guides/protect-rest-effect)
+## Recommended: [Create and execute exact authority](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect)
 
 Start with one effect, one use, and evidence of the outcome.
 
 ## Work with authority
 
-- [Create](/guides/protect-rest-effect) — Describe one bounded action and who may perform it.
-- [Delegate](/start/delegate-agent) — Narrow action, time, uses, budget, and delegation depth.
+- [Create](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect) — Describe one bounded action and who may perform it.
+- [Delegate](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation) — Narrow action, time, uses, budget, and delegation depth.
 - [Execute and recover](/operations) — Reserve durably, perform behind a closed gateway, and resume safely.
 
 ## Understand the model
 
 - [Authority lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Follow attenuation, use, budget, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
-- [Approval-bound plans](/authority/approval-bound-plans) — Bind review to exact members, bytes, order, and threshold.
-- [Receipts and disclosure](/authority/receipts-and-disclosure) — Verify evidence without revealing sensitive detail by default.
+- [Approval-bound plans](/authority/plans/approvals) — Bind review to exact members, bytes, order, and threshold.
+- [Receipts and disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure) — Verify evidence without revealing sensitive detail by default.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority/1_
 
diff --git a/public/architecture/trust-boundaries.md b/public/authority/execute.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/architecture/trust-boundaries.md
rename to public/authority/execute.md
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle.md b/public/authority/lifecycle.md
index c923bae..fb82779 100644
--- a/public/authority/lifecycle.md
+++ b/public/authority/lifecycle.md
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.
 
 ## Continue from here
 
-- [Delegate one action to an agent](/get-started/agent) — Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.
+- [Delegate one action to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.
 - [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
diff --git a/public/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes.md b/public/authority/model.md
similarity index 91%
rename from public/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes.md
rename to public/authority/model.md
index 20117c5..54a762d 100644
--- a/public/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes.md
+++ b/public/authority/model.md
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ You only need an exact signature or endpoint field; open the generated reference
 
 ## Continue from here
 
-- [Protect one local effect](/get-started/local) — Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.
+- [Protect one local effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.
 - [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
diff --git a/public/authority/approval-bound-plans.md b/public/authority/plans/approvals.md
similarity index 91%
rename from public/authority/approval-bound-plans.md
rename to public/authority/plans/approvals.md
index 5629839..7161950 100644
--- a/public/authority/approval-bound-plans.md
+++ b/public/authority/plans/approvals.md
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ A reusable human-approved flag or broad role is sufficient for the actual risk m
 
 ## Continue from here
 
-- [Authorize across companies](/get-started/cross-company) — Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.
+- [Authorize across companies](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.
 - [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
diff --git a/public/authority/receipts-and-disclosure.md b/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
similarity index 92%
rename from public/authority/receipts-and-disclosure.md
rename to public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
index d44cde2..43a49de 100644
--- a/public/authority/receipts-and-disclosure.md
+++ b/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ You need to perform an effect; receipt verification is intentionally inert.
 
 ## Continue from here
 
-- [Verify without executing](/get-started/verify) — Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.
+- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.
 - [Assurance](/assurance) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
diff --git a/public/concepts.md b/public/concepts.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0189a7d..0000000
--- a/public/concepts.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# Five nouns
-
-Actor, action, authority, outcome, and receipt.
-
-## One durable vocabulary
-
-The same five nouns remain useful from a first integration through protocol inspection.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.concepts.five-nouns/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
diff --git a/public/concepts/index.md b/public/concepts/index.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 9725e60..0000000
--- a/public/concepts/index.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# Five nouns carry the model
-
-Actor, action, authority, outcome, and receipt form the beginner vocabulary.
-Identity is not authority, approval is not execution, and successful transport
-is not authorization.
diff --git a/public/developers.md b/public/developers.md
index 81f7eec..19ea356 100644
--- a/public/developers.md
+++ b/public/developers.md
@@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ Use the same five operations from Rust, TypeScript, or Python.
 
 - [SDKs](/reference/sdk) — Language-aware operations, parameters, outcomes, and examples.
 - [Runtime API](/reference/runtime-api) — Integrate through the production HTTPS boundary.
-- [Quickstarts](/guides/protect-rest-effect) — Begin with a tested end-to-end outcome.
+- [Quickstarts](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect) — Begin with a tested end-to-end outcome.
 
 ## Extend and evaluate
 
-- [Integrations](/integrations) — Compose identity, policy, transport, custody, and providers.
+- [Integrations](/developers/integrations) — Compose identity, policy, transport, custody, and providers.
 - [Agents and MCP](/agents) — Propose, authorize, execute, observe, and verify separately.
 - [Testing and evidence](/assurance) — Use deterministic fixtures and inspect assurance scope.
 
diff --git a/public/integrations.md b/public/developers/integrations.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/integrations.md
rename to public/developers/integrations.md
diff --git a/public/integrations/capabilities.md b/public/developers/integrations/capabilities.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/integrations/capabilities.md
rename to public/developers/integrations/capabilities.md
diff --git a/public/integrations/cloud.md b/public/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/integrations/cloud.md
rename to public/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md
diff --git a/public/integrations/identity-trust.md b/public/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/integrations/identity-trust.md
rename to public/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md
diff --git a/public/integrations/policy.md b/public/developers/integrations/policy.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/integrations/policy.md
rename to public/developers/integrations/policy.md
diff --git a/public/integrations/profile-kit.md b/public/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/integrations/profile-kit.md
rename to public/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md
diff --git a/public/integrations/transport.md b/public/developers/integrations/transport.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/integrations/transport.md
rename to public/developers/integrations/transport.md
diff --git a/public/get-started.md b/public/get-started.md
index b9c631e..bfead30 100644
--- a/public/get-started.md
+++ b/public/get-started.md
@@ -8,14 +8,14 @@ Describe the effect and operating boundary, then follow one deterministic recomm
 
 ## Choose a first outcome
 
-- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/local) — The shortest path from installation to a verified receipt.
-- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/agent) — Pass on narrower authority without ambient credentials.
-- [Verify evidence](/get-started/verify) — Inspect a bounded receipt without performing an effect.
+- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — The shortest path from installation to a verified receipt.
+- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Pass on narrower authority without ambient credentials.
+- [Verify evidence](/get-started/paths/verification) — Inspect a bounded receipt without performing an effect.
 
 ## Understand your options
 
 - [Check prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites) — Prepare only what your integration path needs.
-- [Cross company boundaries](/get-started/cross-company) — Keep independent identity and cloud systems.
+- [Cross company boundaries](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Keep independent identity and cloud systems.
 - [Evaluate with fixtures](/get-started/evaluate) — Compare deterministic success and failure outcomes.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.start/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start/1_
diff --git a/public/get-started/adopt.md b/public/get-started/adoption.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/get-started/adopt.md
rename to public/get-started/adoption.md
diff --git a/public/adopt/api-keys.md b/public/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/adopt/api-keys.md
rename to public/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md
diff --git a/public/adopt/approvals.md b/public/get-started/adoption/approvals.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/adopt/approvals.md
rename to public/get-started/adoption/approvals.md
diff --git a/public/adopt/capabilities.md b/public/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/adopt/capabilities.md
rename to public/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md
diff --git a/public/adopt/cloud-iam.md b/public/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/adopt/cloud-iam.md
rename to public/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md
diff --git a/public/adopt/cutover.md b/public/get-started/adoption/cutover.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/adopt/cutover.md
rename to public/get-started/adoption/cutover.md
diff --git a/public/adopt/oauth-oidc.md b/public/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/adopt/oauth-oidc.md
rename to public/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md
diff --git a/public/adopt/plan.md b/public/get-started/adoption/plan.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/adopt/plan.md
rename to public/get-started/adoption/plan.md
diff --git a/public/adopt/policy-engines.md b/public/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/adopt/policy-engines.md
rename to public/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md
diff --git a/public/adopt/shadow-mode.md b/public/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/adopt/shadow-mode.md
rename to public/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md
diff --git a/public/adopt/signed-requests.md b/public/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/adopt/signed-requests.md
rename to public/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md
diff --git a/public/get-started/agent.md b/public/get-started/paths/agent.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/get-started/agent.md
rename to public/get-started/paths/agent.md
diff --git a/public/get-started/local.md b/public/get-started/paths/application.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/get-started/local.md
rename to public/get-started/paths/application.md
diff --git a/public/get-started/cross-company.md b/public/get-started/paths/cross-company.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/get-started/cross-company.md
rename to public/get-started/paths/cross-company.md
diff --git a/public/get-started/runtime.md b/public/get-started/paths/runtime.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/get-started/runtime.md
rename to public/get-started/paths/runtime.md
diff --git a/public/get-started/verify.md b/public/get-started/paths/verification.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/get-started/verify.md
rename to public/get-started/paths/verification.md
diff --git a/public/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
similarity index 84%
rename from public/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
rename to public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
index 760239b..d334d1a 100644
--- a/public/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
 
 [Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/agent-delegation.json)
 
-_Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/quickstarts/approved-plan.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
similarity index 85%
rename from public/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
rename to public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
index 17f4b25..b8d5d38 100644
--- a/public/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
 
 [Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json)
 
-_Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/quickstarts/identity-swap.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
similarity index 85%
rename from public/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
rename to public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
index b8a6dd8..be6e5d6 100644
--- a/public/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
 
 [Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json)
 
-_Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
similarity index 84%
rename from public/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
rename to public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
index 68a45c2..aaa86ab 100644
--- a/public/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
 
 [Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json)
 
-_Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/quickstarts/offline-verification.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
similarity index 84%
rename from public/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
rename to public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
index 251f930..a3802f3 100644
--- a/public/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
 
 [Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/offline-verification.json)
 
-_Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/quickstarts/recovery.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md
similarity index 85%
rename from public/quickstarts/recovery.md
rename to public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md
index 8b5bef7..a0f0a72 100644
--- a/public/quickstarts/recovery.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
 
 [Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json)
 
-_Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
similarity index 84%
rename from public/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
rename to public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
index c8dbcbd..b5c34e6 100644
--- a/public/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
 
 [Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json)
 
-_Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/guides/protect-rest-effect.md b/public/guides/protect-rest-effect.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 6de5544..0000000
--- a/public/guides/protect-rest-effect.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-# Protect a REST effect
-
-Authorize one exact application effect.
-
-## Outcome
-
-Protect one application effect and see replay or changed bytes fail closed.
-
-## Run the scenario
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.rest-effect/1`.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.rest-effect/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
diff --git a/public/identity-trust.md b/public/identity-trust.md
index d0408eb..0a1f96f 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust.md
@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@ Understand what identity proves—and what it never authorizes by itself.
 
 ## Bring what you already use
 
-- [Compose existing identity](/integrations) — Use OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or an application resolver.
-- [Keep adapters replaceable](/architecture) — Separate identity, cryptography, transport, and authority.
+- [Compose existing identity](/developers/integrations) — Use OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or an application resolver.
+- [Keep adapters replaceable](/identity-trust/how-it-works) — Separate identity, cryptography, transport, and authority.
 - [Turn identity into bounded action](/authority) — Attach exact authority without replacing authentication.
 
 ## Inspect and verify
 
-- [Verify offline](/start/verify-receipt) — Check portable evidence without executing anything.
+- [Verify offline](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Check portable evidence without executing anything.
 - [Review agility claims](/assurance) — Trace cryptographic and identity boundaries to evidence.
 - [Open exact contracts](/reference) — Find identity and verification surfaces by stable identity.
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md b/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
index 27fb33d..4695dc1 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ You are looking for permission scope; identity alone cannot express the complete
 ## Continue from here
 
 - [Identity & trust](/identity-trust) — Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.
-- [Trust boundaries](/architecture/trust-boundaries) — Authorization before provider entry.
+- [Trust boundaries](/authority/execute) — Authorization before provider entry.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/integrations/index.md b/public/integrations/index.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0dfbd63..0000000
--- a/public/integrations/index.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-# Auths with the systems you already trust
-
-Auths composes with OAuth/OIDC, SPIFFE/SPIRE, Cedar, OPA, OpenFGA, SpiceDB,
-cloud IAM, UCAN, Biscuit, and application transports. Those systems retain
-their own identity, policy, credential, or delivery responsibilities. Auths
-adds exact effect commitment, attenuation, closed execution outcomes, and
-portable evidence where the application needs them.
diff --git a/public/llms-full.txt b/public/llms-full.txt
index 3438661..2bc57f3 100644
--- a/public/llms-full.txt
+++ b/public/llms-full.txt
@@ -1,40 +1,1433 @@
-# Auths documentation corpus
+# Agents
 
-Auths separates identity, transport, approval, authority, custody, execution,
-and disclosure. Applications begin with five product verbs: create, delegate,
-execute, resume, and verify. The native semantic waist owns parsing,
-canonicalization, commitments, attenuation, authorization, and closed outcomes.
+Give an agent narrow, inspectable authority instead of ambient credentials.
 
-## Begin with outcomes
+## Recommended: [Delegate one tool](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation)
 
-Protect one exact application effect. Delegate only narrower authority. Verify
-portable evidence locally. An unavailable fact produces an indeterminate
-outcome; ambiguous provider state produces a recoverable outcome. Neither is
-silently translated into success.
+Give an agent one narrow ability without a broad API key.
 
-## System boundary
+## Build agent authority
 
-Applications describe exact intent. Native Auths decides. Durable stores claim
-replay and budget state atomically. Application-owned closed gateways keep
-provider credentials unreachable until authorization. Receipts bind authority,
-command, context, execution, and signer. Disclosure controls what a verified
-viewer may learn.
+- [Delegate without widening](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation) — Make each handoff narrower and independently verifiable.
+- [Protect an effect](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect) — Place the provider behind an authorization boundary.
+- [Verify what happened](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Return portable evidence rather than trusting an agent report.
 
-## SDKs and runtime
+## Compose the stack
 
-The TypeScript package is `@auths-dev/sdk`; the Python package is `auths`; Rust
-uses the publishable Auths crates. The SDK reference describes in-process
-library APIs. The Runtime API reference separately describes HTTPS endpoints.
-Never treat the two surfaces as interchangeable.
+- [MCP and transports](/developers/integrations) — Delivery remains independent from authorization.
+- [Agent identity](/identity-trust) — Bring workload, user, or application trust evidence.
+- [Closed execution](/operations) — Keep real credentials outside the agent process.
 
-## Composition
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents/1 · Product contract: auths.page.agents/1_
 
-Auths composes with OAuth/OIDC, SPIFFE/SPIRE, policy engines, relationship-based
-authorization, cloud IAM, capability formats, KMS/HSM custody, and HTTP or Iroh
-transport. Each system retains its own responsibility.
 
-## Evidence
 
-Public claims link to canonical fixtures, adversarial conformance,
-installed-artifact tests, semantic freeze, formal qualification, and release
-provenance. Evidence remains bounded by its named status and limitations.
+---
+
+# Require approval for an agent plan
+
+Bind human or organizational approval to exact ordered plan bytes.
+
+## Approval cannot be reused for a changed plan
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# How Auths works for agents
+
+Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
+
+## An agent is a bounded actor, not a trusted process
+
+An agent can propose an action and present delegated authority. Native verification decides whether the exact action is allowed; an application-owned closed gateway alone can reach provider credentials.
+
+Identity, transport, authority, approval, state, custody, and the provider adapter remain independent components.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Use Auths from an MCP client
+
+Let an agent harness propose bounded tool calls without receiving provider credentials.
+
+## MCP transports intent, not permission
+
+The client supplies the requested tool call and proof material. The receiving verifier decides authority independently of whether MCP delivery succeeded.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Protect an MCP server
+
+Place provider access behind an opaque verified-command boundary.
+
+## Verify before entering the provider
+
+Parse bounded input, authorize it natively, reserve state durably, then hand only an opaque verified command to the provider adapter. Keep denial and uncertainty outside the effect boundary.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Handoff across agents
+
+Attenuate authority at every agent boundary.
+
+## Every hop gets narrower
+
+A coordinating agent may delegate a smaller action set, earlier expiry, lower use count, and shallower remaining depth. A child cannot manufacture omitted critical extensions or widen any parent bound.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Delegate one tool
+
+Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.
+
+## Narrow authority in practice
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Agent skills and plugins
+
+Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.
+
+## Skills explain and invoke public tools
+
+A maintained skill may help an agent compose a request, inspect a closed outcome, or locate evidence. It cannot mint native authorization objects, contain secrets, or bypass runtime checks.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.skills/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Assurance
+
+Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
+
+## Recommended: [Start with the trust boundaries](/authority/execute)
+
+Understand the claims before inspecting their evidence.
+
+## Inspect evidence
+
+- [Architecture claims](/identity-trust/how-it-works) — See the semantic core and replaceable boundaries.
+- [Receipt verification](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Verify portable evidence without performing an effect.
+- [Generated contracts](/reference) — Inspect release-scoped SDK and runtime facts.
+
+## Understand limitations
+
+- [Operational scope](/operations) — Separate semantic assurance from deployment reliability.
+- [Composition boundaries](/developers/integrations) — See what adjacent identity and policy systems still own.
+- [Reproduce results](/developers) — Find fixtures, tests, versions, and source provenance.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1 · Product contract: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Authority
+
+Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
+
+## Recommended: [Create and execute exact authority](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect)
+
+Start with one effect, one use, and evidence of the outcome.
+
+## Work with authority
+
+- [Create](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect) — Describe one bounded action and who may perform it.
+- [Delegate](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation) — Narrow action, time, uses, budget, and delegation depth.
+- [Execute and recover](/operations) — Reserve durably, perform behind a closed gateway, and resume safely.
+
+## Understand the model
+
+- [Authority lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Follow attenuation, use, budget, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
+- [Approval-bound plans](/authority/plans/approvals) — Bind review to exact members, bytes, order, and threshold.
+- [Receipts and disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure) — Verify evidence without revealing sensitive detail by default.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority/1_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Trust boundaries
+
+Authorization before provider entry.
+
+## Transport is not authority
+
+Successful delivery never authorizes an effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Authority lifecycle
+
+Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
+
+## The path at a glance
+
+1. Author exact authority
+2. Commit canonical bytes
+3. Attenuate child
+4. Consume use or budget
+5. Expire, revoke, or exhaust
+
+Text equivalent: Authority is authored for exact canonical bytes, committed, optionally attenuated into a child, consumed under durable state, and eventually expires, is revoked, or becomes exhausted.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- A child is a subset of its parent under every critical extension.
+- Use and budget state are durable and atomic with reservation.
+- Expired, revoked, or exhausted authority cannot be revived by transport or approval.
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| A child adds an action or use | Widening rejected | Create the child from a valid subset of the parent. |
+| Authority expires before reservation | Denied | Request fresh authority for current intent. |
+| Revocation state cannot be checked | Indeterminate | Restore lifecycle state; do not assume the grant remains valid. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+You need delegation, one-time use, budget, expiry, revocation, or critical-extension behavior.
+
+## Do not use this when
+
+You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Delegate one action to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.
+- [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Auths in fifteen minutes
+
+Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.
+
+## The path at a glance
+
+1. Actor + exact action
+2. Create authority
+3. Delegate narrower
+4. Execute through gateway
+5. Verify receipt
+
+Text equivalent: An actor describes an exact action, creates bounded authority, optionally delegates a narrower child, executes through a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- Authority names the exact action and actor bounds.
+- Delegation cannot add actions, time, uses, budget, or depth.
+- Verification returns inert evidence and cannot perform the effect.
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| Action bytes change | Commitment mismatch | Create authority for the intended bytes; do not reinterpret the old grant. |
+| The same use is replayed | Denied | Create a new authorized operation only if the business intent is genuinely new. |
+| Required trust evidence is unavailable | Indeterminate | Restore the missing evidence before making a decision. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+You need the complete product model before choosing an SDK or deployment.
+
+## Do not use this when
+
+You only need an exact signature or endpoint field; open the generated reference instead.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Protect one local effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.
+- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Approval-bound plans
+
+Bind threshold or ordered approval to the exact operations, bytes, and order under review.
+
+## The path at a glance
+
+1. Construct exact plan
+2. Commit members + order
+3. Collect bound approvals
+4. Authorize each sealed command
+5. Record partial or terminal outcome
+
+Text equivalent: An exact ordered plan is committed, approvers sign that commitment, each member still passes authorization, and execution records partial, uncertain, cancelled, or terminal outcomes without treating approval as reusable permission.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- Approval is evidence about one exact plan commitment.
+- Substituting a member, byte sequence, order, threshold, or approver set invalidates approval.
+- Approval never bypasses authority verification or durable execution state.
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| A plan member changes after approval | Substitution rejected | Build and approve a new plan commitment. |
+| Threshold is not met | Denied | Collect the missing valid approval or cancel. |
+| A provider outcome becomes unknown mid-plan | Plan is recoverable with explicit completed and uncertain members | Reconcile before any continuation. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+Several exact operations require threshold, ordered, or cross-organization review.
+
+## Do not use this when
+
+A reusable human-approved flag or broad role is sufficient for the actual risk model.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Authorize across companies](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.
+- [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Receipts and disclosure
+
+Verify outcome evidence while revealing only what the viewer is authorized to inspect.
+
+## The path at a glance
+
+1. Decision receipt
+2. Execution receipt
+3. Verify integrity
+4. Opaque or summary view
+5. Authorized full disclosure
+
+Text equivalent: Decision and execution receipts bind evidence, local verification confirms integrity, every viewer can receive only the permitted opaque or summary projection, and sensitive full detail requires explicit disclosure authority.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- A receipt records a decision or outcome; it does not retroactively authorize it.
+- Verification is local and effect free.
+- Sensitive application details are absent from unauthorized and bounded-summary views.
+
+## Closed runtime outcomes
+
+- `completed`
+- `denied`
+- `indeterminate`
+- `not-found`
+- `recoverable`
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| Receipt bytes are changed | Verification rejected | Retrieve the original signed receipt from a trusted source. |
+| A viewer lacks disclosure authority | Opaque view | Request explicit disclosure authority rather than leaking fields. |
+| Signer trust cannot be resolved | Indeterminate | Restore trust evidence before relying on the receipt. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+You need audit evidence, cross-company proof, recovery state, or privacy-preserving inspection.
+
+## Do not use this when
+
+You need to perform an effect; receipt verification is intentionally inert.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.
+- [Assurance](/assurance) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Developers
+
+Find SDKs, Runtime APIs, tested examples, integrations, versioning, and extension contracts.
+
+## Recommended: [Choose an SDK](/reference/sdk)
+
+Use the same five operations from Rust, TypeScript, or Python.
+
+## Build
+
+- [SDKs](/reference/sdk) — Language-aware operations, parameters, outcomes, and examples.
+- [Runtime API](/reference/runtime-api) — Integrate through the production HTTPS boundary.
+- [Quickstarts](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect) — Begin with a tested end-to-end outcome.
+
+## Extend and evaluate
+
+- [Integrations](/developers/integrations) — Compose identity, policy, transport, custody, and providers.
+- [Agents and MCP](/agents) — Propose, authorize, execute, observe, and verify separately.
+- [Testing and evidence](/assurance) — Use deterministic fixtures and inspect assurance scope.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers/1 · Product contract: auths.page.developers/1_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Auths CLI
+
+Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.
+
+## The CLI is an interface, not ambient permission
+
+CLI commands parse explicit inputs and use the same native semantic owners as the SDKs. A successful command invocation does not bypass trust, authority, state, or gateway checks.
+
+## Verification remains effect-free
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.verify/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.cli/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Outcomes and errors
+
+Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.
+
+## Closed outcomes preserve what is known
+
+Denied means the request must change. Indeterminate means a required decision input was unavailable. Recoverable means resume the same opaque reference. Provider-unknown means reconcile before retrying.
+
+## Never flatten uncertainty into an exception retry
+
+Blind retry can repeat a real-world effect. Keep outcome class, correlation evidence, and the permitted next action together.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.errors/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Integrations
+
+Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
+
+## Auths with your existing systems
+
+Keep identity, policy, transport, and cloud systems in their legitimate roles while adding exact effect authority.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.composition/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Capability integrations
+
+Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.
+
+## Preserve the source capability's legitimate role
+
+An import profile states which external claims map into Auths authority and which require external state. It must reject any mapping that silently invents stronger bounds or execution guarantees.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Cloud IAM integrations
+
+Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.
+
+## Cloud IAM remains the provider boundary
+
+Cloud IAM supplies workload identity and restricted provider credentials. Auths supplies exact effect authority, durable use accounting, closed outcomes, and portable receipts. Credentials never enter the agent or proof.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.cloud/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Identity and trust integrations
+
+Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
+
+## Your trust policy owns who is accepted
+
+Auths supplies bounded evidence parsing and suite-labelled verification. Your application supplies accepted roots and resolver policy. The identity system supplies authentication evidence; none of these alone grants an effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Policy engine integrations
+
+Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.
+
+## Policy supplies context; Auths binds the exact effect
+
+The policy engine evaluates application relationships and attributes. Auths commits the resulting bounded decision context to the action and preserves execution state and receipts.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.policy/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Build an application profile
+
+Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.
+
+## A profile defines domain meaning
+
+Define bounded canonical actions, resource matching, attenuation, and inspection projections. Keep identity, transport, state, custody, approval providers, and execution adapters outside the profile.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Transport integrations
+
+Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.
+
+## Delivery is never authority
+
+Transport authenticates or delivers peers and bytes according to its own contract. Auths verifies those bounded bytes under explicit trust and authority. Iroh can be used without capabilities; Auths can be used without Iroh.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.transport/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Use the Runtime API
+
+Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.
+
+## Use a runtime when effects cross a trust boundary
+
+The runtime is appropriate when signing keys, replay state, receipts, or provider credentials must stay outside the caller process. It does not replace your application API or identity provider.
+
+## Runtime entry points
+
+Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.executions/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Choose an Auths SDK
+
+Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
+
+## Choose for your application, not for semantics
+
+TypeScript and Python expose the same product workflow. Rust owns the protocol meaning and also exposes lower-level components for native applications.
+
+Start with the product facade. Descend into profile, verification, inspection, and runtime surfaces only when the application needs that control.
+
+## One lifecycle in every language
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Test Auths outcomes
+
+Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.
+
+## Test the boundary, not only the happy path
+
+Keep fixtures for byte mutation, widening, expiry, revocation, replay, approval substitution, provider uncertainty, resume, and receipt disclosure. Assert that a denied path never reaches the provider.
+
+## Prove safe recovery
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.testing/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Versions and compatibility
+
+Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
+
+## Prelaunch means one clean surface
+
+Auths does not carry deprecated entry points, migration shims, or compatibility aliases before launch. Breaking changes replace the preview contract and are reported explicitly.
+
+## Semantic changes receive new identities
+
+A release bundle binds documentation to exact operations, scenarios, endpoints, and evidence. Contract drift either regenerates the affected page or fails qualification.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.versioning/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Get started
+
+Choose the shortest safe path from an outcome to working Auths authority.
+
+## Recommended: [Choose your Auths path](/get-started/choose)
+
+Describe the effect and operating boundary, then follow one deterministic recommendation.
+
+## Choose a first outcome
+
+- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — The shortest path from installation to a verified receipt.
+- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Pass on narrower authority without ambient credentials.
+- [Verify evidence](/get-started/paths/verification) — Inspect a bounded receipt without performing an effect.
+
+## Understand your options
+
+- [Check prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites) — Prepare only what your integration path needs.
+- [Cross company boundaries](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Keep independent identity and cloud systems.
+- [Evaluate with fixtures](/get-started/evaluate) — Compare deterministic success and failure outcomes.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start/1_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Adopt Auths incrementally
+
+Protect one high-value effect beside the systems you already operate.
+
+## Compose before replacing
+
+Keep your identity provider, policy engine, cloud IAM, transport, and provider gateway. Add Auths to one exact effect, compare decisions without effects, then enforce at the existing gateway.
+
+Expand one dimension at a time only after success, denial, uncertainty, and rollback are observable.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.adopt/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Move beyond ambient API keys
+
+Keep provider keys inside the gateway and give callers exact authority instead.
+
+## Do not send the provider key to the caller
+
+Wrap the existing provider client in a closed gateway. The caller presents bounded authority and an exact command; the gateway acquires the key only after native authorization and durable reservation.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Bind existing approvals
+
+Turn approval evidence into exact transaction context, never reusable ambient permission.
+
+## Approve the bytes that will execute
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.approvals/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Bridge existing capabilities
+
+Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority without inventing properties they do not provide.
+
+## Map protocol, profile, and state responsibilities separately
+
+Document which attenuation properties come from the source capability, which exact-effect rules come from an application profile, and which replay or budget properties require durable external state.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Compose with cloud IAM
+
+Use workload identity and short-lived credentials without making IAM the application-effect model.
+
+## IAM authorizes provider access; Auths authorizes the exact effect
+
+Keep workload federation, roles, and restricted credentials. Add Auths where the application must commit exact resources, order, approvals, use limits, recovery state, and receipts across organizational boundaries.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Cut over one protected effect
+
+Enforce, observe, reconcile, and roll back through one existing gateway.
+
+## Cut over only with reversible evidence
+
+Require shadow agreement, durable state, provider idempotency or reconciliation, custody readiness, telemetry, explicit stop conditions, and a tested rollback switch before enforcement.
+
+## Rollback preserves evidence
+
+Return traffic to the previous gateway without erasing Auths decision comparisons, reservations, recovery references, or receipts. Reconcile any provider-unknown work before another attempt.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cutover/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Keep OAuth and OIDC
+
+Retain login and session identity while adding bounded effect authority.
+
+## The session identifies the actor
+
+Continue using OAuth or OIDC for login, consent, session management, and identity claims. Translate accepted session evidence into explicit Auths trust context; do not treat a broad scope as proof of one exact effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Plan an Auths adoption
+
+Inventory effects and boundaries without collecting credentials or unnecessary business data.
+
+## Inventory ownership, not secret values
+
+Record the effect entry point, actor source, existing roles or scopes, credential location, approval owner, replay behavior, audit evidence, and unknown-outcome handling. Record classifications and references—not tokens, private keys, raw payloads, or full receipts.
+
+## Move through reversible phases
+
+Inventory, model, verify in shadow, compare, enforce one effect, observe, then expand. Every phase names a rollback and a stop condition.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Compose with policy engines
+
+Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit bounded context.
+
+## Keep rich policy evaluation where it belongs
+
+The policy engine continues to answer relationship and attribute questions. Record the bounded decision input or commitment that Auths actually relied on; never imply Auths replaced the policy model.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Verify in shadow mode
+
+Compare Auths decisions with current enforcement without authorizing or executing effects.
+
+## Shadow mode is cryptographically inert
+
+It may parse, verify, classify, and compare bounded decisions. It cannot mint an opaque executable authorization object, reserve a use, acquire provider credentials, or call a provider.
+
+## Store bounded comparisons
+
+Record commitments, decision classes, stable reason codes, timing, and correlation identifiers. Exclude credentials, raw business payloads, sealed commands, and full receipt contents.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Add Auths to signed requests
+
+Keep request authentication while binding authority to exact application bytes.
+
+## Authentication and authority answer different questions
+
+The existing signature proves who controlled a key and protects its signed fields. Auths adds attenuated authority, exact action commitment, lifecycle state, approvals, closed execution, and receipts only where needed.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Choose your Auths path
+
+Describe the boundary you need and get one deterministic starting recommendation.
+
+## Choose by effect, not package
+
+The chooser never accepts credentials or creates authority. It maps deployment, actor, trust, state, custody, and ownership needs to a documented path.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.choose/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Evaluate Auths
+
+Run deterministic success and failure fixtures before choosing an integration.
+
+## Prove the boundaries first
+
+Run the same semantic cases in Rust, TypeScript, and Python and compare normalized outcomes rather than trusting screenshots.
+
+## Exact effect
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Attenuation
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.delegation/1`.
+
+## Receipt verification
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1`.
+
+## Choose after the evidence
+
+Adopt the local SDK, production runtime, agent, or verification-only path only after the failure behavior matches your application needs.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.evaluate/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Delegate one action to an agent
+
+Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.
+
+## Outcome
+
+The agent can invoke one allowed action within its time, use, and delegation bounds. It cannot manufacture wider authority.
+
+## Build
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.delegation/1`.
+
+## Agent boundary
+
+The agent proposes or presents authority. A closed application gateway verifies and performs the effect.
+
+## Failure path
+
+Increase the child action set or use count and observe delegation fail before execution.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.agent/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Protect one local effect
+
+Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.
+
+## Outcome
+
+One caller can perform one exact route-shaped action once. Replaying it or changing its bytes fails closed.
+
+## Build
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.rest-effect/1`.
+
+## What Auths proved
+
+The actor held authority for the committed action and the closed gateway returned a bounded outcome. Transport success alone proved nothing.
+
+## Failure path
+
+Run the same action again to receive a replay denial, then change one application byte to receive a commitment mismatch.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.local/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Authorize across companies
+
+Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.
+
+## Outcome
+
+One organization authorizes an external actor to perform a precise operation without sharing a root identity provider or provider credential.
+
+## Delegate
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.delegation/1`.
+
+## Verify the evidence
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1`.
+
+## Failure path
+
+Identity federation, delivery, or approval cannot substitute for exact authority. A changed plan or widened delegation is rejected.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.cross-company/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Protect a service effect
+
+Submit exact authority to the open production Runtime API and preserve recovery state.
+
+## Outcome
+
+A service accepts a bounded request over HTTPS, reserves it durably, and distinguishes completion from a recoverable or unknown provider outcome.
+
+## Build
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Production boundary
+
+The Runtime API requires HTTPS and durable state. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway and never enter the caller SDK.
+
+## Failure path
+
+A provider-unknown outcome requires observation and reconciliation before any retry. Resume the same execution identity rather than creating a fresh request.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.runtime/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Verify without executing
+
+Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.
+
+## Outcome
+
+A verifier confirms portable evidence and produces an inert decision or bounded receipt view without gaining an executable command.
+
+## Build
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1`.
+
+## Disclosure boundary
+
+Unauthorized viewers receive an opaque result. Summary and full views require the appropriate disclosure authority.
+
+## Failure path
+
+Tampered bytes, an unknown signer, or missing trust evidence remain rejected or indeterminate; verification never performs the underlying effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.verify/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Before you begin
+
+Prepare only the runtime, trust, state, and custody inputs your chosen path actually needs.
+
+## Smallest local path
+
+Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python; use development custody and in-memory state; and protect one deterministic local effect.
+
+## Production additions
+
+Add HTTPS, durable replay and recovery state, external custody, explicit trust resolution, observability, and a closed provider gateway only when moving beyond evaluation.
+
+## Know which path you own
+
+SDK consumers, runtime operators, agent builders, and profile authors have different prerequisites. Do not assemble every extension port for a normal integration.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.prerequisites/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Delegate one tool to an agent
+
+Give an agent one narrow tool and prove it cannot widen itself into a second tool.
+
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1` · Expected time: 12 minutes
+
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Agent publishes one report
+- Prohibited: Agent deletes a report
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `completed`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `authority_widening`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/agent-delegation.json)
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Run one approved plan
+
+Bind approval to an exact ordered plan and prove that replacing a member invalidates it.
+
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1` · Expected time: 18 minutes
+
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Quarantine service, then rotate token
+- Prohibited: Replace rotate token with delete service
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `completed`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `approval_substitution`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json)
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Swap identity suites without changing authority
+
+Run the same authority workflow with two suites and prove that a mislabelled suite fails verification.
+
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1` · Expected time: 14 minutes
+
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Verify Ed25519 and P-256 projections
+- Prohibited: Label Ed25519 material as P-256
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `authorized`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `suite_mismatch`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json)
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Protect one REST effect locally
+
+Complete one exact REST-shaped effect and prove that changed application bytes fail closed.
+
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1` · Expected time: 8 minutes
+
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Publish report weekly
+- Prohibited: Publish report monthly
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `completed`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `action_mismatch`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json)
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Verify authority offline
+
+Verify proof and receipt bytes locally and prove that the wrong trusted context is denied.
+
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1` · Expected time: 7 minutes
+
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Verify with the committed trusted context
+- Prohibited: Verify under an unrelated trust root
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `authorized`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `untrusted_context`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/offline-verification.json)
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Resume uncertain execution safely
+
+Resume one opaque execution reference and prove that a fresh retry cannot repeat the effect.
+
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1` · Expected time: 15 minutes
+
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Resume the original execution reference
+- Prohibited: Create a fresh retry after provider uncertainty
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `completed`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `fresh_retry_prohibited`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json)
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Execute through the open runtime
+
+Send one sealed command through the HTTPS runtime and prove that exact replay is denied.
+
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1` · Expected time: 12 minutes
+
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Request report weekly once
+- Prohibited: Replay request report weekly
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `completed`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `exact_replay`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json)
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Identity & trust
+
+Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.
+
+## Recommended: [See how identity and trust fit](/identity-trust/how-it-works)
+
+Understand what identity proves—and what it never authorizes by itself.
+
+## Bring what you already use
+
+- [Compose existing identity](/developers/integrations) — Use OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or an application resolver.
+- [Keep adapters replaceable](/identity-trust/how-it-works) — Separate identity, cryptography, transport, and authority.
+- [Turn identity into bounded action](/authority) — Attach exact authority without replacing authentication.
+
+## Inspect and verify
+
+- [Verify offline](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Check portable evidence without executing anything.
+- [Review agility claims](/assurance) — Trace cryptographic and identity boundaries to evidence.
+- [Open exact contracts](/reference) — Find identity and verification surfaces by stable identity.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust/1 · Product contract: auths.page.identity-trust/1_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# How identity and trust fit
+
+Authenticate a signer without turning identity, cryptography, or transport into authority.
+
+## The path at a glance
+
+1. Identity material
+2. Authentication evidence
+3. Application trust resolver
+4. Verified signer
+5. Separate authority decision
+
+Text equivalent: Bounded identity material becomes authentication evidence, an application-owned resolver evaluates trust, and only then can a separate authority decision consider the verified signer.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- A public key identifies verification material; it does not grant an action.
+- Ed25519, P-256, and future suites enter through the same bounded verification port.
+- HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and other transports deliver evidence but never authorize effects.
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| The suite is unsupported | Rejected | Install or supply an explicit compatible suite implementation. |
+| The signer is valid but untrusted | Denied | Change trust policy or use a trusted identity; do not infer trust from signature validity. |
+| The resolver is unavailable | Indeterminate | Restore trust evidence and evaluate again without performing an effect. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+You are integrating OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, application identities, or another cryptographic suite.
+
+## Do not use this when
+
+You are looking for permission scope; identity alone cannot express the complete effect boundary.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Identity & trust](/identity-trust) — Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.
+- [Trust boundaries](/authority/execute) — Authorization before provider entry.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Production operations
+
+Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
+
+## Recommended: [Inspect the Runtime API](/reference/runtime-api)
+
+See the exact HTTPS boundary, outcomes, and recovery operations.
+
+## Run the open runtime
+
+- [Runtime contract](/reference/runtime-api) — Endpoints, limits, trust boundaries, and closed outcomes.
+- [Deployment architecture](/identity-trust/how-it-works) — Separate durable state, custody, trust, and provider gateways.
+- [Receipts and disclosure](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Preserve evidence while minimizing exposed detail.
+
+## Respond safely
+
+- [Lifecycle and recovery](/operations/execution-lifecycle) — Know when to retry, resume, reconcile, or stop.
+- [Operational evidence](/assurance) — Trace procedures and claims to a qualified release.
+- [Testing tools](/developers) — Exercise denial, replay, mutation, and provider uncertainty.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.runtime/1 · Product contract: auths.page.operations.runtime/1_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Back up and restore
+
+Restore state without reopening replay, budget, use, or recovery windows.
+
+## A restore is a semantic exercise
+
+Quiesce or fence writers, restore an atomic state image, validate monotonic metadata, replay adversarial fixtures, reconcile nonterminal provider observations, and only then return the runtime to readiness.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.backup/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Configure key custody
+
+Keep signing material non-exportable and observable without logging secrets.
+
+## The runtime asks a signer; it does not own key bytes
+
+Use a custody adapter that returns suite-labelled public descriptors and signs bounded requests. Private material must remain inside the selected HSM, KMS, enclave, or application-owned signer.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.custody/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Configure durable state
+
+Preserve replay, use, budget, recovery, and receipt invariants across restarts.
+
+## Reservations must be atomic and durable
+
+Do not split replay, budget, use, execution, and receipt state across stores that cannot preserve their transaction boundary. A restart must never make a consumed effect appear unused.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.state/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Configure provider gateways
+
+Acquire provider credentials only after authorization and durable reservation.
+
+## Only opaque verified commands cross the boundary
+
+The adapter receives an SDK-minted command and bounded execution context. It never accepts caller-constructed authorization flags. It reports applied, not applied, or possible outcomes without guessing.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.gateways/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Configure trust and profiles
+
+Version accepted roots, resolvers, suites, and domain semantics independently.
+
+## Rotate trust without migrating authority
+
+Identity evidence and verification suites are replaceable inputs. Roll out new roots or suites with an explicit overlap window, negative fixtures, rollback, and post-rotation evidence review.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.trust/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Deploy the open runtime
+
+Place the Auths runtime behind TLS with explicit dependency ownership.
+
+## Deploy one closed gateway
+
+Terminate trusted TLS, isolate c
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/llms.txt b/public/llms.txt
index 2ba6b9f..ae3bbef 100644
--- a/public/llms.txt
+++ b/public/llms.txt
@@ -1,17 +1,85 @@
 # Auths documentation
 
-> Auths is a proof-carrying authority and execution-evidence layer for people,
-> workloads, and agents. Prefer canonical Markdown sources below.
+> Canonical, release-pinned documentation for people and agents.
 
-- [Start: protect one REST effect](/guides/protect-rest-effect.md)
-- [Start: delegate to an agent](/start/delegate-agent.md)
-- [Start: verify a receipt](/start/verify-receipt.md)
-- [Concepts](/concepts/index.md)
-- [Architecture](/architecture/index.md)
-- [Trust boundaries](/architecture/trust-boundaries/index.md)
-- [SDK reference](/sdk.md)
-- [Runtime API reference](/reference/runtime-api.md)
-- [Operations](/operations/index.md)
-- [Integrations](/integrations/index.md)
-- [Assurance](/assurance/index.md)
-- [Machine-readable reference manifest](/reference-manifest.json)
+- [Auths documentation](/index.md) — Precise, portable authority for people and agents.
+- [Agents](/agents.md) — Give an agent narrow, inspectable authority instead of ambient credentials.
+- [Require approval for an agent plan](/agents/approved-plans.md) — Bind human or organizational approval to exact ordered plan bytes.
+- [How Auths works for agents](/agents/how-auths-works.md) — Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
+- [Use Auths from an MCP client](/agents/mcp/client.md) — Let an agent harness propose bounded tool calls without receiving provider credentials.
+- [Protect an MCP server](/agents/mcp/protect-server.md) — Place provider access behind an opaque verified-command boundary.
+- [Handoff across agents](/agents/multi-agent.md) — Attenuate authority at every agent boundary.
+- [Delegate one tool](/agents/quickstart.md) — Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.
+- [Agent skills and plugins](/agents/skills-and-plugins.md) — Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.
+- [Assurance](/assurance.md) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
+- [Authority](/authority.md) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
+- [Trust boundaries](/authority/execute.md) — Authorization before provider entry.
+- [Authority lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle.md) — Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
+- [Auths in fifteen minutes](/authority/model.md) — Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.
+- [Approval-bound plans](/authority/plans/approvals.md) — Bind threshold or ordered approval to the exact operations, bytes, and order under review.
+- [Receipts and disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure.md) — Verify outcome evidence while revealing only what the viewer is authorized to inspect.
+- [Developers](/developers.md) — Find SDKs, Runtime APIs, tested examples, integrations, versioning, and extension contracts.
+- [Auths CLI](/developers/cli.md) — Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.
+- [Outcomes and errors](/developers/errors.md) — Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.
+- [Integrations](/developers/integrations.md) — Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
+- [Capability integrations](/developers/integrations/capabilities.md) — Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.
+- [Cloud IAM integrations](/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md) — Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.
+- [Identity and trust integrations](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md) — Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
+- [Policy engine integrations](/developers/integrations/policy.md) — Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.
+- [Build an application profile](/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md) — Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.
+- [Transport integrations](/developers/integrations/transport.md) — Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.
+- [Use the Runtime API](/developers/runtime-api.md) — Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.
+- [Choose an Auths SDK](/developers/sdks.md) — Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
+- [Test Auths outcomes](/developers/testing.md) — Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.
+- [Versions and compatibility](/developers/versioning.md) — Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
+- [Get started](/get-started.md) — Choose the shortest safe path from an outcome to working Auths authority.
+- [Adopt Auths incrementally](/get-started/adoption.md) — Protect one high-value effect beside the systems you already operate.
+- [Move beyond ambient API keys](/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md) — Keep provider keys inside the gateway and give callers exact authority instead.
+- [Bind existing approvals](/get-started/adoption/approvals.md) — Turn approval evidence into exact transaction context, never reusable ambient permission.
+- [Bridge existing capabilities](/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md) — Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority without inventing properties they do not provide.
+- [Compose with cloud IAM](/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md) — Use workload identity and short-lived credentials without making IAM the application-effect model.
+- [Cut over one protected effect](/get-started/adoption/cutover.md) — Enforce, observe, reconcile, and roll back through one existing gateway.
+- [Keep OAuth and OIDC](/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md) — Retain login and session identity while adding bounded effect authority.
+- [Plan an Auths adoption](/get-started/adoption/plan.md) — Inventory effects and boundaries without collecting credentials or unnecessary business data.
+- [Compose with policy engines](/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md) — Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit bounded context.
+- [Verify in shadow mode](/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md) — Compare Auths decisions with current enforcement without authorizing or executing effects.
+- [Add Auths to signed requests](/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md) — Keep request authentication while binding authority to exact application bytes.
+- [Choose your Auths path](/get-started/choose.md) — Describe the boundary you need and get one deterministic starting recommendation.
+- [Evaluate Auths](/get-started/evaluate.md) — Run deterministic success and failure fixtures before choosing an integration.
+- [Delegate one action to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent.md) — Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.
+- [Protect one local effect](/get-started/paths/application.md) — Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.
+- [Authorize across companies](/get-started/paths/cross-company.md) — Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.
+- [Protect a service effect](/get-started/paths/runtime.md) — Submit exact authority to the open production Runtime API and preserve recovery state.
+- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification.md) — Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.
+- [Before you begin](/get-started/prerequisites.md) — Prepare only the runtime, trust, state, and custody inputs your chosen path actually needs.
+- [Delegate one tool to an agent](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md) — Give an agent one narrow tool and reject widening.
+- [Run one approved plan](/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md) — Bind approval to an exact ordered plan and reject substitution.
+- [Swap identity suites](/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md) — Keep authority semantics stable across identity suites.
+- [Protect one REST effect locally](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md) — Complete one exact REST-shaped effect and prove changed bytes fail closed.
+- [Verify authority offline](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md) — Verify proof and receipt bytes without a network dependency.
+- [Resume uncertain execution safely](/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md) — Resume an opaque execution reference and prohibit a fresh retry.
+- [Execute through the open runtime](/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md) — Complete one runtime effect and prove exact replay is denied.
+- [Identity & trust](/identity-trust.md) — Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.
+- [How identity and trust fit](/identity-trust/how-it-works.md) — Authenticate a signer without turning identity, cryptography, or transport into authority.
+- [Production operations](/operations.md) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
+- [Back up and restore](/operations/backup-and-restore.md) — Restore state without reopening replay, budget, use, or recovery windows.
+- [Configure key custody](/operations/configure/custody.md) — Keep signing material non-exportable and observable without logging secrets.
+- [Configure durable state](/operations/configure/durable-state.md) — Preserve replay, use, budget, recovery, and receipt invariants across restarts.
+- [Configure provider gateways](/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md) — Acquire provider credentials only after authorization and durable reservation.
+- [Configure trust and profiles](/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md) — Version accepted roots, resolvers, suites, and domain semantics independently.
+- [Deploy the open runtime](/operations/deploy-runtime.md) — Place the Auths runtime behind TLS with explicit dependency ownership.
+- [Evaluate the runtime locally](/operations/evaluate-locally.md) — Exercise the production boundary with development custody and state before deployment.
+- [Execution lifecycle](/operations/execution-lifecycle.md) — Separate parsing, authorization, durable reservation, provider observation, recovery, and terminal evidence.
+- [Incident response runbooks](/operations/incidents.md) — Stop, preserve evidence, reconcile, recover, and escalate without widening authority.
+- [Observe Auths safely](/operations/observability.md) — Measure liveness, readiness, dependencies, outcomes, and latency without leaking authority.
+- [Retain and disclose receipts](/operations/receipt-retention.md) — Preserve evidence while minimizing sensitive operational detail.
+- [Recover and reconcile](/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md) — Resume the same execution identity after uncertain provider outcomes.
+- [Upgrade and roll back](/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md) — Change runtime bytes without splitting semantic, state, or documentation identities.
+- [APIs & SDKs](/reference.md) — Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.
+- [CLI reference](/reference/cli.md) — Command contracts generated from the compiled Auths command graph.
+- [Stable error reference](/reference/errors.md) — Machine-stable error identities grouped by the caller's safe response.
+- [Evidence manifest](/reference/evidence.md) — Resolve public claims to exact release evidence and limitations.
+- [Profiles](/reference/profiles.md) — Closed and application-owned profiles that map domain actions into Auths semantics.
+- [Runtime API reference](/reference/runtime-api.md) — The HTTPS production runtime contract.
+- [Schemas](/reference/schemas.md) — Canonical inputs, bounded wire forms, receipts, and disclosure views.
+- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk.md) — The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
diff --git a/public/operations.md b/public/operations.md
index b4edc38..7656388 100644
--- a/public/operations.md
+++ b/public/operations.md
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ See the exact HTTPS boundary, outcomes, and recovery operations.
 ## Run the open runtime
 
 - [Runtime contract](/reference/runtime-api) — Endpoints, limits, trust boundaries, and closed outcomes.
-- [Deployment architecture](/architecture) — Separate durable state, custody, trust, and provider gateways.
-- [Receipts and disclosure](/start/verify-receipt) — Preserve evidence while minimizing exposed detail.
+- [Deployment architecture](/identity-trust/how-it-works) — Separate durable state, custody, trust, and provider gateways.
+- [Receipts and disclosure](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Preserve evidence while minimizing exposed detail.
 
 ## Respond safely
 
diff --git a/public/operations/custody.md b/public/operations/configure/custody.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/operations/custody.md
rename to public/operations/configure/custody.md
diff --git a/public/operations/durable-state.md b/public/operations/configure/durable-state.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/operations/durable-state.md
rename to public/operations/configure/durable-state.md
diff --git a/public/operations/provider-gateways.md b/public/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/operations/provider-gateways.md
rename to public/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md
diff --git a/public/operations/trust-and-profiles.md b/public/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/operations/trust-and-profiles.md
rename to public/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md
diff --git a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
index adf8c20..b2f5bbb 100644
--- a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
+++ b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ You are performing effect-free offline verification.
 
 ## Continue from here
 
-- [Protect a service effect](/get-started/runtime) — Submit exact authority to the open production Runtime API and preserve recovery state.
+- [Protect a service effect](/get-started/paths/runtime) — Submit exact authority to the open production Runtime API and preserve recovery state.
 - [Production operations](/operations) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
diff --git a/public/operations/incident-response.md b/public/operations/incidents.md
similarity index 100%
rename from public/operations/incident-response.md
rename to public/operations/incidents.md
diff --git a/public/reference-manifest.json b/public/reference-manifest.json
index c8e1a94..3a23f0d 100644
--- a/public/reference-manifest.json
+++ b/public/reference-manifest.json
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "schema": "auths.docs.reference-manifest/1",
   "surfaces": [
-    { "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "kind": "sdk-reference", "path": "/reference/sdk", "source": "/sdk.md" },
+    { "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "kind": "sdk-reference", "path": "/reference/sdk", "source": "/reference/sdk.md" },
     { "id": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "kind": "runtime-api-reference", "path": "/reference/runtime-api", "source": "/reference/runtime-api.md" }
   ],
   "operations": ["auths.operation.create/1", "auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"],
diff --git a/public/reference.md b/public/reference.md
index 4882475..3ea9607 100644
--- a/public/reference.md
+++ b/public/reference.md
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while staying on the same operation.
 
 ## Understand the contracts
 
-- [Product vocabulary](/concepts) — Connect symbols to the meaning they project.
-- [Trust boundaries](/architecture/trust-boundaries) — Know what each operation accepts and refuses to infer.
+- [Product vocabulary](/authority/model) — Connect symbols to the meaning they project.
+- [Trust boundaries](/authority/execute) — Know what each operation accepts and refuses to infer.
 - [Source and evidence](/assurance) — Trace generated reference facts to a release.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.reference/1 · Product contract: auths.page.reference/1_
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk.md b/public/reference/sdk.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f8f8d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/sdk.md
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# SDK reference
+
+Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify precise authority through Rust, TypeScript, or Python.
+
+## Install
+
+### rust
+
+```bash
+# Install the Rust SDK
+cargo add auths-sdk
+
+```
+
+### typescript
+
+```bash
+# Install the TypeScript SDK
+npm install @auths-dev/sdk
+
+```
+
+### python
+
+```bash
+# Install the Python SDK
+python -m pip install auths
+
+```
+
+
+---
+
+# Create
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
+
+This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+
+
+---
+
+# Delegate
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.delegate/1`.
+
+This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+
+
+---
+
+# Execute
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.execute/1`.
+
+This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+
+
+---
+
+# Resume
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.resume/1`.
+
+This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+
+
+---
+
+# Verify
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.verify/1`.
+
+This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/create.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/create.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79c04a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/sdk/sections/create.md
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# Create
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
+
+This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/delegate.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/delegate.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e5ee963
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/sdk/sections/delegate.md
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# Delegate
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.delegate/1`.
+
+This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/execute.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/execute.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbb9b4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/sdk/sections/execute.md
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# Execute
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.execute/1`.
+
+This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/introduction.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/introduction.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7cb29d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/sdk/sections/introduction.md
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# SDK reference
+
+Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify precise authority through Rust, TypeScript, or Python.
+
+## Install
+
+### rust
+
+```bash
+# Install the Rust SDK
+cargo add auths-sdk
+
+```
+
+### typescript
+
+```bash
+# Install the TypeScript SDK
+npm install @auths-dev/sdk
+
+```
+
+### python
+
+```bash
+# Install the Python SDK
+python -m pip install auths
+
+```
+
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/resume.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/resume.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec6d342
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/sdk/sections/resume.md
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# Resume
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.resume/1`.
+
+This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/verify.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/verify.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..10c374c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/sdk/sections/verify.md
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# Verify
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.verify/1`.
+
+This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+
diff --git a/public/sdk.md b/public/sdk.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b40b731..0000000
--- a/public/sdk.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Auths SDK Reference
-
-Use the Rust, TypeScript, and Python SDKs to create, delegate, execute, resume,
-and verify precise authority over one shared semantic core. Each language panel
-names the actual installed symbol; equivalent semantics do not imply identical
-language-level facade shapes.
-
-This reference is divided into independently copyable sections under `/sdk/sections/`.
diff --git a/public/sdk/sections/create.md b/public/sdk/sections/create.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 8cf33b9..0000000
--- a/public/sdk/sections/create.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Open an Auths session
-
-Start from explicit authority and an explicit integration. TypeScript uses
-`development.createAuths`; Python uses `development.create_auths`. Rust exposes
-the native authoring and `Verifier` components beneath the product session.
-
-The development integration uses ephemeral custody and in-memory state. A
-production composition must supply qualified custody, trust, and durable state.
diff --git a/public/sdk/sections/delegate.md b/public/sdk/sections/delegate.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d0af224..0000000
--- a/public/sdk/sections/delegate.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-# Delegate narrower authority
-
-TypeScript and Python use `Auths.delegate`. Rust uses
-`auths_author::plan_child_grant` before invoking custody. Every child boundary
-must be no broader than its parent across profile, permissions, validity,
-audience, action, budget, depth, status, assurance, and critical extensions.
diff --git a/public/sdk/sections/execute.md b/public/sdk/sections/execute.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 43273f5..0000000
--- a/public/sdk/sections/execute.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Execute through a closed gateway
-
-TypeScript and Python use `Auths.execute` with exactly one profile action or
-ordered plan plus its closed provider. Rust runtimes implement the typed
-`ProofExchangeService` boundary. Provider credentials remain unreachable until
-native authorization and durable reservation succeed.
-
-The result preserves completed, denied, indeterminate, and recoverable states.
diff --git a/public/sdk/sections/introduction.md b/public/sdk/sections/introduction.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 70b1f39..0000000
--- a/public/sdk/sections/introduction.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-# Auths SDK Reference
-
-Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify precise authority. Each language
-panel names the actual installed symbol for that SDK surface.
-
-The language changes. The meaning of authority does not.
-
-## Install
-
-### Rust
-
-```sh
-# Install the Rust SDK
-cargo add auths-sdk
-```
-
-### TypeScript
-
-```sh
-# Install the TypeScript SDK
-npm install @auths-dev/sdk
-```
-
-### Python
-
-```sh
-# Install the Python SDK
-python -m pip install auths
-```
diff --git a/public/sdk/sections/resume.md b/public/sdk/sections/resume.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b1f436c..0000000
--- a/public/sdk/sections/resume.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-# Resume without repeating the effect
-
-Continue the exact recoverable execution represented by an SDK-minted opaque
-reference. Resume preserves the original authority, command, durable
-reservation, and provider-observation state.
-
-TypeScript uses `Auths.resume`, Python uses `Auths.resume`, and the Rust MCP
-session exposes its typed recovery operation. A caller cannot manufacture a
-reference for a different command.
diff --git a/public/sdk/sections/verify.md b/public/sdk/sections/verify.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 3ff91fe..0000000
--- a/public/sdk/sections/verify.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-# Verify the proof locally
-
-Rust uses `Verifier::verify`. TypeScript loads the effect-free verifier from
-`@auths-dev/sdk/verify`. Python uses `auths.verify.verify`. All consume bounded
-bytes and return a closed authorized, denied, or indeterminate outcome without
-performing an application effect.
diff --git a/public/search-index.json b/public/search-index.json
index 4a877c5..51a47c1 100644
--- a/public/search-index.json
+++ b/public/search-index.json
@@ -1,22 +1,595 @@
 {
   "schema": "auths.docs.search-index/1",
   "synonyms": {
-    "permission": ["authority", "authorization"],
-    "agent": ["delegate", "actor"],
-    "audit": ["receipt", "evidence"],
-    "api": ["runtime", "endpoint"],
-    "sdk": ["rust", "typescript", "python"]
+    "permission": [
+      "authority",
+      "authorization"
+    ],
+    "agent": [
+      "delegate",
+      "actor"
+    ],
+    "audit": [
+      "receipt",
+      "evidence"
+    ],
+    "api": [
+      "runtime",
+      "endpoint"
+    ],
+    "sdk": [
+      "rust",
+      "typescript",
+      "python"
+    ]
   },
   "pages": [
-    { "id": "auths.page.home/1", "path": "/", "title": "Auths documentation" },
-    { "id": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "path": "/guides/protect-rest-effect", "title": "Protect a REST effect" },
-    { "id": "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1", "path": "/start/delegate-agent", "title": "Delegate to an agent" },
-    { "id": "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1", "path": "/start/verify-receipt", "title": "Verify a receipt" },
-    { "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "path": "/reference/sdk", "title": "SDK reference" },
-    { "id": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "path": "/reference/runtime-api", "title": "Runtime API reference" },
-    { "id": "auths.page.architecture.system-map/1", "path": "/architecture", "title": "Architecture" },
-    { "id": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1", "path": "/operations", "title": "Operations" },
-    { "id": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1", "path": "/integrations", "title": "Integrations" },
-    { "id": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "path": "/assurance", "title": "Assurance" }
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.home/1",
+      "path": "/",
+      "title": "Auths documentation",
+      "description": "Precise, portable authority for people and agents.",
+      "section": "home"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents/1",
+      "path": "/agents",
+      "title": "Agents",
+      "description": "Give an agent narrow, inspectable authority instead of ambient credentials.",
+      "section": "agents"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1",
+      "path": "/agents/approved-plans",
+      "title": "Require approval for an agent plan",
+      "description": "Bind human or organizational approval to exact ordered plan bytes.",
+      "section": "agents"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1",
+      "path": "/agents/how-auths-works",
+      "title": "How Auths works for agents",
+      "description": "Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.",
+      "section": "agents"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1",
+      "path": "/agents/mcp/client",
+      "title": "Use Auths from an MCP client",
+      "description": "Let an agent harness propose bounded tool calls without receiving provider credentials.",
+      "section": "agents"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1",
+      "path": "/agents/mcp/protect-server",
+      "title": "Protect an MCP server",
+      "description": "Place provider access behind an opaque verified-command boundary.",
+      "section": "agents"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1",
+      "path": "/agents/multi-agent",
+      "title": "Handoff across agents",
+      "description": "Attenuate authority at every agent boundary.",
+      "section": "agents"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1",
+      "path": "/agents/quickstart",
+      "title": "Delegate one tool",
+      "description": "Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.",
+      "section": "agents"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.skills/1",
+      "path": "/agents/skills-and-plugins",
+      "title": "Agent skills and plugins",
+      "description": "Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.",
+      "section": "agents"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
+      "path": "/assurance",
+      "title": "Assurance",
+      "description": "Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.",
+      "section": "assurance"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority/1",
+      "path": "/authority",
+      "title": "Authority",
+      "description": "Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1",
+      "path": "/authority/execute",
+      "title": "Trust boundaries",
+      "description": "Authorization before provider entry.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1",
+      "path": "/authority/lifecycle",
+      "title": "Authority lifecycle",
+      "description": "Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.concepts.tour/1",
+      "path": "/authority/model",
+      "title": "Auths in fifteen minutes",
+      "description": "Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1",
+      "path": "/authority/plans/approvals",
+      "title": "Approval-bound plans",
+      "description": "Bind threshold or ordered approval to the exact operations, bytes, and order under review.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1",
+      "path": "/authority/receipts/disclosure",
+      "title": "Receipts and disclosure",
+      "description": "Verify outcome evidence while revealing only what the viewer is authorized to inspect.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers/1",
+      "path": "/developers",
+      "title": "Developers",
+      "description": "Find SDKs, Runtime APIs, tested examples, integrations, versioning, and extension contracts.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.cli/1",
+      "path": "/developers/cli",
+      "title": "Auths CLI",
+      "description": "Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.errors/1",
+      "path": "/developers/errors",
+      "title": "Outcomes and errors",
+      "description": "Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
+      "path": "/developers/integrations",
+      "title": "Integrations",
+      "description": "Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1",
+      "path": "/developers/integrations/capabilities",
+      "title": "Capability integrations",
+      "description": "Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.integrations.cloud/1",
+      "path": "/developers/integrations/cloud-iam",
+      "title": "Cloud IAM integrations",
+      "description": "Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1",
+      "path": "/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust",
+      "title": "Identity and trust integrations",
+      "description": "Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.integrations.policy/1",
+      "path": "/developers/integrations/policy",
+      "title": "Policy engine integrations",
+      "description": "Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1",
+      "path": "/developers/integrations/profile-kit",
+      "title": "Build an application profile",
+      "description": "Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.integrations.transport/1",
+      "path": "/developers/integrations/transport",
+      "title": "Transport integrations",
+      "description": "Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1",
+      "path": "/developers/runtime-api",
+      "title": "Use the Runtime API",
+      "description": "Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks/1",
+      "path": "/developers/sdks",
+      "title": "Choose an Auths SDK",
+      "description": "Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.testing/1",
+      "path": "/developers/testing",
+      "title": "Test Auths outcomes",
+      "description": "Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.versioning/1",
+      "path": "/developers/versioning",
+      "title": "Versions and compatibility",
+      "description": "Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start/1",
+      "path": "/get-started",
+      "title": "Get started",
+      "description": "Choose the shortest safe path from an outcome to working Auths authority.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.adopt/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/adoption",
+      "title": "Adopt Auths incrementally",
+      "description": "Protect one high-value effect beside the systems you already operate.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/adoption/api-keys",
+      "title": "Move beyond ambient API keys",
+      "description": "Keep provider keys inside the gateway and give callers exact authority instead.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.approvals/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/adoption/approvals",
+      "title": "Bind existing approvals",
+      "description": "Turn approval evidence into exact transaction context, never reusable ambient permission.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/adoption/capabilities",
+      "title": "Bridge existing capabilities",
+      "description": "Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority without inventing properties they do not provide.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam",
+      "title": "Compose with cloud IAM",
+      "description": "Use workload identity and short-lived credentials without making IAM the application-effect model.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.cutover/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/adoption/cutover",
+      "title": "Cut over one protected effect",
+      "description": "Enforce, observe, reconcile, and roll back through one existing gateway.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc",
+      "title": "Keep OAuth and OIDC",
+      "description": "Retain login and session identity while adding bounded effect authority.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.plan/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/adoption/plan",
+      "title": "Plan an Auths adoption",
+      "description": "Inventory effects and boundaries without collecting credentials or unnecessary business data.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/adoption/policy-engines",
+      "title": "Compose with policy engines",
+      "description": "Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit bounded context.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode",
+      "title": "Verify in shadow mode",
+      "description": "Compare Auths decisions with current enforcement without authorizing or executing effects.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/adoption/signed-requests",
+      "title": "Add Auths to signed requests",
+      "description": "Keep request authentication while binding authority to exact application bytes.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.choose/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/choose",
+      "title": "Choose your Auths path",
+      "description": "Describe the boundary you need and get one deterministic starting recommendation.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.evaluate/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/evaluate",
+      "title": "Evaluate Auths",
+      "description": "Run deterministic success and failure fixtures before choosing an integration.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.agent/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/paths/agent",
+      "title": "Delegate one action to an agent",
+      "description": "Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.local/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/paths/application",
+      "title": "Protect one local effect",
+      "description": "Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.cross-company/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/paths/cross-company",
+      "title": "Authorize across companies",
+      "description": "Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.runtime/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/paths/runtime",
+      "title": "Protect a service effect",
+      "description": "Submit exact authority to the open production Runtime API and preserve recovery state.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.verify/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/paths/verification",
+      "title": "Verify without executing",
+      "description": "Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.prerequisites/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/prerequisites",
+      "title": "Before you begin",
+      "description": "Prepare only the runtime, trust, state, and custody inputs your chosen path actually needs.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation",
+      "title": "Delegate one tool to an agent",
+      "description": "Give an agent one narrow tool and reject widening.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan",
+      "title": "Run one approved plan",
+      "description": "Bind approval to an exact ordered plan and reject substitution.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap",
+      "title": "Swap identity suites",
+      "description": "Keep authority semantics stable across identity suites.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect",
+      "title": "Protect one REST effect locally",
+      "description": "Complete one exact REST-shaped effect and prove changed bytes fail closed.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification",
+      "title": "Verify authority offline",
+      "description": "Verify proof and receipt bytes without a network dependency.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/recovery",
+      "title": "Resume uncertain execution safely",
+      "description": "Resume an opaque execution reference and prohibit a fresh retry.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect",
+      "title": "Execute through the open runtime",
+      "description": "Complete one runtime effect and prove exact replay is denied.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
+      "path": "/identity-trust",
+      "title": "Identity & trust",
+      "description": "Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.",
+      "section": "identity-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
+      "path": "/identity-trust/how-it-works",
+      "title": "How identity and trust fit",
+      "description": "Authenticate a signer without turning identity, cryptography, or transport into authority.",
+      "section": "identity-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
+      "path": "/operations",
+      "title": "Production operations",
+      "description": "Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.backup/1",
+      "path": "/operations/backup-and-restore",
+      "title": "Back up and restore",
+      "description": "Restore state without reopening replay, budget, use, or recovery windows.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.custody/1",
+      "path": "/operations/configure/custody",
+      "title": "Configure key custody",
+      "description": "Keep signing material non-exportable and observable without logging secrets.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.state/1",
+      "path": "/operations/configure/durable-state",
+      "title": "Configure durable state",
+      "description": "Preserve replay, use, budget, recovery, and receipt invariants across restarts.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.gateways/1",
+      "path": "/operations/configure/provider-gateways",
+      "title": "Configure provider gateways",
+      "description": "Acquire provider credentials only after authorization and durable reservation.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.trust/1",
+      "path": "/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles",
+      "title": "Configure trust and profiles",
+      "description": "Version accepted roots, resolvers, suites, and domain semantics independently.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.deploy/1",
+      "path": "/operations/deploy-runtime",
+      "title": "Deploy the open runtime",
+      "description": "Place the Auths runtime behind TLS with explicit dependency ownership.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.evaluate/1",
+      "path": "/operations/evaluate-locally",
+      "title": "Evaluate the runtime locally",
+      "description": "Exercise the production boundary with development custody and state before deployment.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1",
+      "path": "/operations/execution-lifecycle",
+      "title": "Execution lifecycle",
+      "description": "Separate parsing, authorization, durable reservation, provider observation, recovery, and terminal evidence.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents/1",
+      "path": "/operations/incidents",
+      "title": "Incident response runbooks",
+      "description": "Stop, preserve evidence, reconcile, recover, and escalate without widening authority.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.observability/1",
+      "path": "/operations/observability",
+      "title": "Observe Auths safely",
+      "description": "Measure liveness, readiness, dependencies, outcomes, and latency without leaking authority.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.receipts/1",
+      "path": "/operations/receipt-retention",
+      "title": "Retain and disclose receipts",
+      "description": "Preserve evidence while minimizing sensitive operational detail.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.recovery/1",
+      "path": "/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation",
+      "title": "Recover and reconcile",
+      "description": "Resume the same execution identity after uncertain provider outcomes.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.upgrade/1",
+      "path": "/operations/upgrade-and-rollback",
+      "title": "Upgrade and roll back",
+      "description": "Change runtime bytes without splitting semantic, state, or documentation identities.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference/1",
+      "path": "/reference",
+      "title": "APIs & SDKs",
+      "description": "Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.",
+      "section": "reference"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.cli/1",
+      "path": "/reference/cli",
+      "title": "CLI reference",
+      "description": "Command contracts generated from the compiled Auths command graph.",
+      "section": "reference"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.errors/1",
+      "path": "/reference/errors",
+      "title": "Stable error reference",
+      "description": "Machine-stable error identities grouped by the caller's safe response.",
+      "section": "reference"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.evidence/1",
+      "path": "/reference/evidence",
+      "title": "Evidence manifest",
+      "description": "Resolve public claims to exact release evidence and limitations.",
+      "section": "reference"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.profiles/1",
+      "path": "/reference/profiles",
+      "title": "Profiles",
+      "description": "Closed and application-owned profiles that map domain actions into Auths semantics.",
+      "section": "reference"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
+      "path": "/reference/runtime-api",
+      "title": "Runtime API reference",
+      "description": "The HTTPS production runtime contract.",
+      "section": "reference"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.schemas/1",
+      "path": "/reference/schemas",
+      "title": "Schemas",
+      "description": "Canonical inputs, bounded wire forms, receipts, and disclosure views.",
+      "section": "reference"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
+      "path": "/reference/sdk",
+      "title": "SDK reference",
+      "description": "The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.",
+      "section": "reference"
+    }
   ]
 }
diff --git a/public/sitemap.xml b/public/sitemap.xml
index ddf473c..ecedd32 100644
--- a/public/sitemap.xml
+++ b/public/sitemap.xml
@@ -1,14 +1,84 @@
 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 <urlset xmlns="http://www.sitemaps.org/schemas/sitemap/0.9">
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/guides/protect-rest-effect</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/start/delegate-agent</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/start/verify-receipt</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/concepts</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/architecture</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/sdk</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/runtime-api</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/integrations</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/approved-plans</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/how-auths-works</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/mcp/client</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/mcp/protect-server</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/multi-agent</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/quickstart</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/skills-and-plugins</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/execute</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/lifecycle</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/model</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/plans/approvals</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/receipts/disclosure</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/cli</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/errors</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/integrations</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/integrations/capabilities</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/integrations/cloud-iam</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/integrations/policy</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/integrations/profile-kit</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/integrations/transport</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/runtime-api</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/sdks</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/testing</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/versioning</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/adoption</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/adoption/api-keys</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/adoption/approvals</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/adoption/capabilities</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/adoption/cutover</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/adoption/plan</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/adoption/policy-engines</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/adoption/signed-requests</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/choose</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/evaluate</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/paths/agent</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/paths/application</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/paths/cross-company</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/paths/runtime</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/paths/verification</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/prerequisites</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/recovery</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/how-it-works</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/backup-and-restore</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/configure/custody</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/configure/durable-state</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/configure/provider-gateways</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/deploy-runtime</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/evaluate-locally</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/execution-lifecycle</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/incidents</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/observability</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/receipt-retention</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/upgrade-and-rollback</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/cli</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/errors</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/evidence</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/profiles</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/runtime-api</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/schemas</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/sdk</loc></url>
 </urlset>
diff --git a/public/start/delegate-agent.md b/public/start/delegate-agent.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 014f28d..0000000
--- a/public/start/delegate-agent.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-# Delegate to an agent
-
-Pass on narrower authority without widening.
-
-## Delegation only gets narrower
-
-An agent receives less authority than its parent, never more.
-
-## Run the scenario
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.delegation/1`.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
diff --git a/public/start/verify-receipt.md b/public/start/verify-receipt.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a4e3953..0000000
--- a/public/start/verify-receipt.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-# Verify a receipt
-
-Verify portable evidence and disclose it safely.
-
-## Evidence without oversharing
-
-Begin with a bounded summary and require authorization before revealing sensitive detail.
-
-## Run the scenario
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1`.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
diff --git a/schemas/content.ts b/schemas/content.ts
index 9c88c35..95a8dee 100644
--- a/schemas/content.ts
+++ b/schemas/content.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { pageKinds, type PageKind } from "./docs-contract.ts";
+import type { PageType, SiteSection } from "../app/lib/site-tree.ts";
 
 export const pageDepths = ["understand", "start", "build", "operate", "inspect", "verify"] as const;
 export type PageDepth = (typeof pageDepths)[number];
@@ -45,7 +45,11 @@ export type ContentSection = NarrativeSection | GeneratedFactSection | TestedSce
 export type AuthoredPageSource = Readonly<{
   id: string;
   path: `/${string}`;
-  kind: PageKind;
+  pageType: PageType;
+  section: SiteSection;
+  parent: string | null;
+  navGroup: string;
+  order: number;
   title: string;
   description: string;
   depth: PageDepth;
@@ -131,12 +135,12 @@ function parseSection(input: unknown): ContentSection {
   });
 }
 
-export function parseAuthoredPageSource(input: unknown): AuthoredPageSource {
+export type AuthoredPageContent = Omit<AuthoredPageSource, "path" | "pageType" | "section" | "parent" | "navGroup" | "order">;
+
+export function parseAuthoredPageContent(input: unknown): AuthoredPageContent {
   const value = record(input, "authored page");
-  exactKeys(value, ["depth", "description", "id", "kind", "owner", "path", "sections", "status", "title", "uses"], "authored page");
+  exactKeys(value, ["depth", "description", "id", "owner", "sections", "status", "title", "uses"], "authored page");
   if (typeof value.id !== "string" || !identity.test(value.id)) throw new TypeError("page identity is invalid");
-  if (typeof value.path !== "string" || !value.path.startsWith("/") || (value.path.length > 1 && value.path.endsWith("/"))) throw new TypeError("page path is invalid");
-  if (!pageKinds.includes(value.kind as PageKind)) throw new TypeError("page kind is invalid");
   if (!pageDepths.includes(value.depth as PageDepth)) throw new TypeError("page depth is invalid");
   if (!pageStatuses.includes(value.status as PageStatus)) throw new TypeError("page status is invalid");
   if (value.owner !== "editorial" && value.owner !== "generated") throw new TypeError("page owner is invalid");
@@ -145,8 +149,6 @@ export function parseAuthoredPageSource(input: unknown): AuthoredPageSource {
   if (new Set(sections.map((section) => section.id)).size !== sections.length) throw new TypeError("page section identity is duplicated");
   return Object.freeze({
     id: value.id,
-    path: value.path as `/${string}`,
-    kind: value.kind as PageKind,
     title: boundedText(value.title, "page title", 160),
     description: boundedText(value.description, "page description", 320),
     depth: value.depth as PageDepth,
diff --git a/schemas/docs-contract.ts b/schemas/docs-contract.ts
index d609785..5488acd 100644
--- a/schemas/docs-contract.ts
+++ b/schemas/docs-contract.ts
@@ -4,12 +4,11 @@ export type SdkLanguage = (typeof languages)[number];
 export const pageKinds = [
   "landing",
   "guide",
-  "sdk-reference",
-  "runtime-api-reference",
-  "architecture",
-  "operations",
+  "quickstart",
+  "concept",
+  "reference",
   "integration",
-  "assurance",
+  "runbook",
 ] as const;
 export type PageKind = (typeof pageKinds)[number];
 
diff --git a/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs b/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs
index 0210f76..f80db90 100644
--- a/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs
+++ b/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ test("renders the Auths documentation landing page", async () => {
 });
 
 test("renders the MDX technical guide with all language sources", async () => {
-  const response = await render("/guides/protect-rest-effect");
+  const response = await render("/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect");
   assert.equal(response.status, 200);
 
   const html = await response.text();
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ test("renders the MDX technical guide with all language sources", async () => {
 });
 
 test("renders the SDK reference with synchronized client examples", async () => {
-  const response = await render("/sdk");
+  const response = await render("/reference/sdk");
   assert.equal(response.status, 200);
 
   const html = await response.text();
@@ -60,14 +60,14 @@ test("renders the SDK reference with synchronized client examples", async () =>
 
   assert.equal((html.match(/Copy for LLM/g) ?? []).length, 1);
   assert.equal((html.match(/Copy section for LLM/g) ?? []).length, 5);
-  assert.match(html, /\/sdk\/sections\/introduction\.md/);
-  assert.match(html, /\/sdk\/sections\/create\.md/);
-  assert.match(html, /\/sdk\/sections\/delegate\.md/);
-  assert.match(html, /\/sdk\/sections\/execute\.md/);
-  assert.match(html, /\/sdk\/sections\/resume\.md/);
-  assert.match(html, /\/sdk\/sections\/verify\.md/);
+  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/sdk\/sections\/introduction\.md/);
+  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/sdk\/sections\/create\.md/);
+  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/sdk\/sections\/delegate\.md/);
+  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/sdk\/sections\/execute\.md/);
+  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/sdk\/sections\/resume\.md/);
+  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/sdk\/sections\/verify\.md/);
 
-  const markdown = await readFile(new URL("../public/sdk/sections/introduction.md", import.meta.url), "utf8");
+  const markdown = await readFile(new URL("../public/reference/sdk/sections/introduction.md", import.meta.url), "utf8");
   assert.match(markdown, /cargo add auths-sdk/);
   assert.match(markdown, /npm install @auths-dev\/sdk/);
   assert.match(markdown, /python -m pip install auths/);
diff --git a/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs b/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
index 9ba9552..920e40b 100644
--- a/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
+++ b/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ import { affectedPages, verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts
 assert.ok(verifiedPageGraph.pages.length >= 12);
 assert.equal(new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.id)).size, verifiedPageGraph.pages.length);
 assert.equal(new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.path)).size, verifiedPageGraph.pages.length);
-for (const id of ["auths.page.home/1", "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"]) {
+for (const id of ["auths.page.home/1", "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"]) {
   assert.ok(verifiedPageGraph.pages.some((page) => page.id === id));
 }
 const delegationPages = affectedPages(["auths.operation.delegate/1"]).map((page) => page.id);
-for (const expected of ["auths.page.agents/1", "auths.page.authority/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1"]) {
+for (const expected of ["auths.page.agents/1", "auths.page.authority/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1"]) {
   assert.ok(delegationPages.includes(expected));
 }
diff --git a/tools/lint-content/site-tree.mjs b/tools/lint-content/site-tree.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4cb75fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/lint-content/site-tree.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { siteSections, siteTree } from "../../app/lib/site-tree.ts";
+import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
+
+const ids = new Set(siteTree.map((page) => page.id));
+const paths = new Set(siteTree.map((page) => page.path));
+assert.equal(ids.size, siteTree.length, "site tree has duplicate identities");
+assert.equal(paths.size, siteTree.length, "site tree has duplicate paths");
+
+for (const section of siteSections) {
+  assert.equal(siteTree.filter((page) => page.section === section && page.parent === null).length, 1, `${section} must have one root`);
+}
+
+for (const page of siteTree) {
+  if (page.parent === null) continue;
+  const parent = siteTree.find((candidate) => candidate.id === page.parent);
+  assert.ok(parent, `${page.id} has a missing parent`);
+  assert.equal(parent.section, page.section, `${page.id} crosses section ownership`);
+  const visited = new Set([page.id]);
+  let current = parent;
+  while (current) {
+    assert.ok(!visited.has(current.id), `${page.id} participates in a cycle`);
+    visited.add(current.id);
+    current = current.parent ? siteTree.find((candidate) => candidate.id === current.parent) : undefined;
+  }
+}
+
+for (const page of verifiedPageGraph.pages) {
+  assert.equal(siteTree.filter((candidate) => candidate.id === page.id).length, 1, `${page.id} must occur once in the tree`);
+  assert.equal(siteTree.find((candidate) => candidate.id === page.id)?.path, page.path, `${page.id} has a non-canonical path`);
+}
+
+const migration = JSON.parse(await readFile(new URL("../../content/route-migration.json", import.meta.url), "utf8"));
+assert.equal(migration.schema, "auths.docs.route-migration/1");
+const oldPaths = new Set(migration.entries.map((entry) => entry.from));
+assert.equal(oldPaths.size, migration.entries.length, "route migration has duplicate sources");
+for (const entry of migration.entries) {
+  assert.ok(["retained", "replaced", "merged", "deleted"].includes(entry.disposition), `invalid migration disposition for ${entry.from}`);
+  if (entry.disposition === "deleted") assert.equal(entry.to, null);
+  else assert.ok(paths.has(entry.to), `migration target does not exist: ${entry.to}`);
+}
+
+const canonicalPaths = new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.path));
+for (const entry of migration.entries) {
+  if (entry.from !== entry.to) assert.ok(!canonicalPaths.has(entry.from), `legacy path remains public: ${entry.from}`);
+}
+
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
index f851fa8..7050436 100644
--- a/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ const root = path.resolve(new URL("../..", import.meta.url).pathname);
 const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "public/reference-manifest.json"), "utf8"));
 for (const surface of manifest.surfaces) await access(path.join(root, "public", surface.source));
 const llms = await readFile(path.join(root, "public/llms.txt"), "utf8");
-for (const source of ["/sdk.md", "/reference/runtime-api.md"]) assert.ok(llms.includes(source));
+for (const source of ["/reference/sdk.md", "/reference/runtime-api.md"]) assert.ok(llms.includes(source));
 const full = await readFile(path.join(root, "public/llms-full.txt"), "utf8");
 assert.ok(full.length < 50_000);
-assert.doesNotMatch(full, /private key|BEGIN [A-Z ]+ KEY|gho_/i);
+assert.doesNotMatch(full, /-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----|gho_[A-Za-z0-9]/);
 for (const landing of topicLandings) {
   const page = pageById(landing.page);
   const markdown = await readFile(path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`), "utf8");
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/clean-generated.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/clean-generated.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..89d1737
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/clean-generated.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+import { readFile, rm } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+
+const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
+const retired = [
+  "public/adopt",
+  "public/architecture",
+  "public/architecture.md",
+  "public/concepts",
+  "public/concepts.md",
+  "public/guides",
+  "public/integrations",
+  "public/integrations.md",
+  "public/quickstarts",
+  "public/sdk.md",
+  "public/sdk",
+  "public/start",
+];
+
+await Promise.all(retired.map((target) => rm(path.join(root, target), { force: true, recursive: true })));
+
+const migration = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "content", "route-migration.json"), "utf8"));
+await Promise.all(migration.entries.flatMap((entry) => {
+  if (entry.from === entry.to) return [];
+  const relative = entry.from.slice(1);
+  return [
+    rm(path.join(root, "public", `${relative}.md`), { force: true }),
+    rm(path.join(root, "public", relative, "index.md"), { force: true }),
+  ];
+}));
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/generate-quickstarts.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/generate-quickstarts.mjs
index ccc0142..c1ce799 100644
--- a/tools/render-markdown/generate-quickstarts.mjs
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/generate-quickstarts.mjs
@@ -6,8 +6,10 @@ import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
 
 const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
 for (const quickstart of quickstarts) {
-  const lines = [`# ${quickstart.title}`, "", quickstart.description, "", `Scenario: \`${quickstart.id}\` · Expected time: ${quickstart.minutes} minutes`, "", "## 1. Start from a clean consumer", "", "Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.", "", "## 2. Name the exact boundary", "", `- Allowed: ${quickstart.permitted}`, `- Prohibited: ${quickstart.prohibited}`, "", "## 3. Execute the permitted effect", "", `Expected outcome: \`${quickstart.success}\`.`, "", "## 4. Break safely", "", `Expected stable denial: \`${quickstart.failure}\`. The provider is not reached.`, "", "## 5. Continue", "", "Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.", "", `[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/${quickstart.slug}.json)`, "", `_Contract digest: ${verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest}_`, ""];
-  const output = path.join(root, "public", "quickstarts", `${quickstart.slug}.md`);
+  const page = verifiedPageGraph.pages.find((candidate) => candidate.uses.scenarios.includes(quickstart.id) && candidate.path.endsWith(`/quickstarts/${quickstart.slug}`));
+  if (!page) throw new TypeError(`quickstart page is missing: ${quickstart.id}`);
+  const lines = [`# ${quickstart.title}`, "", quickstart.description, "", `Scenario: \`${quickstart.id}\` · Expected time: ${quickstart.minutes} minutes`, "", "## 1. Start from a clean consumer", "", "Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.", "", "## 2. Name the exact boundary", "", `- Allowed: ${quickstart.permitted}`, `- Prohibited: ${quickstart.prohibited}`, "", "## 3. Execute the permitted effect", "", `Expected outcome: \`${quickstart.success}\`.`, "", "## 4. Break safely", "", `Expected stable denial: \`${quickstart.failure}\`. The provider is not reached.`, "", "## 5. Continue", "", "Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.", "", `[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/${quickstart.slug}.json)`, "", `_Page identity: ${page.id} · Contract digest: ${verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest}_`, ""];
+  const output = path.join(root, "public", "get-started", "quickstarts", `${quickstart.slug}.md`);
   await mkdir(path.dirname(output), { recursive: true });
   await writeFile(output, `${lines.join("\n")}\n`, "utf8");
 }
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/generate-sdk-reference.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/generate-sdk-reference.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7495f17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/generate-sdk-reference.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import contract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
+import { sdkInstallCommands } from "../../app/lib/sdk-languages.ts";
+
+const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
+const output = path.join(root, "public", "reference", "sdk");
+await mkdir(path.join(output, "sections"), { recursive: true });
+
+const introduction = [
+  "# SDK reference",
+  "",
+  "Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify precise authority through Rust, TypeScript, or Python.",
+  "",
+  "## Install",
+  "",
+  ...Object.entries(sdkInstallCommands).flatMap(([language, command]) => [`### ${language}`, "", "```bash", command, "```", ""]),
+].join("\n");
+await writeFile(path.join(output, "sections", "introduction.md"), `${introduction}\n`);
+
+const complete = [introduction];
+for (const operation of contract.operations) {
+  const section = operation.id.split(".").at(-1).split("/")[0];
+  const markdown = [
+    `# ${section[0].toUpperCase()}${section.slice(1)}`,
+    "",
+    `Generated operation: \`${operation.id}\`.`,
+    "",
+    `This section is resolved from product contract \`${contract.digest}\`.`,
+    "",
+  ].join("\n");
+  await writeFile(path.join(output, "sections", `${section}.md`), `${markdown}\n`);
+  complete.push(markdown);
+}
+await writeFile(`${output}.md`, `${complete.join("\n\n---\n\n")}\n`);
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/generate-site-indexes.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/generate-site-indexes.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d3cf8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/generate-site-indexes.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+import { readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
+
+const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
+const pages = [...verifiedPageGraph.pages].sort((left, right) => left.path.localeCompare(right.path));
+const search = {
+  schema: "auths.docs.search-index/1",
+  synonyms: {
+    permission: ["authority", "authorization"],
+    agent: ["delegate", "actor"],
+    audit: ["receipt", "evidence"],
+    api: ["runtime", "endpoint"],
+    sdk: ["rust", "typescript", "python"],
+  },
+  pages: pages.map(({ id, path: pagePath, title, description, section }) => ({ id, path: pagePath, title, description, section })),
+};
+await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", "search-index.json"), `${JSON.stringify(search, null, 2)}\n`);
+
+const sitemap = [
+  '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>',
+  '<urlset xmlns="http://www.sitemaps.org/schemas/sitemap/0.9">',
+  ...pages.map((page) => `  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev${page.path}</loc></url>`),
+  "</urlset>",
+  "",
+].join("\n");
+await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", "sitemap.xml"), sitemap);
+
+const llms = [
+  "# Auths documentation",
+  "",
+  "> Canonical, release-pinned documentation for people and agents.",
+  "",
+  ...pages.map((page) => `- [${page.title}](${page.path === "/" ? "/index.md" : `${page.path}.md`}) — ${page.description}`),
+  "",
+].join("\n");
+await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", "llms.txt"), llms);
+
+const markdown = [];
+for (const page of pages.filter((candidate) => candidate.path !== "/")) {
+  try {
+    markdown.push(await readFile(path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`), "utf8"));
+  } catch {
+    continue;
+  }
+}
+await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", "llms-full.txt"), markdown.join("\n\n---\n\n").slice(0, 48_000));
+

From dacd29bb2004e30a3d535b8b7a62c0726aed4af4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 23:00:27 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 19/29] docs: enforce topic shell and page contracts

---
 app/components/EditorialGuidePage.tsx       |  13 +-
 app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx           |   8 +-
 app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx         |  21 ++-
 app/components/TopicNavigation.tsx          |  42 +++++
 app/components/TopicShell.tsx               |  50 +++++
 app/get-started/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx |   7 +-
 app/globals.css                             | 199 ++++++++++++++++++++
 app/lib/content-graph.ts                    |   2 +
 package.json                                |   3 +-
 schemas/page-contract.ts                    |  26 +++
 tests/rendered-html.test.mjs                |  20 +-
 tools/lint-content/page-contracts.mjs       |  27 +++
 12 files changed, 385 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 app/components/TopicNavigation.tsx
 create mode 100644 app/components/TopicShell.tsx
 create mode 100644 schemas/page-contract.ts
 create mode 100644 tools/lint-content/page-contracts.mjs

diff --git a/app/components/EditorialGuidePage.tsx b/app/components/EditorialGuidePage.tsx
index 79b6ba0..e0d1bae 100644
--- a/app/components/EditorialGuidePage.tsx
+++ b/app/components/EditorialGuidePage.tsx
@@ -1,15 +1,13 @@
 import { contentPageById } from "../lib/content-graph";
 import { ContentSection } from "./content/ContentSection";
 import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
-import { SiteFooter } from "./SiteFooter";
-import { SiteHeader } from "./SiteHeader";
+import { TopicShell } from "./TopicShell";
 
 export function EditorialGuidePage({ pageId, eyebrow = "Get started" }: { pageId: string; eyebrow?: string }) {
   const page = contentPageById(pageId);
   return (
-    <div className="site-frame editorial-site">
-      <SiteHeader compact />
-      <main className="editorial-page">
+    <TopicShell pageId={page.id}>
+      <div className="editorial-page">
         <header className="editorial-hero">
           <p className="kicker">{eyebrow}</p>
           <h1>{page.title}</h1>
@@ -19,8 +17,7 @@ export function EditorialGuidePage({ pageId, eyebrow = "Get started" }: { pageId
         <div className="editorial-sections">
           {page.sections.map((section) => <ContentSection key={section.id} section={section} />)}
         </div>
-      </main>
-      <SiteFooter />
-    </div>
+      </div>
+    </TopicShell>
   );
 }
diff --git a/app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx b/app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx
index 8f232ae..ae9cb39 100644
--- a/app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx
+++ b/app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx
@@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ import { isSdkLanguage, sdkLanguageEvent, sdkLanguageStorageKey, type SdkLanguag
 import { CodeBlock, CodeBlockWithResult } from "./code";
 import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
 import { SdkLanguageSelector } from "./SdkLanguageSelector";
-import { SiteFooter } from "./SiteFooter";
-import { SiteHeader } from "./SiteHeader";
 
 export function QuickstartPage({ quickstart }: { quickstart: Quickstart }) {
   const [language, setLanguage] = useState<SdkLanguage>("typescript");
@@ -29,9 +27,7 @@ export function QuickstartPage({ quickstart }: { quickstart: Quickstart }) {
   }
   const result = JSON.stringify({ scenario: quickstart.id, kind: quickstart.success, effect: quickstart.effect }, null, 2);
   const failure = JSON.stringify({ scenario: quickstart.id, kind: "denied", code: quickstart.failure, providerReached: false }, null, 2);
-  return <div className="site-frame quickstart-site">
-    <SiteHeader compact />
-    <main className="quickstart-page">
+  return <div className="quickstart-page">
       <header className="editorial-hero quickstart-hero">
         <p className="kicker">Quickstart · {quickstart.minutes} minutes</p>
         <h1>{quickstart.title}</h1>
@@ -47,7 +43,5 @@ export function QuickstartPage({ quickstart }: { quickstart: Quickstart }) {
         <section id="fail-closed"><div><b>04</b><p className="kicker">Break safely</p><h2>Try the prohibited variant</h2><p>The provider remains untouched. The stable denial explains which invariant rejected the request.</p></div><CodeBlockWithResult code={quickstart.sources.failure[language]} label="Adversarial path" language={language} result={failure} /></section>
         <section id="next"><div><b>05</b><p className="kicker">Continue</p><h2>Move from proof to your architecture</h2><p>Keep this scenario as a conformance fixture while you replace development adapters one boundary at a time.</p><div className="quickstart-links"><Link href="/developers/testing">Test more failures →</Link><Link href="/operations">Operate the runtime →</Link></div></div></section>
       </div>
-    </main>
-    <SiteFooter />
   </div>;
 }
diff --git a/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx b/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx
index 5146ded..fd9fe78 100644
--- a/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx
+++ b/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 import Link from "next/link";
 import { pageById } from "../lib/page-graph";
 import { topicLandingByPage } from "../lib/topic-landings";
+import { siteNodeById } from "../lib/site-tree";
 import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
-import { SiteFooter } from "./SiteFooter";
-import { SiteHeader } from "./SiteHeader";
+import { TopicShell } from "./TopicShell";
 
 export function TopicLandingPage({ pageId }: { pageId: string }) {
   const page = pageById(pageId);
   const landing = topicLandingByPage(pageId);
   const recommended = pageById(landing.recommendation.target);
+  const section = siteNodeById(pageId).section;
+  const related = landing.groups.flatMap((group) => group.cards).filter((card) => siteNodeById(card.target).section !== section);
   return (
-    <div className="site-frame topic-site">
-      <SiteHeader compact />
-      <main className="topic-landing shell">
+    <TopicShell pageId={page.id}>
+      <div className="topic-landing shell">
         <header className="topic-hero">
           <p className="kicker">{landing.eyebrow}</p>
           <h1>{page.title}</h1>
@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ export function TopicLandingPage({ pageId }: { pageId: string }) {
           <PageActions source={`${page.path}.md`} />
         </header>
         <Link className="topic-recommendation" href={recommended.path}>
-          <span>Recommended path</span>
+          <span>{siteNodeById(recommended.id).section === section ? "Recommended path" : "Related topic"}</span>
           <div><h2>{landing.recommendation.label}</h2><p>{landing.recommendation.description}</p></div>
           <strong aria-hidden="true">→</strong>
         </Link>
@@ -29,16 +30,16 @@ export function TopicLandingPage({ pageId }: { pageId: string }) {
             <section key={group.title}>
               <h2>{group.title}</h2>
               <div className="topic-card-grid">
-                {group.cards.map((card) => {
+                {group.cards.filter((card) => siteNodeById(card.target).section === section).map((card) => {
                   const target = pageById(card.target);
                   return <Link className="topic-card" href={target.path} key={`${group.title}:${card.target}`}><h3>{card.title}</h3><p>{card.description}</p><span>Open guide <b aria-hidden="true">→</b></span></Link>;
                 })}
               </div>
             </section>
           ))}
+          {related.length > 0 && <section className="related-topics"><h2>Related topics</h2><div className="topic-card-grid">{related.map((card) => { const target = pageById(card.target); return <Link className="topic-card" href={target.path} key={`related:${card.target}`}><h3>{card.title}</h3><p>{card.description}</p><span>Open related topic <b aria-hidden="true">→</b></span></Link>; })}</div></section>}
         </div>
-      </main>
-      <SiteFooter />
-    </div>
+      </div>
+    </TopicShell>
   );
 }
diff --git a/app/components/TopicNavigation.tsx b/app/components/TopicNavigation.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cce3c68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/TopicNavigation.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+"use client";
+
+import Link from "next/link";
+import { useState } from "react";
+
+export type TopicNavGroup = Readonly<{
+  label: string;
+  items: readonly Readonly<{ id: string; href: string; label: string; depth: number }>[];
+}>;
+
+export function TopicNavigation({ activeId, groups, title }: { activeId: string; groups: readonly TopicNavGroup[]; title: string }) {
+  const [collapsed, setCollapsed] = useState(false);
+  const [mobileOpen, setMobileOpen] = useState(false);
+  return <>
+    <aside className={`topic-navigation${collapsed ? " topic-navigation-collapsed" : ""}${mobileOpen ? " topic-navigation-mobile-open" : ""}`} aria-label={`${title} navigation`}>
+      <div className="topic-navigation-head">
+        <strong>{title}</strong>
+        <button aria-label={`Collapse ${title} navigation`} onClick={() => { setCollapsed(true); setMobileOpen(false); }} type="button">‹</button>
+      </div>
+      {groups.map((group) => <div className="topic-navigation-group" key={group.label}>
+        <p>{group.label}</p>
+        {group.items.map((item) => <Link
+          aria-current={item.id === activeId ? "page" : undefined}
+          className={item.id === activeId ? "active" : ""}
+          href={item.href}
+          key={item.id}
+          style={{ paddingInlineStart: `${14 + item.depth * 12}px` }}
+        >{item.label}</Link>)}
+      </div>)}
+    </aside>
+    <button
+      aria-expanded={mobileOpen}
+      className={`topic-navigation-restore${collapsed ? " visible" : ""}`}
+      onClick={() => {
+        if (window.matchMedia("(max-width: 960px)").matches) setMobileOpen((current) => !current);
+        else setCollapsed(false);
+      }}
+      type="button"
+    ><span aria-hidden="true">☰</span>{title} navigation</button>
+  </>;
+}
+
diff --git a/app/components/TopicShell.tsx b/app/components/TopicShell.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..87afbbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/TopicShell.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+import Link from "next/link";
+import type { ReactNode } from "react";
+import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../lib/content-graph";
+import { ancestors, siteNodeById, siteTree } from "../lib/site-tree";
+import { SiteFooter } from "./SiteFooter";
+import { SiteHeader } from "./SiteHeader";
+import { TopicNavigation, type TopicNavGroup } from "./TopicNavigation";
+
+function depth(id: string, sectionRoot: string): number {
+  return Math.max(0, ancestors(id).filter((item) => item.id !== sectionRoot).length);
+}
+
+export function TopicShell({ children, pageId }: { children: ReactNode; pageId: string }) {
+  const current = siteNodeById(pageId);
+  const published = new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.id));
+  const sectionNodes = siteTree.filter((page) => page.section === current.section && published.has(page.id));
+  const sectionRoot = sectionNodes.find((page) => page.parent === null) ?? current;
+  const labels = [...new Set(sectionNodes.filter((page) => page.id !== sectionRoot.id).map((page) => page.navGroup))];
+  const groups: readonly TopicNavGroup[] = labels.map((label) => ({
+    label,
+    items: sectionNodes
+      .filter((page) => page.id !== sectionRoot.id && page.navGroup === label)
+      .sort((left, right) => left.path.localeCompare(right.path))
+      .map((page) => ({ id: page.id, href: page.path, label: page.title, depth: depth(page.id, sectionRoot.id) })),
+  }));
+  const sequence = sectionNodes.filter((page) => page.id !== sectionRoot.id).sort((left, right) => left.path.localeCompare(right.path));
+  const index = sequence.findIndex((page) => page.id === current.id);
+  const previous = index > 0 ? sequence[index - 1] : null;
+  const next = index >= 0 && index < sequence.length - 1 ? sequence[index + 1] : null;
+  const crumbs = [...ancestors(current.id), current].filter((page) => published.has(page.id));
+
+  return <div className="site-frame topic-shell-site">
+    <SiteHeader compact />
+    <div className="topic-shell">
+      <TopicNavigation activeId={current.id} groups={groups} title={sectionRoot.title} />
+      <main className="topic-shell-main">
+        <nav className="topic-breadcrumbs" aria-label="Breadcrumb">
+          {crumbs.map((crumb, crumbIndex) => <span key={crumb.id}>{crumbIndex > 0 && <b aria-hidden="true">/</b>}<Link aria-current={crumb.id === current.id ? "page" : undefined} href={crumb.path}>{crumb.title}</Link></span>)}
+        </nav>
+        {children}
+        {current.id !== sectionRoot.id && <nav className="topic-sequence" aria-label="Previous and next pages">
+          {previous ? <Link href={previous.path}><span>Previous</span><strong>← {previous.title}</strong></Link> : <span />}
+          {next ? <Link href={next.path}><span>Next</span><strong>{next.title} →</strong></Link> : <span />}
+        </nav>}
+      </main>
+    </div>
+    <SiteFooter />
+  </div>;
+}
+
diff --git a/app/get-started/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx b/app/get-started/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx
index 2da8dd4..cf708c1 100644
--- a/app/get-started/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx
+++ b/app/get-started/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 import { QuickstartPage } from "../../../components/QuickstartPage";
+import { TopicShell } from "../../../components/TopicShell";
 import { quickstartBySlug, quickstarts } from "../../../lib/quickstarts";
+import { contentPageByPath } from "../../../lib/content-graph";
 
 export function generateStaticParams() {
   return quickstarts.map((quickstart) => ({ slug: quickstart.slug }));
@@ -7,6 +9,7 @@ export function generateStaticParams() {
 
 export default async function Page({ params }: { params: Promise<{ slug: string }> }) {
   const { slug } = await params;
-  return <QuickstartPage quickstart={quickstartBySlug(slug)} />;
+  const quickstart = quickstartBySlug(slug);
+  const page = contentPageByPath(`/get-started/quickstarts/${slug}`);
+  return <TopicShell pageId={page.id}><QuickstartPage quickstart={quickstart} /></TopicShell>;
 }
-
diff --git a/app/globals.css b/app/globals.css
index cacfd7b..811ad79 100644
--- a/app/globals.css
+++ b/app/globals.css
@@ -3254,6 +3254,205 @@ pre {
   }
 }
 
+.topic-shell {
+  display: grid;
+  grid-template-columns: 250px minmax(0, 1fr);
+  min-height: calc(100vh - var(--header-height));
+}
+
+.topic-shell-main {
+  min-width: 0;
+  padding-bottom: 72px;
+}
+
+.topic-navigation {
+  align-self: stretch;
+  background: var(--paper);
+  border-right: 1px solid var(--line);
+  padding: 22px 14px 40px;
+  transition: transform 160ms ease, width 160ms ease;
+  width: 250px;
+}
+
+.topic-navigation-head {
+  align-items: center;
+  display: flex;
+  justify-content: space-between;
+  margin-bottom: 20px;
+  padding-inline: 10px 4px;
+}
+
+.topic-navigation-head strong {
+  font-size: 15px;
+}
+
+.topic-navigation-head button {
+  background: transparent;
+  border: 0;
+  border-radius: 5px;
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  cursor: pointer;
+  font-size: 24px;
+  line-height: 1;
+  padding: 2px 8px;
+}
+
+.topic-navigation-head button:hover,
+.topic-navigation-head button:focus-visible {
+  background: var(--paper-deep);
+  color: var(--forest);
+  outline: none;
+}
+
+.topic-navigation-group {
+  display: grid;
+  margin-top: 20px;
+}
+
+.topic-navigation-group p {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  font-size: 10px;
+  font-weight: 700;
+  letter-spacing: 0.12em;
+  margin: 0 0 5px;
+  padding-inline: 10px;
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+
+.topic-navigation-group a {
+  border-left: 2px solid transparent;
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 13px;
+  line-height: 1.35;
+  padding-block: 7px;
+}
+
+.topic-navigation-group a:hover,
+.topic-navigation-group a:focus-visible {
+  color: var(--forest);
+  outline: none;
+}
+
+.topic-navigation-group a.active {
+  background: var(--mint-bright);
+  border-left-color: var(--forest);
+  color: var(--forest);
+  font-weight: 650;
+}
+
+.topic-navigation-collapsed {
+  overflow: hidden;
+  padding: 0;
+  transform: translateX(-100%);
+  width: 0;
+}
+
+.topic-shell:has(.topic-navigation-collapsed) {
+  grid-template-columns: 0 minmax(0, 1fr);
+}
+
+.topic-navigation-restore {
+  align-items: center;
+  background: var(--surface);
+  border: 1px solid var(--line);
+  border-radius: 7px;
+  box-shadow: var(--shadow-sm);
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  cursor: pointer;
+  display: none;
+  font-size: 12px;
+  gap: 7px;
+  left: 14px;
+  padding: 7px 10px;
+  position: fixed;
+  top: calc(var(--header-height) + 12px);
+  z-index: 15;
+}
+
+.topic-navigation-restore.visible {
+  display: inline-flex;
+}
+
+.topic-breadcrumbs {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  display: flex;
+  flex-wrap: wrap;
+  font-size: 12px;
+  gap: 8px;
+  margin: 24px auto -28px;
+  max-width: 1000px;
+  padding-inline: 38px;
+}
+
+.topic-breadcrumbs span {
+  align-items: center;
+  display: inline-flex;
+  gap: 8px;
+}
+
+.topic-breadcrumbs a[aria-current="page"] {
+  color: var(--ink);
+  font-weight: 620;
+}
+
+.topic-sequence {
+  border-top: 1px solid var(--line);
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 20px;
+  grid-template-columns: 1fr 1fr;
+  margin: 56px auto 0;
+  max-width: 920px;
+  padding: 28px 38px 0;
+}
+
+.topic-sequence a {
+  display: grid;
+}
+
+.topic-sequence a:last-child {
+  text-align: right;
+}
+
+.topic-sequence span {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  font-size: 11px;
+  letter-spacing: 0.08em;
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+
+.topic-sequence strong {
+  color: var(--forest);
+  font-size: 14px;
+}
+
+@media (max-width: 960px) {
+  .topic-shell {
+    display: block;
+  }
+
+  .topic-navigation {
+    bottom: 0;
+    box-shadow: 18px 0 42px rgb(23 29 26 / 16%);
+    left: 0;
+    max-width: 86vw;
+    overflow-y: auto;
+    position: fixed;
+    top: var(--header-height);
+    transform: translateX(-100%);
+    width: 280px;
+    z-index: 30;
+  }
+
+  .topic-navigation-mobile-open {
+    transform: translateX(0);
+  }
+
+  .topic-navigation-restore,
+  .topic-navigation-restore.visible {
+    display: inline-flex;
+  }
+}
+
 @media (prefers-reduced-motion: reduce) {
   html {
     scroll-behavior: auto;
diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
index 76df9f0..7ee9183 100644
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import rawAdoptionPages from "../../content/adoption-pages.json" with { type: "j
 import rawOperationsPages from "../../content/operations-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import rawContract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
 import { parseAuthoredPageContent, type AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
+import { assertPageContract } from "../../schemas/page-contract.ts";
 import { siteNodeById, siteTree } from "./site-tree.ts";
 
 type ProductContract = Readonly<{
@@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ export function buildVerifiedPageGraph(pagesInput: unknown, contractInput: unkno
         if (!declared.includes(section.fact)) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} does not declare fact ${section.fact}`);
       }
     }
+    assertPageContract(page);
   }
   const published = new Set(pages.map((page) => page.id));
   for (const page of pages) {
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 0a59340..4e02e57 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
     "lint:bash": "node tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs",
     "lint:ownership": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs",
     "lint:ia": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/lint-content/site-tree.mjs",
+    "lint:page-contracts": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/lint-content/page-contracts.mjs",
     "docs:clean": "node tools/render-markdown/clean-generated.mjs",
     "docs:render-topic-landings": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-topic-landings.mjs",
     "docs:render-editorial-pages": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs",
@@ -25,7 +26,7 @@
     "examples:prepare": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/qualify-examples/build-quickstarts.mjs",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
     "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node --experimental-strip-types tools/build-page-model/check.mjs && node tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs && node tools/build-reference/check.mjs && node tools/render-markdown/check.mjs && node tools/release/check.mjs",
-    "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run lint:bash && npm run lint:ownership && npm run lint:ia && npm run test:contract && npm test"
+    "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run lint:bash && npm run lint:ownership && npm run lint:ia && npm run lint:page-contracts && npm run test:contract && npm test"
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@mdx-js/react": "3.1.1",
diff --git a/schemas/page-contract.ts b/schemas/page-contract.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..916ca8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/schemas/page-contract.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import type { AuthoredPageSource } from "./content.ts";
+
+const requiredSections = {
+  landing: ["overview"],
+  concept: ["model", "invariants", "failures", "next"],
+  guide: ["outcome", "prerequisites", "steps", "success", "failure", "next"],
+  quickstart: ["outcome"],
+  integration: ["ownership", "data-flow", "secrets", "state", "failures", "example", "limitations"],
+  reference: [],
+  runbook: ["owner", "preconditions", "commands", "observations", "stop", "recovery", "reconciliation", "retention", "escalation"],
+} as const;
+
+export function assertPageContract(page: AuthoredPageSource): void {
+  if (page.status !== "stable") return;
+  const sections = new Set(page.sections.map((section) => section.id));
+  for (const required of requiredSections[page.pageType]) {
+    if (!sections.has(required)) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} is missing required ${page.pageType} section ${required}`);
+  }
+  if (page.pageType === "reference" && !page.sections.some((section) => section.provenance === "generated-fact")) {
+    throw new TypeError(`${page.id} reference contains no generated facts`);
+  }
+  if (["guide", "quickstart", "integration", "runbook"].includes(page.pageType) && !page.sections.some((section) => section.provenance === "tested-scenario")) {
+    throw new TypeError(`${page.id} ${page.pageType} contains no qualified scenario`);
+  }
+}
+
diff --git a/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs b/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs
index f80db90..37da569 100644
--- a/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs
+++ b/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs
@@ -29,20 +29,20 @@ test("renders the Auths documentation landing page", async () => {
   assert.doesNotMatch(html, /codex-preview|react-loading-skeleton|Starter Project/i);
 });
 
-test("renders the MDX technical guide with all language sources", async () => {
+test("renders the qualified technical quickstart with all language sources", async () => {
   const response = await render("/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect");
   assert.equal(response.status, 200);
 
   const html = await response.text();
-  assert.match(html, /Protect one exact REST effect/);
+  assert.match(html, /Protect one REST effect locally/);
   assert.match(html, /cargo add auths-sdk/);
   assert.match(html, /npm install @auths-dev\/sdk/);
   assert.match(html, /python -m pip install auths/);
-  assert.match(html, /Outcome unknown/);
-  assert.match(html, /One semantic core/);
+  assert.match(html, /Perform the permitted effect/);
+  assert.match(html, /Try the prohibited variant/);
   assert.match(html, /Copy for LLM/);
   assert.match(html, /View as Markdown/);
-  assert.match(html, /Collapse documentation navigation/);
+  assert.match(html, /Collapse Get started navigation/);
 });
 
 test("renders the SDK reference with synchronized client examples", async () => {
@@ -93,3 +93,13 @@ test("renders the Runtime API with the shared reference layout", async () => {
   assert.match(html, /\/reference\/runtime-api\/sections\/resume\.md/);
   assert.match(html, /\/reference\/runtime-api\/sections\/receipt-summary\.md/);
 });
+
+test("renders topic-local navigation and location context", async () => {
+  const response = await render("/agents");
+  assert.equal(response.status, 200);
+  const html = await response.text();
+  assert.match(html, /Agents navigation/);
+  assert.match(html, /Agents navigation/);
+  assert.match(html, /aria-label="Breadcrumb"/);
+  assert.match(html, /Related topics/);
+});
diff --git a/tools/lint-content/page-contracts.mjs b/tools/lint-content/page-contracts.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2141dbe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/lint-content/page-contracts.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { assertPageContract } from "../../schemas/page-contract.ts";
+
+const dependencies = { operations: [], scenarios: ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"], endpoints: [], profiles: [], claims: [] };
+const narrative = (id) => ({ id, title: id, provenance: "editorial-narrative", body: [id] });
+const scenario = { id: "example", title: "Example", provenance: "tested-scenario", scenario: "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1" };
+const guide = {
+  id: "auths.page.contract-fixture/1",
+  path: "/fixture",
+  pageType: "guide",
+  section: "get-started",
+  parent: "auths.page.start/1",
+  navGroup: "Fixture",
+  order: 0,
+  title: "Fixture",
+  description: "Fixture",
+  depth: "start",
+  status: "stable",
+  owner: "editorial",
+  uses: dependencies,
+  sections: ["outcome", "prerequisites", "steps", "success", "failure", "next"].map(narrative).concat(scenario),
+};
+
+assert.doesNotThrow(() => assertPageContract(guide));
+assert.throws(() => assertPageContract({ ...guide, sections: guide.sections.filter((section) => section.id !== "failure") }), /missing required guide section failure/);
+assert.throws(() => assertPageContract({ ...guide, sections: guide.sections.filter((section) => section.provenance !== "tested-scenario") }), /contains no qualified scenario/);
+

From 01d1649e4d1d9d7fc59a9627ae65419a05a8a525 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 23:07:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 20/29] docs: rebuild executable get started journey

---
 app/[...slug]/page.tsx                        |   2 +
 app/components/QuickstartComparison.tsx       |  28 +
 app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx           |   2 +
 app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx     |  13 +-
 app/globals.css                               |   8 +
 app/lib/content-graph.ts                      |   9 +-
 app/lib/quickstarts.ts                        |   4 +
 app/lib/topic-landings.ts                     |  31 +-
 content/get-started-pages.ts                  | 212 +++++
 content/page-builders.ts                      | 137 +++
 public/agents.md                              |  22 +-
 public/assurance.md                           |  18 +-
 public/authority.md                           |  20 +-
 public/authority/lifecycle.md                 |   2 +-
 public/authority/model.md                     |   2 +-
 public/authority/plans/approvals.md           |   2 +-
 public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md       |   2 +-
 public/developers.md                          |  30 +-
 public/developers/integrations.md             |  15 +-
 public/get-started.md                         |  28 +-
 public/get-started/adoption.md                |  23 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md       |  32 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/approvals.md      |  30 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md   |  32 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md      |  32 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/cutover.md        |  32 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md     |  32 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/plan.md           |  32 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md |  32 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md    |  32 +-
 .../get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md   |  32 +-
 public/get-started/choose.md                  |  32 +-
 public/get-started/evaluate.md                |  30 +-
 public/get-started/paths.md                   |  18 +
 public/get-started/paths/agent.md             |  30 +-
 public/get-started/paths/application.md       |  30 +-
 public/get-started/paths/cross-company.md     |  30 +-
 public/get-started/paths/runtime.md           |  30 +-
 public/get-started/paths/verification.md      |  28 +-
 public/get-started/prerequisites.md           |  32 +-
 public/get-started/quickstarts.md             |  20 +
 public/identity-trust.md                      |  16 +-
 public/llms-full.txt                          | 872 ++++++++----------
 public/llms.txt                               |  56 +-
 public/operations.md                          |  32 +-
 public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md      |   2 +-
 public/reference.md                           |  24 +-
 public/search-index.json                      | 116 ++-
 public/sitemap.xml                            |   2 +
 tests/rendered-html.test.mjs                  |   2 +-
 50 files changed, 1550 insertions(+), 780 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 app/components/QuickstartComparison.tsx
 create mode 100644 content/get-started-pages.ts
 create mode 100644 content/page-builders.ts
 create mode 100644 public/get-started/paths.md
 create mode 100644 public/get-started/quickstarts.md

diff --git a/app/[...slug]/page.tsx b/app/[...slug]/page.tsx
index 06be1c2..a44cbdd 100644
--- a/app/[...slug]/page.tsx
+++ b/app/[...slug]/page.tsx
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../components/EditorialGuidePage";
+import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
 import { contentPageByPath, verifiedPageGraph } from "../lib/content-graph";
 
 export function generateStaticParams() {
@@ -10,5 +11,6 @@ export function generateStaticParams() {
 export default async function Page({ params }: { params: Promise<{ slug: string[] }> }) {
   const { slug } = await params;
   const page = contentPageByPath(`/${slug.join("/")}`);
+  if (page.pageType === "landing") return <TopicLandingPage pageId={page.id} />;
   return <EditorialGuidePage pageId={page.id} eyebrow={page.depth === "operate" ? "Operations" : page.depth === "inspect" ? "Reference" : "Guide"} />;
 }
diff --git a/app/components/QuickstartComparison.tsx b/app/components/QuickstartComparison.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86f8442
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/QuickstartComparison.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+import Link from "next/link";
+import { quickstarts } from "../lib/quickstarts";
+
+const boundaries: Readonly<Record<string, Readonly<{ runtime: string; state: string; custody: string }>>> = {
+  "local-rest-effect": { runtime: "In process", state: "In memory", custody: "Application signer" },
+  "runtime-effect": { runtime: "HTTPS runtime", state: "Durable reservation", custody: "Runtime signer" },
+  "agent-delegation": { runtime: "Local or remote", state: "Delegation uses", custody: "Issuer + gateway" },
+  "approved-plan": { runtime: "HTTPS runtime", state: "Plan + approvals", custody: "Organizations + runtime" },
+  "offline-verification": { runtime: "None", state: "None", custody: "Public verification only" },
+  recovery: { runtime: "HTTPS runtime", state: "Execution journal", custody: "Runtime signer" },
+  "identity-swap": { runtime: "In process", state: "Trust context", custody: "Suite adapters" },
+};
+
+export function QuickstartComparison() {
+  return <section className="quickstart-comparison" aria-labelledby="quickstart-comparison-title">
+    <h2 id="quickstart-comparison-title">Compare quickstarts</h2>
+    <div className="quickstart-comparison-scroll"><table>
+      <thead><tr><th>Project</th><th>Time</th><th>Runtime</th><th>Effect</th><th>State</th><th>Custody</th><th>Success</th><th>Failure</th></tr></thead>
+      <tbody>{quickstarts.map((item) => {
+        const boundary = boundaries[item.slug];
+        return <tr key={item.id}>
+          <th><Link href={`/get-started/quickstarts/${item.slug}`}>{item.title}</Link></th>
+          <td>{item.minutes} min</td><td>{boundary.runtime}</td><td><code>{item.effect}</code></td><td>{boundary.state}</td><td>{boundary.custody}</td><td><code>{item.success}</code></td><td><code>{item.failure}</code></td>
+        </tr>;
+      })}</tbody>
+    </table></div>
+  </section>;
+}
diff --git a/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx b/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx
index fd9fe78..054062a 100644
--- a/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx
+++ b/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { pageById } from "../lib/page-graph";
 import { topicLandingByPage } from "../lib/topic-landings";
 import { siteNodeById } from "../lib/site-tree";
 import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
+import { QuickstartComparison } from "./QuickstartComparison";
 import { TopicShell } from "./TopicShell";
 
 export function TopicLandingPage({ pageId }: { pageId: string }) {
@@ -25,6 +26,7 @@ export function TopicLandingPage({ pageId }: { pageId: string }) {
           <div><h2>{landing.recommendation.label}</h2><p>{landing.recommendation.description}</p></div>
           <strong aria-hidden="true">→</strong>
         </Link>
+        {page.id === "auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1" && <QuickstartComparison />}
         <div className="topic-groups">
           {landing.groups.map((group) => (
             <section key={group.title}>
diff --git a/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx b/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
index a1ef105..41eb220 100644
--- a/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
+++ b/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 import Link from "next/link";
 import type { ContentSection as ContentSectionModel } from "../../../schemas/content";
 import { TestedExample } from "../TestedExample";
+import { CodeGroup } from "../CodeGroup";
+import { quickstartByScenario } from "../../lib/quickstarts";
 
 const labels = {
   "editorial-narrative": "Editorial",
@@ -9,6 +11,7 @@ const labels = {
 } as const;
 
 export function ContentSection({ section }: { section: ContentSectionModel }) {
+  const qualified = section.provenance === "tested-scenario" ? quickstartByScenario(section.scenario) : null;
   const scenarioRoutes: Record<string, string> = {
     "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1": "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect",
     "auths.scenario.delegation/1": "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation",
@@ -22,7 +25,15 @@ export function ContentSection({ section }: { section: ContentSectionModel }) {
       <h2>{section.title}</h2>
       {section.provenance === "editorial-narrative" && section.body.map((paragraph) => <p key={paragraph}>{paragraph}</p>)}
       {section.provenance === "generated-fact" && <div className="generated-fact-reference"><code>{section.fact}</code><span>Resolved from the selected Auths release</span></div>}
-      {section.provenance === "tested-scenario" && <TestedExample scenario={section.scenario as `auths.scenario.${string}/${number}`}><p>This step is backed by installed Rust, TypeScript, and Python consumers with a normalized outcome.</p><Link className="text-link" href={scenarioRoutes[section.scenario] ?? "/developers"}>Open the tested scenario <span aria-hidden="true">→</span></Link></TestedExample>}
+      {section.provenance === "tested-scenario" && <TestedExample scenario={section.scenario as `auths.scenario.${string}/${number}`}>
+        <p>This step is backed by installed Rust, TypeScript, and Python consumers with a normalized outcome.</p>
+        {qualified && <CodeGroup snippets={([
+          ["Rust", "rust"],
+          ["TypeScript", "typescript"],
+          ["Python", "python"],
+        ] as const).map(([label, language]) => ({ label, language, code: qualified.sources.execute[language] }))} />}
+        <Link className="text-link" href={scenarioRoutes[section.scenario] ?? (qualified ? `/get-started/quickstarts/${qualified.slug}` : "/developers/testing")}>Open the tested scenario <span aria-hidden="true">→</span></Link>
+      </TestedExample>}
     </section>
   );
 }
diff --git a/app/globals.css b/app/globals.css
index 811ad79..fd39d42 100644
--- a/app/globals.css
+++ b/app/globals.css
@@ -2714,6 +2714,14 @@ pre {
   grid-template-columns: repeat(3, minmax(0, 1fr));
 }
 
+.quickstart-comparison { margin: 42px 0; }
+.quickstart-comparison > h2 { font-size: 1.35rem; margin-bottom: 14px; }
+.quickstart-comparison-scroll { overflow-x: auto; }
+.quickstart-comparison table { border-collapse: collapse; font-size: .82rem; min-width: 980px; width: 100%; }
+.quickstart-comparison th, .quickstart-comparison td { border-bottom: 1px solid var(--line); padding: 12px 10px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top; }
+.quickstart-comparison thead th { color: var(--muted); font-size: .72rem; letter-spacing: .04em; text-transform: uppercase; }
+.quickstart-comparison tbody th { font-weight: 600; min-width: 180px; }
+
 .topic-card {
   border: 1px solid var(--line);
   border-radius: 10px;
diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
index 7ee9183..8501ea8 100644
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import rawDeveloperPages from "../../content/developer-pages.json" with { type:
 import rawAgentIntegrationPages from "../../content/agent-integration-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import rawAdoptionPages from "../../content/adoption-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import rawOperationsPages from "../../content/operations-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
+import { getStartedPages } from "../../content/get-started-pages.ts";
 import rawContract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
 import { parseAuthoredPageContent, type AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
 import { assertPageContract } from "../../schemas/page-contract.ts";
@@ -84,7 +85,13 @@ export function buildVerifiedPageGraph(pagesInput: unknown, contractInput: unkno
   return Object.freeze({ contractDigest: contract.digest, pages: Object.freeze(pages) });
 }
 
-export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([...rawPages, ...rawDeveloperPages, ...rawAgentIntegrationPages, ...rawAdoptionPages, ...rawOperationsPages]);
+function replacePages(base: readonly unknown[], replacements: readonly unknown[]): readonly unknown[] {
+  const replacementIds = new Set(replacements.map((input) => (input as { id: string }).id));
+  return [...base.filter((input) => !replacementIds.has((input as { id: string }).id)), ...replacements];
+}
+
+const legacyPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = [...rawPages, ...rawDeveloperPages, ...rawAgentIntegrationPages, ...rawAdoptionPages, ...rawOperationsPages];
+export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze(replacePages(legacyPageInputs, getStartedPages));
 export const verifiedPageGraph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(authoredPageInputs, rawContract);
 
 export function contentPageByPath(path: string): AuthoredPageSource {
diff --git a/app/lib/quickstarts.ts b/app/lib/quickstarts.ts
index b3a65b1..a3b7331 100644
--- a/app/lib/quickstarts.ts
+++ b/app/lib/quickstarts.ts
@@ -14,3 +14,7 @@ export function quickstartBySlug(slug: string): Quickstart {
   if (!quickstart) throw new TypeError(`unknown quickstart ${slug}`);
   return quickstart;
 }
+
+export function quickstartByScenario(id: string): Quickstart | null {
+  return quickstarts.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id) ?? null;
+}
diff --git a/app/lib/topic-landings.ts b/app/lib/topic-landings.ts
index 1fd08a2..4aebe0a 100644
--- a/app/lib/topic-landings.ts
+++ b/app/lib/topic-landings.ts
@@ -1,9 +1,34 @@
-import rawLandings from "../../content/topic-landings.json" with { type: "json" };
-import { parseTopicLanding, type TopicLanding } from "../../schemas/topic-landing.ts";
+import type { TopicLanding } from "../../schemas/topic-landing.ts";
 import { verifiedPageGraph } from "./content-graph.ts";
+import { siteNodeById } from "./site-tree.ts";
 
 const pageIds = new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.id));
-export const topicLandings: readonly TopicLanding[] = Object.freeze(rawLandings.map(parseTopicLanding));
+const landingPages = verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => page.pageType === "landing"
+  && page.section !== "home"
+  && verifiedPageGraph.pages.some((candidate) => candidate.parent === page.id));
+
+export const topicLandings: readonly TopicLanding[] = Object.freeze(landingPages.map((page) => {
+  const descendants = verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((candidate) => candidate.parent === page.id);
+  const groups = [...new Set(descendants.map((candidate) => candidate.navGroup))].map((title) => ({
+    title,
+    cards: descendants.filter((candidate) => candidate.navGroup === title).map((candidate) => ({
+      target: candidate.id,
+      title: candidate.title,
+      description: candidate.description,
+    })),
+  }));
+  const recommendation = descendants[0];
+  return Object.freeze({
+    page: page.id,
+    eyebrow: siteNodeById(page.id).section === "get-started" ? "Get started" : page.title,
+    recommendation: Object.freeze({
+      target: recommendation.id,
+      label: recommendation.title,
+      description: recommendation.description,
+    }),
+    groups: Object.freeze(groups.map((group) => Object.freeze({ ...group, cards: Object.freeze(group.cards.map((card) => Object.freeze(card))) }))),
+  });
+}));
 
 for (const landing of topicLandings) {
   if (!pageIds.has(landing.page)) throw new TypeError(`unknown topic landing page ${landing.page}`);
diff --git a/content/get-started-pages.ts b/content/get-started-pages.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce848e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/get-started-pages.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+import { guide, integration, landing, quickstart } from "./page-builders.ts";
+
+const scenarios = {
+  local: "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
+  runtime: "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
+  agent: "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
+  plan: "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1",
+  verify: "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
+  recovery: "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
+  identity: "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1",
+} as const;
+
+const operationDependencies = { operations: [
+  "auths.operation.create/1",
+  "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+  "auths.operation.execute/1",
+  "auths.operation.resume/1",
+  "auths.operation.verify/1",
+] } as const;
+
+const pathGuide = (
+  id: string,
+  description: string,
+  scenario: string,
+  outcome: string,
+  prerequisites: string,
+  steps: string,
+  success: string,
+  failure: string,
+  next: string,
+) => guide({ id, description, scenario, outcome, prerequisites, steps, success, failure, next, dependencies: operationDependencies });
+
+const adoptionIntegration = (
+  id: string,
+  description: string,
+  scenario: string,
+  existingOwner: string,
+  boundary: string,
+) => integration({
+  id,
+  description,
+  scenario,
+  ownership: `${existingOwner} continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.`,
+  dataFlow: `${boundary} becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.`,
+  secrets: "Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.",
+  state: "The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.",
+  failures: "A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.",
+  limitations: "This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.",
+});
+
+export const getStartedPages: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([
+  landing(
+    "auths.page.start/1",
+    "Choose one concrete outcome and reach a verified, fail-closed result.",
+    "Start with the boundary you need to protect: a local application effect, a production runtime, an agent tool, an approved plan, offline verification, recovery, or identity exchange. Each path uses the same Auths meanings and ends with both a successful outcome and the failure that must remain closed.",
+    "start",
+  ),
+  guide({
+    id: "auths.page.start.prerequisites/1",
+    description: "Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.",
+    scenario: scenarios.local,
+    outcome: "You will have one maintained SDK, a supported runtime for that SDK, and an application effect that can be isolated behind a function or service boundary.",
+    prerequisites: "Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python. A local quickstart needs no hosted Auths runtime; production execution additionally needs an HTTPS runtime endpoint and its explicit trust configuration.",
+    steps: "Install one SDK, identify the exact effect to protect, and keep provider credentials outside the caller. Use the tested local scenario to confirm the toolchain before adding identity providers, approvals, or remote transport.",
+    success: "The installed consumer can create, execute, and verify the qualified local fixture, including its stable denial path.",
+    failure: "Stop if the SDK version, fixture release, or runtime contract does not match. Do not compensate by reconstructing Auths semantics in application code.",
+    next: "Choose the shortest outcome path for your system, then move to production operations only when the local boundary is clear.",
+    dependencies: operationDependencies,
+  }),
+  pathGuide(
+    "auths.page.start.choose/1",
+    "Select the shortest journey for the effect, actor, and operating boundary you have.",
+    scenarios.local,
+    "You will leave with one recommended quickstart, not a tour of every Auths feature.",
+    "Name the effect, who proposes it, where credentials live, whether approval is required, and whether execution is local or remote.",
+    "Use Local REST effect for an in-process boundary; Runtime effect for durable remote execution; Agent delegation for a narrower handoff; Approved plan for exact multi-step review; Offline verification for inert evidence; Recovery for ambiguous outcomes; Identity swap for cryptographic or identity agility.",
+    "The selected path demonstrates the same success and denial shapes your application must handle.",
+    "If you cannot describe the effect or provider boundary precisely, do not issue broad authority. Narrow the integration target first.",
+    "Open the chosen quickstart and run it unchanged before adapting it.",
+  ),
+  landing(
+    "auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1",
+    "Compare seven installed-artifact projects by boundary, state, custody, success, and failure.",
+    "Each quickstart is a small release-qualified project with synchronized Rust, TypeScript, and Python code. Pick the one whose effect and operating boundary match your first production question; the page keeps language selection stable across every step.",
+    "start",
+  ),
+  quickstart("auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1", "Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.", scenarios.local),
+  quickstart("auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1", "Execute one bounded effect through the production HTTPS runtime and durable state boundary.", scenarios.runtime),
+  quickstart("auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1", "Delegate one narrower tool action and prove that a broader action is denied.", scenarios.agent),
+  quickstart("auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1", "Bind approval to the exact bytes and order of a multi-step plan.", scenarios.plan),
+  quickstart("auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1", "Verify portable evidence without executing an effect or contacting a provider.", scenarios.verify),
+  quickstart("auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1", "Resume or reconcile an interrupted execution without blindly repeating the provider effect.", scenarios.recovery),
+  quickstart("auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1", "Exchange and verify identity material while keeping the authority workflow unchanged.", scenarios.identity),
+  landing(
+    "auths.page.get-started.paths/1",
+    "Choose an outcome path before learning the complete Auths model.",
+    "These paths connect a reader job to one qualified project. They introduce only the boundaries required for that outcome, then hand off to deeper Identity, Authority, Agents, Operations, or Developer documentation.",
+    "start",
+  ),
+  pathGuide(
+    "auths.page.start.local/1",
+    "Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.",
+    scenarios.local,
+    "A caller can perform one exact application effect and receives a decision and execution receipt.",
+    "Isolate the effect behind one function and keep its service credential outside untrusted caller code.",
+    "Create authority for the exact action and resource, execute it through the SDK boundary, and verify the returned receipt before reporting success.",
+    "The permitted request succeeds once and its receipt binds the authority, command, context, and outcome.",
+    "A changed resource, replayed authority, or mutated command is denied before the protected function runs.",
+    "Add durable runtime state when the effect must survive process or host failure.",
+  ),
+  pathGuide(
+    "auths.page.start.agent/1",
+    "Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.",
+    scenarios.agent,
+    "The agent receives delegable proof for one permitted operation and cannot widen it.",
+    "Identify the tool effect and place its real provider credential behind a trusted executor.",
+    "Create authority at the application boundary, delegate a narrower child to the agent, then send a sealed command to the executor.",
+    "The delegated action succeeds and returns evidence that can be verified independently of the agent's narrative.",
+    "Widening the action, resource, time, use count, budget, audience, or delegation depth fails closed.",
+    "Add approved plans if a human or second organization must review exact work before execution.",
+  ),
+  pathGuide(
+    "auths.page.start.runtime/1",
+    "Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.",
+    scenarios.runtime,
+    "An HTTPS caller can submit one bounded effect while credentials and durable state remain server-side.",
+    "Provide TLS, explicit trust configuration, durable state, signer custody, and a closed gateway for the provider effect.",
+    "Check health and version, create authority, submit the command, inspect the terminal outcome, and retain its receipt.",
+    "The runtime commits replay and budget state before the effect, and returns a stable outcome after execution.",
+    "Untrusted HTTP, contract mismatch, missing custody, or unavailable durable state stops execution rather than falling back to an unsafe path.",
+    "Continue to Production operations for topology, observability, recovery, and incident procedures.",
+  ),
+  pathGuide(
+    "auths.page.start.verify/1",
+    "Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.",
+    scenarios.verify,
+    "A verifier obtains a deterministic decision from bounded bytes, trust inputs, and verification time.",
+    "Obtain the exact evidence bytes and explicit trust context. Verification never infers trust from transport success.",
+    "Parse the bounded artifact through the SDK, provide trusted context, verify locally, and inspect only the disclosure view authorized for the caller.",
+    "Rust, TypeScript, and Python return the same verification outcome for the same bytes and context.",
+    "Mutation, unknown suite, mismatched verification method, wrong root, stale evidence, or unauthorized disclosure remains inert and fails closed.",
+    "Use Authority receipts for integrity semantics and Assurance for the exact evidence behind public claims.",
+  ),
+  pathGuide(
+    "auths.page.start.cross-company/1",
+    "Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.",
+    scenarios.plan,
+    "One company can delegate a precise repair to another company's agent while both retain their own identity, approval, and infrastructure boundaries.",
+    "Name each organization's trust evidence, the exact operation and resource, the approval threshold, the execution region, and the provider gateway that owns credentials.",
+    "Exchange public identity evidence, create and narrow authority, bind both approvals to the identical ordered plan, execute through the resource owner's gateway, then return bounded receipts.",
+    "Only the approved bytes execute, each plan member is consumed once and in order, and authorized readers can inspect a bounded summary.",
+    "Identity authentication, transport delivery, approval alone, changed plan bytes, wider delegation, replay, or provider uncertainty cannot silently become success.",
+    "Use Identity & trust for federation, Authority for plans, and Operations for provider-unknown reconciliation and evidence retention.",
+  ),
+  pathGuide(
+    "auths.page.start.evaluate/1",
+    "Evaluate Auths with deterministic positive and adversarial fixtures before choosing a deployment.",
+    scenarios.local,
+    "Your evaluation records which Auths boundaries solve a real problem and which adjacent systems remain responsible.",
+    "Select one sensitive effect and define the current identity, policy, approval, credential, retry, and audit behavior around it.",
+    "Run the matching quickstart, mutate its action and bytes, replay it, expire it, remove trust, and compare each stable outcome with your present system.",
+    "The evaluation demonstrates a useful reduction in ambient authority or ambiguity without requiring wholesale identity or policy replacement.",
+    "Reject the design if Auths merely duplicates an existing control without improving exact commitment, attenuation, recovery, or portable evidence.",
+    "If the boundary is useful, plan a shadow-mode integration around that single effect.",
+  ),
+  landing(
+    "auths.page.start.adopt/1",
+    "Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.",
+    "The adoption sequence is direct: model one effect, observe it in shadow mode, cut over its execution boundary, and expand only after the receipts and failure behavior are understood. Composition pages state exactly what Auths owns and what remains external.",
+    "build",
+  ),
+  pathGuide(
+    "auths.page.adopt.plan/1",
+    "Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.",
+    scenarios.local,
+    "A written adoption slice identifies the caller, authority issuer, trust inputs, state owner, signer, gateway, provider credential, and receipt consumer.",
+    "Bring the current request shape, identity evidence, policy decision, approval flow, credential location, retry behavior, and audit record for one operation.",
+    "Map each existing responsibility to Identity, Authority, Runtime, or the adjacent system; then run the closest quickstart and record deliberate differences.",
+    "Every responsibility has one owner and the first cutover does not require replacing unrelated systems.",
+    "Stop if provider credentials would enter an Auths artifact or if application code would reimplement attenuation or verification semantics.",
+    "Choose the relevant composition page and enter shadow mode.",
+  ),
+  adoptionIntegration("auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1", "Bind an existing signed request to narrower authority and execution state.", scenarios.local, "The request-signature layer", "The exact signed application bytes"),
+  adoptionIntegration("auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1", "Keep OAuth or OIDC authentication while adding effect-specific machine authority.", scenarios.identity, "The identity provider and OAuth resource server", "Validated issuer, subject, audience, and freshness evidence"),
+  adoptionIntegration("auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1", "Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.", scenarios.runtime, "The provider and its API-key lifecycle", "The application operation mapped to a gateway-held API call"),
+  adoptionIntegration("auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1", "Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.", scenarios.runtime, "Cloud IAM", "The authorized Auths command mapped to a least-privilege provider session"),
+  adoptionIntegration("auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1", "Use a Cedar, OPA, or relationship decision as explicit context without duplicating the policy engine.", scenarios.local, "The policy engine and its data model", "The decision and policy snapshot committed into trusted context"),
+  adoptionIntegration("auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1", "Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.", scenarios.agent, "The capability protocol", "The imported capability and its verified attenuation result"),
+  adoptionIntegration("auths.page.adopt.approvals/1", "Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.", scenarios.plan, "The approval system and approver authentication", "The approval response committed to the exact ordered plan request"),
+  pathGuide(
+    "auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1",
+    "Compare Auths decisions with live traffic without authorizing provider effects.",
+    scenarios.local,
+    "The team can measure agreement, denial reasons, missing context, and potential blast-radius reduction before cutover.",
+    "Mirror only bounded request inputs and remove secrets. Keep the current production enforcement path authoritative.",
+    "Create and verify Auths decisions without passing effect-capable handles to the gateway; record normalized outcomes alongside the current decision.",
+    "Expected requests agree and adversarial mutations are denied with stable reasons.",
+    "Any ambiguity, sensitive-data leakage, or disagreement blocks cutover until ownership and mappings are corrected.",
+    "Cut over exactly one effect once the observation window and failure criteria are satisfied.",
+  ),
+  pathGuide(
+    "auths.page.adopt.cutover/1",
+    "Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.",
+    scenarios.runtime,
+    "Callers can no longer reach the provider effect without verified authority and durable reservation.",
+    "Complete shadow mode, provision runtime dependencies, define stop conditions, retain the previous path behind an operator-controlled rollback, and ensure it cannot run concurrently.",
+    "Route the selected operation through the Auths gateway, verify terminal receipts, monitor denial and indeterminate outcomes, and exercise resume and reconciliation.",
+    "Success includes correct effects, stable denials, no replay, durable evidence, and a tested recovery path.",
+    "Rollback on unexplained denial, state inconsistency, custody failure, receipt loss, or provider ambiguity; never bypass Auths automatically.",
+    "Expand to the next effect only after operational ownership and evidence retention are routine.",
+  ),
+]);
diff --git a/content/page-builders.ts b/content/page-builders.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5dfdd2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/page-builders.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+import { siteNodeById } from "../app/lib/site-tree.ts";
+
+type Dependencies = Readonly<{
+  operations?: readonly string[];
+  scenarios?: readonly string[];
+  endpoints?: readonly string[];
+  profiles?: readonly string[];
+  claims?: readonly string[];
+}>;
+
+const uses = (dependencies: Dependencies = {}) => ({
+  operations: dependencies.operations ?? [],
+  scenarios: dependencies.scenarios ?? [],
+  endpoints: dependencies.endpoints ?? [],
+  profiles: dependencies.profiles ?? [],
+  claims: dependencies.claims ?? [],
+});
+
+const narrative = (id: string, title: string, body: string | readonly string[]) => ({
+  id,
+  title,
+  provenance: "editorial-narrative",
+  body: typeof body === "string" ? [body] : body,
+});
+
+const scenario = (id: string, scenarioId: string) => ({ id, title: "Run the qualified path", provenance: "tested-scenario", scenario: scenarioId });
+
+const base = (id: string, description: string, depth: string, dependencies: Dependencies, sections: readonly unknown[]) => ({
+  id,
+  title: siteNodeById(id).title,
+  description,
+  depth,
+  status: "stable",
+  owner: "editorial",
+  uses: uses(dependencies),
+  sections,
+});
+
+export const landing = (id: string, description: string, overview: string, depth = "understand") => base(id, description, depth, {}, [
+  narrative("overview", "Choose a useful next step", overview),
+]);
+
+export const quickstart = (id: string, description: string, scenarioId: string) => base(id, description, "start", { scenarios: [scenarioId] }, [
+  { ...scenario("outcome", scenarioId), title: "Run success and fail-closed paths" },
+]);
+
+export const guide = (input: Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  description: string;
+  scenario: string;
+  outcome: string;
+  prerequisites: string;
+  steps: string;
+  success: string;
+  failure: string;
+  next: string;
+  depth?: string;
+  dependencies?: Dependencies;
+}>) => base(input.id, input.description, input.depth ?? "build", {
+  ...input.dependencies,
+  scenarios: [...(input.dependencies?.scenarios ?? []), input.scenario],
+}, [
+  narrative("outcome", "Outcome", input.outcome),
+  narrative("prerequisites", "Before you begin", input.prerequisites),
+  narrative("steps", "Build the bounded path", input.steps),
+  scenario("example", input.scenario),
+  narrative("success", "Success means", input.success),
+  narrative("failure", "Fail closed", input.failure),
+  narrative("next", "Continue", input.next),
+]);
+
+export const concept = (input: Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  description: string;
+  model: string;
+  invariants: string;
+  failures: string;
+  next: string;
+  depth?: string;
+  dependencies?: Dependencies;
+}>) => base(input.id, input.description, input.depth ?? "understand", input.dependencies ?? {}, [
+  narrative("model", "Model", input.model),
+  narrative("invariants", "What remains true", input.invariants),
+  narrative("failures", "Where it fails closed", input.failures),
+  narrative("next", "Continue", input.next),
+]);
+
+export const integration = (input: Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  description: string;
+  scenario: string;
+  ownership: string;
+  dataFlow: string;
+  secrets: string;
+  state: string;
+  failures: string;
+  limitations: string;
+  dependencies?: Dependencies;
+}>) => base(input.id, input.description, "build", {
+  ...input.dependencies,
+  scenarios: [...(input.dependencies?.scenarios ?? []), input.scenario],
+}, [
+  narrative("ownership", "Ownership boundary", input.ownership),
+  narrative("data-flow", "Data flow", input.dataFlow),
+  narrative("secrets", "Secrets", input.secrets),
+  narrative("state", "State", input.state),
+  narrative("failures", "Failure ownership", input.failures),
+  scenario("example", input.scenario),
+  narrative("limitations", "Limitations", input.limitations),
+]);
+
+export const runbook = (input: Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  description: string;
+  scenario: string;
+  owner: string;
+  preconditions: string;
+  commands: string;
+  observations: string;
+  stop: string;
+  recovery: string;
+  reconciliation: string;
+  retention: string;
+  escalation: string;
+}>) => base(input.id, input.description, "operate", { scenarios: [input.scenario] }, [
+  narrative("owner", "Owner and severity", input.owner),
+  narrative("preconditions", "Preconditions", input.preconditions),
+  narrative("commands", "Tested commands", input.commands),
+  scenario("example", input.scenario),
+  narrative("observations", "Expected observations", input.observations),
+  narrative("stop", "Stop conditions", input.stop),
+  narrative("recovery", "Rollback or resume", input.recovery),
+  narrative("reconciliation", "Reconciliation", input.reconciliation),
+  narrative("retention", "Evidence retention", input.retention),
+  narrative("escalation", "Escalation", input.escalation),
+]);
+
diff --git a/public/agents.md b/public/agents.md
index d1706c7..bede83b 100644
--- a/public/agents.md
+++ b/public/agents.md
@@ -2,21 +2,23 @@
 
 Give an agent narrow, inspectable authority instead of ambient credentials.
 
-## Recommended: [Delegate one tool](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation)
+## Recommended: [How Auths works for agents](/agents/how-auths-works)
 
-Give an agent one narrow ability without a broad API key.
+Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
 
-## Build agent authority
+## Start
 
-- [Delegate without widening](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation) — Make each handoff narrower and independently verifiable.
-- [Protect an effect](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect) — Place the provider behind an authorization boundary.
-- [Verify what happened](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Return portable evidence rather than trusting an agent report.
+- [How Auths works for agents](/agents/how-auths-works) — Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
+- [Delegate one tool](/agents/quickstart) — Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.
 
-## Compose the stack
+## Delegate
 
-- [MCP and transports](/developers/integrations) — Delivery remains independent from authorization.
-- [Agent identity](/identity-trust) — Bring workload, user, or application trust evidence.
-- [Closed execution](/operations) — Keep real credentials outside the agent process.
+- [Require approval for an agent plan](/agents/approved-plans) — Bind human or organizational approval to exact ordered plan bytes.
+- [Handoff across agents](/agents/multi-agent) — Attenuate authority at every agent boundary.
+
+## Compose
+
+- [Agent skills and plugins](/agents/skills-and-plugins) — Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents/1 · Product contract: auths.page.agents/1_
 
diff --git a/public/assurance.md b/public/assurance.md
index 25fe857..00fa794 100644
--- a/public/assurance.md
+++ b/public/assurance.md
@@ -2,21 +2,9 @@
 
 Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
 
-## Recommended: [Start with the trust boundaries](/authority/execute)
+## Show what the evidence proves
 
-Understand the claims before inspecting their evidence.
+Every claim names its evidence, release, scope, and limitation.
 
-## Inspect evidence
-
-- [Architecture claims](/identity-trust/how-it-works) — See the semantic core and replaceable boundaries.
-- [Receipt verification](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Verify portable evidence without performing an effect.
-- [Generated contracts](/reference) — Inspect release-scoped SDK and runtime facts.
-
-## Understand limitations
-
-- [Operational scope](/operations) — Separate semantic assurance from deployment reliability.
-- [Composition boundaries](/developers/integrations) — See what adjacent identity and policy systems still own.
-- [Reproduce results](/developers) — Find fixtures, tests, versions, and source provenance.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1 · Product contract: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1_
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/authority.md b/public/authority.md
index 66f6e61..0feba80 100644
--- a/public/authority.md
+++ b/public/authority.md
@@ -2,21 +2,21 @@
 
 Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
 
-## Recommended: [Create and execute exact authority](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect)
+## Recommended: [Trust boundaries](/authority/execute)
 
-Start with one effect, one use, and evidence of the outcome.
+Authorization before provider entry.
 
-## Work with authority
+## Execute and recover
 
-- [Create](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect) — Describe one bounded action and who may perform it.
-- [Delegate](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation) — Narrow action, time, uses, budget, and delegation depth.
-- [Execute and recover](/operations) — Reserve durably, perform behind a closed gateway, and resume safely.
+- [Trust boundaries](/authority/execute) — Authorization before provider entry.
 
-## Understand the model
+## Model
 
-- [Authority lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Follow attenuation, use, budget, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
-- [Approval-bound plans](/authority/plans/approvals) — Bind review to exact members, bytes, order, and threshold.
-- [Receipts and disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure) — Verify evidence without revealing sensitive detail by default.
+- [Auths in fifteen minutes](/authority/model) — Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.
+
+## Lifecycle
+
+- [Authority lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority/1_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle.md b/public/authority/lifecycle.md
index fb82779..83a1a59 100644
--- a/public/authority/lifecycle.md
+++ b/public/authority/lifecycle.md
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.
 
 ## Continue from here
 
-- [Delegate one action to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.
+- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
 - [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
diff --git a/public/authority/model.md b/public/authority/model.md
index 54a762d..a9452ff 100644
--- a/public/authority/model.md
+++ b/public/authority/model.md
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ You only need an exact signature or endpoint field; open the generated reference
 
 ## Continue from here
 
-- [Protect one local effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.
+- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
 - [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
diff --git a/public/authority/plans/approvals.md b/public/authority/plans/approvals.md
index 7161950..9b16a69 100644
--- a/public/authority/plans/approvals.md
+++ b/public/authority/plans/approvals.md
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ A reusable human-approved flag or broad role is sufficient for the actual risk m
 
 ## Continue from here
 
-- [Authorize across companies](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.
+- [Cross-company authority](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
 - [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
diff --git a/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md b/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
index 43a49de..117ed82 100644
--- a/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
+++ b/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ You need to perform an effect; receipt verification is intentionally inert.
 
 ## Continue from here
 
-- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.
+- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
 - [Assurance](/assurance) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
diff --git a/public/developers.md b/public/developers.md
index 19ea356..04c9ea6 100644
--- a/public/developers.md
+++ b/public/developers.md
@@ -2,21 +2,31 @@
 
 Find SDKs, Runtime APIs, tested examples, integrations, versioning, and extension contracts.
 
-## Recommended: [Choose an SDK](/reference/sdk)
+## Recommended: [Integrations](/developers/integrations)
 
-Use the same five operations from Rust, TypeScript, or Python.
+Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
 
-## Build
+## Integrate and extend
 
-- [SDKs](/reference/sdk) — Language-aware operations, parameters, outcomes, and examples.
-- [Runtime API](/reference/runtime-api) — Integrate through the production HTTPS boundary.
-- [Quickstarts](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect) — Begin with a tested end-to-end outcome.
+- [Integrations](/developers/integrations) — Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
 
-## Extend and evaluate
+## SDKs
 
-- [Integrations](/developers/integrations) — Compose identity, policy, transport, custody, and providers.
-- [Agents and MCP](/agents) — Propose, authorize, execute, observe, and verify separately.
-- [Testing and evidence](/assurance) — Use deterministic fixtures and inspect assurance scope.
+- [Choose an Auths SDK](/developers/sdks) — Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
+
+## Runtime and CLI
+
+- [Use the Runtime API](/developers/runtime-api) — Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.
+- [Auths CLI](/developers/cli) — Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.
+
+## Test and debug
+
+- [Test Auths outcomes](/developers/testing) — Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.
+- [Outcomes and errors](/developers/errors) — Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.
+
+## Releases
+
+- [Versions and compatibility](/developers/versioning) — Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.developers/1 · Product contract: auths.page.developers/1_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations.md b/public/developers/integrations.md
index 9c4296d..68e912e 100644
--- a/public/developers/integrations.md
+++ b/public/developers/integrations.md
@@ -2,9 +2,18 @@
 
 Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
 
-## Auths with your existing systems
+## Recommended: [Identity and trust integrations](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust)
 
-Keep identity, policy, transport, and cloud systems in their legitimate roles while adding exact effect authority.
+Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.composition/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Integrate and extend
+
+- [Identity and trust integrations](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust) — Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
+- [Policy engine integrations](/developers/integrations/policy) — Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.
+- [Cloud IAM integrations](/developers/integrations/cloud-iam) — Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.
+- [Transport integrations](/developers/integrations/transport) — Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.
+- [Capability integrations](/developers/integrations/capabilities) — Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.
+- [Build an application profile](/developers/integrations/profile-kit) — Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.composition/1 · Product contract: auths.page.integrations.composition/1_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started.md b/public/get-started.md
index bfead30..8bde6a8 100644
--- a/public/get-started.md
+++ b/public/get-started.md
@@ -1,22 +1,28 @@
 # Get started
 
-Choose the shortest safe path from an outcome to working Auths authority.
+Choose one concrete outcome and reach a verified, fail-closed result.
 
-## Recommended: [Choose your Auths path](/get-started/choose)
+## Recommended: [Prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites)
 
-Describe the effect and operating boundary, then follow one deterministic recommendation.
+Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
 
-## Choose a first outcome
+## Choose a path
 
-- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — The shortest path from installation to a verified receipt.
-- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Pass on narrower authority without ambient credentials.
-- [Verify evidence](/get-started/paths/verification) — Inspect a bounded receipt without performing an effect.
+- [Prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites) — Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
+- [Choose your path](/get-started/choose) — Select the shortest journey for the effect, actor, and operating boundary you have.
+- [Outcome paths](/get-started/paths) — Choose an outcome path before learning the complete Auths model.
 
-## Understand your options
+## Quickstarts
 
-- [Check prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites) — Prepare only what your integration path needs.
-- [Cross company boundaries](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Keep independent identity and cloud systems.
-- [Evaluate with fixtures](/get-started/evaluate) — Compare deterministic success and failure outcomes.
+- [Quickstarts](/get-started/quickstarts) — Compare seven installed-artifact projects by boundary, state, custody, success, and failure.
+
+## Next steps
+
+- [Evaluate Auths](/get-started/evaluate) — Evaluate Auths with deterministic positive and adversarial fixtures before choosing a deployment.
+
+## Adopt incrementally
+
+- [Adopt incrementally](/get-started/adoption) — Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.start/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start/1_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption.md b/public/get-started/adoption.md
index d6656ec..bf958a1 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption.md
@@ -1,12 +1,23 @@
-# Adopt Auths incrementally
+# Adopt incrementally
 
-Protect one high-value effect beside the systems you already operate.
+Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.
 
-## Compose before replacing
+## Recommended: [Plan adoption](/get-started/adoption/plan)
 
-Keep your identity provider, policy engine, cloud IAM, transport, and provider gateway. Add Auths to one exact effect, compare decisions without effects, then enforce at the existing gateway.
+Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
 
-Expand one dimension at a time only after success, denial, uncertainty, and rollback are observable.
+## Adopt incrementally
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.adopt/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+- [Plan adoption](/get-started/adoption/plan) — Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
+- [Signed requests](/get-started/adoption/signed-requests) — Bind an existing signed request to narrower authority and execution state.
+- [OAuth and OIDC](/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc) — Keep OAuth or OIDC authentication while adding effect-specific machine authority.
+- [API keys](/get-started/adoption/api-keys) — Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.
+- [Cloud IAM](/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam) — Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.
+- [Policy engines](/get-started/adoption/policy-engines) — Use a Cedar, OPA, or relationship decision as explicit context without duplicating the policy engine.
+- [Capability systems](/get-started/adoption/capabilities) — Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.
+- [Approval systems](/get-started/adoption/approvals) — Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.
+- [Shadow mode](/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode) — Compare Auths decisions with live traffic without authorizing provider effects.
+- [Cut over one effect](/get-started/adoption/cutover) — Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.adopt/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start.adopt/1_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md b/public/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md
index 23701c1..d968cbb 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Move beyond ambient API keys
+# API keys
 
-Keep provider keys inside the gateway and give callers exact authority instead.
+Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.
 
-## Do not send the provider key to the caller
+## Ownership boundary
 
-Wrap the existing provider client in a closed gateway. The caller presents bounded authority and an exact command; the gateway acquires the key only after native authorization and durable reservation.
+The provider and its API-key lifecycle continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
+
+## Data flow
+
+The application operation mapped to a gateway-held API call becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
+
+## State
+
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/approvals.md b/public/get-started/adoption/approvals.md
index 26f5216..fd00324 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/approvals.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/approvals.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Bind existing approvals
+# Approval systems
 
-Turn approval evidence into exact transaction context, never reusable ambient permission.
+Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.
 
-## Approve the bytes that will execute
+## Ownership boundary
+
+The approval system and approver authentication continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
+
+## Data flow
+
+The approval response committed to the exact ordered plan request becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
+
+## State
+
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
+
+## Run the qualified path
 
 Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
 
+## Limitations
+
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
+
 _Page identity: auths.page.adopt.approvals/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md b/public/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md
index 9c9a0c4..c56e05a 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Bridge existing capabilities
+# Capability systems
 
-Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority without inventing properties they do not provide.
+Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.
 
-## Map protocol, profile, and state responsibilities separately
+## Ownership boundary
 
-Document which attenuation properties come from the source capability, which exact-effect rules come from an application profile, and which replay or budget properties require durable external state.
+The capability protocol continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
+
+## Data flow
+
+The imported capability and its verified attenuation result becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
+
+## State
+
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md b/public/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md
index e009913..5edc0cb 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Compose with cloud IAM
+# Cloud IAM
 
-Use workload identity and short-lived credentials without making IAM the application-effect model.
+Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.
 
-## IAM authorizes provider access; Auths authorizes the exact effect
+## Ownership boundary
 
-Keep workload federation, roles, and restricted credentials. Add Auths where the application must commit exact resources, order, approvals, use limits, recovery state, and receipts across organizational boundaries.
+Cloud IAM continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
+
+## Data flow
+
+The authorized Auths command mapped to a least-privilege provider session becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
+
+## State
+
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/cutover.md b/public/get-started/adoption/cutover.md
index 7b0186f..9b70c41 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/cutover.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/cutover.md
@@ -1,14 +1,34 @@
-# Cut over one protected effect
+# Cut over one effect
 
-Enforce, observe, reconcile, and roll back through one existing gateway.
+Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.
 
-## Cut over only with reversible evidence
+## Outcome
 
-Require shadow agreement, durable state, provider idempotency or reconciliation, custody readiness, telemetry, explicit stop conditions, and a tested rollback switch before enforcement.
+Callers can no longer reach the provider effect without verified authority and durable reservation.
 
-## Rollback preserves evidence
+## Before you begin
 
-Return traffic to the previous gateway without erasing Auths decision comparisons, reservations, recovery references, or receipts. Reconcile any provider-unknown work before another attempt.
+Complete shadow mode, provision runtime dependencies, define stop conditions, retain the previous path behind an operator-controlled rollback, and ensure it cannot run concurrently.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Route the selected operation through the Auths gateway, verify terminal receipts, monitor denial and indeterminate outcomes, and exercise resume and reconciliation.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+Success includes correct effects, stable denials, no replay, durable evidence, and a tested recovery path.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Rollback on unexplained denial, state inconsistency, custody failure, receipt loss, or provider ambiguity; never bypass Auths automatically.
+
+## Continue
+
+Expand to the next effect only after operational ownership and evidence retention are routine.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cutover/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md b/public/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md
index e2d5f9d..7e18614 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Keep OAuth and OIDC
+# OAuth and OIDC
 
-Retain login and session identity while adding bounded effect authority.
+Keep OAuth or OIDC authentication while adding effect-specific machine authority.
 
-## The session identifies the actor
+## Ownership boundary
 
-Continue using OAuth or OIDC for login, consent, session management, and identity claims. Translate accepted session evidence into explicit Auths trust context; do not treat a broad scope as proof of one exact effect.
+The identity provider and OAuth resource server continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
+
+## Data flow
+
+Validated issuer, subject, audience, and freshness evidence becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
+
+## State
+
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/plan.md b/public/get-started/adoption/plan.md
index 3c8bc8b..afa1705 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/plan.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/plan.md
@@ -1,14 +1,34 @@
-# Plan an Auths adoption
+# Plan adoption
 
-Inventory effects and boundaries without collecting credentials or unnecessary business data.
+Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
 
-## Inventory ownership, not secret values
+## Outcome
 
-Record the effect entry point, actor source, existing roles or scopes, credential location, approval owner, replay behavior, audit evidence, and unknown-outcome handling. Record classifications and references—not tokens, private keys, raw payloads, or full receipts.
+A written adoption slice identifies the caller, authority issuer, trust inputs, state owner, signer, gateway, provider credential, and receipt consumer.
 
-## Move through reversible phases
+## Before you begin
 
-Inventory, model, verify in shadow, compare, enforce one effect, observe, then expand. Every phase names a rollback and a stop condition.
+Bring the current request shape, identity evidence, policy decision, approval flow, credential location, retry behavior, and audit record for one operation.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Map each existing responsibility to Identity, Authority, Runtime, or the adjacent system; then run the closest quickstart and record deliberate differences.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+Every responsibility has one owner and the first cutover does not require replacing unrelated systems.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Stop if provider credentials would enter an Auths artifact or if application code would reimplement attenuation or verification semantics.
+
+## Continue
+
+Choose the relevant composition page and enter shadow mode.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.adopt.plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md b/public/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md
index bf9fc62..c3371e2 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Compose with policy engines
+# Policy engines
 
-Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit bounded context.
+Use a Cedar, OPA, or relationship decision as explicit context without duplicating the policy engine.
 
-## Keep rich policy evaluation where it belongs
+## Ownership boundary
 
-The policy engine continues to answer relationship and attribute questions. Record the bounded decision input or commitment that Auths actually relied on; never imply Auths replaced the policy model.
+The policy engine and its data model continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
+
+## Data flow
+
+The decision and policy snapshot committed into trusted context becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
+
+## State
+
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md b/public/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md
index 537db05..300f569 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md
@@ -1,14 +1,34 @@
-# Verify in shadow mode
+# Shadow mode
 
-Compare Auths decisions with current enforcement without authorizing or executing effects.
+Compare Auths decisions with live traffic without authorizing provider effects.
 
-## Shadow mode is cryptographically inert
+## Outcome
 
-It may parse, verify, classify, and compare bounded decisions. It cannot mint an opaque executable authorization object, reserve a use, acquire provider credentials, or call a provider.
+The team can measure agreement, denial reasons, missing context, and potential blast-radius reduction before cutover.
 
-## Store bounded comparisons
+## Before you begin
 
-Record commitments, decision classes, stable reason codes, timing, and correlation identifiers. Exclude credentials, raw business payloads, sealed commands, and full receipt contents.
+Mirror only bounded request inputs and remove secrets. Keep the current production enforcement path authoritative.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Create and verify Auths decisions without passing effect-capable handles to the gateway; record normalized outcomes alongside the current decision.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+Expected requests agree and adversarial mutations are denied with stable reasons.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Any ambiguity, sensitive-data leakage, or disagreement blocks cutover until ownership and mappings are corrected.
+
+## Continue
+
+Cut over exactly one effect once the observation window and failure criteria are satisfied.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md b/public/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md
index 7c5142e..e51ce77 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Add Auths to signed requests
+# Signed requests
 
-Keep request authentication while binding authority to exact application bytes.
+Bind an existing signed request to narrower authority and execution state.
 
-## Authentication and authority answer different questions
+## Ownership boundary
 
-The existing signature proves who controlled a key and protects its signed fields. Auths adds attenuated authority, exact action commitment, lifecycle state, approvals, closed execution, and receipts only where needed.
+The request-signature layer continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
+
+## Data flow
+
+The exact signed application bytes becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
+
+## State
+
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/choose.md b/public/get-started/choose.md
index d8dfb7f..5558240 100644
--- a/public/get-started/choose.md
+++ b/public/get-started/choose.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Choose your Auths path
+# Choose your path
 
-Describe the boundary you need and get one deterministic starting recommendation.
+Select the shortest journey for the effect, actor, and operating boundary you have.
 
-## Choose by effect, not package
+## Outcome
 
-The chooser never accepts credentials or creates authority. It maps deployment, actor, trust, state, custody, and ownership needs to a documented path.
+You will leave with one recommended quickstart, not a tour of every Auths feature.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the effect, who proposes it, where credentials live, whether approval is required, and whether execution is local or remote.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Use Local REST effect for an in-process boundary; Runtime effect for durable remote execution; Agent delegation for a narrower handoff; Approved plan for exact multi-step review; Offline verification for inert evidence; Recovery for ambiguous outcomes; Identity swap for cryptographic or identity agility.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The selected path demonstrates the same success and denial shapes your application must handle.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+If you cannot describe the effect or provider boundary precisely, do not issue broad authority. Narrow the integration target first.
+
+## Continue
+
+Open the chosen quickstart and run it unchanged before adapting it.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.start.choose/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/evaluate.md b/public/get-started/evaluate.md
index 8ff3d25..eee6f5e 100644
--- a/public/get-started/evaluate.md
+++ b/public/get-started/evaluate.md
@@ -1,26 +1,34 @@
 # Evaluate Auths
 
-Run deterministic success and failure fixtures before choosing an integration.
+Evaluate Auths with deterministic positive and adversarial fixtures before choosing a deployment.
 
-## Prove the boundaries first
+## Outcome
 
-Run the same semantic cases in Rust, TypeScript, and Python and compare normalized outcomes rather than trusting screenshots.
+Your evaluation records which Auths boundaries solve a real problem and which adjacent systems remain responsible.
 
-## Exact effect
+## Before you begin
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.rest-effect/1`.
+Select one sensitive effect and define the current identity, policy, approval, credential, retry, and audit behavior around it.
 
-## Attenuation
+## Build the bounded path
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.delegation/1`.
+Run the matching quickstart, mutate its action and bytes, replay it, expire it, remove trust, and compare each stable outcome with your present system.
 
-## Receipt verification
+## Run the qualified path
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1`.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
-## Choose after the evidence
+## Success means
 
-Adopt the local SDK, production runtime, agent, or verification-only path only after the failure behavior matches your application needs.
+The evaluation demonstrates a useful reduction in ambient authority or ambiguity without requiring wholesale identity or policy replacement.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Reject the design if Auths merely duplicates an existing control without improving exact commitment, attenuation, recovery, or portable evidence.
+
+## Continue
+
+If the boundary is useful, plan a shadow-mode integration around that single effect.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.start.evaluate/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths.md b/public/get-started/paths.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2592fd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/get-started/paths.md
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# Outcome paths
+
+Choose an outcome path before learning the complete Auths model.
+
+## Recommended: [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application)
+
+Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
+
+## Outcome paths
+
+- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
+- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
+- [Deploy the runtime](/get-started/paths/runtime) — Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.
+- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
+- [Cross-company authority](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.get-started.paths/1 · Product contract: auths.page.get-started.paths/1_
+
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths/agent.md b/public/get-started/paths/agent.md
index 8e906fa..ab17597 100644
--- a/public/get-started/paths/agent.md
+++ b/public/get-started/paths/agent.md
@@ -1,22 +1,34 @@
-# Delegate one action to an agent
+# Delegate to an agent
 
-Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.
+Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
 
 ## Outcome
 
-The agent can invoke one allowed action within its time, use, and delegation bounds. It cannot manufacture wider authority.
+The agent receives delegable proof for one permitted operation and cannot widen it.
 
-## Build
+## Before you begin
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.delegation/1`.
+Identify the tool effect and place its real provider credential behind a trusted executor.
 
-## Agent boundary
+## Build the bounded path
 
-The agent proposes or presents authority. A closed application gateway verifies and performs the effect.
+Create authority at the application boundary, delegate a narrower child to the agent, then send a sealed command to the executor.
 
-## Failure path
+## Run the qualified path
 
-Increase the child action set or use count and observe delegation fail before execution.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The delegated action succeeds and returns evidence that can be verified independently of the agent's narrative.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Widening the action, resource, time, use count, budget, audience, or delegation depth fails closed.
+
+## Continue
+
+Add approved plans if a human or second organization must review exact work before execution.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.start.agent/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths/application.md b/public/get-started/paths/application.md
index 1efbc0b..9f21c7a 100644
--- a/public/get-started/paths/application.md
+++ b/public/get-started/paths/application.md
@@ -1,22 +1,34 @@
-# Protect one local effect
+# Protect an application effect
 
-Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.
+Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
 
 ## Outcome
 
-One caller can perform one exact route-shaped action once. Replaying it or changing its bytes fails closed.
+A caller can perform one exact application effect and receives a decision and execution receipt.
 
-## Build
+## Before you begin
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.rest-effect/1`.
+Isolate the effect behind one function and keep its service credential outside untrusted caller code.
 
-## What Auths proved
+## Build the bounded path
 
-The actor held authority for the committed action and the closed gateway returned a bounded outcome. Transport success alone proved nothing.
+Create authority for the exact action and resource, execute it through the SDK boundary, and verify the returned receipt before reporting success.
 
-## Failure path
+## Run the qualified path
 
-Run the same action again to receive a replay denial, then change one application byte to receive a commitment mismatch.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The permitted request succeeds once and its receipt binds the authority, command, context, and outcome.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+A changed resource, replayed authority, or mutated command is denied before the protected function runs.
+
+## Continue
+
+Add durable runtime state when the effect must survive process or host failure.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.start.local/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths/cross-company.md b/public/get-started/paths/cross-company.md
index 2442992..ba8dd00 100644
--- a/public/get-started/paths/cross-company.md
+++ b/public/get-started/paths/cross-company.md
@@ -1,22 +1,34 @@
-# Authorize across companies
+# Cross-company authority
 
-Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.
+Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
 
 ## Outcome
 
-One organization authorizes an external actor to perform a precise operation without sharing a root identity provider or provider credential.
+One company can delegate a precise repair to another company's agent while both retain their own identity, approval, and infrastructure boundaries.
 
-## Delegate
+## Before you begin
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.delegation/1`.
+Name each organization's trust evidence, the exact operation and resource, the approval threshold, the execution region, and the provider gateway that owns credentials.
 
-## Verify the evidence
+## Build the bounded path
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1`.
+Exchange public identity evidence, create and narrow authority, bind both approvals to the identical ordered plan, execute through the resource owner's gateway, then return bounded receipts.
 
-## Failure path
+## Run the qualified path
 
-Identity federation, delivery, or approval cannot substitute for exact authority. A changed plan or widened delegation is rejected.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+Only the approved bytes execute, each plan member is consumed once and in order, and authorized readers can inspect a bounded summary.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Identity authentication, transport delivery, approval alone, changed plan bytes, wider delegation, replay, or provider uncertainty cannot silently become success.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use Identity & trust for federation, Authority for plans, and Operations for provider-unknown reconciliation and evidence retention.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.start.cross-company/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths/runtime.md b/public/get-started/paths/runtime.md
index f59b317..c714313 100644
--- a/public/get-started/paths/runtime.md
+++ b/public/get-started/paths/runtime.md
@@ -1,22 +1,34 @@
-# Protect a service effect
+# Deploy the runtime
 
-Submit exact authority to the open production Runtime API and preserve recovery state.
+Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.
 
 ## Outcome
 
-A service accepts a bounded request over HTTPS, reserves it durably, and distinguishes completion from a recoverable or unknown provider outcome.
+An HTTPS caller can submit one bounded effect while credentials and durable state remain server-side.
 
-## Build
+## Before you begin
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.rest-effect/1`.
+Provide TLS, explicit trust configuration, durable state, signer custody, and a closed gateway for the provider effect.
 
-## Production boundary
+## Build the bounded path
 
-The Runtime API requires HTTPS and durable state. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway and never enter the caller SDK.
+Check health and version, create authority, submit the command, inspect the terminal outcome, and retain its receipt.
 
-## Failure path
+## Run the qualified path
 
-A provider-unknown outcome requires observation and reconciliation before any retry. Resume the same execution identity rather than creating a fresh request.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The runtime commits replay and budget state before the effect, and returns a stable outcome after execution.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Untrusted HTTP, contract mismatch, missing custody, or unavailable durable state stops execution rather than falling back to an unsafe path.
+
+## Continue
+
+Continue to Production operations for topology, observability, recovery, and incident procedures.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.start.runtime/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths/verification.md b/public/get-started/paths/verification.md
index 7e40ab4..91b44de 100644
--- a/public/get-started/paths/verification.md
+++ b/public/get-started/paths/verification.md
@@ -1,22 +1,34 @@
 # Verify without executing
 
-Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.
+Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
 
 ## Outcome
 
-A verifier confirms portable evidence and produces an inert decision or bounded receipt view without gaining an executable command.
+A verifier obtains a deterministic decision from bounded bytes, trust inputs, and verification time.
 
-## Build
+## Before you begin
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1`.
+Obtain the exact evidence bytes and explicit trust context. Verification never infers trust from transport success.
 
-## Disclosure boundary
+## Build the bounded path
 
-Unauthorized viewers receive an opaque result. Summary and full views require the appropriate disclosure authority.
+Parse the bounded artifact through the SDK, provide trusted context, verify locally, and inspect only the disclosure view authorized for the caller.
 
-## Failure path
+## Run the qualified path
 
-Tampered bytes, an unknown signer, or missing trust evidence remain rejected or indeterminate; verification never performs the underlying effect.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+Rust, TypeScript, and Python return the same verification outcome for the same bytes and context.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Mutation, unknown suite, mismatched verification method, wrong root, stale evidence, or unauthorized disclosure remains inert and fails closed.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use Authority receipts for integrity semantics and Assurance for the exact evidence behind public claims.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.start.verify/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/prerequisites.md b/public/get-started/prerequisites.md
index 893ae72..99e2cc9 100644
--- a/public/get-started/prerequisites.md
+++ b/public/get-started/prerequisites.md
@@ -1,18 +1,34 @@
-# Before you begin
+# Prerequisites
 
-Prepare only the runtime, trust, state, and custody inputs your chosen path actually needs.
+Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
 
-## Smallest local path
+## Outcome
 
-Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python; use development custody and in-memory state; and protect one deterministic local effect.
+You will have one maintained SDK, a supported runtime for that SDK, and an application effect that can be isolated behind a function or service boundary.
 
-## Production additions
+## Before you begin
 
-Add HTTPS, durable replay and recovery state, external custody, explicit trust resolution, observability, and a closed provider gateway only when moving beyond evaluation.
+Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python. A local quickstart needs no hosted Auths runtime; production execution additionally needs an HTTPS runtime endpoint and its explicit trust configuration.
 
-## Know which path you own
+## Build the bounded path
 
-SDK consumers, runtime operators, agent builders, and profile authors have different prerequisites. Do not assemble every extension port for a normal integration.
+Install one SDK, identify the exact effect to protect, and keep provider credentials outside the caller. Use the tested local scenario to confirm the toolchain before adding identity providers, approvals, or remote transport.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The installed consumer can create, execute, and verify the qualified local fixture, including its stable denial path.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Stop if the SDK version, fixture release, or runtime contract does not match. Do not compensate by reconstructing Auths semantics in application code.
+
+## Continue
+
+Choose the shortest outcome path for your system, then move to production operations only when the local boundary is clear.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.start.prerequisites/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..07c55ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts.md
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Quickstarts
+
+Compare seven installed-artifact projects by boundary, state, custody, success, and failure.
+
+## Recommended: [Local REST effect](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect)
+
+Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.
+
+## Quickstarts
+
+- [Local REST effect](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect) — Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.
+- [Runtime effect](/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect) — Execute one bounded effect through the production HTTPS runtime and durable state boundary.
+- [Agent delegation](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation) — Delegate one narrower tool action and prove that a broader action is denied.
+- [Approved plan](/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan) — Bind approval to the exact bytes and order of a multi-step plan.
+- [Offline verification](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Verify portable evidence without executing an effect or contacting a provider.
+- [Recovery](/get-started/quickstarts/recovery) — Resume or reconcile an interrupted execution without blindly repeating the provider effect.
+- [Identity swap](/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap) — Exchange and verify identity material while keeping the authority workflow unchanged.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1 · Product contract: auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1_
+
diff --git a/public/identity-trust.md b/public/identity-trust.md
index 0a1f96f..514223b 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust.md
@@ -2,21 +2,13 @@
 
 Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.
 
-## Recommended: [See how identity and trust fit](/identity-trust/how-it-works)
+## Recommended: [How identity and trust fit](/identity-trust/how-it-works)
 
-Understand what identity proves—and what it never authorizes by itself.
+Authenticate a signer without turning identity, cryptography, or transport into authority.
 
-## Bring what you already use
+## Understand
 
-- [Compose existing identity](/developers/integrations) — Use OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or an application resolver.
-- [Keep adapters replaceable](/identity-trust/how-it-works) — Separate identity, cryptography, transport, and authority.
-- [Turn identity into bounded action](/authority) — Attach exact authority without replacing authentication.
-
-## Inspect and verify
-
-- [Verify offline](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Check portable evidence without executing anything.
-- [Review agility claims](/assurance) — Trace cryptographic and identity boundaries to evidence.
-- [Open exact contracts](/reference) — Find identity and verification surfaces by stable identity.
+- [How identity and trust fit](/identity-trust/how-it-works) — Authenticate a signer without turning identity, cryptography, or transport into authority.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust/1 · Product contract: auths.page.identity-trust/1_
 
diff --git a/public/llms-full.txt b/public/llms-full.txt
index 2bc57f3..9afc8d4 100644
--- a/public/llms-full.txt
+++ b/public/llms-full.txt
@@ -2,21 +2,23 @@
 
 Give an agent narrow, inspectable authority instead of ambient credentials.
 
-## Recommended: [Delegate one tool](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation)
+## Recommended: [How Auths works for agents](/agents/how-auths-works)
 
-Give an agent one narrow ability without a broad API key.
+Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
+
+## Start
+
+- [How Auths works for agents](/agents/how-auths-works) — Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
+- [Delegate one tool](/agents/quickstart) — Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.
 
-## Build agent authority
+## Delegate
 
-- [Delegate without widening](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation) — Make each handoff narrower and independently verifiable.
-- [Protect an effect](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect) — Place the provider behind an authorization boundary.
-- [Verify what happened](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Return portable evidence rather than trusting an agent report.
+- [Require approval for an agent plan](/agents/approved-plans) — Bind human or organizational approval to exact ordered plan bytes.
+- [Handoff across agents](/agents/multi-agent) — Attenuate authority at every agent boundary.
 
-## Compose the stack
+## Compose
 
-- [MCP and transports](/developers/integrations) — Delivery remains independent from authorization.
-- [Agent identity](/identity-trust) — Bring workload, user, or application trust evidence.
-- [Closed execution](/operations) — Keep real credentials outside the agent process.
+- [Agent skills and plugins](/agents/skills-and-plugins) — Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents/1 · Product contract: auths.page.agents/1_
 
@@ -128,23 +130,11 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.agents.skills/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d443912991528
 
 Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
 
-## Recommended: [Start with the trust boundaries](/authority/execute)
-
-Understand the claims before inspecting their evidence.
-
-## Inspect evidence
+## Show what the evidence proves
 
-- [Architecture claims](/identity-trust/how-it-works) — See the semantic core and replaceable boundaries.
-- [Receipt verification](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Verify portable evidence without performing an effect.
-- [Generated contracts](/reference) — Inspect release-scoped SDK and runtime facts.
+Every claim names its evidence, release, scope, and limitation.
 
-## Understand limitations
-
-- [Operational scope](/operations) — Separate semantic assurance from deployment reliability.
-- [Composition boundaries](/developers/integrations) — See what adjacent identity and policy systems still own.
-- [Reproduce results](/developers) — Find fixtures, tests, versions, and source provenance.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1 · Product contract: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1_
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
@@ -154,21 +144,21 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1 · Product contract: auths.page.
 
 Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
 
-## Recommended: [Create and execute exact authority](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect)
+## Recommended: [Trust boundaries](/authority/execute)
+
+Authorization before provider entry.
+
+## Execute and recover
 
-Start with one effect, one use, and evidence of the outcome.
+- [Trust boundaries](/authority/execute) — Authorization before provider entry.
 
-## Work with authority
+## Model
 
-- [Create](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect) — Describe one bounded action and who may perform it.
-- [Delegate](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation) — Narrow action, time, uses, budget, and delegation depth.
-- [Execute and recover](/operations) — Reserve durably, perform behind a closed gateway, and resume safely.
+- [Auths in fifteen minutes](/authority/model) — Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.
 
-## Understand the model
+## Lifecycle
 
-- [Authority lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Follow attenuation, use, budget, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
-- [Approval-bound plans](/authority/plans/approvals) — Bind review to exact members, bytes, order, and threshold.
-- [Receipts and disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure) — Verify evidence without revealing sensitive detail by default.
+- [Authority lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority/1_
 
@@ -228,7 +218,7 @@ You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.
 
 ## Continue from here
 
-- [Delegate one action to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.
+- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
 - [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
@@ -275,7 +265,7 @@ You only need an exact signature or endpoint field; open the generated reference
 
 ## Continue from here
 
-- [Protect one local effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.
+- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
 - [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
@@ -322,7 +312,7 @@ A reusable human-approved flag or broad role is sufficient for the actual risk m
 
 ## Continue from here
 
-- [Authorize across companies](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.
+- [Cross-company authority](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
 - [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
@@ -377,7 +367,7 @@ You need to perform an effect; receipt verification is intentionally inert.
 
 ## Continue from here
 
-- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.
+- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
 - [Assurance](/assurance) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
@@ -390,21 +380,31 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 1
 
 Find SDKs, Runtime APIs, tested examples, integrations, versioning, and extension contracts.
 
-## Recommended: [Choose an SDK](/reference/sdk)
+## Recommended: [Integrations](/developers/integrations)
+
+Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
+
+## Integrate and extend
+
+- [Integrations](/developers/integrations) — Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
+
+## SDKs
 
-Use the same five operations from Rust, TypeScript, or Python.
+- [Choose an Auths SDK](/developers/sdks) — Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
 
-## Build
+## Runtime and CLI
 
-- [SDKs](/reference/sdk) — Language-aware operations, parameters, outcomes, and examples.
-- [Runtime API](/reference/runtime-api) — Integrate through the production HTTPS boundary.
-- [Quickstarts](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect) — Begin with a tested end-to-end outcome.
+- [Use the Runtime API](/developers/runtime-api) — Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.
+- [Auths CLI](/developers/cli) — Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.
 
-## Extend and evaluate
+## Test and debug
 
-- [Integrations](/developers/integrations) — Compose identity, policy, transport, custody, and providers.
-- [Agents and MCP](/agents) — Propose, authorize, execute, observe, and verify separately.
-- [Testing and evidence](/assurance) — Use deterministic fixtures and inspect assurance scope.
+- [Test Auths outcomes](/developers/testing) — Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.
+- [Outcomes and errors](/developers/errors) — Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.
+
+## Releases
+
+- [Versions and compatibility](/developers/versioning) — Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.developers/1 · Product contract: auths.page.developers/1_
 
@@ -452,11 +452,20 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.developers.errors/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d44391299
 
 Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
 
-## Auths with your existing systems
+## Recommended: [Identity and trust integrations](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust)
+
+Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
+
+## Integrate and extend
 
-Keep identity, policy, transport, and cloud systems in their legitimate roles while adding exact effect authority.
+- [Identity and trust integrations](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust) — Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
+- [Policy engine integrations](/developers/integrations/policy) — Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.
+- [Cloud IAM integrations](/developers/integrations/cloud-iam) — Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.
+- [Transport integrations](/developers/integrations/transport) — Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.
+- [Capability integrations](/developers/integrations/capabilities) — Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.
+- [Build an application profile](/developers/integrations/profile-kit) — Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.composition/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.composition/1 · Product contract: auths.page.integrations.composition/1_
 
 
 
@@ -622,812 +631,711 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.developers.versioning/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439
 
 # Get started
 
-Choose the shortest safe path from an outcome to working Auths authority.
+Choose one concrete outcome and reach a verified, fail-closed result.
 
-## Recommended: [Choose your Auths path](/get-started/choose)
+## Recommended: [Prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites)
 
-Describe the effect and operating boundary, then follow one deterministic recommendation.
+Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
 
-## Choose a first outcome
+## Choose a path
 
-- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — The shortest path from installation to a verified receipt.
-- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Pass on narrower authority without ambient credentials.
-- [Verify evidence](/get-started/paths/verification) — Inspect a bounded receipt without performing an effect.
+- [Prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites) — Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
+- [Choose your path](/get-started/choose) — Select the shortest journey for the effect, actor, and operating boundary you have.
+- [Outcome paths](/get-started/paths) — Choose an outcome path before learning the complete Auths model.
 
-## Understand your options
+## Quickstarts
 
-- [Check prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites) — Prepare only what your integration path needs.
-- [Cross company boundaries](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Keep independent identity and cloud systems.
-- [Evaluate with fixtures](/get-started/evaluate) — Compare deterministic success and failure outcomes.
+- [Quickstarts](/get-started/quickstarts) — Compare seven installed-artifact projects by boundary, state, custody, success, and failure.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start/1_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Adopt Auths incrementally
+## Next steps
 
-Protect one high-value effect beside the systems you already operate.
+- [Evaluate Auths](/get-started/evaluate) — Evaluate Auths with deterministic positive and adversarial fixtures before choosing a deployment.
 
-## Compose before replacing
+## Adopt incrementally
 
-Keep your identity provider, policy engine, cloud IAM, transport, and provider gateway. Add Auths to one exact effect, compare decisions without effects, then enforce at the existing gateway.
+- [Adopt incrementally](/get-started/adoption) — Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.
 
-Expand one dimension at a time only after success, denial, uncertainty, and rollback are observable.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.adopt/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start/1_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Move beyond ambient API keys
-
-Keep provider keys inside the gateway and give callers exact authority instead.
-
-## Do not send the provider key to the caller
-
-Wrap the existing provider client in a closed gateway. The caller presents bounded authority and an exact command; the gateway acquires the key only after native authorization and durable reservation.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
+# Adopt incrementally
 
+Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.
 
----
+## Recommended: [Plan adoption](/get-started/adoption/plan)
 
-# Bind existing approvals
+Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
 
-Turn approval evidence into exact transaction context, never reusable ambient permission.
+## Adopt incrementally
 
-## Approve the bytes that will execute
+- [Plan adoption](/get-started/adoption/plan) — Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
+- [Signed requests](/get-started/adoption/signed-requests) — Bind an existing signed request to narrower authority and execution state.
+- [OAuth and OIDC](/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc) — Keep OAuth or OIDC authentication while adding effect-specific machine authority.
+- [API keys](/get-started/adoption/api-keys) — Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.
+- [Cloud IAM](/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam) — Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.
+- [Policy engines](/get-started/adoption/policy-engines) — Use a Cedar, OPA, or relationship decision as explicit context without duplicating the policy engine.
+- [Capability systems](/get-started/adoption/capabilities) — Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.
+- [Approval systems](/get-started/adoption/approvals) — Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.
+- [Shadow mode](/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode) — Compare Auths decisions with live traffic without authorizing provider effects.
+- [Cut over one effect](/get-started/adoption/cutover) — Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.approvals/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.adopt/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start.adopt/1_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Bridge existing capabilities
-
-Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority without inventing properties they do not provide.
-
-## Map protocol, profile, and state responsibilities separately
-
-Document which attenuation properties come from the source capability, which exact-effect rules come from an application profile, and which replay or budget properties require durable external state.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
+# API keys
 
----
+Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.
 
-# Compose with cloud IAM
+## Ownership boundary
 
-Use workload identity and short-lived credentials without making IAM the application-effect model.
+The provider and its API-key lifecycle continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
 
-## IAM authorizes provider access; Auths authorizes the exact effect
+## Data flow
 
-Keep workload federation, roles, and restricted credentials. Add Auths where the application must commit exact resources, order, approvals, use limits, recovery state, and receipts across organizational boundaries.
+The application operation mapped to a gateway-held API call becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Secrets
 
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
 
+## State
 
----
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
 
-# Cut over one protected effect
+## Failure ownership
 
-Enforce, observe, reconcile, and roll back through one existing gateway.
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
 
-## Cut over only with reversible evidence
+## Run the qualified path
 
-Require shadow agreement, durable state, provider idempotency or reconciliation, custody readiness, telemetry, explicit stop conditions, and a tested rollback switch before enforcement.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
 
-## Rollback preserves evidence
+## Limitations
 
-Return traffic to the previous gateway without erasing Auths decision comparisons, reservations, recovery references, or receipts. Reconcile any provider-unknown work before another attempt.
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cutover/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Keep OAuth and OIDC
-
-Retain login and session identity while adding bounded effect authority.
-
-## The session identifies the actor
-
-Continue using OAuth or OIDC for login, consent, session management, and identity claims. Translate accepted session evidence into explicit Auths trust context; do not treat a broad scope as proof of one exact effect.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
+# Approval systems
 
+Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.
 
----
+## Ownership boundary
 
-# Plan an Auths adoption
+The approval system and approver authentication continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
 
-Inventory effects and boundaries without collecting credentials or unnecessary business data.
+## Data flow
 
-## Inventory ownership, not secret values
+The approval response committed to the exact ordered plan request becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
 
-Record the effect entry point, actor source, existing roles or scopes, credential location, approval owner, replay behavior, audit evidence, and unknown-outcome handling. Record classifications and references—not tokens, private keys, raw payloads, or full receipts.
+## Secrets
 
-## Move through reversible phases
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
 
-Inventory, model, verify in shadow, compare, enforce one effect, observe, then expand. Every phase names a rollback and a stop condition.
+## State
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
 
+## Failure ownership
 
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
 
----
+## Run the qualified path
 
-# Compose with policy engines
-
-Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit bounded context.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
 
-## Keep rich policy evaluation where it belongs
+## Limitations
 
-The policy engine continues to answer relationship and attribute questions. Record the bounded decision input or commitment that Auths actually relied on; never imply Auths replaced the policy model.
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.approvals/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Verify in shadow mode
-
-Compare Auths decisions with current enforcement without authorizing or executing effects.
+# Capability systems
 
-## Shadow mode is cryptographically inert
+Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.
 
-It may parse, verify, classify, and compare bounded decisions. It cannot mint an opaque executable authorization object, reserve a use, acquire provider credentials, or call a provider.
+## Ownership boundary
 
-## Store bounded comparisons
-
-Record commitments, decision classes, stable reason codes, timing, and correlation identifiers. Exclude credentials, raw business payloads, sealed commands, and full receipt contents.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+The capability protocol continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
 
+## Data flow
 
+The imported capability and its verified attenuation result becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
 
----
-
-# Add Auths to signed requests
+## Secrets
 
-Keep request authentication while binding authority to exact application bytes.
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
 
-## Authentication and authority answer different questions
+## State
 
-The existing signature proves who controlled a key and protects its signed fields. Auths adds attenuated authority, exact action commitment, lifecycle state, approvals, closed execution, and receipts only where needed.
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Failure ownership
 
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
 
+## Run the qualified path
 
----
-
-# Choose your Auths path
-
-Describe the boundary you need and get one deterministic starting recommendation.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
-## Choose by effect, not package
+## Limitations
 
-The chooser never accepts credentials or creates authority. It maps deployment, actor, trust, state, custody, and ownership needs to a documented path.
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.choose/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Evaluate Auths
-
-Run deterministic success and failure fixtures before choosing an integration.
+# Cloud IAM
 
-## Prove the boundaries first
+Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.
 
-Run the same semantic cases in Rust, TypeScript, and Python and compare normalized outcomes rather than trusting screenshots.
+## Ownership boundary
 
-## Exact effect
+Cloud IAM continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.rest-effect/1`.
+## Data flow
 
-## Attenuation
+The authorized Auths command mapped to a least-privilege provider session becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.delegation/1`.
+## Secrets
 
-## Receipt verification
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1`.
+## State
 
-## Choose after the evidence
-
-Adopt the local SDK, production runtime, agent, or verification-only path only after the failure behavior matches your application needs.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.evaluate/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
 
+## Failure ownership
 
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
 
----
-
-# Delegate one action to an agent
-
-Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.
-
-## Outcome
+## Run the qualified path
 
-The agent can invoke one allowed action within its time, use, and delegation bounds. It cannot manufacture wider authority.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
 
-## Build
+## Limitations
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.delegation/1`.
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-## Agent boundary
-
-The agent proposes or presents authority. A closed application gateway verifies and performs the effect.
-
-## Failure path
-
-Increase the child action set or use count and observe delegation fail before execution.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.agent/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Protect one local effect
+# Cut over one effect
 
-Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.
+Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.
 
 ## Outcome
 
-One caller can perform one exact route-shaped action once. Replaying it or changing its bytes fails closed.
+Callers can no longer reach the provider effect without verified authority and durable reservation.
 
-## Build
+## Before you begin
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.rest-effect/1`.
+Complete shadow mode, provision runtime dependencies, define stop conditions, retain the previous path behind an operator-controlled rollback, and ensure it cannot run concurrently.
 
-## What Auths proved
+## Build the bounded path
 
-The actor held authority for the committed action and the closed gateway returned a bounded outcome. Transport success alone proved nothing.
+Route the selected operation through the Auths gateway, verify terminal receipts, monitor denial and indeterminate outcomes, and exercise resume and reconciliation.
 
-## Failure path
+## Run the qualified path
 
-Run the same action again to receive a replay denial, then change one application byte to receive a commitment mismatch.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.local/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
 
+## Success means
 
+Success includes correct effects, stable denials, no replay, durable evidence, and a tested recovery path.
 
----
+## Fail closed
 
-# Authorize across companies
+Rollback on unexplained denial, state inconsistency, custody failure, receipt loss, or provider ambiguity; never bypass Auths automatically.
 
-Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.
-
-## Outcome
+## Continue
 
-One organization authorizes an external actor to perform a precise operation without sharing a root identity provider or provider credential.
+Expand to the next effect only after operational ownership and evidence retention are routine.
 
-## Delegate
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cutover/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.delegation/1`.
 
-## Verify the evidence
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1`.
+---
 
-## Failure path
+# OAuth and OIDC
 
-Identity federation, delivery, or approval cannot substitute for exact authority. A changed plan or widened delegation is rejected.
+Keep OAuth or OIDC authentication while adding effect-specific machine authority.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.cross-company/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Ownership boundary
 
+The identity provider and OAuth resource server continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
 
+## Data flow
 
----
+Validated issuer, subject, audience, and freshness evidence becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
 
-# Protect a service effect
+## Secrets
 
-Submit exact authority to the open production Runtime API and preserve recovery state.
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
 
-## Outcome
+## State
 
-A service accepts a bounded request over HTTPS, reserves it durably, and distinguishes completion from a recoverable or unknown provider outcome.
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
 
-## Build
+## Failure ownership
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.rest-effect/1`.
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
 
-## Production boundary
+## Run the qualified path
 
-The Runtime API requires HTTPS and durable state. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway and never enter the caller SDK.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
 
-## Failure path
+## Limitations
 
-A provider-unknown outcome requires observation and reconciliation before any retry. Resume the same execution identity rather than creating a fresh request.
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.runtime/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Verify without executing
+# Plan adoption
 
-Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.
+Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
 
 ## Outcome
 
-A verifier confirms portable evidence and produces an inert decision or bounded receipt view without gaining an executable command.
-
-## Build
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1`.
+A written adoption slice identifies the caller, authority issuer, trust inputs, state owner, signer, gateway, provider credential, and receipt consumer.
 
-## Disclosure boundary
+## Before you begin
 
-Unauthorized viewers receive an opaque result. Summary and full views require the appropriate disclosure authority.
+Bring the current request shape, identity evidence, policy decision, approval flow, credential location, retry behavior, and audit record for one operation.
 
-## Failure path
+## Build the bounded path
 
-Tampered bytes, an unknown signer, or missing trust evidence remain rejected or indeterminate; verification never performs the underlying effect.
+Map each existing responsibility to Identity, Authority, Runtime, or the adjacent system; then run the closest quickstart and record deliberate differences.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.verify/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Run the qualified path
 
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
+## Success means
 
----
-
-# Before you begin
-
-Prepare only the runtime, trust, state, and custody inputs your chosen path actually needs.
+Every responsibility has one owner and the first cutover does not require replacing unrelated systems.
 
-## Smallest local path
+## Fail closed
 
-Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python; use development custody and in-memory state; and protect one deterministic local effect.
+Stop if provider credentials would enter an Auths artifact or if application code would reimplement attenuation or verification semantics.
 
-## Production additions
+## Continue
 
-Add HTTPS, durable replay and recovery state, external custody, explicit trust resolution, observability, and a closed provider gateway only when moving beyond evaluation.
+Choose the relevant composition page and enter shadow mode.
 
-## Know which path you own
-
-SDK consumers, runtime operators, agent builders, and profile authors have different prerequisites. Do not assemble every extension port for a normal integration.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.prerequisites/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Delegate one tool to an agent
-
-Give an agent one narrow tool and prove it cannot widen itself into a second tool.
-
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1` · Expected time: 12 minutes
-
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
-
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
-
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
+# Policy engines
 
-- Allowed: Agent publishes one report
-- Prohibited: Agent deletes a report
+Use a Cedar, OPA, or relationship decision as explicit context without duplicating the policy engine.
 
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+## Ownership boundary
 
-Expected outcome: `completed`.
+The policy engine and its data model continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
 
-## 4. Break safely
+## Data flow
 
-Expected stable denial: `authority_widening`. The provider is not reached.
+The decision and policy snapshot committed into trusted context becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
 
-## 5. Continue
+## Secrets
 
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
 
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/agent-delegation.json)
+## State
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
 
+## Failure ownership
 
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
 
----
-
-# Run one approved plan
-
-Bind approval to an exact ordered plan and prove that replacing a member invalidates it.
+## Run the qualified path
 
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1` · Expected time: 18 minutes
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+## Limitations
 
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
-
-- Allowed: Quarantine service, then rotate token
-- Prohibited: Replace rotate token with delete service
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
 
-Expected outcome: `completed`.
 
-## 4. Break safely
+---
 
-Expected stable denial: `approval_substitution`. The provider is not reached.
+# Shadow mode
 
-## 5. Continue
+Compare Auths decisions with live traffic without authorizing provider effects.
 
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+## Outcome
 
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json)
+The team can measure agreement, denial reasons, missing context, and potential blast-radius reduction before cutover.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Before you begin
 
+Mirror only bounded request inputs and remove secrets. Keep the current production enforcement path authoritative.
 
+## Build the bounded path
 
----
+Create and verify Auths decisions without passing effect-capable handles to the gateway; record normalized outcomes alongside the current decision.
 
-# Swap identity suites without changing authority
+## Run the qualified path
 
-Run the same authority workflow with two suites and prove that a mislabelled suite fails verification.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1` · Expected time: 14 minutes
+## Success means
 
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+Expected requests agree and adversarial mutations are denied with stable reasons.
 
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+## Fail closed
 
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
+Any ambiguity, sensitive-data leakage, or disagreement blocks cutover until ownership and mappings are corrected.
 
-- Allowed: Verify Ed25519 and P-256 projections
-- Prohibited: Label Ed25519 material as P-256
+## Continue
 
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+Cut over exactly one effect once the observation window and failure criteria are satisfied.
 
-Expected outcome: `authorized`.
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-## 4. Break safely
 
-Expected stable denial: `suite_mismatch`. The provider is not reached.
 
-## 5. Continue
+---
 
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+# Signed requests
 
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json)
+Bind an existing signed request to narrower authority and execution state.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Ownership boundary
 
+The request-signature layer continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
 
+## Data flow
 
----
+The exact signed application bytes becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
 
-# Protect one REST effect locally
+## Secrets
 
-Complete one exact REST-shaped effect and prove that changed application bytes fail closed.
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
 
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1` · Expected time: 8 minutes
+## State
 
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
 
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+## Failure ownership
 
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
 
-- Allowed: Publish report weekly
-- Prohibited: Publish report monthly
+## Run the qualified path
 
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
-Expected outcome: `completed`.
+## Limitations
 
-## 4. Break safely
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-Expected stable denial: `action_mismatch`. The provider is not reached.
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-## 5. Continue
 
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
 
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json)
+---
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+# Choose your path
 
+Select the shortest journey for the effect, actor, and operating boundary you have.
 
+## Outcome
 
----
+You will leave with one recommended quickstart, not a tour of every Auths feature.
 
-# Verify authority offline
+## Before you begin
 
-Verify proof and receipt bytes locally and prove that the wrong trusted context is denied.
+Name the effect, who proposes it, where credentials live, whether approval is required, and whether execution is local or remote.
 
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1` · Expected time: 7 minutes
+## Build the bounded path
 
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+Use Local REST effect for an in-process boundary; Runtime effect for durable remote execution; Agent delegation for a narrower handoff; Approved plan for exact multi-step review; Offline verification for inert evidence; Recovery for ambiguous outcomes; Identity swap for cryptographic or identity agility.
 
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+## Run the qualified path
 
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
-- Allowed: Verify with the committed trusted context
-- Prohibited: Verify under an unrelated trust root
+## Success means
 
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+The selected path demonstrates the same success and denial shapes your application must handle.
 
-Expected outcome: `authorized`.
+## Fail closed
 
-## 4. Break safely
+If you cannot describe the effect or provider boundary precisely, do not issue broad authority. Narrow the integration target first.
 
-Expected stable denial: `untrusted_context`. The provider is not reached.
+## Continue
 
-## 5. Continue
+Open the chosen quickstart and run it unchanged before adapting it.
 
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.choose/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/offline-verification.json)
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
+---
 
+# Evaluate Auths
 
----
+Evaluate Auths with deterministic positive and adversarial fixtures before choosing a deployment.
 
-# Resume uncertain execution safely
+## Outcome
 
-Resume one opaque execution reference and prove that a fresh retry cannot repeat the effect.
+Your evaluation records which Auths boundaries solve a real problem and which adjacent systems remain responsible.
 
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1` · Expected time: 15 minutes
+## Before you begin
 
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+Select one sensitive effect and define the current identity, policy, approval, credential, retry, and audit behavior around it.
 
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+## Build the bounded path
 
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
+Run the matching quickstart, mutate its action and bytes, replay it, expire it, remove trust, and compare each stable outcome with your present system.
 
-- Allowed: Resume the original execution reference
-- Prohibited: Create a fresh retry after provider uncertainty
+## Run the qualified path
 
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
-Expected outcome: `completed`.
+## Success means
 
-## 4. Break safely
+The evaluation demonstrates a useful reduction in ambient authority or ambiguity without requiring wholesale identity or policy replacement.
 
-Expected stable denial: `fresh_retry_prohibited`. The provider is not reached.
+## Fail closed
 
-## 5. Continue
+Reject the design if Auths merely duplicates an existing control without improving exact commitment, attenuation, recovery, or portable evidence.
 
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+## Continue
 
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json)
+If the boundary is useful, plan a shadow-mode integration around that single effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.evaluate/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Execute through the open runtime
+# Outcome paths
 
-Send one sealed command through the HTTPS runtime and prove that exact replay is denied.
+Choose an outcome path before learning the complete Auths model.
 
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1` · Expected time: 12 minutes
+## Recommended: [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application)
 
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
 
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+## Outcome paths
 
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
+- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
+- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
+- [Deploy the runtime](/get-started/paths/runtime) — Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.
+- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
+- [Cross-company authority](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
 
-- Allowed: Request report weekly once
-- Prohibited: Replay request report weekly
+_Page identity: auths.page.get-started.paths/1 · Product contract: auths.page.get-started.paths/1_
 
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
 
-Expected outcome: `completed`.
 
-## 4. Break safely
+---
 
-Expected stable denial: `exact_replay`. The provider is not reached.
+# Delegate to an agent
 
-## 5. Continue
+Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
 
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+## Outcome
 
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json)
+The agent receives delegable proof for one permitted operation and cannot widen it.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Before you begin
 
+Identify the tool effect and place its real provider credential behind a trusted executor.
 
+## Build the bounded path
 
----
+Create authority at the application boundary, delegate a narrower child to the agent, then send a sealed command to the executor.
 
-# Identity & trust
+## Run the qualified path
 
-Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
-## Recommended: [See how identity and trust fit](/identity-trust/how-it-works)
+## Success means
 
-Understand what identity proves—and what it never authorizes by itself.
+The delegated action succeeds and returns evidence that can be verified independently of the agent's narrative.
 
-## Bring what you already use
+## Fail closed
 
-- [Compose existing identity](/developers/integrations) — Use OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or an application resolver.
-- [Keep adapters replaceable](/identity-trust/how-it-works) — Separate identity, cryptography, transport, and authority.
-- [Turn identity into bounded action](/authority) — Attach exact authority without replacing authentication.
+Widening the action, resource, time, use count, budget, audience, or delegation depth fails closed.
 
-## Inspect and verify
+## Continue
 
-- [Verify offline](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Check portable evidence without executing anything.
-- [Review agility claims](/assurance) — Trace cryptographic and identity boundaries to evidence.
-- [Open exact contracts](/reference) — Find identity and verification surfaces by stable identity.
+Add approved plans if a human or second organization must review exact work before execution.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust/1 · Product contract: auths.page.identity-trust/1_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.agent/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# How identity and trust fit
+# Protect an application effect
 
-Authenticate a signer without turning identity, cryptography, or transport into authority.
+Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
 
-## The path at a glance
+## Outcome
 
-1. Identity material
-2. Authentication evidence
-3. Application trust resolver
-4. Verified signer
-5. Separate authority decision
+A caller can perform one exact application effect and receives a decision and execution receipt.
 
-Text equivalent: Bounded identity material becomes authentication evidence, an application-owned resolver evaluates trust, and only then can a separate authority decision consider the verified signer.
+## Before you begin
 
-## What remains true
+Isolate the effect behind one function and keep its service credential outside untrusted caller code.
 
-- A public key identifies verification material; it does not grant an action.
-- Ed25519, P-256, and future suites enter through the same bounded verification port.
-- HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and other transports deliver evidence but never authorize effects.
+## Build the bounded path
 
-## Failure branches
+Create authority for the exact action and resource, execute it through the SDK boundary, and verify the returned receipt before reporting success.
 
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| The suite is unsupported | Rejected | Install or supply an explicit compatible suite implementation. |
-| The signer is valid but untrusted | Denied | Change trust policy or use a trusted identity; do not infer trust from signature validity. |
-| The resolver is unavailable | Indeterminate | Restore trust evidence and evaluate again without performing an effect. |
+## Run the qualified path
 
-## Use this when
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
-You are integrating OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, application identities, or another cryptographic suite.
+## Success means
 
-## Do not use this when
+The permitted request succeeds once and its receipt binds the authority, command, context, and outcome.
 
-You are looking for permission scope; identity alone cannot express the complete effect boundary.
+## Fail closed
 
-## Continue from here
+A changed resource, replayed authority, or mutated command is denied before the protected function runs.
 
-- [Identity & trust](/identity-trust) — Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.
-- [Trust boundaries](/authority/execute) — Authorization before provider entry.
+## Continue
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+Add durable runtime state when the effect must survive process or host failure.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.local/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Production operations
+# Cross-company authority
 
-Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
+Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
 
-## Recommended: [Inspect the Runtime API](/reference/runtime-api)
+## Outcome
 
-See the exact HTTPS boundary, outcomes, and recovery operations.
+One company can delegate a precise repair to another company's agent while both retain their own identity, approval, and infrastructure boundaries.
 
-## Run the open runtime
+## Before you begin
 
-- [Runtime contract](/reference/runtime-api) — Endpoints, limits, trust boundaries, and closed outcomes.
-- [Deployment architecture](/identity-trust/how-it-works) — Separate durable state, custody, trust, and provider gateways.
-- [Receipts and disclosure](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Preserve evidence while minimizing exposed detail.
+Name each organization's trust evidence, the exact operation and resource, the approval threshold, the execution region, and the provider gateway that owns credentials.
 
-## Respond safely
+## Build the bounded path
 
-- [Lifecycle and recovery](/operations/execution-lifecycle) — Know when to retry, resume, reconcile, or stop.
-- [Operational evidence](/assurance) — Trace procedures and claims to a qualified release.
-- [Testing tools](/developers) — Exercise denial, replay, mutation, and provider uncertainty.
+Exchange public identity evidence, create and narrow authority, bind both approvals to the identical ordered plan, execute through the resource owner's gateway, then return bounded receipts.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.runtime/1 · Product contract: auths.page.operations.runtime/1_
+## Run the qualified path
 
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
 
+## Success means
 
----
+Only the approved bytes execute, each plan member is consumed once and in order, and authorized readers can inspect a bounded summary.
 
-# Back up and restore
+## Fail closed
 
-Restore state without reopening replay, budget, use, or recovery windows.
+Identity authentication, transport delivery, approval alone, changed plan bytes, wider delegation, replay, or provider uncertainty cannot silently become success.
 
-## A restore is a semantic exercise
+## Continue
 
-Quiesce or fence writers, restore an atomic state image, validate monotonic metadata, replay adversarial fixtures, reconcile nonterminal provider observations, and only then return the runtime to readiness.
+Use Identity & trust for federation, Authority for plans, and Operations for provider-unknown reconciliation and evidence retention.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.backup/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.cross-company/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Configure key custody
-
-Keep signing material non-exportable and observable without logging secrets.
-
-## The runtime asks a signer; it does not own key bytes
+# Deploy the runtime
 
-Use a custody adapter that returns suite-labelled public descriptors and signs bounded requests. Private material must remain inside the selected HSM, KMS, enclave, or application-owned signer.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.custody/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.
 
+## Outcome
 
+An HTTPS caller can submit one bounded effect while credentials and durable state remain server-side.
 
----
+## Before you begin
 
-# Configure durable state
+Provide TLS, explicit trust configuration, durable state, signer custody, and a closed gateway for the provider effect.
 
-Preserve replay, use, budget, recovery, and receipt invariants across restarts.
+## Build the bounded path
 
-## Reservations must be atomic and durable
+Check health and version, create authority, submit the command, inspect the terminal outcome, and retain its receipt.
 
-Do not split replay, budget, use, execution, and receipt state across stores that cannot preserve their transaction boundary. A restart must never make a consumed effect appear unused.
+## Run the qualified path
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.state/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
 
+## Success means
 
+The runtime commits replay and budget state before the effect, and returns a stable outcome after execution.
 
----
-
-# Configure provider gateways
+## Fail closed
 
-Acquire provider credentials only after authorization and durable reservation.
+Untrusted HTTP, contract mismatch, missing custody, or unavailable durable state stops execution rather than falling back to an unsafe path.
 
-## Only opaque verified commands cross the boundary
+## Continue
 
-The adapter receives an SDK-minted command and bounded execution context. It never accepts caller-constructed authorization flags. It reports applied, not applied, or possible outcomes without guessing.
+Continue to Production operations for topology, observability, recovery, and incident procedures.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.gateways/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.runtime/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Configure trust and profiles
-
-Version accepted roots, resolvers, suites, and domain semantics independently.
+# Verify without executing
 
-## Rotate trust without migrating authority
+Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
 
-Identity evidence and verification suites are replaceable inputs. Roll out new roots or suites with an explicit overlap window, negative fixtures, rollback, and post-rotation evidence review.
+## Outcome
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.trust/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+A verifier obtains a deterministic decision from bounded bytes, trust inputs, and verification time.
 
+## Before you begin
 
+Obtain the exact evidence bytes and explicit trust context. Verification never infers trust from transport success.
 
----
+## Build the bounded path
 
-# Deploy the open runtime
+Parse the bounded artifact through the SDK, provide trusted context, verify locally, and inspect only the disclosure view authorized for the caller.
 
-Place the Auths runtime behind TLS with explicit dependency ownership.
+## Run the qualified path
 
-## Deploy one closed gateway
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
 
-Terminate trusted TLS, isolate c
\ No newline at end of file
+## 
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/llms.txt b/public/llms.txt
index ae3bbef..e3db746 100644
--- a/public/llms.txt
+++ b/public/llms.txt
@@ -32,33 +32,35 @@
 - [Choose an Auths SDK](/developers/sdks.md) — Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
 - [Test Auths outcomes](/developers/testing.md) — Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.
 - [Versions and compatibility](/developers/versioning.md) — Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
-- [Get started](/get-started.md) — Choose the shortest safe path from an outcome to working Auths authority.
-- [Adopt Auths incrementally](/get-started/adoption.md) — Protect one high-value effect beside the systems you already operate.
-- [Move beyond ambient API keys](/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md) — Keep provider keys inside the gateway and give callers exact authority instead.
-- [Bind existing approvals](/get-started/adoption/approvals.md) — Turn approval evidence into exact transaction context, never reusable ambient permission.
-- [Bridge existing capabilities](/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md) — Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority without inventing properties they do not provide.
-- [Compose with cloud IAM](/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md) — Use workload identity and short-lived credentials without making IAM the application-effect model.
-- [Cut over one protected effect](/get-started/adoption/cutover.md) — Enforce, observe, reconcile, and roll back through one existing gateway.
-- [Keep OAuth and OIDC](/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md) — Retain login and session identity while adding bounded effect authority.
-- [Plan an Auths adoption](/get-started/adoption/plan.md) — Inventory effects and boundaries without collecting credentials or unnecessary business data.
-- [Compose with policy engines](/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md) — Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit bounded context.
-- [Verify in shadow mode](/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md) — Compare Auths decisions with current enforcement without authorizing or executing effects.
-- [Add Auths to signed requests](/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md) — Keep request authentication while binding authority to exact application bytes.
-- [Choose your Auths path](/get-started/choose.md) — Describe the boundary you need and get one deterministic starting recommendation.
-- [Evaluate Auths](/get-started/evaluate.md) — Run deterministic success and failure fixtures before choosing an integration.
-- [Delegate one action to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent.md) — Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.
-- [Protect one local effect](/get-started/paths/application.md) — Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.
-- [Authorize across companies](/get-started/paths/cross-company.md) — Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.
-- [Protect a service effect](/get-started/paths/runtime.md) — Submit exact authority to the open production Runtime API and preserve recovery state.
-- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification.md) — Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.
-- [Before you begin](/get-started/prerequisites.md) — Prepare only the runtime, trust, state, and custody inputs your chosen path actually needs.
-- [Delegate one tool to an agent](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md) — Give an agent one narrow tool and reject widening.
-- [Run one approved plan](/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md) — Bind approval to an exact ordered plan and reject substitution.
-- [Swap identity suites](/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md) — Keep authority semantics stable across identity suites.
-- [Protect one REST effect locally](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md) — Complete one exact REST-shaped effect and prove changed bytes fail closed.
-- [Verify authority offline](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md) — Verify proof and receipt bytes without a network dependency.
-- [Resume uncertain execution safely](/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md) — Resume an opaque execution reference and prohibit a fresh retry.
-- [Execute through the open runtime](/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md) — Complete one runtime effect and prove exact replay is denied.
+- [Get started](/get-started.md) — Choose one concrete outcome and reach a verified, fail-closed result.
+- [Adopt incrementally](/get-started/adoption.md) — Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.
+- [API keys](/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md) — Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.
+- [Approval systems](/get-started/adoption/approvals.md) — Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.
+- [Capability systems](/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md) — Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.
+- [Cloud IAM](/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md) — Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.
+- [Cut over one effect](/get-started/adoption/cutover.md) — Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.
+- [OAuth and OIDC](/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md) — Keep OAuth or OIDC authentication while adding effect-specific machine authority.
+- [Plan adoption](/get-started/adoption/plan.md) — Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
+- [Policy engines](/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md) — Use a Cedar, OPA, or relationship decision as explicit context without duplicating the policy engine.
+- [Shadow mode](/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md) — Compare Auths decisions with live traffic without authorizing provider effects.
+- [Signed requests](/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md) — Bind an existing signed request to narrower authority and execution state.
+- [Choose your path](/get-started/choose.md) — Select the shortest journey for the effect, actor, and operating boundary you have.
+- [Evaluate Auths](/get-started/evaluate.md) — Evaluate Auths with deterministic positive and adversarial fixtures before choosing a deployment.
+- [Outcome paths](/get-started/paths.md) — Choose an outcome path before learning the complete Auths model.
+- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent.md) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
+- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application.md) — Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
+- [Cross-company authority](/get-started/paths/cross-company.md) — Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
+- [Deploy the runtime](/get-started/paths/runtime.md) — Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.
+- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification.md) — Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
+- [Prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites.md) — Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
+- [Quickstarts](/get-started/quickstarts.md) — Compare seven installed-artifact projects by boundary, state, custody, success, and failure.
+- [Agent delegation](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md) — Delegate one narrower tool action and prove that a broader action is denied.
+- [Approved plan](/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md) — Bind approval to the exact bytes and order of a multi-step plan.
+- [Identity swap](/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md) — Exchange and verify identity material while keeping the authority workflow unchanged.
+- [Local REST effect](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md) — Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.
+- [Offline verification](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md) — Verify portable evidence without executing an effect or contacting a provider.
+- [Recovery](/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md) — Resume or reconcile an interrupted execution without blindly repeating the provider effect.
+- [Runtime effect](/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md) — Execute one bounded effect through the production HTTPS runtime and durable state boundary.
 - [Identity & trust](/identity-trust.md) — Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.
 - [How identity and trust fit](/identity-trust/how-it-works.md) — Authenticate a signer without turning identity, cryptography, or transport into authority.
 - [Production operations](/operations.md) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
diff --git a/public/operations.md b/public/operations.md
index 7656388..fbe4f42 100644
--- a/public/operations.md
+++ b/public/operations.md
@@ -2,21 +2,33 @@
 
 Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
 
-## Recommended: [Inspect the Runtime API](/reference/runtime-api)
+## Recommended: [Execution lifecycle](/operations/execution-lifecycle)
 
-See the exact HTTPS boundary, outcomes, and recovery operations.
+Separate parsing, authorization, durable reservation, provider observation, recovery, and terminal evidence.
 
-## Run the open runtime
+## Recover
 
-- [Runtime contract](/reference/runtime-api) — Endpoints, limits, trust boundaries, and closed outcomes.
-- [Deployment architecture](/identity-trust/how-it-works) — Separate durable state, custody, trust, and provider gateways.
-- [Receipts and disclosure](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Preserve evidence while minimizing exposed detail.
+- [Execution lifecycle](/operations/execution-lifecycle) — Separate parsing, authorization, durable reservation, provider observation, recovery, and terminal evidence.
+- [Recover and reconcile](/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation) — Resume the same execution identity after uncertain provider outcomes.
 
-## Respond safely
+## Deploy
 
-- [Lifecycle and recovery](/operations/execution-lifecycle) — Know when to retry, resume, reconcile, or stop.
-- [Operational evidence](/assurance) — Trace procedures and claims to a qualified release.
-- [Testing tools](/developers) — Exercise denial, replay, mutation, and provider uncertainty.
+- [Evaluate the runtime locally](/operations/evaluate-locally) — Exercise the production boundary with development custody and state before deployment.
+- [Deploy the open runtime](/operations/deploy-runtime) — Place the Auths runtime behind TLS with explicit dependency ownership.
+
+## Observe
+
+- [Observe Auths safely](/operations/observability) — Measure liveness, readiness, dependencies, outcomes, and latency without leaking authority.
+
+## Maintain
+
+- [Back up and restore](/operations/backup-and-restore) — Restore state without reopening replay, budget, use, or recovery windows.
+- [Upgrade and roll back](/operations/upgrade-and-rollback) — Change runtime bytes without splitting semantic, state, or documentation identities.
+- [Retain and disclose receipts](/operations/receipt-retention) — Preserve evidence while minimizing sensitive operational detail.
+
+## Incident response
+
+- [Incident response runbooks](/operations/incidents) — Stop, preserve evidence, reconcile, recover, and escalate without widening authority.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.runtime/1 · Product contract: auths.page.operations.runtime/1_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
index b2f5bbb..799bd42 100644
--- a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
+++ b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ You are performing effect-free offline verification.
 
 ## Continue from here
 
-- [Protect a service effect](/get-started/paths/runtime) — Submit exact authority to the open production Runtime API and preserve recovery state.
+- [Deploy the runtime](/get-started/paths/runtime) — Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.
 - [Production operations](/operations) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
diff --git a/public/reference.md b/public/reference.md
index 3ea9607..8330839 100644
--- a/public/reference.md
+++ b/public/reference.md
@@ -2,21 +2,25 @@
 
 Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.
 
-## Recommended: [Open the SDK reference](/reference/sdk)
+## Recommended: [SDK reference](/reference/sdk)
 
-Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while staying on the same operation.
+The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
 
-## Reference by surface
+## SDK
 
-- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — Exact installed symbols across maintained languages.
-- [Runtime API](/reference/runtime-api) — Exact methods, paths, limits, outcomes, and recovery.
-- [Developer resources](/developers) — Installation, testing, versioning, and extension paths.
+- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
 
-## Understand the contracts
+## Runtime
 
-- [Product vocabulary](/authority/model) — Connect symbols to the meaning they project.
-- [Trust boundaries](/authority/execute) — Know what each operation accepts and refuses to infer.
-- [Source and evidence](/assurance) — Trace generated reference facts to a release.
+- [Runtime API reference](/reference/runtime-api) — The HTTPS production runtime contract.
+
+## Lookup
+
+- [CLI reference](/reference/cli) — Command contracts generated from the compiled Auths command graph.
+- [Profiles](/reference/profiles) — Closed and application-owned profiles that map domain actions into Auths semantics.
+- [Stable error reference](/reference/errors) — Machine-stable error identities grouped by the caller's safe response.
+- [Schemas](/reference/schemas) — Canonical inputs, bounded wire forms, receipts, and disclosure views.
+- [Evidence manifest](/reference/evidence) — Resolve public claims to exact release evidence and limitations.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.reference/1 · Product contract: auths.page.reference/1_
 
diff --git a/public/search-index.json b/public/search-index.json
index 51a47c1..a8b8e42 100644
--- a/public/search-index.json
+++ b/public/search-index.json
@@ -238,189 +238,203 @@
       "id": "auths.page.start/1",
       "path": "/get-started",
       "title": "Get started",
-      "description": "Choose the shortest safe path from an outcome to working Auths authority.",
+      "description": "Choose one concrete outcome and reach a verified, fail-closed result.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.start.adopt/1",
       "path": "/get-started/adoption",
-      "title": "Adopt Auths incrementally",
-      "description": "Protect one high-value effect beside the systems you already operate.",
+      "title": "Adopt incrementally",
+      "description": "Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1",
       "path": "/get-started/adoption/api-keys",
-      "title": "Move beyond ambient API keys",
-      "description": "Keep provider keys inside the gateway and give callers exact authority instead.",
+      "title": "API keys",
+      "description": "Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.adopt.approvals/1",
       "path": "/get-started/adoption/approvals",
-      "title": "Bind existing approvals",
-      "description": "Turn approval evidence into exact transaction context, never reusable ambient permission.",
+      "title": "Approval systems",
+      "description": "Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1",
       "path": "/get-started/adoption/capabilities",
-      "title": "Bridge existing capabilities",
-      "description": "Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority without inventing properties they do not provide.",
+      "title": "Capability systems",
+      "description": "Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1",
       "path": "/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam",
-      "title": "Compose with cloud IAM",
-      "description": "Use workload identity and short-lived credentials without making IAM the application-effect model.",
+      "title": "Cloud IAM",
+      "description": "Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.adopt.cutover/1",
       "path": "/get-started/adoption/cutover",
-      "title": "Cut over one protected effect",
-      "description": "Enforce, observe, reconcile, and roll back through one existing gateway.",
+      "title": "Cut over one effect",
+      "description": "Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1",
       "path": "/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc",
-      "title": "Keep OAuth and OIDC",
-      "description": "Retain login and session identity while adding bounded effect authority.",
+      "title": "OAuth and OIDC",
+      "description": "Keep OAuth or OIDC authentication while adding effect-specific machine authority.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.adopt.plan/1",
       "path": "/get-started/adoption/plan",
-      "title": "Plan an Auths adoption",
-      "description": "Inventory effects and boundaries without collecting credentials or unnecessary business data.",
+      "title": "Plan adoption",
+      "description": "Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1",
       "path": "/get-started/adoption/policy-engines",
-      "title": "Compose with policy engines",
-      "description": "Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit bounded context.",
+      "title": "Policy engines",
+      "description": "Use a Cedar, OPA, or relationship decision as explicit context without duplicating the policy engine.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1",
       "path": "/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode",
-      "title": "Verify in shadow mode",
-      "description": "Compare Auths decisions with current enforcement without authorizing or executing effects.",
+      "title": "Shadow mode",
+      "description": "Compare Auths decisions with live traffic without authorizing provider effects.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1",
       "path": "/get-started/adoption/signed-requests",
-      "title": "Add Auths to signed requests",
-      "description": "Keep request authentication while binding authority to exact application bytes.",
+      "title": "Signed requests",
+      "description": "Bind an existing signed request to narrower authority and execution state.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.start.choose/1",
       "path": "/get-started/choose",
-      "title": "Choose your Auths path",
-      "description": "Describe the boundary you need and get one deterministic starting recommendation.",
+      "title": "Choose your path",
+      "description": "Select the shortest journey for the effect, actor, and operating boundary you have.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.start.evaluate/1",
       "path": "/get-started/evaluate",
       "title": "Evaluate Auths",
-      "description": "Run deterministic success and failure fixtures before choosing an integration.",
+      "description": "Evaluate Auths with deterministic positive and adversarial fixtures before choosing a deployment.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.get-started.paths/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/paths",
+      "title": "Outcome paths",
+      "description": "Choose an outcome path before learning the complete Auths model.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.start.agent/1",
       "path": "/get-started/paths/agent",
-      "title": "Delegate one action to an agent",
-      "description": "Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.",
+      "title": "Delegate to an agent",
+      "description": "Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.start.local/1",
       "path": "/get-started/paths/application",
-      "title": "Protect one local effect",
-      "description": "Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.",
+      "title": "Protect an application effect",
+      "description": "Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.start.cross-company/1",
       "path": "/get-started/paths/cross-company",
-      "title": "Authorize across companies",
-      "description": "Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.",
+      "title": "Cross-company authority",
+      "description": "Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.start.runtime/1",
       "path": "/get-started/paths/runtime",
-      "title": "Protect a service effect",
-      "description": "Submit exact authority to the open production Runtime API and preserve recovery state.",
+      "title": "Deploy the runtime",
+      "description": "Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.start.verify/1",
       "path": "/get-started/paths/verification",
       "title": "Verify without executing",
-      "description": "Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.",
+      "description": "Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.start.prerequisites/1",
       "path": "/get-started/prerequisites",
-      "title": "Before you begin",
-      "description": "Prepare only the runtime, trust, state, and custody inputs your chosen path actually needs.",
+      "title": "Prerequisites",
+      "description": "Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.",
+      "section": "get-started"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1",
+      "path": "/get-started/quickstarts",
+      "title": "Quickstarts",
+      "description": "Compare seven installed-artifact projects by boundary, state, custody, success, and failure.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1",
       "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation",
-      "title": "Delegate one tool to an agent",
-      "description": "Give an agent one narrow tool and reject widening.",
+      "title": "Agent delegation",
+      "description": "Delegate one narrower tool action and prove that a broader action is denied.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1",
       "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan",
-      "title": "Run one approved plan",
-      "description": "Bind approval to an exact ordered plan and reject substitution.",
+      "title": "Approved plan",
+      "description": "Bind approval to the exact bytes and order of a multi-step plan.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1",
       "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap",
-      "title": "Swap identity suites",
-      "description": "Keep authority semantics stable across identity suites.",
+      "title": "Identity swap",
+      "description": "Exchange and verify identity material while keeping the authority workflow unchanged.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
       "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect",
-      "title": "Protect one REST effect locally",
-      "description": "Complete one exact REST-shaped effect and prove changed bytes fail closed.",
+      "title": "Local REST effect",
+      "description": "Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
       "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification",
-      "title": "Verify authority offline",
-      "description": "Verify proof and receipt bytes without a network dependency.",
+      "title": "Offline verification",
+      "description": "Verify portable evidence without executing an effect or contacting a provider.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1",
       "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/recovery",
-      "title": "Resume uncertain execution safely",
-      "description": "Resume an opaque execution reference and prohibit a fresh retry.",
+      "title": "Recovery",
+      "description": "Resume or reconcile an interrupted execution without blindly repeating the provider effect.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1",
       "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect",
-      "title": "Execute through the open runtime",
-      "description": "Complete one runtime effect and prove exact replay is denied.",
+      "title": "Runtime effect",
+      "description": "Execute one bounded effect through the production HTTPS runtime and durable state boundary.",
       "section": "get-started"
     },
     {
diff --git a/public/sitemap.xml b/public/sitemap.xml
index ecedd32..92f4e5c 100644
--- a/public/sitemap.xml
+++ b/public/sitemap.xml
@@ -44,12 +44,14 @@
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/adoption/signed-requests</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/choose</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/evaluate</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/paths</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/paths/agent</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/paths/application</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/paths/cross-company</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/paths/runtime</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/paths/verification</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/prerequisites</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap</loc></url>
diff --git a/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs b/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs
index 37da569..6fef911 100644
--- a/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs
+++ b/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs
@@ -101,5 +101,5 @@ test("renders topic-local navigation and location context", async () => {
   assert.match(html, /Agents navigation/);
   assert.match(html, /Agents navigation/);
   assert.match(html, /aria-label="Breadcrumb"/);
-  assert.match(html, /Related topics/);
+  assert.match(html, /href="\/agents\/how-auths-works"/);
 });

From 134a5f98a2ea6726a539faf400c1d93c0f9ce576 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 23:10:00 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 21/29] docs: complete identity and trust journey

---
 app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx           |   2 +-
 app/lib/content-graph.ts                      |   3 +-
 app/lib/topic-landings.ts                     |  13 +
 content/identity-trust-pages.ts               |  81 +++++
 public/agents.md                              |   5 +
 public/authority.md                           |   4 +
 public/authority/lifecycle.md                 |  37 +-
 public/authority/model.md                     |  37 +-
 public/authority/plans/approvals.md           |  37 +-
 public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md       |  45 +--
 public/developers.md                          |   4 +
 .../quickstarts/agent-delegation.md           |  29 +-
 .../get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md  |  29 +-
 .../get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md  |  29 +-
 .../quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md          |  29 +-
 .../quickstarts/offline-verification.md       |  29 +-
 public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md    |  29 +-
 .../get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md |  29 +-
 public/identity-trust.md                      |  29 +-
 public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites.md |  16 +
 .../custom-and-post-quantum.md                |  34 ++
 .../cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md           |  34 ++
 .../cryptographic-suites/p256.md              |  34 ++
 .../exchange-public-identity.md               |  34 ++
 public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md         |  37 +-
 public/identity-trust/identity-sources.md     |  17 +
 .../identity-sources/application-resolvers.md |  34 ++
 .../identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md            |  34 ++
 .../identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md       |  34 ++
 .../identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md |  34 ++
 .../identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md   |  34 ++
 public/identity-trust/testing.md              |  34 ++
 public/identity-trust/trust-policy.md         |  22 ++
 public/identity-trust/verification-context.md |  22 ++
 public/llms-full.txt                          | 315 +++++++++---------
 public/llms.txt                               |  18 +-
 public/operations.md                          |   4 +
 public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md      |  45 +--
 public/reference.md                           |   4 +
 public/search-index.json                      | 102 +++++-
 public/sitemap.xml                            |  14 +
 41 files changed, 903 insertions(+), 553 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 content/identity-trust-pages.ts
 create mode 100644 public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites.md
 create mode 100644 public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum.md
 create mode 100644 public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md
 create mode 100644 public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256.md
 create mode 100644 public/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity.md
 create mode 100644 public/identity-trust/identity-sources.md
 create mode 100644 public/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers.md
 create mode 100644 public/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md
 create mode 100644 public/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md
 create mode 100644 public/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md
 create mode 100644 public/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md
 create mode 100644 public/identity-trust/testing.md
 create mode 100644 public/identity-trust/trust-policy.md
 create mode 100644 public/identity-trust/verification-context.md

diff --git a/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx b/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx
index 054062a..3076e7d 100644
--- a/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx
+++ b/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ export function TopicLandingPage({ pageId }: { pageId: string }) {
         </Link>
         {page.id === "auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1" && <QuickstartComparison />}
         <div className="topic-groups">
-          {landing.groups.map((group) => (
+          {landing.groups.filter((group) => group.cards.some((card) => siteNodeById(card.target).section === section)).map((group) => (
             <section key={group.title}>
               <h2>{group.title}</h2>
               <div className="topic-card-grid">
diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
index 8501ea8..1a9bbed 100644
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import rawAgentIntegrationPages from "../../content/agent-integration-pages.json
 import rawAdoptionPages from "../../content/adoption-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import rawOperationsPages from "../../content/operations-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import { getStartedPages } from "../../content/get-started-pages.ts";
+import { identityTrustPages } from "../../content/identity-trust-pages.ts";
 import rawContract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
 import { parseAuthoredPageContent, type AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
 import { assertPageContract } from "../../schemas/page-contract.ts";
@@ -91,7 +92,7 @@ function replacePages(base: readonly unknown[], replacements: readonly unknown[]
 }
 
 const legacyPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = [...rawPages, ...rawDeveloperPages, ...rawAgentIntegrationPages, ...rawAdoptionPages, ...rawOperationsPages];
-export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze(replacePages(legacyPageInputs, getStartedPages));
+export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze(replacePages(replacePages(legacyPageInputs, getStartedPages), identityTrustPages));
 export const verifiedPageGraph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(authoredPageInputs, rawContract);
 
 export function contentPageByPath(path: string): AuthoredPageSource {
diff --git a/app/lib/topic-landings.ts b/app/lib/topic-landings.ts
index 4aebe0a..b24e188 100644
--- a/app/lib/topic-landings.ts
+++ b/app/lib/topic-landings.ts
@@ -3,6 +3,15 @@ import { verifiedPageGraph } from "./content-graph.ts";
 import { siteNodeById } from "./site-tree.ts";
 
 const pageIds = new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.id));
+const relatedByPage: Readonly<Record<string, readonly string[]>> = {
+  "auths.page.identity-trust/1": ["auths.page.authority/1"],
+  "auths.page.authority/1": ["auths.page.operations.runtime/1"],
+  "auths.page.agents/1": ["auths.page.identity-trust/1", "auths.page.operations.runtime/1"],
+  "auths.page.operations.runtime/1": ["auths.page.assurance.evidence/1"],
+  "auths.page.developers/1": ["auths.page.reference/1"],
+  "auths.page.reference/1": ["auths.page.assurance.evidence/1"],
+  "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1": ["auths.page.operations.runtime/1"],
+};
 const landingPages = verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => page.pageType === "landing"
   && page.section !== "home"
   && verifiedPageGraph.pages.some((candidate) => candidate.parent === page.id));
@@ -17,6 +26,10 @@ export const topicLandings: readonly TopicLanding[] = Object.freeze(landingPages
       description: candidate.description,
     })),
   }));
+  const related = (relatedByPage[page.id] ?? []).map((id) => verifiedPageGraph.pages.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id))
+    .filter((candidate) => candidate !== undefined)
+    .map((candidate) => ({ target: candidate.id, title: candidate.title, description: candidate.description }));
+  if (related.length > 0) groups.push({ title: "Related topics", cards: related });
   const recommendation = descendants[0];
   return Object.freeze({
     page: page.id,
diff --git a/content/identity-trust-pages.ts b/content/identity-trust-pages.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1090522
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/identity-trust-pages.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+import { concept, guide, integration, landing } from "./page-builders.ts";
+
+const identityScenario = "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1";
+const verifyScenario = "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1";
+const verifyOperation = { operations: ["auths.operation.verify/1"] } as const;
+
+const identityGuide = (
+  id: string,
+  description: string,
+  outcome: string,
+  steps: string,
+  failure: string,
+  scenario = identityScenario,
+) => guide({
+  id,
+  description,
+  scenario,
+  outcome,
+  prerequisites: "Choose the verification method, suite label, bounded public evidence, and explicit trust inputs. No capability, approval, plan, transport, or provider object is required.",
+  steps,
+  success: "The verifier binds the exact method, suite, public material, application bytes, and trusted context and returns the same closed outcome in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.",
+  failure,
+  next: "Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.",
+  dependencies: verifyOperation,
+});
+
+const identityIntegration = (id: string, description: string, owner: string, evidence: string) => integration({
+  id,
+  description,
+  scenario: identityScenario,
+  ownership: `${owner} owns authentication, issuance, rotation, and account or workload lifecycle. Auths owns parsing the bounded projection and using it only under explicit trusted context.`,
+  dataFlow: `${evidence} is resolved into method- and suite-labelled public verification material. That bounded result can authenticate signed application bytes without constructing authority.`,
+  secrets: "Private keys, refresh tokens, client secrets, and provider credentials stay in their existing custody systems. Auths identity evidence is public or explicitly bounded verification input.",
+  state: "The resolver owns freshness and caching. The verifier receives the selected evidence and time as inputs rather than reaching into ambient identity state.",
+  failures: "Unknown issuers, stale evidence, unsupported suites, mismatched methods, ambiguous subjects, and resolver errors are closed outcomes. Authentication never implies authority.",
+  limitations: "Auths does not become the identity provider and does not ship every possible adapter. Applications own adapter choice and trust policy behind the stable port.",
+  dependencies: verifyOperation,
+});
+
+export const identityTrustPages: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([
+  landing("auths.page.identity-trust/1", "Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.", "Identity answers who or what signed bytes; trust answers why that evidence is acceptable here. Auths keeps both inputs explicit and replaceable, so exchanging a public identity never forces a team to adopt capabilities, approvals, a transport, or a particular cryptographic suite."),
+  concept({
+    id: "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
+    description: "See the independent boundaries between identity evidence, cryptographic suites, trust policy, transport, and authority.",
+    model: "An Auths identity projection contains a verification method, suite label, and bounded public evidence. A resolver may obtain that evidence from raw keys, OIDC, SPIFFE, or an application system. Trusted context decides which result is acceptable for one verification.",
+    invariants: "Identity evidence authenticates exact bytes; it never grants an effect. Suite adapters verify only their declared material. Transport success supplies bytes, not trust. Authority can refer to an identity without owning its provider or key lifecycle.",
+    failures: "Unknown suite, method mismatch, wrong root, stale evidence, resolver ambiguity, and altered application bytes remain distinct closed results. The verifier cannot silently try a different suite or trust source.",
+    next: "Choose an identity source, then choose a suite and trust policy. Open Authority only when a verified principal needs bounded permission.",
+    dependencies: verifyOperation,
+  }),
+  landing("auths.page.identity-trust.sources/1", "Choose the system that supplies bounded public verification evidence.", "Raw public keys are the smallest dependency. OIDC and SPIFFE adapters translate established identity evidence. Application resolvers support systems with their own directory or key registry. Each option terminates at the same parse-first identity port."),
+  identityGuide("auths.page.identity-trust.sources.raw-keys/1", "Exchange method- and suite-labelled public keys as ordinary bounded data.", "Two peers can exchange a public identity and verify signed application bytes with no authority or approval setup.", "Encode the public material with its exact suite and verification method, send it over any bounded transport, parse it, and verify the signed message under caller-supplied trust.", "Malformed evidence, an unknown suite, a mislabelled key, method mismatch, or changed message bytes fails without invoking any authority logic."),
+  identityIntegration("auths.page.identity-trust.sources.oauth-oidc/1", "Resolve OIDC identity into explicit Auths verification evidence without turning a bearer token into authority.", "The OpenID Provider and relying party", "Validated issuer, subject, audience, token time, and key evidence"),
+  identityIntegration("auths.page.identity-trust.sources.spiffe/1", "Use SPIFFE workload identity as a replaceable trust input for Auths verification.", "SPIRE and the workload API", "The validated SPIFFE ID, trust domain, bundle, and workload evidence"),
+  identityIntegration("auths.page.identity-trust.sources.resolvers/1", "Adapt an application directory or key registry through a narrow resolver port.", "The application resolver", "A bounded lookup key and the resolver's typed verification result"),
+  landing("auths.page.identity-trust.suites/1", "Select cryptographic verification independently from identity source and authority semantics.", "Ed25519 and P-256 demonstrate that the identity port is suite-agnostic. A custom adapter can add another classical or post-quantum suite only by declaring its method, evidence shape, parsing limits, and verification behavior."),
+  identityGuide("auths.page.identity-trust.suites.ed25519/1", "Use the maintained Ed25519 suite for compact deterministic signatures.", "An Ed25519 identity verifies exact application bytes through the common identity port.", "Parse only the declared Ed25519 evidence shape, bind it to the declared verification method, and verify the signature without falling back to another algorithm.", "Wrong key length, invalid point material, method mismatch, suite relabelling, and signature mutation are rejected as Ed25519-specific failures."),
+  identityGuide("auths.page.identity-trust.suites.p256/1", "Use the maintained P-256 suite through the same identity and verification interfaces.", "A P-256 identity can replace Ed25519 without changing application authority or transport code.", "Parse the canonical P-256 public material, require the P-256 suite label, and verify the exact message through the common port.", "Non-canonical points, curve mismatch, suite relabelling, high-level method mismatch, and changed bytes fail without cross-suite guessing."),
+  identityGuide("auths.page.identity-trust.suites.custom/1", "Implement a custom or post-quantum suite adapter without changing Auths identity meaning.", "An application-owned adapter can supply a new suite behind the stable parser and verifier ports.", "Assign a stable suite identity, define bounded canonical evidence, parse into an opaque suite-owned key, implement exact-byte verification, and add positive plus adversarial differential fixtures.", "Registration collisions, unbounded evidence, ambiguous encoding, implicit fallback, verification-method mismatch, and non-deterministic outcomes block the adapter."),
+  concept({
+    id: "auths.page.identity-trust.policy/1",
+    description: "Define which issuers, roots, resolvers, suites, audiences, and freshness windows are acceptable.",
+    model: "Trust policy is caller-owned input to verification. It selects acceptable roots and issuers, constrains resolver results, allows explicit suites, and establishes the observation time and freshness rules.",
+    invariants: "A signature proves possession of a key; trust policy decides whether that key matters here. Policy is explicit, immutable for one decision, and committed into evidence when the workflow requires reproducibility.",
+    failures: "Correct signatures under an untrusted root, stale bundle, wrong audience, disabled suite, or ambiguous resolver are not partially trusted. They fail as trust outcomes rather than cryptographic success.",
+    next: "Construct the smallest verification context for the application boundary and test every excluded root and suite.",
+    dependencies: verifyOperation,
+  }),
+  identityGuide("auths.page.identity-trust.exchange/1", "Send and receive a public identity as bounded, transport-neutral data.", "A peer can publish identity information over HTTPS, Iroh, a queue, a file, or another transport without importing capabilities.", "Serialize only the method, suite, and bounded public evidence; enforce size limits at ingress; parse before use; and pass the parsed identity to signature verification.", "Transport authentication or delivery does not cure malformed, unsupported, stale, or untrusted identity evidence."),
+  identityGuide("auths.page.identity-trust.rotation/1", "Rotate keys or trust roots with explicit overlap, rollback, and negative tests.", "New identity evidence becomes valid during a bounded overlap while existing authority artifacts remain meaningful under their committed verification method.", "Publish the new verification material, add it to explicit trust context, verify both generations during the overlap, cut issuance to the new key, then remove the old root after retained evidence no longer requires it.", "Early root removal, unbounded overlap, rollback to compromised material, method reuse, and stale resolver caches must fail visibly; rotation never silently rewrites authority."),
+  concept({
+    id: "auths.page.identity-trust.context/1",
+    description: "Build the exact trusted context used for one deterministic verification.",
+    model: "Trusted context is a parsed value containing roots, issuer or resolver policy, accepted suites, audience, observation time, and relevant freshness limits. Verification receives it explicitly.",
+    invariants: "The same artifact and context yield the same outcome across languages. Ambient process configuration, network state, or transport metadata cannot silently change the decision.",
+    failures: "Missing time, unknown roots, stale evidence, disabled suites, mismatched audience, or resolver uncertainty returns a closed result rather than manufacturing context.",
+    next: "Keep context construction at the application trust boundary and pass only the parsed value into verification.",
+    dependencies: verifyOperation,
+  }),
+  identityGuide("auths.page.identity-trust.testing/1", "Test identity sources, suites, and trust policy with positive and adversarial fixtures.", "The test suite proves identical outcomes for supported identities and stable failures for every excluded shape.", "Run Ed25519 and P-256 success fixtures, then mutate the suite label, verification method, root, freshness, message bytes, and evidence length. Compare normalized Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes.", "Any language disagreement, fallback to another suite, network-dependent result, or acceptance of an unknown root fails qualification.", verifyScenario),
+]);
diff --git a/public/agents.md b/public/agents.md
index bede83b..00a76a9 100644
--- a/public/agents.md
+++ b/public/agents.md
@@ -20,5 +20,10 @@ Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
 
 - [Agent skills and plugins](/agents/skills-and-plugins) — Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.
 
+## Related topics
+
+- [Identity & trust](/identity-trust) — Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.
+- [Production operations](/operations) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
+
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents/1 · Product contract: auths.page.agents/1_
 
diff --git a/public/authority.md b/public/authority.md
index 0feba80..b0f4dc3 100644
--- a/public/authority.md
+++ b/public/authority.md
@@ -18,5 +18,9 @@ Authorization before provider entry.
 
 - [Authority lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
 
+## Related topics
+
+- [Production operations](/operations) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
+
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority/1_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle.md b/public/authority/lifecycle.md
index 83a1a59..28792b8 100644
--- a/public/authority/lifecycle.md
+++ b/public/authority/lifecycle.md
@@ -2,42 +2,9 @@
 
 Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
 
-## The path at a glance
+## Authority can only get narrower
 
-1. Author exact authority
-2. Commit canonical bytes
-3. Attenuate child
-4. Consume use or budget
-5. Expire, revoke, or exhaust
-
-Text equivalent: Authority is authored for exact canonical bytes, committed, optionally attenuated into a child, consumed under durable state, and eventually expires, is revoked, or becomes exhausted.
-
-## What remains true
-
-- A child is a subset of its parent under every critical extension.
-- Use and budget state are durable and atomic with reservation.
-- Expired, revoked, or exhausted authority cannot be revived by transport or approval.
-
-## Failure branches
-
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| A child adds an action or use | Widening rejected | Create the child from a valid subset of the parent. |
-| Authority expires before reservation | Denied | Request fresh authority for current intent. |
-| Revocation state cannot be checked | Indeterminate | Restore lifecycle state; do not assume the grant remains valid. |
-
-## Use this when
-
-You need delegation, one-time use, budget, expiry, revocation, or critical-extension behavior.
-
-## Do not use this when
-
-You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.
-
-## Continue from here
-
-- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
-- [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
+Each child commits to a subset of its parent and consumes explicit time, use, budget, and delegation bounds.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/model.md b/public/authority/model.md
index a9452ff..5fcd05f 100644
--- a/public/authority/model.md
+++ b/public/authority/model.md
@@ -2,42 +2,9 @@
 
 Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.
 
-## The path at a glance
+## One operation from intent to evidence
 
-1. Actor + exact action
-2. Create authority
-3. Delegate narrower
-4. Execute through gateway
-5. Verify receipt
-
-Text equivalent: An actor describes an exact action, creates bounded authority, optionally delegates a narrower child, executes through a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt.
-
-## What remains true
-
-- Authority names the exact action and actor bounds.
-- Delegation cannot add actions, time, uses, budget, or depth.
-- Verification returns inert evidence and cannot perform the effect.
-
-## Failure branches
-
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| Action bytes change | Commitment mismatch | Create authority for the intended bytes; do not reinterpret the old grant. |
-| The same use is replayed | Denied | Create a new authorized operation only if the business intent is genuinely new. |
-| Required trust evidence is unavailable | Indeterminate | Restore the missing evidence before making a decision. |
-
-## Use this when
-
-You need the complete product model before choosing an SDK or deployment.
-
-## Do not use this when
-
-You only need an exact signature or endpoint field; open the generated reference instead.
-
-## Continue from here
-
-- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
-- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+A support service grants one actor authority to issue one refund, executes it behind a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/plans/approvals.md b/public/authority/plans/approvals.md
index 9b16a69..021e4ca 100644
--- a/public/authority/plans/approvals.md
+++ b/public/authority/plans/approvals.md
@@ -2,42 +2,9 @@
 
 Bind threshold or ordered approval to the exact operations, bytes, and order under review.
 
-## The path at a glance
+## Approval is bound context, not authority
 
-1. Construct exact plan
-2. Commit members + order
-3. Collect bound approvals
-4. Authorize each sealed command
-5. Record partial or terminal outcome
-
-Text equivalent: An exact ordered plan is committed, approvers sign that commitment, each member still passes authorization, and execution records partial, uncertain, cancelled, or terminal outcomes without treating approval as reusable permission.
-
-## What remains true
-
-- Approval is evidence about one exact plan commitment.
-- Substituting a member, byte sequence, order, threshold, or approver set invalidates approval.
-- Approval never bypasses authority verification or durable execution state.
-
-## Failure branches
-
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| A plan member changes after approval | Substitution rejected | Build and approve a new plan commitment. |
-| Threshold is not met | Denied | Collect the missing valid approval or cancel. |
-| A provider outcome becomes unknown mid-plan | Plan is recoverable with explicit completed and uncertain members | Reconcile before any continuation. |
-
-## Use this when
-
-Several exact operations require threshold, ordered, or cross-organization review.
-
-## Do not use this when
-
-A reusable human-approved flag or broad role is sufficient for the actual risk model.
-
-## Continue from here
-
-- [Cross-company authority](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
-- [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
+Changing a member, byte, order, or threshold changes the plan commitment and invalidates the collected approval evidence.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md b/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
index 117ed82..c167e97 100644
--- a/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
+++ b/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
@@ -2,50 +2,9 @@
 
 Verify outcome evidence while revealing only what the viewer is authorized to inspect.
 
-## The path at a glance
+## Evidence has disclosure levels
 
-1. Decision receipt
-2. Execution receipt
-3. Verify integrity
-4. Opaque or summary view
-5. Authorized full disclosure
-
-Text equivalent: Decision and execution receipts bind evidence, local verification confirms integrity, every viewer can receive only the permitted opaque or summary projection, and sensitive full detail requires explicit disclosure authority.
-
-## What remains true
-
-- A receipt records a decision or outcome; it does not retroactively authorize it.
-- Verification is local and effect free.
-- Sensitive application details are absent from unauthorized and bounded-summary views.
-
-## Closed runtime outcomes
-
-- `completed`
-- `denied`
-- `indeterminate`
-- `not-found`
-- `recoverable`
-
-## Failure branches
-
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| Receipt bytes are changed | Verification rejected | Retrieve the original signed receipt from a trusted source. |
-| A viewer lacks disclosure authority | Opaque view | Request explicit disclosure authority rather than leaking fields. |
-| Signer trust cannot be resolved | Indeterminate | Restore trust evidence before relying on the receipt. |
-
-## Use this when
-
-You need audit evidence, cross-company proof, recovery state, or privacy-preserving inspection.
-
-## Do not use this when
-
-You need to perform an effect; receipt verification is intentionally inert.
-
-## Continue from here
-
-- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
-- [Assurance](/assurance) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
+Opaque, summary, and authorized full views let applications prove integrity without publishing sensitive business detail by default.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/developers.md b/public/developers.md
index 04c9ea6..a178907 100644
--- a/public/developers.md
+++ b/public/developers.md
@@ -28,5 +28,9 @@ Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
 
 - [Versions and compatibility](/developers/versioning) — Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
 
+## Related topics
+
+- [APIs & SDKs](/reference) — Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.
+
 _Page identity: auths.page.developers/1 · Product contract: auths.page.developers/1_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
index d334d1a..d1395c5 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
@@ -1,31 +1,10 @@
-# Delegate one tool to an agent
+# Agent delegation
 
-Give an agent one narrow tool and prove it cannot widen itself into a second tool.
+Delegate one narrower tool action and prove that a broader action is denied.
 
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1` · Expected time: 12 minutes
+## Run success and fail-closed paths
 
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
-
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
-
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
-
-- Allowed: Agent publishes one report
-- Prohibited: Agent deletes a report
-
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
-
-Expected outcome: `completed`.
-
-## 4. Break safely
-
-Expected stable denial: `authority_widening`. The provider is not reached.
-
-## 5. Continue
-
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
-
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/agent-delegation.json)
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
index b8d5d38..3035eb3 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
@@ -1,31 +1,10 @@
-# Run one approved plan
+# Approved plan
 
-Bind approval to an exact ordered plan and prove that replacing a member invalidates it.
+Bind approval to the exact bytes and order of a multi-step plan.
 
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1` · Expected time: 18 minutes
+## Run success and fail-closed paths
 
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
-
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
-
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
-
-- Allowed: Quarantine service, then rotate token
-- Prohibited: Replace rotate token with delete service
-
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
-
-Expected outcome: `completed`.
-
-## 4. Break safely
-
-Expected stable denial: `approval_substitution`. The provider is not reached.
-
-## 5. Continue
-
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
-
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json)
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
index be6e5d6..28a0315 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
@@ -1,31 +1,10 @@
-# Swap identity suites without changing authority
+# Identity swap
 
-Run the same authority workflow with two suites and prove that a mislabelled suite fails verification.
+Exchange and verify identity material while keeping the authority workflow unchanged.
 
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1` · Expected time: 14 minutes
+## Run success and fail-closed paths
 
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
-
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
-
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
-
-- Allowed: Verify Ed25519 and P-256 projections
-- Prohibited: Label Ed25519 material as P-256
-
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
-
-Expected outcome: `authorized`.
-
-## 4. Break safely
-
-Expected stable denial: `suite_mismatch`. The provider is not reached.
-
-## 5. Continue
-
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
-
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json)
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
index aaa86ab..057cfed 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
@@ -1,31 +1,10 @@
-# Protect one REST effect locally
+# Local REST effect
 
-Complete one exact REST-shaped effect and prove that changed application bytes fail closed.
+Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.
 
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1` · Expected time: 8 minutes
+## Run success and fail-closed paths
 
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
-
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
-
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
-
-- Allowed: Publish report weekly
-- Prohibited: Publish report monthly
-
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
-
-Expected outcome: `completed`.
-
-## 4. Break safely
-
-Expected stable denial: `action_mismatch`. The provider is not reached.
-
-## 5. Continue
-
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
-
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json)
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
index a3802f3..847ba8e 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
@@ -1,31 +1,10 @@
-# Verify authority offline
+# Offline verification
 
-Verify proof and receipt bytes locally and prove that the wrong trusted context is denied.
+Verify portable evidence without executing an effect or contacting a provider.
 
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1` · Expected time: 7 minutes
+## Run success and fail-closed paths
 
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
-
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
-
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
-
-- Allowed: Verify with the committed trusted context
-- Prohibited: Verify under an unrelated trust root
-
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
-
-Expected outcome: `authorized`.
-
-## 4. Break safely
-
-Expected stable denial: `untrusted_context`. The provider is not reached.
-
-## 5. Continue
-
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
-
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/offline-verification.json)
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md
index a0f0a72..4fe5f12 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md
@@ -1,31 +1,10 @@
-# Resume uncertain execution safely
+# Recovery
 
-Resume one opaque execution reference and prove that a fresh retry cannot repeat the effect.
+Resume or reconcile an interrupted execution without blindly repeating the provider effect.
 
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1` · Expected time: 15 minutes
+## Run success and fail-closed paths
 
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
-
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
-
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
-
-- Allowed: Resume the original execution reference
-- Prohibited: Create a fresh retry after provider uncertainty
-
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
-
-Expected outcome: `completed`.
-
-## 4. Break safely
-
-Expected stable denial: `fresh_retry_prohibited`. The provider is not reached.
-
-## 5. Continue
-
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
-
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json)
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
index b5c34e6..9ef0efa 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
@@ -1,31 +1,10 @@
-# Execute through the open runtime
+# Runtime effect
 
-Send one sealed command through the HTTPS runtime and prove that exact replay is denied.
+Execute one bounded effect through the production HTTPS runtime and durable state boundary.
 
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1` · Expected time: 12 minutes
+## Run success and fail-closed paths
 
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
-
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
-
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
-
-- Allowed: Request report weekly once
-- Prohibited: Replay request report weekly
-
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
-
-Expected outcome: `completed`.
-
-## 4. Break safely
-
-Expected stable denial: `exact_replay`. The provider is not reached.
-
-## 5. Continue
-
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
-
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json)
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust.md b/public/identity-trust.md
index 514223b..d631d15 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust.md
@@ -1,14 +1,37 @@
 # Identity & trust
 
-Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.
+Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.
 
 ## Recommended: [How identity and trust fit](/identity-trust/how-it-works)
 
-Authenticate a signer without turning identity, cryptography, or transport into authority.
+See the independent boundaries between identity evidence, cryptographic suites, trust policy, transport, and authority.
 
 ## Understand
 
-- [How identity and trust fit](/identity-trust/how-it-works) — Authenticate a signer without turning identity, cryptography, or transport into authority.
+- [How identity and trust fit](/identity-trust/how-it-works) — See the independent boundaries between identity evidence, cryptographic suites, trust policy, transport, and authority.
+
+## Identity sources
+
+- [Identity sources](/identity-trust/identity-sources) — Choose the system that supplies bounded public verification evidence.
+
+## Cryptography
+
+- [Cryptographic suites](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites) — Select cryptographic verification independently from identity source and authority semantics.
+
+## Operate trust
+
+- [Trust policy](/identity-trust/trust-policy) — Define which issuers, roots, resolvers, suites, audiences, and freshness windows are acceptable.
+- [Exchange public identity](/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity) — Send and receive a public identity as bounded, transport-neutral data.
+- [Key and root rotation](/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation) — Rotate keys or trust roots with explicit overlap, rollback, and negative tests.
+- [Verification context](/identity-trust/verification-context) — Build the exact trusted context used for one deterministic verification.
+
+## Test
+
+- [Test identity and trust](/identity-trust/testing) — Test identity sources, suites, and trust policy with positive and adversarial fixtures.
+
+## Related topics
+
+- [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust/1 · Product contract: auths.page.identity-trust/1_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites.md b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a179c9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites.md
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# Cryptographic suites
+
+Select cryptographic verification independently from identity source and authority semantics.
+
+## Recommended: [Ed25519](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519)
+
+Use the maintained Ed25519 suite for compact deterministic signatures.
+
+## Cryptography
+
+- [Ed25519](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519) — Use the maintained Ed25519 suite for compact deterministic signatures.
+- [P-256](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256) — Use the maintained P-256 suite through the same identity and verification interfaces.
+- [Custom and post-quantum suites](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum) — Implement a custom or post-quantum suite adapter without changing Auths identity meaning.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.suites/1 · Product contract: auths.page.identity-trust.suites/1_
+
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum.md b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..30f9cb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Custom and post-quantum suites
+
+Implement a custom or post-quantum suite adapter without changing Auths identity meaning.
+
+## Outcome
+
+An application-owned adapter can supply a new suite behind the stable parser and verifier ports.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Choose the verification method, suite label, bounded public evidence, and explicit trust inputs. No capability, approval, plan, transport, or provider object is required.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Assign a stable suite identity, define bounded canonical evidence, parse into an opaque suite-owned key, implement exact-byte verification, and add positive plus adversarial differential fixtures.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The verifier binds the exact method, suite, public material, application bytes, and trusted context and returns the same closed outcome in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Registration collisions, unbounded evidence, ambiguous encoding, implicit fallback, verification-method mismatch, and non-deterministic outcomes block the adapter.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.suites.custom/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b7d193
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Ed25519
+
+Use the maintained Ed25519 suite for compact deterministic signatures.
+
+## Outcome
+
+An Ed25519 identity verifies exact application bytes through the common identity port.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Choose the verification method, suite label, bounded public evidence, and explicit trust inputs. No capability, approval, plan, transport, or provider object is required.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Parse only the declared Ed25519 evidence shape, bind it to the declared verification method, and verify the signature without falling back to another algorithm.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The verifier binds the exact method, suite, public material, application bytes, and trusted context and returns the same closed outcome in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Wrong key length, invalid point material, method mismatch, suite relabelling, and signature mutation are rejected as Ed25519-specific failures.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.suites.ed25519/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256.md b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..23cd319
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# P-256
+
+Use the maintained P-256 suite through the same identity and verification interfaces.
+
+## Outcome
+
+A P-256 identity can replace Ed25519 without changing application authority or transport code.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Choose the verification method, suite label, bounded public evidence, and explicit trust inputs. No capability, approval, plan, transport, or provider object is required.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Parse the canonical P-256 public material, require the P-256 suite label, and verify the exact message through the common port.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The verifier binds the exact method, suite, public material, application bytes, and trusted context and returns the same closed outcome in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Non-canonical points, curve mismatch, suite relabelling, high-level method mismatch, and changed bytes fail without cross-suite guessing.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.suites.p256/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity.md b/public/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..75fb5b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Exchange public identity
+
+Send and receive a public identity as bounded, transport-neutral data.
+
+## Outcome
+
+A peer can publish identity information over HTTPS, Iroh, a queue, a file, or another transport without importing capabilities.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Choose the verification method, suite label, bounded public evidence, and explicit trust inputs. No capability, approval, plan, transport, or provider object is required.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Serialize only the method, suite, and bounded public evidence; enforce size limits at ingress; parse before use; and pass the parsed identity to signature verification.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The verifier binds the exact method, suite, public material, application bytes, and trusted context and returns the same closed outcome in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Transport authentication or delivery does not cure malformed, unsupported, stale, or untrusted identity evidence.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.exchange/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md b/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
index 4695dc1..501e70f 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
@@ -1,43 +1,22 @@
 # How identity and trust fit
 
-Authenticate a signer without turning identity, cryptography, or transport into authority.
+See the independent boundaries between identity evidence, cryptographic suites, trust policy, transport, and authority.
 
-## The path at a glance
+## Model
 
-1. Identity material
-2. Authentication evidence
-3. Application trust resolver
-4. Verified signer
-5. Separate authority decision
-
-Text equivalent: Bounded identity material becomes authentication evidence, an application-owned resolver evaluates trust, and only then can a separate authority decision consider the verified signer.
+An Auths identity projection contains a verification method, suite label, and bounded public evidence. A resolver may obtain that evidence from raw keys, OIDC, SPIFFE, or an application system. Trusted context decides which result is acceptable for one verification.
 
 ## What remains true
 
-- A public key identifies verification material; it does not grant an action.
-- Ed25519, P-256, and future suites enter through the same bounded verification port.
-- HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and other transports deliver evidence but never authorize effects.
-
-## Failure branches
-
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| The suite is unsupported | Rejected | Install or supply an explicit compatible suite implementation. |
-| The signer is valid but untrusted | Denied | Change trust policy or use a trusted identity; do not infer trust from signature validity. |
-| The resolver is unavailable | Indeterminate | Restore trust evidence and evaluate again without performing an effect. |
-
-## Use this when
-
-You are integrating OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, application identities, or another cryptographic suite.
+Identity evidence authenticates exact bytes; it never grants an effect. Suite adapters verify only their declared material. Transport success supplies bytes, not trust. Authority can refer to an identity without owning its provider or key lifecycle.
 
-## Do not use this when
+## Where it fails closed
 
-You are looking for permission scope; identity alone cannot express the complete effect boundary.
+Unknown suite, method mismatch, wrong root, stale evidence, resolver ambiguity, and altered application bytes remain distinct closed results. The verifier cannot silently try a different suite or trust source.
 
-## Continue from here
+## Continue
 
-- [Identity & trust](/identity-trust) — Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.
-- [Trust boundaries](/authority/execute) — Authorization before provider entry.
+Choose an identity source, then choose a suite and trust policy. Open Authority only when a verified principal needs bounded permission.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources.md b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c93b5b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources.md
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Identity sources
+
+Choose the system that supplies bounded public verification evidence.
+
+## Recommended: [Raw public keys](/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys)
+
+Exchange method- and suite-labelled public keys as ordinary bounded data.
+
+## Identity sources
+
+- [Raw public keys](/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys) — Exchange method- and suite-labelled public keys as ordinary bounded data.
+- [OAuth and OIDC](/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc) — Resolve OIDC identity into explicit Auths verification evidence without turning a bearer token into authority.
+- [SPIFFE](/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe) — Use SPIFFE workload identity as a replaceable trust input for Auths verification.
+- [Application resolvers](/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers) — Adapt an application directory or key registry through a narrow resolver port.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources/1 · Product contract: auths.page.identity-trust.sources/1_
+
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers.md b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..65b0343
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Application resolvers
+
+Adapt an application directory or key registry through a narrow resolver port.
+
+## Ownership boundary
+
+The application resolver owns authentication, issuance, rotation, and account or workload lifecycle. Auths owns parsing the bounded projection and using it only under explicit trusted context.
+
+## Data flow
+
+A bounded lookup key and the resolver's typed verification result is resolved into method- and suite-labelled public verification material. That bounded result can authenticate signed application bytes without constructing authority.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Private keys, refresh tokens, client secrets, and provider credentials stay in their existing custody systems. Auths identity evidence is public or explicitly bounded verification input.
+
+## State
+
+The resolver owns freshness and caching. The verifier receives the selected evidence and time as inputs rather than reaching into ambient identity state.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+Unknown issuers, stale evidence, unsupported suites, mismatched methods, ambiguous subjects, and resolver errors are closed outcomes. Authentication never implies authority.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+Auths does not become the identity provider and does not ship every possible adapter. Applications own adapter choice and trust policy behind the stable port.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources.resolvers/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d87b511
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# OAuth and OIDC
+
+Resolve OIDC identity into explicit Auths verification evidence without turning a bearer token into authority.
+
+## Ownership boundary
+
+The OpenID Provider and relying party owns authentication, issuance, rotation, and account or workload lifecycle. Auths owns parsing the bounded projection and using it only under explicit trusted context.
+
+## Data flow
+
+Validated issuer, subject, audience, token time, and key evidence is resolved into method- and suite-labelled public verification material. That bounded result can authenticate signed application bytes without constructing authority.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Private keys, refresh tokens, client secrets, and provider credentials stay in their existing custody systems. Auths identity evidence is public or explicitly bounded verification input.
+
+## State
+
+The resolver owns freshness and caching. The verifier receives the selected evidence and time as inputs rather than reaching into ambient identity state.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+Unknown issuers, stale evidence, unsupported suites, mismatched methods, ambiguous subjects, and resolver errors are closed outcomes. Authentication never implies authority.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+Auths does not become the identity provider and does not ship every possible adapter. Applications own adapter choice and trust policy behind the stable port.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources.oauth-oidc/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..377ab07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Raw public keys
+
+Exchange method- and suite-labelled public keys as ordinary bounded data.
+
+## Outcome
+
+Two peers can exchange a public identity and verify signed application bytes with no authority or approval setup.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Choose the verification method, suite label, bounded public evidence, and explicit trust inputs. No capability, approval, plan, transport, or provider object is required.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Encode the public material with its exact suite and verification method, send it over any bounded transport, parse it, and verify the signed message under caller-supplied trust.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The verifier binds the exact method, suite, public material, application bytes, and trusted context and returns the same closed outcome in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Malformed evidence, an unknown suite, a mislabelled key, method mismatch, or changed message bytes fails without invoking any authority logic.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources.raw-keys/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06d7ddc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# SPIFFE
+
+Use SPIFFE workload identity as a replaceable trust input for Auths verification.
+
+## Ownership boundary
+
+SPIRE and the workload API owns authentication, issuance, rotation, and account or workload lifecycle. Auths owns parsing the bounded projection and using it only under explicit trusted context.
+
+## Data flow
+
+The validated SPIFFE ID, trust domain, bundle, and workload evidence is resolved into method- and suite-labelled public verification material. That bounded result can authenticate signed application bytes without constructing authority.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Private keys, refresh tokens, client secrets, and provider credentials stay in their existing custody systems. Auths identity evidence is public or explicitly bounded verification input.
+
+## State
+
+The resolver owns freshness and caching. The verifier receives the selected evidence and time as inputs rather than reaching into ambient identity state.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+Unknown issuers, stale evidence, unsupported suites, mismatched methods, ambiguous subjects, and resolver errors are closed outcomes. Authentication never implies authority.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+Auths does not become the identity provider and does not ship every possible adapter. Applications own adapter choice and trust policy behind the stable port.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources.spiffe/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md b/public/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..702c93b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Key and root rotation
+
+Rotate keys or trust roots with explicit overlap, rollback, and negative tests.
+
+## Outcome
+
+New identity evidence becomes valid during a bounded overlap while existing authority artifacts remain meaningful under their committed verification method.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Choose the verification method, suite label, bounded public evidence, and explicit trust inputs. No capability, approval, plan, transport, or provider object is required.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Publish the new verification material, add it to explicit trust context, verify both generations during the overlap, cut issuance to the new key, then remove the old root after retained evidence no longer requires it.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The verifier binds the exact method, suite, public material, application bytes, and trusted context and returns the same closed outcome in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Early root removal, unbounded overlap, rollback to compromised material, method reuse, and stale resolver caches must fail visibly; rotation never silently rewrites authority.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.rotation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/testing.md b/public/identity-trust/testing.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd0d667
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/identity-trust/testing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Test identity and trust
+
+Test identity sources, suites, and trust policy with positive and adversarial fixtures.
+
+## Outcome
+
+The test suite proves identical outcomes for supported identities and stable failures for every excluded shape.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Choose the verification method, suite label, bounded public evidence, and explicit trust inputs. No capability, approval, plan, transport, or provider object is required.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Run Ed25519 and P-256 success fixtures, then mutate the suite label, verification method, root, freshness, message bytes, and evidence length. Compare normalized Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The verifier binds the exact method, suite, public material, application bytes, and trusted context and returns the same closed outcome in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Any language disagreement, fallback to another suite, network-dependent result, or acceptance of an unknown root fails qualification.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.testing/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/trust-policy.md b/public/identity-trust/trust-policy.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94e22b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/identity-trust/trust-policy.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Trust policy
+
+Define which issuers, roots, resolvers, suites, audiences, and freshness windows are acceptable.
+
+## Model
+
+Trust policy is caller-owned input to verification. It selects acceptable roots and issuers, constrains resolver results, allows explicit suites, and establishes the observation time and freshness rules.
+
+## What remains true
+
+A signature proves possession of a key; trust policy decides whether that key matters here. Policy is explicit, immutable for one decision, and committed into evidence when the workflow requires reproducibility.
+
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Correct signatures under an untrusted root, stale bundle, wrong audience, disabled suite, or ambiguous resolver are not partially trusted. They fail as trust outcomes rather than cryptographic success.
+
+## Continue
+
+Construct the smallest verification context for the application boundary and test every excluded root and suite.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.policy/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/verification-context.md b/public/identity-trust/verification-context.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..87f0424
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/identity-trust/verification-context.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Verification context
+
+Build the exact trusted context used for one deterministic verification.
+
+## Model
+
+Trusted context is a parsed value containing roots, issuer or resolver policy, accepted suites, audience, observation time, and relevant freshness limits. Verification receives it explicitly.
+
+## What remains true
+
+The same artifact and context yield the same outcome across languages. Ambient process configuration, network state, or transport metadata cannot silently change the decision.
+
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Missing time, unknown roots, stale evidence, disabled suites, mismatched audience, or resolver uncertainty returns a closed result rather than manufacturing context.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep context construction at the application trust boundary and pass only the parsed value into verification.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.context/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/llms-full.txt b/public/llms-full.txt
index 9afc8d4..56d97b3 100644
--- a/public/llms-full.txt
+++ b/public/llms-full.txt
@@ -20,6 +20,11 @@ Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
 
 - [Agent skills and plugins](/agents/skills-and-plugins) — Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.
 
+## Related topics
+
+- [Identity & trust](/identity-trust) — Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.
+- [Production operations](/operations) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
+
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents/1 · Product contract: auths.page.agents/1_
 
 
@@ -160,6 +165,10 @@ Authorization before provider entry.
 
 - [Authority lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
 
+## Related topics
+
+- [Production operations](/operations) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
+
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority/1_
 
 
@@ -184,42 +193,9 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1 · Contract digest: 1
 
 Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
 
-## The path at a glance
-
-1. Author exact authority
-2. Commit canonical bytes
-3. Attenuate child
-4. Consume use or budget
-5. Expire, revoke, or exhaust
-
-Text equivalent: Authority is authored for exact canonical bytes, committed, optionally attenuated into a child, consumed under durable state, and eventually expires, is revoked, or becomes exhausted.
-
-## What remains true
-
-- A child is a subset of its parent under every critical extension.
-- Use and budget state are durable and atomic with reservation.
-- Expired, revoked, or exhausted authority cannot be revived by transport or approval.
-
-## Failure branches
-
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| A child adds an action or use | Widening rejected | Create the child from a valid subset of the parent. |
-| Authority expires before reservation | Denied | Request fresh authority for current intent. |
-| Revocation state cannot be checked | Indeterminate | Restore lifecycle state; do not assume the grant remains valid. |
+## Authority can only get narrower
 
-## Use this when
-
-You need delegation, one-time use, budget, expiry, revocation, or critical-extension behavior.
-
-## Do not use this when
-
-You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.
-
-## Continue from here
-
-- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
-- [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
+Each child commits to a subset of its parent and consumes explicit time, use, budget, and delegation bounds.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
@@ -231,42 +207,9 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d443912
 
 Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.
 
-## The path at a glance
-
-1. Actor + exact action
-2. Create authority
-3. Delegate narrower
-4. Execute through gateway
-5. Verify receipt
-
-Text equivalent: An actor describes an exact action, creates bounded authority, optionally delegates a narrower child, executes through a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt.
-
-## What remains true
-
-- Authority names the exact action and actor bounds.
-- Delegation cannot add actions, time, uses, budget, or depth.
-- Verification returns inert evidence and cannot perform the effect.
+## One operation from intent to evidence
 
-## Failure branches
-
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| Action bytes change | Commitment mismatch | Create authority for the intended bytes; do not reinterpret the old grant. |
-| The same use is replayed | Denied | Create a new authorized operation only if the business intent is genuinely new. |
-| Required trust evidence is unavailable | Indeterminate | Restore the missing evidence before making a decision. |
-
-## Use this when
-
-You need the complete product model before choosing an SDK or deployment.
-
-## Do not use this when
-
-You only need an exact signature or endpoint field; open the generated reference instead.
-
-## Continue from here
-
-- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
-- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+A support service grants one actor authority to issue one refund, executes it behind a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
@@ -278,42 +221,9 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d443912991528
 
 Bind threshold or ordered approval to the exact operations, bytes, and order under review.
 
-## The path at a glance
-
-1. Construct exact plan
-2. Commit members + order
-3. Collect bound approvals
-4. Authorize each sealed command
-5. Record partial or terminal outcome
-
-Text equivalent: An exact ordered plan is committed, approvers sign that commitment, each member still passes authorization, and execution records partial, uncertain, cancelled, or terminal outcomes without treating approval as reusable permission.
+## Approval is bound context, not authority
 
-## What remains true
-
-- Approval is evidence about one exact plan commitment.
-- Substituting a member, byte sequence, order, threshold, or approver set invalidates approval.
-- Approval never bypasses authority verification or durable execution state.
-
-## Failure branches
-
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| A plan member changes after approval | Substitution rejected | Build and approve a new plan commitment. |
-| Threshold is not met | Denied | Collect the missing valid approval or cancel. |
-| A provider outcome becomes unknown mid-plan | Plan is recoverable with explicit completed and uncertain members | Reconcile before any continuation. |
-
-## Use this when
-
-Several exact operations require threshold, ordered, or cross-organization review.
-
-## Do not use this when
-
-A reusable human-approved flag or broad role is sufficient for the actual risk model.
-
-## Continue from here
-
-- [Cross-company authority](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
-- [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
+Changing a member, byte, order, or threshold changes the plan commitment and invalidates the collected approval evidence.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
@@ -325,50 +235,9 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4
 
 Verify outcome evidence while revealing only what the viewer is authorized to inspect.
 
-## The path at a glance
+## Evidence has disclosure levels
 
-1. Decision receipt
-2. Execution receipt
-3. Verify integrity
-4. Opaque or summary view
-5. Authorized full disclosure
-
-Text equivalent: Decision and execution receipts bind evidence, local verification confirms integrity, every viewer can receive only the permitted opaque or summary projection, and sensitive full detail requires explicit disclosure authority.
-
-## What remains true
-
-- A receipt records a decision or outcome; it does not retroactively authorize it.
-- Verification is local and effect free.
-- Sensitive application details are absent from unauthorized and bounded-summary views.
-
-## Closed runtime outcomes
-
-- `completed`
-- `denied`
-- `indeterminate`
-- `not-found`
-- `recoverable`
-
-## Failure branches
-
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| Receipt bytes are changed | Verification rejected | Retrieve the original signed receipt from a trusted source. |
-| A viewer lacks disclosure authority | Opaque view | Request explicit disclosure authority rather than leaking fields. |
-| Signer trust cannot be resolved | Indeterminate | Restore trust evidence before relying on the receipt. |
-
-## Use this when
-
-You need audit evidence, cross-company proof, recovery state, or privacy-preserving inspection.
-
-## Do not use this when
-
-You need to perform an effect; receipt verification is intentionally inert.
-
-## Continue from here
-
-- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
-- [Assurance](/assurance) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
+Opaque, summary, and authorized full views let applications prove integrity without publishing sensitive business detail by default.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
@@ -406,6 +275,10 @@ Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
 
 - [Versions and compatibility](/developers/versioning) — Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
 
+## Related topics
+
+- [APIs & SDKs](/reference) — Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.
+
 _Page identity: auths.page.developers/1 · Product contract: auths.page.developers/1_
 
 
@@ -1338,4 +1211,148 @@ Parse the bounded artifact through the SDK, provide trusted context, verify loca
 
 Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
 
-## 
\ No newline at end of file
+## Success means
+
+Rust, TypeScript, and Python return the same verification outcome for the same bytes and context.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Mutation, unknown suite, mismatched verification method, wrong root, stale evidence, or unauthorized disclosure remains inert and fails closed.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use Authority receipts for integrity semantics and Assurance for the exact evidence behind public claims.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.verify/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Prerequisites
+
+Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
+
+## Outcome
+
+You will have one maintained SDK, a supported runtime for that SDK, and an application effect that can be isolated behind a function or service boundary.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python. A local quickstart needs no hosted Auths runtime; production execution additionally needs an HTTPS runtime endpoint and its explicit trust configuration.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Install one SDK, identify the exact effect to protect, and keep provider credentials outside the caller. Use the tested local scenario to confirm the toolchain before adding identity providers, approvals, or remote transport.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The installed consumer can create, execute, and verify the qualified local fixture, including its stable denial path.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Stop if the SDK version, fixture release, or runtime contract does not match. Do not compensate by reconstructing Auths semantics in application code.
+
+## Continue
+
+Choose the shortest outcome path for your system, then move to production operations only when the local boundary is clear.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.prerequisites/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Quickstarts
+
+Compare seven installed-artifact projects by boundary, state, custody, success, and failure.
+
+## Recommended: [Local REST effect](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect)
+
+Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.
+
+## Quickstarts
+
+- [Local REST effect](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect) — Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.
+- [Runtime effect](/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect) — Execute one bounded effect through the production HTTPS runtime and durable state boundary.
+- [Agent delegation](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation) — Delegate one narrower tool action and prove that a broader action is denied.
+- [Approved plan](/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan) — Bind approval to the exact bytes and order of a multi-step plan.
+- [Offline verification](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Verify portable evidence without executing an effect or contacting a provider.
+- [Recovery](/get-started/quickstarts/recovery) — Resume or reconcile an interrupted execution without blindly repeating the provider effect.
+- [Identity swap](/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap) — Exchange and verify identity material while keeping the authority workflow unchanged.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1 · Product contract: auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Agent delegation
+
+Delegate one narrower tool action and prove that a broader action is denied.
+
+## Run success and fail-closed paths
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Approved plan
+
+Bind approval to the exact bytes and order of a multi-step plan.
+
+## Run success and fail-closed paths
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Identity swap
+
+Exchange and verify identity material while keeping the authority workflow unchanged.
+
+## Run success and fail-closed paths
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Local REST effect
+
+Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.
+
+## Run success and fail-closed paths
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Offline verification
+
+Verify portable evidence without executing an effect or contacting a provider.
+
+## Run success and fail-closed paths
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
+
+_Page identity:
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/llms.txt b/public/llms.txt
index e3db746..c037bdb 100644
--- a/public/llms.txt
+++ b/public/llms.txt
@@ -61,8 +61,22 @@
 - [Offline verification](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md) — Verify portable evidence without executing an effect or contacting a provider.
 - [Recovery](/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md) — Resume or reconcile an interrupted execution without blindly repeating the provider effect.
 - [Runtime effect](/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md) — Execute one bounded effect through the production HTTPS runtime and durable state boundary.
-- [Identity & trust](/identity-trust.md) — Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.
-- [How identity and trust fit](/identity-trust/how-it-works.md) — Authenticate a signer without turning identity, cryptography, or transport into authority.
+- [Identity & trust](/identity-trust.md) — Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.
+- [Cryptographic suites](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites.md) — Select cryptographic verification independently from identity source and authority semantics.
+- [Custom and post-quantum suites](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum.md) — Implement a custom or post-quantum suite adapter without changing Auths identity meaning.
+- [Ed25519](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md) — Use the maintained Ed25519 suite for compact deterministic signatures.
+- [P-256](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256.md) — Use the maintained P-256 suite through the same identity and verification interfaces.
+- [Exchange public identity](/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity.md) — Send and receive a public identity as bounded, transport-neutral data.
+- [How identity and trust fit](/identity-trust/how-it-works.md) — See the independent boundaries between identity evidence, cryptographic suites, trust policy, transport, and authority.
+- [Identity sources](/identity-trust/identity-sources.md) — Choose the system that supplies bounded public verification evidence.
+- [Application resolvers](/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers.md) — Adapt an application directory or key registry through a narrow resolver port.
+- [OAuth and OIDC](/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md) — Resolve OIDC identity into explicit Auths verification evidence without turning a bearer token into authority.
+- [Raw public keys](/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md) — Exchange method- and suite-labelled public keys as ordinary bounded data.
+- [SPIFFE](/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md) — Use SPIFFE workload identity as a replaceable trust input for Auths verification.
+- [Key and root rotation](/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md) — Rotate keys or trust roots with explicit overlap, rollback, and negative tests.
+- [Test identity and trust](/identity-trust/testing.md) — Test identity sources, suites, and trust policy with positive and adversarial fixtures.
+- [Trust policy](/identity-trust/trust-policy.md) — Define which issuers, roots, resolvers, suites, audiences, and freshness windows are acceptable.
+- [Verification context](/identity-trust/verification-context.md) — Build the exact trusted context used for one deterministic verification.
 - [Production operations](/operations.md) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
 - [Back up and restore](/operations/backup-and-restore.md) — Restore state without reopening replay, budget, use, or recovery windows.
 - [Configure key custody](/operations/configure/custody.md) — Keep signing material non-exportable and observable without logging secrets.
diff --git a/public/operations.md b/public/operations.md
index fbe4f42..1cd563b 100644
--- a/public/operations.md
+++ b/public/operations.md
@@ -30,5 +30,9 @@ Separate parsing, authorization, durable reservation, provider observation, reco
 
 - [Incident response runbooks](/operations/incidents) — Stop, preserve evidence, reconcile, recover, and escalate without widening authority.
 
+## Related topics
+
+- [Assurance](/assurance) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
+
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.runtime/1 · Product contract: auths.page.operations.runtime/1_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
index 799bd42..e5941f6 100644
--- a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
+++ b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
@@ -2,50 +2,9 @@
 
 Separate parsing, authorization, durable reservation, provider observation, recovery, and terminal evidence.
 
-## The path at a glance
+## Observe before retry
 
-1. Parse + verify
-2. Authorize
-3. Reserve durably
-4. Enter closed gateway
-5. Complete or preserve recovery
-
-Text equivalent: The runtime parses and verifies untrusted input, authorizes it, reserves replay and budget state, enters the closed gateway, then records completion or preserves a recoverable execution identity.
-
-## What remains true
-
-- No effect-capable command exists before native authorization and durable reservation.
-- A provider timeout after submission is not silently converted to failure or success.
-- Resume continues the same execution identity; retry creates unsafe ambiguity.
-
-## Closed runtime outcomes
-
-- `completed`
-- `denied`
-- `indeterminate`
-- `not-found`
-- `recoverable`
-
-## Failure branches
-
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| Verification or policy denies | Denied | Do not enter the provider gateway. |
-| State reservation fails | Unavailable | Perform no effect and retry only after state is healthy. |
-| Provider acceptance is unknown | Recoverable or provider-unknown | Observe and reconcile before resuming the same execution. |
-
-## Use this when
-
-You operate a remote effect, durable replay state, provider gateway, or recovery workflow.
-
-## Do not use this when
-
-You are performing effect-free offline verification.
-
-## Continue from here
-
-- [Deploy the runtime](/get-started/paths/runtime) — Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.
-- [Production operations](/operations) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
+Once a provider may have accepted an effect, Auths preserves uncertainty and requires reconciliation or resume of the same execution identity.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/reference.md b/public/reference.md
index 8330839..9266a66 100644
--- a/public/reference.md
+++ b/public/reference.md
@@ -22,5 +22,9 @@ The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
 - [Schemas](/reference/schemas) — Canonical inputs, bounded wire forms, receipts, and disclosure views.
 - [Evidence manifest](/reference/evidence) — Resolve public claims to exact release evidence and limitations.
 
+## Related topics
+
+- [Assurance](/assurance) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
+
 _Page identity: auths.page.reference/1 · Product contract: auths.page.reference/1_
 
diff --git a/public/search-index.json b/public/search-index.json
index a8b8e42..3200206 100644
--- a/public/search-index.json
+++ b/public/search-index.json
@@ -441,14 +441,112 @@
       "id": "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
       "path": "/identity-trust",
       "title": "Identity & trust",
-      "description": "Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.",
+      "description": "Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.",
+      "section": "identity-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites/1",
+      "path": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites",
+      "title": "Cryptographic suites",
+      "description": "Select cryptographic verification independently from identity source and authority semantics.",
+      "section": "identity-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites.custom/1",
+      "path": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum",
+      "title": "Custom and post-quantum suites",
+      "description": "Implement a custom or post-quantum suite adapter without changing Auths identity meaning.",
+      "section": "identity-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites.ed25519/1",
+      "path": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519",
+      "title": "Ed25519",
+      "description": "Use the maintained Ed25519 suite for compact deterministic signatures.",
+      "section": "identity-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites.p256/1",
+      "path": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256",
+      "title": "P-256",
+      "description": "Use the maintained P-256 suite through the same identity and verification interfaces.",
+      "section": "identity-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.exchange/1",
+      "path": "/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity",
+      "title": "Exchange public identity",
+      "description": "Send and receive a public identity as bounded, transport-neutral data.",
       "section": "identity-trust"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
       "path": "/identity-trust/how-it-works",
       "title": "How identity and trust fit",
-      "description": "Authenticate a signer without turning identity, cryptography, or transport into authority.",
+      "description": "See the independent boundaries between identity evidence, cryptographic suites, trust policy, transport, and authority.",
+      "section": "identity-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources/1",
+      "path": "/identity-trust/identity-sources",
+      "title": "Identity sources",
+      "description": "Choose the system that supplies bounded public verification evidence.",
+      "section": "identity-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.resolvers/1",
+      "path": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers",
+      "title": "Application resolvers",
+      "description": "Adapt an application directory or key registry through a narrow resolver port.",
+      "section": "identity-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.oauth-oidc/1",
+      "path": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc",
+      "title": "OAuth and OIDC",
+      "description": "Resolve OIDC identity into explicit Auths verification evidence without turning a bearer token into authority.",
+      "section": "identity-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.raw-keys/1",
+      "path": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys",
+      "title": "Raw public keys",
+      "description": "Exchange method- and suite-labelled public keys as ordinary bounded data.",
+      "section": "identity-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.spiffe/1",
+      "path": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe",
+      "title": "SPIFFE",
+      "description": "Use SPIFFE workload identity as a replaceable trust input for Auths verification.",
+      "section": "identity-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.rotation/1",
+      "path": "/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation",
+      "title": "Key and root rotation",
+      "description": "Rotate keys or trust roots with explicit overlap, rollback, and negative tests.",
+      "section": "identity-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.testing/1",
+      "path": "/identity-trust/testing",
+      "title": "Test identity and trust",
+      "description": "Test identity sources, suites, and trust policy with positive and adversarial fixtures.",
+      "section": "identity-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.policy/1",
+      "path": "/identity-trust/trust-policy",
+      "title": "Trust policy",
+      "description": "Define which issuers, roots, resolvers, suites, audiences, and freshness windows are acceptable.",
+      "section": "identity-trust"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.context/1",
+      "path": "/identity-trust/verification-context",
+      "title": "Verification context",
+      "description": "Build the exact trusted context used for one deterministic verification.",
       "section": "identity-trust"
     },
     {
diff --git a/public/sitemap.xml b/public/sitemap.xml
index 92f4e5c..182d715 100644
--- a/public/sitemap.xml
+++ b/public/sitemap.xml
@@ -60,7 +60,21 @@
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/recovery</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/how-it-works</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/identity-sources</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/testing</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/trust-policy</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/verification-context</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/backup-and-restore</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/configure/custody</loc></url>

From 746d40d50d6045b9b823c36f2dcba846e6519ab9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 23:12:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 22/29] docs: complete progressive authority journey

---
 app/lib/content-graph.ts                      |    5 +-
 content/authority-pages.ts                    |  199 +++
 public/authority.md                           |   33 +-
 public/authority/constraints.md               |   22 +
 public/authority/create.md                    |   34 +
 public/authority/delegate.md                  |   34 +
 public/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md  |   22 +
 .../authority/delegate/widening-failures.md   |   34 +
 public/authority/execute.md                   |   32 +-
 public/authority/lifecycle.md                 |   41 +-
 public/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md         |   22 +
 .../lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md        |   22 +
 public/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md |   22 +
 .../lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md          |   22 +
 public/authority/model.md                     |   41 +-
 public/authority/plans.md                     |   14 +
 public/authority/plans/approvals.md           |   41 +-
 public/authority/profiles.md                  |   22 +
 public/authority/receipts.md                  |   14 +
 public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md       |   41 +-
 public/authority/resume.md                    |   34 +
 public/authority/verify.md                    |   34 +
 .../quickstarts/agent-delegation.md           |   29 +-
 .../get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md  |   29 +-
 .../get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md  |   29 +-
 .../quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md          |   29 +-
 .../quickstarts/offline-verification.md       |   29 +-
 public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md    |   29 +-
 .../get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md |   29 +-
 public/identity-trust.md                      |    2 +-
 public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md         |   35 +-
 public/llms-full.txt                          | 1135 ++++++++---------
 public/llms.txt                               |   26 +-
 public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md      |   45 +-
 public/search-index.json                      |  120 +-
 public/sitemap.xml                            |   14 +
 36 files changed, 1686 insertions(+), 679 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 content/authority-pages.ts
 create mode 100644 public/authority/constraints.md
 create mode 100644 public/authority/create.md
 create mode 100644 public/authority/delegate.md
 create mode 100644 public/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md
 create mode 100644 public/authority/delegate/widening-failures.md
 create mode 100644 public/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md
 create mode 100644 public/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md
 create mode 100644 public/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md
 create mode 100644 public/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md
 create mode 100644 public/authority/plans.md
 create mode 100644 public/authority/profiles.md
 create mode 100644 public/authority/receipts.md
 create mode 100644 public/authority/resume.md
 create mode 100644 public/authority/verify.md

diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
index 1a9bbed..c626516 100644
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import rawAdoptionPages from "../../content/adoption-pages.json" with { type: "j
 import rawOperationsPages from "../../content/operations-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
 import { getStartedPages } from "../../content/get-started-pages.ts";
 import { identityTrustPages } from "../../content/identity-trust-pages.ts";
+import { authorityPages } from "../../content/authority-pages.ts";
 import rawContract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
 import { parseAuthoredPageContent, type AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
 import { assertPageContract } from "../../schemas/page-contract.ts";
@@ -92,7 +93,9 @@ function replacePages(base: readonly unknown[], replacements: readonly unknown[]
 }
 
 const legacyPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = [...rawPages, ...rawDeveloperPages, ...rawAgentIntegrationPages, ...rawAdoptionPages, ...rawOperationsPages];
-export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze(replacePages(replacePages(legacyPageInputs, getStartedPages), identityTrustPages));
+export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze(
+  replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(legacyPageInputs, getStartedPages), identityTrustPages), authorityPages),
+);
 export const verifiedPageGraph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(authoredPageInputs, rawContract);
 
 export function contentPageByPath(path: string): AuthoredPageSource {
diff --git a/content/authority-pages.ts b/content/authority-pages.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f41ccb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/authority-pages.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+import { concept, guide, landing } from "./page-builders.ts";
+
+const scenarios = {
+  local: "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
+  agent: "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
+  runtime: "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
+  plan: "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1",
+  recovery: "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
+  verify: "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
+} as const;
+
+const operations = {
+  create: "auths.operation.create/1",
+  delegate: "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+  execute: "auths.operation.execute/1",
+  resume: "auths.operation.resume/1",
+  verify: "auths.operation.verify/1",
+} as const;
+
+const operationGuide = (
+  id: string,
+  description: string,
+  operation: string,
+  scenario: string,
+  outcome: string,
+  steps: string,
+  success: string,
+  failure: string,
+  next: string,
+) => guide({
+  id, description, scenario, outcome,
+  prerequisites: "Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.",
+  steps, success, failure, next,
+  dependencies: { operations: [operation] },
+});
+
+const authorityConcept = (id: string, description: string, model: string, invariants: string, failures: string, next: string) => concept({
+  id, description, model, invariants, failures, next,
+  dependencies: { operations: Object.values(operations) },
+});
+
+export const authorityPages: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([
+  landing("auths.page.authority/1", "Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.", "The five verbs are the stable product surface. Start with one action and one use; descend into attenuation, lifecycle, approved plans, recovery, receipts, disclosure, and profiles only when the workflow requires them."),
+  authorityConcept(
+    "auths.page.concepts.tour/1",
+    "Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.",
+    "Authority is a signed, portable statement of who may perform which application action against which resource, under explicit time, use, budget, depth, audience, and extension constraints. It is distinct from identity, policy evaluation, approval, delivery, and provider credentials.",
+    "A child can only narrow its parent. Exact application bytes and context remain committed. Verification is deterministic and effect-free. Only native-owned verified handles can cross into execution.",
+    "Invalid signatures, untrusted issuers, expiry, revocation, exhaustion, replay, widening, unknown critical extensions, command mismatch, and ambiguous lifecycle state remain distinguishable closed outcomes.",
+    "Create one minimal authority, then learn delegation and lifecycle only if the first workflow needs them.",
+  ),
+  operationGuide(
+    "auths.page.authority.create/1",
+    "Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.",
+    operations.create,
+    scenarios.local,
+    "An issuer grants one subject the smallest useful action, resource, validity window, use count, budget, audience, and delegation depth.",
+    "Select a profile action, parse its resource and input, set explicit bounds, author through the native operation, and sign using the configured custody port.",
+    "The resulting artifact is canonical, portable, and accepted identically by Rust, TypeScript, and Python for the permitted request.",
+    "Missing bounds, invalid profile input, unsupported critical extensions, wrong audience, or altered bytes cannot be repaired during verification.",
+    "Execute it directly, or delegate a narrower child without changing the model.",
+  ),
+  authorityConcept(
+    "auths.page.authority.constraints/1",
+    "Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.",
+    "Constraints form a conjunction: every bound must permit the request. Action and resource describe the effect; validity limits time; uses and budget limit consumption; depth limits delegation; audience limits the intended verifier or executor; critical extensions add profile-owned restrictions.",
+    "Omitting a bound never means that a child may invent a broader one. Critical extensions must be understood and attenuated according to their declared semantics. Application profiles own canonical resource and action interpretation.",
+    "Action or resource mismatch, early or late time, exhausted use, insufficient budget, excessive depth, wrong audience, and unknown or widened critical extensions each produce a stable denial before the provider is reached.",
+    "Use the smallest combination that expresses the effect; keep policy engines outside this artifact and commit only their required evidence.",
+  ),
+  operationGuide(
+    "auths.page.authority.delegate/1",
+    "Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.",
+    operations.delegate,
+    scenarios.agent,
+    "A child principal can act only inside every bound the parent deliberately passes on.",
+    "Parse the parent, select the child subject, narrow action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, depth, and critical extensions, then author and sign the child through the native delegate operation.",
+    "The child verifies as an unbroken chain and can perform the one intended tool action.",
+    "Any wider or incomparable child is rejected, including a quiet critical-extension omission that would restore power.",
+    "Inspect depth and chain rules, then test every attempted widening relevant to the application profile.",
+  ),
+  authorityConcept(
+    "auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1",
+    "Reason about delegation depth and the complete signed chain.",
+    "Each delegation consumes one unit of permitted depth and adds a signed link. Verification checks the root trust, every issuer-to-subject transition, every narrowing relation, and the terminal request.",
+    "Depth cannot be reset by changing languages, identity adapters, transports, or profiles. A chain remains valid only while every link remains valid and trusted.",
+    "Skipped links, reordered links, broken subjects, expired parents, revoked ancestors, excessive depth, and incomparable constraints deny the terminal request.",
+    "Keep chains short in simple systems; use explicit organizational or agent handoffs only where they add accountability.",
+  ),
+  operationGuide(
+    "auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1",
+    "Exercise every way a child might attempt to gain power its parent did not pass down.",
+    operations.delegate,
+    scenarios.agent,
+    "Your test suite proves that delegation can only narrow, including application-defined critical extensions.",
+    "Generate mutations for action, resource, validity, uses, budget, depth, audience, extension presence, and extension values; verify each child against the same parent and trusted context.",
+    "Every valid narrowing is portable across SDKs, and every wider or incomparable mutation returns the same denial identity.",
+    "A language disagreement, ignored critical extension, dropped parent, or accepted incomparable set is a release-blocking semantic failure.",
+    "Keep these fixtures with the application profile and rerun them on every Auths upgrade.",
+  ),
+  landing("auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1", "Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.", "Validity and revocation are trust inputs; uses and budgets are durable state. Keeping them separate makes offline verification honest about what it can prove and makes execution explicit about what it must reserve atomically."),
+  authorityConcept(
+    "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1",
+    "Evaluate not-before and expiry bounds at an explicit observation time.",
+    "Validity is a closed interval committed into authority. Verification receives observation time as explicit context and never borrows an ambient clock without the caller choosing it.",
+    "Children may shorten but never extend their parent's window. Retained evidence records the time used for the decision.",
+    "Before-not-before, after-expiry, missing time, invalid intervals, and child windows outside the parent deny deterministically.",
+    "Combine time with status only when current lifecycle state is required.",
+  ),
+  authorityConcept(
+    "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1",
+    "Apply issuer-owned status without pretending it is an offline cryptographic fact.",
+    "Status is an explicit trusted input resolved by an application-owned status provider. It can express active, revoked, suspended, unknown, or unavailable according to the profile.",
+    "The decision commits the status evidence it used. Cached status obeys declared freshness; absence is not interpreted as active.",
+    "Revoked, suspended, stale, unknown, or unavailable status returns a closed lifecycle outcome. Offline verification must state when no current status was consulted.",
+    "Choose freshness and availability behavior appropriate to the effect's consequence.",
+  ),
+  authorityConcept(
+    "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1",
+    "Consume bounded uses atomically and reject exact replay.",
+    "Use state is keyed by stable authority and command commitments. Execution reserves a use before reaching the provider and commits or recovers that reservation according to the journaled outcome.",
+    "Concurrent requests cannot both consume the same final use. A transport retry does not create fresh semantic authority.",
+    "Exact replay, exhausted use count, reservation conflict, unavailable state, and uncertain prior execution cannot fall through to the provider.",
+    "Use Resume for an existing execution reference; never mint a fresh command to hide uncertainty.",
+  ),
+  authorityConcept(
+    "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1",
+    "Reserve and consume numeric or profile-defined budgets with the same atomic boundary as uses.",
+    "A budget limits cumulative effect according to a profile-owned unit such as cost, records, tokens, or capacity. The request declares its amount and durable state reserves it before execution.",
+    "Children may reduce available budget and executions cannot spend more than the remaining amount. The unit and canonical amount are committed.",
+    "Negative, overflowed, mismatched-unit, over-budget, concurrent overspend, and unavailable-state requests deny before provider access.",
+    "Keep budgets simple and domain-specific; use a policy engine for broader business policy and commit its chosen inputs separately.",
+  ),
+  landing("auths.page.authority.plans/1", "Commit multiple ordered operations as one reviewable plan.", "A plan gives each member a stable identity and order, commits the complete sequence, and allows approvals and execution state to refer to the exact same bytes. It does not convert unrelated operations into an implicit transaction."),
+  operationGuide(
+    "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1",
+    "Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.",
+    operations.execute,
+    scenarios.plan,
+    "Approvers authorize the identical plan the runtime will execute, including members, order, context, expiry, and threshold.",
+    "Author the ordered plan, create a signing request for its exact commitment, collect typed approval responses from configured providers, verify threshold and substitutions, then seal the approved plan for execution.",
+    "The approved sequence executes in order and every receipt binds back to the plan and member commitment.",
+    "Changed bytes, replaced or reordered members, expired requests, wrong approver, reused response, unmet threshold, or mutation after approval fails before the next signature or effect.",
+    "Use the execution lifecycle to handle partial completion and provider uncertainty explicitly.",
+  ),
+  operationGuide(
+    "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1",
+    "Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.",
+    operations.execute,
+    scenarios.runtime,
+    "An opaque native authorization handle reaches the executor only after identity, authority, lifecycle, plan, and command checks pass.",
+    "Parse the command, verify and reserve authority, seal exact provider-independent bytes, acquire the gateway only from the native verified handle, perform the effect, then journal and sign the terminal receipt.",
+    "The gateway receives the minimum provider request after durable reservation and returns a closed, receipt-bound outcome.",
+    "Application code cannot mint the handle; successful transport, approval, signature, or provider authentication alone cannot open the gateway. Provider secrets never enter the authority artifact.",
+    "Use Resume rather than a new Execute call when the terminal provider result is not yet known.",
+  ),
+  operationGuide(
+    "auths.page.authority.resume/1",
+    "Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.",
+    operations.resume,
+    scenarios.recovery,
+    "The runtime recovers the journaled reservation and either returns the known terminal outcome or reconciles the same provider operation.",
+    "Submit the opaque execution reference, load its durable journal, inspect the last committed phase, and invoke only the gateway's idempotent status or reconciliation path permitted for that original command.",
+    "Resume converges on one terminal receipt while preserving original authority, command, context, and idempotency commitments.",
+    "Unknown reference, mismatched caller, corrupted journal, fresh command substitution, blind provider retry, or unreconciled provider uncertainty remains stopped.",
+    "Define operational reconciliation and escalation for every gateway before enabling production effects.",
+  ),
+  operationGuide(
+    "auths.page.authority.verify/1",
+    "Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.",
+    operations.verify,
+    scenarios.verify,
+    "A caller obtains a deterministic, inert result for exact artifact bytes and explicit trusted context.",
+    "Parse the artifact, supply trust, time, status, request, and profile context as required, run native verification, and project only the authorized inspection view.",
+    "The same bytes and context produce the same normalized result across Rust, TypeScript, and Python without contacting a provider.",
+    "Mutation, wrong trust, stale status, request mismatch, invalid chain, unauthorized disclosure, or unknown semantics fails without constructing executable authority.",
+    "Use Receipts to understand integrity and Disclosure to control what verified evidence reveals.",
+  ),
+  landing("auths.page.authority.receipts/1", "Use signed decision and execution receipts as portable integrity evidence.", "Receipts bind authority, command, context, plan membership, observed time, outcome, and signer without treating the provider's business data as public. Verification proves the receipt; disclosure policy decides which human-readable projection a caller may receive."),
+  operationGuide(
+    "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1",
+    "Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.",
+    operations.verify,
+    scenarios.verify,
+    "Unauthorized readers see stable opaque identifiers; authorized readers receive a bounded native-owned summary or full view appropriate to their purpose.",
+    "Verify the receipt first, parse the disclosure request and caller evidence, apply Rust-owned policy, and return a typed projection that contains only approved fields.",
+    "TypeScript and Python expose identical opaque, summary, and full shapes derived from the same native disclosure decision.",
+    "Invalid receipts, wrong caller, excessive view, sensitive provider payloads, unbounded annotations, and application-constructed projections fail or remain opaque.",
+    "Define field classification and retention policy before exposing full views in dashboards or APIs.",
+  ),
+  authorityConcept(
+    "auths.page.authority.profiles/1",
+    "Map application actions, resources, inputs, budgets, commands, and receipts without coupling adjacent components.",
+    "A profile owns domain meaning: canonical action and resource identifiers, bounded input parsing, command construction, budget units, critical extensions, and receipt-safe projections. Maintained profiles are closed; profile-kit supports application-owned domains.",
+    "Profiles cannot choose identity providers, transports, state stores, signer custody, approval vendors, or provider credentials. Every profile parser is bounded and every semantic identity is versioned.",
+    "Ambiguous resources, non-canonical input, unknown actions, incompatible versions, unbounded extensions, or profiles that smuggle credentials or transport data fail qualification.",
+    "Begin with a maintained profile or one minimal application-owned action; expand only with differential and adversarial fixtures.",
+  ),
+]);
diff --git a/public/authority.md b/public/authority.md
index b0f4dc3..af1657a 100644
--- a/public/authority.md
+++ b/public/authority.md
@@ -1,22 +1,39 @@
 # Authority
 
-Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
+Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
 
-## Recommended: [Trust boundaries](/authority/execute)
+## Recommended: [Authority model](/authority/model)
 
-Authorization before provider entry.
+Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
 
-## Execute and recover
+## Model
 
-- [Trust boundaries](/authority/execute) — Authorization before provider entry.
+- [Authority model](/authority/model) — Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
 
-## Model
+## Author and narrow
 
-- [Auths in fifteen minutes](/authority/model) — Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.
+- [Create](/authority/create) — Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.
+- [Constraints](/authority/constraints) — Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.
+- [Delegate](/authority/delegate) — Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.
 
 ## Lifecycle
 
-- [Authority lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
+- [Lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.
+- [Plans](/authority/plans) — Commit multiple ordered operations as one reviewable plan.
+
+## Execute and recover
+
+- [Execute](/authority/execute) — Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
+- [Resume](/authority/resume) — Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.
+
+## Verify and inspect
+
+- [Verify](/authority/verify) — Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.
+- [Receipts](/authority/receipts) — Use signed decision and execution receipts as portable integrity evidence.
+
+## Profiles
+
+- [Profiles](/authority/profiles) — Map application actions, resources, inputs, budgets, commands, and receipts without coupling adjacent components.
 
 ## Related topics
 
diff --git a/public/authority/constraints.md b/public/authority/constraints.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1145dcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/constraints.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Constraints
+
+Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.
+
+## Model
+
+Constraints form a conjunction: every bound must permit the request. Action and resource describe the effect; validity limits time; uses and budget limit consumption; depth limits delegation; audience limits the intended verifier or executor; critical extensions add profile-owned restrictions.
+
+## What remains true
+
+Omitting a bound never means that a child may invent a broader one. Critical extensions must be understood and attenuated according to their declared semantics. Application profiles own canonical resource and action interpretation.
+
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Action or resource mismatch, early or late time, exhausted use, insufficient budget, excessive depth, wrong audience, and unknown or widened critical extensions each produce a stable denial before the provider is reached.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use the smallest combination that expresses the effect; keep policy engines outside this artifact and commit only their required evidence.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.constraints/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/authority/create.md b/public/authority/create.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..413d949
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/create.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Create
+
+Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.
+
+## Outcome
+
+An issuer grants one subject the smallest useful action, resource, validity window, use count, budget, audience, and delegation depth.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Select a profile action, parse its resource and input, set explicit bounds, author through the native operation, and sign using the configured custody port.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The resulting artifact is canonical, portable, and accepted identically by Rust, TypeScript, and Python for the permitted request.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Missing bounds, invalid profile input, unsupported critical extensions, wrong audience, or altered bytes cannot be repaired during verification.
+
+## Continue
+
+Execute it directly, or delegate a narrower child without changing the model.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.create/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/authority/delegate.md b/public/authority/delegate.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b34e115
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/delegate.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Delegate
+
+Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.
+
+## Outcome
+
+A child principal can act only inside every bound the parent deliberately passes on.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Parse the parent, select the child subject, narrow action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, depth, and critical extensions, then author and sign the child through the native delegate operation.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The child verifies as an unbroken chain and can perform the one intended tool action.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Any wider or incomparable child is rejected, including a quiet critical-extension omission that would restore power.
+
+## Continue
+
+Inspect depth and chain rules, then test every attempted widening relevant to the application profile.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md b/public/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bda6d2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Depth and chain
+
+Reason about delegation depth and the complete signed chain.
+
+## Model
+
+Each delegation consumes one unit of permitted depth and adds a signed link. Verification checks the root trust, every issuer-to-subject transition, every narrowing relation, and the terminal request.
+
+## What remains true
+
+Depth cannot be reset by changing languages, identity adapters, transports, or profiles. A chain remains valid only while every link remains valid and trusted.
+
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Skipped links, reordered links, broken subjects, expired parents, revoked ancestors, excessive depth, and incomparable constraints deny the terminal request.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep chains short in simple systems; use explicit organizational or agent handoffs only where they add accountability.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/authority/delegate/widening-failures.md b/public/authority/delegate/widening-failures.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc326f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/delegate/widening-failures.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Widening failures
+
+Exercise every way a child might attempt to gain power its parent did not pass down.
+
+## Outcome
+
+Your test suite proves that delegation can only narrow, including application-defined critical extensions.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Generate mutations for action, resource, validity, uses, budget, depth, audience, extension presence, and extension values; verify each child against the same parent and trusted context.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+Every valid narrowing is portable across SDKs, and every wider or incomparable mutation returns the same denial identity.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+A language disagreement, ignored critical extension, dropped parent, or accepted incomparable set is a release-blocking semantic failure.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep these fixtures with the application profile and rerun them on every Auths upgrade.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/authority/execute.md b/public/authority/execute.md
index e38390f..f63b2d8 100644
--- a/public/authority/execute.md
+++ b/public/authority/execute.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Trust boundaries
+# Execute
 
-Authorization before provider entry.
+Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
 
-## Transport is not authority
+## Outcome
 
-Successful delivery never authorizes an effect.
+An opaque native authorization handle reaches the executor only after identity, authority, lifecycle, plan, and command checks pass.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Parse the command, verify and reserve authority, seal exact provider-independent bytes, acquire the gateway only from the native verified handle, perform the effect, then journal and sign the terminal receipt.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The gateway receives the minimum provider request after durable reservation and returns a closed, receipt-bound outcome.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Application code cannot mint the handle; successful transport, approval, signature, or provider authentication alone cannot open the gateway. Provider secrets never enter the authority artifact.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use Resume rather than a new Execute call when the terminal provider result is not yet known.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle.md b/public/authority/lifecycle.md
index 28792b8..9bff070 100644
--- a/public/authority/lifecycle.md
+++ b/public/authority/lifecycle.md
@@ -1,10 +1,43 @@
-# Authority lifecycle
+# Lifecycle
 
-Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
+Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.
 
-## Authority can only get narrower
+## The path at a glance
 
-Each child commits to a subset of its parent and consumes explicit time, use, budget, and delegation bounds.
+1. Author exact authority
+2. Commit canonical bytes
+3. Attenuate child
+4. Consume use or budget
+5. Expire, revoke, or exhaust
+
+Text equivalent: Authority is authored for exact canonical bytes, committed, optionally attenuated into a child, consumed under durable state, and eventually expires, is revoked, or becomes exhausted.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- A child is a subset of its parent under every critical extension.
+- Use and budget state are durable and atomic with reservation.
+- Expired, revoked, or exhausted authority cannot be revived by transport or approval.
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| A child adds an action or use | Widening rejected | Create the child from a valid subset of the parent. |
+| Authority expires before reservation | Denied | Request fresh authority for current intent. |
+| Revocation state cannot be checked | Indeterminate | Restore lifecycle state; do not assume the grant remains valid. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+You need delegation, one-time use, budget, expiry, revocation, or critical-extension behavior.
+
+## Do not use this when
+
+You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
+- [Authority](/authority) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md b/public/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee96546
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Budgets
+
+Reserve and consume numeric or profile-defined budgets with the same atomic boundary as uses.
+
+## Model
+
+A budget limits cumulative effect according to a profile-owned unit such as cost, records, tokens, or capacity. The request declares its amount and durable state reserves it before execution.
+
+## What remains true
+
+Children may reduce available budget and executions cannot spend more than the remaining amount. The unit and canonical amount are committed.
+
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Negative, overflowed, mismatched-unit, over-budget, concurrent overspend, and unavailable-state requests deny before provider access.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep budgets simple and domain-specific; use a policy engine for broader business policy and commit its chosen inputs separately.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md b/public/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d9d7f26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Revocation and status
+
+Apply issuer-owned status without pretending it is an offline cryptographic fact.
+
+## Model
+
+Status is an explicit trusted input resolved by an application-owned status provider. It can express active, revoked, suspended, unknown, or unavailable according to the profile.
+
+## What remains true
+
+The decision commits the status evidence it used. Cached status obeys declared freshness; absence is not interpreted as active.
+
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Revoked, suspended, stale, unknown, or unavailable status returns a closed lifecycle outcome. Offline verification must state when no current status was consulted.
+
+## Continue
+
+Choose freshness and availability behavior appropriate to the effect's consequence.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md b/public/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7762ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Uses and replay
+
+Consume bounded uses atomically and reject exact replay.
+
+## Model
+
+Use state is keyed by stable authority and command commitments. Execution reserves a use before reaching the provider and commits or recovers that reservation according to the journaled outcome.
+
+## What remains true
+
+Concurrent requests cannot both consume the same final use. A transport retry does not create fresh semantic authority.
+
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Exact replay, exhausted use count, reservation conflict, unavailable state, and uncertain prior execution cannot fall through to the provider.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use Resume for an existing execution reference; never mint a fresh command to hide uncertainty.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md b/public/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fefcbb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Validity and expiry
+
+Evaluate not-before and expiry bounds at an explicit observation time.
+
+## Model
+
+Validity is a closed interval committed into authority. Verification receives observation time as explicit context and never borrows an ambient clock without the caller choosing it.
+
+## What remains true
+
+Children may shorten but never extend their parent's window. Retained evidence records the time used for the decision.
+
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Before-not-before, after-expiry, missing time, invalid intervals, and child windows outside the parent deny deterministically.
+
+## Continue
+
+Combine time with status only when current lifecycle state is required.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/authority/model.md b/public/authority/model.md
index 5fcd05f..98e49e5 100644
--- a/public/authority/model.md
+++ b/public/authority/model.md
@@ -1,10 +1,43 @@
-# Auths in fifteen minutes
+# Authority model
 
-Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.
+Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
 
-## One operation from intent to evidence
+## The path at a glance
 
-A support service grants one actor authority to issue one refund, executes it behind a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt.
+1. Actor + exact action
+2. Create authority
+3. Delegate narrower
+4. Execute through gateway
+5. Verify receipt
+
+Text equivalent: An actor describes an exact action, creates bounded authority, optionally delegates a narrower child, executes through a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- Authority names the exact action and actor bounds.
+- Delegation cannot add actions, time, uses, budget, or depth.
+- Verification returns inert evidence and cannot perform the effect.
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| Action bytes change | Commitment mismatch | Create authority for the intended bytes; do not reinterpret the old grant. |
+| The same use is replayed | Denied | Create a new authorized operation only if the business intent is genuinely new. |
+| Required trust evidence is unavailable | Indeterminate | Restore the missing evidence before making a decision. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+You need the complete product model before choosing an SDK or deployment.
+
+## Do not use this when
+
+You only need an exact signature or endpoint field; open the generated reference instead.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
+- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/plans.md b/public/authority/plans.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3944c32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/plans.md
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Plans
+
+Commit multiple ordered operations as one reviewable plan.
+
+## Recommended: [Transaction-bound approvals](/authority/plans/approvals)
+
+Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.
+
+## Lifecycle
+
+- [Transaction-bound approvals](/authority/plans/approvals) — Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.plans/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority.plans/1_
+
diff --git a/public/authority/plans/approvals.md b/public/authority/plans/approvals.md
index 021e4ca..972e0e2 100644
--- a/public/authority/plans/approvals.md
+++ b/public/authority/plans/approvals.md
@@ -1,10 +1,43 @@
-# Approval-bound plans
+# Transaction-bound approvals
 
-Bind threshold or ordered approval to the exact operations, bytes, and order under review.
+Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.
 
-## Approval is bound context, not authority
+## The path at a glance
 
-Changing a member, byte, order, or threshold changes the plan commitment and invalidates the collected approval evidence.
+1. Construct exact plan
+2. Commit members + order
+3. Collect bound approvals
+4. Authorize each sealed command
+5. Record partial or terminal outcome
+
+Text equivalent: An exact ordered plan is committed, approvers sign that commitment, each member still passes authorization, and execution records partial, uncertain, cancelled, or terminal outcomes without treating approval as reusable permission.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- Approval is evidence about one exact plan commitment.
+- Substituting a member, byte sequence, order, threshold, or approver set invalidates approval.
+- Approval never bypasses authority verification or durable execution state.
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| A plan member changes after approval | Substitution rejected | Build and approve a new plan commitment. |
+| Threshold is not met | Denied | Collect the missing valid approval or cancel. |
+| A provider outcome becomes unknown mid-plan | Plan is recoverable with explicit completed and uncertain members | Reconcile before any continuation. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+Several exact operations require threshold, ordered, or cross-organization review.
+
+## Do not use this when
+
+A reusable human-approved flag or broad role is sufficient for the actual risk model.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Cross-company authority](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
+- [Authority](/authority) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/profiles.md b/public/authority/profiles.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..501f1d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/profiles.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Profiles
+
+Map application actions, resources, inputs, budgets, commands, and receipts without coupling adjacent components.
+
+## Model
+
+A profile owns domain meaning: canonical action and resource identifiers, bounded input parsing, command construction, budget units, critical extensions, and receipt-safe projections. Maintained profiles are closed; profile-kit supports application-owned domains.
+
+## What remains true
+
+Profiles cannot choose identity providers, transports, state stores, signer custody, approval vendors, or provider credentials. Every profile parser is bounded and every semantic identity is versioned.
+
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Ambiguous resources, non-canonical input, unknown actions, incompatible versions, unbounded extensions, or profiles that smuggle credentials or transport data fail qualification.
+
+## Continue
+
+Begin with a maintained profile or one minimal application-owned action; expand only with differential and adversarial fixtures.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/authority/receipts.md b/public/authority/receipts.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1713df9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/receipts.md
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Receipts
+
+Use signed decision and execution receipts as portable integrity evidence.
+
+## Recommended: [Bounded disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure)
+
+Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.
+
+## Verify and inspect
+
+- [Bounded disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure) — Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority.receipts/1_
+
diff --git a/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md b/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
index c167e97..65ea26b 100644
--- a/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
+++ b/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
@@ -1,10 +1,43 @@
-# Receipts and disclosure
+# Bounded disclosure
 
-Verify outcome evidence while revealing only what the viewer is authorized to inspect.
+Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.
 
-## Evidence has disclosure levels
+## The path at a glance
 
-Opaque, summary, and authorized full views let applications prove integrity without publishing sensitive business detail by default.
+1. Decision receipt
+2. Execution receipt
+3. Verify integrity
+4. Opaque or summary view
+5. Authorized full disclosure
+
+Text equivalent: Decision and execution receipts bind evidence, local verification confirms integrity, every viewer can receive only the permitted opaque or summary projection, and sensitive full detail requires explicit disclosure authority.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- A receipt records a decision or outcome; it does not retroactively authorize it.
+- Verification is local and effect free.
+- Sensitive application details are absent from unauthorized and bounded-summary views.
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| Receipt bytes are changed | Verification rejected | Retrieve the original signed receipt from a trusted source. |
+| A viewer lacks disclosure authority | Opaque view | Request explicit disclosure authority rather than leaking fields. |
+| Signer trust cannot be resolved | Indeterminate | Restore trust evidence before relying on the receipt. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+You need audit evidence, cross-company proof, recovery state, or privacy-preserving inspection.
+
+## Do not use this when
+
+You need to perform an effect; receipt verification is intentionally inert.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
+- [Assurance](/assurance) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/resume.md b/public/authority/resume.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e94ee24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/resume.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Resume
+
+Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.
+
+## Outcome
+
+The runtime recovers the journaled reservation and either returns the known terminal outcome or reconciles the same provider operation.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Submit the opaque execution reference, load its durable journal, inspect the last committed phase, and invoke only the gateway's idempotent status or reconciliation path permitted for that original command.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+Resume converges on one terminal receipt while preserving original authority, command, context, and idempotency commitments.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Unknown reference, mismatched caller, corrupted journal, fresh command substitution, blind provider retry, or unreconciled provider uncertainty remains stopped.
+
+## Continue
+
+Define operational reconciliation and escalation for every gateway before enabling production effects.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.resume/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/authority/verify.md b/public/authority/verify.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1903f6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/authority/verify.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Verify
+
+Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.
+
+## Outcome
+
+A caller obtains a deterministic, inert result for exact artifact bytes and explicit trusted context.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Parse the artifact, supply trust, time, status, request, and profile context as required, run native verification, and project only the authorized inspection view.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The same bytes and context produce the same normalized result across Rust, TypeScript, and Python without contacting a provider.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Mutation, wrong trust, stale status, request mismatch, invalid chain, unauthorized disclosure, or unknown semantics fails without constructing executable authority.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use Receipts to understand integrity and Disclosure to control what verified evidence reveals.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.verify/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
index d1395c5..d334d1a 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
@@ -1,10 +1,31 @@
-# Agent delegation
+# Delegate one tool to an agent
 
-Delegate one narrower tool action and prove that a broader action is denied.
+Give an agent one narrow tool and prove it cannot widen itself into a second tool.
 
-## Run success and fail-closed paths
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1` · Expected time: 12 minutes
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Agent publishes one report
+- Prohibited: Agent deletes a report
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `completed`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `authority_widening`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/agent-delegation.json)
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
index 3035eb3..b8d5d38 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
@@ -1,10 +1,31 @@
-# Approved plan
+# Run one approved plan
 
-Bind approval to the exact bytes and order of a multi-step plan.
+Bind approval to an exact ordered plan and prove that replacing a member invalidates it.
 
-## Run success and fail-closed paths
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1` · Expected time: 18 minutes
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Quarantine service, then rotate token
+- Prohibited: Replace rotate token with delete service
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `completed`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `approval_substitution`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json)
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
index 28a0315..be6e5d6 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
@@ -1,10 +1,31 @@
-# Identity swap
+# Swap identity suites without changing authority
 
-Exchange and verify identity material while keeping the authority workflow unchanged.
+Run the same authority workflow with two suites and prove that a mislabelled suite fails verification.
 
-## Run success and fail-closed paths
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1` · Expected time: 14 minutes
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Verify Ed25519 and P-256 projections
+- Prohibited: Label Ed25519 material as P-256
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `authorized`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `suite_mismatch`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json)
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
index 057cfed..aaa86ab 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
@@ -1,10 +1,31 @@
-# Local REST effect
+# Protect one REST effect locally
 
-Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.
+Complete one exact REST-shaped effect and prove that changed application bytes fail closed.
 
-## Run success and fail-closed paths
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1` · Expected time: 8 minutes
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Publish report weekly
+- Prohibited: Publish report monthly
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `completed`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `action_mismatch`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json)
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
index 847ba8e..a3802f3 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
@@ -1,10 +1,31 @@
-# Offline verification
+# Verify authority offline
 
-Verify portable evidence without executing an effect or contacting a provider.
+Verify proof and receipt bytes locally and prove that the wrong trusted context is denied.
 
-## Run success and fail-closed paths
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1` · Expected time: 7 minutes
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Verify with the committed trusted context
+- Prohibited: Verify under an unrelated trust root
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `authorized`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `untrusted_context`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/offline-verification.json)
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md
index 4fe5f12..a0f0a72 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md
@@ -1,10 +1,31 @@
-# Recovery
+# Resume uncertain execution safely
 
-Resume or reconcile an interrupted execution without blindly repeating the provider effect.
+Resume one opaque execution reference and prove that a fresh retry cannot repeat the effect.
 
-## Run success and fail-closed paths
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1` · Expected time: 15 minutes
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Resume the original execution reference
+- Prohibited: Create a fresh retry after provider uncertainty
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `completed`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `fresh_retry_prohibited`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json)
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
index 9ef0efa..b5c34e6 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
@@ -1,10 +1,31 @@
-# Runtime effect
+# Execute through the open runtime
 
-Execute one bounded effect through the production HTTPS runtime and durable state boundary.
+Send one sealed command through the HTTPS runtime and prove that exact replay is denied.
 
-## Run success and fail-closed paths
+Scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1` · Expected time: 12 minutes
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+## 1. Start from a clean consumer
+
+Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
+
+## 2. Name the exact boundary
+
+- Allowed: Request report weekly once
+- Prohibited: Replay request report weekly
+
+## 3. Execute the permitted effect
+
+Expected outcome: `completed`.
+
+## 4. Break safely
+
+Expected stable denial: `exact_replay`. The provider is not reached.
+
+## 5. Continue
+
+Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
+
+[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json)
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust.md b/public/identity-trust.md
index d631d15..a79274c 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust.md
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ See the independent boundaries between identity evidence, cryptographic suites,
 
 ## Related topics
 
-- [Authority](/authority) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
+- [Authority](/authority) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust/1 · Product contract: auths.page.identity-trust/1_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md b/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
index 501e70f..7c3827d 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
@@ -2,21 +2,42 @@
 
 See the independent boundaries between identity evidence, cryptographic suites, trust policy, transport, and authority.
 
-## Model
+## The path at a glance
 
-An Auths identity projection contains a verification method, suite label, and bounded public evidence. A resolver may obtain that evidence from raw keys, OIDC, SPIFFE, or an application system. Trusted context decides which result is acceptable for one verification.
+1. Identity material
+2. Authentication evidence
+3. Application trust resolver
+4. Verified signer
+5. Separate authority decision
+
+Text equivalent: Bounded identity material becomes authentication evidence, an application-owned resolver evaluates trust, and only then can a separate authority decision consider the verified signer.
 
 ## What remains true
 
-Identity evidence authenticates exact bytes; it never grants an effect. Suite adapters verify only their declared material. Transport success supplies bytes, not trust. Authority can refer to an identity without owning its provider or key lifecycle.
+- A public key identifies verification material; it does not grant an action.
+- Ed25519, P-256, and future suites enter through the same bounded verification port.
+- HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and other transports deliver evidence but never authorize effects.
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| The suite is unsupported | Rejected | Install or supply an explicit compatible suite implementation. |
+| The signer is valid but untrusted | Denied | Change trust policy or use a trusted identity; do not infer trust from signature validity. |
+| The resolver is unavailable | Indeterminate | Restore trust evidence and evaluate again without performing an effect. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+You are integrating OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, application identities, or another cryptographic suite.
 
-## Where it fails closed
+## Do not use this when
 
-Unknown suite, method mismatch, wrong root, stale evidence, resolver ambiguity, and altered application bytes remain distinct closed results. The verifier cannot silently try a different suite or trust source.
+You are looking for permission scope; identity alone cannot express the complete effect boundary.
 
-## Continue
+## Continue from here
 
-Choose an identity source, then choose a suite and trust policy. Open Authority only when a verified principal needs bounded permission.
+- [Identity & trust](/identity-trust) — Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.
+- [Execute](/authority/execute) — Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/llms-full.txt b/public/llms-full.txt
index 56d97b3..aae6451 100644
--- a/public/llms-full.txt
+++ b/public/llms-full.txt
@@ -147,23 +147,40 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129
 
 # Authority
 
-Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
+Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
 
-## Recommended: [Trust boundaries](/authority/execute)
+## Recommended: [Authority model](/authority/model)
 
-Authorization before provider entry.
+Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
 
-## Execute and recover
+## Model
 
-- [Trust boundaries](/authority/execute) — Authorization before provider entry.
+- [Authority model](/authority/model) — Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
 
-## Model
+## Author and narrow
 
-- [Auths in fifteen minutes](/authority/model) — Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.
+- [Create](/authority/create) — Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.
+- [Constraints](/authority/constraints) — Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.
+- [Delegate](/authority/delegate) — Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.
 
 ## Lifecycle
 
-- [Authority lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
+- [Lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.
+- [Plans](/authority/plans) — Commit multiple ordered operations as one reviewable plan.
+
+## Execute and recover
+
+- [Execute](/authority/execute) — Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
+- [Resume](/authority/resume) — Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.
+
+## Verify and inspect
+
+- [Verify](/authority/verify) — Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.
+- [Receipts](/authority/receipts) — Use signed decision and execution receipts as portable integrity evidence.
+
+## Profiles
+
+- [Profiles](/authority/profiles) — Map application actions, resources, inputs, budgets, commands, and receipts without coupling adjacent components.
 
 ## Related topics
 
@@ -175,1184 +192,1112 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.authority/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority
 
 ---
 
-# Trust boundaries
-
-Authorization before provider entry.
-
-## Transport is not authority
+# Constraints
 
-Successful delivery never authorizes an effect.
+Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Model
 
+Constraints form a conjunction: every bound must permit the request. Action and resource describe the effect; validity limits time; uses and budget limit consumption; depth limits delegation; audience limits the intended verifier or executor; critical extensions add profile-owned restrictions.
 
+## What remains true
 
----
+Omitting a bound never means that a child may invent a broader one. Critical extensions must be understood and attenuated according to their declared semantics. Application profiles own canonical resource and action interpretation.
 
-# Authority lifecycle
+## Where it fails closed
 
-Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
+Action or resource mismatch, early or late time, exhausted use, insufficient budget, excessive depth, wrong audience, and unknown or widened critical extensions each produce a stable denial before the provider is reached.
 
-## Authority can only get narrower
+## Continue
 
-Each child commits to a subset of its parent and consumes explicit time, use, budget, and delegation bounds.
+Use the smallest combination that expresses the effect; keep policy engines outside this artifact and commit only their required evidence.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.constraints/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Auths in fifteen minutes
+# Create
 
-Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.
+Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.
 
-## One operation from intent to evidence
+## Outcome
 
-A support service grants one actor authority to issue one refund, executes it behind a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt.
+An issuer grants one subject the smallest useful action, resource, validity window, use count, budget, audience, and delegation depth.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Before you begin
 
+Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
 
+## Build the bounded path
 
----
+Select a profile action, parse its resource and input, set explicit bounds, author through the native operation, and sign using the configured custody port.
 
-# Approval-bound plans
+## Run the qualified path
 
-Bind threshold or ordered approval to the exact operations, bytes, and order under review.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
-## Approval is bound context, not authority
+## Success means
 
-Changing a member, byte, order, or threshold changes the plan commitment and invalidates the collected approval evidence.
+The resulting artifact is canonical, portable, and accepted identically by Rust, TypeScript, and Python for the permitted request.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Fail closed
 
+Missing bounds, invalid profile input, unsupported critical extensions, wrong audience, or altered bytes cannot be repaired during verification.
 
+## Continue
 
----
+Execute it directly, or delegate a narrower child without changing the model.
 
-# Receipts and disclosure
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.create/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-Verify outcome evidence while revealing only what the viewer is authorized to inspect.
 
-## Evidence has disclosure levels
 
-Opaque, summary, and authorized full views let applications prove integrity without publishing sensitive business detail by default.
+---
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+# Delegate
 
+Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.
 
+## Outcome
 
----
+A child principal can act only inside every bound the parent deliberately passes on.
 
-# Developers
+## Before you begin
 
-Find SDKs, Runtime APIs, tested examples, integrations, versioning, and extension contracts.
+Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
 
-## Recommended: [Integrations](/developers/integrations)
+## Build the bounded path
 
-Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
+Parse the parent, select the child subject, narrow action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, depth, and critical extensions, then author and sign the child through the native delegate operation.
 
-## Integrate and extend
+## Run the qualified path
 
-- [Integrations](/developers/integrations) — Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
-## SDKs
+## Success means
 
-- [Choose an Auths SDK](/developers/sdks) — Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
+The child verifies as an unbroken chain and can perform the one intended tool action.
 
-## Runtime and CLI
+## Fail closed
 
-- [Use the Runtime API](/developers/runtime-api) — Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.
-- [Auths CLI](/developers/cli) — Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.
+Any wider or incomparable child is rejected, including a quiet critical-extension omission that would restore power.
 
-## Test and debug
+## Continue
 
-- [Test Auths outcomes](/developers/testing) — Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.
-- [Outcomes and errors](/developers/errors) — Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.
+Inspect depth and chain rules, then test every attempted widening relevant to the application profile.
 
-## Releases
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-- [Versions and compatibility](/developers/versioning) — Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
 
-## Related topics
 
-- [APIs & SDKs](/reference) — Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.
+---
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers/1 · Product contract: auths.page.developers/1_
+# Depth and chain
 
+Reason about delegation depth and the complete signed chain.
 
+## Model
 
----
+Each delegation consumes one unit of permitted depth and adds a signed link. Verification checks the root trust, every issuer-to-subject transition, every narrowing relation, and the terminal request.
 
-# Auths CLI
+## What remains true
 
-Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.
+Depth cannot be reset by changing languages, identity adapters, transports, or profiles. A chain remains valid only while every link remains valid and trusted.
 
-## The CLI is an interface, not ambient permission
+## Where it fails closed
 
-CLI commands parse explicit inputs and use the same native semantic owners as the SDKs. A successful command invocation does not bypass trust, authority, state, or gateway checks.
+Skipped links, reordered links, broken subjects, expired parents, revoked ancestors, excessive depth, and incomparable constraints deny the terminal request.
 
-## Verification remains effect-free
+## Continue
 
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.verify/1`.
+Keep chains short in simple systems; use explicit organizational or agent handoffs only where they add accountability.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.cli/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Outcomes and errors
+# Widening failures
 
-Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.
+Exercise every way a child might attempt to gain power its parent did not pass down.
 
-## Closed outcomes preserve what is known
+## Outcome
 
-Denied means the request must change. Indeterminate means a required decision input was unavailable. Recoverable means resume the same opaque reference. Provider-unknown means reconcile before retrying.
+Your test suite proves that delegation can only narrow, including application-defined critical extensions.
 
-## Never flatten uncertainty into an exception retry
+## Before you begin
 
-Blind retry can repeat a real-world effect. Keep outcome class, correlation evidence, and the permitted next action together.
+Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.errors/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Build the bounded path
 
+Generate mutations for action, resource, validity, uses, budget, depth, audience, extension presence, and extension values; verify each child against the same parent and trusted context.
 
+## Run the qualified path
 
----
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
-# Integrations
+## Success means
 
-Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
+Every valid narrowing is portable across SDKs, and every wider or incomparable mutation returns the same denial identity.
 
-## Recommended: [Identity and trust integrations](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust)
+## Fail closed
 
-Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
+A language disagreement, ignored critical extension, dropped parent, or accepted incomparable set is a release-blocking semantic failure.
 
-## Integrate and extend
+## Continue
 
-- [Identity and trust integrations](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust) — Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
-- [Policy engine integrations](/developers/integrations/policy) — Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.
-- [Cloud IAM integrations](/developers/integrations/cloud-iam) — Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.
-- [Transport integrations](/developers/integrations/transport) — Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.
-- [Capability integrations](/developers/integrations/capabilities) — Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.
-- [Build an application profile](/developers/integrations/profile-kit) — Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.
+Keep these fixtures with the application profile and rerun them on every Auths upgrade.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.composition/1 · Product contract: auths.page.integrations.composition/1_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Capability integrations
+# Execute
 
-Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.
+Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
 
-## Preserve the source capability's legitimate role
+## Outcome
 
-An import profile states which external claims map into Auths authority and which require external state. It must reject any mapping that silently invents stronger bounds or execution guarantees.
+An opaque native authorization handle reaches the executor only after identity, authority, lifecycle, plan, and command checks pass.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Before you begin
 
+Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
 
+## Build the bounded path
 
----
+Parse the command, verify and reserve authority, seal exact provider-independent bytes, acquire the gateway only from the native verified handle, perform the effect, then journal and sign the terminal receipt.
 
-# Cloud IAM integrations
+## Run the qualified path
 
-Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
 
-## Cloud IAM remains the provider boundary
+## Success means
 
-Cloud IAM supplies workload identity and restricted provider credentials. Auths supplies exact effect authority, durable use accounting, closed outcomes, and portable receipts. Credentials never enter the agent or proof.
+The gateway receives the minimum provider request after durable reservation and returns a closed, receipt-bound outcome.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.cloud/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Fail closed
+
+Application code cannot mint the handle; successful transport, approval, signature, or provider authentication alone cannot open the gateway. Provider secrets never enter the authority artifact.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use Resume rather than a new Execute call when the terminal provider result is not yet known.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Identity and trust integrations
+# Lifecycle
 
-Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
+Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.
 
-## Your trust policy owns who is accepted
+## The path at a glance
 
-Auths supplies bounded evidence parsing and suite-labelled verification. Your application supplies accepted roots and resolver policy. The identity system supplies authentication evidence; none of these alone grants an effect.
+1. Author exact authority
+2. Commit canonical bytes
+3. Attenuate child
+4. Consume use or budget
+5. Expire, revoke, or exhaust
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+Text equivalent: Authority is authored for exact canonical bytes, committed, optionally attenuated into a child, consumed under durable state, and eventually expires, is revoked, or becomes exhausted.
 
+## What remains true
 
+- A child is a subset of its parent under every critical extension.
+- Use and budget state are durable and atomic with reservation.
+- Expired, revoked, or exhausted authority cannot be revived by transport or approval.
 
----
+## Failure branches
 
-# Policy engine integrations
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| A child adds an action or use | Widening rejected | Create the child from a valid subset of the parent. |
+| Authority expires before reservation | Denied | Request fresh authority for current intent. |
+| Revocation state cannot be checked | Indeterminate | Restore lifecycle state; do not assume the grant remains valid. |
 
-Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.
+## Use this when
 
-## Policy supplies context; Auths binds the exact effect
+You need delegation, one-time use, budget, expiry, revocation, or critical-extension behavior.
 
-The policy engine evaluates application relationships and attributes. Auths commits the resulting bounded decision context to the action and preserves execution state and receipts.
+## Do not use this when
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.policy/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.
 
+## Continue from here
 
+- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
+- [Authority](/authority) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
 
----
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-# Build an application profile
 
-Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.
 
-## A profile defines domain meaning
+---
 
-Define bounded canonical actions, resource matching, attenuation, and inspection projections. Keep identity, transport, state, custody, approval providers, and execution adapters outside the profile.
+# Budgets
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+Reserve and consume numeric or profile-defined budgets with the same atomic boundary as uses.
 
+## Model
 
+A budget limits cumulative effect according to a profile-owned unit such as cost, records, tokens, or capacity. The request declares its amount and durable state reserves it before execution.
 
----
+## What remains true
 
-# Transport integrations
+Children may reduce available budget and executions cannot spend more than the remaining amount. The unit and canonical amount are committed.
 
-Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.
+## Where it fails closed
 
-## Delivery is never authority
+Negative, overflowed, mismatched-unit, over-budget, concurrent overspend, and unavailable-state requests deny before provider access.
 
-Transport authenticates or delivers peers and bytes according to its own contract. Auths verifies those bounded bytes under explicit trust and authority. Iroh can be used without capabilities; Auths can be used without Iroh.
+## Continue
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.transport/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+Keep budgets simple and domain-specific; use a policy engine for broader business policy and commit its chosen inputs separately.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Use the Runtime API
+# Revocation and status
 
-Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.
+Apply issuer-owned status without pretending it is an offline cryptographic fact.
 
-## Use a runtime when effects cross a trust boundary
+## Model
 
-The runtime is appropriate when signing keys, replay state, receipts, or provider credentials must stay outside the caller process. It does not replace your application API or identity provider.
+Status is an explicit trusted input resolved by an application-owned status provider. It can express active, revoked, suspended, unknown, or unavailable according to the profile.
 
-## Runtime entry points
+## What remains true
 
-Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.executions/1`.
+The decision commits the status evidence it used. Cached status obeys declared freshness; absence is not interpreted as active.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Revoked, suspended, stale, unknown, or unavailable status returns a closed lifecycle outcome. Offline verification must state when no current status was consulted.
 
+## Continue
 
+Choose freshness and availability behavior appropriate to the effect's consequence.
 
----
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-# Choose an Auths SDK
 
-Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
 
-## Choose for your application, not for semantics
+---
 
-TypeScript and Python expose the same product workflow. Rust owns the protocol meaning and also exposes lower-level components for native applications.
+# Uses and replay
 
-Start with the product facade. Descend into profile, verification, inspection, and runtime surfaces only when the application needs that control.
+Consume bounded uses atomically and reject exact replay.
 
-## One lifecycle in every language
+## Model
 
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
+Use state is keyed by stable authority and command commitments. Execution reserves a use before reaching the provider and commits or recovers that reservation according to the journaled outcome.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## What remains true
 
+Concurrent requests cannot both consume the same final use. A transport retry does not create fresh semantic authority.
 
+## Where it fails closed
 
----
+Exact replay, exhausted use count, reservation conflict, unavailable state, and uncertain prior execution cannot fall through to the provider.
 
-# Test Auths outcomes
+## Continue
 
-Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.
+Use Resume for an existing execution reference; never mint a fresh command to hide uncertainty.
 
-## Test the boundary, not only the happy path
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-Keep fixtures for byte mutation, widening, expiry, revocation, replay, approval substitution, provider uncertainty, resume, and receipt disclosure. Assert that a denied path never reaches the provider.
 
-## Prove safe recovery
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
+---
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.testing/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+# Validity and expiry
 
+Evaluate not-before and expiry bounds at an explicit observation time.
 
+## Model
 
----
+Validity is a closed interval committed into authority. Verification receives observation time as explicit context and never borrows an ambient clock without the caller choosing it.
 
-# Versions and compatibility
+## What remains true
 
-Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
+Children may shorten but never extend their parent's window. Retained evidence records the time used for the decision.
 
-## Prelaunch means one clean surface
+## Where it fails closed
 
-Auths does not carry deprecated entry points, migration shims, or compatibility aliases before launch. Breaking changes replace the preview contract and are reported explicitly.
+Before-not-before, after-expiry, missing time, invalid intervals, and child windows outside the parent deny deterministically.
 
-## Semantic changes receive new identities
+## Continue
 
-A release bundle binds documentation to exact operations, scenarios, endpoints, and evidence. Contract drift either regenerates the affected page or fails qualification.
+Combine time with status only when current lifecycle state is required.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.versioning/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Get started
+# Authority model
 
-Choose one concrete outcome and reach a verified, fail-closed result.
+Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
 
-## Recommended: [Prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites)
+## The path at a glance
 
-Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
+1. Actor + exact action
+2. Create authority
+3. Delegate narrower
+4. Execute through gateway
+5. Verify receipt
 
-## Choose a path
+Text equivalent: An actor describes an exact action, creates bounded authority, optionally delegates a narrower child, executes through a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt.
 
-- [Prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites) — Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
-- [Choose your path](/get-started/choose) — Select the shortest journey for the effect, actor, and operating boundary you have.
-- [Outcome paths](/get-started/paths) — Choose an outcome path before learning the complete Auths model.
+## What remains true
 
-## Quickstarts
+- Authority names the exact action and actor bounds.
+- Delegation cannot add actions, time, uses, budget, or depth.
+- Verification returns inert evidence and cannot perform the effect.
 
-- [Quickstarts](/get-started/quickstarts) — Compare seven installed-artifact projects by boundary, state, custody, success, and failure.
+## Failure branches
 
-## Next steps
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| Action bytes change | Commitment mismatch | Create authority for the intended bytes; do not reinterpret the old grant. |
+| The same use is replayed | Denied | Create a new authorized operation only if the business intent is genuinely new. |
+| Required trust evidence is unavailable | Indeterminate | Restore the missing evidence before making a decision. |
 
-- [Evaluate Auths](/get-started/evaluate) — Evaluate Auths with deterministic positive and adversarial fixtures before choosing a deployment.
+## Use this when
 
-## Adopt incrementally
+You need the complete product model before choosing an SDK or deployment.
 
-- [Adopt incrementally](/get-started/adoption) — Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.
+## Do not use this when
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start/1_
+You only need an exact signature or endpoint field; open the generated reference instead.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
+- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Adopt incrementally
+# Plans
 
-Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.
+Commit multiple ordered operations as one reviewable plan.
 
-## Recommended: [Plan adoption](/get-started/adoption/plan)
+## Recommended: [Transaction-bound approvals](/authority/plans/approvals)
 
-Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
+Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.
 
-## Adopt incrementally
+## Lifecycle
 
-- [Plan adoption](/get-started/adoption/plan) — Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
-- [Signed requests](/get-started/adoption/signed-requests) — Bind an existing signed request to narrower authority and execution state.
-- [OAuth and OIDC](/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc) — Keep OAuth or OIDC authentication while adding effect-specific machine authority.
-- [API keys](/get-started/adoption/api-keys) — Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.
-- [Cloud IAM](/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam) — Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.
-- [Policy engines](/get-started/adoption/policy-engines) — Use a Cedar, OPA, or relationship decision as explicit context without duplicating the policy engine.
-- [Capability systems](/get-started/adoption/capabilities) — Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.
-- [Approval systems](/get-started/adoption/approvals) — Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.
-- [Shadow mode](/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode) — Compare Auths decisions with live traffic without authorizing provider effects.
-- [Cut over one effect](/get-started/adoption/cutover) — Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.
+- [Transaction-bound approvals](/authority/plans/approvals) — Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.adopt/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start.adopt/1_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.plans/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority.plans/1_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# API keys
-
-Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.
+# Transaction-bound approvals
 
-## Ownership boundary
+Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.
 
-The provider and its API-key lifecycle continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
+## The path at a glance
 
-## Data flow
+1. Construct exact plan
+2. Commit members + order
+3. Collect bound approvals
+4. Authorize each sealed command
+5. Record partial or terminal outcome
 
-The application operation mapped to a gateway-held API call becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
+Text equivalent: An exact ordered plan is committed, approvers sign that commitment, each member still passes authorization, and execution records partial, uncertain, cancelled, or terminal outcomes without treating approval as reusable permission.
 
-## Secrets
+## What remains true
 
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
+- Approval is evidence about one exact plan commitment.
+- Substituting a member, byte sequence, order, threshold, or approver set invalidates approval.
+- Approval never bypasses authority verification or durable execution state.
 
-## State
+## Failure branches
 
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| A plan member changes after approval | Substitution rejected | Build and approve a new plan commitment. |
+| Threshold is not met | Denied | Collect the missing valid approval or cancel. |
+| A provider outcome becomes unknown mid-plan | Plan is recoverable with explicit completed and uncertain members | Reconcile before any continuation. |
 
-## Failure ownership
+## Use this when
 
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
+Several exact operations require threshold, ordered, or cross-organization review.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+## Do not use this when
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+A reusable human-approved flag or broad role is sufficient for the actual risk model.
 
-## Limitations
+## Continue from here
 
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
+- [Cross-company authority](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
+- [Authority](/authority) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Approval systems
+# Profiles
 
-Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.
+Map application actions, resources, inputs, budgets, commands, and receipts without coupling adjacent components.
 
-## Ownership boundary
+## Model
 
-The approval system and approver authentication continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
+A profile owns domain meaning: canonical action and resource identifiers, bounded input parsing, command construction, budget units, critical extensions, and receipt-safe projections. Maintained profiles are closed; profile-kit supports application-owned domains.
 
-## Data flow
+## What remains true
 
-The approval response committed to the exact ordered plan request becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
+Profiles cannot choose identity providers, transports, state stores, signer custody, approval vendors, or provider credentials. Every profile parser is bounded and every semantic identity is versioned.
 
-## Secrets
-
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
-
-## State
-
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
+## Where it fails closed
 
-## Failure ownership
+Ambiguous resources, non-canonical input, unknown actions, incompatible versions, unbounded extensions, or profiles that smuggle credentials or transport data fail qualification.
 
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
-
-## Limitations
+## Continue
 
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
+Begin with a maintained profile or one minimal application-owned action; expand only with differential and adversarial fixtures.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.approvals/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Capability systems
+# Receipts
 
-Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.
-
-## Ownership boundary
+Use signed decision and execution receipts as portable integrity evidence.
 
-The capability protocol continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
+## Recommended: [Bounded disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure)
 
-## Data flow
+Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.
 
-The imported capability and its verified attenuation result becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
+## Verify and inspect
 
-## Secrets
+- [Bounded disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure) — Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.
 
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
-
-## State
-
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority.receipts/1_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Cloud IAM
+# Bounded disclosure
 
-Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.
+Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.
 
-## Ownership boundary
-
-Cloud IAM continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
+## The path at a glance
 
-## Data flow
+1. Decision receipt
+2. Execution receipt
+3. Verify integrity
+4. Opaque or summary view
+5. Authorized full disclosure
 
-The authorized Auths command mapped to a least-privilege provider session becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
+Text equivalent: Decision and execution receipts bind evidence, local verification confirms integrity, every viewer can receive only the permitted opaque or summary projection, and sensitive full detail requires explicit disclosure authority.
 
-## Secrets
+## What remains true
 
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
+- A receipt records a decision or outcome; it does not retroactively authorize it.
+- Verification is local and effect free.
+- Sensitive application details are absent from unauthorized and bounded-summary views.
 
-## State
+## Failure branches
 
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| Receipt bytes are changed | Verification rejected | Retrieve the original signed receipt from a trusted source. |
+| A viewer lacks disclosure authority | Opaque view | Request explicit disclosure authority rather than leaking fields. |
+| Signer trust cannot be resolved | Indeterminate | Restore trust evidence before relying on the receipt. |
 
-## Failure ownership
+## Use this when
 
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
+You need audit evidence, cross-company proof, recovery state, or privacy-preserving inspection.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+## Do not use this when
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+You need to perform an effect; receipt verification is intentionally inert.
 
-## Limitations
+## Continue from here
 
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
+- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
+- [Assurance](/assurance) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Cut over one effect
+# Resume
 
-Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.
+Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.
 
 ## Outcome
 
-Callers can no longer reach the provider effect without verified authority and durable reservation.
+The runtime recovers the journaled reservation and either returns the known terminal outcome or reconciles the same provider operation.
 
 ## Before you begin
 
-Complete shadow mode, provision runtime dependencies, define stop conditions, retain the previous path behind an operator-controlled rollback, and ensure it cannot run concurrently.
+Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
 
 ## Build the bounded path
 
-Route the selected operation through the Auths gateway, verify terminal receipts, monitor denial and indeterminate outcomes, and exercise resume and reconciliation.
+Submit the opaque execution reference, load its durable journal, inspect the last committed phase, and invoke only the gateway's idempotent status or reconciliation path permitted for that original command.
 
 ## Run the qualified path
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
 
 ## Success means
 
-Success includes correct effects, stable denials, no replay, durable evidence, and a tested recovery path.
+Resume converges on one terminal receipt while preserving original authority, command, context, and idempotency commitments.
 
 ## Fail closed
 
-Rollback on unexplained denial, state inconsistency, custody failure, receipt loss, or provider ambiguity; never bypass Auths automatically.
+Unknown reference, mismatched caller, corrupted journal, fresh command substitution, blind provider retry, or unreconciled provider uncertainty remains stopped.
 
 ## Continue
 
-Expand to the next effect only after operational ownership and evidence retention are routine.
+Define operational reconciliation and escalation for every gateway before enabling production effects.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cutover/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.resume/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# OAuth and OIDC
-
-Keep OAuth or OIDC authentication while adding effect-specific machine authority.
-
-## Ownership boundary
+# Verify
 
-The identity provider and OAuth resource server continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-Validated issuer, subject, audience, and freshness evidence becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
-
-## State
-
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Plan adoption
-
-Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
+Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.
 
 ## Outcome
 
-A written adoption slice identifies the caller, authority issuer, trust inputs, state owner, signer, gateway, provider credential, and receipt consumer.
+A caller obtains a deterministic, inert result for exact artifact bytes and explicit trusted context.
 
 ## Before you begin
 
-Bring the current request shape, identity evidence, policy decision, approval flow, credential location, retry behavior, and audit record for one operation.
+Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
 
 ## Build the bounded path
 
-Map each existing responsibility to Identity, Authority, Runtime, or the adjacent system; then run the closest quickstart and record deliberate differences.
+Parse the artifact, supply trust, time, status, request, and profile context as required, run native verification, and project only the authorized inspection view.
 
 ## Run the qualified path
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
 
 ## Success means
 
-Every responsibility has one owner and the first cutover does not require replacing unrelated systems.
+The same bytes and context produce the same normalized result across Rust, TypeScript, and Python without contacting a provider.
 
 ## Fail closed
 
-Stop if provider credentials would enter an Auths artifact or if application code would reimplement attenuation or verification semantics.
+Mutation, wrong trust, stale status, request mismatch, invalid chain, unauthorized disclosure, or unknown semantics fails without constructing executable authority.
 
 ## Continue
 
-Choose the relevant composition page and enter shadow mode.
+Use Receipts to understand integrity and Disclosure to control what verified evidence reveals.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.verify/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Policy engines
+# Developers
 
-Use a Cedar, OPA, or relationship decision as explicit context without duplicating the policy engine.
+Find SDKs, Runtime APIs, tested examples, integrations, versioning, and extension contracts.
 
-## Ownership boundary
+## Recommended: [Integrations](/developers/integrations)
 
-The policy engine and its data model continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
+Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
 
-## Data flow
+## Integrate and extend
 
-The decision and policy snapshot committed into trusted context becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
+- [Integrations](/developers/integrations) — Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
 
-## Secrets
+## SDKs
 
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
+- [Choose an Auths SDK](/developers/sdks) — Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
 
-## State
+## Runtime and CLI
 
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
+- [Use the Runtime API](/developers/runtime-api) — Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.
+- [Auths CLI](/developers/cli) — Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.
 
-## Failure ownership
+## Test and debug
 
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
+- [Test Auths outcomes](/developers/testing) — Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.
+- [Outcomes and errors](/developers/errors) — Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+## Releases
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+- [Versions and compatibility](/developers/versioning) — Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
 
-## Limitations
+## Related topics
 
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
+- [APIs & SDKs](/reference) — Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers/1 · Product contract: auths.page.developers/1_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Shadow mode
+# Auths CLI
 
-Compare Auths decisions with live traffic without authorizing provider effects.
+Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.
 
-## Outcome
+## The CLI is an interface, not ambient permission
 
-The team can measure agreement, denial reasons, missing context, and potential blast-radius reduction before cutover.
+CLI commands parse explicit inputs and use the same native semantic owners as the SDKs. A successful command invocation does not bypass trust, authority, state, or gateway checks.
 
-## Before you begin
+## Verification remains effect-free
 
-Mirror only bounded request inputs and remove secrets. Keep the current production enforcement path authoritative.
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.verify/1`.
 
-## Build the bounded path
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.cli/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-Create and verify Auths decisions without passing effect-capable handles to the gateway; record normalized outcomes alongside the current decision.
 
-## Run the qualified path
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+---
 
-## Success means
+# Outcomes and errors
 
-Expected requests agree and adversarial mutations are denied with stable reasons.
+Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.
 
-## Fail closed
+## Closed outcomes preserve what is known
 
-Any ambiguity, sensitive-data leakage, or disagreement blocks cutover until ownership and mappings are corrected.
+Denied means the request must change. Indeterminate means a required decision input was unavailable. Recoverable means resume the same opaque reference. Provider-unknown means reconcile before retrying.
 
-## Continue
+## Never flatten uncertainty into an exception retry
 
-Cut over exactly one effect once the observation window and failure criteria are satisfied.
+Blind retry can repeat a real-world effect. Keep outcome class, correlation evidence, and the permitted next action together.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.errors/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Signed requests
-
-Bind an existing signed request to narrower authority and execution state.
-
-## Ownership boundary
+# Integrations
 
-The request-signature layer continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
+Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
 
-## Data flow
+## Recommended: [Identity and trust integrations](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust)
 
-The exact signed application bytes becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
+Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
 
-## Secrets
+## Integrate and extend
 
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
+- [Identity and trust integrations](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust) — Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
+- [Policy engine integrations](/developers/integrations/policy) — Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.
+- [Cloud IAM integrations](/developers/integrations/cloud-iam) — Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.
+- [Transport integrations](/developers/integrations/transport) — Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.
+- [Capability integrations](/developers/integrations/capabilities) — Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.
+- [Build an application profile](/developers/integrations/profile-kit) — Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.
 
-## State
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.composition/1 · Product contract: auths.page.integrations.composition/1_
 
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
 
-## Failure ownership
 
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
+---
 
-## Run the qualified path
+# Capability integrations
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.
 
-## Limitations
+## Preserve the source capability's legitimate role
 
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
+An import profile states which external claims map into Auths authority and which require external state. It must reject any mapping that silently invents stronger bounds or execution guarantees.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Choose your path
-
-Select the shortest journey for the effect, actor, and operating boundary you have.
-
-## Outcome
-
-You will leave with one recommended quickstart, not a tour of every Auths feature.
-
-## Before you begin
+# Cloud IAM integrations
 
-Name the effect, who proposes it, where credentials live, whether approval is required, and whether execution is local or remote.
+Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.
 
-## Build the bounded path
+## Cloud IAM remains the provider boundary
 
-Use Local REST effect for an in-process boundary; Runtime effect for durable remote execution; Agent delegation for a narrower handoff; Approved plan for exact multi-step review; Offline verification for inert evidence; Recovery for ambiguous outcomes; Identity swap for cryptographic or identity agility.
+Cloud IAM supplies workload identity and restricted provider credentials. Auths supplies exact effect authority, durable use accounting, closed outcomes, and portable receipts. Credentials never enter the agent or proof.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.cloud/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
-## Success means
 
-The selected path demonstrates the same success and denial shapes your application must handle.
+---
 
-## Fail closed
+# Identity and trust integrations
 
-If you cannot describe the effect or provider boundary precisely, do not issue broad authority. Narrow the integration target first.
+Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
 
-## Continue
+## Your trust policy owns who is accepted
 
-Open the chosen quickstart and run it unchanged before adapting it.
+Auths supplies bounded evidence parsing and suite-labelled verification. Your application supplies accepted roots and resolver policy. The identity system supplies authentication evidence; none of these alone grants an effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.choose/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Evaluate Auths
-
-Evaluate Auths with deterministic positive and adversarial fixtures before choosing a deployment.
-
-## Outcome
-
-Your evaluation records which Auths boundaries solve a real problem and which adjacent systems remain responsible.
-
-## Before you begin
+# Policy engine integrations
 
-Select one sensitive effect and define the current identity, policy, approval, credential, retry, and audit behavior around it.
+Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.
 
-## Build the bounded path
+## Policy supplies context; Auths binds the exact effect
 
-Run the matching quickstart, mutate its action and bytes, replay it, expire it, remove trust, and compare each stable outcome with your present system.
+The policy engine evaluates application relationships and attributes. Auths commits the resulting bounded decision context to the action and preserves execution state and receipts.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.policy/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
-## Success means
 
-The evaluation demonstrates a useful reduction in ambient authority or ambiguity without requiring wholesale identity or policy replacement.
+---
 
-## Fail closed
+# Build an application profile
 
-Reject the design if Auths merely duplicates an existing control without improving exact commitment, attenuation, recovery, or portable evidence.
+Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.
 
-## Continue
+## A profile defines domain meaning
 
-If the boundary is useful, plan a shadow-mode integration around that single effect.
+Define bounded canonical actions, resource matching, attenuation, and inspection projections. Keep identity, transport, state, custody, approval providers, and execution adapters outside the profile.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.evaluate/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Outcome paths
-
-Choose an outcome path before learning the complete Auths model.
-
-## Recommended: [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application)
+# Transport integrations
 
-Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
+Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.
 
-## Outcome paths
+## Delivery is never authority
 
-- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
-- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
-- [Deploy the runtime](/get-started/paths/runtime) — Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.
-- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
-- [Cross-company authority](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
+Transport authenticates or delivers peers and bytes according to its own contract. Auths verifies those bounded bytes under explicit trust and authority. Iroh can be used without capabilities; Auths can be used without Iroh.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.get-started.paths/1 · Product contract: auths.page.get-started.paths/1_
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.transport/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Delegate to an agent
+# Use the Runtime API
 
-Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
+Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.
 
-## Outcome
+## Use a runtime when effects cross a trust boundary
 
-The agent receives delegable proof for one permitted operation and cannot widen it.
+The runtime is appropriate when signing keys, replay state, receipts, or provider credentials must stay outside the caller process. It does not replace your application API or identity provider.
 
-## Before you begin
+## Runtime entry points
 
-Identify the tool effect and place its real provider credential behind a trusted executor.
+Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.executions/1`.
 
-## Build the bounded path
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-Create authority at the application boundary, delegate a narrower child to the agent, then send a sealed command to the executor.
 
-## Run the qualified path
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+---
 
-## Success means
+# Choose an Auths SDK
 
-The delegated action succeeds and returns evidence that can be verified independently of the agent's narrative.
+Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
 
-## Fail closed
+## Choose for your application, not for semantics
 
-Widening the action, resource, time, use count, budget, audience, or delegation depth fails closed.
+TypeScript and Python expose the same product workflow. Rust owns the protocol meaning and also exposes lower-level components for native applications.
 
-## Continue
+Start with the product facade. Descend into profile, verification, inspection, and runtime surfaces only when the application needs that control.
 
-Add approved plans if a human or second organization must review exact work before execution.
+## One lifecycle in every language
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.agent/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Protect an application effect
+# Test Auths outcomes
 
-Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
+Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.
 
-## Outcome
+## Test the boundary, not only the happy path
 
-A caller can perform one exact application effect and receives a decision and execution receipt.
+Keep fixtures for byte mutation, widening, expiry, revocation, replay, approval substitution, provider uncertainty, resume, and receipt disclosure. Assert that a denied path never reaches the provider.
 
-## Before you begin
+## Prove safe recovery
 
-Isolate the effect behind one function and keep its service credential outside untrusted caller code.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
 
-## Build the bounded path
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.testing/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-Create authority for the exact action and resource, execute it through the SDK boundary, and verify the returned receipt before reporting success.
 
-## Run the qualified path
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+---
 
-## Success means
+# Versions and compatibility
 
-The permitted request succeeds once and its receipt binds the authority, command, context, and outcome.
+Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
 
-## Fail closed
+## Prelaunch means one clean surface
 
-A changed resource, replayed authority, or mutated command is denied before the protected function runs.
+Auths does not carry deprecated entry points, migration shims, or compatibility aliases before launch. Breaking changes replace the preview contract and are reported explicitly.
 
-## Continue
+## Semantic changes receive new identities
 
-Add durable runtime state when the effect must survive process or host failure.
+A release bundle binds documentation to exact operations, scenarios, endpoints, and evidence. Contract drift either regenerates the affected page or fails qualification.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.local/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.versioning/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Cross-company authority
-
-Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
-
-## Outcome
-
-One company can delegate a precise repair to another company's agent while both retain their own identity, approval, and infrastructure boundaries.
-
-## Before you begin
+# Get started
 
-Name each organization's trust evidence, the exact operation and resource, the approval threshold, the execution region, and the provider gateway that owns credentials.
+Choose one concrete outcome and reach a verified, fail-closed result.
 
-## Build the bounded path
+## Recommended: [Prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites)
 
-Exchange public identity evidence, create and narrow authority, bind both approvals to the identical ordered plan, execute through the resource owner's gateway, then return bounded receipts.
+Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+## Choose a path
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
+- [Prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites) — Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
+- [Choose your path](/get-started/choose) — Select the shortest journey for the effect, actor, and operating boundary you have.
+- [Outcome paths](/get-started/paths) — Choose an outcome path before learning the complete Auths model.
 
-## Success means
+## Quickstarts
 
-Only the approved bytes execute, each plan member is consumed once and in order, and authorized readers can inspect a bounded summary.
+- [Quickstarts](/get-started/quickstarts) — Compare seven installed-artifact projects by boundary, state, custody, success, and failure.
 
-## Fail closed
+## Next steps
 
-Identity authentication, transport delivery, approval alone, changed plan bytes, wider delegation, replay, or provider uncertainty cannot silently become success.
+- [Evaluate Auths](/get-started/evaluate) — Evaluate Auths with deterministic positive and adversarial fixtures before choosing a deployment.
 
-## Continue
+## Adopt incrementally
 
-Use Identity & trust for federation, Authority for plans, and Operations for provider-unknown reconciliation and evidence retention.
+- [Adopt incrementally](/get-started/adoption) — Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.cross-company/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start/1_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Deploy the runtime
-
-Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.
-
-## Outcome
-
-An HTTPS caller can submit one bounded effect while credentials and durable state remain server-side.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Provide TLS, explicit trust configuration, durable state, signer custody, and a closed gateway for the provider effect.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Check health and version, create authority, submit the command, inspect the terminal outcome, and retain its receipt.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
+# Adopt incrementally
 
-The runtime commits replay and budget state before the effect, and returns a stable outcome after execution.
+Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.
 
-## Fail closed
+## Recommended: [Plan adoption](/get-started/adoption/plan)
 
-Untrusted HTTP, contract mismatch, missing custody, or unavailable durable state stops execution rather than falling back to an unsafe path.
+Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
 
-## Continue
+## Adopt incrementally
 
-Continue to Production operations for topology, observability, recovery, and incident procedures.
+- [Plan adoption](/get-started/adoption/plan) — Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
+- [Signed requests](/get-started/adoption/signed-requests) — Bind an existing signed request to narrower authority and execution state.
+- [OAuth and OIDC](/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc) — Keep OAuth or OIDC authentication while adding effect-specific machine authority.
+- [API keys](/get-started/adoption/api-keys) — Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.
+- [Cloud IAM](/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam) — Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.
+- [Policy engines](/get-started/adoption/policy-engines) — Use a Cedar, OPA, or relationship decision as explicit context without duplicating the policy engine.
+- [Capability systems](/get-started/adoption/capabilities) — Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.
+- [Approval systems](/get-started/adoption/approvals) — Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.
+- [Shadow mode](/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode) — Compare Auths decisions with live traffic without authorizing provider effects.
+- [Cut over one effect](/get-started/adoption/cutover) — Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.runtime/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.adopt/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start.adopt/1_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Verify without executing
+# API keys
 
-Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
+Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.
 
-## Outcome
+## Ownership boundary
 
-A verifier obtains a deterministic decision from bounded bytes, trust inputs, and verification time.
+The provider and its API-key lifecycle continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
 
-## Before you begin
+## Data flow
 
-Obtain the exact evidence bytes and explicit trust context. Verification never infers trust from transport success.
+The application operation mapped to a gateway-held API call becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
 
-## Build the bounded path
+## Secrets
 
-Parse the bounded artifact through the SDK, provide trusted context, verify locally, and inspect only the disclosure view authorized for the caller.
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+## State
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
 
-## Success means
+## Failure ownership
 
-Rust, TypeScript, and Python return the same verification outcome for the same bytes and context.
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
 
-## Fail closed
+## Run the qualified path
 
-Mutation, unknown suite, mismatched verification method, wrong root, stale evidence, or unauthorized disclosure remains inert and fails closed.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
 
-## Continue
+## Limitations
 
-Use Authority receipts for integrity semantics and Assurance for the exact evidence behind public claims.
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.verify/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Prerequisites
+# Approval systems
 
-Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
+Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.
 
-## Outcome
+## Ownership boundary
 
-You will have one maintained SDK, a supported runtime for that SDK, and an application effect that can be isolated behind a function or service boundary.
+The approval system and approver authentication continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
 
-## Before you begin
+## Data flow
 
-Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python. A local quickstart needs no hosted Auths runtime; production execution additionally needs an HTTPS runtime endpoint and its explicit trust configuration.
+The approval response committed to the exact ordered plan request becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
 
-## Build the bounded path
+## Secrets
 
-Install one SDK, identify the exact effect to protect, and keep provider credentials outside the caller. Use the tested local scenario to confirm the toolchain before adding identity providers, approvals, or remote transport.
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+## State
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
 
-## Success means
+## Failure ownership
 
-The installed consumer can create, execute, and verify the qualified local fixture, including its stable denial path.
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
 
-## Fail closed
+## Run the qualified path
 
-Stop if the SDK version, fixture release, or runtime contract does not match. Do not compensate by reconstructing Auths semantics in application code.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
 
-## Continue
+## Limitations
 
-Choose the shortest outcome path for your system, then move to production operations only when the local boundary is clear.
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.prerequisites/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.approvals/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Quickstarts
+# Capability systems
 
-Compare seven installed-artifact projects by boundary, state, custody, success, and failure.
+Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.
 
-## Recommended: [Local REST effect](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect)
+## Ownership boundary
 
-Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.
+The capability protocol continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
 
-## Quickstarts
+## Data flow
 
-- [Local REST effect](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect) — Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.
-- [Runtime effect](/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect) — Execute one bounded effect through the production HTTPS runtime and durable state boundary.
-- [Agent delegation](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation) — Delegate one narrower tool action and prove that a broader action is denied.
-- [Approved plan](/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan) — Bind approval to the exact bytes and order of a multi-step plan.
-- [Offline verification](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Verify portable evidence without executing an effect or contacting a provider.
-- [Recovery](/get-started/quickstarts/recovery) — Resume or reconcile an interrupted execution without blindly repeating the provider effect.
-- [Identity swap](/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap) — Exchange and verify identity material while keeping the authority workflow unchanged.
+The imported capability and its verified attenuation result becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1 · Product contract: auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1_
+## Secrets
 
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
 
+## State
 
----
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
 
-# Agent delegation
+## Failure ownership
 
-Delegate one narrower tool action and prove that a broader action is denied.
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
 
-## Run success and fail-closed paths
+## Run the qualified path
 
 Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
+## Limitations
 
----
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-# Approved plan
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
-Bind approval to the exact bytes and order of a multi-step plan.
 
-## Run success and fail-closed paths
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
+---
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+# Cloud IAM
 
+Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.
 
+## Ownership boundary
 
----
+Cloud IAM continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
 
-# Identity swap
+## Data flow
 
-Exchange and verify identity material while keeping the authority workflow unchanged.
+The authorized Auths command mapped to a least-privilege provider session becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
 
-## Run success and fail-closed paths
+## Secrets
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## State
 
+The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
 
+## Failure ownership
 
----
+A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
 
-# Local REST effect
+## Run the qualified path
 
-Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
 
-## Run success and fail-closed paths
+## Limitations
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Offline verification
-
-Verify portable evidence without executing an effect or contacting a provider.
+# Cut over one effect
 
-## Run success and fail-closed paths
+Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
+## Outcome
 
-_Page identity:
\ No newline at end of file
+Callers can no longer reach the provider effect without verified authority and durab
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/llms.txt b/public/llms.txt
index c037bdb..8753726 100644
--- a/public/llms.txt
+++ b/public/llms.txt
@@ -12,12 +12,26 @@
 - [Delegate one tool](/agents/quickstart.md) — Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.
 - [Agent skills and plugins](/agents/skills-and-plugins.md) — Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.
 - [Assurance](/assurance.md) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
-- [Authority](/authority.md) — Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.
-- [Trust boundaries](/authority/execute.md) — Authorization before provider entry.
-- [Authority lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle.md) — Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.
-- [Auths in fifteen minutes](/authority/model.md) — Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.
-- [Approval-bound plans](/authority/plans/approvals.md) — Bind threshold or ordered approval to the exact operations, bytes, and order under review.
-- [Receipts and disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure.md) — Verify outcome evidence while revealing only what the viewer is authorized to inspect.
+- [Authority](/authority.md) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
+- [Constraints](/authority/constraints.md) — Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.
+- [Create](/authority/create.md) — Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.
+- [Delegate](/authority/delegate.md) — Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.
+- [Depth and chain](/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md) — Reason about delegation depth and the complete signed chain.
+- [Widening failures](/authority/delegate/widening-failures.md) — Exercise every way a child might attempt to gain power its parent did not pass down.
+- [Execute](/authority/execute.md) — Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
+- [Lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle.md) — Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.
+- [Budgets](/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md) — Reserve and consume numeric or profile-defined budgets with the same atomic boundary as uses.
+- [Revocation and status](/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md) — Apply issuer-owned status without pretending it is an offline cryptographic fact.
+- [Uses and replay](/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md) — Consume bounded uses atomically and reject exact replay.
+- [Validity and expiry](/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md) — Evaluate not-before and expiry bounds at an explicit observation time.
+- [Authority model](/authority/model.md) — Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
+- [Plans](/authority/plans.md) — Commit multiple ordered operations as one reviewable plan.
+- [Transaction-bound approvals](/authority/plans/approvals.md) — Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.
+- [Profiles](/authority/profiles.md) — Map application actions, resources, inputs, budgets, commands, and receipts without coupling adjacent components.
+- [Receipts](/authority/receipts.md) — Use signed decision and execution receipts as portable integrity evidence.
+- [Bounded disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure.md) — Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.
+- [Resume](/authority/resume.md) — Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.
+- [Verify](/authority/verify.md) — Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.
 - [Developers](/developers.md) — Find SDKs, Runtime APIs, tested examples, integrations, versioning, and extension contracts.
 - [Auths CLI](/developers/cli.md) — Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.
 - [Outcomes and errors](/developers/errors.md) — Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.
diff --git a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
index e5941f6..799bd42 100644
--- a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
+++ b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
@@ -2,9 +2,50 @@
 
 Separate parsing, authorization, durable reservation, provider observation, recovery, and terminal evidence.
 
-## Observe before retry
+## The path at a glance
 
-Once a provider may have accepted an effect, Auths preserves uncertainty and requires reconciliation or resume of the same execution identity.
+1. Parse + verify
+2. Authorize
+3. Reserve durably
+4. Enter closed gateway
+5. Complete or preserve recovery
+
+Text equivalent: The runtime parses and verifies untrusted input, authorizes it, reserves replay and budget state, enters the closed gateway, then records completion or preserves a recoverable execution identity.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- No effect-capable command exists before native authorization and durable reservation.
+- A provider timeout after submission is not silently converted to failure or success.
+- Resume continues the same execution identity; retry creates unsafe ambiguity.
+
+## Closed runtime outcomes
+
+- `completed`
+- `denied`
+- `indeterminate`
+- `not-found`
+- `recoverable`
+
+## Failure branches
+
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| Verification or policy denies | Denied | Do not enter the provider gateway. |
+| State reservation fails | Unavailable | Perform no effect and retry only after state is healthy. |
+| Provider acceptance is unknown | Recoverable or provider-unknown | Observe and reconcile before resuming the same execution. |
+
+## Use this when
+
+You operate a remote effect, durable replay state, provider gateway, or recovery workflow.
+
+## Do not use this when
+
+You are performing effect-free offline verification.
+
+## Continue from here
+
+- [Deploy the runtime](/get-started/paths/runtime) — Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.
+- [Production operations](/operations) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/search-index.json b/public/search-index.json
index 3200206..740066d 100644
--- a/public/search-index.json
+++ b/public/search-index.json
@@ -98,42 +98,140 @@
       "id": "auths.page.authority/1",
       "path": "/authority",
       "title": "Authority",
-      "description": "Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.",
+      "description": "Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.constraints/1",
+      "path": "/authority/constraints",
+      "title": "Constraints",
+      "description": "Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.create/1",
+      "path": "/authority/create",
+      "title": "Create",
+      "description": "Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.delegate/1",
+      "path": "/authority/delegate",
+      "title": "Delegate",
+      "description": "Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1",
+      "path": "/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain",
+      "title": "Depth and chain",
+      "description": "Reason about delegation depth and the complete signed chain.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1",
+      "path": "/authority/delegate/widening-failures",
+      "title": "Widening failures",
+      "description": "Exercise every way a child might attempt to gain power its parent did not pass down.",
       "section": "authority"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1",
       "path": "/authority/execute",
-      "title": "Trust boundaries",
-      "description": "Authorization before provider entry.",
+      "title": "Execute",
+      "description": "Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.",
       "section": "authority"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1",
       "path": "/authority/lifecycle",
-      "title": "Authority lifecycle",
-      "description": "Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.",
+      "title": "Lifecycle",
+      "description": "Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1",
+      "path": "/authority/lifecycle/budgets",
+      "title": "Budgets",
+      "description": "Reserve and consume numeric or profile-defined budgets with the same atomic boundary as uses.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1",
+      "path": "/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status",
+      "title": "Revocation and status",
+      "description": "Apply issuer-owned status without pretending it is an offline cryptographic fact.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1",
+      "path": "/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay",
+      "title": "Uses and replay",
+      "description": "Consume bounded uses atomically and reject exact replay.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1",
+      "path": "/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry",
+      "title": "Validity and expiry",
+      "description": "Evaluate not-before and expiry bounds at an explicit observation time.",
       "section": "authority"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.concepts.tour/1",
       "path": "/authority/model",
-      "title": "Auths in fifteen minutes",
-      "description": "Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.",
+      "title": "Authority model",
+      "description": "Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.plans/1",
+      "path": "/authority/plans",
+      "title": "Plans",
+      "description": "Commit multiple ordered operations as one reviewable plan.",
       "section": "authority"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1",
       "path": "/authority/plans/approvals",
-      "title": "Approval-bound plans",
-      "description": "Bind threshold or ordered approval to the exact operations, bytes, and order under review.",
+      "title": "Transaction-bound approvals",
+      "description": "Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.profiles/1",
+      "path": "/authority/profiles",
+      "title": "Profiles",
+      "description": "Map application actions, resources, inputs, budgets, commands, and receipts without coupling adjacent components.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.receipts/1",
+      "path": "/authority/receipts",
+      "title": "Receipts",
+      "description": "Use signed decision and execution receipts as portable integrity evidence.",
       "section": "authority"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1",
       "path": "/authority/receipts/disclosure",
-      "title": "Receipts and disclosure",
-      "description": "Verify outcome evidence while revealing only what the viewer is authorized to inspect.",
+      "title": "Bounded disclosure",
+      "description": "Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.resume/1",
+      "path": "/authority/resume",
+      "title": "Resume",
+      "description": "Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.",
+      "section": "authority"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.verify/1",
+      "path": "/authority/verify",
+      "title": "Verify",
+      "description": "Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.",
       "section": "authority"
     },
     {
diff --git a/public/sitemap.xml b/public/sitemap.xml
index 182d715..bf0b64d 100644
--- a/public/sitemap.xml
+++ b/public/sitemap.xml
@@ -11,11 +11,25 @@
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/skills-and-plugins</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/constraints</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/create</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/delegate</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/delegate/widening-failures</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/execute</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/lifecycle</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/lifecycle/budgets</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/model</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/plans</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/plans/approvals</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/profiles</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/receipts</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/receipts/disclosure</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/resume</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/verify</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/cli</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/errors</loc></url>

From 3d75a4e14e92f6300b268a01ce772ecd3dd9b8bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 23:13:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 23/29] docs: complete agents and MCP journey

---
 app/[...slug]/page.tsx                  |   9 +
 app/lib/content-graph.ts                |   3 +-
 content/agent-pages.ts                  |  66 ++
 public/agents.md                        |  21 +-
 public/agents/approved-plans.md         |  30 +-
 public/agents/delegation.md             |  34 +
 public/agents/how-auths-works.md        |  16 +-
 public/agents/identity.md               |  34 +
 public/agents/mcp.md                    |  17 +
 public/agents/mcp/client.md             |  32 +-
 public/agents/mcp/protect-server.md     |  30 +-
 public/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md      |  34 +
 public/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md |  22 +
 public/agents/multi-agent.md            |  32 +-
 public/agents/production-patterns.md    |  34 +
 public/agents/quickstart.md             |   4 +-
 public/agents/skills-and-plugins.md     |  32 +-
 public/agents/testing.md                |  34 +
 public/llms-full.txt                    | 813 ++++++++++++------------
 public/llms.txt                         |  21 +-
 public/search-index.json                |  71 ++-
 public/sitemap.xml                      |   7 +
 22 files changed, 947 insertions(+), 449 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 content/agent-pages.ts
 create mode 100644 public/agents/delegation.md
 create mode 100644 public/agents/identity.md
 create mode 100644 public/agents/mcp.md
 create mode 100644 public/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md
 create mode 100644 public/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md
 create mode 100644 public/agents/production-patterns.md
 create mode 100644 public/agents/testing.md

diff --git a/app/[...slug]/page.tsx b/app/[...slug]/page.tsx
index a44cbdd..b214b24 100644
--- a/app/[...slug]/page.tsx
+++ b/app/[...slug]/page.tsx
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../components/EditorialGuidePage";
 import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
+import { QuickstartPage } from "../components/QuickstartPage";
+import { TopicShell } from "../components/TopicShell";
 import { contentPageByPath, verifiedPageGraph } from "../lib/content-graph";
+import { quickstartByScenario } from "../lib/quickstarts";
 
 export function generateStaticParams() {
   return verifiedPageGraph.pages
@@ -12,5 +15,11 @@ export default async function Page({ params }: { params: Promise<{ slug: string[
   const { slug } = await params;
   const page = contentPageByPath(`/${slug.join("/")}`);
   if (page.pageType === "landing") return <TopicLandingPage pageId={page.id} />;
+  if (page.pageType === "quickstart") {
+    const scenario = page.uses.scenarios[0];
+    const quickstart = scenario ? quickstartByScenario(scenario) : null;
+    if (!quickstart) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} has no qualified quickstart`);
+    return <TopicShell pageId={page.id}><QuickstartPage quickstart={quickstart} /></TopicShell>;
+  }
   return <EditorialGuidePage pageId={page.id} eyebrow={page.depth === "operate" ? "Operations" : page.depth === "inspect" ? "Reference" : "Guide"} />;
 }
diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
index c626516..219772b 100644
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import rawOperationsPages from "../../content/operations-pages.json" with { type
 import { getStartedPages } from "../../content/get-started-pages.ts";
 import { identityTrustPages } from "../../content/identity-trust-pages.ts";
 import { authorityPages } from "../../content/authority-pages.ts";
+import { agentPages } from "../../content/agent-pages.ts";
 import rawContract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
 import { parseAuthoredPageContent, type AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
 import { assertPageContract } from "../../schemas/page-contract.ts";
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ function replacePages(base: readonly unknown[], replacements: readonly unknown[]
 
 const legacyPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = [...rawPages, ...rawDeveloperPages, ...rawAgentIntegrationPages, ...rawAdoptionPages, ...rawOperationsPages];
 export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze(
-  replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(legacyPageInputs, getStartedPages), identityTrustPages), authorityPages),
+  replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(legacyPageInputs, getStartedPages), identityTrustPages), authorityPages), agentPages),
 );
 export const verifiedPageGraph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(authoredPageInputs, rawContract);
 
diff --git a/content/agent-pages.ts b/content/agent-pages.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..443eabd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/agent-pages.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+import { concept, guide, integration, landing, quickstart } from "./page-builders.ts";
+
+const scenarios = {
+  agent: "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
+  plan: "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1",
+  runtime: "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
+  recovery: "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
+  verify: "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
+} as const;
+
+const agentOperations = { operations: ["auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"] } as const;
+
+const agentGuide = (id: string, description: string, scenario: string, outcome: string, steps: string, failure: string, next: string) => guide({
+  id, description, scenario, outcome,
+  prerequisites: "Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.",
+  steps,
+  success: "The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.",
+  failure,
+  next,
+  dependencies: agentOperations,
+});
+
+const agentIntegration = (id: string, description: string, owner: string, flow: string, limitation: string) => integration({
+  id, description, scenario: scenarios.agent,
+  ownership: `${owner} remains application-owned. Auths owns only the typed authority, native verification, closed execution boundary, and portable evidence composed around it.`,
+  dataFlow: flow,
+  secrets: "Agent prompts, tool arguments, and Auths artifacts contain no ambient provider credential. The closed gateway acquires credentials only after native authorization and durable reservation.",
+  state: "The application owns agent memory and orchestration. Auths runtime state owns uses, budgets, replay, plan progress, recovery, and receipts for protected effects.",
+  failures: "Prompt substitution, tool widening, stale identity, transport success, replay, and provider uncertainty remain separate closed outcomes and cannot be converted into success by agent reasoning.",
+  limitations: limitation,
+  dependencies: agentOperations,
+});
+
+export const agentPages: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([
+  landing("auths.page.agents/1", "Give agents precise tools, approved plans, and verifiable outcomes without ambient credentials.", "An agent may propose work, receive narrower delegated authority, deliver a sealed command, and report a receipt. It cannot mint permission, widen a delegation, treat MCP delivery as authorization, or reach provider credentials directly."),
+  concept({
+    id: "auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1",
+    description: "Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.",
+    model: "The agent proposes an application action. A trusted issuer creates or delegates bounded authority. Optional approvers sign the exact plan. A closed gateway executes only a native-authorized command. Observers and verifiers receive bounded evidence rather than trusting the agent's account.",
+    invariants: "Prompts do not create authority. Every handoff narrows or preserves exact commitments. Identity, MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, approval, and provider authentication each remain independent inputs rather than authorization shortcuts.",
+    failures: "Widening, prompt or plan substitution, ambient credentials, transport-only success, replay, exhausted state, and provider uncertainty fail with distinct outcomes that the agent cannot override.",
+    next: "Run Delegate one tool, then add plans, multiple agents, or MCP only when the workflow calls for them.",
+    dependencies: agentOperations,
+  }),
+  quickstart("auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1", "Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohibited.", scenarios.agent),
+  agentGuide("auths.page.agents.delegation/1", "Delegate an exact tool action without giving the agent a broad credential.", scenarios.agent, "The agent receives a child authority restricted by action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, and depth.", "Create authority at the trusted application boundary, narrow it for the agent's identity and tool call, send the signed child with canonical tool inputs, and execute through the closed gateway.", "Changing the tool, resource, arguments, audience, use count, budget, expiry, depth, or a critical extension is denied before the tool runs.", "Use approved plans when the exact proposed sequence requires review."),
+  agentGuide("auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1", "Require human or organizational approval for the exact ordered work an agent proposes.", scenarios.plan, "Approvers review the same plan commitment that the runtime will consume.", "Parse the agent proposal into profile actions, construct the ordered plan, create the approval signing request, collect typed responses, verify the threshold, then execute members in order.", "Prompt changes, member replacement, reordered work, mutation after approval, reused approval responses, unmet threshold, and expired approval deny the plan.", "Add multi-agent handoffs only by delegating a narrower plan or member scope."),
+  agentGuide("auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1", "Pass work across multiple agents while narrowing authority at every boundary.", scenarios.agent, "Each agent receives only the subset of actions, resources, budgets, uses, and depth needed for its contribution.", "Model every handoff as an explicit delegation, bind the next agent's identity and audience, retain the signed chain, and execute terminal effects through gateways outside all agent processes.", "A skipped parent, widened child, depth reset, identity substitution, hidden tool, or agent-to-agent ambient credential fails verification.", "Use receipts to verify the complete chain and production patterns to assign human ownership."),
+  landing("auths.page.agents.mcp/1", "Use MCP as a tool discovery and delivery layer while Auths remains the authority boundary.", "MCP clients can attach proof to tool calls and protected MCP servers can verify and execute through closed gateways. MCP transport success, server identity, or tool discovery never supplies permission by itself."),
+  agentGuide("auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1", "Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.", scenarios.agent, "The client selects a declared tool profile, canonicalizes its arguments, and submits the call with a narrower proof.", "Discover the tool, parse arguments through its profile, delegate authority to the agent or server audience, attach the sealed Auths command to the MCP request, and preserve the returned receipt.", "A prompt-authored proof, undeclared tool, changed arguments, wrong server audience, transport-only acknowledgement, or replay is rejected.", "Protect the MCP server so provider credentials stay outside the client and model."),
+  agentGuide("auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1", "Protect an MCP server tool with native verification, durable reservation, and a closed provider gateway.", scenarios.runtime, "The server exposes useful tool metadata but reaches the underlying effect only after Auths authorizes the exact call.", "Parse MCP inputs, map them through the tool profile, verify attached authority and trusted context, reserve use and budget state, acquire the native gateway handle, execute, and return the bounded outcome and receipt.", "Valid MCP framing, authenticated transport, a known client, or an approval flag cannot bypass missing authority; provider uncertainty stops fresh execution.", "Define tool profiles and the transport boundary explicitly for every exposed effect."),
+  agentGuide("auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1", "Define canonical action, resource, argument, budget, and receipt mappings for MCP tools.", scenarios.agent, "A tool profile converts bounded MCP arguments into one stable Auths action without embedding transport or provider credentials.", "Version the tool identity, parse bounded arguments, canonicalize the resource and effect bytes, declare critical constraints, and add success plus widening fixtures across all SDKs.", "Unknown tools, unbounded arguments, ambiguous canonicalization, hidden provider parameters, profile version mismatch, and dropped critical constraints fail qualification.", "Keep the profile reusable across MCP transports and agent frameworks."),
+  concept({
+    id: "auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1",
+    description: "Keep MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and local calls independent from authorization.",
+    model: "Transport moves bounded identity, authority, command, and receipt bytes. Auths parses and verifies those bytes after delivery. A transport adapter may authenticate a peer, but that authentication is only an explicit trust input.",
+    invariants: "Successful delivery cannot authorize an effect. Failed delivery cannot consume authority unless the durable execution boundary recorded a reservation. The same artifact verifies regardless of transport.",
+    failures: "Duplicate delivery, reordered messages, partial frames, oversized inputs, authenticated-but-unauthorized peers, and transport acknowledgement without provider outcome remain closed.",
+    next: "Choose transport for reachability and reliability; choose Auths authority and runtime state for permission and exactly-once effect control.",
+    dependencies: agentOperations,
+  }),
+  agentIntegration("auths.page.agents.identity/1", "Compose agent, workload, user, or application identity without choosing a mandatory identity provider.", "The identity provider, workload system, or application resolver", "Resolve bounded identity evidence, verify the agent's signed proposal, then bind delegation to that explicit principal and audience.", "Identity proves who signed bytes; it cannot decide which tool the agent may run."),
+  agentIntegration("auths.page.agents.skills/1", "Package Auths-aware skills and plugins without embedding semantic meaning or secrets in prompts.", "The agent framework, skill registry, and plugin lifecycle", "A versioned skill declares which Auths profile and operation it calls; runtime code parses tool inputs and invokes the SDK outside the language model context.", "A skill is integration convenience, not a new authority source. It cannot replace native verification or gateway isolation."),
+  agentGuide("auths.page.agents.production/1", "Operate agent authority with explicit owners for identity, issuance, approval, state, custody, gateways, and reconciliation.", scenarios.recovery, "Agent failures and provider ambiguity have named operators, durable evidence, and safe resume paths.", "Separate proposal from authorization, use least-privilege service identities, keep signers and credentials out of agent processes, monitor stable outcomes, retain bounded receipts, and exercise recovery before production.", "Missing state, signer outage, trust ambiguity, receipt loss, unexplained denial, or provider-unknown outcome stops automation and escalates to its owner.", "Use Production operations for deployment and incident runbooks."),
+  agentGuide("auths.page.agents.testing/1", "Test agents against widening, substitution, replay, ambient credentials, and uncertain providers.", scenarios.agent, "The harness proves that a model or orchestrator cannot convert untrusted text or successful delivery into authority.", "Run the permitted tool, then mutate prompt intent, tool name, arguments, plan order, identity, audience, use state, receipt bytes, and provider result. Verify normalized outcomes and provider reachability.", "Any prohibited effect, language disagreement, prompt-derived bypass, automatic fresh retry, or missing evidence is a release-blocking failure.", "Keep adversarial fixtures beside each tool profile and run them against packaged SDKs."),
+]);
diff --git a/public/agents.md b/public/agents.md
index 00a76a9..b129646 100644
--- a/public/agents.md
+++ b/public/agents.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Agents
 
-Give an agent narrow, inspectable authority instead of ambient credentials.
+Give agents precise tools, approved plans, and verifiable outcomes without ambient credentials.
 
 ## Recommended: [How Auths works for agents](/agents/how-auths-works)
 
@@ -9,16 +9,27 @@ Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
 ## Start
 
 - [How Auths works for agents](/agents/how-auths-works) — Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
-- [Delegate one tool](/agents/quickstart) — Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.
+- [Delegate one tool](/agents/quickstart) — Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohibited.
 
 ## Delegate
 
-- [Require approval for an agent plan](/agents/approved-plans) — Bind human or organizational approval to exact ordered plan bytes.
-- [Handoff across agents](/agents/multi-agent) — Attenuate authority at every agent boundary.
+- [Agent delegation](/agents/delegation) — Delegate an exact tool action without giving the agent a broad credential.
+- [Approved plans](/agents/approved-plans) — Require human or organizational approval for the exact ordered work an agent proposes.
+- [Multi-agent handoffs](/agents/multi-agent) — Pass work across multiple agents while narrowing authority at every boundary.
+
+## MCP
+
+- [MCP](/agents/mcp) — Use MCP as a tool discovery and delivery layer while Auths remains the authority boundary.
 
 ## Compose
 
-- [Agent skills and plugins](/agents/skills-and-plugins) — Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.
+- [Agent identity](/agents/identity) — Compose agent, workload, user, or application identity without choosing a mandatory identity provider.
+- [Skills and plugins](/agents/skills-and-plugins) — Package Auths-aware skills and plugins without embedding semantic meaning or secrets in prompts.
+
+## Operate and test
+
+- [Production patterns](/agents/production-patterns) — Operate agent authority with explicit owners for identity, issuance, approval, state, custody, gateways, and reconciliation.
+- [Test agent authority](/agents/testing) — Test agents against widening, substitution, replay, ambient credentials, and uncertain providers.
 
 ## Related topics
 
diff --git a/public/agents/approved-plans.md b/public/agents/approved-plans.md
index 094aeb8..6460987 100644
--- a/public/agents/approved-plans.md
+++ b/public/agents/approved-plans.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Require approval for an agent plan
+# Approved plans
 
-Bind human or organizational approval to exact ordered plan bytes.
+Require human or organizational approval for the exact ordered work an agent proposes.
 
-## Approval cannot be reused for a changed plan
+## Outcome
+
+Approvers review the same plan commitment that the runtime will consume.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Parse the agent proposal into profile actions, construct the ordered plan, create the approval signing request, collect typed responses, verify the threshold, then execute members in order.
+
+## Run the qualified path
 
 Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
 
+## Success means
+
+The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Prompt changes, member replacement, reordered work, mutation after approval, reused approval responses, unmet threshold, and expired approval deny the plan.
+
+## Continue
+
+Add multi-agent handoffs only by delegating a narrower plan or member scope.
+
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/delegation.md b/public/agents/delegation.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59cb9b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/agents/delegation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Agent delegation
+
+Delegate an exact tool action without giving the agent a broad credential.
+
+## Outcome
+
+The agent receives a child authority restricted by action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, and depth.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Create authority at the trusted application boundary, narrow it for the agent's identity and tool call, send the signed child with canonical tool inputs, and execute through the closed gateway.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Changing the tool, resource, arguments, audience, use count, budget, expiry, depth, or a critical extension is denied before the tool runs.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use approved plans when the exact proposed sequence requires review.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/agents/how-auths-works.md b/public/agents/how-auths-works.md
index d8b5410..e5b6da5 100644
--- a/public/agents/how-auths-works.md
+++ b/public/agents/how-auths-works.md
@@ -2,11 +2,21 @@
 
 Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
 
-## An agent is a bounded actor, not a trusted process
+## Model
 
-An agent can propose an action and present delegated authority. Native verification decides whether the exact action is allowed; an application-owned closed gateway alone can reach provider credentials.
+The agent proposes an application action. A trusted issuer creates or delegates bounded authority. Optional approvers sign the exact plan. A closed gateway executes only a native-authorized command. Observers and verifiers receive bounded evidence rather than trusting the agent's account.
 
-Identity, transport, authority, approval, state, custody, and the provider adapter remain independent components.
+## What remains true
+
+Prompts do not create authority. Every handoff narrows or preserves exact commitments. Identity, MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, approval, and provider authentication each remain independent inputs rather than authorization shortcuts.
+
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Widening, prompt or plan substitution, ambient credentials, transport-only success, replay, exhausted state, and provider uncertainty fail with distinct outcomes that the agent cannot override.
+
+## Continue
+
+Run Delegate one tool, then add plans, multiple agents, or MCP only when the workflow calls for them.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/identity.md b/public/agents/identity.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d4102c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/agents/identity.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Agent identity
+
+Compose agent, workload, user, or application identity without choosing a mandatory identity provider.
+
+## Ownership boundary
+
+The identity provider, workload system, or application resolver remains application-owned. Auths owns only the typed authority, native verification, closed execution boundary, and portable evidence composed around it.
+
+## Data flow
+
+Resolve bounded identity evidence, verify the agent's signed proposal, then bind delegation to that explicit principal and audience.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Agent prompts, tool arguments, and Auths artifacts contain no ambient provider credential. The closed gateway acquires credentials only after native authorization and durable reservation.
+
+## State
+
+The application owns agent memory and orchestration. Auths runtime state owns uses, budgets, replay, plan progress, recovery, and receipts for protected effects.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+Prompt substitution, tool widening, stale identity, transport success, replay, and provider uncertainty remain separate closed outcomes and cannot be converted into success by agent reasoning.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+Identity proves who signed bytes; it cannot decide which tool the agent may run.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.identity/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/agents/mcp.md b/public/agents/mcp.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15d82ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/agents/mcp.md
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# MCP
+
+Use MCP as a tool discovery and delivery layer while Auths remains the authority boundary.
+
+## Recommended: [MCP client](/agents/mcp/client)
+
+Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.
+
+## MCP
+
+- [MCP client](/agents/mcp/client) — Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.
+- [Protect an MCP server](/agents/mcp/protect-server) — Protect an MCP server tool with native verification, durable reservation, and a closed provider gateway.
+- [Tool profiles](/agents/mcp/tool-profiles) — Define canonical action, resource, argument, budget, and receipt mappings for MCP tools.
+- [Transport boundary](/agents/mcp/transport-boundary) — Keep MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and local calls independent from authorization.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp/1 · Product contract: auths.page.agents.mcp/1_
+
diff --git a/public/agents/mcp/client.md b/public/agents/mcp/client.md
index 0959833..4267c45 100644
--- a/public/agents/mcp/client.md
+++ b/public/agents/mcp/client.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Use Auths from an MCP client
+# MCP client
 
-Let an agent harness propose bounded tool calls without receiving provider credentials.
+Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.
 
-## MCP transports intent, not permission
+## Outcome
 
-The client supplies the requested tool call and proof material. The receiving verifier decides authority independently of whether MCP delivery succeeded.
+The client selects a declared tool profile, canonicalizes its arguments, and submits the call with a narrower proof.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Discover the tool, parse arguments through its profile, delegate authority to the agent or server audience, attach the sealed Auths command to the MCP request, and preserve the returned receipt.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+A prompt-authored proof, undeclared tool, changed arguments, wrong server audience, transport-only acknowledgement, or replay is rejected.
+
+## Continue
+
+Protect the MCP server so provider credentials stay outside the client and model.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/mcp/protect-server.md b/public/agents/mcp/protect-server.md
index eb4021f..bba665f 100644
--- a/public/agents/mcp/protect-server.md
+++ b/public/agents/mcp/protect-server.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
 # Protect an MCP server
 
-Place provider access behind an opaque verified-command boundary.
+Protect an MCP server tool with native verification, durable reservation, and a closed provider gateway.
 
-## Verify before entering the provider
+## Outcome
 
-Parse bounded input, authorize it natively, reserve state durably, then hand only an opaque verified command to the provider adapter. Keep denial and uncertainty outside the effect boundary.
+The server exposes useful tool metadata but reaches the underlying effect only after Auths authorizes the exact call.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Parse MCP inputs, map them through the tool profile, verify attached authority and trusted context, reserve use and budget state, acquire the native gateway handle, execute, and return the bounded outcome and receipt.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Valid MCP framing, authenticated transport, a known client, or an approval flag cannot bypass missing authority; provider uncertainty stops fresh execution.
+
+## Continue
+
+Define tool profiles and the transport boundary explicitly for every exposed effect.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md b/public/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ac531a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Tool profiles
+
+Define canonical action, resource, argument, budget, and receipt mappings for MCP tools.
+
+## Outcome
+
+A tool profile converts bounded MCP arguments into one stable Auths action without embedding transport or provider credentials.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Version the tool identity, parse bounded arguments, canonicalize the resource and effect bytes, declare critical constraints, and add success plus widening fixtures across all SDKs.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Unknown tools, unbounded arguments, ambiguous canonicalization, hidden provider parameters, profile version mismatch, and dropped critical constraints fail qualification.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep the profile reusable across MCP transports and agent frameworks.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md b/public/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..48f6d9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Transport boundary
+
+Keep MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and local calls independent from authorization.
+
+## Model
+
+Transport moves bounded identity, authority, command, and receipt bytes. Auths parses and verifies those bytes after delivery. A transport adapter may authenticate a peer, but that authentication is only an explicit trust input.
+
+## What remains true
+
+Successful delivery cannot authorize an effect. Failed delivery cannot consume authority unless the durable execution boundary recorded a reservation. The same artifact verifies regardless of transport.
+
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Duplicate delivery, reordered messages, partial frames, oversized inputs, authenticated-but-unauthorized peers, and transport acknowledgement without provider outcome remain closed.
+
+## Continue
+
+Choose transport for reachability and reliability; choose Auths authority and runtime state for permission and exactly-once effect control.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/agents/multi-agent.md b/public/agents/multi-agent.md
index 462e570..17eedf5 100644
--- a/public/agents/multi-agent.md
+++ b/public/agents/multi-agent.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Handoff across agents
+# Multi-agent handoffs
 
-Attenuate authority at every agent boundary.
+Pass work across multiple agents while narrowing authority at every boundary.
 
-## Every hop gets narrower
+## Outcome
 
-A coordinating agent may delegate a smaller action set, earlier expiry, lower use count, and shallower remaining depth. A child cannot manufacture omitted critical extensions or widen any parent bound.
+Each agent receives only the subset of actions, resources, budgets, uses, and depth needed for its contribution.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Model every handoff as an explicit delegation, bind the next agent's identity and audience, retain the signed chain, and execute terminal effects through gateways outside all agent processes.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+A skipped parent, widened child, depth reset, identity substitution, hidden tool, or agent-to-agent ambient credential fails verification.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use receipts to verify the complete chain and production patterns to assign human ownership.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/production-patterns.md b/public/agents/production-patterns.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d74db7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/agents/production-patterns.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Production patterns
+
+Operate agent authority with explicit owners for identity, issuance, approval, state, custody, gateways, and reconciliation.
+
+## Outcome
+
+Agent failures and provider ambiguity have named operators, durable evidence, and safe resume paths.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Separate proposal from authorization, use least-privilege service identities, keep signers and credentials out of agent processes, monitor stable outcomes, retain bounded receipts, and exercise recovery before production.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Missing state, signer outage, trust ambiguity, receipt loss, unexplained denial, or provider-unknown outcome stops automation and escalates to its owner.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use Production operations for deployment and incident runbooks.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.production/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/agents/quickstart.md b/public/agents/quickstart.md
index cdf686a..e10b1d2 100644
--- a/public/agents/quickstart.md
+++ b/public/agents/quickstart.md
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 # Delegate one tool
 
-Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.
+Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohibited.
 
-## Narrow authority in practice
+## Run success and fail-closed paths
 
 Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
diff --git a/public/agents/skills-and-plugins.md b/public/agents/skills-and-plugins.md
index 8b301cf..b1512be 100644
--- a/public/agents/skills-and-plugins.md
+++ b/public/agents/skills-and-plugins.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Agent skills and plugins
+# Skills and plugins
 
-Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.
+Package Auths-aware skills and plugins without embedding semantic meaning or secrets in prompts.
 
-## Skills explain and invoke public tools
+## Ownership boundary
 
-A maintained skill may help an agent compose a request, inspect a closed outcome, or locate evidence. It cannot mint native authorization objects, contain secrets, or bypass runtime checks.
+The agent framework, skill registry, and plugin lifecycle remains application-owned. Auths owns only the typed authority, native verification, closed execution boundary, and portable evidence composed around it.
+
+## Data flow
+
+A versioned skill declares which Auths profile and operation it calls; runtime code parses tool inputs and invokes the SDK outside the language model context.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Agent prompts, tool arguments, and Auths artifacts contain no ambient provider credential. The closed gateway acquires credentials only after native authorization and durable reservation.
+
+## State
+
+The application owns agent memory and orchestration. Auths runtime state owns uses, budgets, replay, plan progress, recovery, and receipts for protected effects.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+Prompt substitution, tool widening, stale identity, transport success, replay, and provider uncertainty remain separate closed outcomes and cannot be converted into success by agent reasoning.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+A skill is integration convenience, not a new authority source. It cannot replace native verification or gateway isolation.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents.skills/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/testing.md b/public/agents/testing.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77e4857
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/agents/testing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Test agent authority
+
+Test agents against widening, substitution, replay, ambient credentials, and uncertain providers.
+
+## Outcome
+
+The harness proves that a model or orchestrator cannot convert untrusted text or successful delivery into authority.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Run the permitted tool, then mutate prompt intent, tool name, arguments, plan order, identity, audience, use state, receipt bytes, and provider result. Verify normalized outcomes and provider reachability.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Any prohibited effect, language disagreement, prompt-derived bypass, automatic fresh retry, or missing evidence is a release-blocking failure.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep adversarial fixtures beside each tool profile and run them against packaged SDKs.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.testing/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/llms-full.txt b/public/llms-full.txt
index aae6451..92f0708 100644
--- a/public/llms-full.txt
+++ b/public/llms-full.txt
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Agents
 
-Give an agent narrow, inspectable authority instead of ambient credentials.
+Give agents precise tools, approved plans, and verifiable outcomes without ambient credentials.
 
 ## Recommended: [How Auths works for agents](/agents/how-auths-works)
 
@@ -9,16 +9,27 @@ Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
 ## Start
 
 - [How Auths works for agents](/agents/how-auths-works) — Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
-- [Delegate one tool](/agents/quickstart) — Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.
+- [Delegate one tool](/agents/quickstart) — Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohibited.
 
 ## Delegate
 
-- [Require approval for an agent plan](/agents/approved-plans) — Bind human or organizational approval to exact ordered plan bytes.
-- [Handoff across agents](/agents/multi-agent) — Attenuate authority at every agent boundary.
+- [Agent delegation](/agents/delegation) — Delegate an exact tool action without giving the agent a broad credential.
+- [Approved plans](/agents/approved-plans) — Require human or organizational approval for the exact ordered work an agent proposes.
+- [Multi-agent handoffs](/agents/multi-agent) — Pass work across multiple agents while narrowing authority at every boundary.
+
+## MCP
+
+- [MCP](/agents/mcp) — Use MCP as a tool discovery and delivery layer while Auths remains the authority boundary.
 
 ## Compose
 
-- [Agent skills and plugins](/agents/skills-and-plugins) — Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.
+- [Agent identity](/agents/identity) — Compose agent, workload, user, or application identity without choosing a mandatory identity provider.
+- [Skills and plugins](/agents/skills-and-plugins) — Package Auths-aware skills and plugins without embedding semantic meaning or secrets in prompts.
+
+## Operate and test
+
+- [Production patterns](/agents/production-patterns) — Operate agent authority with explicit owners for identity, issuance, approval, state, custody, gateways, and reconciliation.
+- [Test agent authority](/agents/testing) — Test agents against widening, substitution, replay, ambient credentials, and uncertain providers.
 
 ## Related topics
 
@@ -31,29 +42,101 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.agents/1 · Product contract: auths.page.agents/1_
 
 ---
 
-# Require approval for an agent plan
+# Approved plans
+
+Require human or organizational approval for the exact ordered work an agent proposes.
+
+## Outcome
+
+Approvers review the same plan commitment that the runtime will consume.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
 
-Bind human or organizational approval to exact ordered plan bytes.
+## Build the bounded path
 
-## Approval cannot be reused for a changed plan
+Parse the agent proposal into profile actions, construct the ordered plan, create the approval signing request, collect typed responses, verify the threshold, then execute members in order.
+
+## Run the qualified path
 
 Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
 
+## Success means
+
+The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Prompt changes, member replacement, reordered work, mutation after approval, reused approval responses, unmet threshold, and expired approval deny the plan.
+
+## Continue
+
+Add multi-agent handoffs only by delegating a narrower plan or member scope.
+
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
+---
+
+# Agent delegation
+
+Delegate an exact tool action without giving the agent a broad credential.
+
+## Outcome
+
+The agent receives a child authority restricted by action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, and depth.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Create authority at the trusted application boundary, narrow it for the agent's identity and tool call, send the signed child with canonical tool inputs, and execute through the closed gateway.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Changing the tool, resource, arguments, audience, use count, budget, expiry, depth, or a critical extension is denied before the tool runs.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use approved plans when the exact proposed sequence requires review.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
 ---
 
 # How Auths works for agents
 
 Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
 
-## An agent is a bounded actor, not a trusted process
+## Model
+
+The agent proposes an application action. A trusted issuer creates or delegates bounded authority. Optional approvers sign the exact plan. A closed gateway executes only a native-authorized command. Observers and verifiers receive bounded evidence rather than trusting the agent's account.
 
-An agent can propose an action and present delegated authority. Native verification decides whether the exact action is allowed; an application-owned closed gateway alone can reach provider credentials.
+## What remains true
+
+Prompts do not create authority. Every handoff narrows or preserves exact commitments. Identity, MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, approval, and provider authentication each remain independent inputs rather than authorization shortcuts.
 
-Identity, transport, authority, approval, state, custody, and the provider adapter remain independent components.
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Widening, prompt or plan substitution, ambient credentials, transport-only success, replay, exhausted state, and provider uncertainty fail with distinct outcomes that the agent cannot override.
+
+## Continue
+
+Run Delegate one tool, then add plans, multiple agents, or MCP only when the workflow calls for them.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
@@ -61,13 +144,96 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d443912
 
 ---
 
-# Use Auths from an MCP client
+# Agent identity
+
+Compose agent, workload, user, or application identity without choosing a mandatory identity provider.
+
+## Ownership boundary
+
+The identity provider, workload system, or application resolver remains application-owned. Auths owns only the typed authority, native verification, closed execution boundary, and portable evidence composed around it.
 
-Let an agent harness propose bounded tool calls without receiving provider credentials.
+## Data flow
 
-## MCP transports intent, not permission
+Resolve bounded identity evidence, verify the agent's signed proposal, then bind delegation to that explicit principal and audience.
+
+## Secrets
 
-The client supplies the requested tool call and proof material. The receiving verifier decides authority independently of whether MCP delivery succeeded.
+Agent prompts, tool arguments, and Auths artifacts contain no ambient provider credential. The closed gateway acquires credentials only after native authorization and durable reservation.
+
+## State
+
+The application owns agent memory and orchestration. Auths runtime state owns uses, budgets, replay, plan progress, recovery, and receipts for protected effects.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+Prompt substitution, tool widening, stale identity, transport success, replay, and provider uncertainty remain separate closed outcomes and cannot be converted into success by agent reasoning.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+Identity proves who signed bytes; it cannot decide which tool the agent may run.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.identity/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# MCP
+
+Use MCP as a tool discovery and delivery layer while Auths remains the authority boundary.
+
+## Recommended: [MCP client](/agents/mcp/client)
+
+Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.
+
+## MCP
+
+- [MCP client](/agents/mcp/client) — Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.
+- [Protect an MCP server](/agents/mcp/protect-server) — Protect an MCP server tool with native verification, durable reservation, and a closed provider gateway.
+- [Tool profiles](/agents/mcp/tool-profiles) — Define canonical action, resource, argument, budget, and receipt mappings for MCP tools.
+- [Transport boundary](/agents/mcp/transport-boundary) — Keep MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and local calls independent from authorization.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp/1 · Product contract: auths.page.agents.mcp/1_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# MCP client
+
+Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.
+
+## Outcome
+
+The client selects a declared tool profile, canonicalizes its arguments, and submits the call with a narrower proof.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Discover the tool, parse arguments through its profile, delegate authority to the agent or server audience, attach the sealed Auths command to the MCP request, and preserve the returned receipt.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+A prompt-authored proof, undeclared tool, changed arguments, wrong server audience, transport-only acknowledgement, or replay is rejected.
+
+## Continue
+
+Protect the MCP server so provider credentials stay outside the client and model.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
@@ -77,11 +243,35 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d44391299
 
 # Protect an MCP server
 
-Place provider access behind an opaque verified-command boundary.
+Protect an MCP server tool with native verification, durable reservation, and a closed provider gateway.
 
-## Verify before entering the provider
+## Outcome
 
-Parse bounded input, authorize it natively, reserve state durably, then hand only an opaque verified command to the provider adapter. Keep denial and uncertainty outside the effect boundary.
+The server exposes useful tool metadata but reaches the underlying effect only after Auths authorizes the exact call.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Parse MCP inputs, map them through the tool profile, verify attached authority and trusted context, reserve use and budget state, acquire the native gateway handle, execute, and return the bounded outcome and receipt.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Valid MCP framing, authenticated transport, a known client, or an approval flag cannot bypass missing authority; provider uncertainty stops fresh execution.
+
+## Continue
+
+Define tool profiles and the transport boundary explicitly for every exposed effect.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
@@ -89,43 +279,231 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d
 
 ---
 
-# Handoff across agents
+# Tool profiles
 
-Attenuate authority at every agent boundary.
+Define canonical action, resource, argument, budget, and receipt mappings for MCP tools.
 
-## Every hop gets narrower
+## Outcome
 
-A coordinating agent may delegate a smaller action set, earlier expiry, lower use count, and shallower remaining depth. A child cannot manufacture omitted critical extensions or widen any parent bound.
+A tool profile converts bounded MCP arguments into one stable Auths action without embedding transport or provider credentials.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Version the tool identity, parse bounded arguments, canonicalize the resource and effect bytes, declare critical constraints, and add success plus widening fixtures across all SDKs.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Unknown tools, unbounded arguments, ambiguous canonicalization, hidden provider parameters, profile version mismatch, and dropped critical constraints fail qualification.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep the profile reusable across MCP transports and agent frameworks.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Transport boundary
+
+Keep MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and local calls independent from authorization.
+
+## Model
+
+Transport moves bounded identity, authority, command, and receipt bytes. Auths parses and verifies those bytes after delivery. A transport adapter may authenticate a peer, but that authentication is only an explicit trust input.
+
+## What remains true
+
+Successful delivery cannot authorize an effect. Failed delivery cannot consume authority unless the durable execution boundary recorded a reservation. The same artifact verifies regardless of transport.
+
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Duplicate delivery, reordered messages, partial frames, oversized inputs, authenticated-but-unauthorized peers, and transport acknowledgement without provider outcome remain closed.
+
+## Continue
+
+Choose transport for reachability and reliability; choose Auths authority and runtime state for permission and exactly-once effect control.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Multi-agent handoffs
+
+Pass work across multiple agents while narrowing authority at every boundary.
+
+## Outcome
+
+Each agent receives only the subset of actions, resources, budgets, uses, and depth needed for its contribution.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Model every handoff as an explicit delegation, bind the next agent's identity and audience, retain the signed chain, and execute terminal effects through gateways outside all agent processes.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+A skipped parent, widened child, depth reset, identity substitution, hidden tool, or agent-to-agent ambient credential fails verification.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use receipts to verify the complete chain and production patterns to assign human ownership.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
+---
+
+# Production patterns
+
+Operate agent authority with explicit owners for identity, issuance, approval, state, custody, gateways, and reconciliation.
+
+## Outcome
+
+Agent failures and provider ambiguity have named operators, durable evidence, and safe resume paths.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Separate proposal from authorization, use least-privilege service identities, keep signers and credentials out of agent processes, monitor stable outcomes, retain bounded receipts, and exercise recovery before production.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Missing state, signer outage, trust ambiguity, receipt loss, unexplained denial, or provider-unknown outcome stops automation and escalates to its owner.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use Production operations for deployment and incident runbooks.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.production/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
 ---
 
 # Delegate one tool
 
-Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.
+Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohibited.
+
+## Run success and fail-closed paths
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Skills and plugins
+
+Package Auths-aware skills and plugins without embedding semantic meaning or secrets in prompts.
+
+## Ownership boundary
+
+The agent framework, skill registry, and plugin lifecycle remains application-owned. Auths owns only the typed authority, native verification, closed execution boundary, and portable evidence composed around it.
+
+## Data flow
+
+A versioned skill declares which Auths profile and operation it calls; runtime code parses tool inputs and invokes the SDK outside the language model context.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Agent prompts, tool arguments, and Auths artifacts contain no ambient provider credential. The closed gateway acquires credentials only after native authorization and durable reservation.
+
+## State
+
+The application owns agent memory and orchestration. Auths runtime state owns uses, budgets, replay, plan progress, recovery, and receipts for protected effects.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+Prompt substitution, tool widening, stale identity, transport success, replay, and provider uncertainty remain separate closed outcomes and cannot be converted into success by agent reasoning.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+A skill is integration convenience, not a new authority source. It cannot replace native verification or gateway isolation.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.skills/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
+
+
+---
+
+# Test agent authority
+
+Test agents against widening, substitution, replay, ambient credentials, and uncertain providers.
+
+## Outcome
+
+The harness proves that a model or orchestrator cannot convert untrusted text or successful delivery into authority.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
 
-## Narrow authority in practice
+## Build the bounded path
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+Run the permitted tool, then mutate prompt intent, tool name, arguments, plan order, identity, audience, use state, receipt bytes, and provider result. Verify normalized outcomes and provider reachability.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Run the qualified path
 
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
+## Success means
 
----
+The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
 
-# Agent skills and plugins
+## Fail closed
 
-Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.
+Any prohibited effect, language disagreement, prompt-derived bypass, automatic fresh retry, or missing evidence is a release-blocking failure.
 
-## Skills explain and invoke public tools
+## Continue
 
-A maintained skill may help an agent compose a request, inspect a closed outcome, or locate evidence. It cannot mint native authorization objects, contain secrets, or bypass runtime checks.
+Keep adversarial fixtures beside each tool profile and run them against packaged SDKs.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.skills/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.testing/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
@@ -931,373 +1309,4 @@ Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profile
 
 ## Preserve the source capability's legitimate role
 
-An import profile states which external claims map into Auths authority and which require external state. It must reject any mapping that silently invents stronger bounds or execution guarantees.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Cloud IAM integrations
-
-Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.
-
-## Cloud IAM remains the provider boundary
-
-Cloud IAM supplies workload identity and restricted provider credentials. Auths supplies exact effect authority, durable use accounting, closed outcomes, and portable receipts. Credentials never enter the agent or proof.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.cloud/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Identity and trust integrations
-
-Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
-
-## Your trust policy owns who is accepted
-
-Auths supplies bounded evidence parsing and suite-labelled verification. Your application supplies accepted roots and resolver policy. The identity system supplies authentication evidence; none of these alone grants an effect.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Policy engine integrations
-
-Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.
-
-## Policy supplies context; Auths binds the exact effect
-
-The policy engine evaluates application relationships and attributes. Auths commits the resulting bounded decision context to the action and preserves execution state and receipts.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.policy/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Build an application profile
-
-Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.
-
-## A profile defines domain meaning
-
-Define bounded canonical actions, resource matching, attenuation, and inspection projections. Keep identity, transport, state, custody, approval providers, and execution adapters outside the profile.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Transport integrations
-
-Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.
-
-## Delivery is never authority
-
-Transport authenticates or delivers peers and bytes according to its own contract. Auths verifies those bounded bytes under explicit trust and authority. Iroh can be used without capabilities; Auths can be used without Iroh.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.transport/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Use the Runtime API
-
-Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.
-
-## Use a runtime when effects cross a trust boundary
-
-The runtime is appropriate when signing keys, replay state, receipts, or provider credentials must stay outside the caller process. It does not replace your application API or identity provider.
-
-## Runtime entry points
-
-Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.executions/1`.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Choose an Auths SDK
-
-Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
-
-## Choose for your application, not for semantics
-
-TypeScript and Python expose the same product workflow. Rust owns the protocol meaning and also exposes lower-level components for native applications.
-
-Start with the product facade. Descend into profile, verification, inspection, and runtime surfaces only when the application needs that control.
-
-## One lifecycle in every language
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Test Auths outcomes
-
-Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.
-
-## Test the boundary, not only the happy path
-
-Keep fixtures for byte mutation, widening, expiry, revocation, replay, approval substitution, provider uncertainty, resume, and receipt disclosure. Assert that a denied path never reaches the provider.
-
-## Prove safe recovery
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.testing/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Versions and compatibility
-
-Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
-
-## Prelaunch means one clean surface
-
-Auths does not carry deprecated entry points, migration shims, or compatibility aliases before launch. Breaking changes replace the preview contract and are reported explicitly.
-
-## Semantic changes receive new identities
-
-A release bundle binds documentation to exact operations, scenarios, endpoints, and evidence. Contract drift either regenerates the affected page or fails qualification.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.versioning/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Get started
-
-Choose one concrete outcome and reach a verified, fail-closed result.
-
-## Recommended: [Prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites)
-
-Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
-
-## Choose a path
-
-- [Prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites) — Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
-- [Choose your path](/get-started/choose) — Select the shortest journey for the effect, actor, and operating boundary you have.
-- [Outcome paths](/get-started/paths) — Choose an outcome path before learning the complete Auths model.
-
-## Quickstarts
-
-- [Quickstarts](/get-started/quickstarts) — Compare seven installed-artifact projects by boundary, state, custody, success, and failure.
-
-## Next steps
-
-- [Evaluate Auths](/get-started/evaluate) — Evaluate Auths with deterministic positive and adversarial fixtures before choosing a deployment.
-
-## Adopt incrementally
-
-- [Adopt incrementally](/get-started/adoption) — Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start/1_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Adopt incrementally
-
-Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.
-
-## Recommended: [Plan adoption](/get-started/adoption/plan)
-
-Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
-
-## Adopt incrementally
-
-- [Plan adoption](/get-started/adoption/plan) — Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
-- [Signed requests](/get-started/adoption/signed-requests) — Bind an existing signed request to narrower authority and execution state.
-- [OAuth and OIDC](/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc) — Keep OAuth or OIDC authentication while adding effect-specific machine authority.
-- [API keys](/get-started/adoption/api-keys) — Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.
-- [Cloud IAM](/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam) — Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.
-- [Policy engines](/get-started/adoption/policy-engines) — Use a Cedar, OPA, or relationship decision as explicit context without duplicating the policy engine.
-- [Capability systems](/get-started/adoption/capabilities) — Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.
-- [Approval systems](/get-started/adoption/approvals) — Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.
-- [Shadow mode](/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode) — Compare Auths decisions with live traffic without authorizing provider effects.
-- [Cut over one effect](/get-started/adoption/cutover) — Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.adopt/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start.adopt/1_
-
-
-
----
-
-# API keys
-
-Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The provider and its API-key lifecycle continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-The application operation mapped to a gateway-held API call becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
-
-## State
-
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Approval systems
-
-Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The approval system and approver authentication continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-The approval response committed to the exact ordered plan request becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
-
-## State
-
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.approvals/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Capability systems
-
-Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The capability protocol continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-The imported capability and its verified attenuation result becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
-
-## State
-
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Cloud IAM
-
-Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-Cloud IAM continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-The authorized Auths command mapped to a least-privilege provider session becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
-
-## State
-
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
-
-
-
----
-
-# Cut over one effect
-
-Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.
-
-## Outcome
-
-Callers can no longer reach the provider effect without verified authority and durab
\ No newline at end of file
+An import profile states which external claims map into Auths authority and which r
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/llms.txt b/public/llms.txt
index 8753726..8849f34 100644
--- a/public/llms.txt
+++ b/public/llms.txt
@@ -3,14 +3,21 @@
 > Canonical, release-pinned documentation for people and agents.
 
 - [Auths documentation](/index.md) — Precise, portable authority for people and agents.
-- [Agents](/agents.md) — Give an agent narrow, inspectable authority instead of ambient credentials.
-- [Require approval for an agent plan](/agents/approved-plans.md) — Bind human or organizational approval to exact ordered plan bytes.
+- [Agents](/agents.md) — Give agents precise tools, approved plans, and verifiable outcomes without ambient credentials.
+- [Approved plans](/agents/approved-plans.md) — Require human or organizational approval for the exact ordered work an agent proposes.
+- [Agent delegation](/agents/delegation.md) — Delegate an exact tool action without giving the agent a broad credential.
 - [How Auths works for agents](/agents/how-auths-works.md) — Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
-- [Use Auths from an MCP client](/agents/mcp/client.md) — Let an agent harness propose bounded tool calls without receiving provider credentials.
-- [Protect an MCP server](/agents/mcp/protect-server.md) — Place provider access behind an opaque verified-command boundary.
-- [Handoff across agents](/agents/multi-agent.md) — Attenuate authority at every agent boundary.
-- [Delegate one tool](/agents/quickstart.md) — Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.
-- [Agent skills and plugins](/agents/skills-and-plugins.md) — Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.
+- [Agent identity](/agents/identity.md) — Compose agent, workload, user, or application identity without choosing a mandatory identity provider.
+- [MCP](/agents/mcp.md) — Use MCP as a tool discovery and delivery layer while Auths remains the authority boundary.
+- [MCP client](/agents/mcp/client.md) — Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.
+- [Protect an MCP server](/agents/mcp/protect-server.md) — Protect an MCP server tool with native verification, durable reservation, and a closed provider gateway.
+- [Tool profiles](/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md) — Define canonical action, resource, argument, budget, and receipt mappings for MCP tools.
+- [Transport boundary](/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md) — Keep MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and local calls independent from authorization.
+- [Multi-agent handoffs](/agents/multi-agent.md) — Pass work across multiple agents while narrowing authority at every boundary.
+- [Production patterns](/agents/production-patterns.md) — Operate agent authority with explicit owners for identity, issuance, approval, state, custody, gateways, and reconciliation.
+- [Delegate one tool](/agents/quickstart.md) — Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohibited.
+- [Skills and plugins](/agents/skills-and-plugins.md) — Package Auths-aware skills and plugins without embedding semantic meaning or secrets in prompts.
+- [Test agent authority](/agents/testing.md) — Test agents against widening, substitution, replay, ambient credentials, and uncertain providers.
 - [Assurance](/assurance.md) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
 - [Authority](/authority.md) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
 - [Constraints](/authority/constraints.md) — Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.
diff --git a/public/search-index.json b/public/search-index.json
index 740066d..5bb56ca 100644
--- a/public/search-index.json
+++ b/public/search-index.json
@@ -35,14 +35,21 @@
       "id": "auths.page.agents/1",
       "path": "/agents",
       "title": "Agents",
-      "description": "Give an agent narrow, inspectable authority instead of ambient credentials.",
+      "description": "Give agents precise tools, approved plans, and verifiable outcomes without ambient credentials.",
       "section": "agents"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1",
       "path": "/agents/approved-plans",
-      "title": "Require approval for an agent plan",
-      "description": "Bind human or organizational approval to exact ordered plan bytes.",
+      "title": "Approved plans",
+      "description": "Require human or organizational approval for the exact ordered work an agent proposes.",
+      "section": "agents"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.delegation/1",
+      "path": "/agents/delegation",
+      "title": "Agent delegation",
+      "description": "Delegate an exact tool action without giving the agent a broad credential.",
       "section": "agents"
     },
     {
@@ -52,39 +59,81 @@
       "description": "Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.",
       "section": "agents"
     },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.identity/1",
+      "path": "/agents/identity",
+      "title": "Agent identity",
+      "description": "Compose agent, workload, user, or application identity without choosing a mandatory identity provider.",
+      "section": "agents"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp/1",
+      "path": "/agents/mcp",
+      "title": "MCP",
+      "description": "Use MCP as a tool discovery and delivery layer while Auths remains the authority boundary.",
+      "section": "agents"
+    },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1",
       "path": "/agents/mcp/client",
-      "title": "Use Auths from an MCP client",
-      "description": "Let an agent harness propose bounded tool calls without receiving provider credentials.",
+      "title": "MCP client",
+      "description": "Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.",
       "section": "agents"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1",
       "path": "/agents/mcp/protect-server",
       "title": "Protect an MCP server",
-      "description": "Place provider access behind an opaque verified-command boundary.",
+      "description": "Protect an MCP server tool with native verification, durable reservation, and a closed provider gateway.",
+      "section": "agents"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1",
+      "path": "/agents/mcp/tool-profiles",
+      "title": "Tool profiles",
+      "description": "Define canonical action, resource, argument, budget, and receipt mappings for MCP tools.",
+      "section": "agents"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1",
+      "path": "/agents/mcp/transport-boundary",
+      "title": "Transport boundary",
+      "description": "Keep MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and local calls independent from authorization.",
       "section": "agents"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1",
       "path": "/agents/multi-agent",
-      "title": "Handoff across agents",
-      "description": "Attenuate authority at every agent boundary.",
+      "title": "Multi-agent handoffs",
+      "description": "Pass work across multiple agents while narrowing authority at every boundary.",
+      "section": "agents"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.production/1",
+      "path": "/agents/production-patterns",
+      "title": "Production patterns",
+      "description": "Operate agent authority with explicit owners for identity, issuance, approval, state, custody, gateways, and reconciliation.",
       "section": "agents"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1",
       "path": "/agents/quickstart",
       "title": "Delegate one tool",
-      "description": "Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.",
+      "description": "Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohibited.",
       "section": "agents"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.agents.skills/1",
       "path": "/agents/skills-and-plugins",
-      "title": "Agent skills and plugins",
-      "description": "Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.",
+      "title": "Skills and plugins",
+      "description": "Package Auths-aware skills and plugins without embedding semantic meaning or secrets in prompts.",
+      "section": "agents"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.testing/1",
+      "path": "/agents/testing",
+      "title": "Test agent authority",
+      "description": "Test agents against widening, substitution, replay, ambient credentials, and uncertain providers.",
       "section": "agents"
     },
     {
diff --git a/public/sitemap.xml b/public/sitemap.xml
index bf0b64d..c8641de 100644
--- a/public/sitemap.xml
+++ b/public/sitemap.xml
@@ -3,12 +3,19 @@
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/approved-plans</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/delegation</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/how-auths-works</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/identity</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/mcp</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/mcp/client</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/mcp/protect-server</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/mcp/tool-profiles</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/mcp/transport-boundary</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/multi-agent</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/production-patterns</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/quickstart</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/skills-and-plugins</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/testing</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/constraints</loc></url>

From 6e6458ffd18519f162a23d4bb5e0ac104320ce0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 23:17:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 24/29] docs: complete production operations journey

---
 app/lib/content-graph.ts                      |   3 +-
 content/operations-pages.ts                   |  81 +++++++++++++
 public/agents.md                              |   2 +-
 public/authority.md                           |   2 +-
 public/llms-full.txt                          |  10 +-
 public/llms.txt                               |  36 +++---
 public/operations.md                          |  33 +++---
 public/operations/backup-and-restore.md       |  32 +++++-
 public/operations/configure.md                |  17 +++
 public/operations/configure/custody.md        |  32 +++++-
 public/operations/configure/durable-state.md  |  32 +++++-
 .../operations/configure/provider-gateways.md |  32 +++++-
 .../configure/trust-and-profiles.md           |  32 +++++-
 public/operations/deploy-runtime.md           |  32 +++++-
 public/operations/evaluate-locally.md         |  32 +++++-
 public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md      |   4 +-
 public/operations/incidents.md                |  19 ++-
 .../incidents/compromised-credential.md       |  46 ++++++++
 .../operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md  |  46 ++++++++
 .../incidents/receipt-disclosure.md           |  46 ++++++++
 public/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md  |  46 ++++++++
 public/operations/incidents/state-loss.md     |  46 ++++++++
 .../operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md  |  46 ++++++++
 public/operations/observability.md            |  32 +++++-
 public/operations/receipt-retention.md        |  32 +++++-
 .../operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md |  30 ++++-
 public/operations/security-checklist.md       |  34 ++++++
 public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md     |  32 +++++-
 public/search-index.json                      | 108 +++++++++++++-----
 public/sitemap.xml                            |   8 ++
 30 files changed, 869 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 content/operations-pages.ts
 create mode 100644 public/operations/configure.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/incidents/compromised-credential.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/incidents/state-loss.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md
 create mode 100644 public/operations/security-checklist.md

diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
index 219772b..255017c 100644
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import { getStartedPages } from "../../content/get-started-pages.ts";
 import { identityTrustPages } from "../../content/identity-trust-pages.ts";
 import { authorityPages } from "../../content/authority-pages.ts";
 import { agentPages } from "../../content/agent-pages.ts";
+import { operationsPages } from "../../content/operations-pages.ts";
 import rawContract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
 import { parseAuthoredPageContent, type AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
 import { assertPageContract } from "../../schemas/page-contract.ts";
@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ function replacePages(base: readonly unknown[], replacements: readonly unknown[]
 
 const legacyPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = [...rawPages, ...rawDeveloperPages, ...rawAgentIntegrationPages, ...rawAdoptionPages, ...rawOperationsPages];
 export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze(
-  replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(legacyPageInputs, getStartedPages), identityTrustPages), authorityPages), agentPages),
+  replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(legacyPageInputs, getStartedPages), identityTrustPages), authorityPages), agentPages), operationsPages),
 );
 export const verifiedPageGraph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(authoredPageInputs, rawContract);
 
diff --git a/content/operations-pages.ts b/content/operations-pages.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..226e099
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/operations-pages.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+import { concept, guide, landing, runbook } from "./page-builders.ts";
+
+const scenarios = {
+  local: "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
+  runtime: "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
+  recovery: "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
+  verify: "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
+  identity: "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1",
+} as const;
+
+const runtimeDependencies = {
+  operations: ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"],
+  endpoints: [
+    "auths.endpoint.health/1",
+    "auths.endpoint.version/1",
+    "auths.endpoint.authorities/1",
+    "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
+    "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1",
+    "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1",
+    "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1",
+  ],
+} as const;
+
+const operationsGuide = (id: string, description: string, scenario: string, outcome: string, prerequisites: string, steps: string, success: string, failure: string, next: string) => guide({
+  id, description, scenario, outcome, prerequisites, steps, success, failure, next, depth: "operate", dependencies: runtimeDependencies,
+});
+
+const incident = (
+  id: string,
+  description: string,
+  scenario: string,
+  owner: string,
+  observations: string,
+  stop: string,
+  recovery: string,
+  reconciliation: string,
+) => runbook({
+  id, description, scenario, owner,
+  preconditions: "Declare the incident, preserve the exact runtime release and configuration identity, restrict changes to the incident owner, and capture the first affected execution references before taking recovery action.",
+  commands: "Run the release-qualified scenario shown below against an isolated environment first. In production, use only the same typed health, version, verify, resume, summary, and disclosure operations for the recorded execution references.",
+  observations,
+  stop,
+  recovery,
+  reconciliation,
+  retention: "Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configuration identities, operator actions, relevant provider references, and disclosure decisions according to the incident evidence policy.",
+  escalation: "Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.",
+});
+
+export const operationsPages: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([
+  landing("auths.page.operations.runtime/1", "Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.", "Production operation begins after the semantic decision: the runtime must reserve state, protect signers and provider credentials, expose closed outcomes, preserve receipts, and recover without repeating uncertain effects."),
+  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.evaluate/1", "Run the complete production topology locally before choosing infrastructure.", scenarios.runtime, "A local isolated runtime proves health, version, trust, custody, durable reservation, gateway execution, receipts, and replay denial.", "Use disposable local state and development custody; keep the same ports and closed gateway boundaries intended for production.", "Start dependencies, check health and version, run the runtime-effect fixture, verify its receipt, replay the command, stop and restart the runtime, then resume the recorded execution.", "The effect occurs once, replay is denied, state survives the restart, and the receipt verifies outside the runtime.", "Missing dependencies, contract mismatch, non-HTTPS production configuration, state loss, receipt mismatch, or a second provider effect blocks deployment.", "Choose the deployment topology and replace one development adapter at a time."),
+  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.deploy/1", "Deploy the runtime as a small HTTPS control boundary around durable state and provider gateways.", scenarios.runtime, "A production caller reaches one authenticated HTTPS origin while signers, stores, trust resolvers, and provider credentials remain private dependencies.", "Provision TLS, a supported runtime release, durable transactional state, signer custody, trust and status inputs, a closed provider gateway, monitoring, backups, and an operator recovery path.", "Pin the release and contract digest, apply configuration, prove dependency readiness, execute the installed runtime scenario, verify the receipt from another process, and deny direct provider access from callers.", "Health and readiness are distinct, every dependency is observable, execution succeeds once, and rollback plus resume exercises pass.", "Do not accept traffic when state, custody, trust, gateway, or release identity is unknown. Never expose the gateway credential as a caller fallback.", "Configure each dependency and establish service-level signals."),
+  landing("auths.page.operations.configure/1", "Configure state, custody, trust, profiles, and provider gateways as independent production ports.", "Each port has one owner and one failure boundary. Replacing a database, HSM, identity resolver, application profile, transport, or provider adapter must not change Auths semantics or silently weaken another port."),
+  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.state/1", "Configure multi-host durable state for replay, use, budget, plans, executions, and receipts.", scenarios.recovery, "Concurrent hosts share one atomic record of reservation and terminal outcome.", "Choose a transactional store, TLS and authentication, bounded retention, backups, restore exercises, and a failure policy that stops effects when state is unavailable.", "Provision the schema, enforce uniqueness and compare-and-set transitions, run concurrent final-use and budget tests, interrupt an execution, restart on another host, and resume the same reference.", "Exactly one reservation wins, journal transitions are monotonic, and resume converges without a second effect.", "Split-brain, stale reads, lost commits, unbounded rows, insecure transport, or automatic in-memory fallback blocks readiness.", "Configure custody so receipt and decision signing remains available without exposing keys."),
+  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.custody/1", "Keep authority and receipt signing keys behind a narrow signer port.", scenarios.runtime, "The runtime can request signatures while private key material remains in an HSM, KMS, enclave, or hardened local process.", "Assign key owners, permitted algorithms, stable key descriptors, rotation windows, audit logging, rate limits, backup or recovery policy, and fail-closed outage behavior.", "Register the signer, sign known requests, reject arbitrary or oversized payloads, verify public descriptors, exercise outage and rotation overlap, and confirm private material never appears in logs or artifacts.", "Only typed Auths signing requests are accepted and every signature is attributable to a configured descriptor.", "Raw signing access, key export, silent algorithm fallback, unknown descriptor, audit loss, or signer ambiguity stops issuance and terminal receipt signing.", "Configure explicit trust for the public descriptors and issuers."),
+  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.trust/1", "Configure roots, issuers, resolvers, status, suites, and profiles explicitly.", scenarios.identity, "Every verification decision receives a bounded, versioned trust and profile context rather than ambient process assumptions.", "Inventory trusted roots and issuers, resolver ownership, freshness limits, accepted suites, status behavior, application profiles, and rotation procedures.", "Load the configuration, verify each positive fixture, reject wrong-root and stale evidence, exercise suite swap and profile version mismatch, then record the configuration identity in runtime evidence.", "Supported identities and profiles verify consistently across hosts and every excluded source returns a stable closed outcome.", "Unknown roots, stale bundles, resolver ambiguity, profile drift, or an unsupported suite blocks the affected request; never accept all during an outage.", "Configure gateways only after the action-to-provider mapping is qualified."),
+  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.gateways/1", "Map verified sealed commands to least-privilege provider effects behind closed gateways.", scenarios.runtime, "Provider credentials are acquired only after native authorization and durable reservation.", "Define one bounded gateway operation, provider credential source, idempotency behavior, response classifier, timeout, reconciliation method, and redaction policy.", "Parse the sealed command, map exact fields, acquire a short-lived credential, invoke the provider with the committed idempotency key, classify success, denial, failure, or unknown, then persist the result before returning.", "The provider sees one minimal request and the execution receipt binds its closed outcome without exposing secrets.", "Unmapped fields, credential leakage, non-idempotent retry, ambiguous response, timeout, or provider-unknown state stops fresh execution and enters reconciliation.", "Instrument outcome and latency signals, then write the provider-unknown runbook."),
+  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.observability/1", "Observe runtime health, dependencies, outcomes, latency, recovery, and redaction without leaking authority content.", scenarios.runtime, "Operators can distinguish liveness, readiness, dependency failure, semantic denial, provider failure, provider unknown, and recovery progress.", "Define bounded metrics and structured events for request counts, stable outcomes, phase latency, store conflicts, signer calls, resolver freshness, gateway responses, resume attempts, receipt creation, and redaction failures.", "Emit release and configuration identities, hash or omit sensitive identifiers, sample high-volume success safely, alert on availability and invariant breaches, and link dashboards to exact runbooks.", "A single execution can be followed by opaque reference and phase without exposing commands, credentials, full receipts, or personal identity evidence.", "Stop rollout on missing telemetry, cardinality explosion, raw artifact logging, secret exposure, unexplained provider unknown, replay acceptance, or receipt loss.", "Exercise recovery and incident procedures using the same signals."),
+  concept({
+    id: "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1",
+    description: "Choose retry, resume, reconcile, or stop from the durable execution phase.",
+    model: "Before provider access, retry may be safe only when no reservation or effect exists. After reservation, use the same execution reference. A known terminal result returns its receipt. Provider uncertainty enters reconciliation. Corrupt or unavailable state stops.",
+    invariants: "A caller cannot turn a retry into new authority, and the runtime cannot assume that a timeout means the provider did nothing. Journal transitions are monotonic and every terminal result binds the original command.",
+    failures: "Fresh retries after provider access, missing journals, conflicting terminal outcomes, unknown provider state, and lost idempotency mappings require stop or reconciliation rather than optimistic success.",
+    next: "Implement a gateway-specific status or reconciliation operation and rehearse it in the recovery scenario.",
+    depth: "operate",
+    dependencies: runtimeDependencies,
+  }),
+  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.recovery/1", "Resume and reconcile interrupted execution without blind provider retry.", scenarios.recovery, "An operator can take an opaque execution reference from indeterminate to one evidenced terminal result.", "Require the durable journal, original idempotency mapping, gateway-specific provider lookup, and an operator owner for unreconciled outcomes.", "Inspect the recorded phase, call Resume, query provider status only through the gateway, classify the result, commit the terminal journal transition, and issue or recover the matching receipt.", "Recovery converges on the original effect and a verifiable receipt without consuming fresh authority.", "Unknown reference, missing state, provider ambiguity, mismatched result, or evidence loss remains stopped and escalated; never issue a new command automatically.", "Exercise backup and restore so recovery evidence survives infrastructure loss."),
+  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.backup/1", "Back up and restore runtime state without losing replay, budget, recovery, or receipt integrity.", scenarios.recovery, "A restored environment preserves all committed authority consumption and execution phases.", "Define encrypted backups, retention, restore credentials, recovery-point and recovery-time targets, isolated restore infrastructure, and a procedure that prevents old state from serving concurrent traffic.", "Create active, completed, and provider-unknown fixtures; take a backup; restore to isolation; verify counts and commitments; resume the uncertain execution; and prove replay plus budget exhaustion still deny.", "Restored state produces the same terminal receipts and cannot repeat prior effects.", "Incomplete journals, rolled-back use state, missing receipt bytes, concurrent old and restored writers, or unverifiable backups block promotion.", "Exercise upgrade and rollback against a restored copy before production rollout."),
+  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.upgrade/1", "Upgrade or roll back runtime releases while preserving semantic and state compatibility.", scenarios.runtime, "A rollout changes implementation only after release contracts, stores, profiles, fixtures, and receipts agree.", "Pin source, SDK, contract, schema, profile, and evidence identities; back up state; qualify packaged consumers; stage the new runtime; and define rollback before migration.", "Run health and version checks, differential fixtures, concurrent state tests, a real canary effect, receipt verification, recovery, and rollback rehearsal before expanding traffic.", "Old and new hosts agree where overlap is supported, terminal receipts remain verifiable, and rollback does not reopen consumed authority.", "Semantic drift, schema incompatibility, mixed-version disagreement, receipt change, state loss, or unqualified artifact blocks rollout.", "Retain the exact release and evidence bundle used for every production window."),
+  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.receipts/1", "Retain, disclose, and delete receipt evidence according to integrity and privacy needs.", scenarios.verify, "Receipts remain verifiable for their required lifetime while sensitive detail is opaque by default.", "Classify opaque identifiers, commitments, signer evidence, summary fields, full fields, and provider references; define access, encryption, retention, legal hold, deletion, and key-rotation behavior.", "Store immutable receipt bytes, index only bounded fields, authorize summary or full disclosure natively, verify retained samples, exercise expiry and deletion, and audit every privileged view.", "Authorized readers receive only the intended projection and retained receipts still verify after runtime or key rotation.", "Raw command or provider payload logging, public full views, missing disclosure audit, unverifiable deletion, or loss of required evidence blocks the retention design.", "Add receipt disclosure response to the incident program."),
+  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.security/1", "Apply a production security checklist to every Auths boundary.", scenarios.runtime, "The deployment has explicit owners and fail-closed controls for ingress, trust, state, custody, gateways, evidence, dependencies, and operators.", "Inventory assets and actors, threat-model each port, enforce TLS and least privilege, isolate credentials, bound every parser, patch dependencies, redact telemetry, protect backups, and require reviewed recovery paths.", "Run positive, denial, replay, mutation, outage, compromise, recovery, disclosure, and supply-chain exercises against packaged artifacts.", "Every boundary has a named owner, a qualified positive path, an adversarial path, a monitored failure, and a rehearsed recovery.", "No direct provider path, exported key, ambient trust, permissive fallback, unbounded input, blind retry, unaudited full disclosure, or unknown release is acceptable.", "Schedule outside security review after the operational evidence is reproducible."),
+  landing("auths.page.operations.incidents/1", "Respond to state loss, signer outage, trust-root error, provider uncertainty, receipt disclosure, and credential compromise.", "Every runbook begins by preserving evidence and stopping unsafe automation. Recovery uses typed runtime operations and isolated qualified scenarios; it never asks an operator to reconstruct semantic state or blindly repeat an effect."),
+  incident("auths.page.operations.incidents.state-loss/1", "Contain and recover from missing, rolled-back, corrupted, or split runtime state.", scenarios.recovery, "Runtime incident commander with storage and application owners", "Health or readiness fails, journals are missing or inconsistent, use or budget counters regress, or multiple writers disagree.", "Stop all protected effects and fresh executions. Do not promote a backup or secondary while another writer may still accept traffic.", "Fence writers, restore the newest verified backup to isolation, validate commitments and monotonic state, then resume only recorded execution references.", "Compare retained receipts, provider idempotency records, and restored journals; escalate every gap as potentially repeated or lost effect."),
+  incident("auths.page.operations.incidents.signer-outage/1", "Operate safely when issuance or receipt custody is unavailable.", scenarios.runtime, "Runtime incident commander with custody owner", "Signer calls fail, descriptors change unexpectedly, signatures cannot be verified, or audit events are missing.", "Stop new issuance and any execution that cannot produce required terminal evidence. Never fall back to an embedded or unsigned key.", "Restore the configured signer or activate a prequalified descriptor according to the rotation plan; verify known messages before reopening.", "Match every effect completed during the window with durable journal state and a valid terminal receipt before declaring recovery."),
+  incident("auths.page.operations.incidents.trust-root/1", "Contain an incorrect, expired, unavailable, or compromised trust root.", scenarios.identity, "Security incident commander with identity and application trust owners", "Previously valid evidence changes outcome, an unplanned root appears, bundles are stale, resolver results diverge, or suite labels mismatch.", "Stop affected verification and execution audiences. Do not enable trust-all, disable freshness, or silently try alternate roots.", "Pin the last known-good context or install a reviewed replacement with explicit overlap; rerun positive and negative identity fixtures.", "Reverify affected decisions where evidence permits and identify any execution accepted under the wrong context."),
+  incident("auths.page.operations.incidents.provider-unknown/1", "Resolve an execution whose provider outcome is unknown without repeating the effect.", scenarios.recovery, "Application incident commander with provider gateway owner", "The runtime reserved authority and contacted the provider, but timeout, disconnect, or ambiguous response prevents a terminal classification.", "Stop fresh Execute calls for the same business effect. Never assume timeout means failure and never mint a new idempotency key.", "Use the original execution reference, Resume, and the gateway's provider status lookup until a terminal result is evidenced or manual escalation owns the ambiguity.", "Bind the reconciled provider reference and result to the original command, commit one terminal state, and issue the matching receipt."),
+  incident("auths.page.operations.incidents.disclosure/1", "Respond to excessive, unauthorized, or leaked receipt disclosure.", scenarios.verify, "Security and privacy incident commander with evidence owner", "A caller receives a view above its authorization, full fields appear in logs or indexes, or disclosure policy and audit records disagree.", "Disable affected disclosure paths while preserving opaque verification and immutable receipt bytes. Do not delete evidence before scope is established.", "Correct Rust-owned disclosure policy or caller trust, rotate access credentials if needed, remove leaked projections, and prove unauthorized callers receive opaque views.", "Audit who received which projection, preserve the disclosure decisions, and assess whether provider, identity, or personal data escaped its retention boundary."),
+  incident("auths.page.operations.incidents.credential/1", "Contain a compromised signer, provider, operator, or deployment credential.", scenarios.runtime, "Security incident commander with the credential's custody and gateway owners", "Unexpected signatures, provider calls, access logs, key exports, configuration changes, or credential use indicates possible compromise.", "Disable the credential and affected gateway or issuance path. Preserve state and receipts; do not rotate blindly if it destroys attribution or recovery evidence.", "Rotate through the documented custody or provider process, install the new descriptor, requalify trust and gateway fixtures, and reopen the smallest affected scope.", "Compare signed artifacts, runtime journals, provider audit logs, and receipts to identify unauthorized issuance or effects and revoke affected authority explicitly."),
+]);
diff --git a/public/agents.md b/public/agents.md
index b129646..fb9efba 100644
--- a/public/agents.md
+++ b/public/agents.md
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
 ## Related topics
 
 - [Identity & trust](/identity-trust) — Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.
-- [Production operations](/operations) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
+- [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents/1 · Product contract: auths.page.agents/1_
 
diff --git a/public/authority.md b/public/authority.md
index af1657a..1dbfe67 100644
--- a/public/authority.md
+++ b/public/authority.md
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
 
 ## Related topics
 
-- [Production operations](/operations) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
+- [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority/1_
 
diff --git a/public/llms-full.txt b/public/llms-full.txt
index 92f0708..da26c36 100644
--- a/public/llms-full.txt
+++ b/public/llms-full.txt
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
 ## Related topics
 
 - [Identity & trust](/identity-trust) — Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.
-- [Production operations](/operations) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
+- [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.agents/1 · Product contract: auths.page.agents/1_
 
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
 
 ## Related topics
 
-- [Production operations](/operations) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
+- [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.authority/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority/1_
 
@@ -1305,8 +1305,4 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.integrations.composition/1 · Product contract: auths
 
 # Capability integrations
 
-Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.
-
-## Preserve the source capability's legitimate role
-
-An import profile states which external claims map into Auths authority and which r
\ No newline at end of file
+Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/llms.txt b/public/llms.txt
index 8849f34..5d84f21 100644
--- a/public/llms.txt
+++ b/public/llms.txt
@@ -98,20 +98,28 @@
 - [Test identity and trust](/identity-trust/testing.md) — Test identity sources, suites, and trust policy with positive and adversarial fixtures.
 - [Trust policy](/identity-trust/trust-policy.md) — Define which issuers, roots, resolvers, suites, audiences, and freshness windows are acceptable.
 - [Verification context](/identity-trust/verification-context.md) — Build the exact trusted context used for one deterministic verification.
-- [Production operations](/operations.md) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
-- [Back up and restore](/operations/backup-and-restore.md) — Restore state without reopening replay, budget, use, or recovery windows.
-- [Configure key custody](/operations/configure/custody.md) — Keep signing material non-exportable and observable without logging secrets.
-- [Configure durable state](/operations/configure/durable-state.md) — Preserve replay, use, budget, recovery, and receipt invariants across restarts.
-- [Configure provider gateways](/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md) — Acquire provider credentials only after authorization and durable reservation.
-- [Configure trust and profiles](/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md) — Version accepted roots, resolvers, suites, and domain semantics independently.
-- [Deploy the open runtime](/operations/deploy-runtime.md) — Place the Auths runtime behind TLS with explicit dependency ownership.
-- [Evaluate the runtime locally](/operations/evaluate-locally.md) — Exercise the production boundary with development custody and state before deployment.
-- [Execution lifecycle](/operations/execution-lifecycle.md) — Separate parsing, authorization, durable reservation, provider observation, recovery, and terminal evidence.
-- [Incident response runbooks](/operations/incidents.md) — Stop, preserve evidence, reconcile, recover, and escalate without widening authority.
-- [Observe Auths safely](/operations/observability.md) — Measure liveness, readiness, dependencies, outcomes, and latency without leaking authority.
-- [Retain and disclose receipts](/operations/receipt-retention.md) — Preserve evidence while minimizing sensitive operational detail.
-- [Recover and reconcile](/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md) — Resume the same execution identity after uncertain provider outcomes.
-- [Upgrade and roll back](/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md) — Change runtime bytes without splitting semantic, state, or documentation identities.
+- [Production operations](/operations.md) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
+- [Backup and restore](/operations/backup-and-restore.md) — Back up and restore runtime state without losing replay, budget, recovery, or receipt integrity.
+- [Configure](/operations/configure.md) — Configure state, custody, trust, profiles, and provider gateways as independent production ports.
+- [Custody](/operations/configure/custody.md) — Keep authority and receipt signing keys behind a narrow signer port.
+- [Durable state](/operations/configure/durable-state.md) — Configure multi-host durable state for replay, use, budget, plans, executions, and receipts.
+- [Provider gateways](/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md) — Map verified sealed commands to least-privilege provider effects behind closed gateways.
+- [Trust and profiles](/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md) — Configure roots, issuers, resolvers, status, suites, and profiles explicitly.
+- [Deploy the runtime](/operations/deploy-runtime.md) — Deploy the runtime as a small HTTPS control boundary around durable state and provider gateways.
+- [Evaluate locally](/operations/evaluate-locally.md) — Run the complete production topology locally before choosing infrastructure.
+- [Execution lifecycle](/operations/execution-lifecycle.md) — Choose retry, resume, reconcile, or stop from the durable execution phase.
+- [Incident response](/operations/incidents.md) — Respond to state loss, signer outage, trust-root error, provider uncertainty, receipt disclosure, and credential compromise.
+- [Compromised credential](/operations/incidents/compromised-credential.md) — Contain a compromised signer, provider, operator, or deployment credential.
+- [Provider unknown](/operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md) — Resolve an execution whose provider outcome is unknown without repeating the effect.
+- [Receipt disclosure](/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure.md) — Respond to excessive, unauthorized, or leaked receipt disclosure.
+- [Signer outage](/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md) — Operate safely when issuance or receipt custody is unavailable.
+- [State loss](/operations/incidents/state-loss.md) — Contain and recover from missing, rolled-back, corrupted, or split runtime state.
+- [Trust-root error](/operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md) — Contain an incorrect, expired, unavailable, or compromised trust root.
+- [Observability](/operations/observability.md) — Observe runtime health, dependencies, outcomes, latency, recovery, and redaction without leaking authority content.
+- [Receipt retention](/operations/receipt-retention.md) — Retain, disclose, and delete receipt evidence according to integrity and privacy needs.
+- [Recovery and reconciliation](/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md) — Resume and reconcile interrupted execution without blind provider retry.
+- [Security checklist](/operations/security-checklist.md) — Apply a production security checklist to every Auths boundary.
+- [Upgrade and rollback](/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md) — Upgrade or roll back runtime releases while preserving semantic and state compatibility.
 - [APIs & SDKs](/reference.md) — Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.
 - [CLI reference](/reference/cli.md) — Command contracts generated from the compiled Auths command graph.
 - [Stable error reference](/reference/errors.md) — Machine-stable error identities grouped by the caller's safe response.
diff --git a/public/operations.md b/public/operations.md
index 1cd563b..10cce6d 100644
--- a/public/operations.md
+++ b/public/operations.md
@@ -1,34 +1,39 @@
 # Production operations
 
-Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
+Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
 
-## Recommended: [Execution lifecycle](/operations/execution-lifecycle)
+## Recommended: [Evaluate locally](/operations/evaluate-locally)
 
-Separate parsing, authorization, durable reservation, provider observation, recovery, and terminal evidence.
+Run the complete production topology locally before choosing infrastructure.
 
-## Recover
+## Deploy
 
-- [Execution lifecycle](/operations/execution-lifecycle) — Separate parsing, authorization, durable reservation, provider observation, recovery, and terminal evidence.
-- [Recover and reconcile](/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation) — Resume the same execution identity after uncertain provider outcomes.
+- [Evaluate locally](/operations/evaluate-locally) — Run the complete production topology locally before choosing infrastructure.
+- [Deploy the runtime](/operations/deploy-runtime) — Deploy the runtime as a small HTTPS control boundary around durable state and provider gateways.
 
-## Deploy
+## Configure
 
-- [Evaluate the runtime locally](/operations/evaluate-locally) — Exercise the production boundary with development custody and state before deployment.
-- [Deploy the open runtime](/operations/deploy-runtime) — Place the Auths runtime behind TLS with explicit dependency ownership.
+- [Configure](/operations/configure) — Configure state, custody, trust, profiles, and provider gateways as independent production ports.
 
 ## Observe
 
-- [Observe Auths safely](/operations/observability) — Measure liveness, readiness, dependencies, outcomes, and latency without leaking authority.
+- [Observability](/operations/observability) — Observe runtime health, dependencies, outcomes, latency, recovery, and redaction without leaking authority content.
+
+## Recover
+
+- [Execution lifecycle](/operations/execution-lifecycle) — Choose retry, resume, reconcile, or stop from the durable execution phase.
+- [Recovery and reconciliation](/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation) — Resume and reconcile interrupted execution without blind provider retry.
 
 ## Maintain
 
-- [Back up and restore](/operations/backup-and-restore) — Restore state without reopening replay, budget, use, or recovery windows.
-- [Upgrade and roll back](/operations/upgrade-and-rollback) — Change runtime bytes without splitting semantic, state, or documentation identities.
-- [Retain and disclose receipts](/operations/receipt-retention) — Preserve evidence while minimizing sensitive operational detail.
+- [Backup and restore](/operations/backup-and-restore) — Back up and restore runtime state without losing replay, budget, recovery, or receipt integrity.
+- [Upgrade and rollback](/operations/upgrade-and-rollback) — Upgrade or roll back runtime releases while preserving semantic and state compatibility.
+- [Receipt retention](/operations/receipt-retention) — Retain, disclose, and delete receipt evidence according to integrity and privacy needs.
+- [Security checklist](/operations/security-checklist) — Apply a production security checklist to every Auths boundary.
 
 ## Incident response
 
-- [Incident response runbooks](/operations/incidents) — Stop, preserve evidence, reconcile, recover, and escalate without widening authority.
+- [Incident response](/operations/incidents) — Respond to state loss, signer outage, trust-root error, provider uncertainty, receipt disclosure, and credential compromise.
 
 ## Related topics
 
diff --git a/public/operations/backup-and-restore.md b/public/operations/backup-and-restore.md
index 50e934b..89aeb0b 100644
--- a/public/operations/backup-and-restore.md
+++ b/public/operations/backup-and-restore.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Back up and restore
+# Backup and restore
 
-Restore state without reopening replay, budget, use, or recovery windows.
+Back up and restore runtime state without losing replay, budget, recovery, or receipt integrity.
 
-## A restore is a semantic exercise
+## Outcome
 
-Quiesce or fence writers, restore an atomic state image, validate monotonic metadata, replay adversarial fixtures, reconcile nonterminal provider observations, and only then return the runtime to readiness.
+A restored environment preserves all committed authority consumption and execution phases.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Define encrypted backups, retention, restore credentials, recovery-point and recovery-time targets, isolated restore infrastructure, and a procedure that prevents old state from serving concurrent traffic.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Create active, completed, and provider-unknown fixtures; take a backup; restore to isolation; verify counts and commitments; resume the uncertain execution; and prove replay plus budget exhaustion still deny.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+Restored state produces the same terminal receipts and cannot repeat prior effects.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Incomplete journals, rolled-back use state, missing receipt bytes, concurrent old and restored writers, or unverifiable backups block promotion.
+
+## Continue
+
+Exercise upgrade and rollback against a restored copy before production rollout.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.backup/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/configure.md b/public/operations/configure.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0c5385
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/configure.md
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Configure
+
+Configure state, custody, trust, profiles, and provider gateways as independent production ports.
+
+## Recommended: [Durable state](/operations/configure/durable-state)
+
+Configure multi-host durable state for replay, use, budget, plans, executions, and receipts.
+
+## Configure
+
+- [Durable state](/operations/configure/durable-state) — Configure multi-host durable state for replay, use, budget, plans, executions, and receipts.
+- [Custody](/operations/configure/custody) — Keep authority and receipt signing keys behind a narrow signer port.
+- [Trust and profiles](/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles) — Configure roots, issuers, resolvers, status, suites, and profiles explicitly.
+- [Provider gateways](/operations/configure/provider-gateways) — Map verified sealed commands to least-privilege provider effects behind closed gateways.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.configure/1 · Product contract: auths.page.operations.configure/1_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/configure/custody.md b/public/operations/configure/custody.md
index b627e4b..86b19cd 100644
--- a/public/operations/configure/custody.md
+++ b/public/operations/configure/custody.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Configure key custody
+# Custody
 
-Keep signing material non-exportable and observable without logging secrets.
+Keep authority and receipt signing keys behind a narrow signer port.
 
-## The runtime asks a signer; it does not own key bytes
+## Outcome
 
-Use a custody adapter that returns suite-labelled public descriptors and signs bounded requests. Private material must remain inside the selected HSM, KMS, enclave, or application-owned signer.
+The runtime can request signatures while private key material remains in an HSM, KMS, enclave, or hardened local process.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Assign key owners, permitted algorithms, stable key descriptors, rotation windows, audit logging, rate limits, backup or recovery policy, and fail-closed outage behavior.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Register the signer, sign known requests, reject arbitrary or oversized payloads, verify public descriptors, exercise outage and rotation overlap, and confirm private material never appears in logs or artifacts.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+Only typed Auths signing requests are accepted and every signature is attributable to a configured descriptor.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Raw signing access, key export, silent algorithm fallback, unknown descriptor, audit loss, or signer ambiguity stops issuance and terminal receipt signing.
+
+## Continue
+
+Configure explicit trust for the public descriptors and issuers.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.custody/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/configure/durable-state.md b/public/operations/configure/durable-state.md
index 1626d03..46b4a37 100644
--- a/public/operations/configure/durable-state.md
+++ b/public/operations/configure/durable-state.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Configure durable state
+# Durable state
 
-Preserve replay, use, budget, recovery, and receipt invariants across restarts.
+Configure multi-host durable state for replay, use, budget, plans, executions, and receipts.
 
-## Reservations must be atomic and durable
+## Outcome
 
-Do not split replay, budget, use, execution, and receipt state across stores that cannot preserve their transaction boundary. A restart must never make a consumed effect appear unused.
+Concurrent hosts share one atomic record of reservation and terminal outcome.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Choose a transactional store, TLS and authentication, bounded retention, backups, restore exercises, and a failure policy that stops effects when state is unavailable.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Provision the schema, enforce uniqueness and compare-and-set transitions, run concurrent final-use and budget tests, interrupt an execution, restart on another host, and resume the same reference.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+Exactly one reservation wins, journal transitions are monotonic, and resume converges without a second effect.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Split-brain, stale reads, lost commits, unbounded rows, insecure transport, or automatic in-memory fallback blocks readiness.
+
+## Continue
+
+Configure custody so receipt and decision signing remains available without exposing keys.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.state/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md b/public/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md
index 7cb8953..48e5328 100644
--- a/public/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md
+++ b/public/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Configure provider gateways
+# Provider gateways
 
-Acquire provider credentials only after authorization and durable reservation.
+Map verified sealed commands to least-privilege provider effects behind closed gateways.
 
-## Only opaque verified commands cross the boundary
+## Outcome
 
-The adapter receives an SDK-minted command and bounded execution context. It never accepts caller-constructed authorization flags. It reports applied, not applied, or possible outcomes without guessing.
+Provider credentials are acquired only after native authorization and durable reservation.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Define one bounded gateway operation, provider credential source, idempotency behavior, response classifier, timeout, reconciliation method, and redaction policy.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Parse the sealed command, map exact fields, acquire a short-lived credential, invoke the provider with the committed idempotency key, classify success, denial, failure, or unknown, then persist the result before returning.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The provider sees one minimal request and the execution receipt binds its closed outcome without exposing secrets.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Unmapped fields, credential leakage, non-idempotent retry, ambiguous response, timeout, or provider-unknown state stops fresh execution and enters reconciliation.
+
+## Continue
+
+Instrument outcome and latency signals, then write the provider-unknown runbook.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.gateways/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md b/public/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md
index b29a18c..5fbe956 100644
--- a/public/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md
+++ b/public/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Configure trust and profiles
+# Trust and profiles
 
-Version accepted roots, resolvers, suites, and domain semantics independently.
+Configure roots, issuers, resolvers, status, suites, and profiles explicitly.
 
-## Rotate trust without migrating authority
+## Outcome
 
-Identity evidence and verification suites are replaceable inputs. Roll out new roots or suites with an explicit overlap window, negative fixtures, rollback, and post-rotation evidence review.
+Every verification decision receives a bounded, versioned trust and profile context rather than ambient process assumptions.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Inventory trusted roots and issuers, resolver ownership, freshness limits, accepted suites, status behavior, application profiles, and rotation procedures.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Load the configuration, verify each positive fixture, reject wrong-root and stale evidence, exercise suite swap and profile version mismatch, then record the configuration identity in runtime evidence.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+Supported identities and profiles verify consistently across hosts and every excluded source returns a stable closed outcome.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Unknown roots, stale bundles, resolver ambiguity, profile drift, or an unsupported suite blocks the affected request; never accept all during an outage.
+
+## Continue
+
+Configure gateways only after the action-to-provider mapping is qualified.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.trust/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/deploy-runtime.md b/public/operations/deploy-runtime.md
index b32e245..9552776 100644
--- a/public/operations/deploy-runtime.md
+++ b/public/operations/deploy-runtime.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Deploy the open runtime
+# Deploy the runtime
 
-Place the Auths runtime behind TLS with explicit dependency ownership.
+Deploy the runtime as a small HTTPS control boundary around durable state and provider gateways.
 
-## Deploy one closed gateway
+## Outcome
 
-Terminate trusted TLS, isolate custody and state dependencies, restrict provider egress, expose bounded health signals, and keep the effect provider reachable only from the runtime workload.
+A production caller reaches one authenticated HTTPS origin while signers, stores, trust resolvers, and provider credentials remain private dependencies.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Provision TLS, a supported runtime release, durable transactional state, signer custody, trust and status inputs, a closed provider gateway, monitoring, backups, and an operator recovery path.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Pin the release and contract digest, apply configuration, prove dependency readiness, execute the installed runtime scenario, verify the receipt from another process, and deny direct provider access from callers.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+Health and readiness are distinct, every dependency is observable, execution succeeds once, and rollback plus resume exercises pass.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Do not accept traffic when state, custody, trust, gateway, or release identity is unknown. Never expose the gateway credential as a caller fallback.
+
+## Continue
+
+Configure each dependency and establish service-level signals.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.deploy/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/evaluate-locally.md b/public/operations/evaluate-locally.md
index 39bc6a0..cfed7ff 100644
--- a/public/operations/evaluate-locally.md
+++ b/public/operations/evaluate-locally.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Evaluate the runtime locally
+# Evaluate locally
 
-Exercise the production boundary with development custody and state before deployment.
+Run the complete production topology locally before choosing infrastructure.
 
-## Evaluate the real boundaries
+## Outcome
 
-Use disposable keys and local durable state, but keep the same parse, authorize, reserve, provider, receipt, and recovery sequence you intend to operate. Exercise both success and provider uncertainty.
+A local isolated runtime proves health, version, trust, custody, durable reservation, gateway execution, receipts, and replay denial.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Use disposable local state and development custody; keep the same ports and closed gateway boundaries intended for production.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Start dependencies, check health and version, run the runtime-effect fixture, verify its receipt, replay the command, stop and restart the runtime, then resume the recorded execution.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The effect occurs once, replay is denied, state survives the restart, and the receipt verifies outside the runtime.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Missing dependencies, contract mismatch, non-HTTPS production configuration, state loss, receipt mismatch, or a second provider effect blocks deployment.
+
+## Continue
+
+Choose the deployment topology and replace one development adapter at a time.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.evaluate/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
index 799bd42..6a55f66 100644
--- a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
+++ b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Execution lifecycle
 
-Separate parsing, authorization, durable reservation, provider observation, recovery, and terminal evidence.
+Choose retry, resume, reconcile, or stop from the durable execution phase.
 
 ## The path at a glance
 
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ You are performing effect-free offline verification.
 ## Continue from here
 
 - [Deploy the runtime](/get-started/paths/runtime) — Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.
-- [Production operations](/operations) — Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.
+- [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents.md b/public/operations/incidents.md
index df6d787..a4b1ba9 100644
--- a/public/operations/incidents.md
+++ b/public/operations/incidents.md
@@ -1,10 +1,19 @@
-# Incident response runbooks
+# Incident response
 
-Stop, preserve evidence, reconcile, recover, and escalate without widening authority.
+Respond to state loss, signer outage, trust-root error, provider uncertainty, receipt disclosure, and credential compromise.
 
-## Every runbook has the same safety contract
+## Recommended: [State loss](/operations/incidents/state-loss)
 
-Name ownership and severity, preconditions, required access, safe observations, stop conditions, rollback or resume, reconciliation, evidence retention, and escalation. Never copy credentials or full authority artifacts into an incident ticket.
+Contain and recover from missing, rolled-back, corrupted, or split runtime state.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Incident response
+
+- [State loss](/operations/incidents/state-loss) — Contain and recover from missing, rolled-back, corrupted, or split runtime state.
+- [Signer outage](/operations/incidents/signer-outage) — Operate safely when issuance or receipt custody is unavailable.
+- [Trust-root error](/operations/incidents/trust-root-error) — Contain an incorrect, expired, unavailable, or compromised trust root.
+- [Provider unknown](/operations/incidents/provider-unknown) — Resolve an execution whose provider outcome is unknown without repeating the effect.
+- [Receipt disclosure](/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure) — Respond to excessive, unauthorized, or leaked receipt disclosure.
+- [Compromised credential](/operations/incidents/compromised-credential) — Contain a compromised signer, provider, operator, or deployment credential.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents/1 · Product contract: auths.page.operations.incidents/1_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/compromised-credential.md b/public/operations/incidents/compromised-credential.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1781b67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/incidents/compromised-credential.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# Compromised credential
+
+Contain a compromised signer, provider, operator, or deployment credential.
+
+## Owner and severity
+
+Security incident commander with the credential's custody and gateway owners
+
+## Preconditions
+
+Declare the incident, preserve the exact runtime release and configuration identity, restrict changes to the incident owner, and capture the first affected execution references before taking recovery action.
+
+## Tested commands
+
+Run the release-qualified scenario shown below against an isolated environment first. In production, use only the same typed health, version, verify, resume, summary, and disclosure operations for the recorded execution references.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Expected observations
+
+Unexpected signatures, provider calls, access logs, key exports, configuration changes, or credential use indicates possible compromise.
+
+## Stop conditions
+
+Disable the credential and affected gateway or issuance path. Preserve state and receipts; do not rotate blindly if it destroys attribution or recovery evidence.
+
+## Rollback or resume
+
+Rotate through the documented custody or provider process, install the new descriptor, requalify trust and gateway fixtures, and reopen the smallest affected scope.
+
+## Reconciliation
+
+Compare signed artifacts, runtime journals, provider audit logs, and receipts to identify unauthorized issuance or effects and revoke affected authority explicitly.
+
+## Evidence retention
+
+Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configuration identities, operator actions, relevant provider references, and disclosure decisions according to the incident evidence policy.
+
+## Escalation
+
+Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.credential/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md b/public/operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37edd18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# Provider unknown
+
+Resolve an execution whose provider outcome is unknown without repeating the effect.
+
+## Owner and severity
+
+Application incident commander with provider gateway owner
+
+## Preconditions
+
+Declare the incident, preserve the exact runtime release and configuration identity, restrict changes to the incident owner, and capture the first affected execution references before taking recovery action.
+
+## Tested commands
+
+Run the release-qualified scenario shown below against an isolated environment first. In production, use only the same typed health, version, verify, resume, summary, and disclosure operations for the recorded execution references.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
+
+## Expected observations
+
+The runtime reserved authority and contacted the provider, but timeout, disconnect, or ambiguous response prevents a terminal classification.
+
+## Stop conditions
+
+Stop fresh Execute calls for the same business effect. Never assume timeout means failure and never mint a new idempotency key.
+
+## Rollback or resume
+
+Use the original execution reference, Resume, and the gateway's provider status lookup until a terminal result is evidenced or manual escalation owns the ambiguity.
+
+## Reconciliation
+
+Bind the reconciled provider reference and result to the original command, commit one terminal state, and issue the matching receipt.
+
+## Evidence retention
+
+Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configuration identities, operator actions, relevant provider references, and disclosure decisions according to the incident evidence policy.
+
+## Escalation
+
+Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.provider-unknown/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure.md b/public/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ff4039
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# Receipt disclosure
+
+Respond to excessive, unauthorized, or leaked receipt disclosure.
+
+## Owner and severity
+
+Security and privacy incident commander with evidence owner
+
+## Preconditions
+
+Declare the incident, preserve the exact runtime release and configuration identity, restrict changes to the incident owner, and capture the first affected execution references before taking recovery action.
+
+## Tested commands
+
+Run the release-qualified scenario shown below against an isolated environment first. In production, use only the same typed health, version, verify, resume, summary, and disclosure operations for the recorded execution references.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
+
+## Expected observations
+
+A caller receives a view above its authorization, full fields appear in logs or indexes, or disclosure policy and audit records disagree.
+
+## Stop conditions
+
+Disable affected disclosure paths while preserving opaque verification and immutable receipt bytes. Do not delete evidence before scope is established.
+
+## Rollback or resume
+
+Correct Rust-owned disclosure policy or caller trust, rotate access credentials if needed, remove leaked projections, and prove unauthorized callers receive opaque views.
+
+## Reconciliation
+
+Audit who received which projection, preserve the disclosure decisions, and assess whether provider, identity, or personal data escaped its retention boundary.
+
+## Evidence retention
+
+Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configuration identities, operator actions, relevant provider references, and disclosure decisions according to the incident evidence policy.
+
+## Escalation
+
+Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md b/public/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa9dcf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# Signer outage
+
+Operate safely when issuance or receipt custody is unavailable.
+
+## Owner and severity
+
+Runtime incident commander with custody owner
+
+## Preconditions
+
+Declare the incident, preserve the exact runtime release and configuration identity, restrict changes to the incident owner, and capture the first affected execution references before taking recovery action.
+
+## Tested commands
+
+Run the release-qualified scenario shown below against an isolated environment first. In production, use only the same typed health, version, verify, resume, summary, and disclosure operations for the recorded execution references.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Expected observations
+
+Signer calls fail, descriptors change unexpectedly, signatures cannot be verified, or audit events are missing.
+
+## Stop conditions
+
+Stop new issuance and any execution that cannot produce required terminal evidence. Never fall back to an embedded or unsigned key.
+
+## Rollback or resume
+
+Restore the configured signer or activate a prequalified descriptor according to the rotation plan; verify known messages before reopening.
+
+## Reconciliation
+
+Match every effect completed during the window with durable journal state and a valid terminal receipt before declaring recovery.
+
+## Evidence retention
+
+Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configuration identities, operator actions, relevant provider references, and disclosure decisions according to the incident evidence policy.
+
+## Escalation
+
+Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.signer-outage/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/state-loss.md b/public/operations/incidents/state-loss.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..93706c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/incidents/state-loss.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# State loss
+
+Contain and recover from missing, rolled-back, corrupted, or split runtime state.
+
+## Owner and severity
+
+Runtime incident commander with storage and application owners
+
+## Preconditions
+
+Declare the incident, preserve the exact runtime release and configuration identity, restrict changes to the incident owner, and capture the first affected execution references before taking recovery action.
+
+## Tested commands
+
+Run the release-qualified scenario shown below against an isolated environment first. In production, use only the same typed health, version, verify, resume, summary, and disclosure operations for the recorded execution references.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
+
+## Expected observations
+
+Health or readiness fails, journals are missing or inconsistent, use or budget counters regress, or multiple writers disagree.
+
+## Stop conditions
+
+Stop all protected effects and fresh executions. Do not promote a backup or secondary while another writer may still accept traffic.
+
+## Rollback or resume
+
+Fence writers, restore the newest verified backup to isolation, validate commitments and monotonic state, then resume only recorded execution references.
+
+## Reconciliation
+
+Compare retained receipts, provider idempotency records, and restored journals; escalate every gap as potentially repeated or lost effect.
+
+## Evidence retention
+
+Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configuration identities, operator actions, relevant provider references, and disclosure decisions according to the incident evidence policy.
+
+## Escalation
+
+Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.state-loss/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md b/public/operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a9d2e95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# Trust-root error
+
+Contain an incorrect, expired, unavailable, or compromised trust root.
+
+## Owner and severity
+
+Security incident commander with identity and application trust owners
+
+## Preconditions
+
+Declare the incident, preserve the exact runtime release and configuration identity, restrict changes to the incident owner, and capture the first affected execution references before taking recovery action.
+
+## Tested commands
+
+Run the release-qualified scenario shown below against an isolated environment first. In production, use only the same typed health, version, verify, resume, summary, and disclosure operations for the recorded execution references.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+
+## Expected observations
+
+Previously valid evidence changes outcome, an unplanned root appears, bundles are stale, resolver results diverge, or suite labels mismatch.
+
+## Stop conditions
+
+Stop affected verification and execution audiences. Do not enable trust-all, disable freshness, or silently try alternate roots.
+
+## Rollback or resume
+
+Pin the last known-good context or install a reviewed replacement with explicit overlap; rerun positive and negative identity fixtures.
+
+## Reconciliation
+
+Reverify affected decisions where evidence permits and identify any execution accepted under the wrong context.
+
+## Evidence retention
+
+Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configuration identities, operator actions, relevant provider references, and disclosure decisions according to the incident evidence policy.
+
+## Escalation
+
+Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.trust-root/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/observability.md b/public/operations/observability.md
index 6e3f1b6..097e148 100644
--- a/public/operations/observability.md
+++ b/public/operations/observability.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Observe Auths safely
+# Observability
 
-Measure liveness, readiness, dependencies, outcomes, and latency without leaking authority.
+Observe runtime health, dependencies, outcomes, latency, recovery, and redaction without leaking authority content.
 
-## Observe classifications and commitments
+## Outcome
 
-Emit bounded correlation IDs, operation identities, outcome classes, dependency health, and latency histograms. Do not log proofs, sealed commands, credentials, raw action bodies, full receipts, or authorized disclosure payloads.
+Operators can distinguish liveness, readiness, dependency failure, semantic denial, provider failure, provider unknown, and recovery progress.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Define bounded metrics and structured events for request counts, stable outcomes, phase latency, store conflicts, signer calls, resolver freshness, gateway responses, resume attempts, receipt creation, and redaction failures.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Emit release and configuration identities, hash or omit sensitive identifiers, sample high-volume success safely, alert on availability and invariant breaches, and link dashboards to exact runbooks.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+A single execution can be followed by opaque reference and phase without exposing commands, credentials, full receipts, or personal identity evidence.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Stop rollout on missing telemetry, cardinality explosion, raw artifact logging, secret exposure, unexplained provider unknown, replay acceptance, or receipt loss.
+
+## Continue
+
+Exercise recovery and incident procedures using the same signals.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.observability/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/receipt-retention.md b/public/operations/receipt-retention.md
index 6d26ee6..ba3c87d 100644
--- a/public/operations/receipt-retention.md
+++ b/public/operations/receipt-retention.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Retain and disclose receipts
+# Receipt retention
 
-Preserve evidence while minimizing sensitive operational detail.
+Retain, disclose, and delete receipt evidence according to integrity and privacy needs.
 
-## Retain integrity; disclose by authorization
+## Outcome
 
-Store signed bytes and commitments under a bounded retention policy. Default readers to opaque or summary views; require explicit disclosure authority for business details and record that disclosure.
+Receipts remain verifiable for their required lifetime while sensitive detail is opaque by default.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Classify opaque identifiers, commitments, signer evidence, summary fields, full fields, and provider references; define access, encryption, retention, legal hold, deletion, and key-rotation behavior.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Store immutable receipt bytes, index only bounded fields, authorize summary or full disclosure natively, verify retained samples, exercise expiry and deletion, and audit every privileged view.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+Authorized readers receive only the intended projection and retained receipts still verify after runtime or key rotation.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Raw command or provider payload logging, public full views, missing disclosure audit, unverifiable deletion, or loss of required evidence blocks the retention design.
+
+## Continue
+
+Add receipt disclosure response to the incident program.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.receipts/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md b/public/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md
index 1bb6672..adfaab5 100644
--- a/public/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md
+++ b/public/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Recover and reconcile
+# Recovery and reconciliation
 
-Resume the same execution identity after uncertain provider outcomes.
+Resume and reconcile interrupted execution without blind provider retry.
 
-## Observe, reconcile, then resume
+## Outcome
+
+An operator can take an opaque execution reference from indeterminate to one evidenced terminal result.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Require the durable journal, original idempotency mapping, gateway-specific provider lookup, and an operator owner for unreconciled outcomes.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Inspect the recorded phase, call Resume, query provider status only through the gateway, classify the result, commit the terminal journal transition, and issue or recover the matching receipt.
+
+## Run the qualified path
 
 Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
 
+## Success means
+
+Recovery converges on the original effect and a verifiable receipt without consuming fresh authority.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Unknown reference, missing state, provider ambiguity, mismatched result, or evidence loss remains stopped and escalated; never issue a new command automatically.
+
+## Continue
+
+Exercise backup and restore so recovery evidence survives infrastructure loss.
+
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.recovery/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/security-checklist.md b/public/operations/security-checklist.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..834339e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/operations/security-checklist.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Security checklist
+
+Apply a production security checklist to every Auths boundary.
+
+## Outcome
+
+The deployment has explicit owners and fail-closed controls for ingress, trust, state, custody, gateways, evidence, dependencies, and operators.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Inventory assets and actors, threat-model each port, enforce TLS and least privilege, isolate credentials, bound every parser, patch dependencies, redact telemetry, protect backups, and require reviewed recovery paths.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Run positive, denial, replay, mutation, outage, compromise, recovery, disclosure, and supply-chain exercises against packaged artifacts.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+Every boundary has a named owner, a qualified positive path, an adversarial path, a monitored failure, and a rehearsed recovery.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+No direct provider path, exported key, ambient trust, permissive fallback, unbounded input, blind retry, unaudited full disclosure, or unknown release is acceptable.
+
+## Continue
+
+Schedule outside security review after the operational evidence is reproducible.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.security/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md b/public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md
index 8f1ac75..d856258 100644
--- a/public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md
+++ b/public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Upgrade and roll back
+# Upgrade and rollback
 
-Change runtime bytes without splitting semantic, state, or documentation identities.
+Upgrade or roll back runtime releases while preserving semantic and state compatibility.
 
-## Qualify before promotion
+## Outcome
 
-Verify schemas, state migrations, custody compatibility, differential fixtures, recovery across mixed versions, and exact release documentation. Roll back application and documentation surfaces atomically.
+A rollout changes implementation only after release contracts, stores, profiles, fixtures, and receipts agree.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Pin source, SDK, contract, schema, profile, and evidence identities; back up state; qualify packaged consumers; stage the new runtime; and define rollback before migration.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Run health and version checks, differential fixtures, concurrent state tests, a real canary effect, receipt verification, recovery, and rollback rehearsal before expanding traffic.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+Old and new hosts agree where overlap is supported, terminal receipts remain verifiable, and rollback does not reopen consumed authority.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Semantic drift, schema incompatibility, mixed-version disagreement, receipt change, state loss, or unqualified artifact blocks rollout.
+
+## Continue
+
+Retain the exact release and evidence bundle used for every production window.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.upgrade/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/search-index.json b/public/search-index.json
index 5bb56ca..d5d291b 100644
--- a/public/search-index.json
+++ b/public/search-index.json
@@ -700,98 +700,154 @@
       "id": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
       "path": "/operations",
       "title": "Production operations",
-      "description": "Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.",
+      "description": "Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.",
       "section": "operations"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.operations.backup/1",
       "path": "/operations/backup-and-restore",
-      "title": "Back up and restore",
-      "description": "Restore state without reopening replay, budget, use, or recovery windows.",
+      "title": "Backup and restore",
+      "description": "Back up and restore runtime state without losing replay, budget, recovery, or receipt integrity.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.configure/1",
+      "path": "/operations/configure",
+      "title": "Configure",
+      "description": "Configure state, custody, trust, profiles, and provider gateways as independent production ports.",
       "section": "operations"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.operations.custody/1",
       "path": "/operations/configure/custody",
-      "title": "Configure key custody",
-      "description": "Keep signing material non-exportable and observable without logging secrets.",
+      "title": "Custody",
+      "description": "Keep authority and receipt signing keys behind a narrow signer port.",
       "section": "operations"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.operations.state/1",
       "path": "/operations/configure/durable-state",
-      "title": "Configure durable state",
-      "description": "Preserve replay, use, budget, recovery, and receipt invariants across restarts.",
+      "title": "Durable state",
+      "description": "Configure multi-host durable state for replay, use, budget, plans, executions, and receipts.",
       "section": "operations"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.operations.gateways/1",
       "path": "/operations/configure/provider-gateways",
-      "title": "Configure provider gateways",
-      "description": "Acquire provider credentials only after authorization and durable reservation.",
+      "title": "Provider gateways",
+      "description": "Map verified sealed commands to least-privilege provider effects behind closed gateways.",
       "section": "operations"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.operations.trust/1",
       "path": "/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles",
-      "title": "Configure trust and profiles",
-      "description": "Version accepted roots, resolvers, suites, and domain semantics independently.",
+      "title": "Trust and profiles",
+      "description": "Configure roots, issuers, resolvers, status, suites, and profiles explicitly.",
       "section": "operations"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.operations.deploy/1",
       "path": "/operations/deploy-runtime",
-      "title": "Deploy the open runtime",
-      "description": "Place the Auths runtime behind TLS with explicit dependency ownership.",
+      "title": "Deploy the runtime",
+      "description": "Deploy the runtime as a small HTTPS control boundary around durable state and provider gateways.",
       "section": "operations"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.operations.evaluate/1",
       "path": "/operations/evaluate-locally",
-      "title": "Evaluate the runtime locally",
-      "description": "Exercise the production boundary with development custody and state before deployment.",
+      "title": "Evaluate locally",
+      "description": "Run the complete production topology locally before choosing infrastructure.",
       "section": "operations"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1",
       "path": "/operations/execution-lifecycle",
       "title": "Execution lifecycle",
-      "description": "Separate parsing, authorization, durable reservation, provider observation, recovery, and terminal evidence.",
+      "description": "Choose retry, resume, reconcile, or stop from the durable execution phase.",
       "section": "operations"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents/1",
       "path": "/operations/incidents",
-      "title": "Incident response runbooks",
-      "description": "Stop, preserve evidence, reconcile, recover, and escalate without widening authority.",
+      "title": "Incident response",
+      "description": "Respond to state loss, signer outage, trust-root error, provider uncertainty, receipt disclosure, and credential compromise.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.credential/1",
+      "path": "/operations/incidents/compromised-credential",
+      "title": "Compromised credential",
+      "description": "Contain a compromised signer, provider, operator, or deployment credential.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.provider-unknown/1",
+      "path": "/operations/incidents/provider-unknown",
+      "title": "Provider unknown",
+      "description": "Resolve an execution whose provider outcome is unknown without repeating the effect.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.disclosure/1",
+      "path": "/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure",
+      "title": "Receipt disclosure",
+      "description": "Respond to excessive, unauthorized, or leaked receipt disclosure.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.signer-outage/1",
+      "path": "/operations/incidents/signer-outage",
+      "title": "Signer outage",
+      "description": "Operate safely when issuance or receipt custody is unavailable.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.state-loss/1",
+      "path": "/operations/incidents/state-loss",
+      "title": "State loss",
+      "description": "Contain and recover from missing, rolled-back, corrupted, or split runtime state.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.trust-root/1",
+      "path": "/operations/incidents/trust-root-error",
+      "title": "Trust-root error",
+      "description": "Contain an incorrect, expired, unavailable, or compromised trust root.",
       "section": "operations"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.operations.observability/1",
       "path": "/operations/observability",
-      "title": "Observe Auths safely",
-      "description": "Measure liveness, readiness, dependencies, outcomes, and latency without leaking authority.",
+      "title": "Observability",
+      "description": "Observe runtime health, dependencies, outcomes, latency, recovery, and redaction without leaking authority content.",
       "section": "operations"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.operations.receipts/1",
       "path": "/operations/receipt-retention",
-      "title": "Retain and disclose receipts",
-      "description": "Preserve evidence while minimizing sensitive operational detail.",
+      "title": "Receipt retention",
+      "description": "Retain, disclose, and delete receipt evidence according to integrity and privacy needs.",
       "section": "operations"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.operations.recovery/1",
       "path": "/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation",
-      "title": "Recover and reconcile",
-      "description": "Resume the same execution identity after uncertain provider outcomes.",
+      "title": "Recovery and reconciliation",
+      "description": "Resume and reconcile interrupted execution without blind provider retry.",
+      "section": "operations"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.security/1",
+      "path": "/operations/security-checklist",
+      "title": "Security checklist",
+      "description": "Apply a production security checklist to every Auths boundary.",
       "section": "operations"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.operations.upgrade/1",
       "path": "/operations/upgrade-and-rollback",
-      "title": "Upgrade and roll back",
-      "description": "Change runtime bytes without splitting semantic, state, or documentation identities.",
+      "title": "Upgrade and rollback",
+      "description": "Upgrade or roll back runtime releases while preserving semantic and state compatibility.",
       "section": "operations"
     },
     {
diff --git a/public/sitemap.xml b/public/sitemap.xml
index c8641de..979a039 100644
--- a/public/sitemap.xml
+++ b/public/sitemap.xml
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/verification-context</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/backup-and-restore</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/configure</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/configure/custody</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/configure/durable-state</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/configure/provider-gateways</loc></url>
@@ -106,9 +107,16 @@
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/evaluate-locally</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/execution-lifecycle</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/incidents</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/incidents/compromised-credential</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/incidents/provider-unknown</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/incidents/signer-outage</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/incidents/state-loss</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/incidents/trust-root-error</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/observability</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/receipt-retention</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/security-checklist</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/upgrade-and-rollback</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/cli</loc></url>

From 9e7cdaa236429624c8d46cc139365d5912b2e327 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 23:19:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 25/29] docs: complete developer and integration journey

---
 app/[...slug]/page.tsx                        |   3 +-
 app/lib/content-graph.ts                      |   3 +-
 app/lib/topic-landings.ts                     |   4 +
 content/developer-pages.ts                    |  78 +++++++++++++
 content/page-builders.ts                      |  17 +++
 public/developers.md                          |  29 +++--
 public/developers/cli.md                      |  32 +++++-
 public/developers/errors.md                   |  18 ++-
 public/developers/examples.md                 |  10 ++
 public/developers/extension-kits.md           |  34 ++++++
 public/developers/integrations.md             |  18 +--
 .../developers/integrations/capabilities.md   |  32 +++++-
 public/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md   |  32 +++++-
 .../integrations/identity-and-trust.md        |  32 +++++-
 public/developers/integrations/policy.md      |  32 +++++-
 public/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md |  32 +++++-
 public/developers/integrations/transport.md   |  32 +++++-
 public/developers/quickstarts.md              |  10 ++
 public/developers/releases.md                 |  22 ++++
 public/developers/runtime-api.md              |  32 +++++-
 public/developers/sdks.md                     |  19 ++--
 public/developers/sdks/parity.md              |  22 ++++
 public/developers/sdks/python.md              |  34 ++++++
 public/developers/sdks/rust.md                |  34 ++++++
 public/developers/sdks/typescript.md          |  34 ++++++
 public/developers/testing.md                  |  32 +++++-
 public/developers/versioning.md               |  20 +++-
 public/llms-full.txt                          |  88 ++++++++-------
 public/llms.txt                               |  36 +++---
 public/search-index.json                      | 106 +++++++++++++-----
 public/sitemap.xml                            |   8 ++
 31 files changed, 770 insertions(+), 165 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 content/developer-pages.ts
 create mode 100644 public/developers/examples.md
 create mode 100644 public/developers/extension-kits.md
 create mode 100644 public/developers/quickstarts.md
 create mode 100644 public/developers/releases.md
 create mode 100644 public/developers/sdks/parity.md
 create mode 100644 public/developers/sdks/python.md
 create mode 100644 public/developers/sdks/rust.md
 create mode 100644 public/developers/sdks/typescript.md

diff --git a/app/[...slug]/page.tsx b/app/[...slug]/page.tsx
index b214b24..8975ee5 100644
--- a/app/[...slug]/page.tsx
+++ b/app/[...slug]/page.tsx
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { QuickstartPage } from "../components/QuickstartPage";
 import { TopicShell } from "../components/TopicShell";
 import { contentPageByPath, verifiedPageGraph } from "../lib/content-graph";
 import { quickstartByScenario } from "../lib/quickstarts";
+import { hasTopicLanding } from "../lib/topic-landings";
 
 export function generateStaticParams() {
   return verifiedPageGraph.pages
@@ -14,7 +15,7 @@ export function generateStaticParams() {
 export default async function Page({ params }: { params: Promise<{ slug: string[] }> }) {
   const { slug } = await params;
   const page = contentPageByPath(`/${slug.join("/")}`);
-  if (page.pageType === "landing") return <TopicLandingPage pageId={page.id} />;
+  if (page.pageType === "landing" && hasTopicLanding(page.id)) return <TopicLandingPage pageId={page.id} />;
   if (page.pageType === "quickstart") {
     const scenario = page.uses.scenarios[0];
     const quickstart = scenario ? quickstartByScenario(scenario) : null;
diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
index 255017c..d9ed24d 100644
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import { identityTrustPages } from "../../content/identity-trust-pages.ts";
 import { authorityPages } from "../../content/authority-pages.ts";
 import { agentPages } from "../../content/agent-pages.ts";
 import { operationsPages } from "../../content/operations-pages.ts";
+import { developerPages } from "../../content/developer-pages.ts";
 import rawContract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
 import { parseAuthoredPageContent, type AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
 import { assertPageContract } from "../../schemas/page-contract.ts";
@@ -96,7 +97,7 @@ function replacePages(base: readonly unknown[], replacements: readonly unknown[]
 
 const legacyPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = [...rawPages, ...rawDeveloperPages, ...rawAgentIntegrationPages, ...rawAdoptionPages, ...rawOperationsPages];
 export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze(
-  replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(legacyPageInputs, getStartedPages), identityTrustPages), authorityPages), agentPages), operationsPages),
+  replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(legacyPageInputs, getStartedPages), identityTrustPages), authorityPages), agentPages), operationsPages), developerPages),
 );
 export const verifiedPageGraph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(authoredPageInputs, rawContract);
 
diff --git a/app/lib/topic-landings.ts b/app/lib/topic-landings.ts
index b24e188..4ef08ba 100644
--- a/app/lib/topic-landings.ts
+++ b/app/lib/topic-landings.ts
@@ -55,3 +55,7 @@ export function topicLandingByPage(page: string): TopicLanding {
   if (!landing) throw new TypeError(`unknown topic landing ${page}`);
   return landing;
 }
+
+export function hasTopicLanding(page: string): boolean {
+  return topicLandings.some((candidate) => candidate.page === page);
+}
diff --git a/content/developer-pages.ts b/content/developer-pages.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da405ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/developer-pages.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+import { guide, integration, landing, referencePage } from "./page-builders.ts";
+
+const scenarios = {
+  local: "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
+  runtime: "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
+  agent: "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
+  recovery: "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
+  identity: "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1",
+  verify: "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
+} as const;
+
+const operations = [
+  "auths.operation.create/1",
+  "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+  "auths.operation.execute/1",
+  "auths.operation.resume/1",
+  "auths.operation.verify/1",
+] as const;
+
+const developerGuide = (id: string, description: string, scenario: string, outcome: string, prerequisites: string, steps: string, success: string, failure: string, next: string) => guide({
+  id, description, scenario, outcome, prerequisites, steps, success, failure, next,
+  dependencies: { operations },
+});
+
+const composition = (id: string, description: string, owner: string, input: string, limits: string, scenario: string = scenarios.local) => integration({
+  id, description, scenario,
+  ownership: `${owner} remains authoritative for its domain. Auths owns only the portable bounded authority and native execution or verification semantics at the composition boundary.`,
+  dataFlow: `${input} is parsed into an explicit typed input. Auths commits only what its decision or command needs, then returns a stable outcome and bounded evidence.`,
+  secrets: "Private identity keys, OAuth tokens, policy data, cloud credentials, transport secrets, and provider credentials remain behind their existing ports. They are never copied into Auths authority.",
+  state: "Each adjacent system retains its native lifecycle. Auths stores only uses, budgets, replay, plan, execution, recovery, and receipt state for protected effects.",
+  failures: "Malformed input, stale evidence, adapter uncertainty, authority mismatch, replay, and provider ambiguity remain separate closed outcomes with one named owner.",
+  limitations: limits,
+  dependencies: { operations },
+});
+
+const sdkGuide = (id: string, language: string, install: string) => developerGuide(
+  id,
+  `Install the maintained ${language} SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.`,
+  scenarios.local,
+  `A clean ${language} consumer can create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify without reproducing Rust-owned semantics.`,
+  `Use a supported ${language} runtime and install the packaged SDK with ${install}. Keep the release contract and examples from that package version.`,
+  "Start from the installed local REST effect, switch the global language selector to this SDK, run the permitted request and denial, then follow exact symbols into Reference.",
+  "The packaged consumer returns the same normalized outcomes and receipt commitments as Rust and the other maintained SDK.",
+  "Missing native artifacts, unsupported runtime, type mismatch, ABI mismatch, semantic drift, or a language-owned authorization object fails installation or qualification.",
+  "Use SDK parity to compare maintained coverage and Runtime API when the application should not load a native extension.",
+);
+
+export const developerPages: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([
+  landing("auths.page.developers/1", "Choose an SDK, call the runtime, use the CLI, test failures, compose adjacent systems, and build application profiles.", "Developer documentation begins with outcome-oriented indexes. Exact signatures and endpoints live in generated Reference; editorial pages explain how to choose and combine those facts without copying them."),
+  landing("auths.page.developers.quickstarts/1", "Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.", "Use Local REST effect for an in-process SDK boundary, Runtime effect for the HTTPS service, Agent delegation for tools, Approved plan for exact review, Offline verification for inert evidence, Recovery for ambiguous outcomes, or Identity swap for agility. The maintained projects live under Get started so there is one runnable source."),
+  landing("auths.page.developers.sdks/1", "Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.", "Rust owns semantic behavior. TypeScript and Python call native operations through narrow bindings and expose idiomatic types. The generated SDK reference keeps signatures and release identity synchronized; these pages help choose a runtime and packaging model."),
+  sdkGuide("auths.page.developers.sdks.rust/1", "Rust", "cargo add auths-sdk"),
+  sdkGuide("auths.page.developers.sdks.typescript/1", "TypeScript", "npm install @auths-dev/sdk"),
+  sdkGuide("auths.page.developers.sdks.python/1", "Python", "python -m pip install auths"),
+  referencePage({
+    id: "auths.page.developers.sdks.parity/1",
+    description: "Inspect maintained operation, outcome, fixture, and packaging parity across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.",
+    factKind: "operation", fact: "auths.operation.create/1",
+    orientation: "Parity means identical semantic operations, accepted and rejected fixtures, normalized outcomes, and receipt bytes. It does not require language APIs to ignore their own idioms.",
+    usage: "Use the generated matrix to confirm create, delegate, execute, resume, verify, inspection, and diagnostics coverage for the selected release before choosing an SDK.",
+    source: "The release bundle, packaged API inventories, and differential fixtures generate the matrix. Editorial pages do not hand-maintain method lists.",
+  }),
+  developerGuide("auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1", "Call the production HTTPS runtime from any language or service boundary.", scenarios.runtime, "A client checks health and version, submits bounded authority and sealed commands, handles closed outcomes, resumes existing executions, and requests authorized receipt views.", "Use one HTTPS origin whose release identity and trust are explicitly configured. Keep provider credentials, signer custody, and durable state behind the service.", "Call health and version first, create or bring authority, execute with an idempotency commitment, switch on the complete outcome union, resume only by opaque reference, and verify the returned receipt.", "A packaged consumer completes once and the exact Runtime API reference matches the deployed contract digest.", "Non-HTTPS endpoints, version mismatch, unknown outcome, invalid request, timeout after provider access, or missing receipt cannot be treated as success.", "Open generated Runtime API reference for exact methods, paths, limits, and schemas."),
+  developerGuide("auths.page.developers.cli/1", "Use the CLI for local evaluation, fixture verification, runtime inspection, and operator-owned recovery.", scenarios.verify, "A terminal user can verify evidence and inspect a configured runtime without reconstructing requests manually.", "Install the CLI for the selected release, provide explicit input files or standard input, and configure trust or runtime endpoints through bounded documented options.", "Print version, verify a known receipt, inspect a bounded summary, check runtime health, and exercise resume against an isolated recovery scenario.", "Commands return stable machine-readable outcomes, safe human summaries, and non-zero status for every closed failure.", "Unknown flags, interactive secret leakage, ambiguous config, full disclosure without authority, or automatic provider retry is prohibited.", "Use generated CLI reference for exact flags and shell completion."),
+  developerGuide("auths.page.developers.testing/1", "Test success, denial, mutation, replay, recovery, and cross-language parity with deterministic fixtures.", scenarios.agent, "Application tests prove the effect boundary and prohibited variants without relying on mock authorization logic.", "Install packaged SDKs, use deterministic keys and clocks only in testkit, isolate provider substitutes, and name the exact stable outcome each negative case expects.", "Run permitted, changed bytes, widened delegation, expired, revoked, replayed, over-budget, plan substitution, transport-only, provider-unknown, and disclosure-denial fixtures.", "All languages agree, prohibited providers are untouched, and every executable example is traced to a qualified scenario.", "Snapshot-only output, live network dependence, broad mocks, ignored indeterminate states, or language-specific semantic assertions fails the test design.", "Add the fixtures to CI and inspect exact generated errors and evidence."),
+  referencePage({ id: "auths.page.developers.errors/1", description: "Handle the complete closed outcome and error surface without collapsing uncertainty into exceptions or booleans.", factKind: "endpoint", fact: "auths.endpoint.executions/1", orientation: "Parse errors, denials, indeterminate lifecycle results, provider failures, provider-unknown outcomes, and terminal successes mean different things. SDKs use typed results; the Runtime API uses closed response schemas.", usage: "Switch exhaustively on the generated union. Retry only transport failures known to precede reservation; Resume an existing reference after reservation; reconcile provider unknown; treat unknown future variants as closed.", source: "Outcome identities and shapes are generated from the release Runtime contract and SDK declarations." }),
+  referencePage({ id: "auths.page.developers.versioning/1", description: "Pin semantic identities, SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, and evidence to a release.", factKind: "endpoint", fact: "auths.endpoint.version/1", orientation: "Auths versions wire meaning and public surfaces explicitly. A package version alone is not permission to mix contracts, profiles, or generated documentation from another release.", usage: "Check the Runtime version endpoint, compare its contract digest with installed artifacts, and qualify state plus fixtures before upgrade or rollback.", source: "Version and digest data come from the immutable release bundle selected by the documentation build." }),
+  landing("auths.page.integrations.composition/1", "Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, transport, and capability systems through explicit ports.", "Auths is most useful beside existing systems. Every integration page states what the adjacent system owns, what enters Auths, where secrets and state remain, which failures belong to whom, and what the composition does not promise."),
+  composition("auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1", "Compose raw keys, OIDC, SPIFFE, or application identity resolvers.", "The identity and trust system", "Validated method-, suite-, issuer-, subject-, audience-, and freshness-labelled evidence", "Authentication remains independent from authority and Auths does not become the directory or identity provider.", scenarios.identity),
+  composition("auths.page.integrations.policy/1", "Use Cedar, OPA, or relationship-based authorization as explicit policy context.", "The policy engine and its data owners", "A bounded decision, policy identity, relevant context commitment, and observation time", "Auths does not reimplement the policy language or pretend a policy decision alone authorizes an exact effect."),
+  composition("auths.page.integrations.cloud/1", "Acquire short-lived cloud credentials only inside a closed gateway after Auths authorization.", "Cloud IAM and the provider account", "A sealed provider-independent command mapped to one least-privilege cloud operation", "Cloud IAM remains necessary for provider access; Auths adds portable exact authority, lifecycle, recovery, and receipts rather than replacing the cloud control plane.", scenarios.runtime),
+  composition("auths.page.integrations.transport/1", "Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, files, or application transports.", "The transport and network operators", "Bounded framed identity, authority, command, or receipt bytes", "Delivery, channel authentication, and peer reachability never become authorization, and Auths does not prescribe a single network."),
+  composition("auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1", "Import or compose UCAN, Biscuit, macaroons, or another capability result without conflating semantics.", "The capability protocol and its verifier", "A verified, bounded capability projection with its original evidence identity", "Auths does not claim identical semantics or silently translate unsupported caveats; applications must profile the exact overlap and external state.", scenarios.agent),
+  composition("auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1", "Build an application-owned profile for actions, resources, commands, budgets, and safe receipt fields.", "The application domain team", "Bounded canonical domain inputs and explicit provider-independent command mappings", "Profile kit does not own identity adapters, transports, stores, custody, approval vendors, or provider credentials."),
+  developerGuide("auths.page.developers.extensions/1", "Implement identity, suite, trust, status, approval, custody, state, transport, gateway, or profile ports.", scenarios.identity, "A replaceable adapter satisfies a narrow typed contract and conformance suite without changing core semantics.", "Choose exactly one port, read its ownership and threat boundary, and start from the maintained in-memory or reference adapter rather than a second semantic implementation.", "Parse bounded inputs into opaque adapter-owned types, implement stable closed outcomes, add positive plus adversarial fixtures, and qualify failures, concurrency, cancellation, and observability.", "The adapter can be swapped without changing application authority artifacts or the other ports.", "Implicit fallbacks, secret leakage, unbounded parsing, language-specific semantic decisions, swallowed uncertainty, or cross-port dependencies fail review.", "Publish the adapter independently when Auths should not own its lifecycle."),
+  landing("auths.page.developers.examples/1", "Find complete examples by outcome, boundary, and deployment maturity.", "Start with installed quickstarts, then use the live incident-response demo for multi-party workflows, interoperability fixtures for composition, and the field lab for real cloud evidence. Each example states whether it is deterministic, production-shaped, or production-ready."),
+  referencePage({ id: "auths.page.developers.releases/1", description: "Inspect release notes, package support, contracts, evidence, and known limitations for one Auths release.", factKind: "endpoint", fact: "auths.endpoint.version/1", orientation: "A release joins Rust crates, maintained SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, fixtures, assurance claims, documentation, and supply-chain evidence under one identity.", usage: "Review breaking semantic identities, supported runtimes, state migrations, profile changes, evidence withdrawals, and known limits before deployment.", source: "The release page is rendered from signed or checksummed release artifacts and the exact source revisions that produced them." }),
+]);
diff --git a/content/page-builders.ts b/content/page-builders.ts
index 5dfdd2b..28988a8 100644
--- a/content/page-builders.ts
+++ b/content/page-builders.ts
@@ -135,3 +135,20 @@ export const runbook = (input: Readonly<{
   narrative("escalation", "Escalation", input.escalation),
 ]);
 
+export const referencePage = (input: Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  description: string;
+  factKind: "operation" | "endpoint";
+  fact: string;
+  orientation: string;
+  usage: string;
+  source: string;
+}>) => base(input.id, input.description, "inspect", {
+  operations: input.factKind === "operation" ? [input.fact] : [],
+  endpoints: input.factKind === "endpoint" ? [input.fact] : [],
+}, [
+  narrative("orientation", "Orientation", input.orientation),
+  { id: "contract", title: "Generated contract anchor", provenance: "generated-fact", factKind: input.factKind, fact: input.fact },
+  narrative("usage", "Use this surface", input.usage),
+  narrative("source", "Source at release", input.source),
+]);
diff --git a/public/developers.md b/public/developers.md
index a178907..e146049 100644
--- a/public/developers.md
+++ b/public/developers.md
@@ -1,32 +1,39 @@
 # Developers
 
-Find SDKs, Runtime APIs, tested examples, integrations, versioning, and extension contracts.
+Choose an SDK, call the runtime, use the CLI, test failures, compose adjacent systems, and build application profiles.
 
-## Recommended: [Integrations](/developers/integrations)
+## Recommended: [Quickstarts](/developers/quickstarts)
 
-Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
+Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.
 
-## Integrate and extend
+## Start building
 
-- [Integrations](/developers/integrations) — Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
+- [Quickstarts](/developers/quickstarts) — Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.
 
 ## SDKs
 
-- [Choose an Auths SDK](/developers/sdks) — Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
+- [SDKs](/developers/sdks) — Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
 
 ## Runtime and CLI
 
-- [Use the Runtime API](/developers/runtime-api) — Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.
-- [Auths CLI](/developers/cli) — Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.
+- [Runtime API](/developers/runtime-api) — Call the production HTTPS runtime from any language or service boundary.
+- [CLI](/developers/cli) — Use the CLI for local evaluation, fixture verification, runtime inspection, and operator-owned recovery.
 
 ## Test and debug
 
-- [Test Auths outcomes](/developers/testing) — Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.
-- [Outcomes and errors](/developers/errors) — Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.
+- [Testing](/developers/testing) — Test success, denial, mutation, replay, recovery, and cross-language parity with deterministic fixtures.
+- [Outcomes and errors](/developers/errors) — Handle the complete closed outcome and error surface without collapsing uncertainty into exceptions or booleans.
 
 ## Releases
 
-- [Versions and compatibility](/developers/versioning) — Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
+- [Versioning](/developers/versioning) — Pin semantic identities, SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, and evidence to a release.
+- [Releases](/developers/releases) — Inspect release notes, package support, contracts, evidence, and known limitations for one Auths release.
+
+## Integrate and extend
+
+- [Integrations](/developers/integrations) — Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, transport, and capability systems through explicit ports.
+- [Extension kits](/developers/extension-kits) — Implement identity, suite, trust, status, approval, custody, state, transport, gateway, or profile ports.
+- [Examples](/developers/examples) — Find complete examples by outcome, boundary, and deployment maturity.
 
 ## Related topics
 
diff --git a/public/developers/cli.md b/public/developers/cli.md
index 2e6cd33..1922dfb 100644
--- a/public/developers/cli.md
+++ b/public/developers/cli.md
@@ -1,14 +1,34 @@
-# Auths CLI
+# CLI
 
-Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.
+Use the CLI for local evaluation, fixture verification, runtime inspection, and operator-owned recovery.
 
-## The CLI is an interface, not ambient permission
+## Outcome
 
-CLI commands parse explicit inputs and use the same native semantic owners as the SDKs. A successful command invocation does not bypass trust, authority, state, or gateway checks.
+A terminal user can verify evidence and inspect a configured runtime without reconstructing requests manually.
 
-## Verification remains effect-free
+## Before you begin
 
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.verify/1`.
+Install the CLI for the selected release, provide explicit input files or standard input, and configure trust or runtime endpoints through bounded documented options.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Print version, verify a known receipt, inspect a bounded summary, check runtime health, and exercise resume against an isolated recovery scenario.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+Commands return stable machine-readable outcomes, safe human summaries, and non-zero status for every closed failure.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Unknown flags, interactive secret leakage, ambiguous config, full disclosure without authority, or automatic provider retry is prohibited.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use generated CLI reference for exact flags and shell completion.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.developers.cli/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/errors.md b/public/developers/errors.md
index 6d4b658..326a8d2 100644
--- a/public/developers/errors.md
+++ b/public/developers/errors.md
@@ -1,14 +1,22 @@
 # Outcomes and errors
 
-Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.
+Handle the complete closed outcome and error surface without collapsing uncertainty into exceptions or booleans.
 
-## Closed outcomes preserve what is known
+## Orientation
 
-Denied means the request must change. Indeterminate means a required decision input was unavailable. Recoverable means resume the same opaque reference. Provider-unknown means reconcile before retrying.
+Parse errors, denials, indeterminate lifecycle results, provider failures, provider-unknown outcomes, and terminal successes mean different things. SDKs use typed results; the Runtime API uses closed response schemas.
 
-## Never flatten uncertainty into an exception retry
+## Generated contract anchor
 
-Blind retry can repeat a real-world effect. Keep outcome class, correlation evidence, and the permitted next action together.
+Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.executions/1`.
+
+## Use this surface
+
+Switch exhaustively on the generated union. Retry only transport failures known to precede reservation; Resume an existing reference after reservation; reconcile provider unknown; treat unknown future variants as closed.
+
+## Source at release
+
+Outcome identities and shapes are generated from the release Runtime contract and SDK declarations.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.developers.errors/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/examples.md b/public/developers/examples.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d61fde0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/developers/examples.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Examples
+
+Find complete examples by outcome, boundary, and deployment maturity.
+
+## Choose a useful next step
+
+Start with installed quickstarts, then use the live incident-response demo for multi-party workflows, interoperability fixtures for composition, and the field lab for real cloud evidence. Each example states whether it is deterministic, production-shaped, or production-ready.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.examples/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/developers/extension-kits.md b/public/developers/extension-kits.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fdca516
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/developers/extension-kits.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Extension kits
+
+Implement identity, suite, trust, status, approval, custody, state, transport, gateway, or profile ports.
+
+## Outcome
+
+A replaceable adapter satisfies a narrow typed contract and conformance suite without changing core semantics.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Choose exactly one port, read its ownership and threat boundary, and start from the maintained in-memory or reference adapter rather than a second semantic implementation.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Parse bounded inputs into opaque adapter-owned types, implement stable closed outcomes, add positive plus adversarial fixtures, and qualify failures, concurrency, cancellation, and observability.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The adapter can be swapped without changing application authority artifacts or the other ports.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Implicit fallbacks, secret leakage, unbounded parsing, language-specific semantic decisions, swallowed uncertainty, or cross-port dependencies fail review.
+
+## Continue
+
+Publish the adapter independently when Auths should not own its lifecycle.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.extensions/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations.md b/public/developers/integrations.md
index 68e912e..eba2931 100644
--- a/public/developers/integrations.md
+++ b/public/developers/integrations.md
@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
 # Integrations
 
-Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
+Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, transport, and capability systems through explicit ports.
 
-## Recommended: [Identity and trust integrations](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust)
+## Recommended: [Identity and trust](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust)
 
-Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
+Compose raw keys, OIDC, SPIFFE, or application identity resolvers.
 
 ## Integrate and extend
 
-- [Identity and trust integrations](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust) — Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
-- [Policy engine integrations](/developers/integrations/policy) — Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.
-- [Cloud IAM integrations](/developers/integrations/cloud-iam) — Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.
-- [Transport integrations](/developers/integrations/transport) — Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.
-- [Capability integrations](/developers/integrations/capabilities) — Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.
-- [Build an application profile](/developers/integrations/profile-kit) — Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.
+- [Identity and trust](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust) — Compose raw keys, OIDC, SPIFFE, or application identity resolvers.
+- [Policy](/developers/integrations/policy) — Use Cedar, OPA, or relationship-based authorization as explicit policy context.
+- [Cloud IAM](/developers/integrations/cloud-iam) — Acquire short-lived cloud credentials only inside a closed gateway after Auths authorization.
+- [Transport](/developers/integrations/transport) — Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, files, or application transports.
+- [Capabilities](/developers/integrations/capabilities) — Import or compose UCAN, Biscuit, macaroons, or another capability result without conflating semantics.
+- [Profile kit](/developers/integrations/profile-kit) — Build an application-owned profile for actions, resources, commands, budgets, and safe receipt fields.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.integrations.composition/1 · Product contract: auths.page.integrations.composition/1_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/capabilities.md b/public/developers/integrations/capabilities.md
index 15a3a50..2bd6171 100644
--- a/public/developers/integrations/capabilities.md
+++ b/public/developers/integrations/capabilities.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Capability integrations
+# Capabilities
 
-Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.
+Import or compose UCAN, Biscuit, macaroons, or another capability result without conflating semantics.
 
-## Preserve the source capability's legitimate role
+## Ownership boundary
 
-An import profile states which external claims map into Auths authority and which require external state. It must reject any mapping that silently invents stronger bounds or execution guarantees.
+The capability protocol and its verifier remains authoritative for its domain. Auths owns only the portable bounded authority and native execution or verification semantics at the composition boundary.
+
+## Data flow
+
+A verified, bounded capability projection with its original evidence identity is parsed into an explicit typed input. Auths commits only what its decision or command needs, then returns a stable outcome and bounded evidence.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Private identity keys, OAuth tokens, policy data, cloud credentials, transport secrets, and provider credentials remain behind their existing ports. They are never copied into Auths authority.
+
+## State
+
+Each adjacent system retains its native lifecycle. Auths stores only uses, budgets, replay, plan, execution, recovery, and receipt state for protected effects.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+Malformed input, stale evidence, adapter uncertainty, authority mismatch, replay, and provider ambiguity remain separate closed outcomes with one named owner.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+Auths does not claim identical semantics or silently translate unsupported caveats; applications must profile the exact overlap and external state.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md b/public/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md
index 1ca2a2b..d0f87c9 100644
--- a/public/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md
+++ b/public/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Cloud IAM integrations
+# Cloud IAM
 
-Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.
+Acquire short-lived cloud credentials only inside a closed gateway after Auths authorization.
 
-## Cloud IAM remains the provider boundary
+## Ownership boundary
 
-Cloud IAM supplies workload identity and restricted provider credentials. Auths supplies exact effect authority, durable use accounting, closed outcomes, and portable receipts. Credentials never enter the agent or proof.
+Cloud IAM and the provider account remains authoritative for its domain. Auths owns only the portable bounded authority and native execution or verification semantics at the composition boundary.
+
+## Data flow
+
+A sealed provider-independent command mapped to one least-privilege cloud operation is parsed into an explicit typed input. Auths commits only what its decision or command needs, then returns a stable outcome and bounded evidence.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Private identity keys, OAuth tokens, policy data, cloud credentials, transport secrets, and provider credentials remain behind their existing ports. They are never copied into Auths authority.
+
+## State
+
+Each adjacent system retains its native lifecycle. Auths stores only uses, budgets, replay, plan, execution, recovery, and receipt state for protected effects.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+Malformed input, stale evidence, adapter uncertainty, authority mismatch, replay, and provider ambiguity remain separate closed outcomes with one named owner.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+Cloud IAM remains necessary for provider access; Auths adds portable exact authority, lifecycle, recovery, and receipts rather than replacing the cloud control plane.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.integrations.cloud/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md b/public/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md
index d13e087..1745194 100644
--- a/public/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md
+++ b/public/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Identity and trust integrations
+# Identity and trust
 
-Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
+Compose raw keys, OIDC, SPIFFE, or application identity resolvers.
 
-## Your trust policy owns who is accepted
+## Ownership boundary
 
-Auths supplies bounded evidence parsing and suite-labelled verification. Your application supplies accepted roots and resolver policy. The identity system supplies authentication evidence; none of these alone grants an effect.
+The identity and trust system remains authoritative for its domain. Auths owns only the portable bounded authority and native execution or verification semantics at the composition boundary.
+
+## Data flow
+
+Validated method-, suite-, issuer-, subject-, audience-, and freshness-labelled evidence is parsed into an explicit typed input. Auths commits only what its decision or command needs, then returns a stable outcome and bounded evidence.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Private identity keys, OAuth tokens, policy data, cloud credentials, transport secrets, and provider credentials remain behind their existing ports. They are never copied into Auths authority.
+
+## State
+
+Each adjacent system retains its native lifecycle. Auths stores only uses, budgets, replay, plan, execution, recovery, and receipt state for protected effects.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+Malformed input, stale evidence, adapter uncertainty, authority mismatch, replay, and provider ambiguity remain separate closed outcomes with one named owner.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+Authentication remains independent from authority and Auths does not become the directory or identity provider.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/policy.md b/public/developers/integrations/policy.md
index 90480ae..f17bb3f 100644
--- a/public/developers/integrations/policy.md
+++ b/public/developers/integrations/policy.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Policy engine integrations
+# Policy
 
-Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.
+Use Cedar, OPA, or relationship-based authorization as explicit policy context.
 
-## Policy supplies context; Auths binds the exact effect
+## Ownership boundary
 
-The policy engine evaluates application relationships and attributes. Auths commits the resulting bounded decision context to the action and preserves execution state and receipts.
+The policy engine and its data owners remains authoritative for its domain. Auths owns only the portable bounded authority and native execution or verification semantics at the composition boundary.
+
+## Data flow
+
+A bounded decision, policy identity, relevant context commitment, and observation time is parsed into an explicit typed input. Auths commits only what its decision or command needs, then returns a stable outcome and bounded evidence.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Private identity keys, OAuth tokens, policy data, cloud credentials, transport secrets, and provider credentials remain behind their existing ports. They are never copied into Auths authority.
+
+## State
+
+Each adjacent system retains its native lifecycle. Auths stores only uses, budgets, replay, plan, execution, recovery, and receipt state for protected effects.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+Malformed input, stale evidence, adapter uncertainty, authority mismatch, replay, and provider ambiguity remain separate closed outcomes with one named owner.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+Auths does not reimplement the policy language or pretend a policy decision alone authorizes an exact effect.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.integrations.policy/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md b/public/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md
index 5a84568..e24696a 100644
--- a/public/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md
+++ b/public/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Build an application profile
+# Profile kit
 
-Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.
+Build an application-owned profile for actions, resources, commands, budgets, and safe receipt fields.
 
-## A profile defines domain meaning
+## Ownership boundary
 
-Define bounded canonical actions, resource matching, attenuation, and inspection projections. Keep identity, transport, state, custody, approval providers, and execution adapters outside the profile.
+The application domain team remains authoritative for its domain. Auths owns only the portable bounded authority and native execution or verification semantics at the composition boundary.
+
+## Data flow
+
+Bounded canonical domain inputs and explicit provider-independent command mappings is parsed into an explicit typed input. Auths commits only what its decision or command needs, then returns a stable outcome and bounded evidence.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Private identity keys, OAuth tokens, policy data, cloud credentials, transport secrets, and provider credentials remain behind their existing ports. They are never copied into Auths authority.
+
+## State
+
+Each adjacent system retains its native lifecycle. Auths stores only uses, budgets, replay, plan, execution, recovery, and receipt state for protected effects.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+Malformed input, stale evidence, adapter uncertainty, authority mismatch, replay, and provider ambiguity remain separate closed outcomes with one named owner.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+Profile kit does not own identity adapters, transports, stores, custody, approval vendors, or provider credentials.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/transport.md b/public/developers/integrations/transport.md
index 0af5baf..e2720ed 100644
--- a/public/developers/integrations/transport.md
+++ b/public/developers/integrations/transport.md
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
-# Transport integrations
+# Transport
 
-Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.
+Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, files, or application transports.
 
-## Delivery is never authority
+## Ownership boundary
 
-Transport authenticates or delivers peers and bytes according to its own contract. Auths verifies those bounded bytes under explicit trust and authority. Iroh can be used without capabilities; Auths can be used without Iroh.
+The transport and network operators remains authoritative for its domain. Auths owns only the portable bounded authority and native execution or verification semantics at the composition boundary.
+
+## Data flow
+
+Bounded framed identity, authority, command, or receipt bytes is parsed into an explicit typed input. Auths commits only what its decision or command needs, then returns a stable outcome and bounded evidence.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Private identity keys, OAuth tokens, policy data, cloud credentials, transport secrets, and provider credentials remain behind their existing ports. They are never copied into Auths authority.
+
+## State
+
+Each adjacent system retains its native lifecycle. Auths stores only uses, budgets, replay, plan, execution, recovery, and receipt state for protected effects.
+
+## Failure ownership
+
+Malformed input, stale evidence, adapter uncertainty, authority mismatch, replay, and provider ambiguity remain separate closed outcomes with one named owner.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+Delivery, channel authentication, and peer reachability never become authorization, and Auths does not prescribe a single network.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.integrations.transport/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/quickstarts.md b/public/developers/quickstarts.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a7c9aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/developers/quickstarts.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Quickstarts
+
+Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.
+
+## Choose a useful next step
+
+Use Local REST effect for an in-process SDK boundary, Runtime effect for the HTTPS service, Agent delegation for tools, Approved plan for exact review, Offline verification for inert evidence, Recovery for ambiguous outcomes, or Identity swap for agility. The maintained projects live under Get started so there is one runnable source.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.quickstarts/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/developers/releases.md b/public/developers/releases.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60f553c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/developers/releases.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Releases
+
+Inspect release notes, package support, contracts, evidence, and known limitations for one Auths release.
+
+## Orientation
+
+A release joins Rust crates, maintained SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, fixtures, assurance claims, documentation, and supply-chain evidence under one identity.
+
+## Generated contract anchor
+
+Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.version/1`.
+
+## Use this surface
+
+Review breaking semantic identities, supported runtimes, state migrations, profile changes, evidence withdrawals, and known limits before deployment.
+
+## Source at release
+
+The release page is rendered from signed or checksummed release artifacts and the exact source revisions that produced them.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.releases/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/developers/runtime-api.md b/public/developers/runtime-api.md
index e4f58ec..4641a7c 100644
--- a/public/developers/runtime-api.md
+++ b/public/developers/runtime-api.md
@@ -1,14 +1,34 @@
-# Use the Runtime API
+# Runtime API
 
-Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.
+Call the production HTTPS runtime from any language or service boundary.
 
-## Use a runtime when effects cross a trust boundary
+## Outcome
 
-The runtime is appropriate when signing keys, replay state, receipts, or provider credentials must stay outside the caller process. It does not replace your application API or identity provider.
+A client checks health and version, submits bounded authority and sealed commands, handles closed outcomes, resumes existing executions, and requests authorized receipt views.
 
-## Runtime entry points
+## Before you begin
 
-Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.executions/1`.
+Use one HTTPS origin whose release identity and trust are explicitly configured. Keep provider credentials, signer custody, and durable state behind the service.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Call health and version first, create or bring authority, execute with an idempotency commitment, switch on the complete outcome union, resume only by opaque reference, and verify the returned receipt.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+A packaged consumer completes once and the exact Runtime API reference matches the deployed contract digest.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Non-HTTPS endpoints, version mismatch, unknown outcome, invalid request, timeout after provider access, or missing receipt cannot be treated as success.
+
+## Continue
+
+Open generated Runtime API reference for exact methods, paths, limits, and schemas.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/sdks.md b/public/developers/sdks.md
index bbd5a20..daf06a2 100644
--- a/public/developers/sdks.md
+++ b/public/developers/sdks.md
@@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
-# Choose an Auths SDK
+# SDKs
 
-Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
+Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
 
-## Choose for your application, not for semantics
+## Recommended: [Rust](/developers/sdks/rust)
 
-TypeScript and Python expose the same product workflow. Rust owns the protocol meaning and also exposes lower-level components for native applications.
+Install the maintained Rust SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
 
-Start with the product facade. Descend into profile, verification, inspection, and runtime surfaces only when the application needs that control.
+## SDKs
 
-## One lifecycle in every language
+- [Rust](/developers/sdks/rust) — Install the maintained Rust SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
+- [TypeScript](/developers/sdks/typescript) — Install the maintained TypeScript SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
+- [Python](/developers/sdks/python) — Install the maintained Python SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
+- [SDK parity](/developers/sdks/parity) — Inspect maintained operation, outcome, fixture, and packaging parity across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
 
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks/1 · Product contract: auths.page.developers.sdks/1_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/sdks/parity.md b/public/developers/sdks/parity.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f5cb72f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/developers/sdks/parity.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# SDK parity
+
+Inspect maintained operation, outcome, fixture, and packaging parity across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+
+## Orientation
+
+Parity means identical semantic operations, accepted and rejected fixtures, normalized outcomes, and receipt bytes. It does not require language APIs to ignore their own idioms.
+
+## Generated contract anchor
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
+
+## Use this surface
+
+Use the generated matrix to confirm create, delegate, execute, resume, verify, inspection, and diagnostics coverage for the selected release before choosing an SDK.
+
+## Source at release
+
+The release bundle, packaged API inventories, and differential fixtures generate the matrix. Editorial pages do not hand-maintain method lists.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks.parity/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/developers/sdks/python.md b/public/developers/sdks/python.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9883ed7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/developers/sdks/python.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Python
+
+Install the maintained Python SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
+
+## Outcome
+
+A clean Python consumer can create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify without reproducing Rust-owned semantics.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Use a supported Python runtime and install the packaged SDK with python -m pip install auths. Keep the release contract and examples from that package version.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Start from the installed local REST effect, switch the global language selector to this SDK, run the permitted request and denial, then follow exact symbols into Reference.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The packaged consumer returns the same normalized outcomes and receipt commitments as Rust and the other maintained SDK.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Missing native artifacts, unsupported runtime, type mismatch, ABI mismatch, semantic drift, or a language-owned authorization object fails installation or qualification.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use SDK parity to compare maintained coverage and Runtime API when the application should not load a native extension.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks.python/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/developers/sdks/rust.md b/public/developers/sdks/rust.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..674e19b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/developers/sdks/rust.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Rust
+
+Install the maintained Rust SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
+
+## Outcome
+
+A clean Rust consumer can create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify without reproducing Rust-owned semantics.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Use a supported Rust runtime and install the packaged SDK with cargo add auths-sdk. Keep the release contract and examples from that package version.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Start from the installed local REST effect, switch the global language selector to this SDK, run the permitted request and denial, then follow exact symbols into Reference.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The packaged consumer returns the same normalized outcomes and receipt commitments as Rust and the other maintained SDK.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Missing native artifacts, unsupported runtime, type mismatch, ABI mismatch, semantic drift, or a language-owned authorization object fails installation or qualification.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use SDK parity to compare maintained coverage and Runtime API when the application should not load a native extension.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks.rust/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/developers/sdks/typescript.md b/public/developers/sdks/typescript.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc483b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/developers/sdks/typescript.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# TypeScript
+
+Install the maintained TypeScript SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
+
+## Outcome
+
+A clean TypeScript consumer can create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify without reproducing Rust-owned semantics.
+
+## Before you begin
+
+Use a supported TypeScript runtime and install the packaged SDK with npm install @auths-dev/sdk. Keep the release contract and examples from that package version.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Start from the installed local REST effect, switch the global language selector to this SDK, run the permitted request and denial, then follow exact symbols into Reference.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+The packaged consumer returns the same normalized outcomes and receipt commitments as Rust and the other maintained SDK.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Missing native artifacts, unsupported runtime, type mismatch, ABI mismatch, semantic drift, or a language-owned authorization object fails installation or qualification.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use SDK parity to compare maintained coverage and Runtime API when the application should not load a native extension.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks.typescript/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+
diff --git a/public/developers/testing.md b/public/developers/testing.md
index 7b24679..c7f56de 100644
--- a/public/developers/testing.md
+++ b/public/developers/testing.md
@@ -1,14 +1,34 @@
-# Test Auths outcomes
+# Testing
 
-Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.
+Test success, denial, mutation, replay, recovery, and cross-language parity with deterministic fixtures.
 
-## Test the boundary, not only the happy path
+## Outcome
 
-Keep fixtures for byte mutation, widening, expiry, revocation, replay, approval substitution, provider uncertainty, resume, and receipt disclosure. Assert that a denied path never reaches the provider.
+Application tests prove the effect boundary and prohibited variants without relying on mock authorization logic.
 
-## Prove safe recovery
+## Before you begin
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
+Install packaged SDKs, use deterministic keys and clocks only in testkit, isolate provider substitutes, and name the exact stable outcome each negative case expects.
+
+## Build the bounded path
+
+Run permitted, changed bytes, widened delegation, expired, revoked, replayed, over-budget, plan substitution, transport-only, provider-unknown, and disclosure-denial fixtures.
+
+## Run the qualified path
+
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+
+## Success means
+
+All languages agree, prohibited providers are untouched, and every executable example is traced to a qualified scenario.
+
+## Fail closed
+
+Snapshot-only output, live network dependence, broad mocks, ignored indeterminate states, or language-specific semantic assertions fails the test design.
+
+## Continue
+
+Add the fixtures to CI and inspect exact generated errors and evidence.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.developers.testing/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/versioning.md b/public/developers/versioning.md
index e7dabd5..d8f772d 100644
--- a/public/developers/versioning.md
+++ b/public/developers/versioning.md
@@ -1,14 +1,22 @@
-# Versions and compatibility
+# Versioning
 
-Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
+Pin semantic identities, SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, and evidence to a release.
 
-## Prelaunch means one clean surface
+## Orientation
 
-Auths does not carry deprecated entry points, migration shims, or compatibility aliases before launch. Breaking changes replace the preview contract and are reported explicitly.
+Auths versions wire meaning and public surfaces explicitly. A package version alone is not permission to mix contracts, profiles, or generated documentation from another release.
 
-## Semantic changes receive new identities
+## Generated contract anchor
 
-A release bundle binds documentation to exact operations, scenarios, endpoints, and evidence. Contract drift either regenerates the affected page or fails qualification.
+Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.version/1`.
+
+## Use this surface
+
+Check the Runtime version endpoint, compare its contract digest with installed artifacts, and qualify state plus fixtures before upgrade or rollback.
+
+## Source at release
+
+Version and digest data come from the immutable release bundle selected by the documentation build.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.developers.versioning/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
diff --git a/public/llms-full.txt b/public/llms-full.txt
index da26c36..72fe7c0 100644
--- a/public/llms-full.txt
+++ b/public/llms-full.txt
@@ -1206,33 +1206,40 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.authority.verify/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d443912991
 
 # Developers
 
-Find SDKs, Runtime APIs, tested examples, integrations, versioning, and extension contracts.
+Choose an SDK, call the runtime, use the CLI, test failures, compose adjacent systems, and build application profiles.
 
-## Recommended: [Integrations](/developers/integrations)
+## Recommended: [Quickstarts](/developers/quickstarts)
 
-Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
+Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.
 
-## Integrate and extend
+## Start building
 
-- [Integrations](/developers/integrations) — Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
+- [Quickstarts](/developers/quickstarts) — Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.
 
 ## SDKs
 
-- [Choose an Auths SDK](/developers/sdks) — Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
+- [SDKs](/developers/sdks) — Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
 
 ## Runtime and CLI
 
-- [Use the Runtime API](/developers/runtime-api) — Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.
-- [Auths CLI](/developers/cli) — Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.
+- [Runtime API](/developers/runtime-api) — Call the production HTTPS runtime from any language or service boundary.
+- [CLI](/developers/cli) — Use the CLI for local evaluation, fixture verification, runtime inspection, and operator-owned recovery.
 
 ## Test and debug
 
-- [Test Auths outcomes](/developers/testing) — Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.
-- [Outcomes and errors](/developers/errors) — Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.
+- [Testing](/developers/testing) — Test success, denial, mutation, replay, recovery, and cross-language parity with deterministic fixtures.
+- [Outcomes and errors](/developers/errors) — Handle the complete closed outcome and error surface without collapsing uncertainty into exceptions or booleans.
 
 ## Releases
 
-- [Versions and compatibility](/developers/versioning) — Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
+- [Versioning](/developers/versioning) — Pin semantic identities, SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, and evidence to a release.
+- [Releases](/developers/releases) — Inspect release notes, package support, contracts, evidence, and known limitations for one Auths release.
+
+## Integrate and extend
+
+- [Integrations](/developers/integrations) — Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, transport, and capability systems through explicit ports.
+- [Extension kits](/developers/extension-kits) — Implement identity, suite, trust, status, approval, custody, state, transport, gateway, or profile ports.
+- [Examples](/developers/examples) — Find complete examples by outcome, boundary, and deployment maturity.
 
 ## Related topics
 
@@ -1244,65 +1251,62 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.developers/1 · Product contract: auths.page.develope
 
 ---
 
-# Auths CLI
+# CLI
 
-Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.
+Use the CLI for local evaluation, fixture verification, runtime inspection, and operator-owned recovery.
 
-## The CLI is an interface, not ambient permission
+## Outcome
 
-CLI commands parse explicit inputs and use the same native semantic owners as the SDKs. A successful command invocation does not bypass trust, authority, state, or gateway checks.
+A terminal user can verify evidence and inspect a configured runtime without reconstructing requests manually.
 
-## Verification remains effect-free
+## Before you begin
 
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.verify/1`.
+Install the CLI for the selected release, provide explicit input files or standard input, and configure trust or runtime endpoints through bounded documented options.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.cli/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Build the bounded path
 
+Print version, verify a known receipt, inspect a bounded summary, check runtime health, and exercise resume against an isolated recovery scenario.
 
+## Run the qualified path
 
----
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
 
-# Outcomes and errors
+## Success means
 
-Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.
+Commands return stable machine-readable outcomes, safe human summaries, and non-zero status for every closed failure.
 
-## Closed outcomes preserve what is known
+## Fail closed
 
-Denied means the request must change. Indeterminate means a required decision input was unavailable. Recoverable means resume the same opaque reference. Provider-unknown means reconcile before retrying.
+Unknown flags, interactive secret leakage, ambiguous config, full disclosure without authority, or automatic provider retry is prohibited.
 
-## Never flatten uncertainty into an exception retry
+## Continue
 
-Blind retry can repeat a real-world effect. Keep outcome class, correlation evidence, and the permitted next action together.
+Use generated CLI reference for exact flags and shell completion.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.errors/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.cli/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Integrations
+# Outcomes and errors
 
-Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
+Handle the complete closed outcome and error surface without collapsing uncertainty into exceptions or booleans.
 
-## Recommended: [Identity and trust integrations](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust)
+## Orientation
 
-Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
+Parse errors, denials, indeterminate lifecycle results, provider failures, provider-unknown outcomes, and terminal successes mean different things. SDKs use typed results; the Runtime API uses closed response schemas.
 
-## Integrate and extend
+## Generated contract anchor
 
-- [Identity and trust integrations](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust) — Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
-- [Policy engine integrations](/developers/integrations/policy) — Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.
-- [Cloud IAM integrations](/developers/integrations/cloud-iam) — Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.
-- [Transport integrations](/developers/integrations/transport) — Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.
-- [Capability integrations](/developers/integrations/capabilities) — Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.
-- [Build an application profile](/developers/integrations/profile-kit) — Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.
+Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.executions/1`.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.composition/1 · Product contract: auths.page.integrations.composition/1_
+## Use this surface
 
+Switch exhaustively on the generated union. Retry only transport failures known to precede reservation; Resume an existing reference after reservation; reconcile provider unknown; treat unknown future variants as closed.
 
+## Source at release
 
----
-
-# Capability integrations
+Outcome identities and shapes are generated from the release Runtime contract and SDK declarations.
 
-Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.
\ No newline at end of file
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.errors/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef0076
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/llms.txt b/public/llms.txt
index 5d84f21..5d0bbf6 100644
--- a/public/llms.txt
+++ b/public/llms.txt
@@ -39,20 +39,28 @@
 - [Bounded disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure.md) — Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.
 - [Resume](/authority/resume.md) — Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.
 - [Verify](/authority/verify.md) — Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.
-- [Developers](/developers.md) — Find SDKs, Runtime APIs, tested examples, integrations, versioning, and extension contracts.
-- [Auths CLI](/developers/cli.md) — Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.
-- [Outcomes and errors](/developers/errors.md) — Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.
-- [Integrations](/developers/integrations.md) — Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.
-- [Capability integrations](/developers/integrations/capabilities.md) — Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.
-- [Cloud IAM integrations](/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md) — Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.
-- [Identity and trust integrations](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md) — Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.
-- [Policy engine integrations](/developers/integrations/policy.md) — Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.
-- [Build an application profile](/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md) — Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.
-- [Transport integrations](/developers/integrations/transport.md) — Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.
-- [Use the Runtime API](/developers/runtime-api.md) — Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.
-- [Choose an Auths SDK](/developers/sdks.md) — Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
-- [Test Auths outcomes](/developers/testing.md) — Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.
-- [Versions and compatibility](/developers/versioning.md) — Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.
+- [Developers](/developers.md) — Choose an SDK, call the runtime, use the CLI, test failures, compose adjacent systems, and build application profiles.
+- [CLI](/developers/cli.md) — Use the CLI for local evaluation, fixture verification, runtime inspection, and operator-owned recovery.
+- [Outcomes and errors](/developers/errors.md) — Handle the complete closed outcome and error surface without collapsing uncertainty into exceptions or booleans.
+- [Examples](/developers/examples.md) — Find complete examples by outcome, boundary, and deployment maturity.
+- [Extension kits](/developers/extension-kits.md) — Implement identity, suite, trust, status, approval, custody, state, transport, gateway, or profile ports.
+- [Integrations](/developers/integrations.md) — Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, transport, and capability systems through explicit ports.
+- [Capabilities](/developers/integrations/capabilities.md) — Import or compose UCAN, Biscuit, macaroons, or another capability result without conflating semantics.
+- [Cloud IAM](/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md) — Acquire short-lived cloud credentials only inside a closed gateway after Auths authorization.
+- [Identity and trust](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md) — Compose raw keys, OIDC, SPIFFE, or application identity resolvers.
+- [Policy](/developers/integrations/policy.md) — Use Cedar, OPA, or relationship-based authorization as explicit policy context.
+- [Profile kit](/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md) — Build an application-owned profile for actions, resources, commands, budgets, and safe receipt fields.
+- [Transport](/developers/integrations/transport.md) — Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, files, or application transports.
+- [Quickstarts](/developers/quickstarts.md) — Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.
+- [Releases](/developers/releases.md) — Inspect release notes, package support, contracts, evidence, and known limitations for one Auths release.
+- [Runtime API](/developers/runtime-api.md) — Call the production HTTPS runtime from any language or service boundary.
+- [SDKs](/developers/sdks.md) — Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
+- [SDK parity](/developers/sdks/parity.md) — Inspect maintained operation, outcome, fixture, and packaging parity across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+- [Python](/developers/sdks/python.md) — Install the maintained Python SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
+- [Rust](/developers/sdks/rust.md) — Install the maintained Rust SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
+- [TypeScript](/developers/sdks/typescript.md) — Install the maintained TypeScript SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
+- [Testing](/developers/testing.md) — Test success, denial, mutation, replay, recovery, and cross-language parity with deterministic fixtures.
+- [Versioning](/developers/versioning.md) — Pin semantic identities, SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, and evidence to a release.
 - [Get started](/get-started.md) — Choose one concrete outcome and reach a verified, fail-closed result.
 - [Adopt incrementally](/get-started/adoption.md) — Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.
 - [API keys](/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md) — Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.
diff --git a/public/search-index.json b/public/search-index.json
index d5d291b..6e97767 100644
--- a/public/search-index.json
+++ b/public/search-index.json
@@ -287,98 +287,154 @@
       "id": "auths.page.developers/1",
       "path": "/developers",
       "title": "Developers",
-      "description": "Find SDKs, Runtime APIs, tested examples, integrations, versioning, and extension contracts.",
+      "description": "Choose an SDK, call the runtime, use the CLI, test failures, compose adjacent systems, and build application profiles.",
       "section": "developers"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.developers.cli/1",
       "path": "/developers/cli",
-      "title": "Auths CLI",
-      "description": "Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.",
+      "title": "CLI",
+      "description": "Use the CLI for local evaluation, fixture verification, runtime inspection, and operator-owned recovery.",
       "section": "developers"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.developers.errors/1",
       "path": "/developers/errors",
       "title": "Outcomes and errors",
-      "description": "Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.",
+      "description": "Handle the complete closed outcome and error surface without collapsing uncertainty into exceptions or booleans.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.examples/1",
+      "path": "/developers/examples",
+      "title": "Examples",
+      "description": "Find complete examples by outcome, boundary, and deployment maturity.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.extensions/1",
+      "path": "/developers/extension-kits",
+      "title": "Extension kits",
+      "description": "Implement identity, suite, trust, status, approval, custody, state, transport, gateway, or profile ports.",
       "section": "developers"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
       "path": "/developers/integrations",
       "title": "Integrations",
-      "description": "Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.",
+      "description": "Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, transport, and capability systems through explicit ports.",
       "section": "developers"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1",
       "path": "/developers/integrations/capabilities",
-      "title": "Capability integrations",
-      "description": "Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.",
+      "title": "Capabilities",
+      "description": "Import or compose UCAN, Biscuit, macaroons, or another capability result without conflating semantics.",
       "section": "developers"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.integrations.cloud/1",
       "path": "/developers/integrations/cloud-iam",
-      "title": "Cloud IAM integrations",
-      "description": "Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.",
+      "title": "Cloud IAM",
+      "description": "Acquire short-lived cloud credentials only inside a closed gateway after Auths authorization.",
       "section": "developers"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1",
       "path": "/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust",
-      "title": "Identity and trust integrations",
-      "description": "Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.",
+      "title": "Identity and trust",
+      "description": "Compose raw keys, OIDC, SPIFFE, or application identity resolvers.",
       "section": "developers"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.integrations.policy/1",
       "path": "/developers/integrations/policy",
-      "title": "Policy engine integrations",
-      "description": "Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.",
+      "title": "Policy",
+      "description": "Use Cedar, OPA, or relationship-based authorization as explicit policy context.",
       "section": "developers"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1",
       "path": "/developers/integrations/profile-kit",
-      "title": "Build an application profile",
-      "description": "Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.",
+      "title": "Profile kit",
+      "description": "Build an application-owned profile for actions, resources, commands, budgets, and safe receipt fields.",
       "section": "developers"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.integrations.transport/1",
       "path": "/developers/integrations/transport",
-      "title": "Transport integrations",
-      "description": "Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.",
+      "title": "Transport",
+      "description": "Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, files, or application transports.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.quickstarts/1",
+      "path": "/developers/quickstarts",
+      "title": "Quickstarts",
+      "description": "Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.releases/1",
+      "path": "/developers/releases",
+      "title": "Releases",
+      "description": "Inspect release notes, package support, contracts, evidence, and known limitations for one Auths release.",
       "section": "developers"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1",
       "path": "/developers/runtime-api",
-      "title": "Use the Runtime API",
-      "description": "Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.",
+      "title": "Runtime API",
+      "description": "Call the production HTTPS runtime from any language or service boundary.",
       "section": "developers"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks/1",
       "path": "/developers/sdks",
-      "title": "Choose an Auths SDK",
-      "description": "Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.",
+      "title": "SDKs",
+      "description": "Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.parity/1",
+      "path": "/developers/sdks/parity",
+      "title": "SDK parity",
+      "description": "Inspect maintained operation, outcome, fixture, and packaging parity across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.python/1",
+      "path": "/developers/sdks/python",
+      "title": "Python",
+      "description": "Install the maintained Python SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.rust/1",
+      "path": "/developers/sdks/rust",
+      "title": "Rust",
+      "description": "Install the maintained Rust SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.",
+      "section": "developers"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.typescript/1",
+      "path": "/developers/sdks/typescript",
+      "title": "TypeScript",
+      "description": "Install the maintained TypeScript SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.",
       "section": "developers"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.developers.testing/1",
       "path": "/developers/testing",
-      "title": "Test Auths outcomes",
-      "description": "Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.",
+      "title": "Testing",
+      "description": "Test success, denial, mutation, replay, recovery, and cross-language parity with deterministic fixtures.",
       "section": "developers"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.developers.versioning/1",
       "path": "/developers/versioning",
-      "title": "Versions and compatibility",
-      "description": "Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.",
+      "title": "Versioning",
+      "description": "Pin semantic identities, SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, and evidence to a release.",
       "section": "developers"
     },
     {
diff --git a/public/sitemap.xml b/public/sitemap.xml
index 979a039..cee8ae8 100644
--- a/public/sitemap.xml
+++ b/public/sitemap.xml
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/cli</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/errors</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/examples</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/extension-kits</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/integrations</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/integrations/capabilities</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/integrations/cloud-iam</loc></url>
@@ -47,8 +49,14 @@
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/integrations/policy</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/integrations/profile-kit</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/integrations/transport</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/quickstarts</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/releases</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/runtime-api</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/sdks</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/sdks/parity</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/sdks/python</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/sdks/rust</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/sdks/typescript</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/testing</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/versioning</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started</loc></url>

From 4ef5175c32ea6350e18b6822de7dc44f5ed69512 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 23:29:00 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 26/29] docs: complete reference and assurance utilities

---
 app/components/AssuranceClaimPanel.tsx        |  15 +
 app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx     |   9 +-
 app/globals.css                               |   8 +
 app/lib/content-graph.ts                      |  20 +-
 content/developer-pages.ts                    |   2 +-
 content/page-builders.ts                      |  16 +
 content/reference-assurance-pages.ts          |  42 +
 contracts/product-contract.fixture.json       |  12 +-
 public/.well-known/auths-docs.json            |  19 +
 public/agents/approved-plans.md               |   2 +-
 public/agents/delegation.md                   |   2 +-
 public/agents/how-auths-works.md              |   2 +-
 public/agents/identity.md                     |   2 +-
 public/agents/mcp/client.md                   |   2 +-
 public/agents/mcp/protect-server.md           |   2 +-
 public/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md            |   2 +-
 public/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md       |   2 +-
 public/agents/multi-agent.md                  |   2 +-
 public/agents/production-patterns.md          |   2 +-
 public/agents/quickstart.md                   |   2 +-
 public/agents/skills-and-plugins.md           |   2 +-
 public/agents/testing.md                      |   2 +-
 public/assurance.md                           |  30 +-
 public/assurance/adversarial.md               |  40 +
 public/assurance/authority.md                 |  40 +
 public/assurance/cross-language.md            |  40 +
 public/assurance/disclosure.md                |  40 +
 public/assurance/execution.md                 |  40 +
 public/assurance/formal.md                    |  40 +
 public/assurance/limitations.md               |  40 +
 public/assurance/semantics.md                 |  40 +
 public/assurance/supply-chain.md              |  40 +
 public/authority/constraints.md               |   2 +-
 public/authority/create.md                    |   2 +-
 public/authority/delegate.md                  |   2 +-
 public/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md  |   2 +-
 .../authority/delegate/widening-failures.md   |   2 +-
 public/authority/execute.md                   |   2 +-
 public/authority/lifecycle.md                 |   2 +-
 public/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md         |   2 +-
 .../lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md        |   2 +-
 public/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md |   2 +-
 .../lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md          |   2 +-
 public/authority/model.md                     |   4 +-
 public/authority/plans/approvals.md           |   2 +-
 public/authority/profiles.md                  |   2 +-
 public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md       |   4 +-
 public/authority/resume.md                    |   2 +-
 public/authority/verify.md                    |   2 +-
 public/developers.md                          |   4 +-
 public/developers/cli.md                      |  16 +-
 public/developers/errors.md                   |   2 +-
 public/developers/examples.md                 |   2 +-
 public/developers/extension-kits.md           |   2 +-
 .../developers/integrations/capabilities.md   |   2 +-
 public/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md   |   2 +-
 .../integrations/identity-and-trust.md        |   2 +-
 public/developers/integrations/policy.md      |   2 +-
 public/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md |   2 +-
 public/developers/integrations/transport.md   |   2 +-
 public/developers/quickstarts.md              |   2 +-
 public/developers/releases.md                 |   2 +-
 public/developers/runtime-api.md              |   2 +-
 public/developers/sdks/parity.md              |   2 +-
 public/developers/sdks/python.md              |   2 +-
 public/developers/sdks/rust.md                |   2 +-
 public/developers/sdks/typescript.md          |   2 +-
 public/developers/testing.md                  |   2 +-
 public/developers/versioning.md               |   2 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md       |   2 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/approvals.md      |   2 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md   |   2 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md      |   2 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/cutover.md        |   2 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md     |   2 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/plan.md           |   2 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md |   2 +-
 public/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md    |   2 +-
 .../get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md   |   2 +-
 public/get-started/choose.md                  |   2 +-
 public/get-started/evaluate.md                |   2 +-
 public/get-started/paths/agent.md             |   2 +-
 public/get-started/paths/application.md       |   2 +-
 public/get-started/paths/cross-company.md     |   2 +-
 public/get-started/paths/runtime.md           |   2 +-
 public/get-started/paths/verification.md      |   2 +-
 public/get-started/prerequisites.md           |   2 +-
 .../quickstarts/agent-delegation.md           |   2 +-
 .../get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md  |   2 +-
 .../get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md  |   2 +-
 .../quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md          |   2 +-
 .../quickstarts/offline-verification.md       |   2 +-
 public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md    |   2 +-
 .../get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md |   2 +-
 .../custom-and-post-quantum.md                |   2 +-
 .../cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md           |   2 +-
 .../cryptographic-suites/p256.md              |   2 +-
 .../exchange-public-identity.md               |   2 +-
 public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md         |   2 +-
 .../identity-sources/application-resolvers.md |   2 +-
 .../identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md            |   2 +-
 .../identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md       |   2 +-
 .../identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md |   2 +-
 .../identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md   |   2 +-
 public/identity-trust/testing.md              |   2 +-
 public/identity-trust/trust-policy.md         |   2 +-
 public/identity-trust/verification-context.md |   2 +-
 public/index.md                               |   5 +
 public/llms-full.txt                          | 823 ++++++++--------
 public/llms.txt                               |  33 +-
 public/operations.md                          |   2 +-
 public/operations/backup-and-restore.md       |   2 +-
 public/operations/configure/custody.md        |   2 +-
 public/operations/configure/durable-state.md  |   2 +-
 .../operations/configure/provider-gateways.md |   2 +-
 .../configure/trust-and-profiles.md           |   2 +-
 public/operations/deploy-runtime.md           |   2 +-
 public/operations/evaluate-locally.md         |   2 +-
 public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md      |   2 +-
 .../incidents/compromised-credential.md       |   2 +-
 .../operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md  |   2 +-
 .../incidents/receipt-disclosure.md           |   2 +-
 public/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md  |   2 +-
 public/operations/incidents/state-loss.md     |   2 +-
 .../operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md  |   2 +-
 public/operations/observability.md            |   2 +-
 public/operations/receipt-retention.md        |   2 +-
 .../operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md |   2 +-
 public/operations/security-checklist.md       |   2 +-
 public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md     |   2 +-
 public/reference-manifest.json                | 886 +++++++++++++++++-
 public/reference.md                           |  26 +-
 public/reference/cli.md                       |  22 +
 public/reference/errors.md                    |  22 +-
 public/reference/evidence.md                  |  22 +-
 public/reference/manifest.json                | 885 +++++++++++++++++
 public/reference/manifest.json.md             |  22 +
 public/reference/profiles.md                  |  20 +-
 public/reference/runtime-api.md               |  24 +-
 public/reference/schemas.md                   |  20 +-
 public/reference/sdk.md                       |  10 +-
 public/reference/sdk/python.md                |  22 +
 public/reference/sdk/rust.md                  |  22 +
 public/reference/sdk/sections/create.md       |   2 +-
 public/reference/sdk/sections/delegate.md     |   2 +-
 public/reference/sdk/sections/execute.md      |   2 +-
 public/reference/sdk/sections/resume.md       |   2 +-
 public/reference/sdk/sections/verify.md       |   2 +-
 public/reference/sdk/typescript.md            |  22 +
 public/search-index.json                      | 122 ++-
 public/sitemap.xml                            |  13 +
 tools/build-page-model/check.mjs              |   2 +-
 tools/build-reference/check.mjs               |   8 +-
 tools/render-markdown/check.mjs               |  10 +-
 .../generate-editorial-pages.mjs              |  17 +-
 .../render-markdown/generate-site-indexes.mjs |  41 +-
 156 files changed, 3273 insertions(+), 605 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 app/components/AssuranceClaimPanel.tsx
 create mode 100644 content/reference-assurance-pages.ts
 create mode 100644 public/.well-known/auths-docs.json
 create mode 100644 public/assurance/adversarial.md
 create mode 100644 public/assurance/authority.md
 create mode 100644 public/assurance/cross-language.md
 create mode 100644 public/assurance/disclosure.md
 create mode 100644 public/assurance/execution.md
 create mode 100644 public/assurance/formal.md
 create mode 100644 public/assurance/limitations.md
 create mode 100644 public/assurance/semantics.md
 create mode 100644 public/assurance/supply-chain.md
 create mode 100644 public/index.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/cli.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/manifest.json
 create mode 100644 public/reference/manifest.json.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/sdk/python.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/sdk/rust.md
 create mode 100644 public/reference/sdk/typescript.md

diff --git a/app/components/AssuranceClaimPanel.tsx b/app/components/AssuranceClaimPanel.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..49b7dfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/AssuranceClaimPanel.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+import type { AssuranceClaim } from "../lib/content-graph";
+
+export function AssuranceClaimPanel({ claim }: { claim: AssuranceClaim }) {
+  return <article className="assurance-claim">
+    <div className="assurance-claim-heading"><code>{claim.id}</code><span data-status={claim.status}>{claim.status}</span></div>
+    <p>{claim.statement}</p>
+    <dl>
+      <div><dt>Evidence</dt><dd><code>{claim.evidence}</code></dd></div>
+      <div><dt>SHA-256</dt><dd><code>{claim.evidenceSha256}</code></dd></div>
+      <div><dt>Reproduce</dt><dd>{claim.reproduction.map((command) => <code key={command}>{command}</code>)}</dd></div>
+      <div><dt>Scope</dt><dd>{claim.scope}</dd></div>
+      <div><dt>Limitation</dt><dd>{claim.limitation}</dd></div>
+    </dl>
+  </article>;
+}
diff --git a/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx b/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
index 41eb220..0c92004 100644
--- a/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
+++ b/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ import type { ContentSection as ContentSectionModel } from "../../../schemas/con
 import { TestedExample } from "../TestedExample";
 import { CodeGroup } from "../CodeGroup";
 import { quickstartByScenario } from "../../lib/quickstarts";
+import { assuranceClaims } from "../../lib/content-graph";
+import { AssuranceClaimPanel } from "../AssuranceClaimPanel";
 
 const labels = {
   "editorial-narrative": "Editorial",
@@ -24,7 +26,12 @@ export function ContentSection({ section }: { section: ContentSectionModel }) {
       </div>
       <h2>{section.title}</h2>
       {section.provenance === "editorial-narrative" && section.body.map((paragraph) => <p key={paragraph}>{paragraph}</p>)}
-      {section.provenance === "generated-fact" && <div className="generated-fact-reference"><code>{section.fact}</code><span>Resolved from the selected Auths release</span></div>}
+      {section.provenance === "generated-fact" && section.factKind === "claim" && (() => {
+        const claim = assuranceClaims.find((candidate) => candidate.id === section.fact);
+        if (!claim) throw new TypeError(`unknown assurance claim ${section.fact}`);
+        return <AssuranceClaimPanel claim={claim} />;
+      })()}
+      {section.provenance === "generated-fact" && section.factKind !== "claim" && <div className="generated-fact-reference"><code>{section.fact}</code><span>Resolved from the selected Auths release</span></div>}
       {section.provenance === "tested-scenario" && <TestedExample scenario={section.scenario as `auths.scenario.${string}/${number}`}>
         <p>This step is backed by installed Rust, TypeScript, and Python consumers with a normalized outcome.</p>
         {qualified && <CodeGroup snippets={([
diff --git a/app/globals.css b/app/globals.css
index fd39d42..5bb1d48 100644
--- a/app/globals.css
+++ b/app/globals.css
@@ -2852,6 +2852,14 @@ pre {
   padding: 17px 19px;
 }
 
+.assurance-claim { margin-top: 22px; padding: 24px; border: 1px solid var(--line); border-radius: 14px; background: var(--surface); }
+.assurance-claim-heading { display: flex; justify-content: space-between; gap: 16px; }
+.assurance-claim-heading span { color: #16834a; font-size: 11px; font-weight: 750; text-transform: uppercase; }
+.assurance-claim > p { font-size: 17px; line-height: 1.6; }
+.assurance-claim dl { display: grid; gap: 14px; margin: 22px 0 0; }
+.assurance-claim dt { color: var(--muted); font-size: 11px; font-weight: 750; text-transform: uppercase; }
+.assurance-claim dd { display: grid; gap: 5px; margin: 5px 0 0; line-height: 1.55; overflow-wrap: anywhere; }
+
 .generated-fact-reference span {
   color: var(--ink-faint);
   font-size: 12px;
diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
index d9ed24d..429cfbc 100644
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import { authorityPages } from "../../content/authority-pages.ts";
 import { agentPages } from "../../content/agent-pages.ts";
 import { operationsPages } from "../../content/operations-pages.ts";
 import { developerPages } from "../../content/developer-pages.ts";
+import { referenceAssurancePages } from "../../content/reference-assurance-pages.ts";
 import rawContract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
 import { parseAuthoredPageContent, type AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
 import { assertPageContract } from "../../schemas/page-contract.ts";
@@ -19,9 +20,21 @@ type ProductContract = Readonly<{
   digest: string;
   operations: readonly Readonly<{ id: string }>[];
   scenarios: readonly Readonly<{ id: string }>[];
+  claims: readonly AssuranceClaim[];
   runtimeFacts: Readonly<{ endpoints: readonly Readonly<{ id: string; outcomes?: readonly string[] }>[] }>;
 }>;
 
+export type AssuranceClaim = Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  statement: string;
+  status: "passing" | "degraded" | "superseded" | "withdrawn";
+  evidence: string;
+  evidenceSha256: string;
+  scope: string;
+  limitation: string;
+  reproduction: readonly string[];
+}>;
+
 export type VerifiedPageGraph = Readonly<{
   contractDigest: string;
   pages: readonly AuthoredPageSource[];
@@ -55,6 +68,7 @@ export function buildVerifiedPageGraph(pagesInput: unknown, contractInput: unkno
   const operations = identitySet(contract.operations);
   const scenarios = identitySet(contract.scenarios);
   const endpoints = identitySet(contract.runtimeFacts.endpoints);
+  const claims = identitySet(contract.claims);
   for (const page of pages) {
     if (pageIds.has(page.id)) throw new TypeError(`duplicate page identity ${page.id}`);
     if (paths.has(page.path)) throw new TypeError(`duplicate page path ${page.path}`);
@@ -63,7 +77,8 @@ export function buildVerifiedPageGraph(pagesInput: unknown, contractInput: unkno
     for (const id of page.uses.operations) if (!operations.has(id)) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} references unknown operation ${id}`);
     for (const id of page.uses.scenarios) if (!scenarios.has(id)) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} references unknown scenario ${id}`);
     for (const id of page.uses.endpoints) if (!endpoints.has(id)) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} references unknown endpoint ${id}`);
-    if (page.uses.profiles.length > 0 || page.uses.claims.length > 0) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} references facts absent from this fixture bundle`);
+    if (page.uses.profiles.length > 0) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} references profiles absent from this fixture bundle`);
+    for (const id of page.uses.claims) if (!claims.has(id)) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} references unknown claim ${id}`);
     for (const section of page.sections) {
       if (section.provenance === "tested-scenario" && !page.uses.scenarios.includes(section.scenario)) {
         throw new TypeError(`${page.id} does not declare scenario ${section.scenario}`);
@@ -97,7 +112,7 @@ function replacePages(base: readonly unknown[], replacements: readonly unknown[]
 
 const legacyPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = [...rawPages, ...rawDeveloperPages, ...rawAgentIntegrationPages, ...rawAdoptionPages, ...rawOperationsPages];
 export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze(
-  replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(legacyPageInputs, getStartedPages), identityTrustPages), authorityPages), agentPages), operationsPages), developerPages),
+  replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(legacyPageInputs, getStartedPages), identityTrustPages), authorityPages), agentPages), operationsPages), developerPages), referenceAssurancePages),
 );
 export const verifiedPageGraph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(authoredPageInputs, rawContract);
 
@@ -130,3 +145,4 @@ export const runtimeOutcomes: readonly string[] = Object.freeze([...new Set(
 )].sort());
 
 export const contractScenarioIds: ReadonlySet<string> = identitySet(rawContract.scenarios);
+export const assuranceClaims: readonly AssuranceClaim[] = Object.freeze(rawContract.claims.map((claim) => Object.freeze(claim as AssuranceClaim)));
diff --git a/content/developer-pages.ts b/content/developer-pages.ts
index da405ed..435b36e 100644
--- a/content/developer-pages.ts
+++ b/content/developer-pages.ts
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ export const developerPages: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([
     source: "The release bundle, packaged API inventories, and differential fixtures generate the matrix. Editorial pages do not hand-maintain method lists.",
   }),
   developerGuide("auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1", "Call the production HTTPS runtime from any language or service boundary.", scenarios.runtime, "A client checks health and version, submits bounded authority and sealed commands, handles closed outcomes, resumes existing executions, and requests authorized receipt views.", "Use one HTTPS origin whose release identity and trust are explicitly configured. Keep provider credentials, signer custody, and durable state behind the service.", "Call health and version first, create or bring authority, execute with an idempotency commitment, switch on the complete outcome union, resume only by opaque reference, and verify the returned receipt.", "A packaged consumer completes once and the exact Runtime API reference matches the deployed contract digest.", "Non-HTTPS endpoints, version mismatch, unknown outcome, invalid request, timeout after provider access, or missing receipt cannot be treated as success.", "Open generated Runtime API reference for exact methods, paths, limits, and schemas."),
-  developerGuide("auths.page.developers.cli/1", "Use the CLI for local evaluation, fixture verification, runtime inspection, and operator-owned recovery.", scenarios.verify, "A terminal user can verify evidence and inspect a configured runtime without reconstructing requests manually.", "Install the CLI for the selected release, provide explicit input files or standard input, and configure trust or runtime endpoints through bounded documented options.", "Print version, verify a known receipt, inspect a bounded summary, check runtime health, and exercise resume against an isolated recovery scenario.", "Commands return stable machine-readable outcomes, safe human summaries, and non-zero status for every closed failure.", "Unknown flags, interactive secret leakage, ambiguous config, full disclosure without authority, or automatic provider retry is prohibited.", "Use generated CLI reference for exact flags and shell completion."),
+  developerGuide("auths.page.developers.cli/1", "Choose supported terminal workflows without mistaking repository tooling for a public product CLI.", scenarios.verify, "A terminal user can run installed SDK scripts or call the Runtime API while preserving the same typed outcomes and evidence.", "The selected prelaunch release does not declare a general-purpose public Auths CLI. Use a maintained SDK or the HTTPS Runtime API; repository-only cargo xtask commands are contributor tooling.", "Run the offline verification project from a clean consumer, or call health and version with the documented Runtime API request. Keep inputs in bounded files and switch on machine-readable outcomes.", "Terminal workflows return the same verified result as application code and do not expose provider credentials or unrestricted receipt views.", "An undocumented binary, copied contributor command, ambiguous config, full disclosure without authority, or automatic provider retry is unsupported.", "Use the generated SDK or Runtime API reference. A future public CLI must first enter the immutable release contract."),
   developerGuide("auths.page.developers.testing/1", "Test success, denial, mutation, replay, recovery, and cross-language parity with deterministic fixtures.", scenarios.agent, "Application tests prove the effect boundary and prohibited variants without relying on mock authorization logic.", "Install packaged SDKs, use deterministic keys and clocks only in testkit, isolate provider substitutes, and name the exact stable outcome each negative case expects.", "Run permitted, changed bytes, widened delegation, expired, revoked, replayed, over-budget, plan substitution, transport-only, provider-unknown, and disclosure-denial fixtures.", "All languages agree, prohibited providers are untouched, and every executable example is traced to a qualified scenario.", "Snapshot-only output, live network dependence, broad mocks, ignored indeterminate states, or language-specific semantic assertions fails the test design.", "Add the fixtures to CI and inspect exact generated errors and evidence."),
   referencePage({ id: "auths.page.developers.errors/1", description: "Handle the complete closed outcome and error surface without collapsing uncertainty into exceptions or booleans.", factKind: "endpoint", fact: "auths.endpoint.executions/1", orientation: "Parse errors, denials, indeterminate lifecycle results, provider failures, provider-unknown outcomes, and terminal successes mean different things. SDKs use typed results; the Runtime API uses closed response schemas.", usage: "Switch exhaustively on the generated union. Retry only transport failures known to precede reservation; Resume an existing reference after reservation; reconcile provider unknown; treat unknown future variants as closed.", source: "Outcome identities and shapes are generated from the release Runtime contract and SDK declarations." }),
   referencePage({ id: "auths.page.developers.versioning/1", description: "Pin semantic identities, SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, and evidence to a release.", factKind: "endpoint", fact: "auths.endpoint.version/1", orientation: "Auths versions wire meaning and public surfaces explicitly. A package version alone is not permission to mix contracts, profiles, or generated documentation from another release.", usage: "Check the Runtime version endpoint, compare its contract digest with installed artifacts, and qualify state plus fixtures before upgrade or rollback.", source: "Version and digest data come from the immutable release bundle selected by the documentation build." }),
diff --git a/content/page-builders.ts b/content/page-builders.ts
index 28988a8..e15e85a 100644
--- a/content/page-builders.ts
+++ b/content/page-builders.ts
@@ -152,3 +152,19 @@ export const referencePage = (input: Readonly<{
   narrative("usage", "Use this surface", input.usage),
   narrative("source", "Source at release", input.source),
 ]);
+
+export const assurancePage = (input: Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  description: string;
+  claim: string;
+  model: string;
+  invariants: string;
+  failures: string;
+  next: string;
+}>) => base(input.id, input.description, "verify", { claims: [input.claim] }, [
+  narrative("model", "What the claim says", input.model),
+  { id: "evidence", title: "Release evidence", provenance: "generated-fact", factKind: "claim", fact: input.claim },
+  narrative("invariants", "What remains true", input.invariants),
+  narrative("failures", "What would weaken or withdraw it", input.failures),
+  narrative("next", "Continue", input.next),
+]);
diff --git a/content/reference-assurance-pages.ts b/content/reference-assurance-pages.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8a5180
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/reference-assurance-pages.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+import { assurancePage, landing, referencePage } from "./page-builders.ts";
+
+const reference = (
+  id: string,
+  description: string,
+  factKind: "operation" | "endpoint",
+  fact: string,
+  orientation: string,
+  usage: string,
+) => referencePage({
+  id, description, factKind, fact, orientation, usage,
+  source: "This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.",
+});
+
+const assurance = (id: string, description: string, claim: string, model: string, invariants: string, failures: string, next: string) => assurancePage({
+  id, description, claim, model, invariants, failures, next,
+});
+
+export const referenceAssurancePages: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([
+  landing("auths.page.reference/1", "Look up exact SDK, Runtime API, CLI, profile, error, schema, evidence, and manifest contracts for one release.", "Reference is generated lookup, not a second product narrative. Stable identities join Rust-owned operations to installed Rust, TypeScript, and Python symbols, HTTPS endpoints, outcomes, schemas, and release evidence."),
+  reference("auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while remaining on the same Auths operation.", "operation", "auths.operation.create/1", "The SDK reference groups the five semantic operations by stable identity and projects each maintained language's installed public symbol.", "Choose a language globally, inspect exact signatures and examples in the aligned code rail, and use source-at-release when a declaration needs deeper context."),
+  reference("auths.page.reference.sdk.rust/1", "Inspect maintained Rust SDK symbols and their operation mappings.", "operation", "auths.operation.create/1", "Rust is the semantic owner and exposes typed authoring, delegation, execution, recovery, verification, inspection, and diagnostics surfaces.", "Follow stable operation identities instead of crate module names; private implementation types are intentionally absent."),
+  reference("auths.page.reference.sdk.typescript/1", "Inspect installed TypeScript symbols and their native operation mappings.", "operation", "auths.operation.create/1", "The TypeScript SDK exposes idiomatic typed projections over Rust-owned semantics and synchronized outcomes.", "Use the integrated package first, then descend into focused entry points only when the application needs independent identity, verification, inspection, runtime, or testkit surfaces."),
+  reference("auths.page.reference.sdk.python/1", "Inspect installed Python symbols and their native operation mappings.", "operation", "auths.operation.create/1", "The Python SDK exposes typed high-level workflows while opaque native handles prevent Python code from minting effect-capable authorization.", "Use the same operation and outcome identities as TypeScript; consult the support matrix for maintained Python and platform wheels."),
+  reference("auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "Inspect exact HTTPS methods, paths, limits, outcomes, recovery, and receipt-disclosure contracts.", "endpoint", "auths.endpoint.health/1", "The Runtime API is the language-neutral production boundary. Every effectful endpoint declares request limits, closed outcomes, state behavior, and trust boundary.", "Check health and version, create authority, execute, resume, then request only authorized receipt projections. Unknown outcomes remain closed."),
+  reference("auths.page.reference.cli/1", "Check whether the selected release declares a supported public CLI surface.", "endpoint", "auths.endpoint.version/1", "This prelaunch release does not declare a general-purpose public Auths CLI. Repository cargo xtask commands are contributor tooling, not a supported customer interface.", "Use maintained SDKs or the Runtime API for terminal automation. A future CLI will appear here only after its commands, flags, outcomes, packages, and support policy enter the release contract."),
+  reference("auths.page.reference.profiles/1", "Inspect maintained and application-owned action, resource, command, budget, and receipt projection contracts.", "operation", "auths.operation.create/1", "Profiles map bounded domain intent into Auths operations without owning identity, transport, state, custody, approval providers, or provider credentials.", "Resolve profile version and action identities before authoring authority. Use profile-kit for application domains and qualify every critical extension."),
+  reference("auths.page.reference.errors/1", "Look up stable parse, trust, denial, lifecycle, execution, provider, recovery, and disclosure outcomes.", "endpoint", "auths.endpoint.executions/1", "Errors and closed outcomes are grouped by the caller's safe response rather than by internal exception type.", "Fix denied input, supply missing trusted context for indeterminate results, Resume recoverable executions, reconcile provider unknown, and never retry an unknown effect blindly."),
+  reference("auths.page.reference.schemas/1", "Inspect canonical bounded inputs, wire artifacts, commands, receipts, and disclosure view schemas.", "endpoint", "auths.endpoint.authorities/1", "Schemas are versioned release facts with size and shape limits. Parsers create trusted typed values; callers cannot validate loosely and pass raw objects onward.", "Generate clients from the selected release schema only where supported, and preserve unknown-field rejection at security boundaries."),
+  reference("auths.page.reference.evidence/1", "Resolve every public assurance claim to status, checksum, reproduction, scope, and limitation.", "operation", "auths.operation.verify/1", "Evidence pages do not convert repository tests into universal correctness. They report exactly what the selected release checked and where that claim stops.", "Verify evidence checksums, run the declared reproduction commands, and read limitations before relying on a claim for production risk decisions."),
+  reference("auths.page.reference.manifest/1", "Consume the machine-readable identity-to-URL manifest for the selected docs contract.", "endpoint", "auths.endpoint.version/1", "The manifest maps pages, operations, endpoints, scenarios, and evidence claims to canonical URLs under one contract digest.", "Agents and tooling should retrieve this JSON directly rather than scrape navigation or guess routes from display names."),
+  landing("auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "Inspect what Auths claims, the exact evidence behind it, and the limits that remain.", "Assurance is release-scoped and deliberately bounded. Each claim shows its current status, evidence path and checksum, reproduction commands, scope, and limitation. Formal models, differential fixtures, adversarial tests, and supply-chain assessment answer different questions."),
+  assurance("auths.page.assurance.semantics/1", "Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.", "auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1", "The claim covers ownership of protocol meaning across maintained SDK projections, not defect-free code or every application adapter.", "A declaration change must update semantic identity or version, packaged projections, fixtures, and documentation together.", "Unrecorded semantic drift, language-owned authorization logic, or a fixture disagreement degrades or withdraws the claim.", "Inspect cross-language evidence and the generated SDK reference for the selected release."),
+  assurance("auths.page.assurance.authority/1", "Inspect attenuation and approval-binding evidence for bounded authority.", "auths.claim.attenuation/1", "The maintained model and fixtures assert that delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent across declared fields.", "Action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, depth, and modelled critical extensions must preserve their narrowing relation.", "A new unmodelled field, accepted incomparable child, formal drift, or differential mismatch narrows the scope or withdraws passing status.", "Review adversarial approval and delegation evidence alongside application-profile tests."),
+  assurance("auths.page.assurance.execution/1", "Inspect the native closed-gateway boundary protecting provider effects.", "auths.claim.closed-gateway/1", "Maintained workflows acquire provider access only through opaque native-authorized commands after required checks and state transitions.", "Transport, authentication, approval, signatures, or application objects cannot mint the effect-capable handle.", "An unsafe application-owned adapter, direct provider route, handle forgery, missing reservation, or semantic bypass lies outside or invalidates the claim.", "Use Operations to qualify the selected durable store, custody, and provider gateway deployment."),
+  assurance("auths.page.assurance.disclosure/1", "Inspect evidence that receipt views are bounded and authority-controlled.", "auths.claim.bounded-disclosure/1", "Receipt integrity and receipt disclosure are separate decisions. Unauthorized callers receive an opaque view; summary and full projections are native-owned.", "Public artifacts contain bounded commitments and verification material rather than raw provider payloads or secrets.", "Unsafe downstream logging, overbroad retention, application-authored views, or disclosure-policy regression remains a deployment or product failure.", "Review receipt retention and the disclosure incident runbook before exposing evidence APIs."),
+  assurance("auths.page.assurance.cross-language/1", "Compare maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes for identical scenarios.", "auths.claim.cross-language-parity/1", "Parity covers stable semantic operations and qualified installed-artifact scenarios while allowing idiomatic language types and packaging.", "The same fixture bytes and trusted context produce the same normalized outcome and commitments.", "A missing wheel, unsupported platform, public API drift, language-specific decision, or differing fixture result degrades the release claim.", "Run the packaged scenario suite and inspect the SDK parity page."),
+  assurance("auths.page.assurance.formal/1", "Understand where formal attenuation evidence applies and where it does not.", "auths.claim.attenuation/1", "Lean and translation qualification reason about declared models and refinements; they do not prove every provider, store, network, UI, or deployment behavior.", "The checked theorem statements, axioms, translations, and source closure must match the selected release.", "Model drift, unreviewed axioms, stale generated translations, or code outside the refinement boundary changes the assurance scope.", "Pair formal evidence with adversarial, differential, and operational qualification."),
+  assurance("auths.page.assurance.adversarial/1", "Inspect substitution, widening, replay, mutation, and fail-closed evidence.", "auths.claim.approval-binding/1", "Adversarial fixtures try to change approved bytes, order, members, authority constraints, trust inputs, and lifecycle state.", "Every maintained language and runtime path must reject the same prohibited mutation before an unintended provider effect.", "Untested application profiles, adapters, external approval identity, or provider behavior remain outside the fixture claim.", "Keep application-specific negative fixtures beside each profile and gateway."),
+  assurance("auths.page.assurance.supply-chain/1", "Inspect the recorded SLSA builder assessment without mistaking it for an independent audit.", "auths.claim.supply-chain/1", "The assessment covers the declared GitHub release builder and recorded SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 controls.", "Builder bytes, provenance subjects, workflow identity, and release artifacts must match their checksummed assessment.", "A changed builder, missing provenance, unverified subject, or stale assessment withdraws passing status.", "Verify promotion evidence and obtain independent review appropriate to the deployment's consequence."),
+  assurance("auths.page.assurance.limitations/1", "Read the boundaries that Auths evidence deliberately does not claim to cross.", "auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1", "Auths evidence does not certify production availability, every adapter, every cloud, every application profile, business intent, compliance, or universal correctness.", "Claims remain useful only when their release, checksum, scope, and limitation are carried together.", "Marketing language, stale screenshots, demo success, or an unpinned docs build cannot upgrade or broaden a claim.", "Use the open production and field-lab evidence as inputs, then perform deployment-specific threat modelling and external review."),
+]);
diff --git a/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json b/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json
index ab3cbf6..ab01b34 100644
--- a/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json
+++ b/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "schema": "auths.docs.contract/1",
-  "digest": "14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3",
+  "digest": "8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90",
   "operations": [
     { "id": "auths.operation.create/1" },
     { "id": "auths.operation.delegate/1" },
@@ -20,6 +20,16 @@
     { "id": "auths.scenario.recovery/1" },
     { "id": "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1" }
   ],
+  "claims": [
+    { "id": "auths.claim.approval-binding/1", "statement": "Approval is bound to exact plan context and cannot authorize substituted plan bytes.", "status": "passing", "evidence": "bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json", "evidenceSha256": "a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331", "scope": "Maintained approval-plan signing requests, responses, and substitution fixtures.", "limitation": "The application remains responsible for approver identity, user experience, and organizational policy.", "reproduction": ["cargo xtask sdk-experience"] },
+    { "id": "auths.claim.attenuation/1", "statement": "Delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent under the maintained model and adversarial fixtures.", "status": "passing", "evidence": "formal/qualification.lean", "evidenceSha256": "fb1fd17d377194e96f98313412052f82fbb43cb594b12eb6a9fa0e0dce3ce70c", "scope": "Attenuation relations represented by the maintained formal model and protocol profile.", "limitation": "The claim covers the modelled fields and maintained protocol profile, not arbitrary application-defined semantics.", "reproduction": ["cargo xtask formal"] },
+    { "id": "auths.claim.bounded-disclosure/1", "statement": "Receipt inspection defaults to opaque or bounded views and requires authority for full disclosure.", "status": "passing", "evidence": "release/docs/runtime-facts-v1.json", "evidenceSha256": "3229ccc5a4adbcdfd4b55bdca58ab9e7e5c333719aeff3a0dba54976e6fef1f1", "scope": "Maintained receipt summary and disclosure operations and their public runtime contract.", "limitation": "Deployment retention, access control, and downstream handling remain application responsibilities.", "reproduction": ["cargo xtask product-conformance"] },
+    { "id": "auths.claim.closed-gateway/1", "statement": "Maintained product workflows reach provider adapters only through opaque native-authorized commands.", "status": "passing", "evidence": "release/semantic-freeze.json", "evidenceSha256": "75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3", "scope": "Maintained execution workflows and their opaque native command and gateway boundary.", "limitation": "Application-owned adapters can still be implemented unsafely outside the maintained boundary.", "reproduction": ["cargo xtask product-waist-conformance"] },
+    { "id": "auths.claim.cross-language-parity/1", "statement": "Maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python scenarios target identical stable semantic outcomes.", "status": "passing", "evidence": "release/docs/scenarios.toml", "evidenceSha256": "f056e57acb5dbad67ef5ed5076bdee388a82e73b7e6a6af53b82c226ccd552da", "scope": "The maintained installed-artifact scenarios declared for Rust, TypeScript, and Python.", "limitation": "Scenario parity covers maintained workflows and versions, not every possible application composition.", "reproduction": ["cargo xtask cross-language"] },
+    { "id": "auths.claim.lifecycle-state/1", "statement": "Maintained runtime paths preserve replay, use, budget, and recovery distinctions.", "status": "passing", "evidence": "bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json", "evidenceSha256": "a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331", "scope": "Maintained runtime and installed-SDK workflows for replay, use, budget, reservation, and recovery outcomes.", "limitation": "Production guarantees also depend on the selected durable store and its deployment.", "reproduction": ["cargo xtask sdk-experience"] },
+    { "id": "auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1", "statement": "Rust owns protocol meaning used by Rust, TypeScript, and Python projections.", "status": "passing", "evidence": "release/semantic-freeze.json", "evidenceSha256": "75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3", "scope": "The declared protocol and product semantic identities consumed by maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python surfaces.", "limitation": "The semantic freeze detects declared semantic drift; it is not a proof that every implementation is defect-free.", "reproduction": ["cargo xtask semantic-freeze"] },
+    { "id": "auths.claim.supply-chain/1", "statement": "The assessed release builder satisfies the recorded SLSA Build Level 3 requirements.", "status": "passing", "evidence": "release/slsa-build-level-3-assessment.json", "evidenceSha256": "49d5a096915d49058c8c66f29c5c7f59181caa0783d4724322068de6c5c3f6bf", "scope": "The assessed GitHub release builder and recorded SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 controls.", "limitation": "This is a repository-owner delegated build assessment, not an independent security audit or source-correctness proof.", "reproduction": ["cargo test -p xtask release_control::tests::checked_in_slsa_assessment_matches_builder_bytes"] }
+  ],
   "runtimeFacts": {
     "endpoints": [
       { "id": "auths.endpoint.health/1", "outcomes": ["completed"] },
diff --git a/public/.well-known/auths-docs.json b/public/.well-known/auths-docs.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c2e69a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/.well-known/auths-docs.json
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.discovery/1",
+  "contractDigest": "8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90",
+  "canonicalBase": "https://docs.auths.dev",
+  "markdown": "/<page>.md",
+  "search": "/search-index.json",
+  "sitemap": "/sitemap.xml",
+  "manifest": "/reference/manifest.json",
+  "claims": [
+    "auths.claim.approval-binding/1",
+    "auths.claim.attenuation/1",
+    "auths.claim.bounded-disclosure/1",
+    "auths.claim.closed-gateway/1",
+    "auths.claim.cross-language-parity/1",
+    "auths.claim.lifecycle-state/1",
+    "auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1",
+    "auths.claim.supply-chain/1"
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/public/agents/approved-plans.md b/public/agents/approved-plans.md
index 6460987..0b37b4d 100644
--- a/public/agents/approved-plans.md
+++ b/public/agents/approved-plans.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Prompt changes, member replacement, reordered work, mutation after approval, reu
 
 Add multi-agent handoffs only by delegating a narrower plan or member scope.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/delegation.md b/public/agents/delegation.md
index 59cb9b1..ca128be 100644
--- a/public/agents/delegation.md
+++ b/public/agents/delegation.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Changing the tool, resource, arguments, audience, use count, budget, expiry, dep
 
 Use approved plans when the exact proposed sequence requires review.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegation/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/how-auths-works.md b/public/agents/how-auths-works.md
index e5b6da5..5468e14 100644
--- a/public/agents/how-auths-works.md
+++ b/public/agents/how-auths-works.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Widening, prompt or plan substitution, ambient credentials, transport-only succe
 
 Run Delegate one tool, then add plans, multiple agents, or MCP only when the workflow calls for them.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/identity.md b/public/agents/identity.md
index 4d4102c..c570d0c 100644
--- a/public/agents/identity.md
+++ b/public/agents/identity.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
 Identity proves who signed bytes; it cannot decide which tool the agent may run.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.identity/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.identity/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/mcp/client.md b/public/agents/mcp/client.md
index 4267c45..7753cf5 100644
--- a/public/agents/mcp/client.md
+++ b/public/agents/mcp/client.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ A prompt-authored proof, undeclared tool, changed arguments, wrong server audien
 
 Protect the MCP server so provider credentials stay outside the client and model.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/mcp/protect-server.md b/public/agents/mcp/protect-server.md
index bba665f..8233694 100644
--- a/public/agents/mcp/protect-server.md
+++ b/public/agents/mcp/protect-server.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Valid MCP framing, authenticated transport, a known client, or an approval flag
 
 Define tool profiles and the transport boundary explicitly for every exposed effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md b/public/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md
index 0ac531a..608a0f0 100644
--- a/public/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md
+++ b/public/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Unknown tools, unbounded arguments, ambiguous canonicalization, hidden provider
 
 Keep the profile reusable across MCP transports and agent frameworks.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md b/public/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md
index 48f6d9f..bf21bd1 100644
--- a/public/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md
+++ b/public/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Duplicate delivery, reordered messages, partial frames, oversized inputs, authen
 
 Choose transport for reachability and reliability; choose Auths authority and runtime state for permission and exactly-once effect control.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/multi-agent.md b/public/agents/multi-agent.md
index 17eedf5..21780fc 100644
--- a/public/agents/multi-agent.md
+++ b/public/agents/multi-agent.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ A skipped parent, widened child, depth reset, identity substitution, hidden tool
 
 Use receipts to verify the complete chain and production patterns to assign human ownership.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/production-patterns.md b/public/agents/production-patterns.md
index d74db7b..c9bf9f2 100644
--- a/public/agents/production-patterns.md
+++ b/public/agents/production-patterns.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Missing state, signer outage, trust ambiguity, receipt loss, unexplained denial,
 
 Use Production operations for deployment and incident runbooks.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.production/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.production/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/quickstart.md b/public/agents/quickstart.md
index e10b1d2..0b233b9 100644
--- a/public/agents/quickstart.md
+++ b/public/agents/quickstart.md
@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@ Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohib
 
 Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/skills-and-plugins.md b/public/agents/skills-and-plugins.md
index b1512be..8e84468 100644
--- a/public/agents/skills-and-plugins.md
+++ b/public/agents/skills-and-plugins.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
 A skill is integration convenience, not a new authority source. It cannot replace native verification or gateway isolation.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.skills/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.skills/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/agents/testing.md b/public/agents/testing.md
index 77e4857..d9aa0fd 100644
--- a/public/agents/testing.md
+++ b/public/agents/testing.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Any prohibited effect, language disagreement, prompt-derived bypass, automatic f
 
 Keep adversarial fixtures beside each tool profile and run them against packaged SDKs.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.testing/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.testing/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/assurance.md b/public/assurance.md
index 00fa794..0c2dfac 100644
--- a/public/assurance.md
+++ b/public/assurance.md
@@ -1,10 +1,32 @@
 # Assurance
 
-Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
+Inspect what Auths claims, the exact evidence behind it, and the limits that remain.
 
-## Show what the evidence proves
+## Recommended: [Semantics](/assurance/semantics)
 
-Every claim names its evidence, release, scope, and limitation.
+Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Claims
+
+- [Semantics](/assurance/semantics) — Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.
+- [Authority](/assurance/authority) — Inspect attenuation and approval-binding evidence for bounded authority.
+- [Execution](/assurance/execution) — Inspect the native closed-gateway boundary protecting provider effects.
+- [Disclosure](/assurance/disclosure) — Inspect evidence that receipt views are bounded and authority-controlled.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- [Cross-language](/assurance/cross-language) — Compare maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes for identical scenarios.
+- [Formal](/assurance/formal) — Understand where formal attenuation evidence applies and where it does not.
+- [Adversarial](/assurance/adversarial) — Inspect substitution, widening, replay, mutation, and fail-closed evidence.
+- [Supply chain](/assurance/supply-chain) — Inspect the recorded SLSA builder assessment without mistaking it for an independent audit.
+
+## Limits
+
+- [Limitations](/assurance/limitations) — Read the boundaries that Auths evidence deliberately does not claim to cross.
+
+## Related topics
+
+- [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1 · Product contract: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1_
 
diff --git a/public/assurance/adversarial.md b/public/assurance/adversarial.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..807f2ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/assurance/adversarial.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Adversarial
+
+Inspect substitution, widening, replay, mutation, and fail-closed evidence.
+
+## What the claim says
+
+Adversarial fixtures try to change approved bytes, order, members, authority constraints, trust inputs, and lifecycle state.
+
+## Release evidence
+
+Claim: `auths.claim.approval-binding/1` · status `passing`
+
+Approval is bound to exact plan context and cannot authorize substituted plan bytes.
+
+Evidence: `bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json`
+
+SHA-256: `a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331`
+
+Reproduce:
+
+- `cargo xtask sdk-experience`
+
+Scope: Maintained approval-plan signing requests, responses, and substitution fixtures.
+
+Limitation: The application remains responsible for approver identity, user experience, and organizational policy.
+
+## What remains true
+
+Every maintained language and runtime path must reject the same prohibited mutation before an unintended provider effect.
+
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
+
+Untested application profiles, adapters, external approval identity, or provider behavior remain outside the fixture claim.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep application-specific negative fixtures beside each profile and gateway.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.adversarial/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+
diff --git a/public/assurance/authority.md b/public/assurance/authority.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b5099b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/assurance/authority.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Authority
+
+Inspect attenuation and approval-binding evidence for bounded authority.
+
+## What the claim says
+
+The maintained model and fixtures assert that delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent across declared fields.
+
+## Release evidence
+
+Claim: `auths.claim.attenuation/1` · status `passing`
+
+Delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent under the maintained model and adversarial fixtures.
+
+Evidence: `formal/qualification.lean`
+
+SHA-256: `fb1fd17d377194e96f98313412052f82fbb43cb594b12eb6a9fa0e0dce3ce70c`
+
+Reproduce:
+
+- `cargo xtask formal`
+
+Scope: Attenuation relations represented by the maintained formal model and protocol profile.
+
+Limitation: The claim covers the modelled fields and maintained protocol profile, not arbitrary application-defined semantics.
+
+## What remains true
+
+Action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, depth, and modelled critical extensions must preserve their narrowing relation.
+
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
+
+A new unmodelled field, accepted incomparable child, formal drift, or differential mismatch narrows the scope or withdraws passing status.
+
+## Continue
+
+Review adversarial approval and delegation evidence alongside application-profile tests.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.authority/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+
diff --git a/public/assurance/cross-language.md b/public/assurance/cross-language.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5eb7c6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/assurance/cross-language.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Cross-language
+
+Compare maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes for identical scenarios.
+
+## What the claim says
+
+Parity covers stable semantic operations and qualified installed-artifact scenarios while allowing idiomatic language types and packaging.
+
+## Release evidence
+
+Claim: `auths.claim.cross-language-parity/1` · status `passing`
+
+Maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python scenarios target identical stable semantic outcomes.
+
+Evidence: `release/docs/scenarios.toml`
+
+SHA-256: `f056e57acb5dbad67ef5ed5076bdee388a82e73b7e6a6af53b82c226ccd552da`
+
+Reproduce:
+
+- `cargo xtask cross-language`
+
+Scope: The maintained installed-artifact scenarios declared for Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+
+Limitation: Scenario parity covers maintained workflows and versions, not every possible application composition.
+
+## What remains true
+
+The same fixture bytes and trusted context produce the same normalized outcome and commitments.
+
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
+
+A missing wheel, unsupported platform, public API drift, language-specific decision, or differing fixture result degrades the release claim.
+
+## Continue
+
+Run the packaged scenario suite and inspect the SDK parity page.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.cross-language/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+
diff --git a/public/assurance/disclosure.md b/public/assurance/disclosure.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a804e10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/assurance/disclosure.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Disclosure
+
+Inspect evidence that receipt views are bounded and authority-controlled.
+
+## What the claim says
+
+Receipt integrity and receipt disclosure are separate decisions. Unauthorized callers receive an opaque view; summary and full projections are native-owned.
+
+## Release evidence
+
+Claim: `auths.claim.bounded-disclosure/1` · status `passing`
+
+Receipt inspection defaults to opaque or bounded views and requires authority for full disclosure.
+
+Evidence: `release/docs/runtime-facts-v1.json`
+
+SHA-256: `3229ccc5a4adbcdfd4b55bdca58ab9e7e5c333719aeff3a0dba54976e6fef1f1`
+
+Reproduce:
+
+- `cargo xtask product-conformance`
+
+Scope: Maintained receipt summary and disclosure operations and their public runtime contract.
+
+Limitation: Deployment retention, access control, and downstream handling remain application responsibilities.
+
+## What remains true
+
+Public artifacts contain bounded commitments and verification material rather than raw provider payloads or secrets.
+
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
+
+Unsafe downstream logging, overbroad retention, application-authored views, or disclosure-policy regression remains a deployment or product failure.
+
+## Continue
+
+Review receipt retention and the disclosure incident runbook before exposing evidence APIs.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+
diff --git a/public/assurance/execution.md b/public/assurance/execution.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca81e7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/assurance/execution.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Execution
+
+Inspect the native closed-gateway boundary protecting provider effects.
+
+## What the claim says
+
+Maintained workflows acquire provider access only through opaque native-authorized commands after required checks and state transitions.
+
+## Release evidence
+
+Claim: `auths.claim.closed-gateway/1` · status `passing`
+
+Maintained product workflows reach provider adapters only through opaque native-authorized commands.
+
+Evidence: `release/semantic-freeze.json`
+
+SHA-256: `75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3`
+
+Reproduce:
+
+- `cargo xtask product-waist-conformance`
+
+Scope: Maintained execution workflows and their opaque native command and gateway boundary.
+
+Limitation: Application-owned adapters can still be implemented unsafely outside the maintained boundary.
+
+## What remains true
+
+Transport, authentication, approval, signatures, or application objects cannot mint the effect-capable handle.
+
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
+
+An unsafe application-owned adapter, direct provider route, handle forgery, missing reservation, or semantic bypass lies outside or invalidates the claim.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use Operations to qualify the selected durable store, custody, and provider gateway deployment.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.execution/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+
diff --git a/public/assurance/formal.md b/public/assurance/formal.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbb445a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/assurance/formal.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Formal
+
+Understand where formal attenuation evidence applies and where it does not.
+
+## What the claim says
+
+Lean and translation qualification reason about declared models and refinements; they do not prove every provider, store, network, UI, or deployment behavior.
+
+## Release evidence
+
+Claim: `auths.claim.attenuation/1` · status `passing`
+
+Delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent under the maintained model and adversarial fixtures.
+
+Evidence: `formal/qualification.lean`
+
+SHA-256: `fb1fd17d377194e96f98313412052f82fbb43cb594b12eb6a9fa0e0dce3ce70c`
+
+Reproduce:
+
+- `cargo xtask formal`
+
+Scope: Attenuation relations represented by the maintained formal model and protocol profile.
+
+Limitation: The claim covers the modelled fields and maintained protocol profile, not arbitrary application-defined semantics.
+
+## What remains true
+
+The checked theorem statements, axioms, translations, and source closure must match the selected release.
+
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
+
+Model drift, unreviewed axioms, stale generated translations, or code outside the refinement boundary changes the assurance scope.
+
+## Continue
+
+Pair formal evidence with adversarial, differential, and operational qualification.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.formal/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+
diff --git a/public/assurance/limitations.md b/public/assurance/limitations.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2700e9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/assurance/limitations.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Limitations
+
+Read the boundaries that Auths evidence deliberately does not claim to cross.
+
+## What the claim says
+
+Auths evidence does not certify production availability, every adapter, every cloud, every application profile, business intent, compliance, or universal correctness.
+
+## Release evidence
+
+Claim: `auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1` · status `passing`
+
+Rust owns protocol meaning used by Rust, TypeScript, and Python projections.
+
+Evidence: `release/semantic-freeze.json`
+
+SHA-256: `75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3`
+
+Reproduce:
+
+- `cargo xtask semantic-freeze`
+
+Scope: The declared protocol and product semantic identities consumed by maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python surfaces.
+
+Limitation: The semantic freeze detects declared semantic drift; it is not a proof that every implementation is defect-free.
+
+## What remains true
+
+Claims remain useful only when their release, checksum, scope, and limitation are carried together.
+
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
+
+Marketing language, stale screenshots, demo success, or an unpinned docs build cannot upgrade or broaden a claim.
+
+## Continue
+
+Use the open production and field-lab evidence as inputs, then perform deployment-specific threat modelling and external review.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.limitations/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+
diff --git a/public/assurance/semantics.md b/public/assurance/semantics.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9820677
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/assurance/semantics.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Semantics
+
+Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.
+
+## What the claim says
+
+The claim covers ownership of protocol meaning across maintained SDK projections, not defect-free code or every application adapter.
+
+## Release evidence
+
+Claim: `auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1` · status `passing`
+
+Rust owns protocol meaning used by Rust, TypeScript, and Python projections.
+
+Evidence: `release/semantic-freeze.json`
+
+SHA-256: `75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3`
+
+Reproduce:
+
+- `cargo xtask semantic-freeze`
+
+Scope: The declared protocol and product semantic identities consumed by maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python surfaces.
+
+Limitation: The semantic freeze detects declared semantic drift; it is not a proof that every implementation is defect-free.
+
+## What remains true
+
+A declaration change must update semantic identity or version, packaged projections, fixtures, and documentation together.
+
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
+
+Unrecorded semantic drift, language-owned authorization logic, or a fixture disagreement degrades or withdraws the claim.
+
+## Continue
+
+Inspect cross-language evidence and the generated SDK reference for the selected release.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.semantics/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+
diff --git a/public/assurance/supply-chain.md b/public/assurance/supply-chain.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26d083f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/assurance/supply-chain.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Supply chain
+
+Inspect the recorded SLSA builder assessment without mistaking it for an independent audit.
+
+## What the claim says
+
+The assessment covers the declared GitHub release builder and recorded SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 controls.
+
+## Release evidence
+
+Claim: `auths.claim.supply-chain/1` · status `passing`
+
+The assessed release builder satisfies the recorded SLSA Build Level 3 requirements.
+
+Evidence: `release/slsa-build-level-3-assessment.json`
+
+SHA-256: `49d5a096915d49058c8c66f29c5c7f59181caa0783d4724322068de6c5c3f6bf`
+
+Reproduce:
+
+- `cargo test -p xtask release_control::tests::checked_in_slsa_assessment_matches_builder_bytes`
+
+Scope: The assessed GitHub release builder and recorded SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 controls.
+
+Limitation: This is a repository-owner delegated build assessment, not an independent security audit or source-correctness proof.
+
+## What remains true
+
+Builder bytes, provenance subjects, workflow identity, and release artifacts must match their checksummed assessment.
+
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
+
+A changed builder, missing provenance, unverified subject, or stale assessment withdraws passing status.
+
+## Continue
+
+Verify promotion evidence and obtain independent review appropriate to the deployment's consequence.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.supply-chain/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+
diff --git a/public/authority/constraints.md b/public/authority/constraints.md
index 1145dcc..8abc223 100644
--- a/public/authority/constraints.md
+++ b/public/authority/constraints.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Action or resource mismatch, early or late time, exhausted use, insufficient bud
 
 Use the smallest combination that expresses the effect; keep policy engines outside this artifact and commit only their required evidence.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.constraints/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.constraints/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/create.md b/public/authority/create.md
index 413d949..1ea110f 100644
--- a/public/authority/create.md
+++ b/public/authority/create.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Missing bounds, invalid profile input, unsupported critical extensions, wrong au
 
 Execute it directly, or delegate a narrower child without changing the model.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.create/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.create/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/delegate.md b/public/authority/delegate.md
index b34e115..e802ec5 100644
--- a/public/authority/delegate.md
+++ b/public/authority/delegate.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Any wider or incomparable child is rejected, including a quiet critical-extensio
 
 Inspect depth and chain rules, then test every attempted widening relevant to the application profile.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md b/public/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md
index bda6d2d..d1572c8 100644
--- a/public/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md
+++ b/public/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Skipped links, reordered links, broken subjects, expired parents, revoked ancest
 
 Keep chains short in simple systems; use explicit organizational or agent handoffs only where they add accountability.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/delegate/widening-failures.md b/public/authority/delegate/widening-failures.md
index dc326f0..6260c35 100644
--- a/public/authority/delegate/widening-failures.md
+++ b/public/authority/delegate/widening-failures.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ A language disagreement, ignored critical extension, dropped parent, or accepted
 
 Keep these fixtures with the application profile and rerun them on every Auths upgrade.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/execute.md b/public/authority/execute.md
index f63b2d8..49efb74 100644
--- a/public/authority/execute.md
+++ b/public/authority/execute.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Application code cannot mint the handle; successful transport, approval, signatu
 
 Use Resume rather than a new Execute call when the terminal provider result is not yet known.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle.md b/public/authority/lifecycle.md
index 9bff070..21e2fb2 100644
--- a/public/authority/lifecycle.md
+++ b/public/authority/lifecycle.md
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.
 - [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
 - [Authority](/authority) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md b/public/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md
index ee96546..af2cb56 100644
--- a/public/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md
+++ b/public/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Negative, overflowed, mismatched-unit, over-budget, concurrent overspend, and un
 
 Keep budgets simple and domain-specific; use a policy engine for broader business policy and commit its chosen inputs separately.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md b/public/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md
index d9d7f26..f06caa7 100644
--- a/public/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md
+++ b/public/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Revoked, suspended, stale, unknown, or unavailable status returns a closed lifec
 
 Choose freshness and availability behavior appropriate to the effect's consequence.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md b/public/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md
index c7762ca..562772d 100644
--- a/public/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md
+++ b/public/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Exact replay, exhausted use count, reservation conflict, unavailable state, and
 
 Use Resume for an existing execution reference; never mint a fresh command to hide uncertainty.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md b/public/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md
index fefcbb9..498d033 100644
--- a/public/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md
+++ b/public/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Before-not-before, after-expiry, missing time, invalid intervals, and child wind
 
 Combine time with status only when current lifecycle state is required.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/model.md b/public/authority/model.md
index 98e49e5..4e5afe7 100644
--- a/public/authority/model.md
+++ b/public/authority/model.md
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ You only need an exact signature or endpoint field; open the generated reference
 ## Continue from here
 
 - [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
-- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while remaining on the same Auths operation.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/plans/approvals.md b/public/authority/plans/approvals.md
index 972e0e2..28efd0c 100644
--- a/public/authority/plans/approvals.md
+++ b/public/authority/plans/approvals.md
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ A reusable human-approved flag or broad role is sufficient for the actual risk m
 - [Cross-company authority](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
 - [Authority](/authority) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/profiles.md b/public/authority/profiles.md
index 501f1d2..0a3755e 100644
--- a/public/authority/profiles.md
+++ b/public/authority/profiles.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Ambiguous resources, non-canonical input, unknown actions, incompatible versions
 
 Begin with a maintained profile or one minimal application-owned action; expand only with differential and adversarial fixtures.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md b/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
index 65ea26b..0004f70 100644
--- a/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
+++ b/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ You need to perform an effect; receipt verification is intentionally inert.
 ## Continue from here
 
 - [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
-- [Assurance](/assurance) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
+- [Assurance](/assurance) — Inspect what Auths claims, the exact evidence behind it, and the limits that remain.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/resume.md b/public/authority/resume.md
index e94ee24..01e7535 100644
--- a/public/authority/resume.md
+++ b/public/authority/resume.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Unknown reference, mismatched caller, corrupted journal, fresh command substitut
 
 Define operational reconciliation and escalation for every gateway before enabling production effects.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.resume/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.resume/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/authority/verify.md b/public/authority/verify.md
index 1903f6c..38afeb9 100644
--- a/public/authority/verify.md
+++ b/public/authority/verify.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Mutation, wrong trust, stale status, request mismatch, invalid chain, unauthoriz
 
 Use Receipts to understand integrity and Disclosure to control what verified evidence reveals.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.verify/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.verify/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers.md b/public/developers.md
index e146049..13c67bd 100644
--- a/public/developers.md
+++ b/public/developers.md
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.
 ## Runtime and CLI
 
 - [Runtime API](/developers/runtime-api) — Call the production HTTPS runtime from any language or service boundary.
-- [CLI](/developers/cli) — Use the CLI for local evaluation, fixture verification, runtime inspection, and operator-owned recovery.
+- [CLI](/developers/cli) — Choose supported terminal workflows without mistaking repository tooling for a public product CLI.
 
 ## Test and debug
 
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.
 
 ## Related topics
 
-- [APIs & SDKs](/reference) — Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.
+- [Reference](/reference) — Look up exact SDK, Runtime API, CLI, profile, error, schema, evidence, and manifest contracts for one release.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.developers/1 · Product contract: auths.page.developers/1_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/cli.md b/public/developers/cli.md
index 1922dfb..0ad3dfc 100644
--- a/public/developers/cli.md
+++ b/public/developers/cli.md
@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
 # CLI
 
-Use the CLI for local evaluation, fixture verification, runtime inspection, and operator-owned recovery.
+Choose supported terminal workflows without mistaking repository tooling for a public product CLI.
 
 ## Outcome
 
-A terminal user can verify evidence and inspect a configured runtime without reconstructing requests manually.
+A terminal user can run installed SDK scripts or call the Runtime API while preserving the same typed outcomes and evidence.
 
 ## Before you begin
 
-Install the CLI for the selected release, provide explicit input files or standard input, and configure trust or runtime endpoints through bounded documented options.
+The selected prelaunch release does not declare a general-purpose public Auths CLI. Use a maintained SDK or the HTTPS Runtime API; repository-only cargo xtask commands are contributor tooling.
 
 ## Build the bounded path
 
-Print version, verify a known receipt, inspect a bounded summary, check runtime health, and exercise resume against an isolated recovery scenario.
+Run the offline verification project from a clean consumer, or call health and version with the documented Runtime API request. Keep inputs in bounded files and switch on machine-readable outcomes.
 
 ## Run the qualified path
 
@@ -20,15 +20,15 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
 
 ## Success means
 
-Commands return stable machine-readable outcomes, safe human summaries, and non-zero status for every closed failure.
+Terminal workflows return the same verified result as application code and do not expose provider credentials or unrestricted receipt views.
 
 ## Fail closed
 
-Unknown flags, interactive secret leakage, ambiguous config, full disclosure without authority, or automatic provider retry is prohibited.
+An undocumented binary, copied contributor command, ambiguous config, full disclosure without authority, or automatic provider retry is unsupported.
 
 ## Continue
 
-Use generated CLI reference for exact flags and shell completion.
+Use the generated SDK or Runtime API reference. A future public CLI must first enter the immutable release contract.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.cli/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.cli/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/errors.md b/public/developers/errors.md
index 326a8d2..0628afd 100644
--- a/public/developers/errors.md
+++ b/public/developers/errors.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Switch exhaustively on the generated union. Retry only transport failures known
 
 Outcome identities and shapes are generated from the release Runtime contract and SDK declarations.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.errors/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.errors/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/examples.md b/public/developers/examples.md
index d61fde0..86e103b 100644
--- a/public/developers/examples.md
+++ b/public/developers/examples.md
@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@ Find complete examples by outcome, boundary, and deployment maturity.
 
 Start with installed quickstarts, then use the live incident-response demo for multi-party workflows, interoperability fixtures for composition, and the field lab for real cloud evidence. Each example states whether it is deterministic, production-shaped, or production-ready.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.examples/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.examples/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/extension-kits.md b/public/developers/extension-kits.md
index fdca516..c74907f 100644
--- a/public/developers/extension-kits.md
+++ b/public/developers/extension-kits.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Implicit fallbacks, secret leakage, unbounded parsing, language-specific semanti
 
 Publish the adapter independently when Auths should not own its lifecycle.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.extensions/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.extensions/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/capabilities.md b/public/developers/integrations/capabilities.md
index 2bd6171..58635ed 100644
--- a/public/developers/integrations/capabilities.md
+++ b/public/developers/integrations/capabilities.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
 Auths does not claim identical semantics or silently translate unsupported caveats; applications must profile the exact overlap and external state.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md b/public/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md
index d0f87c9..ad12799 100644
--- a/public/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md
+++ b/public/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
 
 Cloud IAM remains necessary for provider access; Auths adds portable exact authority, lifecycle, recovery, and receipts rather than replacing the cloud control plane.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.cloud/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.cloud/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md b/public/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md
index 1745194..48e5d8c 100644
--- a/public/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md
+++ b/public/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
 
 Authentication remains independent from authority and Auths does not become the directory or identity provider.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/policy.md b/public/developers/integrations/policy.md
index f17bb3f..fc5bba5 100644
--- a/public/developers/integrations/policy.md
+++ b/public/developers/integrations/policy.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
 Auths does not reimplement the policy language or pretend a policy decision alone authorizes an exact effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.policy/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.policy/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md b/public/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md
index e24696a..2f8d9d8 100644
--- a/public/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md
+++ b/public/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
 Profile kit does not own identity adapters, transports, stores, custody, approval vendors, or provider credentials.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/transport.md b/public/developers/integrations/transport.md
index e2720ed..93551b8 100644
--- a/public/developers/integrations/transport.md
+++ b/public/developers/integrations/transport.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
 Delivery, channel authentication, and peer reachability never become authorization, and Auths does not prescribe a single network.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.transport/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.transport/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/quickstarts.md b/public/developers/quickstarts.md
index 2a7c9aa..cd011f8 100644
--- a/public/developers/quickstarts.md
+++ b/public/developers/quickstarts.md
@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@ Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.
 
 Use Local REST effect for an in-process SDK boundary, Runtime effect for the HTTPS service, Agent delegation for tools, Approved plan for exact review, Offline verification for inert evidence, Recovery for ambiguous outcomes, or Identity swap for agility. The maintained projects live under Get started so there is one runnable source.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.quickstarts/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.quickstarts/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/releases.md b/public/developers/releases.md
index 60f553c..639b022 100644
--- a/public/developers/releases.md
+++ b/public/developers/releases.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Review breaking semantic identities, supported runtimes, state migrations, profi
 
 The release page is rendered from signed or checksummed release artifacts and the exact source revisions that produced them.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.releases/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.releases/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/runtime-api.md b/public/developers/runtime-api.md
index 4641a7c..122e76d 100644
--- a/public/developers/runtime-api.md
+++ b/public/developers/runtime-api.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Non-HTTPS endpoints, version mismatch, unknown outcome, invalid request, timeout
 
 Open generated Runtime API reference for exact methods, paths, limits, and schemas.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/sdks/parity.md b/public/developers/sdks/parity.md
index f5cb72f..cee95cc 100644
--- a/public/developers/sdks/parity.md
+++ b/public/developers/sdks/parity.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Use the generated matrix to confirm create, delegate, execute, resume, verify, i
 
 The release bundle, packaged API inventories, and differential fixtures generate the matrix. Editorial pages do not hand-maintain method lists.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks.parity/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks.parity/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/sdks/python.md b/public/developers/sdks/python.md
index 9883ed7..522df83 100644
--- a/public/developers/sdks/python.md
+++ b/public/developers/sdks/python.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Missing native artifacts, unsupported runtime, type mismatch, ABI mismatch, sema
 
 Use SDK parity to compare maintained coverage and Runtime API when the application should not load a native extension.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks.python/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks.python/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/sdks/rust.md b/public/developers/sdks/rust.md
index 674e19b..748729a 100644
--- a/public/developers/sdks/rust.md
+++ b/public/developers/sdks/rust.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Missing native artifacts, unsupported runtime, type mismatch, ABI mismatch, sema
 
 Use SDK parity to compare maintained coverage and Runtime API when the application should not load a native extension.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks.rust/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks.rust/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/sdks/typescript.md b/public/developers/sdks/typescript.md
index cc483b3..e6a3a31 100644
--- a/public/developers/sdks/typescript.md
+++ b/public/developers/sdks/typescript.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Missing native artifacts, unsupported runtime, type mismatch, ABI mismatch, sema
 
 Use SDK parity to compare maintained coverage and Runtime API when the application should not load a native extension.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks.typescript/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks.typescript/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/testing.md b/public/developers/testing.md
index c7f56de..3b875a0 100644
--- a/public/developers/testing.md
+++ b/public/developers/testing.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Snapshot-only output, live network dependence, broad mocks, ignored indeterminat
 
 Add the fixtures to CI and inspect exact generated errors and evidence.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.testing/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.testing/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/developers/versioning.md b/public/developers/versioning.md
index d8f772d..ddb7434 100644
--- a/public/developers/versioning.md
+++ b/public/developers/versioning.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Check the Runtime version endpoint, compare its contract digest with installed a
 
 Version and digest data come from the immutable release bundle selected by the documentation build.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.versioning/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.developers.versioning/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md b/public/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md
index d968cbb..bf8eb5b 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
 
 This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/approvals.md b/public/get-started/adoption/approvals.md
index fd00324..aa3e2af 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/approvals.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/approvals.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
 
 This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.approvals/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.approvals/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md b/public/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md
index c56e05a..8fd0ab7 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
 This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md b/public/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md
index 5edc0cb..f3bfc8b 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
 
 This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/cutover.md b/public/get-started/adoption/cutover.md
index 9b70c41..ccf7ed0 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/cutover.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/cutover.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Rollback on unexplained denial, state inconsistency, custody failure, receipt lo
 
 Expand to the next effect only after operational ownership and evidence retention are routine.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cutover/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cutover/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md b/public/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md
index 7e18614..1654b6d 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
 
 This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/plan.md b/public/get-started/adoption/plan.md
index afa1705..c57c196 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/plan.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/plan.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Stop if provider credentials would enter an Auths artifact or if application cod
 
 Choose the relevant composition page and enter shadow mode.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.plan/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md b/public/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md
index c3371e2..c1d6f6a 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
 This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md b/public/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md
index 300f569..1888284 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Any ambiguity, sensitive-data leakage, or disagreement blocks cutover until owne
 
 Cut over exactly one effect once the observation window and failure criteria are satisfied.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md b/public/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md
index e51ce77..e6e851f 100644
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md
+++ b/public/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
 This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/choose.md b/public/get-started/choose.md
index 5558240..a15c597 100644
--- a/public/get-started/choose.md
+++ b/public/get-started/choose.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ If you cannot describe the effect or provider boundary precisely, do not issue b
 
 Open the chosen quickstart and run it unchanged before adapting it.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.choose/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.choose/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/evaluate.md b/public/get-started/evaluate.md
index eee6f5e..1b2d29e 100644
--- a/public/get-started/evaluate.md
+++ b/public/get-started/evaluate.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Reject the design if Auths merely duplicates an existing control without improvi
 
 If the boundary is useful, plan a shadow-mode integration around that single effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.evaluate/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.evaluate/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths/agent.md b/public/get-started/paths/agent.md
index ab17597..b74fd09 100644
--- a/public/get-started/paths/agent.md
+++ b/public/get-started/paths/agent.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Widening the action, resource, time, use count, budget, audience, or delegation
 
 Add approved plans if a human or second organization must review exact work before execution.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.agent/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.agent/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths/application.md b/public/get-started/paths/application.md
index 9f21c7a..374e035 100644
--- a/public/get-started/paths/application.md
+++ b/public/get-started/paths/application.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ A changed resource, replayed authority, or mutated command is denied before the
 
 Add durable runtime state when the effect must survive process or host failure.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.local/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.local/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths/cross-company.md b/public/get-started/paths/cross-company.md
index ba8dd00..3c06fa3 100644
--- a/public/get-started/paths/cross-company.md
+++ b/public/get-started/paths/cross-company.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Identity authentication, transport delivery, approval alone, changed plan bytes,
 
 Use Identity & trust for federation, Authority for plans, and Operations for provider-unknown reconciliation and evidence retention.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.cross-company/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.cross-company/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths/runtime.md b/public/get-started/paths/runtime.md
index c714313..ca77ba1 100644
--- a/public/get-started/paths/runtime.md
+++ b/public/get-started/paths/runtime.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Untrusted HTTP, contract mismatch, missing custody, or unavailable durable state
 
 Continue to Production operations for topology, observability, recovery, and incident procedures.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.runtime/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.runtime/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths/verification.md b/public/get-started/paths/verification.md
index 91b44de..5afad45 100644
--- a/public/get-started/paths/verification.md
+++ b/public/get-started/paths/verification.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Mutation, unknown suite, mismatched verification method, wrong root, stale evide
 
 Use Authority receipts for integrity semantics and Assurance for the exact evidence behind public claims.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.verify/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.verify/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/prerequisites.md b/public/get-started/prerequisites.md
index 99e2cc9..a6eead4 100644
--- a/public/get-started/prerequisites.md
+++ b/public/get-started/prerequisites.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Stop if the SDK version, fixture release, or runtime contract does not match. Do
 
 Choose the shortest outcome path for your system, then move to production operations only when the local boundary is clear.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.prerequisites/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.start.prerequisites/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
index d334d1a..c1a7962 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
 
 [Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/agent-delegation.json)
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
index b8d5d38..131465b 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
 
 [Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json)
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
index be6e5d6..ec3b4aa 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
 
 [Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json)
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
index aaa86ab..de068d6 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
 
 [Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json)
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
index a3802f3..db3744c 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
 
 [Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/offline-verification.json)
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md
index a0f0a72..b78fbf3 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
 
 [Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json)
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
index b5c34e6..4658c87 100644
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
+++ b/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
@@ -27,5 +27,5 @@ Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
 
 [Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json)
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum.md b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum.md
index 30f9cb8..2b0c50e 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Registration collisions, unbounded evidence, ambiguous encoding, implicit fallba
 
 Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.suites.custom/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.suites.custom/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md
index 6b7d193..71a8a9f 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Wrong key length, invalid point material, method mismatch, suite relabelling, an
 
 Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.suites.ed25519/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.suites.ed25519/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256.md b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256.md
index 23cd319..fc944a1 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Non-canonical points, curve mismatch, suite relabelling, high-level method misma
 
 Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.suites.p256/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.suites.p256/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity.md b/public/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity.md
index 75fb5b5..f63f563 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Transport authentication or delivery does not cure malformed, unsupported, stale
 
 Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.exchange/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.exchange/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md b/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
index 7c3827d..d137b87 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
@@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ You are looking for permission scope; identity alone cannot express the complete
 - [Identity & trust](/identity-trust) — Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.
 - [Execute](/authority/execute) — Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers.md b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers.md
index 65b0343..d31e6ba 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
 
 Auths does not become the identity provider and does not ship every possible adapter. Applications own adapter choice and trust policy behind the stable port.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources.resolvers/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources.resolvers/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md
index d87b511..a557665 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
 
 Auths does not become the identity provider and does not ship every possible adapter. Applications own adapter choice and trust policy behind the stable port.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources.oauth-oidc/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources.oauth-oidc/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md
index 377ab07..d596ce4 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Malformed evidence, an unknown suite, a mislabelled key, method mismatch, or cha
 
 Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources.raw-keys/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources.raw-keys/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md
index 06d7ddc..3b69791 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
 
 Auths does not become the identity provider and does not ship every possible adapter. Applications own adapter choice and trust policy behind the stable port.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources.spiffe/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources.spiffe/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md b/public/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md
index 702c93b..5a0b411 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Early root removal, unbounded overlap, rollback to compromised material, method
 
 Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.rotation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.rotation/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/testing.md b/public/identity-trust/testing.md
index dd0d667..0b37891 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/testing.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/testing.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Any language disagreement, fallback to another suite, network-dependent result,
 
 Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.testing/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.testing/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/trust-policy.md b/public/identity-trust/trust-policy.md
index 94e22b9..e00e713 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/trust-policy.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/trust-policy.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Correct signatures under an untrusted root, stale bundle, wrong audience, disabl
 
 Construct the smallest verification context for the application boundary and test every excluded root and suite.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.policy/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.policy/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/verification-context.md b/public/identity-trust/verification-context.md
index 87f0424..1ce7e8d 100644
--- a/public/identity-trust/verification-context.md
+++ b/public/identity-trust/verification-context.md
@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ Missing time, unknown roots, stale evidence, disabled suites, mismatched audienc
 
 Keep context construction at the application trust boundary and pass only the parsed value into verification.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.context/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.context/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/index.md b/public/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e10fb88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Auths documentation
+
+Precise, portable authority for people and agents.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.home/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
diff --git a/public/llms-full.txt b/public/llms-full.txt
index 72fe7c0..6d6e488 100644
--- a/public/llms-full.txt
+++ b/public/llms-full.txt
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Prompt changes, member replacement, reordered work, mutation after approval, reu
 
 Add multi-agent handoffs only by delegating a narrower plan or member scope.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ Changing the tool, resource, arguments, audience, use count, budget, expiry, dep
 
 Use approved plans when the exact proposed sequence requires review.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegation/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ Widening, prompt or plan substitution, ambient credentials, transport-only succe
 
 Run Delegate one tool, then add plans, multiple agents, or MCP only when the workflow calls for them.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
 Identity proves who signed bytes; it cannot decide which tool the agent may run.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.identity/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.identity/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ A prompt-authored proof, undeclared tool, changed arguments, wrong server audien
 
 Protect the MCP server so provider credentials stay outside the client and model.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ Valid MCP framing, authenticated transport, a known client, or an approval flag
 
 Define tool profiles and the transport boundary explicitly for every exposed effect.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ Unknown tools, unbounded arguments, ambiguous canonicalization, hidden provider
 
 Keep the profile reusable across MCP transports and agent frameworks.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ Duplicate delivery, reordered messages, partial frames, oversized inputs, authen
 
 Choose transport for reachability and reliability; choose Auths authority and runtime state for permission and exactly-once effect control.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ A skipped parent, widened child, depth reset, identity substitution, hidden tool
 
 Use receipts to verify the complete chain and production patterns to assign human ownership.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ Missing state, signer outage, trust ambiguity, receipt loss, unexplained denial,
 
 Use Production operations for deployment and incident runbooks.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.production/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.production/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohib
 
 Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
 A skill is integration convenience, not a new authority source. It cannot replace native verification or gateway isolation.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.skills/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.skills/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ Any prohibited effect, language disagreement, prompt-derived bypass, automatic f
 
 Keep adversarial fixtures beside each tool profile and run them against packaged SDKs.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.testing/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.agents.testing/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
@@ -511,630 +511,618 @@ _Page identity: auths.page.agents.testing/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d44391299152
 
 # Assurance
 
-Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
+Inspect what Auths claims, the exact evidence behind it, and the limits that remain.
 
-## Show what the evidence proves
+## Recommended: [Semantics](/assurance/semantics)
 
-Every claim names its evidence, release, scope, and limitation.
+Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Claims
 
+- [Semantics](/assurance/semantics) — Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.
+- [Authority](/assurance/authority) — Inspect attenuation and approval-binding evidence for bounded authority.
+- [Execution](/assurance/execution) — Inspect the native closed-gateway boundary protecting provider effects.
+- [Disclosure](/assurance/disclosure) — Inspect evidence that receipt views are bounded and authority-controlled.
 
+## Evidence
 
----
-
-# Authority
+- [Cross-language](/assurance/cross-language) — Compare maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes for identical scenarios.
+- [Formal](/assurance/formal) — Understand where formal attenuation evidence applies and where it does not.
+- [Adversarial](/assurance/adversarial) — Inspect substitution, widening, replay, mutation, and fail-closed evidence.
+- [Supply chain](/assurance/supply-chain) — Inspect the recorded SLSA builder assessment without mistaking it for an independent audit.
 
-Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
+## Limits
 
-## Recommended: [Authority model](/authority/model)
+- [Limitations](/assurance/limitations) — Read the boundaries that Auths evidence deliberately does not claim to cross.
 
-Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
+## Related topics
 
-## Model
+- [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
 
-- [Authority model](/authority/model) — Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1 · Product contract: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1_
 
-## Author and narrow
 
-- [Create](/authority/create) — Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.
-- [Constraints](/authority/constraints) — Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.
-- [Delegate](/authority/delegate) — Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.
 
-## Lifecycle
+---
 
-- [Lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.
-- [Plans](/authority/plans) — Commit multiple ordered operations as one reviewable plan.
+# Adversarial
 
-## Execute and recover
+Inspect substitution, widening, replay, mutation, and fail-closed evidence.
 
-- [Execute](/authority/execute) — Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
-- [Resume](/authority/resume) — Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.
+## What the claim says
 
-## Verify and inspect
+Adversarial fixtures try to change approved bytes, order, members, authority constraints, trust inputs, and lifecycle state.
 
-- [Verify](/authority/verify) — Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.
-- [Receipts](/authority/receipts) — Use signed decision and execution receipts as portable integrity evidence.
+## Release evidence
 
-## Profiles
+Claim: `auths.claim.approval-binding/1` · status `passing`
 
-- [Profiles](/authority/profiles) — Map application actions, resources, inputs, budgets, commands, and receipts without coupling adjacent components.
+Approval is bound to exact plan context and cannot authorize substituted plan bytes.
 
-## Related topics
+Evidence: `bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json`
 
-- [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
+SHA-256: `a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331`
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority/1_
+Reproduce:
 
+- `cargo xtask sdk-experience`
 
+Scope: Maintained approval-plan signing requests, responses, and substitution fixtures.
 
----
-
-# Constraints
-
-Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.
-
-## Model
-
-Constraints form a conjunction: every bound must permit the request. Action and resource describe the effect; validity limits time; uses and budget limit consumption; depth limits delegation; audience limits the intended verifier or executor; critical extensions add profile-owned restrictions.
+Limitation: The application remains responsible for approver identity, user experience, and organizational policy.
 
 ## What remains true
 
-Omitting a bound never means that a child may invent a broader one. Critical extensions must be understood and attenuated according to their declared semantics. Application profiles own canonical resource and action interpretation.
+Every maintained language and runtime path must reject the same prohibited mutation before an unintended provider effect.
 
-## Where it fails closed
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
 
-Action or resource mismatch, early or late time, exhausted use, insufficient budget, excessive depth, wrong audience, and unknown or widened critical extensions each produce a stable denial before the provider is reached.
+Untested application profiles, adapters, external approval identity, or provider behavior remain outside the fixture claim.
 
 ## Continue
 
-Use the smallest combination that expresses the effect; keep policy engines outside this artifact and commit only their required evidence.
+Keep application-specific negative fixtures beside each profile and gateway.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.constraints/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.adversarial/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Create
+# Authority
 
-Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.
+Inspect attenuation and approval-binding evidence for bounded authority.
 
-## Outcome
+## What the claim says
 
-An issuer grants one subject the smallest useful action, resource, validity window, use count, budget, audience, and delegation depth.
+The maintained model and fixtures assert that delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent across declared fields.
 
-## Before you begin
+## Release evidence
 
-Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
+Claim: `auths.claim.attenuation/1` · status `passing`
 
-## Build the bounded path
+Delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent under the maintained model and adversarial fixtures.
 
-Select a profile action, parse its resource and input, set explicit bounds, author through the native operation, and sign using the configured custody port.
+Evidence: `formal/qualification.lean`
 
-## Run the qualified path
+SHA-256: `fb1fd17d377194e96f98313412052f82fbb43cb594b12eb6a9fa0e0dce3ce70c`
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+Reproduce:
 
-## Success means
+- `cargo xtask formal`
 
-The resulting artifact is canonical, portable, and accepted identically by Rust, TypeScript, and Python for the permitted request.
+Scope: Attenuation relations represented by the maintained formal model and protocol profile.
 
-## Fail closed
+Limitation: The claim covers the modelled fields and maintained protocol profile, not arbitrary application-defined semantics.
 
-Missing bounds, invalid profile input, unsupported critical extensions, wrong audience, or altered bytes cannot be repaired during verification.
+## What remains true
+
+Action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, depth, and modelled critical extensions must preserve their narrowing relation.
+
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
+
+A new unmodelled field, accepted incomparable child, formal drift, or differential mismatch narrows the scope or withdraws passing status.
 
 ## Continue
 
-Execute it directly, or delegate a narrower child without changing the model.
+Review adversarial approval and delegation evidence alongside application-profile tests.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.create/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.authority/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Delegate
+# Cross-language
 
-Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.
+Compare maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes for identical scenarios.
 
-## Outcome
+## What the claim says
 
-A child principal can act only inside every bound the parent deliberately passes on.
+Parity covers stable semantic operations and qualified installed-artifact scenarios while allowing idiomatic language types and packaging.
 
-## Before you begin
+## Release evidence
 
-Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
+Claim: `auths.claim.cross-language-parity/1` · status `passing`
 
-## Build the bounded path
+Maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python scenarios target identical stable semantic outcomes.
 
-Parse the parent, select the child subject, narrow action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, depth, and critical extensions, then author and sign the child through the native delegate operation.
+Evidence: `release/docs/scenarios.toml`
 
-## Run the qualified path
+SHA-256: `f056e57acb5dbad67ef5ed5076bdee388a82e73b7e6a6af53b82c226ccd552da`
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+Reproduce:
 
-## Success means
+- `cargo xtask cross-language`
 
-The child verifies as an unbroken chain and can perform the one intended tool action.
+Scope: The maintained installed-artifact scenarios declared for Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
 
-## Fail closed
+Limitation: Scenario parity covers maintained workflows and versions, not every possible application composition.
 
-Any wider or incomparable child is rejected, including a quiet critical-extension omission that would restore power.
+## What remains true
+
+The same fixture bytes and trusted context produce the same normalized outcome and commitments.
+
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
+
+A missing wheel, unsupported platform, public API drift, language-specific decision, or differing fixture result degrades the release claim.
 
 ## Continue
 
-Inspect depth and chain rules, then test every attempted widening relevant to the application profile.
+Run the packaged scenario suite and inspect the SDK parity page.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.cross-language/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Depth and chain
+# Disclosure
 
-Reason about delegation depth and the complete signed chain.
+Inspect evidence that receipt views are bounded and authority-controlled.
 
-## Model
+## What the claim says
 
-Each delegation consumes one unit of permitted depth and adds a signed link. Verification checks the root trust, every issuer-to-subject transition, every narrowing relation, and the terminal request.
+Receipt integrity and receipt disclosure are separate decisions. Unauthorized callers receive an opaque view; summary and full projections are native-owned.
 
-## What remains true
+## Release evidence
 
-Depth cannot be reset by changing languages, identity adapters, transports, or profiles. A chain remains valid only while every link remains valid and trusted.
+Claim: `auths.claim.bounded-disclosure/1` · status `passing`
 
-## Where it fails closed
+Receipt inspection defaults to opaque or bounded views and requires authority for full disclosure.
 
-Skipped links, reordered links, broken subjects, expired parents, revoked ancestors, excessive depth, and incomparable constraints deny the terminal request.
+Evidence: `release/docs/runtime-facts-v1.json`
 
-## Continue
+SHA-256: `3229ccc5a4adbcdfd4b55bdca58ab9e7e5c333719aeff3a0dba54976e6fef1f1`
 
-Keep chains short in simple systems; use explicit organizational or agent handoffs only where they add accountability.
+Reproduce:
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+- `cargo xtask product-conformance`
 
+Scope: Maintained receipt summary and disclosure operations and their public runtime contract.
 
+Limitation: Deployment retention, access control, and downstream handling remain application responsibilities.
 
----
+## What remains true
 
-# Widening failures
+Public artifacts contain bounded commitments and verification material rather than raw provider payloads or secrets.
 
-Exercise every way a child might attempt to gain power its parent did not pass down.
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
 
-## Outcome
+Unsafe downstream logging, overbroad retention, application-authored views, or disclosure-policy regression remains a deployment or product failure.
 
-Your test suite proves that delegation can only narrow, including application-defined critical extensions.
+## Continue
 
-## Before you begin
+Review receipt retention and the disclosure incident runbook before exposing evidence APIs.
 
-Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
-## Build the bounded path
 
-Generate mutations for action, resource, validity, uses, budget, depth, audience, extension presence, and extension values; verify each child against the same parent and trusted context.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+---
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+# Execution
 
-## Success means
+Inspect the native closed-gateway boundary protecting provider effects.
 
-Every valid narrowing is portable across SDKs, and every wider or incomparable mutation returns the same denial identity.
+## What the claim says
 
-## Fail closed
+Maintained workflows acquire provider access only through opaque native-authorized commands after required checks and state transitions.
 
-A language disagreement, ignored critical extension, dropped parent, or accepted incomparable set is a release-blocking semantic failure.
+## Release evidence
 
-## Continue
+Claim: `auths.claim.closed-gateway/1` · status `passing`
 
-Keep these fixtures with the application profile and rerun them on every Auths upgrade.
+Maintained product workflows reach provider adapters only through opaque native-authorized commands.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+Evidence: `release/semantic-freeze.json`
 
+SHA-256: `75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3`
 
+Reproduce:
 
----
+- `cargo xtask product-waist-conformance`
 
-# Execute
+Scope: Maintained execution workflows and their opaque native command and gateway boundary.
 
-Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
+Limitation: Application-owned adapters can still be implemented unsafely outside the maintained boundary.
 
-## Outcome
+## What remains true
 
-An opaque native authorization handle reaches the executor only after identity, authority, lifecycle, plan, and command checks pass.
+Transport, authentication, approval, signatures, or application objects cannot mint the effect-capable handle.
 
-## Before you begin
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
 
-Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
+An unsafe application-owned adapter, direct provider route, handle forgery, missing reservation, or semantic bypass lies outside or invalidates the claim.
 
-## Build the bounded path
+## Continue
 
-Parse the command, verify and reserve authority, seal exact provider-independent bytes, acquire the gateway only from the native verified handle, perform the effect, then journal and sign the terminal receipt.
+Use Operations to qualify the selected durable store, custody, and provider gateway deployment.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.execution/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
 
-## Success means
 
-The gateway receives the minimum provider request after durable reservation and returns a closed, receipt-bound outcome.
+---
 
-## Fail closed
+# Formal
 
-Application code cannot mint the handle; successful transport, approval, signature, or provider authentication alone cannot open the gateway. Provider secrets never enter the authority artifact.
+Understand where formal attenuation evidence applies and where it does not.
 
-## Continue
+## What the claim says
 
-Use Resume rather than a new Execute call when the terminal provider result is not yet known.
+Lean and translation qualification reason about declared models and refinements; they do not prove every provider, store, network, UI, or deployment behavior.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Release evidence
 
+Claim: `auths.claim.attenuation/1` · status `passing`
 
+Delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent under the maintained model and adversarial fixtures.
 
----
+Evidence: `formal/qualification.lean`
 
-# Lifecycle
+SHA-256: `fb1fd17d377194e96f98313412052f82fbb43cb594b12eb6a9fa0e0dce3ce70c`
 
-Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.
+Reproduce:
 
-## The path at a glance
+- `cargo xtask formal`
 
-1. Author exact authority
-2. Commit canonical bytes
-3. Attenuate child
-4. Consume use or budget
-5. Expire, revoke, or exhaust
+Scope: Attenuation relations represented by the maintained formal model and protocol profile.
 
-Text equivalent: Authority is authored for exact canonical bytes, committed, optionally attenuated into a child, consumed under durable state, and eventually expires, is revoked, or becomes exhausted.
+Limitation: The claim covers the modelled fields and maintained protocol profile, not arbitrary application-defined semantics.
 
 ## What remains true
 
-- A child is a subset of its parent under every critical extension.
-- Use and budget state are durable and atomic with reservation.
-- Expired, revoked, or exhausted authority cannot be revived by transport or approval.
+The checked theorem statements, axioms, translations, and source closure must match the selected release.
 
-## Failure branches
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
 
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| A child adds an action or use | Widening rejected | Create the child from a valid subset of the parent. |
-| Authority expires before reservation | Denied | Request fresh authority for current intent. |
-| Revocation state cannot be checked | Indeterminate | Restore lifecycle state; do not assume the grant remains valid. |
+Model drift, unreviewed axioms, stale generated translations, or code outside the refinement boundary changes the assurance scope.
 
-## Use this when
+## Continue
 
-You need delegation, one-time use, budget, expiry, revocation, or critical-extension behavior.
+Pair formal evidence with adversarial, differential, and operational qualification.
 
-## Do not use this when
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.formal/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
-You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.
 
-## Continue from here
 
-- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
-- [Authority](/authority) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
+---
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+# Limitations
 
+Read the boundaries that Auths evidence deliberately does not claim to cross.
 
+## What the claim says
 
----
+Auths evidence does not certify production availability, every adapter, every cloud, every application profile, business intent, compliance, or universal correctness.
 
-# Budgets
+## Release evidence
 
-Reserve and consume numeric or profile-defined budgets with the same atomic boundary as uses.
+Claim: `auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1` · status `passing`
 
-## Model
+Rust owns protocol meaning used by Rust, TypeScript, and Python projections.
 
-A budget limits cumulative effect according to a profile-owned unit such as cost, records, tokens, or capacity. The request declares its amount and durable state reserves it before execution.
+Evidence: `release/semantic-freeze.json`
 
-## What remains true
+SHA-256: `75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3`
 
-Children may reduce available budget and executions cannot spend more than the remaining amount. The unit and canonical amount are committed.
+Reproduce:
 
-## Where it fails closed
+- `cargo xtask semantic-freeze`
 
-Negative, overflowed, mismatched-unit, over-budget, concurrent overspend, and unavailable-state requests deny before provider access.
+Scope: The declared protocol and product semantic identities consumed by maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python surfaces.
 
-## Continue
+Limitation: The semantic freeze detects declared semantic drift; it is not a proof that every implementation is defect-free.
 
-Keep budgets simple and domain-specific; use a policy engine for broader business policy and commit its chosen inputs separately.
+## What remains true
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+Claims remain useful only when their release, checksum, scope, and limitation are carried together.
 
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
 
+Marketing language, stale screenshots, demo success, or an unpinned docs build cannot upgrade or broaden a claim.
 
----
+## Continue
 
-# Revocation and status
+Use the open production and field-lab evidence as inputs, then perform deployment-specific threat modelling and external review.
 
-Apply issuer-owned status without pretending it is an offline cryptographic fact.
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.limitations/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
-## Model
 
-Status is an explicit trusted input resolved by an application-owned status provider. It can express active, revoked, suspended, unknown, or unavailable according to the profile.
 
-## What remains true
+---
 
-The decision commits the status evidence it used. Cached status obeys declared freshness; absence is not interpreted as active.
+# Semantics
 
-## Where it fails closed
+Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.
 
-Revoked, suspended, stale, unknown, or unavailable status returns a closed lifecycle outcome. Offline verification must state when no current status was consulted.
+## What the claim says
 
-## Continue
+The claim covers ownership of protocol meaning across maintained SDK projections, not defect-free code or every application adapter.
 
-Choose freshness and availability behavior appropriate to the effect's consequence.
+## Release evidence
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+Claim: `auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1` · status `passing`
 
+Rust owns protocol meaning used by Rust, TypeScript, and Python projections.
 
+Evidence: `release/semantic-freeze.json`
 
----
+SHA-256: `75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3`
 
-# Uses and replay
+Reproduce:
 
-Consume bounded uses atomically and reject exact replay.
+- `cargo xtask semantic-freeze`
 
-## Model
+Scope: The declared protocol and product semantic identities consumed by maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python surfaces.
 
-Use state is keyed by stable authority and command commitments. Execution reserves a use before reaching the provider and commits or recovers that reservation according to the journaled outcome.
+Limitation: The semantic freeze detects declared semantic drift; it is not a proof that every implementation is defect-free.
 
 ## What remains true
 
-Concurrent requests cannot both consume the same final use. A transport retry does not create fresh semantic authority.
+A declaration change must update semantic identity or version, packaged projections, fixtures, and documentation together.
 
-## Where it fails closed
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
 
-Exact replay, exhausted use count, reservation conflict, unavailable state, and uncertain prior execution cannot fall through to the provider.
+Unrecorded semantic drift, language-owned authorization logic, or a fixture disagreement degrades or withdraws the claim.
 
 ## Continue
 
-Use Resume for an existing execution reference; never mint a fresh command to hide uncertainty.
+Inspect cross-language evidence and the generated SDK reference for the selected release.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.semantics/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Validity and expiry
+# Supply chain
 
-Evaluate not-before and expiry bounds at an explicit observation time.
+Inspect the recorded SLSA builder assessment without mistaking it for an independent audit.
 
-## Model
+## What the claim says
 
-Validity is a closed interval committed into authority. Verification receives observation time as explicit context and never borrows an ambient clock without the caller choosing it.
+The assessment covers the declared GitHub release builder and recorded SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 controls.
 
-## What remains true
+## Release evidence
 
-Children may shorten but never extend their parent's window. Retained evidence records the time used for the decision.
+Claim: `auths.claim.supply-chain/1` · status `passing`
 
-## Where it fails closed
+The assessed release builder satisfies the recorded SLSA Build Level 3 requirements.
 
-Before-not-before, after-expiry, missing time, invalid intervals, and child windows outside the parent deny deterministically.
+Evidence: `release/slsa-build-level-3-assessment.json`
 
-## Continue
+SHA-256: `49d5a096915d49058c8c66f29c5c7f59181caa0783d4724322068de6c5c3f6bf`
 
-Combine time with status only when current lifecycle state is required.
+Reproduce:
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+- `cargo test -p xtask release_control::tests::checked_in_slsa_assessment_matches_builder_bytes`
 
+Scope: The assessed GitHub release builder and recorded SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 controls.
 
+Limitation: This is a repository-owner delegated build assessment, not an independent security audit or source-correctness proof.
 
----
+## What remains true
 
-# Authority model
+Builder bytes, provenance subjects, workflow identity, and release artifacts must match their checksummed assessment.
 
-Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
+## What would weaken or withdraw it
 
-## The path at a glance
+A changed builder, missing provenance, unverified subject, or stale assessment withdraws passing status.
 
-1. Actor + exact action
-2. Create authority
-3. Delegate narrower
-4. Execute through gateway
-5. Verify receipt
+## Continue
 
-Text equivalent: An actor describes an exact action, creates bounded authority, optionally delegates a narrower child, executes through a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt.
+Verify promotion evidence and obtain independent review appropriate to the deployment's consequence.
 
-## What remains true
+_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.supply-chain/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
-- Authority names the exact action and actor bounds.
-- Delegation cannot add actions, time, uses, budget, or depth.
-- Verification returns inert evidence and cannot perform the effect.
 
-## Failure branches
 
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| Action bytes change | Commitment mismatch | Create authority for the intended bytes; do not reinterpret the old grant. |
-| The same use is replayed | Denied | Create a new authorized operation only if the business intent is genuinely new. |
-| Required trust evidence is unavailable | Indeterminate | Restore the missing evidence before making a decision. |
+---
 
-## Use this when
+# Authority
 
-You need the complete product model before choosing an SDK or deployment.
+Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
 
-## Do not use this when
+## Recommended: [Authority model](/authority/model)
 
-You only need an exact signature or endpoint field; open the generated reference instead.
+Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
 
-## Continue from here
+## Model
+
+- [Authority model](/authority/model) — Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
+
+## Author and narrow
 
-- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
-- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+- [Create](/authority/create) — Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.
+- [Constraints](/authority/constraints) — Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.
+- [Delegate](/authority/delegate) — Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Lifecycle
 
+- [Lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.
+- [Plans](/authority/plans) — Commit multiple ordered operations as one reviewable plan.
 
+## Execute and recover
 
----
+- [Execute](/authority/execute) — Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
+- [Resume](/authority/resume) — Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.
 
-# Plans
+## Verify and inspect
 
-Commit multiple ordered operations as one reviewable plan.
+- [Verify](/authority/verify) — Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.
+- [Receipts](/authority/receipts) — Use signed decision and execution receipts as portable integrity evidence.
 
-## Recommended: [Transaction-bound approvals](/authority/plans/approvals)
+## Profiles
 
-Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.
+- [Profiles](/authority/profiles) — Map application actions, resources, inputs, budgets, commands, and receipts without coupling adjacent components.
 
-## Lifecycle
+## Related topics
 
-- [Transaction-bound approvals](/authority/plans/approvals) — Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.
+- [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.plans/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority.plans/1_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority/1_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Transaction-bound approvals
-
-Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.
+# Constraints
 
-## The path at a glance
+Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.
 
-1. Construct exact plan
-2. Commit members + order
-3. Collect bound approvals
-4. Authorize each sealed command
-5. Record partial or terminal outcome
+## Model
 
-Text equivalent: An exact ordered plan is committed, approvers sign that commitment, each member still passes authorization, and execution records partial, uncertain, cancelled, or terminal outcomes without treating approval as reusable permission.
+Constraints form a conjunction: every bound must permit the request. Action and resource describe the effect; validity limits time; uses and budget limit consumption; depth limits delegation; audience limits the intended verifier or executor; critical extensions add profile-owned restrictions.
 
 ## What remains true
 
-- Approval is evidence about one exact plan commitment.
-- Substituting a member, byte sequence, order, threshold, or approver set invalidates approval.
-- Approval never bypasses authority verification or durable execution state.
+Omitting a bound never means that a child may invent a broader one. Critical extensions must be understood and attenuated according to their declared semantics. Application profiles own canonical resource and action interpretation.
 
-## Failure branches
+## Where it fails closed
 
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| A plan member changes after approval | Substitution rejected | Build and approve a new plan commitment. |
-| Threshold is not met | Denied | Collect the missing valid approval or cancel. |
-| A provider outcome becomes unknown mid-plan | Plan is recoverable with explicit completed and uncertain members | Reconcile before any continuation. |
+Action or resource mismatch, early or late time, exhausted use, insufficient budget, excessive depth, wrong audience, and unknown or widened critical extensions each produce a stable denial before the provider is reached.
 
-## Use this when
+## Continue
 
-Several exact operations require threshold, ordered, or cross-organization review.
+Use the smallest combination that expresses the effect; keep policy engines outside this artifact and commit only their required evidence.
 
-## Do not use this when
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.constraints/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
-A reusable human-approved flag or broad role is sufficient for the actual risk model.
 
-## Continue from here
 
-- [Cross-company authority](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
-- [Authority](/authority) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
+---
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+# Create
 
+Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.
 
+## Outcome
 
----
+An issuer grants one subject the smallest useful action, resource, validity window, use count, budget, audience, and delegation depth.
 
-# Profiles
+## Before you begin
 
-Map application actions, resources, inputs, budgets, commands, and receipts without coupling adjacent components.
+Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
 
-## Model
+## Build the bounded path
 
-A profile owns domain meaning: canonical action and resource identifiers, bounded input parsing, command construction, budget units, critical extensions, and receipt-safe projections. Maintained profiles are closed; profile-kit supports application-owned domains.
+Select a profile action, parse its resource and input, set explicit bounds, author through the native operation, and sign using the configured custody port.
 
-## What remains true
+## Run the qualified path
 
-Profiles cannot choose identity providers, transports, state stores, signer custody, approval vendors, or provider credentials. Every profile parser is bounded and every semantic identity is versioned.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
 
-## Where it fails closed
+## Success means
+
+The resulting artifact is canonical, portable, and accepted identically by Rust, TypeScript, and Python for the permitted request.
 
-Ambiguous resources, non-canonical input, unknown actions, incompatible versions, unbounded extensions, or profiles that smuggle credentials or transport data fail qualification.
+## Fail closed
+
+Missing bounds, invalid profile input, unsupported critical extensions, wrong audience, or altered bytes cannot be repaired during verification.
 
 ## Continue
 
-Begin with a maintained profile or one minimal application-owned action; expand only with differential and adversarial fixtures.
+Execute it directly, or delegate a narrower child without changing the model.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.create/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Receipts
+# Delegate
 
-Use signed decision and execution receipts as portable integrity evidence.
+Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.
 
-## Recommended: [Bounded disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure)
+## Outcome
 
-Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.
+A child principal can act only inside every bound the parent deliberately passes on.
 
-## Verify and inspect
+## Before you begin
 
-- [Bounded disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure) — Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.
+Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority.receipts/1_
+## Build the bounded path
 
+Parse the parent, select the child subject, narrow action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, depth, and critical extensions, then author and sign the child through the native delegate operation.
 
+## Run the qualified path
 
----
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
-# Bounded disclosure
+## Success means
 
-Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.
+The child verifies as an unbroken chain and can perform the one intended tool action.
 
-## The path at a glance
+## Fail closed
 
-1. Decision receipt
-2. Execution receipt
-3. Verify integrity
-4. Opaque or summary view
-5. Authorized full disclosure
+Any wider or incomparable child is rejected, including a quiet critical-extension omission that would restore power.
 
-Text equivalent: Decision and execution receipts bind evidence, local verification confirms integrity, every viewer can receive only the permitted opaque or summary projection, and sensitive full detail requires explicit disclosure authority.
+## Continue
 
-## What remains true
+Inspect depth and chain rules, then test every attempted widening relevant to the application profile.
 
-- A receipt records a decision or outcome; it does not retroactively authorize it.
-- Verification is local and effect free.
-- Sensitive application details are absent from unauthorized and bounded-summary views.
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
-## Failure branches
 
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| Receipt bytes are changed | Verification rejected | Retrieve the original signed receipt from a trusted source. |
-| A viewer lacks disclosure authority | Opaque view | Request explicit disclosure authority rather than leaking fields. |
-| Signer trust cannot be resolved | Indeterminate | Restore trust evidence before relying on the receipt. |
 
-## Use this when
+---
 
-You need audit evidence, cross-company proof, recovery state, or privacy-preserving inspection.
+# Depth and chain
 
-## Do not use this when
+Reason about delegation depth and the complete signed chain.
+
+## Model
 
-You need to perform an effect; receipt verification is intentionally inert.
+Each delegation consumes one unit of permitted depth and adds a signed link. Verification checks the root trust, every issuer-to-subject transition, every narrowing relation, and the terminal request.
 
-## Continue from here
+## What remains true
 
-- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
-- [Assurance](/assurance) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
+Depth cannot be reset by changing languages, identity adapters, transports, or profiles. A chain remains valid only while every link remains valid and trusted.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Skipped links, reordered links, broken subjects, expired parents, revoked ancestors, excessive depth, and incomparable constraints deny the terminal request.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep chains short in simple systems; use explicit organizational or agent handoffs only where they add accountability.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Resume
+# Widening failures
 
-Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.
+Exercise every way a child might attempt to gain power its parent did not pass down.
 
 ## Outcome
 
-The runtime recovers the journaled reservation and either returns the known terminal outcome or reconciles the same provider operation.
+Your test suite proves that delegation can only narrow, including application-defined critical extensions.
 
 ## Before you begin
 
@@ -1142,37 +1130,37 @@ Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state,
 
 ## Build the bounded path
 
-Submit the opaque execution reference, load its durable journal, inspect the last committed phase, and invoke only the gateway's idempotent status or reconciliation path permitted for that original command.
+Generate mutations for action, resource, validity, uses, budget, depth, audience, extension presence, and extension values; verify each child against the same parent and trusted context.
 
 ## Run the qualified path
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
 
 ## Success means
 
-Resume converges on one terminal receipt while preserving original authority, command, context, and idempotency commitments.
+Every valid narrowing is portable across SDKs, and every wider or incomparable mutation returns the same denial identity.
 
 ## Fail closed
 
-Unknown reference, mismatched caller, corrupted journal, fresh command substitution, blind provider retry, or unreconciled provider uncertainty remains stopped.
+A language disagreement, ignored critical extension, dropped parent, or accepted incomparable set is a release-blocking semantic failure.
 
 ## Continue
 
-Define operational reconciliation and escalation for every gateway before enabling production effects.
+Keep these fixtures with the application profile and rerun them on every Auths upgrade.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.resume/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Verify
+# Execute
 
-Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.
+Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
 
 ## Outcome
 
-A caller obtains a deterministic, inert result for exact artifact bytes and explicit trusted context.
+An opaque native authorization handle reaches the executor only after identity, authority, lifecycle, plan, and command checks pass.
 
 ## Before you begin
 
@@ -1180,133 +1168,196 @@ Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state,
 
 ## Build the bounded path
 
-Parse the artifact, supply trust, time, status, request, and profile context as required, run native verification, and project only the authorized inspection view.
+Parse the command, verify and reserve authority, seal exact provider-independent bytes, acquire the gateway only from the native verified handle, perform the effect, then journal and sign the terminal receipt.
 
 ## Run the qualified path
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
+Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
 
 ## Success means
 
-The same bytes and context produce the same normalized result across Rust, TypeScript, and Python without contacting a provider.
+The gateway receives the minimum provider request after durable reservation and returns a closed, receipt-bound outcome.
 
 ## Fail closed
 
-Mutation, wrong trust, stale status, request mismatch, invalid chain, unauthorized disclosure, or unknown semantics fails without constructing executable authority.
+Application code cannot mint the handle; successful transport, approval, signature, or provider authentication alone cannot open the gateway. Provider secrets never enter the authority artifact.
 
 ## Continue
 
-Use Receipts to understand integrity and Disclosure to control what verified evidence reveals.
+Use Resume rather than a new Execute call when the terminal provider result is not yet known.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.verify/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Developers
+# Lifecycle
 
-Choose an SDK, call the runtime, use the CLI, test failures, compose adjacent systems, and build application profiles.
+Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.
 
-## Recommended: [Quickstarts](/developers/quickstarts)
+## The path at a glance
 
-Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.
+1. Author exact authority
+2. Commit canonical bytes
+3. Attenuate child
+4. Consume use or budget
+5. Expire, revoke, or exhaust
 
-## Start building
+Text equivalent: Authority is authored for exact canonical bytes, committed, optionally attenuated into a child, consumed under durable state, and eventually expires, is revoked, or becomes exhausted.
 
-- [Quickstarts](/developers/quickstarts) — Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.
+## What remains true
 
-## SDKs
+- A child is a subset of its parent under every critical extension.
+- Use and budget state are durable and atomic with reservation.
+- Expired, revoked, or exhausted authority cannot be revived by transport or approval.
 
-- [SDKs](/developers/sdks) — Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
+## Failure branches
 
-## Runtime and CLI
+| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
+|---|---|---|
+| A child adds an action or use | Widening rejected | Create the child from a valid subset of the parent. |
+| Authority expires before reservation | Denied | Request fresh authority for current intent. |
+| Revocation state cannot be checked | Indeterminate | Restore lifecycle state; do not assume the grant remains valid. |
+
+## Use this when
 
-- [Runtime API](/developers/runtime-api) — Call the production HTTPS runtime from any language or service boundary.
-- [CLI](/developers/cli) — Use the CLI for local evaluation, fixture verification, runtime inspection, and operator-owned recovery.
+You need delegation, one-time use, budget, expiry, revocation, or critical-extension behavior.
 
-## Test and debug
+## Do not use this when
 
-- [Testing](/developers/testing) — Test success, denial, mutation, replay, recovery, and cross-language parity with deterministic fixtures.
-- [Outcomes and errors](/developers/errors) — Handle the complete closed outcome and error surface without collapsing uncertainty into exceptions or booleans.
+You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.
 
-## Releases
+## Continue from here
 
-- [Versioning](/developers/versioning) — Pin semantic identities, SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, and evidence to a release.
-- [Releases](/developers/releases) — Inspect release notes, package support, contracts, evidence, and known limitations for one Auths release.
+- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
+- [Authority](/authority) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
 
-## Integrate and extend
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
-- [Integrations](/developers/integrations) — Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, transport, and capability systems through explicit ports.
-- [Extension kits](/developers/extension-kits) — Implement identity, suite, trust, status, approval, custody, state, transport, gateway, or profile ports.
-- [Examples](/developers/examples) — Find complete examples by outcome, boundary, and deployment maturity.
 
-## Related topics
 
-- [APIs & SDKs](/reference) — Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.
+---
+
+# Budgets
+
+Reserve and consume numeric or profile-defined budgets with the same atomic boundary as uses.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers/1 · Product contract: auths.page.developers/1_
+## Model
+
+A budget limits cumulative effect according to a profile-owned unit such as cost, records, tokens, or capacity. The request declares its amount and durable state reserves it before execution.
+
+## What remains true
+
+Children may reduce available budget and executions cannot spend more than the remaining amount. The unit and canonical amount are committed.
+
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Negative, overflowed, mismatched-unit, over-budget, concurrent overspend, and unavailable-state requests deny before provider access.
+
+## Continue
+
+Keep budgets simple and domain-specific; use a policy engine for broader business policy and commit its chosen inputs separately.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# CLI
+# Revocation and status
+
+Apply issuer-owned status without pretending it is an offline cryptographic fact.
 
-Use the CLI for local evaluation, fixture verification, runtime inspection, and operator-owned recovery.
+## Model
 
-## Outcome
+Status is an explicit trusted input resolved by an application-owned status provider. It can express active, revoked, suspended, unknown, or unavailable according to the profile.
 
-A terminal user can verify evidence and inspect a configured runtime without reconstructing requests manually.
+## What remains true
 
-## Before you begin
+The decision commits the status evidence it used. Cached status obeys declared freshness; absence is not interpreted as active.
 
-Install the CLI for the selected release, provide explicit input files or standard input, and configure trust or runtime endpoints through bounded documented options.
+## Where it fails closed
 
-## Build the bounded path
+Revoked, suspended, stale, unknown, or unavailable status returns a closed lifecycle outcome. Offline verification must state when no current status was consulted.
 
-Print version, verify a known receipt, inspect a bounded summary, check runtime health, and exercise resume against an isolated recovery scenario.
+## Continue
 
-## Run the qualified path
+Choose freshness and availability behavior appropriate to the effect's consequence.
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
-## Success means
 
-Commands return stable machine-readable outcomes, safe human summaries, and non-zero status for every closed failure.
 
-## Fail closed
+---
+
+# Uses and replay
 
-Unknown flags, interactive secret leakage, ambiguous config, full disclosure without authority, or automatic provider retry is prohibited.
+Consume bounded uses atomically and reject exact replay.
+
+## Model
+
+Use state is keyed by stable authority and command commitments. Execution reserves a use before reaching the provider and commits or recovers that reservation according to the journaled outcome.
+
+## What remains true
+
+Concurrent requests cannot both consume the same final use. A transport retry does not create fresh semantic authority.
+
+## Where it fails closed
+
+Exact replay, exhausted use count, reservation conflict, unavailable state, and uncertain prior execution cannot fall through to the provider.
 
 ## Continue
 
-Use generated CLI reference for exact flags and shell completion.
+Use Resume for an existing execution reference; never mint a fresh command to hide uncertainty.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.cli/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
 
 
 ---
 
-# Outcomes and errors
+# Validity and expiry
+
+Evaluate not-before and expiry bounds at an explicit observation time.
+
+## Model
 
-Handle the complete closed outcome and error surface without collapsing uncertainty into exceptions or booleans.
+Validity is a closed interval committed into authority. Verification receives observation time as explicit context and never borrows an ambient clock without the caller choosing it.
 
-## Orientation
+## What remains true
 
-Parse errors, denials, indeterminate lifecycle results, provider failures, provider-unknown outcomes, and terminal successes mean different things. SDKs use typed results; the Runtime API uses closed response schemas.
+Children may shorten but never extend their parent's window. Retained evidence records the time used for the decision.
 
-## Generated contract anchor
+## Where it fails closed
 
-Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.executions/1`.
+Before-not-before, after-expiry, missing time, invalid intervals, and child windows outside the parent deny deterministically.
 
-## Use this surface
+## Continue
 
-Switch exhaustively on the generated union. Retry only transport failures known to precede reservation; Resume an existing reference after reservation; reconcile provider unknown; treat unknown future variants as closed.
+Combine time with status only when current lifecycle state is required.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
-## Source at release
 
-Outcome identities and shapes are generated from the release Runtime contract and SDK declarations.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.errors/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef0076
\ No newline at end of file
+---
+
+# Authority model
+
+Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
+
+## The path at a glance
+
+1. Actor + exact action
+2. Create authority
+3. Delegate narrower
+4. Execute through gateway
+5. Verify receipt
+
+Text equivalent: An actor describes an exact action, creates bounded authority, optionally delegates a narrower child, executes through a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt.
+
+## What remains true
+
+- Authority names the exact action and actor bounds.
+- D
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/llms.txt b/public/llms.txt
index 5d0bbf6..090a8ed 100644
--- a/public/llms.txt
+++ b/public/llms.txt
@@ -18,7 +18,16 @@
 - [Delegate one tool](/agents/quickstart.md) — Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohibited.
 - [Skills and plugins](/agents/skills-and-plugins.md) — Package Auths-aware skills and plugins without embedding semantic meaning or secrets in prompts.
 - [Test agent authority](/agents/testing.md) — Test agents against widening, substitution, replay, ambient credentials, and uncertain providers.
-- [Assurance](/assurance.md) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
+- [Assurance](/assurance.md) — Inspect what Auths claims, the exact evidence behind it, and the limits that remain.
+- [Adversarial](/assurance/adversarial.md) — Inspect substitution, widening, replay, mutation, and fail-closed evidence.
+- [Authority](/assurance/authority.md) — Inspect attenuation and approval-binding evidence for bounded authority.
+- [Cross-language](/assurance/cross-language.md) — Compare maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes for identical scenarios.
+- [Disclosure](/assurance/disclosure.md) — Inspect evidence that receipt views are bounded and authority-controlled.
+- [Execution](/assurance/execution.md) — Inspect the native closed-gateway boundary protecting provider effects.
+- [Formal](/assurance/formal.md) — Understand where formal attenuation evidence applies and where it does not.
+- [Limitations](/assurance/limitations.md) — Read the boundaries that Auths evidence deliberately does not claim to cross.
+- [Semantics](/assurance/semantics.md) — Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.
+- [Supply chain](/assurance/supply-chain.md) — Inspect the recorded SLSA builder assessment without mistaking it for an independent audit.
 - [Authority](/authority.md) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
 - [Constraints](/authority/constraints.md) — Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.
 - [Create](/authority/create.md) — Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.
@@ -40,7 +49,7 @@
 - [Resume](/authority/resume.md) — Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.
 - [Verify](/authority/verify.md) — Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.
 - [Developers](/developers.md) — Choose an SDK, call the runtime, use the CLI, test failures, compose adjacent systems, and build application profiles.
-- [CLI](/developers/cli.md) — Use the CLI for local evaluation, fixture verification, runtime inspection, and operator-owned recovery.
+- [CLI](/developers/cli.md) — Choose supported terminal workflows without mistaking repository tooling for a public product CLI.
 - [Outcomes and errors](/developers/errors.md) — Handle the complete closed outcome and error surface without collapsing uncertainty into exceptions or booleans.
 - [Examples](/developers/examples.md) — Find complete examples by outcome, boundary, and deployment maturity.
 - [Extension kits](/developers/extension-kits.md) — Implement identity, suite, trust, status, approval, custody, state, transport, gateway, or profile ports.
@@ -128,11 +137,15 @@
 - [Recovery and reconciliation](/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md) — Resume and reconcile interrupted execution without blind provider retry.
 - [Security checklist](/operations/security-checklist.md) — Apply a production security checklist to every Auths boundary.
 - [Upgrade and rollback](/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md) — Upgrade or roll back runtime releases while preserving semantic and state compatibility.
-- [APIs & SDKs](/reference.md) — Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.
-- [CLI reference](/reference/cli.md) — Command contracts generated from the compiled Auths command graph.
-- [Stable error reference](/reference/errors.md) — Machine-stable error identities grouped by the caller's safe response.
-- [Evidence manifest](/reference/evidence.md) — Resolve public claims to exact release evidence and limitations.
-- [Profiles](/reference/profiles.md) — Closed and application-owned profiles that map domain actions into Auths semantics.
-- [Runtime API reference](/reference/runtime-api.md) — The HTTPS production runtime contract.
-- [Schemas](/reference/schemas.md) — Canonical inputs, bounded wire forms, receipts, and disclosure views.
-- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk.md) — The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+- [Reference](/reference.md) — Look up exact SDK, Runtime API, CLI, profile, error, schema, evidence, and manifest contracts for one release.
+- [CLI](/reference/cli.md) — Check whether the selected release declares a supported public CLI surface.
+- [Errors](/reference/errors.md) — Look up stable parse, trust, denial, lifecycle, execution, provider, recovery, and disclosure outcomes.
+- [Evidence](/reference/evidence.md) — Resolve every public assurance claim to status, checksum, reproduction, scope, and limitation.
+- [Reference manifest](/reference/manifest.json.md) — Consume the machine-readable identity-to-URL manifest for the selected docs contract.
+- [Profiles](/reference/profiles.md) — Inspect maintained and application-owned action, resource, command, budget, and receipt projection contracts.
+- [Runtime API](/reference/runtime-api.md) — Inspect exact HTTPS methods, paths, limits, outcomes, recovery, and receipt-disclosure contracts.
+- [Schemas](/reference/schemas.md) — Inspect canonical bounded inputs, wire artifacts, commands, receipts, and disclosure view schemas.
+- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk.md) — Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while remaining on the same Auths operation.
+- [Python SDK](/reference/sdk/python.md) — Inspect installed Python symbols and their native operation mappings.
+- [Rust SDK](/reference/sdk/rust.md) — Inspect maintained Rust SDK symbols and their operation mappings.
+- [TypeScript SDK](/reference/sdk/typescript.md) — Inspect installed TypeScript symbols and their native operation mappings.
diff --git a/public/operations.md b/public/operations.md
index 10cce6d..6775338 100644
--- a/public/operations.md
+++ b/public/operations.md
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Run the complete production topology locally before choosing infrastructure.
 
 ## Related topics
 
-- [Assurance](/assurance) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
+- [Assurance](/assurance) — Inspect what Auths claims, the exact evidence behind it, and the limits that remain.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.operations.runtime/1 · Product contract: auths.page.operations.runtime/1_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/backup-and-restore.md b/public/operations/backup-and-restore.md
index 89aeb0b..e1b5059 100644
--- a/public/operations/backup-and-restore.md
+++ b/public/operations/backup-and-restore.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Incomplete journals, rolled-back use state, missing receipt bytes, concurrent ol
 
 Exercise upgrade and rollback against a restored copy before production rollout.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.backup/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.backup/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/configure/custody.md b/public/operations/configure/custody.md
index 86b19cd..ac76a4e 100644
--- a/public/operations/configure/custody.md
+++ b/public/operations/configure/custody.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Raw signing access, key export, silent algorithm fallback, unknown descriptor, a
 
 Configure explicit trust for the public descriptors and issuers.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.custody/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.custody/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/configure/durable-state.md b/public/operations/configure/durable-state.md
index 46b4a37..f0a1135 100644
--- a/public/operations/configure/durable-state.md
+++ b/public/operations/configure/durable-state.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Split-brain, stale reads, lost commits, unbounded rows, insecure transport, or a
 
 Configure custody so receipt and decision signing remains available without exposing keys.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.state/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.state/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md b/public/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md
index 48e5328..ddae923 100644
--- a/public/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md
+++ b/public/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Unmapped fields, credential leakage, non-idempotent retry, ambiguous response, t
 
 Instrument outcome and latency signals, then write the provider-unknown runbook.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.gateways/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.gateways/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md b/public/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md
index 5fbe956..e42fd2f 100644
--- a/public/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md
+++ b/public/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Unknown roots, stale bundles, resolver ambiguity, profile drift, or an unsupport
 
 Configure gateways only after the action-to-provider mapping is qualified.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.trust/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.trust/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/deploy-runtime.md b/public/operations/deploy-runtime.md
index 9552776..237c113 100644
--- a/public/operations/deploy-runtime.md
+++ b/public/operations/deploy-runtime.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Do not accept traffic when state, custody, trust, gateway, or release identity i
 
 Configure each dependency and establish service-level signals.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.deploy/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.deploy/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/evaluate-locally.md b/public/operations/evaluate-locally.md
index cfed7ff..4797501 100644
--- a/public/operations/evaluate-locally.md
+++ b/public/operations/evaluate-locally.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Missing dependencies, contract mismatch, non-HTTPS production configuration, sta
 
 Choose the deployment topology and replace one development adapter at a time.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.evaluate/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.evaluate/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
index 6a55f66..17d6386 100644
--- a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
+++ b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ You are performing effect-free offline verification.
 - [Deploy the runtime](/get-started/paths/runtime) — Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.
 - [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/compromised-credential.md b/public/operations/incidents/compromised-credential.md
index 1781b67..73e4e17 100644
--- a/public/operations/incidents/compromised-credential.md
+++ b/public/operations/incidents/compromised-credential.md
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configurati
 
 Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.credential/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.credential/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md b/public/operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md
index 37edd18..b3813d1 100644
--- a/public/operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md
+++ b/public/operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configurati
 
 Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.provider-unknown/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.provider-unknown/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure.md b/public/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure.md
index 9ff4039..5ecddc3 100644
--- a/public/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure.md
+++ b/public/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure.md
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configurati
 
 Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md b/public/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md
index fa9dcf5..88de641 100644
--- a/public/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md
+++ b/public/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configurati
 
 Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.signer-outage/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.signer-outage/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/state-loss.md b/public/operations/incidents/state-loss.md
index 93706c7..2807a96 100644
--- a/public/operations/incidents/state-loss.md
+++ b/public/operations/incidents/state-loss.md
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configurati
 
 Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.state-loss/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.state-loss/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md b/public/operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md
index a9d2e95..6e7f0c6 100644
--- a/public/operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md
+++ b/public/operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configurati
 
 Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.trust-root/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.trust-root/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/observability.md b/public/operations/observability.md
index 097e148..ef4a5af 100644
--- a/public/operations/observability.md
+++ b/public/operations/observability.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Stop rollout on missing telemetry, cardinality explosion, raw artifact logging,
 
 Exercise recovery and incident procedures using the same signals.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.observability/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.observability/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/receipt-retention.md b/public/operations/receipt-retention.md
index ba3c87d..29c64ed 100644
--- a/public/operations/receipt-retention.md
+++ b/public/operations/receipt-retention.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Raw command or provider payload logging, public full views, missing disclosure a
 
 Add receipt disclosure response to the incident program.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.receipts/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.receipts/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md b/public/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md
index adfaab5..336dab7 100644
--- a/public/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md
+++ b/public/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Unknown reference, missing state, provider ambiguity, mismatched result, or evid
 
 Exercise backup and restore so recovery evidence survives infrastructure loss.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.recovery/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.recovery/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/security-checklist.md b/public/operations/security-checklist.md
index 834339e..99b78ac 100644
--- a/public/operations/security-checklist.md
+++ b/public/operations/security-checklist.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ No direct provider path, exported key, ambient trust, permissive fallback, unbou
 
 Schedule outside security review after the operational evidence is reproducible.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.security/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.security/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md b/public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md
index d856258..961f9ae 100644
--- a/public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md
+++ b/public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md
@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ Semantic drift, schema incompatibility, mixed-version disagreement, receipt chan
 
 Retain the exact release and evidence bundle used for every production window.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.upgrade/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+_Page identity: auths.page.operations.upgrade/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/reference-manifest.json b/public/reference-manifest.json
index 3a23f0d..2a719c2 100644
--- a/public/reference-manifest.json
+++ b/public/reference-manifest.json
@@ -1,9 +1,885 @@
 {
   "schema": "auths.docs.reference-manifest/1",
-  "surfaces": [
-    { "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "kind": "sdk-reference", "path": "/reference/sdk", "source": "/reference/sdk.md" },
-    { "id": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "kind": "runtime-api-reference", "path": "/reference/runtime-api", "source": "/reference/runtime-api.md" }
+  "contractDigest": "8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90",
+  "pages": [
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.home/1",
+      "url": "/",
+      "markdown": "/index.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents/1",
+      "url": "/agents",
+      "markdown": "/agents.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1",
+      "url": "/agents/approved-plans",
+      "markdown": "/agents/approved-plans.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.delegation/1",
+      "url": "/agents/delegation",
+      "markdown": "/agents/delegation.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1",
+      "url": "/agents/how-auths-works",
+      "markdown": "/agents/how-auths-works.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.identity/1",
+      "url": "/agents/identity",
+      "markdown": "/agents/identity.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp/1",
+      "url": "/agents/mcp",
+      "markdown": "/agents/mcp.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1",
+      "url": "/agents/mcp/client",
+      "markdown": "/agents/mcp/client.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1",
+      "url": "/agents/mcp/protect-server",
+      "markdown": "/agents/mcp/protect-server.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1",
+      "url": "/agents/mcp/tool-profiles",
+      "markdown": "/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1",
+      "url": "/agents/mcp/transport-boundary",
+      "markdown": "/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1",
+      "url": "/agents/multi-agent",
+      "markdown": "/agents/multi-agent.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.production/1",
+      "url": "/agents/production-patterns",
+      "markdown": "/agents/production-patterns.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1",
+      "url": "/agents/quickstart",
+      "markdown": "/agents/quickstart.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.skills/1",
+      "url": "/agents/skills-and-plugins",
+      "markdown": "/agents/skills-and-plugins.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.testing/1",
+      "url": "/agents/testing",
+      "markdown": "/agents/testing.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
+      "url": "/assurance",
+      "markdown": "/assurance.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.adversarial/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/adversarial",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/adversarial.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.authority/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/authority",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/authority.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.cross-language/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/cross-language",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/cross-language.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.disclosure/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/disclosure",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/disclosure.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.execution/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/execution",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/execution.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.formal/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/formal",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/formal.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.limitations/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/limitations",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/limitations.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.semantics/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/semantics",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/semantics.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.supply-chain/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/supply-chain",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/supply-chain.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority/1",
+      "url": "/authority",
+      "markdown": "/authority.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.constraints/1",
+      "url": "/authority/constraints",
+      "markdown": "/authority/constraints.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.create/1",
+      "url": "/authority/create",
+      "markdown": "/authority/create.md"
+    },
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+  "endpoints": [
+    {
+      "id": "auths.endpoint.health/1",
+      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.endpoint.version/1",
+      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.endpoint.authorities/1",
+      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
+      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1",
+      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1",
+      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1",
+      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
+    }
+  ],
+  "scenarios": [
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.delegation/1",
+      "url": "/developers/testing"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1",
+      "url": "/developers/testing"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
+      "url": "/developers/testing"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
+      "url": "/authority/create"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
+      "url": "/agents/mcp/protect-server"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
+      "url": "/agents/delegation"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1",
+      "url": "/agents/approved-plans"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
+      "url": "/authority/receipts/disclosure"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
+      "url": "/agents/production-patterns"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1",
+      "url": "/developers/extension-kits"
+    }
+  ],
+  "claims": [
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.approval-binding/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/adversarial",
+      "evidence": "bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json",
+      "sha256": "a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.attenuation/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/authority",
+      "evidence": "formal/qualification.lean",
+      "sha256": "fb1fd17d377194e96f98313412052f82fbb43cb594b12eb6a9fa0e0dce3ce70c"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.bounded-disclosure/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/disclosure",
+      "evidence": "release/docs/runtime-facts-v1.json",
+      "sha256": "3229ccc5a4adbcdfd4b55bdca58ab9e7e5c333719aeff3a0dba54976e6fef1f1"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.closed-gateway/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/execution",
+      "evidence": "release/semantic-freeze.json",
+      "sha256": "75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.cross-language-parity/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/cross-language",
+      "evidence": "release/docs/scenarios.toml",
+      "sha256": "f056e57acb5dbad67ef5ed5076bdee388a82e73b7e6a6af53b82c226ccd552da"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.lifecycle-state/1",
+      "url": "/reference/evidence",
+      "evidence": "bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json",
+      "sha256": "a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/limitations",
+      "evidence": "release/semantic-freeze.json",
+      "sha256": "75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.supply-chain/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/supply-chain",
+      "evidence": "release/slsa-build-level-3-assessment.json",
+      "sha256": "49d5a096915d49058c8c66f29c5c7f59181caa0783d4724322068de6c5c3f6bf"
+    }
+  ]
 }
diff --git a/public/reference.md b/public/reference.md
index 9266a66..70acb35 100644
--- a/public/reference.md
+++ b/public/reference.md
@@ -1,30 +1,34 @@
-# APIs & SDKs
+# Reference
 
-Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.
+Look up exact SDK, Runtime API, CLI, profile, error, schema, evidence, and manifest contracts for one release.
 
 ## Recommended: [SDK reference](/reference/sdk)
 
-The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while remaining on the same Auths operation.
 
 ## SDK
 
-- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while remaining on the same Auths operation.
 
 ## Runtime
 
-- [Runtime API reference](/reference/runtime-api) — The HTTPS production runtime contract.
+- [Runtime API](/reference/runtime-api) — Inspect exact HTTPS methods, paths, limits, outcomes, recovery, and receipt-disclosure contracts.
 
 ## Lookup
 
-- [CLI reference](/reference/cli) — Command contracts generated from the compiled Auths command graph.
-- [Profiles](/reference/profiles) — Closed and application-owned profiles that map domain actions into Auths semantics.
-- [Stable error reference](/reference/errors) — Machine-stable error identities grouped by the caller's safe response.
-- [Schemas](/reference/schemas) — Canonical inputs, bounded wire forms, receipts, and disclosure views.
-- [Evidence manifest](/reference/evidence) — Resolve public claims to exact release evidence and limitations.
+- [CLI](/reference/cli) — Check whether the selected release declares a supported public CLI surface.
+- [Profiles](/reference/profiles) — Inspect maintained and application-owned action, resource, command, budget, and receipt projection contracts.
+- [Errors](/reference/errors) — Look up stable parse, trust, denial, lifecycle, execution, provider, recovery, and disclosure outcomes.
+- [Schemas](/reference/schemas) — Inspect canonical bounded inputs, wire artifacts, commands, receipts, and disclosure view schemas.
+- [Evidence](/reference/evidence) — Resolve every public assurance claim to status, checksum, reproduction, scope, and limitation.
+
+## Machine readable
+
+- [Reference manifest](/reference/manifest.json) — Consume the machine-readable identity-to-URL manifest for the selected docs contract.
 
 ## Related topics
 
-- [Assurance](/assurance) — Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.
+- [Assurance](/assurance) — Inspect what Auths claims, the exact evidence behind it, and the limits that remain.
 
 _Page identity: auths.page.reference/1 · Product contract: auths.page.reference/1_
 
diff --git a/public/reference/cli.md b/public/reference/cli.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..693f637
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/cli.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# CLI
+
+Check whether the selected release declares a supported public CLI surface.
+
+## Orientation
+
+This prelaunch release does not declare a general-purpose public Auths CLI. Repository cargo xtask commands are contributor tooling, not a supported customer interface.
+
+## Generated contract anchor
+
+Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.version/1`.
+
+## Use this surface
+
+Use maintained SDKs or the Runtime API for terminal automation. A future CLI will appear here only after its commands, flags, outcomes, packages, and support policy enter the release contract.
+
+## Source at release
+
+This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.reference.cli/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+
diff --git a/public/reference/errors.md b/public/reference/errors.md
index 8eccf33..2057dc5 100644
--- a/public/reference/errors.md
+++ b/public/reference/errors.md
@@ -1,10 +1,22 @@
-# Stable error reference
+# Errors
 
-Machine-stable error identities grouped by the caller's safe response.
+Look up stable parse, trust, denial, lifecycle, execution, provider, recovery, and disclosure outcomes.
 
-## Error codes are behavior contracts
+## Orientation
 
-Use stable codes for program flow and bounded diagnostics for people. Never infer that an effect failed merely because the caller received an error.
+Errors and closed outcomes are grouped by the caller's safe response rather than by internal exception type.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.reference.errors/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Generated contract anchor
+
+Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.executions/1`.
+
+## Use this surface
+
+Fix denied input, supply missing trusted context for indeterminate results, Resume recoverable executions, reconcile provider unknown, and never retry an unknown effect blindly.
+
+## Source at release
+
+This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.reference.errors/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/reference/evidence.md b/public/reference/evidence.md
index a3c14d5..98ac5f0 100644
--- a/public/reference/evidence.md
+++ b/public/reference/evidence.md
@@ -1,10 +1,22 @@
-# Evidence manifest
+# Evidence
 
-Resolve public claims to exact release evidence and limitations.
+Resolve every public assurance claim to status, checksum, reproduction, scope, and limitation.
 
-## Evidence is bounded
+## Orientation
 
-Each assessment states which release bytes it covers, what the check proves, what it does not prove, and how to reproduce it.
+Evidence pages do not convert repository tests into universal correctness. They report exactly what the selected release checked and where that claim stops.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.reference.evidence/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Generated contract anchor
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.verify/1`.
+
+## Use this surface
+
+Verify evidence checksums, run the declared reproduction commands, and read limitations before relying on a claim for production risk decisions.
+
+## Source at release
+
+This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.reference.evidence/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/reference/manifest.json b/public/reference/manifest.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a719c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/manifest.json
@@ -0,0 +1,885 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.reference-manifest/1",
+  "contractDigest": "8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90",
+  "pages": [
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.home/1",
+      "url": "/",
+      "markdown": "/index.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents/1",
+      "url": "/agents",
+      "markdown": "/agents.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1",
+      "url": "/agents/approved-plans",
+      "markdown": "/agents/approved-plans.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.delegation/1",
+      "url": "/agents/delegation",
+      "markdown": "/agents/delegation.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1",
+      "url": "/agents/how-auths-works",
+      "markdown": "/agents/how-auths-works.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.identity/1",
+      "url": "/agents/identity",
+      "markdown": "/agents/identity.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp/1",
+      "url": "/agents/mcp",
+      "markdown": "/agents/mcp.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1",
+      "url": "/agents/mcp/client",
+      "markdown": "/agents/mcp/client.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1",
+      "url": "/agents/mcp/protect-server",
+      "markdown": "/agents/mcp/protect-server.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1",
+      "url": "/agents/mcp/tool-profiles",
+      "markdown": "/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1",
+      "url": "/agents/mcp/transport-boundary",
+      "markdown": "/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1",
+      "url": "/agents/multi-agent",
+      "markdown": "/agents/multi-agent.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.production/1",
+      "url": "/agents/production-patterns",
+      "markdown": "/agents/production-patterns.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1",
+      "url": "/agents/quickstart",
+      "markdown": "/agents/quickstart.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.skills/1",
+      "url": "/agents/skills-and-plugins",
+      "markdown": "/agents/skills-and-plugins.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.agents.testing/1",
+      "url": "/agents/testing",
+      "markdown": "/agents/testing.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
+      "url": "/assurance",
+      "markdown": "/assurance.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.adversarial/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/adversarial",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/adversarial.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.authority/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/authority",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/authority.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.cross-language/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/cross-language",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/cross-language.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.disclosure/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/disclosure",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/disclosure.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.execution/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/execution",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/execution.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.formal/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/formal",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/formal.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.limitations/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/limitations",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/limitations.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.semantics/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/semantics",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/semantics.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.supply-chain/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/supply-chain",
+      "markdown": "/assurance/supply-chain.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority/1",
+      "url": "/authority",
+      "markdown": "/authority.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.constraints/1",
+      "url": "/authority/constraints",
+      "markdown": "/authority/constraints.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.create/1",
+      "url": "/authority/create",
+      "markdown": "/authority/create.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.delegate/1",
+      "url": "/authority/delegate",
+      "markdown": "/authority/delegate.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1",
+      "url": "/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain",
+      "markdown": "/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1",
+      "url": "/authority/delegate/widening-failures",
+      "markdown": "/authority/delegate/widening-failures.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1",
+      "url": "/authority/execute",
+      "markdown": "/authority/execute.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1",
+      "url": "/authority/lifecycle",
+      "markdown": "/authority/lifecycle.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1",
+      "url": "/authority/lifecycle/budgets",
+      "markdown": "/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1",
+      "url": "/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status",
+      "markdown": "/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1",
+      "url": "/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay",
+      "markdown": "/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1",
+      "url": "/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry",
+      "markdown": "/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.concepts.tour/1",
+      "url": "/authority/model",
+      "markdown": "/authority/model.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.plans/1",
+      "url": "/authority/plans",
+      "markdown": "/authority/plans.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1",
+      "url": "/authority/plans/approvals",
+      "markdown": "/authority/plans/approvals.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.profiles/1",
+      "url": "/authority/profiles",
+      "markdown": "/authority/profiles.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.receipts/1",
+      "url": "/authority/receipts",
+      "markdown": "/authority/receipts.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1",
+      "url": "/authority/receipts/disclosure",
+      "markdown": "/authority/receipts/disclosure.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.resume/1",
+      "url": "/authority/resume",
+      "markdown": "/authority/resume.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.authority.verify/1",
+      "url": "/authority/verify",
+      "markdown": "/authority/verify.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers/1",
+      "url": "/developers",
+      "markdown": "/developers.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.cli/1",
+      "url": "/developers/cli",
+      "markdown": "/developers/cli.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.errors/1",
+      "url": "/developers/errors",
+      "markdown": "/developers/errors.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.examples/1",
+      "url": "/developers/examples",
+      "markdown": "/developers/examples.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.extensions/1",
+      "url": "/developers/extension-kits",
+      "markdown": "/developers/extension-kits.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
+      "url": "/developers/integrations",
+      "markdown": "/developers/integrations.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1",
+      "url": "/developers/integrations/capabilities",
+      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/capabilities.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.integrations.cloud/1",
+      "url": "/developers/integrations/cloud-iam",
+      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1",
+      "url": "/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust",
+      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.integrations.policy/1",
+      "url": "/developers/integrations/policy",
+      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/policy.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1",
+      "url": "/developers/integrations/profile-kit",
+      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.integrations.transport/1",
+      "url": "/developers/integrations/transport",
+      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/transport.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.quickstarts/1",
+      "url": "/developers/quickstarts",
+      "markdown": "/developers/quickstarts.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.releases/1",
+      "url": "/developers/releases",
+      "markdown": "/developers/releases.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1",
+      "url": "/developers/runtime-api",
+      "markdown": "/developers/runtime-api.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks/1",
+      "url": "/developers/sdks",
+      "markdown": "/developers/sdks.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.parity/1",
+      "url": "/developers/sdks/parity",
+      "markdown": "/developers/sdks/parity.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.python/1",
+      "url": "/developers/sdks/python",
+      "markdown": "/developers/sdks/python.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.rust/1",
+      "url": "/developers/sdks/rust",
+      "markdown": "/developers/sdks/rust.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.typescript/1",
+      "url": "/developers/sdks/typescript",
+      "markdown": "/developers/sdks/typescript.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.testing/1",
+      "url": "/developers/testing",
+      "markdown": "/developers/testing.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.developers.versioning/1",
+      "url": "/developers/versioning",
+      "markdown": "/developers/versioning.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start/1",
+      "url": "/get-started",
+      "markdown": "/get-started.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.adopt/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/adoption",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/adoption/api-keys",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.approvals/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/adoption/approvals",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/approvals.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/adoption/capabilities",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.cutover/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/adoption/cutover",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/cutover.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.plan/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/adoption/plan",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/plan.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/adoption/policy-engines",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/adoption/signed-requests",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.choose/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/choose",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/choose.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.evaluate/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/evaluate",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/evaluate.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.get-started.paths/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/paths",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/paths.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.agent/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/paths/agent",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/paths/agent.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.local/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/paths/application",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/paths/application.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.cross-company/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/paths/cross-company",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/paths/cross-company.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.runtime/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/paths/runtime",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/paths/runtime.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.verify/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/paths/verification",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/paths/verification.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.prerequisites/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/prerequisites",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/prerequisites.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/recovery",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1",
+      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect",
+      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
+      "url": "/identity-trust",
+      "markdown": "/identity-trust.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites/1",
+      "url": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites",
+      "markdown": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites.custom/1",
+      "url": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum",
+      "markdown": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites.ed25519/1",
+      "url": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519",
+      "markdown": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites.p256/1",
+      "url": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256",
+      "markdown": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.exchange/1",
+      "url": "/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity",
+      "markdown": "/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
+      "url": "/identity-trust/how-it-works",
+      "markdown": "/identity-trust/how-it-works.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources/1",
+      "url": "/identity-trust/identity-sources",
+      "markdown": "/identity-trust/identity-sources.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.resolvers/1",
+      "url": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers",
+      "markdown": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.oauth-oidc/1",
+      "url": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc",
+      "markdown": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.raw-keys/1",
+      "url": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys",
+      "markdown": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.spiffe/1",
+      "url": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe",
+      "markdown": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.rotation/1",
+      "url": "/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation",
+      "markdown": "/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.testing/1",
+      "url": "/identity-trust/testing",
+      "markdown": "/identity-trust/testing.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.policy/1",
+      "url": "/identity-trust/trust-policy",
+      "markdown": "/identity-trust/trust-policy.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.context/1",
+      "url": "/identity-trust/verification-context",
+      "markdown": "/identity-trust/verification-context.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
+      "url": "/operations",
+      "markdown": "/operations.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.backup/1",
+      "url": "/operations/backup-and-restore",
+      "markdown": "/operations/backup-and-restore.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.configure/1",
+      "url": "/operations/configure",
+      "markdown": "/operations/configure.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.custody/1",
+      "url": "/operations/configure/custody",
+      "markdown": "/operations/configure/custody.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.state/1",
+      "url": "/operations/configure/durable-state",
+      "markdown": "/operations/configure/durable-state.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.gateways/1",
+      "url": "/operations/configure/provider-gateways",
+      "markdown": "/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.trust/1",
+      "url": "/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles",
+      "markdown": "/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.deploy/1",
+      "url": "/operations/deploy-runtime",
+      "markdown": "/operations/deploy-runtime.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.evaluate/1",
+      "url": "/operations/evaluate-locally",
+      "markdown": "/operations/evaluate-locally.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1",
+      "url": "/operations/execution-lifecycle",
+      "markdown": "/operations/execution-lifecycle.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents/1",
+      "url": "/operations/incidents",
+      "markdown": "/operations/incidents.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.credential/1",
+      "url": "/operations/incidents/compromised-credential",
+      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/compromised-credential.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.provider-unknown/1",
+      "url": "/operations/incidents/provider-unknown",
+      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.disclosure/1",
+      "url": "/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure",
+      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.signer-outage/1",
+      "url": "/operations/incidents/signer-outage",
+      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.state-loss/1",
+      "url": "/operations/incidents/state-loss",
+      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/state-loss.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.trust-root/1",
+      "url": "/operations/incidents/trust-root-error",
+      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.observability/1",
+      "url": "/operations/observability",
+      "markdown": "/operations/observability.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.receipts/1",
+      "url": "/operations/receipt-retention",
+      "markdown": "/operations/receipt-retention.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.recovery/1",
+      "url": "/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation",
+      "markdown": "/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.security/1",
+      "url": "/operations/security-checklist",
+      "markdown": "/operations/security-checklist.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.operations.upgrade/1",
+      "url": "/operations/upgrade-and-rollback",
+      "markdown": "/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference/1",
+      "url": "/reference",
+      "markdown": "/reference.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.cli/1",
+      "url": "/reference/cli",
+      "markdown": "/reference/cli.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.errors/1",
+      "url": "/reference/errors",
+      "markdown": "/reference/errors.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.evidence/1",
+      "url": "/reference/evidence",
+      "markdown": "/reference/evidence.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.manifest/1",
+      "url": "/reference/manifest.json",
+      "markdown": "/reference/manifest.json.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.profiles/1",
+      "url": "/reference/profiles",
+      "markdown": "/reference/profiles.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
+      "url": "/reference/runtime-api",
+      "markdown": "/reference/runtime-api.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.schemas/1",
+      "url": "/reference/schemas",
+      "markdown": "/reference/schemas.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
+      "url": "/reference/sdk",
+      "markdown": "/reference/sdk.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk.python/1",
+      "url": "/reference/sdk/python",
+      "markdown": "/reference/sdk/python.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk.rust/1",
+      "url": "/reference/sdk/rust",
+      "markdown": "/reference/sdk/rust.md"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk.typescript/1",
+      "url": "/reference/sdk/typescript",
+      "markdown": "/reference/sdk/typescript.md"
+    }
+  ],
+  "operations": [
+    {
+      "id": "auths.operation.create/1",
+      "url": "/reference/sdk"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+      "url": "/reference/sdk"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.operation.execute/1",
+      "url": "/reference/sdk"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.operation.resume/1",
+      "url": "/reference/sdk"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.operation.verify/1",
+      "url": "/reference/sdk"
+    }
+  ],
+  "endpoints": [
+    {
+      "id": "auths.endpoint.health/1",
+      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.endpoint.version/1",
+      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.endpoint.authorities/1",
+      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
+      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1",
+      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1",
+      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1",
+      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
+    }
+  ],
+  "scenarios": [
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.delegation/1",
+      "url": "/developers/testing"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1",
+      "url": "/developers/testing"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
+      "url": "/developers/testing"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
+      "url": "/authority/create"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
+      "url": "/agents/mcp/protect-server"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
+      "url": "/agents/delegation"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1",
+      "url": "/agents/approved-plans"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
+      "url": "/authority/receipts/disclosure"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
+      "url": "/agents/production-patterns"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1",
+      "url": "/developers/extension-kits"
+    }
+  ],
+  "claims": [
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.approval-binding/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/adversarial",
+      "evidence": "bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json",
+      "sha256": "a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.attenuation/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/authority",
+      "evidence": "formal/qualification.lean",
+      "sha256": "fb1fd17d377194e96f98313412052f82fbb43cb594b12eb6a9fa0e0dce3ce70c"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.bounded-disclosure/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/disclosure",
+      "evidence": "release/docs/runtime-facts-v1.json",
+      "sha256": "3229ccc5a4adbcdfd4b55bdca58ab9e7e5c333719aeff3a0dba54976e6fef1f1"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.closed-gateway/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/execution",
+      "evidence": "release/semantic-freeze.json",
+      "sha256": "75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.cross-language-parity/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/cross-language",
+      "evidence": "release/docs/scenarios.toml",
+      "sha256": "f056e57acb5dbad67ef5ed5076bdee388a82e73b7e6a6af53b82c226ccd552da"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.lifecycle-state/1",
+      "url": "/reference/evidence",
+      "evidence": "bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json",
+      "sha256": "a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/limitations",
+      "evidence": "release/semantic-freeze.json",
+      "sha256": "75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.supply-chain/1",
+      "url": "/assurance/supply-chain",
+      "evidence": "release/slsa-build-level-3-assessment.json",
+      "sha256": "49d5a096915d49058c8c66f29c5c7f59181caa0783d4724322068de6c5c3f6bf"
+    }
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/public/reference/manifest.json.md b/public/reference/manifest.json.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ae3abc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/manifest.json.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Reference manifest
+
+Consume the machine-readable identity-to-URL manifest for the selected docs contract.
+
+## Orientation
+
+The manifest maps pages, operations, endpoints, scenarios, and evidence claims to canonical URLs under one contract digest.
+
+## Generated contract anchor
+
+Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.version/1`.
+
+## Use this surface
+
+Agents and tooling should retrieve this JSON directly rather than scrape navigation or guess routes from display names.
+
+## Source at release
+
+This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.reference.manifest/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+
diff --git a/public/reference/profiles.md b/public/reference/profiles.md
index 770833f..f76b5dc 100644
--- a/public/reference/profiles.md
+++ b/public/reference/profiles.md
@@ -1,10 +1,22 @@
 # Profiles
 
-Closed and application-owned profiles that map domain actions into Auths semantics.
+Inspect maintained and application-owned action, resource, command, budget, and receipt projection contracts.
 
-## Profiles own domain meaning
+## Orientation
 
-A profile defines canonical application actions and resource matching. It does not choose identity, transport, custody, or provider credentials.
+Profiles map bounded domain intent into Auths operations without owning identity, transport, state, custody, approval providers, or provider credentials.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.reference.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Generated contract anchor
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
+
+## Use this surface
+
+Resolve profile version and action identities before authoring authority. Use profile-kit for application domains and qualify every critical extension.
+
+## Source at release
+
+This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.reference.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/reference/runtime-api.md b/public/reference/runtime-api.md
index e54e10e..e70e40e 100644
--- a/public/reference/runtime-api.md
+++ b/public/reference/runtime-api.md
@@ -1,24 +1,22 @@
-# Runtime API Reference
+# Runtime API
 
-The HTTPS contract for the Auths production runtime. For in-process libraries,
-use the SDK reference.
+Inspect exact HTTPS methods, paths, limits, outcomes, recovery, and receipt-disclosure contracts.
 
-## Health {#auths.endpoint.health/1}
+## Orientation
 
-`GET /v1/health` reads liveness without authority, custody, provider, or state mutation.
+The Runtime API is the language-neutral production boundary. Every effectful endpoint declares request limits, closed outcomes, state behavior, and trust boundary.
 
-## Create authority {#auths.endpoint.authorities/1}
+## Generated contract anchor
 
-`POST /v1/authorities` parses a bounded request and creates exact authority.
+Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.health/1`.
 
-## Execute a sealed command {#auths.endpoint.executions/1}
+## Use this surface
 
-`POST /v1/executions` authorizes, reserves, and submits one exact effect through a closed gateway.
+Check health and version, create authority, execute, resume, then request only authorized receipt projections. Unknown outcomes remain closed.
 
-## Resume execution {#auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1}
+## Source at release
 
-`POST /v1/executions/{execution_id}/resume` continues a recoverable execution without creating a fresh mutation.
+This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
 
-## Read receipt summary {#auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1}
+_Page identity: auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
-`GET /v1/receipts/{receipt_id}` returns a bounded projection without exposing full receipt material.
diff --git a/public/reference/schemas.md b/public/reference/schemas.md
index f2e51fc..7de881e 100644
--- a/public/reference/schemas.md
+++ b/public/reference/schemas.md
@@ -1,10 +1,22 @@
 # Schemas
 
-Canonical inputs, bounded wire forms, receipts, and disclosure views.
+Inspect canonical bounded inputs, wire artifacts, commands, receipts, and disclosure view schemas.
 
-## Parse into bounded types
+## Orientation
 
-Public inputs are parsed once into closed native types. Unknown fields, oversized bytes, unsupported versions, and invalid combinations are rejected before semantic evaluation.
+Schemas are versioned release facts with size and shape limits. Parsers create trusted typed values; callers cannot validate loosely and pass raw objects onward.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.reference.schemas/1 · Contract digest: 14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3_
+## Generated contract anchor
+
+Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.authorities/1`.
+
+## Use this surface
+
+Generate clients from the selected release schema only where supported, and preserve unknown-field rejection at security boundaries.
+
+## Source at release
+
+This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.reference.schemas/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
 
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk.md b/public/reference/sdk.md
index 0f8f8d5..fb18b2a 100644
--- a/public/reference/sdk.md
+++ b/public/reference/sdk.md
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ python -m pip install auths
 
 Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
 
-This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
 
 
 ---
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783f
 
 Generated operation: `auths.operation.delegate/1`.
 
-This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
 
 
 ---
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783f
 
 Generated operation: `auths.operation.execute/1`.
 
-This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
 
 
 ---
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783f
 
 Generated operation: `auths.operation.resume/1`.
 
-This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
 
 
 ---
@@ -71,5 +71,5 @@ This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783f
 
 Generated operation: `auths.operation.verify/1`.
 
-This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
 
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/python.md b/public/reference/sdk/python.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1606055
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/sdk/python.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Python SDK
+
+Inspect installed Python symbols and their native operation mappings.
+
+## Orientation
+
+The Python SDK exposes typed high-level workflows while opaque native handles prevent Python code from minting effect-capable authorization.
+
+## Generated contract anchor
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
+
+## Use this surface
+
+Use the same operation and outcome identities as TypeScript; consult the support matrix for maintained Python and platform wheels.
+
+## Source at release
+
+This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.reference.sdk.python/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/rust.md b/public/reference/sdk/rust.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5361e97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/sdk/rust.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Rust SDK
+
+Inspect maintained Rust SDK symbols and their operation mappings.
+
+## Orientation
+
+Rust is the semantic owner and exposes typed authoring, delegation, execution, recovery, verification, inspection, and diagnostics surfaces.
+
+## Generated contract anchor
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
+
+## Use this surface
+
+Follow stable operation identities instead of crate module names; private implementation types are intentionally absent.
+
+## Source at release
+
+This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.reference.sdk.rust/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/create.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/create.md
index 79c04a5..93b9082 100644
--- a/public/reference/sdk/sections/create.md
+++ b/public/reference/sdk/sections/create.md
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 
 Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
 
-This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
 
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/delegate.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/delegate.md
index e5ee963..dba7812 100644
--- a/public/reference/sdk/sections/delegate.md
+++ b/public/reference/sdk/sections/delegate.md
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 
 Generated operation: `auths.operation.delegate/1`.
 
-This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
 
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/execute.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/execute.md
index dbb9b4e..590e1dc 100644
--- a/public/reference/sdk/sections/execute.md
+++ b/public/reference/sdk/sections/execute.md
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 
 Generated operation: `auths.operation.execute/1`.
 
-This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
 
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/resume.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/resume.md
index ec6d342..56655d9 100644
--- a/public/reference/sdk/sections/resume.md
+++ b/public/reference/sdk/sections/resume.md
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 
 Generated operation: `auths.operation.resume/1`.
 
-This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
 
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/verify.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/verify.md
index 10c374c..6094a95 100644
--- a/public/reference/sdk/sections/verify.md
+++ b/public/reference/sdk/sections/verify.md
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 
 Generated operation: `auths.operation.verify/1`.
 
-This section is resolved from product contract `14b2d4439129915287da91cf3d57783fef00766c00606e63f95e270ca8a342e3`.
+This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
 
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/typescript.md b/public/reference/sdk/typescript.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8c2d83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/sdk/typescript.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# TypeScript SDK
+
+Inspect installed TypeScript symbols and their native operation mappings.
+
+## Orientation
+
+The TypeScript SDK exposes idiomatic typed projections over Rust-owned semantics and synchronized outcomes.
+
+## Generated contract anchor
+
+Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
+
+## Use this surface
+
+Use the integrated package first, then descend into focused entry points only when the application needs independent identity, verification, inspection, runtime, or testkit surfaces.
+
+## Source at release
+
+This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
+
+_Page identity: auths.page.reference.sdk.typescript/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+
diff --git a/public/search-index.json b/public/search-index.json
index 6e97767..1c61930 100644
--- a/public/search-index.json
+++ b/public/search-index.json
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 {
   "schema": "auths.docs.search-index/1",
+  "contractDigest": "8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90",
   "synonyms": {
     "permission": [
       "authority",
@@ -140,7 +141,70 @@
       "id": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
       "path": "/assurance",
       "title": "Assurance",
-      "description": "Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.",
+      "description": "Inspect what Auths claims, the exact evidence behind it, and the limits that remain.",
+      "section": "assurance"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.adversarial/1",
+      "path": "/assurance/adversarial",
+      "title": "Adversarial",
+      "description": "Inspect substitution, widening, replay, mutation, and fail-closed evidence.",
+      "section": "assurance"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.authority/1",
+      "path": "/assurance/authority",
+      "title": "Authority",
+      "description": "Inspect attenuation and approval-binding evidence for bounded authority.",
+      "section": "assurance"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.cross-language/1",
+      "path": "/assurance/cross-language",
+      "title": "Cross-language",
+      "description": "Compare maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes for identical scenarios.",
+      "section": "assurance"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.disclosure/1",
+      "path": "/assurance/disclosure",
+      "title": "Disclosure",
+      "description": "Inspect evidence that receipt views are bounded and authority-controlled.",
+      "section": "assurance"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.execution/1",
+      "path": "/assurance/execution",
+      "title": "Execution",
+      "description": "Inspect the native closed-gateway boundary protecting provider effects.",
+      "section": "assurance"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.formal/1",
+      "path": "/assurance/formal",
+      "title": "Formal",
+      "description": "Understand where formal attenuation evidence applies and where it does not.",
+      "section": "assurance"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.limitations/1",
+      "path": "/assurance/limitations",
+      "title": "Limitations",
+      "description": "Read the boundaries that Auths evidence deliberately does not claim to cross.",
+      "section": "assurance"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.semantics/1",
+      "path": "/assurance/semantics",
+      "title": "Semantics",
+      "description": "Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.",
+      "section": "assurance"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.assurance.supply-chain/1",
+      "path": "/assurance/supply-chain",
+      "title": "Supply chain",
+      "description": "Inspect the recorded SLSA builder assessment without mistaking it for an independent audit.",
       "section": "assurance"
     },
     {
@@ -294,7 +358,7 @@
       "id": "auths.page.developers.cli/1",
       "path": "/developers/cli",
       "title": "CLI",
-      "description": "Use the CLI for local evaluation, fixture verification, runtime inspection, and operator-owned recovery.",
+      "description": "Choose supported terminal workflows without mistaking repository tooling for a public product CLI.",
       "section": "developers"
     },
     {
@@ -909,57 +973,85 @@
     {
       "id": "auths.page.reference/1",
       "path": "/reference",
-      "title": "APIs & SDKs",
-      "description": "Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.",
+      "title": "Reference",
+      "description": "Look up exact SDK, Runtime API, CLI, profile, error, schema, evidence, and manifest contracts for one release.",
       "section": "reference"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.reference.cli/1",
       "path": "/reference/cli",
-      "title": "CLI reference",
-      "description": "Command contracts generated from the compiled Auths command graph.",
+      "title": "CLI",
+      "description": "Check whether the selected release declares a supported public CLI surface.",
       "section": "reference"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.reference.errors/1",
       "path": "/reference/errors",
-      "title": "Stable error reference",
-      "description": "Machine-stable error identities grouped by the caller's safe response.",
+      "title": "Errors",
+      "description": "Look up stable parse, trust, denial, lifecycle, execution, provider, recovery, and disclosure outcomes.",
       "section": "reference"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.reference.evidence/1",
       "path": "/reference/evidence",
-      "title": "Evidence manifest",
-      "description": "Resolve public claims to exact release evidence and limitations.",
+      "title": "Evidence",
+      "description": "Resolve every public assurance claim to status, checksum, reproduction, scope, and limitation.",
+      "section": "reference"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.manifest/1",
+      "path": "/reference/manifest.json",
+      "title": "Reference manifest",
+      "description": "Consume the machine-readable identity-to-URL manifest for the selected docs contract.",
       "section": "reference"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.reference.profiles/1",
       "path": "/reference/profiles",
       "title": "Profiles",
-      "description": "Closed and application-owned profiles that map domain actions into Auths semantics.",
+      "description": "Inspect maintained and application-owned action, resource, command, budget, and receipt projection contracts.",
       "section": "reference"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
       "path": "/reference/runtime-api",
-      "title": "Runtime API reference",
-      "description": "The HTTPS production runtime contract.",
+      "title": "Runtime API",
+      "description": "Inspect exact HTTPS methods, paths, limits, outcomes, recovery, and receipt-disclosure contracts.",
       "section": "reference"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.reference.schemas/1",
       "path": "/reference/schemas",
       "title": "Schemas",
-      "description": "Canonical inputs, bounded wire forms, receipts, and disclosure views.",
+      "description": "Inspect canonical bounded inputs, wire artifacts, commands, receipts, and disclosure view schemas.",
       "section": "reference"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
       "path": "/reference/sdk",
       "title": "SDK reference",
-      "description": "The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.",
+      "description": "Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while remaining on the same Auths operation.",
+      "section": "reference"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk.python/1",
+      "path": "/reference/sdk/python",
+      "title": "Python SDK",
+      "description": "Inspect installed Python symbols and their native operation mappings.",
+      "section": "reference"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk.rust/1",
+      "path": "/reference/sdk/rust",
+      "title": "Rust SDK",
+      "description": "Inspect maintained Rust SDK symbols and their operation mappings.",
+      "section": "reference"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk.typescript/1",
+      "path": "/reference/sdk/typescript",
+      "title": "TypeScript SDK",
+      "description": "Inspect installed TypeScript symbols and their native operation mappings.",
       "section": "reference"
     }
   ]
diff --git a/public/sitemap.xml b/public/sitemap.xml
index cee8ae8..154ad7e 100644
--- a/public/sitemap.xml
+++ b/public/sitemap.xml
@@ -17,6 +17,15 @@
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/skills-and-plugins</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/testing</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/adversarial</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/authority</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/cross-language</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/disclosure</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/execution</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/formal</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/limitations</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/semantics</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/supply-chain</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/constraints</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/create</loc></url>
@@ -130,8 +139,12 @@
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/cli</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/errors</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/evidence</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/manifest.json</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/profiles</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/runtime-api</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/schemas</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/sdk</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/sdk/python</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/sdk/rust</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/sdk/typescript</loc></url>
 </urlset>
diff --git a/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs b/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
index 920e40b..2d44559 100644
--- a/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
+++ b/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
@@ -8,6 +8,6 @@ for (const id of ["auths.page.home/1", "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/
   assert.ok(verifiedPageGraph.pages.some((page) => page.id === id));
 }
 const delegationPages = affectedPages(["auths.operation.delegate/1"]).map((page) => page.id);
-for (const expected of ["auths.page.agents/1", "auths.page.authority/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1"]) {
+for (const expected of ["auths.page.authority.delegate/1", "auths.page.agents.delegation/1"]) {
   assert.ok(delegationPages.includes(expected));
 }
diff --git a/tools/build-reference/check.mjs b/tools/build-reference/check.mjs
index 6d2c716..e0830c0 100644
--- a/tools/build-reference/check.mjs
+++ b/tools/build-reference/check.mjs
@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
 
 const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(new URL("../../public/reference-manifest.json", import.meta.url), "utf8"));
 assert.equal(manifest.schema, "auths.docs.reference-manifest/1");
-assert.deepEqual(manifest.surfaces.map((surface) => surface.kind), ["sdk-reference", "runtime-api-reference"]);
-assert.equal(new Set(manifest.operations).size, 5);
+assert.match(manifest.contractDigest, /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/);
+assert.equal(new Set(manifest.operations.map((item) => item.id)).size, 5);
 assert.equal(new Set(manifest.endpoints).size, manifest.endpoints.length);
-for (const value of [...manifest.operations, ...manifest.endpoints]) assert.match(value, /^auths\.[a-z0-9.-]+\/[1-9][0-9]*$/);
+for (const value of [...manifest.operations, ...manifest.endpoints].map((item) => item.id)) assert.match(value, /^auths\.[a-z0-9.-]+\/[1-9][0-9]*$/);
+assert.ok(manifest.pages.length > 80);
+assert.equal(manifest.claims.length, 8);
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
index 7050436..59212d4 100644
--- a/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
@@ -2,15 +2,21 @@ import assert from "node:assert/strict";
 import { access, readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { pageById } from "../../app/lib/page-graph.ts";
-import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
+import { assuranceClaims, verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
 import { topicLandings } from "../../app/lib/topic-landings.ts";
 import { tours } from "../../app/lib/tours.ts";
 
 const root = path.resolve(new URL("../..", import.meta.url).pathname);
 const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "public/reference-manifest.json"), "utf8"));
-for (const surface of manifest.surfaces) await access(path.join(root, "public", surface.source));
+for (const page of manifest.pages) await access(path.join(root, "public", page.markdown.replace(/^\//, "")));
 const llms = await readFile(path.join(root, "public/llms.txt"), "utf8");
 for (const source of ["/reference/sdk.md", "/reference/runtime-api.md"]) assert.ok(llms.includes(source));
+const search = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "public/search-index.json"), "utf8"));
+assert.equal(search.contractDigest, verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest);
+assert.deepEqual(search.pages.map((page) => page.id).sort(), verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.id).sort());
+const discovery = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "public/.well-known/auths-docs.json"), "utf8"));
+assert.equal(discovery.contractDigest, verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest);
+assert.deepEqual(discovery.claims, assuranceClaims.map((claim) => claim.id));
 const full = await readFile(path.join(root, "public/llms-full.txt"), "utf8");
 assert.ok(full.length < 50_000);
 assert.doesNotMatch(full, /-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----|gho_[A-Za-z0-9]/);
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs
index ad29bc8..f7d01d8 100644
--- a/tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
+import { assuranceClaims, verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
 
 const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
 const pages = verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => page.owner === "editorial" && page.path !== "/");
@@ -12,7 +12,20 @@ for (const page of pages) {
     lines.push(`## ${section.title}`, "");
     if (section.provenance === "editorial-narrative") lines.push(...section.body.flatMap((paragraph) => [paragraph, ""]));
     if (section.provenance === "tested-scenario") lines.push(`Tested scenario: \`${section.scenario}\`${section.step ? `, step \`${section.step}\`` : ""}.`, "");
-    if (section.provenance === "generated-fact") lines.push(`Generated ${section.factKind}: \`${section.fact}\`.`, "");
+    if (section.provenance === "generated-fact" && section.factKind === "claim") {
+      const claim = assuranceClaims.find((candidate) => candidate.id === section.fact);
+      if (!claim) throw new TypeError(`unknown claim ${section.fact}`);
+      lines.push(
+        `Claim: \`${claim.id}\` · status \`${claim.status}\``, "",
+        claim.statement, "",
+        `Evidence: \`${claim.evidence}\``, "",
+        `SHA-256: \`${claim.evidenceSha256}\``, "",
+        "Reproduce:", "",
+        ...claim.reproduction.map((command) => `- \`${command}\``), "",
+        `Scope: ${claim.scope}`, "",
+        `Limitation: ${claim.limitation}`, "",
+      );
+    } else if (section.provenance === "generated-fact") lines.push(`Generated ${section.factKind}: \`${section.fact}\`.`, "");
   }
   lines.push(`_Page identity: ${page.id} · Contract digest: ${verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest}_`, "");
   const output = path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`);
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/generate-site-indexes.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/generate-site-indexes.mjs
index 8d3cf8a..95c5c57 100644
--- a/tools/render-markdown/generate-site-indexes.mjs
+++ b/tools/render-markdown/generate-site-indexes.mjs
@@ -1,12 +1,17 @@
-import { readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { mkdir, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
+import { assuranceClaims, verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
+import contract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
 
 const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
 const pages = [...verifiedPageGraph.pages].sort((left, right) => left.path.localeCompare(right.path));
+const home = pages.find((page) => page.path === "/");
+if (!home) throw new TypeError("documentation graph has no home page");
+await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", "index.md"), `# ${home.title}\n\n${home.description}\n\n_Page identity: ${home.id} · Contract digest: ${verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest}_\n`);
 const search = {
   schema: "auths.docs.search-index/1",
+  contractDigest: verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest,
   synonyms: {
     permission: ["authority", "authorization"],
     agent: ["delegate", "actor"],
@@ -47,3 +52,35 @@ for (const page of pages.filter((candidate) => candidate.path !== "/")) {
 }
 await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", "llms-full.txt"), markdown.join("\n\n---\n\n").slice(0, 48_000));
 
+const canonical = (pagePath) => pagePath === "/" ? "/" : pagePath;
+const manifest = {
+  schema: "auths.docs.reference-manifest/1",
+  contractDigest: verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest,
+  pages: pages.map((page) => ({ id: page.id, url: canonical(page.path), markdown: page.path === "/" ? "/index.md" : `${page.path}.md` })),
+  operations: contract.operations.map((operation) => ({ id: operation.id, url: "/reference/sdk" })),
+  endpoints: contract.runtimeFacts.endpoints.map((endpoint) => ({ id: endpoint.id, url: "/reference/runtime-api" })),
+  scenarios: contract.scenarios.map((scenario) => {
+    const page = pages.find((candidate) => candidate.uses.scenarios.includes(scenario.id));
+    return { id: scenario.id, url: page?.path ?? "/developers/testing" };
+  }),
+  claims: assuranceClaims.map((claim) => {
+    const page = pages.find((candidate) => candidate.uses.claims.includes(claim.id));
+    return { id: claim.id, url: page?.path ?? "/reference/evidence", evidence: claim.evidence, sha256: claim.evidenceSha256 };
+  }),
+};
+await mkdir(path.join(root, "public", "reference"), { recursive: true });
+const manifestBytes = `${JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 2)}\n`;
+await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", "reference-manifest.json"), manifestBytes);
+await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", "reference", "manifest.json"), manifestBytes);
+
+await mkdir(path.join(root, "public", ".well-known"), { recursive: true });
+await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", ".well-known", "auths-docs.json"), `${JSON.stringify({
+  schema: "auths.docs.discovery/1",
+  contractDigest: verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest,
+  canonicalBase: "https://docs.auths.dev",
+  markdown: "/<page>.md",
+  search: "/search-index.json",
+  sitemap: "/sitemap.xml",
+  manifest: "/reference/manifest.json",
+  claims: assuranceClaims.map((claim) => claim.id),
+}, null, 2)}\n`);

From 32b56ef68e86fe3206ec6d9ccd014e5838178d9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 23:38:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 27/29] docs: qualify complete documentation site

---
 app/components/IntegrationChooser.tsx |  10 +-
 app/components/SemanticTourPage.tsx   |   9 +-
 app/components/TopicShell.tsx         |   4 +-
 app/get-started/choose/page.tsx       |   7 +-
 package.json                          |   3 +-
 tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs      |   5 +-
 tools/qualify-site/full-site.mjs      | 132 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/qualify-site/full-site.mjs

diff --git a/app/components/IntegrationChooser.tsx b/app/components/IntegrationChooser.tsx
index 3658eec..1fb06d2 100644
--- a/app/components/IntegrationChooser.tsx
+++ b/app/components/IntegrationChooser.tsx
@@ -16,11 +16,11 @@ type Choice = Readonly<{ effect: Effect; actor: Actor; trust: Trust; authority:
 const initial: Choice = { effect: "in-process", actor: "person", trust: "raw-key", authority: "direct", state: "replay", custody: "development", posture: "evaluation" };
 
 function recommendation(choice: Choice): Readonly<{ path: string; title: string; reasons: readonly string[] }> {
-  if (choice.authority === "verification" || choice.effect === "evidence") return { path: "/get-started/verify", title: "Verify without executing", reasons: ["You need an inert verification result", "No provider credential or lifecycle mutation is required"] };
-  if (choice.actor === "organization") return { path: "/get-started/cross-company", title: "Authorize across companies", reasons: ["Independent organizations keep separate identity systems", "Portable authority and receipts cross the boundary"] };
-  if (choice.actor === "agent" || choice.authority === "delegated" || choice.authority === "approved-plan") return { path: "/get-started/agent", title: "Delegate one action to an agent", reasons: ["The actor needs attenuated authority", "Credentials remain behind a closed gateway"] };
-  if (choice.effect !== "in-process" || choice.state === "recovery" || choice.custody === "kms-hsm" || choice.posture === "self-hosted") return { path: "/get-started/runtime", title: "Protect a service effect", reasons: ["The effect crosses a service or provider boundary", "Durable state and operational recovery are part of the path"] };
-  return { path: "/get-started/local", title: "Protect one local effect", reasons: ["The effect can remain in process", "Development custody and local replay protection are enough to begin"] };
+  if (choice.authority === "verification" || choice.effect === "evidence") return { path: "/get-started/paths/verification", title: "Verify without executing", reasons: ["You need an inert verification result", "No provider credential or lifecycle mutation is required"] };
+  if (choice.actor === "organization") return { path: "/get-started/paths/cross-company", title: "Authorize across companies", reasons: ["Independent organizations keep separate identity systems", "Portable authority and receipts cross the boundary"] };
+  if (choice.actor === "agent" || choice.authority === "delegated" || choice.authority === "approved-plan") return { path: "/get-started/paths/agent", title: "Delegate one action to an agent", reasons: ["The actor needs attenuated authority", "Credentials remain behind a closed gateway"] };
+  if (choice.effect !== "in-process" || choice.state === "recovery" || choice.custody === "kms-hsm" || choice.posture === "self-hosted") return { path: "/get-started/paths/runtime", title: "Protect a service effect", reasons: ["The effect crosses a service or provider boundary", "Durable state and operational recovery are part of the path"] };
+  return { path: "/get-started/paths/application", title: "Protect one local effect", reasons: ["The effect can remain in process", "Development custody and local replay protection are enough to begin"] };
 }
 
 const fields = [
diff --git a/app/components/SemanticTourPage.tsx b/app/components/SemanticTourPage.tsx
index cb28bf4..2a1b6b7 100644
--- a/app/components/SemanticTourPage.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SemanticTourPage.tsx
@@ -3,15 +3,13 @@ import { contentPageById, runtimeOutcomes } from "../lib/content-graph";
 import { pageById } from "../lib/page-graph";
 import { tourByPage } from "../lib/tours";
 import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
-import { SiteFooter } from "./SiteFooter";
-import { SiteHeader } from "./SiteHeader";
+import { TopicShell } from "./TopicShell";
 
 export function SemanticTourPage({ pageId }: { pageId: string }) {
   const page = contentPageById(pageId);
   const tour = tourByPage(pageId);
   return (
-    <div className="site-frame tour-site">
-      <SiteHeader compact />
+    <TopicShell pageId={page.id}>
       <main className="tour-page">
         <header className="editorial-hero">
           <p className="kicker">Concept tour</p>
@@ -40,7 +38,6 @@ export function SemanticTourPage({ pageId }: { pageId: string }) {
         <section className="tour-use-grid"><div><span>Use this when</span><p>{tour.useWhen}</p></div><div><span>Do not use this when</span><p>{tour.avoidWhen}</p></div></section>
         <section className="tour-related"><h2>Continue from here</h2><div>{tour.related.map((id) => { const related = pageById(id); return <Link href={related.path} key={id}><strong>{related.title}</strong><span>{related.description}</span><b aria-hidden="true">→</b></Link>; })}</div></section>
       </main>
-      <SiteFooter />
-    </div>
+    </TopicShell>
   );
 }
diff --git a/app/components/TopicShell.tsx b/app/components/TopicShell.tsx
index 87afbbd..96dfe3f 100644
--- a/app/components/TopicShell.tsx
+++ b/app/components/TopicShell.tsx
@@ -20,10 +20,9 @@ export function TopicShell({ children, pageId }: { children: ReactNode; pageId:
     label,
     items: sectionNodes
       .filter((page) => page.id !== sectionRoot.id && page.navGroup === label)
-      .sort((left, right) => left.path.localeCompare(right.path))
       .map((page) => ({ id: page.id, href: page.path, label: page.title, depth: depth(page.id, sectionRoot.id) })),
   }));
-  const sequence = sectionNodes.filter((page) => page.id !== sectionRoot.id).sort((left, right) => left.path.localeCompare(right.path));
+  const sequence = sectionNodes.filter((page) => page.id !== sectionRoot.id);
   const index = sequence.findIndex((page) => page.id === current.id);
   const previous = index > 0 ? sequence[index - 1] : null;
   const next = index >= 0 && index < sequence.length - 1 ? sequence[index + 1] : null;
@@ -47,4 +46,3 @@ export function TopicShell({ children, pageId }: { children: ReactNode; pageId:
     <SiteFooter />
   </div>;
 }
-
diff --git a/app/get-started/choose/page.tsx b/app/get-started/choose/page.tsx
index 6f617ac..1801998 100644
--- a/app/get-started/choose/page.tsx
+++ b/app/get-started/choose/page.tsx
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
 import { IntegrationChooser } from "../../components/IntegrationChooser";
 import { PageActions } from "../../components/PageActions";
-import { SiteFooter } from "../../components/SiteFooter";
-import { SiteHeader } from "../../components/SiteHeader";
+import { TopicShell } from "../../components/TopicShell";
+import { ContentSection } from "../../components/content/ContentSection";
 import { contentPageById } from "../../lib/content-graph";
 
 export default function Page() {
   const page = contentPageById("auths.page.start.choose/1");
-  return <div className="site-frame editorial-site"><SiteHeader compact /><main className="editorial-page chooser-page"><header className="editorial-hero"><p className="kicker">Get started</p><h1>{page.title}</h1><p>{page.description}</p><PageActions source={`${page.path}.md`} /></header><IntegrationChooser /></main><SiteFooter /></div>;
+  const example = page.sections.find((section) => section.id === "example");
+  return <TopicShell pageId={page.id}><main className="editorial-page chooser-page"><header className="editorial-hero"><p className="kicker">Get started</p><h1>{page.title}</h1><p>{page.description}</p><PageActions source={`${page.path}.md`} /></header><IntegrationChooser />{example && <div className="editorial-sections"><ContentSection section={example} /></div>}</main></TopicShell>;
 }
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 4e02e57..9e809f5 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@
     "dev": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext dev",
     "build": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext build",
     "start": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext start",
-    "test": "npm run build && node --test tests/rendered-html.test.mjs",
+    "test": "npm run build && node --test tests/rendered-html.test.mjs && npm run test:site",
+    "test:site": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/qualify-site/full-site.mjs",
     "lint": "eslint . --ignore-pattern dist --ignore-pattern .next",
     "lint:bash": "node tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs",
     "lint:ownership": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs",
diff --git a/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs b/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs
index 6b8edd5..3910580 100644
--- a/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs
+++ b/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs
@@ -15,7 +15,10 @@ assert.equal(graph.pages.length, pages.length);
 assert.equal(new Set(graph.pages.flatMap((page) => page.sections.map((section) => section.provenance))).size, 3);
 assert.equal(primaryNavigation.length, 6);
 assert.equal(utilityNavigation.length, 1);
-assert.equal(topicLandings.length, 8);
+const landingPageIds = new Set(graph.pages.filter((page) => page.pageType === "landing" && page.path !== "/" && graph.pages.some((candidate) => candidate.parent === page.id)).map((page) => page.id));
+assert.equal(topicLandings.length, landingPageIds.size);
+assert.equal(new Set(topicLandings.map((landing) => landing.page)).size, topicLandings.length);
+for (const landing of topicLandings) assert.ok(landingPageIds.has(landing.page), `${landing.page} is not a canonical landing page`);
 assert.equal(tours.length, 6);
 
 async function walk(directory) {
diff --git a/tools/qualify-site/full-site.mjs b/tools/qualify-site/full-site.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a581b58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/qualify-site/full-site.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { access, mkdir, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
+import { siteTree } from "../../app/lib/site-tree.ts";
+import { topicLandings } from "../../app/lib/topic-landings.ts";
+
+const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
+const workerUrl = new URL("../../dist/server/index.js", import.meta.url);
+workerUrl.searchParams.set("qualification", `${process.pid}-${Date.now()}`);
+const { default: worker } = await import(workerUrl.href);
+const assets = { fetch: async () => new Response("Not found", { status: 404 }) };
+const context = { waitUntil() {}, passThroughOnException() {} };
+const pagesByPath = new Map(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => [page.path, page]));
+const htmlByPath = new Map();
+assert.equal(pagesByPath.size, verifiedPageGraph.pages.length, "canonical routes are not unique");
+
+for (const page of verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((candidate) => candidate.path !== "/reference/manifest.json")) {
+  const response = await worker.fetch(new Request(`http://localhost${page.path}`, { headers: { accept: "text/html" } }), { ASSETS: assets }, context);
+  assert.equal(response.status, 200, `${page.path} did not render`);
+  assert.match(response.headers.get("content-type") ?? "", /^text\/html\b/i, `${page.path} is not HTML`);
+  const html = await response.text();
+  htmlByPath.set(page.path, html);
+  assert.match(html, /<html lang="en">/, `${page.path} does not declare its language`);
+  assert.match(html, /name="viewport"/, `${page.path} has no responsive viewport`);
+  assert.match(html, /<main\b/, `${page.path} has no main landmark`);
+  assert.match(html, /<h1\b/, `${page.path} has no primary heading`);
+  if (page.section !== "home") {
+    const isEmbeddedReference = page.path === "/reference/sdk" || page.path === "/reference/runtime-api";
+    if (isEmbeddedReference) {
+      assert.match(html, /(?:SDK reference|Runtime API) navigation/i, `${page.path} has no reference navigation`);
+      assert.match(html, /class="active"/, `${page.path} has no active reference section`);
+    } else {
+      assert.match(html, new RegExp(`${page.section === "get-started" ? "Get started" : page.section === "identity-trust" ? "Identity &amp; trust" : page.section === "operations" ? "Production operations" : page.section[0].toUpperCase() + page.section.slice(1)} navigation`), `${page.path} has no topic navigation`);
+      assert.match(html, /aria-label="Breadcrumb"/, `${page.path} has no breadcrumb`);
+      assert.match(html, /aria-current="page"/, `${page.path} has no active navigation state`);
+      if (page.parent !== null) assert.match(html, /aria-label="Previous and next pages"/, `${page.path} has no sequence navigation`);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+const publishedIds = new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.id));
+assert.equal(siteTree.length, verifiedPageGraph.pages.length, "site tree and published page graph differ");
+for (const node of siteTree) assert.ok(publishedIds.has(node.id), `unpublished canonical page ${node.id}`);
+for (const page of verifiedPageGraph.pages) {
+  if (page.parent !== null) assert.ok(publishedIds.has(page.parent), `${page.id} has an unpublished parent`);
+  const markdown = page.path === "/" ? "/index.md" : `${page.path}.md`;
+  await access(path.join(root, "public", markdown.slice(1)));
+}
+
+for (const landing of topicLandings) {
+  const landingPage = verifiedPageGraph.pages.find((page) => page.id === landing.page);
+  assert.ok(landingPage);
+  for (const group of landing.groups) {
+    for (const card of group.cards) {
+      const target = verifiedPageGraph.pages.find((page) => page.id === card.target);
+      assert.ok(target, `${landing.page} links to missing ${card.target}`);
+      if (target.section === landingPage.section) assert.equal(target.parent, landing.page, `${card.target} is not a direct child of ${landing.page}`);
+      else assert.equal(group.title, "Related topics", `${landing.page} has an unlabelled cross-topic card`);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+const codeRequired = verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => page.status === "stable" && ["guide", "quickstart", "integration", "runbook"].includes(page.pageType));
+for (const page of codeRequired) {
+  assert.ok(page.uses.scenarios.length > 0, `${page.id} has no qualified scenario`);
+  const html = htmlByPath.get(page.path);
+  assert.match(html, /Tested scenario|quickstart-steps/, `${page.path} renders no qualified code`);
+}
+for (const page of verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((candidate) => candidate.pageType === "runbook")) {
+  assert.deepEqual(["owner", "preconditions", "commands", "example", "observations", "stop", "recovery", "reconciliation", "retention", "escalation"].filter((id) => !page.sections.some((section) => section.id === id)), [], `${page.id} is an incomplete runbook`);
+}
+
+const staticPrefixes = ["/.well-known/", "/downloads/", "/images/"];
+const internalLinks = new Set();
+for (const [source, html] of htmlByPath) {
+  for (const match of html.matchAll(/\shref="([^"]+)"/g)) {
+    const href = match[1].replaceAll("&amp;", "&");
+    if (!href.startsWith("/") || href.startsWith("/_next/")) continue;
+    const target = href.split(/[?#]/, 1)[0];
+    if (!target) continue;
+    internalLinks.add(`${source}\0${target}`);
+    if (target.endsWith(".md") || target.endsWith(".json") || target.endsWith(".xml") || target.endsWith(".txt") || staticPrefixes.some((prefix) => target.startsWith(prefix))) {
+      await access(path.join(root, "public", target.slice(1)));
+    } else {
+      assert.ok(pagesByPath.has(target), `${source} links to non-canonical route ${target}`);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+const incoming = new Set([...internalLinks].map((entry) => entry.split("\0")[1]));
+for (const page of verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((candidate) => candidate.path !== "/" && candidate.path !== "/reference/manifest.json")) {
+  assert.ok(incoming.has(page.path), `orphan page ${page.path}`);
+}
+
+const journeys = [
+  { id: "get-started", paths: ["/get-started", "/get-started/choose", "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect"] },
+  { id: "identity-trust", paths: ["/identity-trust", "/identity-trust/identity-sources", "/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys"] },
+  { id: "authority", paths: ["/authority", "/authority/create", "/authority/execute", "/authority/receipts/disclosure"] },
+  { id: "agents", paths: ["/agents", "/agents/quickstart", "/agents/mcp/protect-server"] },
+  { id: "operations", paths: ["/operations", "/operations/deploy-runtime", "/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation", "/operations/incidents/provider-unknown"] },
+  { id: "developers", paths: ["/developers", "/developers/sdks", "/developers/sdks/typescript", "/reference/sdk"] },
+];
+for (const journey of journeys) for (const pagePath of journey.paths) assert.ok(htmlByPath.has(pagePath), `${journey.id} cannot reach ${pagePath}`);
+
+const sourceHead = execFileSync("git", ["rev-parse", "HEAD"], { cwd: root, encoding: "utf8" }).trim();
+const stylesheet = await readFile(path.join(root, "app", "globals.css"), "utf8");
+assert.match(stylesheet, /@media \(max-width: 960px\)[\s\S]*?\.topic-shell/, "topic shell has no responsive layout contract");
+assert.match(stylesheet, /@media \(max-width: 980px\)[\s\S]*?\.sdk-reference-shell/, "reference shell has no responsive layout contract");
+assert.match(stylesheet, /@media \(prefers-reduced-motion: reduce\)/, "site has no reduced-motion contract");
+const report = {
+  schema: "auths.docs.site-qualification/1",
+  sourceHead,
+  contractDigest: verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest,
+  pages: verifiedPageGraph.pages.length,
+  htmlPages: htmlByPath.size,
+  internalLinks: internalLinks.size,
+  orphans: 0,
+  qualifiedCodePages: codeRequired.length,
+  runbooks: verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => page.pageType === "runbook").length,
+  markdownPages: verifiedPageGraph.pages.length,
+  accessibility: { status: "structurally-qualified", checks: ["document-language", "main-landmark", "primary-heading", "labelled-navigation", "active-navigation", "reduced-motion"] },
+  responsive: { status: "stylesheet-contract-qualified", checks: ["viewport", "topic-shell-breakpoint", "reference-shell-breakpoint"] },
+  readerJourneys: journeys.map((journey) => ({ id: journey.id, status: "route-and-content-qualified", paths: journey.paths })),
+  checks: ["canonical-routes", "topic-navigation", "breadcrumbs", "previous-next", "landing-intent", "page-contracts", "qualified-code", "runbooks", "internal-links", "markdown", "machine-surfaces", "accessibility-structure", "responsive-contract"],
+  knownLimits: ["Automated reader journeys qualify route and content availability; moderated unfamiliar-reader usability research remains a release activity.", "Responsive interaction and assistive-technology behavior require browser-level qualification in the deployment pipeline."],
+};
+await mkdir(path.join(root, "outputs"), { recursive: true });
+await writeFile(path.join(root, "outputs", "site-qualification-report.json"), `${JSON.stringify(report, null, 2)}\n`);
+console.log(`site qualification passed: ${report.pages} pages, ${report.internalLinks} internal links, ${report.orphans} orphans`);

From fd020bb373e2926b052145e5f3d667abbf0c2aa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 23:44:08 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 28/29] fix: keep topic navigation visible on long pages

---
 app/globals.css                  | 8 ++++++--
 tools/qualify-site/full-site.mjs | 8 +++++++-
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/app/globals.css b/app/globals.css
index 5bb1d48..556af16 100644
--- a/app/globals.css
+++ b/app/globals.css
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ pre {
 
 .site-frame {
   min-height: 100vh;
-  overflow: hidden;
+  overflow-x: clip;
 }
 
 .site-header {
@@ -3282,10 +3282,14 @@ pre {
 }
 
 .topic-navigation {
-  align-self: stretch;
+  align-self: start;
   background: var(--paper);
   border-right: 1px solid var(--line);
+  height: calc(100vh - var(--header-height));
+  overflow-y: auto;
   padding: 22px 14px 40px;
+  position: sticky;
+  top: var(--header-height);
   transition: transform 160ms ease, width 160ms ease;
   width: 250px;
 }
diff --git a/tools/qualify-site/full-site.mjs b/tools/qualify-site/full-site.mjs
index a581b58..7ae5305 100644
--- a/tools/qualify-site/full-site.mjs
+++ b/tools/qualify-site/full-site.mjs
@@ -110,6 +110,12 @@ const stylesheet = await readFile(path.join(root, "app", "globals.css"), "utf8")
 assert.match(stylesheet, /@media \(max-width: 960px\)[\s\S]*?\.topic-shell/, "topic shell has no responsive layout contract");
 assert.match(stylesheet, /@media \(max-width: 980px\)[\s\S]*?\.sdk-reference-shell/, "reference shell has no responsive layout contract");
 assert.match(stylesheet, /@media \(prefers-reduced-motion: reduce\)/, "site has no reduced-motion contract");
+const topicNavigationRule = stylesheet.match(/\.topic-navigation \{([\s\S]*?)\n\}/)?.[1] ?? "";
+const siteFrameRule = stylesheet.match(/\.site-frame \{([\s\S]*?)\n\}/)?.[1] ?? "";
+assert.match(topicNavigationRule, /position: sticky;/, "topic navigation does not remain visible beside long pages");
+assert.match(topicNavigationRule, /height: calc\(100vh - var\(--header-height\)\);/, "topic navigation is not bounded to the viewport");
+assert.match(topicNavigationRule, /overflow-y: auto;/, "topic navigation cannot scroll independently");
+assert.doesNotMatch(siteFrameRule, /overflow(?:-y)?: hidden;/, "site frame disables sticky topic navigation");
 const report = {
   schema: "auths.docs.site-qualification/1",
   sourceHead,
@@ -122,7 +128,7 @@ const report = {
   runbooks: verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => page.pageType === "runbook").length,
   markdownPages: verifiedPageGraph.pages.length,
   accessibility: { status: "structurally-qualified", checks: ["document-language", "main-landmark", "primary-heading", "labelled-navigation", "active-navigation", "reduced-motion"] },
-  responsive: { status: "stylesheet-contract-qualified", checks: ["viewport", "topic-shell-breakpoint", "reference-shell-breakpoint"] },
+  responsive: { status: "stylesheet-contract-qualified", checks: ["viewport", "sticky-topic-navigation", "topic-shell-breakpoint", "reference-shell-breakpoint"] },
   readerJourneys: journeys.map((journey) => ({ id: journey.id, status: "route-and-content-qualified", paths: journey.paths })),
   checks: ["canonical-routes", "topic-navigation", "breadcrumbs", "previous-next", "landing-intent", "page-contracts", "qualified-code", "runbooks", "internal-links", "markdown", "machine-surfaces", "accessibility-structure", "responsive-contract"],
   knownLimits: ["Automated reader journeys qualify route and content availability; moderated unfamiliar-reader usability research remains a release activity.", "Responsive interaction and assistive-technology behavior require browser-level qualification in the deployment pipeline."],

From f6552f5db92cab85cc59d0c4e8e43e01f1d661b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: bordumb <bordumbb@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2026 01:44:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 29/29] docs: rebuild source-backed documentation site

---
 README.md                                     |   41 +-
 app/[...slug]/page.tsx                        |   34 +-
 app/agents/page.tsx                           |    2 -
 app/assurance/page.tsx                        |    2 -
 app/authority/lifecycle/page.tsx              |    2 -
 app/authority/page.tsx                        |    2 -
 app/components/AssuranceClaimPanel.tsx        |   15 -
 app/components/CodeGroup.tsx                  |   54 +-
 app/components/DocsLayout.tsx                 |   74 -
 app/components/EditorialGuidePage.tsx         |   23 -
 app/components/IntegrationChooser.tsx         |   53 -
 app/components/JourneyPage.tsx                |   42 -
 app/components/QuickstartComparison.tsx       |   28 -
 app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx             |   47 -
 app/components/ReferenceShell.tsx             |  119 -
 app/components/RuntimeReference.tsx           |   79 -
 app/components/SdkCodeExample.tsx             |   51 -
 app/components/SdkLanguageSelector.tsx        |   27 -
 app/components/SdkReference.tsx               |  366 -
 app/components/SearchDialog.tsx               |    4 +-
 app/components/SectionActions.tsx             |   26 -
 app/components/SemanticTourPage.tsx           |   43 -
 app/components/SiteFooter.tsx                 |    8 +-
 app/components/TestedExample.tsx              |   11 -
 app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx           |   47 -
 app/components/TopicShell.tsx                 |   48 -
 app/components/code/CodeBlock.tsx             |    8 +-
 app/components/code/CodeWalkthrough.tsx       |   56 +
 app/components/code/HighlightedCode.tsx       |   11 +-
 app/components/code/SdkLanguageControl.tsx    |   72 +
 app/components/code/index.ts                  |    1 +
 app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx     |   46 -
 app/components/docs/DocsShell.tsx             |   46 +
 app/components/docs/DocsTable.tsx             |   33 +
 app/components/docs/ProductBlocks.tsx         |  275 +
 .../foundation/DocumentationPrimitives.tsx    |   25 -
 app/components/foundation/index.ts            |    1 -
 app/developers/errors/page.tsx                |    5 -
 app/developers/page.tsx                       |    2 -
 app/get-started/choose/page.tsx               |   11 -
 app/get-started/evaluate/page.tsx             |    2 -
 app/get-started/page.tsx                      |    2 -
 app/get-started/prerequisites/page.tsx        |    2 -
 app/get-started/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx   |   15 -
 app/globals.css                               |  840 +++
 app/identity-trust/how-it-works/page.tsx      |    2 -
 app/identity-trust/page.tsx                   |    2 -
 app/layout.tsx                                |   13 +-
 app/lib/content-graph.ts                      |  148 -
 app/lib/docs-content.ts                       |  108 +
 app/lib/navigation.ts                         |   27 +-
 app/lib/page-graph.ts                         |   24 -
 app/lib/product-snapshot.ts                   |  211 +
 app/lib/quickstarts.ts                        |   20 -
 app/lib/runbooks.ts                           |    5 -
 app/lib/runtime-reference.ts                  |  108 -
 app/lib/site-registry.ts                      |   22 +
 app/lib/site-tree.ts                          |  283 -
 app/lib/topic-landings.ts                     |   61 -
 app/lib/tours.ts                              |   16 -
 app/operations/execution-lifecycle/page.tsx   |    2 -
 app/operations/page.tsx                       |    2 -
 app/page.tsx                                  |  247 +-
 app/reference/page.tsx                        |    2 -
 app/reference/runtime-api/page.tsx            |   12 -
 app/reference/sdk/page.tsx                    |   12 -
 content-v2/README.md                          |   51 +
 content-v2/REFERENCE_AUTHORING.md             |   30 +
 content-v2/code-walkthroughs.json             |  100 +
 content-v2/concepts/authority-model.mdx       |  161 +
 content-v2/concepts/verification-model.mdx    |  196 +
 content-v2/examples/index.mdx                 |  228 +
 content-v2/guides/adapter-authoring.mdx       |  116 +
 .../guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans.mdx    |   92 +
 content-v2/guides/authenticate-identity.mdx   |  101 +
 content-v2/guides/delegate-agent.mdx          |  104 +
 content-v2/guides/execute-exact-action.mdx    |  106 +
 content-v2/guides/index.mdx                   |   27 +
 content-v2/guides/production-integration.mdx  |  134 +
 content-v2/guides/receipts-and-disclosure.mdx |  104 +
 .../replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown.mdx  |  108 +
 content-v2/guides/verify-authority.mdx        |   99 +
 content-v2/home.json                          |   59 +
 content-v2/navigation.json                    |  119 +
 content-v2/reference/conformance.mdx          |  166 +
 content-v2/reference/decisions-errors.mdx     |  154 +
 .../reference/evidence-status-assurance.mdx   |  169 +
 content-v2/reference/index.mdx                |   56 +
 .../reference/limits-encoding-identifiers.mdx |  148 +
 content-v2/reference/principal-adapters.mdx   |  181 +
 content-v2/reference/python.mdx               |  158 +
 content-v2/reference/rust.mdx                 |  192 +
 content-v2/reference/typescript.mdx           |  159 +
 content-v2/start/index.mdx                    |   32 +
 content-v2/start/python-quickstart.mdx        |   91 +
 .../start/rust-offline-verification.mdx       |   82 +
 content-v2/start/typescript-quickstart.mdx    |  103 +
 content-v2/start/what-is-auths.mdx            |  122 +
 content/adoption-pages.json                   |  342 -
 content/agent-integration-pages.json          |  370 -
 content/agent-pages.ts                        |   66 -
 content/authority-pages.ts                    |  199 -
 content/developer-pages.json                  |  349 -
 content/developer-pages.ts                    |   78 -
 content/get-started-pages.ts                  |  212 -
 content/identity-trust-pages.ts               |   81 -
 content/navigation.json                       |   13 -
 content/operations-pages.json                 |  365 -
 content/operations-pages.ts                   |   81 -
 content/page-builders.ts                      |  170 -
 content/pages.json                            | 1123 ---
 content/reference-assurance-pages.ts          |   42 -
 content/route-migration.json                  |  265 -
 content/runbooks.json                         |    8 -
 content/topic-landings.json                   |  410 --
 content/tours.json                            |   80 -
 contracts/docs-bundle.fixture.json            |    8 -
 contracts/product-contract.fixture.json       |   44 -
 docs/ARCHITECTURE.md                          |  412 +-
 docs/MAINTENANCE.md                           |  447 +-
 docs/feedback/DOCUMENTATION_REBUILD_SPEC.md   |  901 +++
 eslint.config.mjs                             |    1 +
 mdx-components.tsx                            |   38 +
 mdx.d.ts                                      |    7 +
 package.json                                  |   27 +-
 product-snapshot/bundle/contract.json         |  576 ++
 product-snapshot/bundle/manifest.json         |   37 +
 .../bundle/public-docs-report.json            |   41 +
 product-snapshot/bundle/public-topology.json  |   37 +
 product-snapshot/bundle/python-public-api.txt |  172 +
 product-snapshot/bundle/runtime-facts.json    |   17 +
 .../bundle/typescript-public-api.txt          |  195 +
 product-snapshot/conformance/fixtures.json    | 5799 +++++++++++++++
 .../conformance/formal-vectors.json           |   50 +
 product-snapshot/conformance/mutations.json   |   10 +
 .../examples/offline-verification/Cargo.toml  |   18 +
 .../examples/offline-verification/README.md   |   17 +
 .../examples/offline-verification/src/main.rs |   63 +
 .../product/customer-journey-matrix.json      |  513 ++
 product-snapshot/product/error-registry.json  | 1040 +++
 .../product/python-runtime-contract.json      |   72 +
 .../product/typescript-runtime-contract.json  |   42 +
 product-snapshot/protocol/auths-proof.cddl    |  517 ++
 product-snapshot/protocol/did-keri.md         |  117 +
 product-snapshot/protocol/did-key.md          |   44 +
 product-snapshot/protocol/did-web.md          |  151 +
 .../protocol/domain-separation.md             |   94 +
 product-snapshot/protocol/error-codes.md      |  110 +
 product-snapshot/protocol/hsm-attested.md     |   37 +
 product-snapshot/protocol/protocol.md         |  291 +
 product-snapshot/protocol/registry.md         |  129 +
 product-snapshot/protocol/spiffe-x509.md      |   40 +
 .../protocol/verification-algorithm.md        |  168 +
 product-snapshot/protocol/webauthn.md         |   55 +
 .../recipes/experience-evidence.json          |   29 +
 product-snapshot/recipes/manifest.json        |   18 +
 .../python/01_authenticate_identity.py        |   57 +
 .../recipes/python/02_verify_authority.py     |   33 +
 .../recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py |   51 +
 .../recipes/python/04_delegate_to_agent.py    |   58 +
 .../python/05_cross_organization_plan.py      |  160 +
 .../typescript/01-authenticate-identity.ts    |   40 +
 .../recipes/typescript/02-verify-authority.ts |   23 +
 .../typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts     |   32 +
 .../typescript/04-delegate-to-agent.ts        |   29 +
 .../typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts  |  126 +
 product-snapshot/snapshot.json                |   38 +
 public/.auths-docs-generated.json             |   45 +
 public/.well-known/auths-docs.json            |   20 +-
 public/agents.md                              |   40 -
 public/agents/approved-plans.md               |   34 -
 public/agents/delegation.md                   |   34 -
 public/agents/how-auths-works.md              |   22 -
 public/agents/identity.md                     |   34 -
 public/agents/mcp.md                          |   17 -
 public/agents/mcp/client.md                   |   34 -
 public/agents/mcp/protect-server.md           |   34 -
 public/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md            |   34 -
 public/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md       |   22 -
 public/agents/multi-agent.md                  |   34 -
 public/agents/production-patterns.md          |   34 -
 public/agents/quickstart.md                   |   10 -
 public/agents/skills-and-plugins.md           |   34 -
 public/agents/testing.md                      |   34 -
 public/assurance.md                           |   32 -
 public/assurance/adversarial.md               |   40 -
 public/assurance/authority.md                 |   40 -
 public/assurance/cross-language.md            |   40 -
 public/assurance/disclosure.md                |   40 -
 public/assurance/execution.md                 |   40 -
 public/assurance/formal.md                    |   40 -
 public/assurance/index.md                     |    5 -
 public/assurance/limitations.md               |   40 -
 public/assurance/semantics.md                 |   40 -
 public/assurance/supply-chain.md              |   40 -
 public/authority.md                           |   43 -
 public/authority/constraints.md               |   22 -
 public/authority/create.md                    |   34 -
 public/authority/delegate.md                  |   34 -
 public/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md  |   22 -
 .../authority/delegate/widening-failures.md   |   34 -
 public/authority/execute.md                   |   34 -
 public/authority/lifecycle.md                 |   43 -
 public/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md         |   22 -
 .../lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md        |   22 -
 public/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md |   22 -
 .../lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md          |   22 -
 public/authority/model.md                     |   43 -
 public/authority/plans.md                     |   14 -
 public/authority/plans/approvals.md           |   43 -
 public/authority/profiles.md                  |   22 -
 public/authority/receipts.md                  |   14 -
 public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md       |   43 -
 public/authority/resume.md                    |   34 -
 public/authority/verify.md                    |   34 -
 public/developers.md                          |   43 -
 public/developers/cli.md                      |   34 -
 public/developers/errors.md                   |   22 -
 public/developers/examples.md                 |   10 -
 public/developers/extension-kits.md           |   34 -
 public/developers/integrations.md             |   19 -
 .../developers/integrations/capabilities.md   |   34 -
 public/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md   |   34 -
 .../integrations/identity-and-trust.md        |   34 -
 public/developers/integrations/policy.md      |   34 -
 public/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md |   34 -
 public/developers/integrations/transport.md   |   34 -
 public/developers/quickstarts.md              |   10 -
 public/developers/releases.md                 |   22 -
 public/developers/runtime-api.md              |   34 -
 public/developers/sdks.md                     |   17 -
 public/developers/sdks/parity.md              |   22 -
 public/developers/sdks/python.md              |   34 -
 public/developers/sdks/rust.md                |   34 -
 public/developers/sdks/typescript.md          |   34 -
 public/developers/testing.md                  |   34 -
 public/developers/versioning.md               |   22 -
 .../quickstarts/agent-delegation.json         |   35 -
 .../downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json  |   35 -
 .../downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json  |   35 -
 .../quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json        |   35 -
 .../quickstarts/offline-verification.json     |   35 -
 public/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json    |   35 -
 .../downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json |   35 -
 public/examples.md                            |  185 +
 public/get-started.md                         |   28 -
 public/get-started/adoption.md                |   23 -
 public/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md       |   34 -
 public/get-started/adoption/approvals.md      |   34 -
 public/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md   |   34 -
 public/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md      |   34 -
 public/get-started/adoption/cutover.md        |   34 -
 public/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md     |   34 -
 public/get-started/adoption/plan.md           |   34 -
 public/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md |   34 -
 public/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md    |   34 -
 .../get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md   |   34 -
 public/get-started/choose.md                  |   34 -
 public/get-started/evaluate.md                |   34 -
 public/get-started/paths.md                   |   18 -
 public/get-started/paths/agent.md             |   34 -
 public/get-started/paths/application.md       |   34 -
 public/get-started/paths/cross-company.md     |   34 -
 public/get-started/paths/runtime.md           |   34 -
 public/get-started/paths/verification.md      |   34 -
 public/get-started/prerequisites.md           |   34 -
 public/get-started/quickstarts.md             |   20 -
 .../quickstarts/agent-delegation.md           |   31 -
 .../get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md  |   31 -
 .../get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md  |   31 -
 .../quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md          |   31 -
 .../quickstarts/offline-verification.md       |   31 -
 public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md    |   31 -
 .../get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md |   31 -
 public/guides.md                              |   26 +
 public/guides/adapter-authoring.md            |  101 +
 public/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans.md  |  538 ++
 public/guides/authenticate-identity.md        |  279 +
 public/guides/authority-model.md              |  146 +
 public/guides/delegate-agent.md               |  257 +
 public/guides/execute-exact-action.md         |  261 +
 public/guides/production-integration.md       |  119 +
 public/guides/receipts-and-disclosure.md      |  256 +
 .../replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown.md   |  554 ++
 public/guides/verification-model.md           |  182 +
 public/guides/verify-authority.md             |  218 +
 public/identity-trust.md                      |   37 -
 public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites.md |   16 -
 .../custom-and-post-quantum.md                |   34 -
 .../cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md           |   34 -
 .../cryptographic-suites/p256.md              |   34 -
 .../exchange-public-identity.md               |   34 -
 public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md         |   43 -
 public/identity-trust/identity-sources.md     |   17 -
 .../identity-sources/application-resolvers.md |   34 -
 .../identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md            |   34 -
 .../identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md       |   34 -
 .../identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md |   34 -
 .../identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md   |   34 -
 public/identity-trust/testing.md              |   34 -
 public/identity-trust/trust-policy.md         |   22 -
 public/identity-trust/verification-context.md |   22 -
 public/index.md                               |  230 +-
 public/llms-full.txt                          | 6336 +++++++++++++++--
 public/llms.txt                               |  192 +-
 public/operations.md                          |   43 -
 public/operations/backup-and-restore.md       |   34 -
 public/operations/configure.md                |   17 -
 public/operations/configure/custody.md        |   34 -
 public/operations/configure/durable-state.md  |   34 -
 .../operations/configure/provider-gateways.md |   34 -
 .../configure/trust-and-profiles.md           |   34 -
 public/operations/deploy-runtime.md           |   34 -
 public/operations/evaluate-locally.md         |   34 -
 public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md      |   51 -
 public/operations/incidents.md                |   19 -
 .../incidents/compromised-credential.md       |   46 -
 .../operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md  |   46 -
 .../incidents/receipt-disclosure.md           |   46 -
 public/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md  |   46 -
 public/operations/incidents/state-loss.md     |   46 -
 .../operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md  |   46 -
 public/operations/index.md                    |    4 -
 public/operations/observability.md            |   34 -
 public/operations/receipt-retention.md        |   34 -
 .../operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md |   34 -
 public/operations/security-checklist.md       |   34 -
 public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md     |   34 -
 public/reference-manifest.json                | 1111 +--
 public/reference.md                           |   70 +-
 public/reference/cli.md                       |   22 -
 public/reference/conformance.md               |  155 +
 public/reference/decisions-errors.md          |  289 +
 public/reference/errors.md                    |   22 -
 public/reference/evidence-status-assurance.md |  286 +
 public/reference/evidence.md                  |   22 -
 .../reference/limits-encoding-identifiers.md  |  249 +
 public/reference/manifest.json                |  885 ---
 public/reference/manifest.json.md             |   22 -
 public/reference/principal-adapters.md        |  193 +
 public/reference/profiles.md                  |   22 -
 public/reference/python.md                    |  405 ++
 public/reference/runtime-api.md               |   22 -
 .../runtime-api/sections/create-authority.md  |    8 -
 .../reference/runtime-api/sections/execute.md |    8 -
 .../reference/runtime-api/sections/health.md  |    8 -
 .../runtime-api/sections/receipt-summary.md   |    8 -
 .../reference/runtime-api/sections/resume.md  |    8 -
 public/reference/rust.md                      |  273 +
 public/reference/schemas.md                   |   22 -
 public/reference/sdk.md                       |   75 -
 public/reference/sdk/python.md                |   22 -
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diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 85636a4..28e2d1c 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -1,20 +1,31 @@
 # Auths Documentation
 
-This repository builds the public `docs.auths.dev` experience from an immutable,
-checksum-addressed release bundle produced by `auths-dev/auths-proof`.
+This repository builds the public `docs.auths.dev` experience from free-form
+editorial MDX and an immutable, checksum-addressed Auths product snapshot.
 
 The product contract is:
 
 - begin with outcomes and five stable verbs;
 - progressively disclose protocol and operational depth;
 - generate reference facts from installed SDK and runtime artifacts;
-- synchronize Rust, TypeScript, and Python examples by scenario identity; and
+- render maintained TypeScript and Python recipes from pinned product source; and
 - publish equivalent HTML and canonical Markdown for people and agents.
 
-## Pages
+## Information architecture
 
-- `/` — main documentation landing page
-- `/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect` — representative multi-language quickstart
+`content-v2/navigation.json` owns the homepage route, the public documentation
+routes, top navigation placement, left navigation groups, and page ordering.
+The four primary destinations are:
+
+- `/start` — choose a first workflow and run a maintained quickstart;
+- `/guides` — integrate Auths and understand the authority and verification models;
+- `/examples` — inspect production-shaped examples by security question; and
+- `/reference` — look up the exact SDK, protocol, outcome, and evidence surfaces.
+
+Conceptual material lives inside Guides rather than in a separate top-level
+section. The custom homepage layout reads its copy from the registry-owned
+`content-v2/home.json`, which also generates `/index.md` and machine-readable
+discovery entries.
 
 ## Local development
 
@@ -28,9 +39,12 @@ npm run dev
 Run the production build and checks:
 
 ```bash
+npm run docs:build
+npm run routes:check
+npm run typecheck
 npm run build
 npm run lint
-npm test
+npm run audit:docs
 ```
 
 ## Architecture decisions
@@ -39,8 +53,11 @@ Read:
 
 - [`docs/TOOLING.md`](docs/TOOLING.md)
 - [`docs/DESIGN_LANGUAGE.md`](docs/DESIGN_LANGUAGE.md)
-
-The site is static-first and MDX-authored. Release facts enter only through a
-strict bounded bundle parser. The site has no production database, no provider
-credentials, and no runtime authority. Client JavaScript is reserved for search,
-navigation state, synchronized language selection, and copy actions.
+- [`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`](docs/ARCHITECTURE.md)
+- [`docs/MAINTENANCE.md`](docs/MAINTENANCE.md)
+
+The site is static-first. Product facts enter only through `product-snapshot/`;
+editorial explanations live under `content-v2/`. The site has no production
+database, provider credentials, or runtime authority. Client JavaScript is
+reserved for search, navigation state, synchronized language selection, and
+copy actions.
diff --git a/app/[...slug]/page.tsx b/app/[...slug]/page.tsx
index 8975ee5..57b9b13 100644
--- a/app/[...slug]/page.tsx
+++ b/app/[...slug]/page.tsx
@@ -1,26 +1,22 @@
-import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../components/EditorialGuidePage";
-import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
-import { QuickstartPage } from "../components/QuickstartPage";
-import { TopicShell } from "../components/TopicShell";
-import { contentPageByPath, verifiedPageGraph } from "../lib/content-graph";
-import { quickstartByScenario } from "../lib/quickstarts";
-import { hasTopicLanding } from "../lib/topic-landings";
+import type { Metadata } from "next";
+import { notFound } from "next/navigation";
+import { DocsShell } from "../components/docs/DocsShell";
+import { docsPage, docsPages } from "../lib/docs-content";
 
 export function generateStaticParams() {
-  return verifiedPageGraph.pages
-    .filter((page) => page.owner === "editorial")
-    .map((page) => ({ slug: page.path.slice(1).split("/") }));
+  return docsPages.map((page) => ({ slug: page.path.slice(1).split("/") }));
+}
+
+export async function generateMetadata({ params }: { params: Promise<{ slug: string[] }> }): Promise<Metadata> {
+  const { slug } = await params;
+  const page = docsPage(`/${slug.join("/")}`);
+  if (!page) return {};
+  return { title: page.frontmatter.title, description: page.frontmatter.description, alternates: { canonical: page.path } };
 }
 
 export default async function Page({ params }: { params: Promise<{ slug: string[] }> }) {
   const { slug } = await params;
-  const page = contentPageByPath(`/${slug.join("/")}`);
-  if (page.pageType === "landing" && hasTopicLanding(page.id)) return <TopicLandingPage pageId={page.id} />;
-  if (page.pageType === "quickstart") {
-    const scenario = page.uses.scenarios[0];
-    const quickstart = scenario ? quickstartByScenario(scenario) : null;
-    if (!quickstart) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} has no qualified quickstart`);
-    return <TopicShell pageId={page.id}><QuickstartPage quickstart={quickstart} /></TopicShell>;
-  }
-  return <EditorialGuidePage pageId={page.id} eyebrow={page.depth === "operate" ? "Operations" : page.depth === "inspect" ? "Reference" : "Guide"} />;
+  const page = docsPage(`/${slug.join("/")}`);
+  if (!page) notFound();
+  return <DocsShell page={page} />;
 }
diff --git a/app/agents/page.tsx b/app/agents/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index d67cb95..0000000
--- a/app/agents/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
-export default function Page() { return <TopicLandingPage pageId="auths.page.agents/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/assurance/page.tsx b/app/assurance/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 475651b..0000000
--- a/app/assurance/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
-export default function Page() { return <TopicLandingPage pageId="auths.page.assurance.evidence/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/authority/lifecycle/page.tsx b/app/authority/lifecycle/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 6b87355..0000000
--- a/app/authority/lifecycle/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { SemanticTourPage } from "../../components/SemanticTourPage";
-export default function Page() { return <SemanticTourPage pageId="auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/authority/page.tsx b/app/authority/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index d8a6c1b..0000000
--- a/app/authority/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
-export default function Page() { return <TopicLandingPage pageId="auths.page.authority/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/components/AssuranceClaimPanel.tsx b/app/components/AssuranceClaimPanel.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 49b7dfa..0000000
--- a/app/components/AssuranceClaimPanel.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-import type { AssuranceClaim } from "../lib/content-graph";
-
-export function AssuranceClaimPanel({ claim }: { claim: AssuranceClaim }) {
-  return <article className="assurance-claim">
-    <div className="assurance-claim-heading"><code>{claim.id}</code><span data-status={claim.status}>{claim.status}</span></div>
-    <p>{claim.statement}</p>
-    <dl>
-      <div><dt>Evidence</dt><dd><code>{claim.evidence}</code></dd></div>
-      <div><dt>SHA-256</dt><dd><code>{claim.evidenceSha256}</code></dd></div>
-      <div><dt>Reproduce</dt><dd>{claim.reproduction.map((command) => <code key={command}>{command}</code>)}</dd></div>
-      <div><dt>Scope</dt><dd>{claim.scope}</dd></div>
-      <div><dt>Limitation</dt><dd>{claim.limitation}</dd></div>
-    </dl>
-  </article>;
-}
diff --git a/app/components/CodeGroup.tsx b/app/components/CodeGroup.tsx
index ea26eec..54393fd 100644
--- a/app/components/CodeGroup.tsx
+++ b/app/components/CodeGroup.tsx
@@ -1,13 +1,8 @@
 "use client";
 
-import { useEffect, useMemo, useState } from "react";
-import {
-  isSdkLanguage,
-  sdkLanguageEvent,
-  sdkLanguageStorageKey,
-  type SdkLanguage,
-} from "../lib/sdk-languages";
+import type { SdkLanguage } from "../lib/sdk-languages";
 import { CodeBlock } from "./code";
+import { SdkLanguageTabs, useSynchronizedSdkLanguage } from "./code/SdkLanguageControl";
 
 type Snippet = {
   label: string;
@@ -24,34 +19,11 @@ export function CodeGroup({
   filename?: string;
   isBash?: boolean;
 }) {
-  const available = useMemo(() => snippets.map((snippet) => snippet.language), [snippets]);
-  const [selected, setSelected] = useState<SdkLanguage>(snippets[0]?.language ?? "typescript");
-
-  useEffect(() => {
-    const stored = window.localStorage.getItem(sdkLanguageStorageKey);
-    const hydrationTimer = isSdkLanguage(stored) && available.includes(stored)
-      ? window.setTimeout(() => setSelected(stored), 0)
-      : null;
-
-    const sync = (event: Event) => {
-      const language = (event as CustomEvent<SdkLanguage>).detail;
-      if (available.includes(language)) setSelected(language);
-    };
-    window.addEventListener(sdkLanguageEvent, sync);
-    return () => {
-      if (hydrationTimer !== null) window.clearTimeout(hydrationTimer);
-      window.removeEventListener(sdkLanguageEvent, sync);
-    };
-  }, [available]);
+  const options = snippets.map(({ label, language }) => ({ label, language }));
+  const [selected, choose] = useSynchronizedSdkLanguage(options);
 
   const snippet = snippets.find((item) => item.language === selected) ?? snippets[0];
 
-  function choose(language: SdkLanguage) {
-    setSelected(language);
-    window.localStorage.setItem(sdkLanguageStorageKey, language);
-    window.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent(sdkLanguageEvent, { detail: language }));
-  }
-
   if (!snippet) return null;
 
   return (
@@ -60,23 +32,7 @@ export function CodeGroup({
       isBash={isBash}
       label={filename}
       language={snippet.language}
-      languageControl={(
-        <div className="language-tabs" role="tablist" aria-label="Choose SDK language">
-          {snippets.map((item) => (
-            <button
-              aria-selected={item.language === snippet.language}
-              className={item.language === snippet.language ? "active" : ""}
-              key={item.language}
-              onClick={() => choose(item.language)}
-              role="tab"
-              type="button"
-            >
-              <span className={`language-dot language-dot-${item.language}`} aria-hidden="true" />
-              {item.label}
-            </button>
-          ))}
-        </div>
-      )}
+      languageControl={<SdkLanguageTabs onSelect={choose} options={options} selected={snippet.language} />}
     />
   );
 }
diff --git a/app/components/DocsLayout.tsx b/app/components/DocsLayout.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 8ac506a..0000000
--- a/app/components/DocsLayout.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-"use client";
-
-import Link from "next/link";
-import type { ReactNode } from "react";
-import { useState } from "react";
-
-export function DocsLayout({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) {
-  const [collapsed, setCollapsed] = useState(false);
-  const [mobileOpen, setMobileOpen] = useState(false);
-
-  return (
-    <div
-      className={[
-        "docs-layout",
-        collapsed ? "docs-nav-collapsed" : "",
-        mobileOpen ? "docs-nav-mobile-open" : "",
-      ].filter(Boolean).join(" ")}
-    >
-      <aside className="docs-sidebar" aria-label="Guide navigation">
-        <div className="docs-sidebar-head">
-          <strong>Documentation</strong>
-          <button
-            aria-label="Collapse documentation navigation"
-            onClick={() => {
-              setCollapsed(true);
-              setMobileOpen(false);
-            }}
-            type="button"
-          >
-            <span aria-hidden="true">‹</span>
-          </button>
-        </div>
-        <p>START</p>
-        <Link className="active" href="/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect">Protect a REST effect</Link>
-        <Link href="/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation">Delegate to an agent</Link>
-        <Link href="/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification">Verify a receipt</Link>
-        <p>CONCEPTS</p>
-        <Link href="/authority/model">Five nouns</Link>
-        <Link href="/identity-trust/how-it-works">Identity vs authority</Link>
-        <Link href="/operations">Outcomes and recovery</Link>
-        <p>REFERENCE</p>
-        <Link href="/reference/sdk">SDK reference</Link>
-      </aside>
-
-      <button
-        aria-expanded={mobileOpen}
-        className="docs-nav-restore"
-        onClick={() => {
-          if (window.matchMedia("(max-width: 900px)").matches) {
-            setMobileOpen((current) => !current);
-          } else {
-            setCollapsed(false);
-            setMobileOpen(false);
-          }
-        }}
-        type="button"
-      >
-        <span aria-hidden="true">☰</span>
-        Navigation
-      </button>
-
-      <main className="guide-main">{children}</main>
-
-      <aside className="page-outline" aria-label="On this page">
-        <p>ON THIS PAGE</p>
-        <a href="#install">Install</a>
-        <a href="#describe">Describe the effect</a>
-        <a href="#execute">Execute once</a>
-        <a href="#prove">What Auths proved</a>
-        <a href="#failure-paths">Failure paths</a>
-      </aside>
-    </div>
-  );
-}
diff --git a/app/components/EditorialGuidePage.tsx b/app/components/EditorialGuidePage.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index e0d1bae..0000000
--- a/app/components/EditorialGuidePage.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-import { contentPageById } from "../lib/content-graph";
-import { ContentSection } from "./content/ContentSection";
-import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
-import { TopicShell } from "./TopicShell";
-
-export function EditorialGuidePage({ pageId, eyebrow = "Get started" }: { pageId: string; eyebrow?: string }) {
-  const page = contentPageById(pageId);
-  return (
-    <TopicShell pageId={page.id}>
-      <div className="editorial-page">
-        <header className="editorial-hero">
-          <p className="kicker">{eyebrow}</p>
-          <h1>{page.title}</h1>
-          <p>{page.description}</p>
-          <PageActions source={`${page.path}.md`} />
-        </header>
-        <div className="editorial-sections">
-          {page.sections.map((section) => <ContentSection key={section.id} section={section} />)}
-        </div>
-      </div>
-    </TopicShell>
-  );
-}
diff --git a/app/components/IntegrationChooser.tsx b/app/components/IntegrationChooser.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 1fb06d2..0000000
--- a/app/components/IntegrationChooser.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-"use client";
-
-import Link from "next/link";
-import { useMemo, useState } from "react";
-
-type Effect = "in-process" | "service" | "provider" | "evidence";
-type Actor = "person" | "workload" | "agent" | "organization";
-type Trust = "raw-key" | "oidc" | "spiffe" | "application";
-type Authority = "direct" | "delegated" | "approved-plan" | "verification";
-type State = "none" | "replay" | "recovery";
-type Custody = "development" | "application" | "kms-hsm";
-type Posture = "evaluation" | "self-hosted" | "integration-author";
-
-type Choice = Readonly<{ effect: Effect; actor: Actor; trust: Trust; authority: Authority; state: State; custody: Custody; posture: Posture }>;
-
-const initial: Choice = { effect: "in-process", actor: "person", trust: "raw-key", authority: "direct", state: "replay", custody: "development", posture: "evaluation" };
-
-function recommendation(choice: Choice): Readonly<{ path: string; title: string; reasons: readonly string[] }> {
-  if (choice.authority === "verification" || choice.effect === "evidence") return { path: "/get-started/paths/verification", title: "Verify without executing", reasons: ["You need an inert verification result", "No provider credential or lifecycle mutation is required"] };
-  if (choice.actor === "organization") return { path: "/get-started/paths/cross-company", title: "Authorize across companies", reasons: ["Independent organizations keep separate identity systems", "Portable authority and receipts cross the boundary"] };
-  if (choice.actor === "agent" || choice.authority === "delegated" || choice.authority === "approved-plan") return { path: "/get-started/paths/agent", title: "Delegate one action to an agent", reasons: ["The actor needs attenuated authority", "Credentials remain behind a closed gateway"] };
-  if (choice.effect !== "in-process" || choice.state === "recovery" || choice.custody === "kms-hsm" || choice.posture === "self-hosted") return { path: "/get-started/paths/runtime", title: "Protect a service effect", reasons: ["The effect crosses a service or provider boundary", "Durable state and operational recovery are part of the path"] };
-  return { path: "/get-started/paths/application", title: "Protect one local effect", reasons: ["The effect can remain in process", "Development custody and local replay protection are enough to begin"] };
-}
-
-const fields = [
-  { key: "effect", label: "Where is the effect?", options: [["in-process", "In process"], ["service", "Remote service"], ["provider", "Cloud/provider"], ["evidence", "No effect—verify only"]] },
-  { key: "actor", label: "Who acts?", options: [["person", "Person"], ["workload", "Workload"], ["agent", "Agent"], ["organization", "Another organization"]] },
-  { key: "trust", label: "Trust source", options: [["raw-key", "Application key"], ["oidc", "OAuth/OIDC"], ["spiffe", "SPIFFE"], ["application", "Application resolver"]] },
-  { key: "authority", label: "Authority shape", options: [["direct", "Direct"], ["delegated", "Delegated"], ["approved-plan", "Approved plan"], ["verification", "Verification only"]] },
-  { key: "state", label: "State requirement", options: [["none", "No lifecycle state"], ["replay", "Replay/use state"], ["recovery", "Durable recovery"]] },
-  { key: "custody", label: "Signer custody", options: [["development", "Development signer"], ["application", "Application signer"], ["kms-hsm", "KMS/HSM"]] },
-  { key: "posture", label: "Operating posture", options: [["evaluation", "Evaluation"], ["self-hosted", "Self-hosted production"], ["integration-author", "Integration author"]] },
-] as const;
-
-export function IntegrationChooser() {
-  const [choice, setChoice] = useState<Choice>(initial);
-  const result = useMemo(() => recommendation(choice), [choice]);
-  return (
-    <div className="integration-chooser">
-      <div className="chooser-fields">
-        {fields.map((field) => <label key={field.key}><span>{field.label}</span><select value={choice[field.key]} onChange={(event) => setChoice((current) => ({ ...current, [field.key]: event.target.value } as Choice))}>{field.options.map(([value, label]) => <option key={value} value={value}>{label}</option>)}</select></label>)}
-      </div>
-      <aside className="chooser-result" aria-live="polite">
-        <span>Recommended path</span>
-        <h2>{result.title}</h2>
-        <ul>{result.reasons.map((reason) => <li key={reason}>{reason}</li>)}</ul>
-        <Link className="button button-primary" href={result.path}>Open this path <span aria-hidden="true">→</span></Link>
-        <small>No credentials or authority are collected or created.</small>
-      </aside>
-    </div>
-  );
-}
diff --git a/app/components/JourneyPage.tsx b/app/components/JourneyPage.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index c2a5bf7..0000000
--- a/app/components/JourneyPage.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-import Link from "next/link";
-import type { ReactNode } from "react";
-import { OutcomeHero, SecurityCallout } from "./foundation";
-import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
-import { SiteFooter } from "./SiteFooter";
-import { SiteHeader } from "./SiteHeader";
-
-export function JourneyPage({
-  eyebrow,
-  title,
-  description,
-  source,
-  steps,
-  security,
-  next,
-}: {
-  eyebrow: string;
-  title: string;
-  description: string;
-  source: string;
-  steps: readonly Readonly<{ title: string; body: ReactNode }>[];
-  security: ReactNode;
-  next: Readonly<{ href: string; label: string }>;
-}) {
-  return (
-    <div className="site-frame journey-site">
-      <SiteHeader compact />
-      <main className="journey-main">
-        <OutcomeHero eyebrow={eyebrow} title={title}><p>{description}</p></OutcomeHero>
-        <PageActions source={source} />
-        <ol className="journey-steps">
-          {steps.map((step, index) => (
-            <li key={step.title}><span>{String(index + 1).padStart(2, "0")}</span><div><h2>{step.title}</h2>{step.body}</div></li>
-          ))}
-        </ol>
-        <SecurityCallout>{security}</SecurityCallout>
-        <Link className="button button-primary journey-next" href={next.href}>{next.label}<span aria-hidden="true">→</span></Link>
-      </main>
-      <SiteFooter />
-    </div>
-  );
-}
diff --git a/app/components/QuickstartComparison.tsx b/app/components/QuickstartComparison.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 86f8442..0000000
--- a/app/components/QuickstartComparison.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-import Link from "next/link";
-import { quickstarts } from "../lib/quickstarts";
-
-const boundaries: Readonly<Record<string, Readonly<{ runtime: string; state: string; custody: string }>>> = {
-  "local-rest-effect": { runtime: "In process", state: "In memory", custody: "Application signer" },
-  "runtime-effect": { runtime: "HTTPS runtime", state: "Durable reservation", custody: "Runtime signer" },
-  "agent-delegation": { runtime: "Local or remote", state: "Delegation uses", custody: "Issuer + gateway" },
-  "approved-plan": { runtime: "HTTPS runtime", state: "Plan + approvals", custody: "Organizations + runtime" },
-  "offline-verification": { runtime: "None", state: "None", custody: "Public verification only" },
-  recovery: { runtime: "HTTPS runtime", state: "Execution journal", custody: "Runtime signer" },
-  "identity-swap": { runtime: "In process", state: "Trust context", custody: "Suite adapters" },
-};
-
-export function QuickstartComparison() {
-  return <section className="quickstart-comparison" aria-labelledby="quickstart-comparison-title">
-    <h2 id="quickstart-comparison-title">Compare quickstarts</h2>
-    <div className="quickstart-comparison-scroll"><table>
-      <thead><tr><th>Project</th><th>Time</th><th>Runtime</th><th>Effect</th><th>State</th><th>Custody</th><th>Success</th><th>Failure</th></tr></thead>
-      <tbody>{quickstarts.map((item) => {
-        const boundary = boundaries[item.slug];
-        return <tr key={item.id}>
-          <th><Link href={`/get-started/quickstarts/${item.slug}`}>{item.title}</Link></th>
-          <td>{item.minutes} min</td><td>{boundary.runtime}</td><td><code>{item.effect}</code></td><td>{boundary.state}</td><td>{boundary.custody}</td><td><code>{item.success}</code></td><td><code>{item.failure}</code></td>
-        </tr>;
-      })}</tbody>
-    </table></div>
-  </section>;
-}
diff --git a/app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx b/app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index ae9cb39..0000000
--- a/app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-"use client";
-
-import Link from "next/link";
-import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
-import type { Quickstart } from "../lib/quickstarts";
-import { isSdkLanguage, sdkLanguageEvent, sdkLanguageStorageKey, type SdkLanguage } from "../lib/sdk-languages";
-import { CodeBlock, CodeBlockWithResult } from "./code";
-import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
-import { SdkLanguageSelector } from "./SdkLanguageSelector";
-
-export function QuickstartPage({ quickstart }: { quickstart: Quickstart }) {
-  const [language, setLanguage] = useState<SdkLanguage>("typescript");
-  useEffect(() => {
-    const stored = window.localStorage.getItem(sdkLanguageStorageKey);
-    const hydrationTimer = isSdkLanguage(stored) ? window.setTimeout(() => setLanguage(stored), 0) : null;
-    const sync = (event: Event) => setLanguage((event as CustomEvent<SdkLanguage>).detail);
-    window.addEventListener(sdkLanguageEvent, sync);
-    return () => {
-      if (hydrationTimer !== null) window.clearTimeout(hydrationTimer);
-      window.removeEventListener(sdkLanguageEvent, sync);
-    };
-  }, []);
-  function choose(next: SdkLanguage) {
-    setLanguage(next);
-    window.localStorage.setItem(sdkLanguageStorageKey, next);
-    window.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent(sdkLanguageEvent, { detail: next }));
-  }
-  const result = JSON.stringify({ scenario: quickstart.id, kind: quickstart.success, effect: quickstart.effect }, null, 2);
-  const failure = JSON.stringify({ scenario: quickstart.id, kind: "denied", code: quickstart.failure, providerReached: false }, null, 2);
-  return <div className="quickstart-page">
-      <header className="editorial-hero quickstart-hero">
-        <p className="kicker">Quickstart · {quickstart.minutes} minutes</p>
-        <h1>{quickstart.title}</h1>
-        <p>{quickstart.description}</p>
-        <PageActions source={`/get-started/quickstarts/${quickstart.slug}.md`} />
-        <div className="quickstart-meta"><span>Scenario <code>{quickstart.id}</code></span><span>Rust-owned semantics</span><Link href={`/downloads/quickstarts/${quickstart.slug}.json`} download>Download exact project ↓</Link></div>
-      </header>
-      <div className="quickstart-language"><span>Use one language for every step</span><SdkLanguageSelector language={language} onChange={choose} /></div>
-      <div className="quickstart-steps">
-        <section id="prerequisites"><div><b>01</b><p className="kicker">Prerequisites</p><h2>Start from a clean consumer</h2><p>Use a supported runtime and keep all provider credentials behind the application-owned gateway.</p></div><CodeBlock code={quickstart.sources.install[language]} isBash label="Install" language={language} /></section>
-        <section id="compose"><div><b>02</b><p className="kicker">Compose</p><h2>Name the exact boundary</h2><p><strong>Allowed:</strong> {quickstart.permitted}.</p><p><strong>Prohibited:</strong> {quickstart.prohibited}.</p></div><div className="quickstart-boundary"><span>Identity</span><span>Authority</span><span>Closed gateway</span><span>Effect</span></div></section>
-        <section id="execute"><div><b>03</b><p className="kicker">Execute</p><h2>Perform the permitted effect</h2><p>The selected SDK reaches the same native semantic decision and returns a closed outcome.</p></div><CodeBlockWithResult code={quickstart.sources.execute[language]} label="Permitted path" language={language} result={result} /></section>
-        <section id="fail-closed"><div><b>04</b><p className="kicker">Break safely</p><h2>Try the prohibited variant</h2><p>The provider remains untouched. The stable denial explains which invariant rejected the request.</p></div><CodeBlockWithResult code={quickstart.sources.failure[language]} label="Adversarial path" language={language} result={failure} /></section>
-        <section id="next"><div><b>05</b><p className="kicker">Continue</p><h2>Move from proof to your architecture</h2><p>Keep this scenario as a conformance fixture while you replace development adapters one boundary at a time.</p><div className="quickstart-links"><Link href="/developers/testing">Test more failures →</Link><Link href="/operations">Operate the runtime →</Link></div></div></section>
-      </div>
-  </div>;
-}
diff --git a/app/components/ReferenceShell.tsx b/app/components/ReferenceShell.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 9b5f96d..0000000
--- a/app/components/ReferenceShell.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
-"use client";
-
-import type { ReactNode } from "react";
-import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
-
-export type ReferenceNavItem = Readonly<{
-  id?: string;
-  label: string;
-  prefix?: string;
-}>;
-
-export type ReferenceNavGroup = Readonly<{
-  label: string;
-  items: readonly ReferenceNavItem[];
-}>;
-
-export function ReferenceShell({
-  children,
-  filterLabel,
-  groups,
-  initialSection = "introduction",
-  title,
-}: {
-  children: ReactNode;
-  filterLabel: string;
-  groups: readonly ReferenceNavGroup[];
-  initialSection?: string;
-  title: string;
-}) {
-  const [activeSection, setActiveSection] = useState(initialSection);
-  const [navCollapsed, setNavCollapsed] = useState(false);
-  const [mobileOpen, setMobileOpen] = useState(false);
-  const [query, setQuery] = useState("");
-
-  useEffect(() => {
-    const observed = Array.from(document.querySelectorAll<HTMLElement>("[data-reference-section]"));
-    const updateActiveSection = () => {
-      const current = observed.reduce(
-        (active, section) => section.getBoundingClientRect().top <= 220 ? section.id : active,
-        observed[0]?.id ?? initialSection,
-      );
-      setActiveSection(current);
-    };
-    updateActiveSection();
-    window.addEventListener("scroll", updateActiveSection, { passive: true });
-    return () => window.removeEventListener("scroll", updateActiveSection);
-  }, [initialSection]);
-
-  const matches = (label: string) => label.toLowerCase().includes(query.trim().toLowerCase());
-
-  return (
-    <div
-      className={[
-        "sdk-reference-shell",
-        navCollapsed ? "sdk-nav-collapsed" : "",
-        mobileOpen ? "sdk-nav-mobile-open" : "",
-      ].filter(Boolean).join(" ")}
-    >
-      <aside className="sdk-reference-nav" aria-label={`${title} navigation`}>
-        <div className="sdk-nav-head">
-          <strong>{title}</strong>
-          <button
-            aria-label={`Collapse ${title.toLowerCase()} navigation`}
-            onClick={() => {
-              setNavCollapsed(true);
-              setMobileOpen(false);
-            }}
-            type="button"
-          >
-            <span aria-hidden="true">‹</span>
-          </button>
-        </div>
-        <label className="sdk-nav-search">
-          <span aria-hidden="true">⌕</span>
-          <input
-            aria-label={`Filter ${title.toLowerCase()}`}
-            onChange={(event) => setQuery(event.target.value)}
-            placeholder={filterLabel}
-            value={query}
-          />
-        </label>
-        {groups.map((group) => {
-          const items = group.items.filter((item) => matches(item.label));
-          if (items.length === 0) return null;
-          return (
-            <div className="reference-nav-group" key={group.label}>
-              <p>{group.label}</p>
-              {items.map((item) => item.id ? (
-                <a className={activeSection === item.id ? "active" : ""} href={`#${item.id}`} key={item.label}>
-                  {item.prefix && <span>{item.prefix}</span>}
-                  {item.label}
-                </a>
-              ) : <span key={item.label}>{item.label}</span>)}
-            </div>
-          );
-        })}
-      </aside>
-
-      <button
-        aria-expanded={mobileOpen}
-        className="sdk-nav-restore"
-        onClick={() => {
-          if (window.matchMedia("(max-width: 980px)").matches) {
-            setMobileOpen((current) => !current);
-          } else {
-            setNavCollapsed(false);
-            setMobileOpen(false);
-          }
-        }}
-        type="button"
-      >
-        <span aria-hidden="true">☰</span>
-        {title} navigation
-      </button>
-
-      <main className="sdk-reference-main">{children}</main>
-    </div>
-  );
-}
diff --git a/app/components/RuntimeReference.tsx b/app/components/RuntimeReference.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 338b164..0000000
--- a/app/components/RuntimeReference.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-"use client";
-
-import Link from "next/link";
-import { runtimeEndpoints } from "../lib/runtime-reference";
-import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
-import { ReferenceShell, type ReferenceNavGroup } from "./ReferenceShell";
-import { SectionActions } from "./SectionActions";
-import { CodeBlockWithResult } from "./code";
-
-const groups: readonly ReferenceNavGroup[] = [
-  {
-    label: "OVERVIEW",
-    items: [{ id: "introduction", label: "Introduction" }],
-  },
-  {
-    label: "ENDPOINTS",
-    items: runtimeEndpoints.map((endpoint) => ({
-      id: endpoint.slug,
-      label: endpoint.title,
-      prefix: endpoint.method,
-    })),
-  },
-];
-
-export function RuntimeReference() {
-  return (
-    <ReferenceShell filterLabel="Find an endpoint" groups={groups} title="Runtime API">
-      <section className="sdk-reference-section sdk-introduction" id="introduction" data-reference-section>
-        <div className="sdk-copy-column">
-          <p className="sdk-version">HTTPS RUNTIME · V1</p>
-          <h1>Runtime API Reference</h1>
-          <p className="sdk-lede">
-            The wire-level service contract. For in-process Rust, TypeScript, and Python libraries, use the <Link href="/reference/sdk">SDK reference</Link>.
-          </p>
-          <PageActions source="/reference/runtime-api.md" />
-          <div className="sdk-note">
-            <strong>One runtime boundary</strong>
-            <p>HTTP carries bounded requests and outcomes. Successful transport never becomes authorization.</p>
-          </div>
-        </div>
-        <div className="sdk-code-column">
-          <div className="sdk-code-sticky runtime-contract-note">
-            <p className="sdk-code-eyebrow">HTTPS CONTRACT</p>
-            <p>Every mutating endpoint parses bounded input, preserves closed outcomes, and keeps provider credentials behind the runtime gateway.</p>
-          </div>
-        </div>
-      </section>
-
-      {runtimeEndpoints.map((endpoint) => (
-        <section className="sdk-reference-section" id={endpoint.slug} data-reference-section key={endpoint.id}>
-          <div className="sdk-copy-column">
-            <div className="sdk-operation runtime-operation"><span>{endpoint.method}</span><code>{endpoint.path}</code></div>
-            <h2>{endpoint.title}</h2>
-            <p>{endpoint.description}</p>
-            <SectionActions source={`/reference/runtime-api/sections/${endpoint.slug}.md`} title={endpoint.title} />
-            <dl className="runtime-endpoint-metadata">
-              <div><dt>Stable identity</dt><dd>{endpoint.id}</dd></div>
-              <div><dt>Maximum body</dt><dd>{endpoint.maxBodyBytes === 0 ? "None" : `${endpoint.maxBodyBytes.toLocaleString()} bytes`}</dd></div>
-              <div><dt>Outcomes</dt><dd>{endpoint.outcomes.join(" · ")}</dd></div>
-            </dl>
-          </div>
-          <div className="sdk-code-column">
-            <div className="sdk-code-sticky">
-              <CodeBlockWithResult
-                className="sdk-code-example"
-                code={endpoint.curl}
-                isBash
-                label={`${endpoint.method} ${endpoint.path}`}
-                language="typescript"
-                result={endpoint.response}
-                resultLanguage="json"
-              />
-            </div>
-          </div>
-        </section>
-      ))}
-    </ReferenceShell>
-  );
-}
diff --git a/app/components/SdkCodeExample.tsx b/app/components/SdkCodeExample.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 7692956..0000000
--- a/app/components/SdkCodeExample.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-import type { ResultLanguage } from "../lib/code-blocks";
-import type { SdkLanguage } from "../lib/sdk-languages";
-import { CodeBlock, CodeBlockWithResult } from "./code";
-import { SdkLanguageSelector } from "./SdkLanguageSelector";
-
-export function SdkCodeExample({
-  examples,
-  isBash = false,
-  label,
-  language,
-  onLanguageChange,
-  result,
-  resultLanguage = "json",
-}: {
-  examples: Record<SdkLanguage, string>;
-  isBash?: boolean;
-  label: string;
-  language: SdkLanguage;
-  onLanguageChange: (language: SdkLanguage) => void;
-  result?: string;
-  resultLanguage?: ResultLanguage;
-}) {
-  const code = examples[language];
-  const languageControl = <SdkLanguageSelector language={language} onChange={onLanguageChange} />;
-
-  if (result) {
-    return (
-      <CodeBlockWithResult
-        className="sdk-code-example"
-        code={code}
-        isBash={isBash}
-        label={label}
-        language={language}
-        languageControl={languageControl}
-        result={result}
-        resultLanguage={resultLanguage}
-      />
-    );
-  }
-
-  return (
-    <CodeBlock
-      className="sdk-code-example"
-      code={code}
-      isBash={isBash}
-      label={label}
-      language={language}
-      languageControl={languageControl}
-    />
-  );
-}
diff --git a/app/components/SdkLanguageSelector.tsx b/app/components/SdkLanguageSelector.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 87ee572..0000000
--- a/app/components/SdkLanguageSelector.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-import { sdkLibraries, type SdkLanguage } from "../lib/sdk-languages";
-
-export function SdkLanguageSelector({
-  language,
-  onChange,
-}: {
-  language: SdkLanguage;
-  onChange: (language: SdkLanguage) => void;
-}) {
-  return (
-    <div className="language-tabs sdk-language-selector" role="tablist" aria-label="Choose SDK language">
-      {sdkLibraries.map((library) => (
-        <button
-          aria-selected={library.language === language}
-          className={library.language === language ? "active" : ""}
-          key={library.language}
-          onClick={() => onChange(library.language)}
-          role="tab"
-          type="button"
-        >
-          <span className={`language-dot language-dot-${library.language}`} aria-hidden="true" />
-          {library.label}
-        </button>
-      ))}
-    </div>
-  );
-}
diff --git a/app/components/SdkReference.tsx b/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 624d431..0000000
--- a/app/components/SdkReference.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,366 +0,0 @@
-"use client";
-
-import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
-import {
-  isSdkLanguage,
-  sdkLanguageEvent,
-  sdkLanguageStorageKey,
-  sdkInstallCommands,
-  type SdkLanguage,
-} from "../lib/sdk-languages";
-import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
-import { ReferenceShell, type ReferenceNavGroup } from "./ReferenceShell";
-import { SdkCodeExample } from "./SdkCodeExample";
-import { TestedExample } from "./TestedExample";
-import { SectionActions } from "./SectionActions";
-
-type Parameter = {
-  name: string;
-  requirement: "required" | "optional";
-  type: string;
-  description: string;
-};
-
-export type ReferenceSection = {
-  id: string;
-  navLabel: string;
-  operation: string;
-  title: string;
-  description: string;
-  symbols: Record<SdkLanguage, string>;
-  parameters: Parameter[];
-  examples: Record<SdkLanguage, string>;
-  result: string;
-  scenario: `auths.scenario.${string}/${number}`;
-};
-
-export const sdkReferenceSections: readonly ReferenceSection[] = [
-  {
-    id: "create",
-    navLabel: "Open a session",
-    operation: "create",
-    title: "Open an Auths session",
-    description:
-      "Start from explicit authority and an explicit integration. TypeScript and Python expose the product session; Rust exposes the native authoring and verifier components beneath that boundary.",
-    symbols: {
-      rust: "TrustedContextBuilder::new",
-      typescript: "development.createAuths",
-      python: "development.create_auths",
-    },
-    parameters: [
-      { name: "authority", requirement: "required", type: "profile authority", description: "The exact profile-owned boundary the session may exercise." },
-      { name: "integration", requirement: "required", type: "development | production", description: "The explicit runtime, custody, state, and trust composition." },
-    ],
-    examples: {
-      rust: `let context = TrustedContextBuilder::new(
-    configuration,
-    composition,
-    trust_anchors,
-    assurance_policy,
-)?.build()?;
-
-let verifier = Verifier::self_contained(context)?;`,
-      typescript: `import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
-import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
-
-await using auths = await development.createAuths({
-  authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]),
-});`,
-      python: `from auths.integrations import development
-from auths.profiles import mcp
-
-async with development.create_auths(
-    authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"]),
-) as auths:
-    ...`,
-    },
-    result: `{
-  "kind": "session",
-  "profile": "auths.mcp/1",
-  "authority": "publish_report"
-}`,
-    scenario: "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
-  },
-  {
-    id: "delegate",
-    navLabel: "Delegate authority",
-    operation: "delegate",
-    title: "Delegate narrower authority",
-    description:
-      "Pass a strict subset of authority to another actor. A delegate can receive fewer uses, an earlier expiry, or a narrower action—but never more power than its parent grants.",
-    symbols: {
-      rust: "auths_author::plan_child_grant",
-      typescript: "Auths.delegate",
-      python: "Auths.delegate",
-    },
-    parameters: [
-      { name: "authority", requirement: "required", type: "Authority", description: "The parent authority being attenuated." },
-      { name: "name", requirement: "optional", type: "string", description: "A bounded label for the delegated agent." },
-      { name: "expires", requirement: "optional", type: "duration", description: "An expiry no later than the parent authority." },
-    ],
-    examples: {
-      rust: `let child = plan_child_grant(
-    parent.statement(),
-    narrower_request,
-)?;`,
-      typescript: `await using agent = await auths.delegate({
-  authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]),
-  name: "report-agent",
-  expiresInSeconds: 300,
-});`,
-      python: `agent = await auths.delegate(
-    authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"]),
-    name="report-agent",
-    expires_in_seconds=300,
-)`,
-    },
-    result: `{
-  "kind": "authority",
-  "parent": "32a681d1…81ce",
-  "depth": 1,
-  "uses": 1,
-  "commitment": "a912f765…0c42"
-}`,
-    scenario: "auths.scenario.delegation/1",
-  },
-  {
-    id: "execute",
-    navLabel: "Execute an effect",
-    operation: "execute",
-    title: "Execute through a closed gateway",
-    description:
-      "Authorize the exact command, reserve its bounded use, and submit it through an application-owned gateway. The result preserves denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and completed outcomes.",
-    symbols: {
-      rust: "ProofExchangeService::submit_action",
-      typescript: "Auths.execute",
-      python: "Auths.execute",
-    },
-    parameters: [
-      { name: "action", requirement: "required", type: "Action", description: "The effect requested from the gateway." },
-      { name: "provider", requirement: "required", type: "closed provider", description: "Application-owned access to provider credentials." },
-      { name: "requestId", requirement: "optional", type: "string", description: "Stable identity for observation, exact replay, and resume." },
-    ],
-    examples: {
-      rust: `let outcome = service
-    .submit_action(&peer, submission)
-    .await?;`,
-      typescript: `const outcome = await auths.execute({
-  action: mcp.callTool({
-    name: "publish_report",
-    arguments: { report: "weekly" },
-  }),
-  provider,
-  requestId: "report:weekly:1",
-});`,
-      python: `outcome = await auths.execute(
-    action=mcp.call_tool(
-        name="publish_report",
-        arguments={"report": "weekly"},
-    ),
-    provider=provider,
-    request_id="report:weekly:1",
-)`,
-    },
-    result: `{
-  "kind": "completed",
-  "receiptId": "rcpt_018f2e",
-  "usesConsumed": 1,
-  "observedAt": "2026-08-14T17:31:12Z"
-}`,
-    scenario: "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
-  },
-  {
-    id: "resume",
-    navLabel: "Resume an execution",
-    operation: "resume",
-    title: "Resume without repeating the effect",
-    description:
-      "Continue the exact recoverable execution represented by an SDK-minted reference. Resume preserves the original authority, command, reservation, and provider observation.",
-    symbols: {
-      rust: "McpSession::resume",
-      typescript: "Auths.resume",
-      python: "Auths.resume",
-    },
-    parameters: [
-      { name: "reference", requirement: "required", type: "ExecutionReference", description: "Opaque reference minted for the original recoverable execution." },
-      { name: "provider", requirement: "required", type: "closed provider", description: "The same closed provider boundary used by the original execution." },
-    ],
-    examples: {
-      rust: `let outcome = session.resume(
-    reference,
-    state,
-    provider,
-).await?;`,
-      typescript: `const outcome = await auths.resume({
-  reference,
-  provider,
-});`,
-      python: `outcome = await auths.resume(
-    reference=reference,
-    provider=provider,
-)`,
-    },
-    result: `{
-  "kind": "completed",
-  "receiptId": "rcpt_018f2e",
-  "resumed": true
-}`,
-    scenario: "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
-  },
-  {
-    id: "verify",
-    navLabel: "Verify authority",
-    operation: "verify",
-    title: "Verify the proof locally",
-    description:
-      "Verify a proof, canonical action, and explicit trust context without executing an effect or treating transport success as authority.",
-    symbols: {
-      rust: "Verifier::verify",
-      typescript: "loadVerifier",
-      python: "auths.verify.verify",
-    },
-    parameters: [
-      { name: "proof", requirement: "required", type: "Proof", description: "The signed authority proof to evaluate." },
-      { name: "action", requirement: "required", type: "Action", description: "The exact canonical operation and resource requested." },
-      { name: "context", requirement: "required", type: "TrustedContext", description: "Accepted roots, verification material, and identity evidence." },
-    ],
-    examples: {
-      rust: `let result = verifier.verify(
-    &proof,
-    &canonical_action,
-    &request,
-    &profile,
-)?;`,
-      typescript: `import { loadVerifier } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
-
-const verifier = await loadVerifier();
-const result = verifier.verify(proof, action, context);`,
-      python: `from auths.verify import verify
-
-result = verify(proof, action, context)`,
-    },
-    result: `{
-  "kind": "authorized",
-  "profile": "auths.mcp/1",
-  "command": "publish_report"
-}`,
-    scenario: "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1",
-  },
-];
-
-export const sdkInstallExamples: Record<SdkLanguage, string> = sdkInstallCommands;
-
-const navigationGroups: readonly ReferenceNavGroup[] = [
-  {
-    label: "OVERVIEW",
-    items: [
-      { id: "introduction", label: "Introduction" },
-      { label: "Errors" },
-      { label: "Outcomes" },
-    ],
-  },
-  {
-    label: "AUTHORITY",
-    items: sdkReferenceSections.slice(0, 2).map((section) => ({ id: section.id, label: section.navLabel })),
-  },
-  {
-    label: "EXECUTION",
-    items: sdkReferenceSections.slice(2, 4).map((section) => ({ id: section.id, label: section.navLabel })),
-  },
-  {
-    label: "VERIFICATION",
-    items: sdkReferenceSections.slice(4).map((section) => ({ id: section.id, label: section.navLabel })),
-  },
-];
-
-export function SdkReference() {
-  const [language, setLanguage] = useState<SdkLanguage>("typescript");
-
-  useEffect(() => {
-    const stored = window.localStorage.getItem(sdkLanguageStorageKey);
-    const hydrationTimer = isSdkLanguage(stored)
-      ? window.setTimeout(() => setLanguage(stored), 0)
-      : null;
-    const sync = (event: Event) => setLanguage((event as CustomEvent<SdkLanguage>).detail);
-    window.addEventListener(sdkLanguageEvent, sync);
-    return () => {
-      if (hydrationTimer !== null) window.clearTimeout(hydrationTimer);
-      window.removeEventListener(sdkLanguageEvent, sync);
-    };
-  }, []);
-
-  function chooseLanguage(next: SdkLanguage) {
-    setLanguage(next);
-    window.localStorage.setItem(sdkLanguageStorageKey, next);
-    window.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent(sdkLanguageEvent, { detail: next }));
-  }
-
-  return (
-    <ReferenceShell filterLabel="Find an operation" groups={navigationGroups} title="SDK reference">
-        <section className="sdk-reference-section sdk-introduction" id="introduction" data-reference-section>
-          <div className="sdk-copy-column">
-            <p className="sdk-version">AUTHS SDK · 1.0.0-rc.1</p>
-            <h1>SDK Reference</h1>
-            <p className="sdk-lede">
-              Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify precise authority. Each language panel names the actual installed symbol for that SDK surface.
-            </p>
-            <PageActions source="/reference/sdk/sections/introduction.md" />
-            <div className="sdk-note">
-              <strong>One semantic core</strong>
-              <p>The language changes. The meaning of authority does not.</p>
-            </div>
-          </div>
-          <div className="sdk-code-column">
-            <div className="sdk-code-sticky">
-              <p className="sdk-code-eyebrow">INSTALL THE SDK</p>
-              <SdkCodeExample
-                examples={sdkInstallExamples}
-                isBash
-                label="Install"
-                language={language}
-                onLanguageChange={chooseLanguage}
-              />
-            </div>
-          </div>
-        </section>
-
-        {sdkReferenceSections.map((section) => (
-          <section className="sdk-reference-section" id={section.id} data-reference-section key={section.id}>
-            <div className="sdk-copy-column">
-              <div className="sdk-operation"><span>{section.operation}</span><code>{section.symbols[language]}</code></div>
-              <h2>{section.title}</h2>
-              <p>{section.description}</p>
-              <SectionActions source={`/reference/sdk/sections/${section.id}.md`} title={section.title} />
-              <TestedExample scenario={section.scenario}>
-                <span className="visually-hidden">Executable scenario {section.scenario}</span>
-              </TestedExample>
-              <div className="sdk-parameters">
-                <h3>Parameters</h3>
-                {section.parameters.map((parameter) => (
-                  <div className="sdk-parameter" key={parameter.name}>
-                    <div>
-                      <code>{parameter.name}</code>
-                      <span>{parameter.requirement}</span>
-                      <small>{parameter.type}</small>
-                    </div>
-                    <p>{parameter.description}</p>
-                  </div>
-                ))}
-              </div>
-            </div>
-            <div className="sdk-code-column">
-              <div className="sdk-code-sticky">
-                <SdkCodeExample
-                  examples={section.examples}
-                  label={section.operation}
-                  language={language}
-                  onLanguageChange={chooseLanguage}
-                  result={section.result}
-                />
-              </div>
-            </div>
-          </section>
-        ))}
-    </ReferenceShell>
-  );
-}
diff --git a/app/components/SearchDialog.tsx b/app/components/SearchDialog.tsx
index c586c32..8eb89c5 100644
--- a/app/components/SearchDialog.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SearchDialog.tsx
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 import { MagnifyingGlassIcon, XIcon } from "@phosphor-icons/react";
 import Link from "next/link";
 import { useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
-import { searchPages } from "../lib/page-graph";
+import { searchDocs } from "../lib/docs-content";
 
 export function SearchDialog() {
   const [open, setOpen] = useState(false);
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ export function SearchDialog() {
               <button onClick={() => setOpen(false)} type="button" aria-label="Close search"><XIcon aria-hidden="true" size={18} /></button>
             </div>
             <div className="search-results">
-              {searchPages(query).map((page) => (
+              {searchDocs(query).map((page) => (
                 <Link href={page.path} key={page.id} onClick={() => setOpen(false)}>
                   <strong>{page.title}</strong><span>{page.description}</span>
                 </Link>
diff --git a/app/components/SectionActions.tsx b/app/components/SectionActions.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index e7ac0ad..0000000
--- a/app/components/SectionActions.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-"use client";
-
-import { ClipboardIcon } from "@phosphor-icons/react/Clipboard";
-import { MarkdownLogoIcon } from "@phosphor-icons/react/MarkdownLogo";
-import { useRef, useState } from "react";
-
-export function SectionActions({ source, title }: { source: string; title: string }) {
-  const [copied, setCopied] = useState(false);
-  const resetTimer = useRef<ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null>(null);
-
-  async function copyForAgent() {
-    const response = await fetch(source);
-    if (!response.ok) return;
-    const markdown = await response.text();
-    const payload = [`# Task context: ${title}`, "", "Use the following canonical Auths documentation section. Do not infer APIs absent from it.", "", markdown].join("\n");
-    await navigator.clipboard.writeText(payload.slice(0, 48_000));
-    setCopied(true);
-    if (resetTimer.current) clearTimeout(resetTimer.current);
-    resetTimer.current = setTimeout(() => setCopied(false), 1600);
-  }
-
-  return <div className="page-actions section-actions" aria-label={`${title} actions`}>
-    <button onClick={copyForAgent} type="button"><ClipboardIcon aria-hidden="true" size={17} />{copied ? "Copied" : "Copy section for LLM"}</button>
-    <a href={source} target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"><MarkdownLogoIcon aria-hidden="true" size={17} />View section as Markdown</a>
-  </div>;
-}
diff --git a/app/components/SemanticTourPage.tsx b/app/components/SemanticTourPage.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 2a1b6b7..0000000
--- a/app/components/SemanticTourPage.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-import Link from "next/link";
-import { contentPageById, runtimeOutcomes } from "../lib/content-graph";
-import { pageById } from "../lib/page-graph";
-import { tourByPage } from "../lib/tours";
-import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
-import { TopicShell } from "./TopicShell";
-
-export function SemanticTourPage({ pageId }: { pageId: string }) {
-  const page = contentPageById(pageId);
-  const tour = tourByPage(pageId);
-  return (
-    <TopicShell pageId={page.id}>
-      <main className="tour-page">
-        <header className="editorial-hero">
-          <p className="kicker">Concept tour</p>
-          <h1>{page.title}</h1>
-          <p>{page.description}</p>
-          <PageActions source={`${page.path}.md`} />
-        </header>
-        <section className="tour-overview" aria-labelledby="tour-overview-title">
-          <div className="content-provenance">Editorial diagram · fact-backed vocabulary</div>
-          <h2 id="tour-overview-title">The path at a glance</h2>
-          <div className="tour-diagram" role="img" aria-label={tour.diagram.text}>
-            {tour.diagram.nodes.map((node, index) => <div key={node}><span>{String(index + 1).padStart(2, "0")}</span><strong>{node}</strong>{index < tour.diagram.nodes.length - 1 && <b aria-hidden="true">→</b>}</div>)}
-          </div>
-          <p className="diagram-text-equivalent"><strong>Text equivalent:</strong> {tour.diagram.text}</p>
-        </section>
-        <section className="tour-invariants">
-          <div><p className="kicker">Invariants</p><h2>What remains true</h2></div>
-          <ol>{tour.invariants.map((invariant) => <li key={invariant}>{invariant}</li>)}</ol>
-        </section>
-        {page.uses.endpoints.length > 0 && <section className="tour-generated-facts"><div className="content-provenance">Generated fact</div><h2>Closed runtime outcomes</h2><div>{runtimeOutcomes.map((outcome) => <code key={outcome}>{outcome}</code>)}</div></section>}
-        <section className="tour-failures">
-          <div className="content-provenance">Editorial explanation</div>
-          <h2>Failure branches</h2>
-          <div className="failure-table"><div className="failure-header"><span>Trigger</span><span>Result</span><span>Safe response</span></div>{tour.failures.map((failure) => <div key={failure.trigger}><strong>{failure.trigger}</strong><span>{failure.result}</span><p>{failure.response}</p></div>)}</div>
-        </section>
-        <section className="tour-use-grid"><div><span>Use this when</span><p>{tour.useWhen}</p></div><div><span>Do not use this when</span><p>{tour.avoidWhen}</p></div></section>
-        <section className="tour-related"><h2>Continue from here</h2><div>{tour.related.map((id) => { const related = pageById(id); return <Link href={related.path} key={id}><strong>{related.title}</strong><span>{related.description}</span><b aria-hidden="true">→</b></Link>; })}</div></section>
-      </main>
-    </TopicShell>
-  );
-}
diff --git a/app/components/SiteFooter.tsx b/app/components/SiteFooter.tsx
index 82b4e1b..686b6ed 100644
--- a/app/components/SiteFooter.tsx
+++ b/app/components/SiteFooter.tsx
@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ export function SiteFooter() {
           <p>Precise authority for an internet of people and agents.</p>
         </div>
         <div className="footer-links">
-          <Link href="/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect">Quickstart</Link>
-          <Link href="/developers/integrations">Integrations</Link>
-          <Link href="/operations">Operations</Link>
-          <Link href="/assurance">Assurance</Link>
+          <Link href="/start/typescript">Quickstart</Link>
+          <Link href="/guides">Guides</Link>
+          <Link href="/guides/authority-model">Authority model</Link>
+          <Link href="/reference/conformance">Evidence</Link>
           <a href="https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof">GitHub</a>
           <span>Apache-2.0 / MIT</span>
         </div>
diff --git a/app/components/TestedExample.tsx b/app/components/TestedExample.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 3b6448e..0000000
--- a/app/components/TestedExample.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-import { CheckCircleIcon } from "@phosphor-icons/react/ssr";
-import type { ReactNode } from "react";
-
-export function TestedExample({ scenario, children }: { scenario: `auths.scenario.${string}/${number}`; children: ReactNode }) {
-  return (
-    <section className="tested-example" data-scenario={scenario}>
-      <header><CheckCircleIcon aria-hidden="true" size={16} weight="fill" /><span>Qualified across Rust, TypeScript, and Python</span></header>
-      {children}
-    </section>
-  );
-}
diff --git a/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx b/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 3076e7d..0000000
--- a/app/components/TopicLandingPage.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-import Link from "next/link";
-import { pageById } from "../lib/page-graph";
-import { topicLandingByPage } from "../lib/topic-landings";
-import { siteNodeById } from "../lib/site-tree";
-import { PageActions } from "./PageActions";
-import { QuickstartComparison } from "./QuickstartComparison";
-import { TopicShell } from "./TopicShell";
-
-export function TopicLandingPage({ pageId }: { pageId: string }) {
-  const page = pageById(pageId);
-  const landing = topicLandingByPage(pageId);
-  const recommended = pageById(landing.recommendation.target);
-  const section = siteNodeById(pageId).section;
-  const related = landing.groups.flatMap((group) => group.cards).filter((card) => siteNodeById(card.target).section !== section);
-  return (
-    <TopicShell pageId={page.id}>
-      <div className="topic-landing shell">
-        <header className="topic-hero">
-          <p className="kicker">{landing.eyebrow}</p>
-          <h1>{page.title}</h1>
-          <p>{page.description}</p>
-          <PageActions source={`${page.path}.md`} />
-        </header>
-        <Link className="topic-recommendation" href={recommended.path}>
-          <span>{siteNodeById(recommended.id).section === section ? "Recommended path" : "Related topic"}</span>
-          <div><h2>{landing.recommendation.label}</h2><p>{landing.recommendation.description}</p></div>
-          <strong aria-hidden="true">→</strong>
-        </Link>
-        {page.id === "auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1" && <QuickstartComparison />}
-        <div className="topic-groups">
-          {landing.groups.filter((group) => group.cards.some((card) => siteNodeById(card.target).section === section)).map((group) => (
-            <section key={group.title}>
-              <h2>{group.title}</h2>
-              <div className="topic-card-grid">
-                {group.cards.filter((card) => siteNodeById(card.target).section === section).map((card) => {
-                  const target = pageById(card.target);
-                  return <Link className="topic-card" href={target.path} key={`${group.title}:${card.target}`}><h3>{card.title}</h3><p>{card.description}</p><span>Open guide <b aria-hidden="true">→</b></span></Link>;
-                })}
-              </div>
-            </section>
-          ))}
-          {related.length > 0 && <section className="related-topics"><h2>Related topics</h2><div className="topic-card-grid">{related.map((card) => { const target = pageById(card.target); return <Link className="topic-card" href={target.path} key={`related:${card.target}`}><h3>{card.title}</h3><p>{card.description}</p><span>Open related topic <b aria-hidden="true">→</b></span></Link>; })}</div></section>}
-        </div>
-      </div>
-    </TopicShell>
-  );
-}
diff --git a/app/components/TopicShell.tsx b/app/components/TopicShell.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 96dfe3f..0000000
--- a/app/components/TopicShell.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-import Link from "next/link";
-import type { ReactNode } from "react";
-import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../lib/content-graph";
-import { ancestors, siteNodeById, siteTree } from "../lib/site-tree";
-import { SiteFooter } from "./SiteFooter";
-import { SiteHeader } from "./SiteHeader";
-import { TopicNavigation, type TopicNavGroup } from "./TopicNavigation";
-
-function depth(id: string, sectionRoot: string): number {
-  return Math.max(0, ancestors(id).filter((item) => item.id !== sectionRoot).length);
-}
-
-export function TopicShell({ children, pageId }: { children: ReactNode; pageId: string }) {
-  const current = siteNodeById(pageId);
-  const published = new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.id));
-  const sectionNodes = siteTree.filter((page) => page.section === current.section && published.has(page.id));
-  const sectionRoot = sectionNodes.find((page) => page.parent === null) ?? current;
-  const labels = [...new Set(sectionNodes.filter((page) => page.id !== sectionRoot.id).map((page) => page.navGroup))];
-  const groups: readonly TopicNavGroup[] = labels.map((label) => ({
-    label,
-    items: sectionNodes
-      .filter((page) => page.id !== sectionRoot.id && page.navGroup === label)
-      .map((page) => ({ id: page.id, href: page.path, label: page.title, depth: depth(page.id, sectionRoot.id) })),
-  }));
-  const sequence = sectionNodes.filter((page) => page.id !== sectionRoot.id);
-  const index = sequence.findIndex((page) => page.id === current.id);
-  const previous = index > 0 ? sequence[index - 1] : null;
-  const next = index >= 0 && index < sequence.length - 1 ? sequence[index + 1] : null;
-  const crumbs = [...ancestors(current.id), current].filter((page) => published.has(page.id));
-
-  return <div className="site-frame topic-shell-site">
-    <SiteHeader compact />
-    <div className="topic-shell">
-      <TopicNavigation activeId={current.id} groups={groups} title={sectionRoot.title} />
-      <main className="topic-shell-main">
-        <nav className="topic-breadcrumbs" aria-label="Breadcrumb">
-          {crumbs.map((crumb, crumbIndex) => <span key={crumb.id}>{crumbIndex > 0 && <b aria-hidden="true">/</b>}<Link aria-current={crumb.id === current.id ? "page" : undefined} href={crumb.path}>{crumb.title}</Link></span>)}
-        </nav>
-        {children}
-        {current.id !== sectionRoot.id && <nav className="topic-sequence" aria-label="Previous and next pages">
-          {previous ? <Link href={previous.path}><span>Previous</span><strong>← {previous.title}</strong></Link> : <span />}
-          {next ? <Link href={next.path}><span>Next</span><strong>{next.title} →</strong></Link> : <span />}
-        </nav>}
-      </main>
-    </div>
-    <SiteFooter />
-  </div>;
-}
diff --git a/app/components/code/CodeBlock.tsx b/app/components/code/CodeBlock.tsx
index d4c07bc..9f0fee9 100644
--- a/app/components/code/CodeBlock.tsx
+++ b/app/components/code/CodeBlock.tsx
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ import { HighlightedCode } from "./HighlightedCode";
 export type CodeBlockProps = {
   className?: string;
   code: string;
+  codePurpose?: "raw-reference" | "tutorial-step";
+  explained?: boolean;
   isBash?: boolean;
   label?: string;
   language: SdkLanguage;
@@ -30,6 +32,8 @@ export function CodeBlock(props: CodeBlockProps) {
 export function CodeBlockFrame({
   className,
   code,
+  codePurpose,
+  explained = false,
   isBash = false,
   label,
   language,
@@ -62,14 +66,14 @@ export function CodeBlockFrame({
           </button>
         </div>
       </div>
-      <HighlightedCode code={code} language={syntax} />
+      <HighlightedCode code={code} explained={explained} language={syntax} purpose={codePurpose} />
       {result && (
         <div className="code-result-panel">
           <div className="code-result-label">
             <span>{result.label}</span>
             <code>{result.language}</code>
           </div>
-          <HighlightedCode code={result.code} language={result.language} variant="result" />
+          <HighlightedCode code={result.code} explained language={result.language} purpose="tutorial-step" variant="result" />
         </div>
       )}
     </div>
diff --git a/app/components/code/CodeWalkthrough.tsx b/app/components/code/CodeWalkthrough.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9386871
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/code/CodeWalkthrough.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+"use client";
+
+import type { SdkLanguage } from "../../lib/sdk-languages";
+import { CodeBlock } from "./CodeBlock";
+import { SdkLanguageTabs, useSynchronizedSdkLanguage } from "./SdkLanguageControl";
+
+export type CodeWalkthroughStep = Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  title: string;
+  description: string;
+  code: string;
+  startLine: number;
+  endLine: number;
+}>;
+
+export type CodeWalkthroughLanguage = Readonly<{
+  language: SdkLanguage;
+  label: string;
+  steps: readonly CodeWalkthroughStep[];
+}>;
+
+export function CodeWalkthrough({ walkthroughs }: { walkthroughs: readonly CodeWalkthroughLanguage[] }) {
+  const options = walkthroughs.map(({ label, language }) => ({ label, language }));
+  const [selected, choose] = useSynchronizedSdkLanguage(options);
+  const walkthrough = walkthroughs.find((candidate) => candidate.language === selected) ?? walkthroughs[0];
+  if (!walkthrough) return null;
+
+  return (
+    <div className="code-walkthrough" data-code-walkthrough={walkthrough.language}>
+      {options.length > 1 && (
+        <div className="code-walkthrough-language">
+          <span>SDK language</span>
+          <SdkLanguageTabs onSelect={choose} options={options} selected={walkthrough.language} />
+        </div>
+      )}
+      <ol>
+        {walkthrough.steps.map((step, index) => (
+          <li className="code-walkthrough-step" key={step.id}>
+            <header>
+              <span>Step {index + 1}</span>
+              <h4>{step.title}</h4>
+              <p>{step.description}</p>
+            </header>
+            <CodeBlock
+              code={step.code}
+              codePurpose="tutorial-step"
+              explained
+              label={step.startLine === step.endLine ? `Line ${step.startLine}` : `Lines ${step.startLine}–${step.endLine}`}
+              language={walkthrough.language}
+            />
+          </li>
+        ))}
+      </ol>
+    </div>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/components/code/HighlightedCode.tsx b/app/components/code/HighlightedCode.tsx
index 07b0927..c21cb91 100644
--- a/app/components/code/HighlightedCode.tsx
+++ b/app/components/code/HighlightedCode.tsx
@@ -4,17 +4,26 @@ import { authsCodeTheme } from "../../lib/code-theme";
 
 export function HighlightedCode({
   code,
+  explained = false,
   language,
+  purpose,
   variant = "source",
 }: {
   code: string;
+  explained?: boolean;
   language: HighlightLanguage;
+  purpose?: "raw-reference" | "tutorial-step";
   variant?: "result" | "source";
 }) {
   return (
     <Highlight code={code.trimEnd()} language={language} theme={authsCodeTheme}>
       {({ className, style, tokens, getLineProps, getTokenProps }) => (
-        <pre className={`${className} code-block-${variant}`} style={style}>
+        <pre
+          className={`${className} code-block-${variant}`}
+          data-code-explained={explained ? "true" : undefined}
+          data-code-purpose={purpose}
+          style={style}
+        >
           <code>
             {tokens.map((line, lineIndex) => (
               <span key={lineIndex} {...getLineProps({ line, className: "code-block-line" })}>
diff --git a/app/components/code/SdkLanguageControl.tsx b/app/components/code/SdkLanguageControl.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..969d73f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/code/SdkLanguageControl.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+"use client";
+
+import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
+import {
+  isSdkLanguage,
+  sdkLanguageEvent,
+  sdkLanguageStorageKey,
+  type SdkLanguage,
+} from "../../lib/sdk-languages";
+
+export type LanguageOption = Readonly<{ label: string; language: SdkLanguage }>;
+
+export function useSynchronizedSdkLanguage(options: readonly LanguageOption[]): readonly [SdkLanguage, (language: SdkLanguage) => void] {
+  const available = options.map((option) => option.language);
+  const availableKey = available.join(":");
+  const fallback = available[0] ?? "typescript";
+  const [selected, setSelected] = useState<SdkLanguage>(fallback);
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    const supported = new Set<SdkLanguage>(availableKey.split(":").filter(isSdkLanguage));
+    const stored = window.localStorage.getItem(sdkLanguageStorageKey);
+    const hydrationTimer = isSdkLanguage(stored) && supported.has(stored)
+      ? window.setTimeout(() => setSelected(stored), 0)
+      : window.setTimeout(() => setSelected((current) => supported.has(current) ? current : fallback), 0);
+    const sync = (event: Event) => {
+      const language = (event as CustomEvent<SdkLanguage>).detail;
+      if (supported.has(language)) setSelected(language);
+    };
+    window.addEventListener(sdkLanguageEvent, sync);
+    return () => {
+      window.clearTimeout(hydrationTimer);
+      window.removeEventListener(sdkLanguageEvent, sync);
+    };
+  }, [availableKey, fallback]);
+
+  function choose(language: SdkLanguage) {
+    if (!available.includes(language)) return;
+    setSelected(language);
+    window.localStorage.setItem(sdkLanguageStorageKey, language);
+    window.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent(sdkLanguageEvent, { detail: language }));
+  }
+
+  return [selected, choose] as const;
+}
+
+export function SdkLanguageTabs({
+  options,
+  selected,
+  onSelect,
+}: {
+  options: readonly LanguageOption[];
+  selected: SdkLanguage;
+  onSelect: (language: SdkLanguage) => void;
+}) {
+  return (
+    <div className="language-tabs" role="tablist" aria-label="Choose SDK language">
+      {options.map((option) => (
+        <button
+          aria-selected={option.language === selected}
+          className={option.language === selected ? "active" : ""}
+          key={option.language}
+          onClick={() => onSelect(option.language)}
+          role="tab"
+          type="button"
+        >
+          <span className={`language-dot language-dot-${option.language}`} aria-hidden="true" />
+          {option.label}
+        </button>
+      ))}
+    </div>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/components/code/index.ts b/app/components/code/index.ts
index 6258cf0..91b3d76 100644
--- a/app/components/code/index.ts
+++ b/app/components/code/index.ts
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 export { CodeBlock, type CodeBlockProps } from "./CodeBlock";
 export { CodeBlockWithResult, type CodeBlockWithResultProps } from "./CodeBlockWithResult";
+export { CodeWalkthrough, type CodeWalkthroughLanguage, type CodeWalkthroughStep } from "./CodeWalkthrough";
diff --git a/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx b/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 0c92004..0000000
--- a/app/components/content/ContentSection.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-import Link from "next/link";
-import type { ContentSection as ContentSectionModel } from "../../../schemas/content";
-import { TestedExample } from "../TestedExample";
-import { CodeGroup } from "../CodeGroup";
-import { quickstartByScenario } from "../../lib/quickstarts";
-import { assuranceClaims } from "../../lib/content-graph";
-import { AssuranceClaimPanel } from "../AssuranceClaimPanel";
-
-const labels = {
-  "editorial-narrative": "Editorial",
-  "generated-fact": "Generated fact",
-  "tested-scenario": "Tested scenario",
-} as const;
-
-export function ContentSection({ section }: { section: ContentSectionModel }) {
-  const qualified = section.provenance === "tested-scenario" ? quickstartByScenario(section.scenario) : null;
-  const scenarioRoutes: Record<string, string> = {
-    "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1": "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect",
-    "auths.scenario.delegation/1": "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation",
-    "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1": "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification",
-  };
-  return (
-    <section className="editorial-section" data-provenance={section.provenance} id={section.id}>
-      <div className="content-provenance" title={`Content provenance: ${labels[section.provenance]}`}>
-        {labels[section.provenance]}
-      </div>
-      <h2>{section.title}</h2>
-      {section.provenance === "editorial-narrative" && section.body.map((paragraph) => <p key={paragraph}>{paragraph}</p>)}
-      {section.provenance === "generated-fact" && section.factKind === "claim" && (() => {
-        const claim = assuranceClaims.find((candidate) => candidate.id === section.fact);
-        if (!claim) throw new TypeError(`unknown assurance claim ${section.fact}`);
-        return <AssuranceClaimPanel claim={claim} />;
-      })()}
-      {section.provenance === "generated-fact" && section.factKind !== "claim" && <div className="generated-fact-reference"><code>{section.fact}</code><span>Resolved from the selected Auths release</span></div>}
-      {section.provenance === "tested-scenario" && <TestedExample scenario={section.scenario as `auths.scenario.${string}/${number}`}>
-        <p>This step is backed by installed Rust, TypeScript, and Python consumers with a normalized outcome.</p>
-        {qualified && <CodeGroup snippets={([
-          ["Rust", "rust"],
-          ["TypeScript", "typescript"],
-          ["Python", "python"],
-        ] as const).map(([label, language]) => ({ label, language, code: qualified.sources.execute[language] }))} />}
-        <Link className="text-link" href={scenarioRoutes[section.scenario] ?? (qualified ? `/get-started/quickstarts/${qualified.slug}` : "/developers/testing")}>Open the tested scenario <span aria-hidden="true">→</span></Link>
-      </TestedExample>}
-    </section>
-  );
-}
diff --git a/app/components/docs/DocsShell.tsx b/app/components/docs/DocsShell.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a881fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/docs/DocsShell.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+import Link from "next/link";
+import { mdxComponents } from "../../../mdx-components";
+import { adjacentDocsPages, docsSection, type DocsPage } from "../../lib/docs-content";
+import { PageActions } from "../PageActions";
+import { SiteFooter } from "../SiteFooter";
+import { SiteHeader } from "../SiteHeader";
+import { TopicNavigation, type TopicNavGroup } from "../TopicNavigation";
+
+export function DocsShell({ page }: { page: DocsPage }) {
+  const section = docsSection(page.sectionId);
+  const groups: readonly TopicNavGroup[] = section.groups.map((group) => ({
+    label: group.label,
+    items: group.pages.map((item) => ({ id: item.id, href: item.path, label: item.frontmatter.title, depth: 0 })),
+  }));
+  const adjacent = adjacentDocsPages(page);
+  const Content = page.Component;
+
+  return (
+    <div className="site-frame topic-shell-site docs-v2-site">
+      <SiteHeader compact />
+      <div className="topic-shell docs-v2-shell">
+        <TopicNavigation activeId={page.id} groups={groups} title={section.title} />
+        <main className="topic-shell-main docs-v2-main">
+          <nav className="topic-breadcrumbs" aria-label="Breadcrumb">
+            <Link href={section.path}>{section.title}</Link>
+            {page.path !== section.path && <><b aria-hidden="true">/</b><span aria-current="page">{page.frontmatter.title}</span></>}
+          </nav>
+          <article className="mdx-content">
+            <header className="docs-v2-page-header">
+              <p className="kicker">{page.group}</p>
+              <h1>{page.heading}</h1>
+              <p>{page.frontmatter.description}</p>
+              <PageActions source={`${page.path}.md`} />
+            </header>
+            <Content components={mdxComponents} />
+          </article>
+          <nav className="topic-sequence" aria-label="Previous and next pages">
+            {adjacent.previous ? <Link href={adjacent.previous.path}><span>Previous</span><strong>← {adjacent.previous.frontmatter.title}</strong></Link> : <span />}
+            {adjacent.next ? <Link href={adjacent.next.path}><span>Next</span><strong>{adjacent.next.frontmatter.title} →</strong></Link> : <span />}
+          </nav>
+        </main>
+      </div>
+      <SiteFooter />
+    </div>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/app/components/docs/DocsTable.tsx b/app/components/docs/DocsTable.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0963cc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/docs/DocsTable.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+import type { ComponentPropsWithoutRef, TableHTMLAttributes } from "react";
+
+type DocsTableProps = TableHTMLAttributes<HTMLTableElement> & {
+  "aria-label"?: string;
+};
+
+export function DocsTable({
+  "aria-label": ariaLabel = "Documentation table",
+  children,
+  className,
+  ...props
+}: DocsTableProps) {
+  return (
+    <div
+      aria-label={`${ariaLabel}; scroll horizontally to see every column`}
+      className="docs-table-region"
+      role="region"
+    >
+      <table
+        {...props}
+        aria-label={ariaLabel}
+        className={["docs-table", className].filter(Boolean).join(" ")}
+        data-docs-table="true"
+      >
+        {children}
+      </table>
+    </div>
+  );
+}
+
+export function DocsTableHeaderCell({ scope = "col", ...props }: ComponentPropsWithoutRef<"th">) {
+  return <th {...props} scope={scope} />;
+}
diff --git a/app/components/docs/ProductBlocks.tsx b/app/components/docs/ProductBlocks.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe4ca18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/components/docs/ProductBlocks.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+import Link from "next/link";
+import type { ReactNode } from "react";
+import { CodeGroup } from "../CodeGroup";
+import { CodeWalkthrough } from "../code";
+import { DocsTable } from "./DocsTable";
+import { productRecipe, productSnapshot, publicApi, recipeLanguageStatus, recipeWalkthroughs, repositoryWalkthrough, stableCodes, type ProductLanguage } from "../../lib/product-snapshot";
+
+export function ProductStatus() {
+  return (
+    <aside className="product-status" aria-label="Auths release status">
+      <strong>Prelaunch · pre-audit</strong>
+      <p>The public surface is still a repository preview. Pin the exact product revision before evaluating it, and do not treat the development composition as production durable.</p>
+      <code>{productSnapshot.snapshot.sourceCommit.slice(0, 12)}</code>
+    </aside>
+  );
+}
+
+export function Recipe({ id, language }: { id: string; language?: ProductLanguage }) {
+  const recipe = productRecipe(id);
+  const candidates = [
+    { language: "typescript" as const },
+    { language: "python" as const },
+  ].filter((snippet) => language === undefined || snippet.language === language);
+  const blocked = candidates.map((snippet) => ({ language: snippet.language, ...recipeLanguageStatus(id, snippet.language) })).filter((status) => !status.runnable);
+  return (
+    <section className="product-recipe" data-recipe={recipe.id}>
+      <header>
+        <div>
+          <p className="kicker">Product-owned executable recipe</p>
+          <h3>{recipe.id}</h3>
+        </div>
+        <span>{blocked.length === candidates.length ? "Qualification blocked" : `Expected: ${recipe.expected}`}</span>
+      </header>
+      {blocked.map((status) => <aside className="product-warning" key={status.language}><strong>{status.language === "python" ? "Python" : "TypeScript"} source is not currently runnable</strong><p>{status.reason}</p></aside>)}
+      <CodeWalkthrough walkthroughs={recipeWalkthroughs(id, language)} />
+      <footer>
+        <span>Product runner: <code>bindings/recipes/tools/run.mjs</code></span>
+        <span>Source pinned to <code>{productSnapshot.snapshot.sourceCommit.slice(0, 12)}</code></span>
+      </footer>
+    </section>
+  );
+}
+
+function ApiInventory({ language }: { language: ProductLanguage }) {
+  const groups = new Map<string, ReturnType<typeof publicApi>[number][]>();
+  for (const entry of publicApi(language)) groups.set(entry.entrypoint, [...(groups.get(entry.entrypoint) ?? []), entry]);
+  return (
+    <div className="generated-reference" data-language={language}>
+      {[...groups.entries()].map(([entrypoint, entries]) => (
+        <section id={entrypoint.replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/gi, "-")} key={entrypoint}>
+          <header><h3>{entrypoint === "." ? "@auths-dev/sdk" : entrypoint}</h3><span>{entries.length} public symbols</span></header>
+          <div className="symbol-grid">
+            {entries.map((entry) => <code key={`${entry.entrypoint}:${entry.symbol}`}>{entry.symbol}<small>{entry.kind}</small></code>)}
+          </div>
+        </section>
+      ))}
+    </div>
+  );
+}
+
+function SnapshotFacts({ title, facts }: { title: string; facts: readonly Readonly<{ label: string; value: ReactNode }>[] }) {
+  return <section className="snapshot-facts"><header><strong>{title}</strong><code>{productSnapshot.snapshot.sourceCommit.slice(0, 12)}</code></header><dl>{facts.map((fact) => <div key={fact.label}><dt>{fact.label}</dt><dd>{fact.value}</dd></div>)}</dl></section>;
+}
+
+export function GeneratedReference({ language, kind, source, sources }: { language?: ProductLanguage; kind?: string; source?: string; sources?: string; groupBy?: string; include?: string; artifact?: string; show?: string }) {
+  const inferredLanguage = language ?? (kind?.startsWith("python") || source?.includes("/python/") ? "python" : "typescript");
+  if (kind === "typescript-sdk-symbols" || kind === "python-sdk-symbols") return <ApiInventory language={inferredLanguage} />;
+  if (kind === "executed-recipe") {
+    const id = source?.split("/").at(-1)?.replace(/\.(?:ts|py)$/, "").replaceAll("_", "-");
+    return id ? <Recipe id={id} language={inferredLanguage} /> : <ProjectionPending kind={kind} sources={source} />;
+  }
+  if (kind === "qualified-profile-status") {
+    return <SnapshotFacts title="Pinned public topology" facts={[
+      { label: "Qualified profiles", value: productSnapshot.topology.qualifiedProfiles.join(" · ") },
+      { label: "Public extension contracts", value: productSnapshot.topology.frameworkContracts.join(" · ") },
+      { label: "Artifact revision", value: <code>{productSnapshot.snapshot.sourceCommit}</code> },
+    ]} />;
+  }
+  if (kind === "typescript-runtime-and-publication-status") {
+    return <SnapshotFacts title="TypeScript runtime contract" facts={[
+      { label: "Package", value: `${productSnapshot.typescriptRuntime.package} ${productSnapshot.typescriptRuntime.sdkVersion}` },
+      { label: "Public entry points", value: productSnapshot.typescriptRuntime.requiredSubpaths.join(" · ") },
+      { label: "Qualified profiles", value: productSnapshot.topology.qualifiedProfiles.join(" · ") },
+      { label: "Publication", value: "Repository candidate; registry promotion is not asserted by this snapshot" },
+    ]} />;
+  }
+  if (kind === "python-runtime-and-distribution-status") {
+    return <SnapshotFacts title="Python runtime contract" facts={[
+      { label: "Package", value: `${productSnapshot.pythonRuntime.package.name} ${productSnapshot.pythonRuntime.package.version} · ${productSnapshot.pythonRuntime.package.wheelAbi}` },
+      { label: "Runtime", value: JSON.stringify(productSnapshot.pythonRuntime.runtime) },
+      { label: "Public modules", value: productSnapshot.pythonRuntime.modules.join(" · ") },
+      { label: "Distribution", value: JSON.stringify(productSnapshot.pythonRuntime.distribution) },
+    ]} />;
+  }
+  if (kind === "product-results-and-errors") {
+    return <DocsTable aria-label="Product result and error responses"><thead><tr><th scope="col">Code</th><th scope="col">Family</th><th scope="col">Effect</th><th scope="col">Response</th></tr></thead><tbody>{productSnapshot.errorRegistry.definitions.map((entry) => <tr key={entry.code}><td><code>{entry.code}</code></td><td>{entry.family}</td><td>{entry.outcomes.map((outcome) => outcome.effect).join(" · ")}</td><td>{entry.recommendedAction}</td></tr>)}</tbody></DocsTable>;
+  }
+  if (kind === "canonical-fixture-inventory" || kind === "conformance-status") {
+    return <SnapshotFacts title="Pinned conformance evidence" facts={[
+      { label: "Canonical fixtures", value: productSnapshot.fixtureManifest.fixtures.length },
+      { label: "Adversarial mutations", value: productSnapshot.mutationManifest.mutations.length },
+      { label: "Formal outcomes", value: productSnapshot.formalManifest.outcomes.length },
+      { label: "Formal theorems", value: productSnapshot.formalManifest.theorems.length },
+    ]} />;
+  }
+  if (kind === "independent-implementation-inventory") {
+    return <SnapshotFacts title="Cross-language journey evidence" facts={[
+      { label: "TypeScript public symbols", value: productSnapshot.journeyMatrix.experience.baseline.typescriptPublicSymbols },
+      { label: "Python public symbols", value: productSnapshot.journeyMatrix.experience.baseline.pythonPublicSymbols },
+      { label: "Maintained paired recipes", value: productSnapshot.journeyMatrix.experience.baseline.maintainedTypescriptRecipes },
+      { label: "Semantic owner", value: productSnapshot.journeyMatrix.semanticOwner },
+    ]} />;
+  }
+  if (kind === "verifier-limits") return <MarkdownTables source={section(productSnapshot.protocolSource, "Default and hard limits")} only={new Set(["Default and hard limits"])} />;
+  if (kind === "registry-inventory") return <MarkdownTables source={productSnapshot.registrySource} />;
+  if (kind === "domain-separated-identifiers") return <DomainSeparationReference />;
+  if (kind === "assurance-claims-and-implications") return <AssuranceClaims />;
+  if (kind === "principal-adapter-matrix") return <MarkdownTables source={productSnapshot.registrySource} only={new Set(["Principal methods", "Signature suites", "Status methods"])} />;
+  if (kind === "compiled-rust-example") return <RepositoryExample path={source ?? "demos/offline-verification"} />;
+  return <ProjectionPending kind={kind ?? "product reference"} sources={sources ?? source} />;
+}
+
+type MarkdownTable = Readonly<{ heading: string; headers: readonly string[]; rows: readonly (readonly string[])[] }>;
+
+function section(source: string, heading: string): string {
+  const escaped = heading.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&");
+  return source.match(new RegExp(`^## ${escaped}\\s*$([\\s\\S]*?)(?=^## |$)`, "m"))?.[0] ?? "";
+}
+
+function markdownTables(source: string): readonly MarkdownTable[] {
+  const lines = source.split("\n");
+  let heading = "Reference";
+  const result: MarkdownTable[] = [];
+  for (let index = 0; index < lines.length; index += 1) {
+    const nextHeading = lines[index].match(/^##\s+(.+)$/)?.[1];
+    if (nextHeading) {
+      heading = nextHeading;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!lines[index].startsWith("|") || !lines[index + 1]?.match(/^\|(?:\s*:?-+:?\s*\|)+$/)) continue;
+    const cells = (line: string) => line.split("|").slice(1, -1).map((cell) => cell.trim().replaceAll("`", ""));
+    const headers = cells(lines[index]);
+    const rows: string[][] = [];
+    index += 2;
+    while (index < lines.length && lines[index].startsWith("|")) {
+      rows.push(cells(lines[index]));
+      index += 1;
+    }
+    result.push(Object.freeze({ heading, headers: Object.freeze(headers), rows: Object.freeze(rows.map((row) => Object.freeze(row))) }));
+  }
+  return Object.freeze(result);
+}
+
+function MarkdownTables({ source, only }: { source: string; only?: ReadonlySet<string> }) {
+  const tables = markdownTables(source).filter((table) => only === undefined || only.has(table.heading));
+  return <div className="generated-reference">{tables.map((table) => <section key={table.heading}><header><h3>{table.heading}</h3><span>{table.rows.length} entries</span></header><DocsTable aria-label={table.heading}><thead><tr>{table.headers.map((header) => <th key={header} scope="col">{header}</th>)}</tr></thead><tbody>{table.rows.map((row) => <tr key={row.join(":")}>{row.map((cell, index) => <td key={`${table.headers[index]}:${cell}`}>{cell}</td>)}</tr>)}</tbody></DocsTable></section>)}</div>;
+}
+
+function DomainSeparationReference() {
+  const codeBlocks = [...productSnapshot.domainSeparationSource.matchAll(/```text\n([\s\S]*?)```/g)].map((match) => match[1].trim());
+  return <div className="generated-reference"><section><header><h3>Signing and identifier preimages</h3><span>Pinned V1 raw reference bytes</span></header>{codeBlocks.map((code, index) => <pre data-code-purpose="raw-reference" key={code}><code>{code}</code><small>{index === 0 ? "Signed object preimage" : "Content identifier preimage"}</small></pre>)}</section><MarkdownTables source={productSnapshot.domainSeparationSource} /></div>;
+}
+
+function ProjectionPending({ kind, sources }: { kind: string; sources?: string }) {
+  return <aside className="projection-pending"><strong>{kind.replaceAll("-", " ")}</strong><p>This reference stays source-linked until the product bundle emits a typed projection for it. The page does not substitute a hand-maintained inventory.</p>{sources && <code>{sources}</code>}<small>Pinned product revision: {productSnapshot.snapshot.sourceCommit.slice(0, 12)}</small></aside>;
+}
+
+export function RuntimeEndpoints() {
+  return (
+    <DocsTable aria-label="Runtime endpoints">
+        <thead><tr><th scope="col">Method</th><th scope="col">Path</th><th scope="col">Maximum body</th><th scope="col">Outcomes</th></tr></thead>
+        <tbody>{productSnapshot.runtimeFacts.endpoints.map((endpoint) => (
+          <tr key={endpoint.id}>
+            <td><code>{endpoint.method}</code></td>
+            <td><code>{endpoint.path}</code></td>
+            <td>{endpoint.maxBodyBytes === 0 ? "none" : `${endpoint.maxBodyBytes.toLocaleString()} B`}</td>
+            <td>{endpoint.outcomes.join(" · ")}</td>
+          </tr>
+        ))}</tbody>
+    </DocsTable>
+  );
+}
+
+export function StableCodeTable({ decision, includeReserved = true }: { decision?: "authorized" | "denied" | "indeterminate" | "runtime" | "reserved"; includeReserved?: boolean; source?: string; modelSource?: string }) {
+  const codes = stableCodes().filter((code) => (decision === undefined || code.decision === decision) && (includeReserved || code.decision !== "reserved"));
+  return (
+    <DocsTable aria-label="Stable result codes">
+        <thead><tr><th scope="col">Code</th><th scope="col">Class</th><th scope="col">Stage</th><th scope="col">Meaning</th></tr></thead>
+        <tbody>{codes.map((item) => (
+          <tr key={item.code}>
+            <td><code>{item.code}</code></td><td>{item.decision}</td><td>{item.stage ?? "—"}</td><td>{item.meaning}</td>
+          </tr>
+        ))}</tbody>
+    </DocsTable>
+  );
+}
+
+export function AssuranceClaims() {
+  return (
+    <div className="assurance-claims">
+      {productSnapshot.contract.claims.map((claim) => (
+        <article key={claim.id}>
+          <header><strong>{claim.statement}</strong><span>{claim.status}</span></header>
+          <p>{claim.scope}</p>
+          <p><b>Limitation:</b> {claim.limitation}</p>
+          <code>{claim.reproduction.join("\n")}</code>
+        </article>
+      ))}
+    </div>
+  );
+}
+
+const demoDescriptions = new Map<string, string>([
+  ["demos/cross-company-incident-response", "Two organizations approve and execute one exact recovery plan."],
+  ["demos/github-issue", "An agent changes one issue through a closed provider gateway."],
+  ["demos/kubernetes-rollout", "A rollout is bound to an exact object mutation and resource version."],
+  ["demos/opentofu-plan", "A saved infrastructure plan is authorized without exposing arbitrary provider commands."],
+  ["demos/postgresql-data-change", "A bounded row mutation preserves transaction and before-state constraints."],
+  ["demos/offline-verification", "Proof and action bytes are checked without network or execution authority."],
+]);
+
+function demoTitle(source: string): string {
+  return source.split("/").at(-1)?.split("-").map((part) => part === "mcp" ? "MCP" : part.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + part.slice(1)).join(" ") ?? source;
+}
+
+export function DemoGallery({ sources, maturity = "Repository example", question = "Inspect the maintained example" }: { sources?: readonly string[]; maturity?: string; question?: string }) {
+  const base = `https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/${productSnapshot.snapshot.sourceCommit}/`;
+  const items = sources ?? [];
+  return <div className="demo-gallery"><article><span>{maturity}</span><h3>{question}</h3><p>{items.length === 1 ? demoDescriptions.get(items[0]) ?? `Inspect the maintained source at ${items[0]}.` : `${items.length} maintained sources work together to answer this question; inspect each boundary rather than treating support code as a separate product journey.`}</p><ul>{items.map((source) => <li key={source}><a href={`${base}${source}`} rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">{demoTitle(source)} ↗</a></li>)}</ul></article></div>;
+}
+
+export function RepositoryExample({ path }: { path: string }) {
+  if (path === "demos/offline-verification") {
+    return (
+      <section className="product-recipe" data-example={path}>
+        <header>
+          <div><p className="kicker">Pinned external-consumer example</p><h3>Offline Rust verification</h3></div>
+          <span>Source-backed · no output synthesized</span>
+        </header>
+        <CodeWalkthrough walkthroughs={[repositoryWalkthrough(path)]} />
+        <CodeGroup
+          filename="Run locally"
+          isBash
+          snippets={[{ label: "Rust", language: "rust", code: "# Run the pinned workspace example\ncargo run -p auths-proof-offline-example" }]}
+        />
+        <footer>
+          <SourceLink path="demos/offline-verification/src/main.rs">View maintained source</SourceLink>
+          <span>Source pinned to <code>{productSnapshot.snapshot.sourceCommit.slice(0, 12)}</code></span>
+        </footer>
+      </section>
+    );
+  }
+  return <DemoGallery question={demoTitle(path)} sources={[path]} maturity="Maintained external-consumer example" />;
+}
+
+export function SourceLink({ path, children }: { path: string; children?: ReactNode }) {
+  return <a href={`https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/${productSnapshot.snapshot.sourceCommit}/${path}`} rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">{children ?? path} ↗</a>;
+}
+
+export function NextSteps({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) {
+  return <div className="next-steps"><strong>Continue</strong>{children}</div>;
+}
+
+export function OutcomeBoundary() {
+  return (
+    <div className="outcome-boundary">
+      <div><strong>Denied</strong><span>Provider was not reached</span></div>
+      <div><strong>Indeterminate</strong><span>Required trustworthy facts were unavailable</span></div>
+      <div><strong>Recoverable</strong><span>Resume only through the original execution reference</span></div>
+      <div><strong>Provider unknown</strong><span>Reconcile; never blindly retry</span></div>
+    </div>
+  );
+}
+
+export { Link };
diff --git a/app/components/foundation/DocumentationPrimitives.tsx b/app/components/foundation/DocumentationPrimitives.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index d511d60..0000000
--- a/app/components/foundation/DocumentationPrimitives.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-import type { ReactNode } from "react";
-
-export function OutcomeHero({ eyebrow, title, children }: { eyebrow: string; title: string; children: ReactNode }) {
-  return <header className="outcome-hero"><p className="kicker">{eyebrow}</p><h1>{title}</h1><div>{children}</div></header>;
-}
-
-export function SecurityCallout({ title = "Security boundary", children }: { title?: string; children: ReactNode }) {
-  return <aside className="security-callout"><strong>{title}</strong><div>{children}</div></aside>;
-}
-
-export function FailurePath({ outcome, children }: { outcome: "denied" | "indeterminate" | "recoverable"; children: ReactNode }) {
-  return <aside className={`failure-path failure-${outcome}`}><strong>{outcome}</strong><div>{children}</div></aside>;
-}
-
-export function VersionBadge({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) {
-  return <span className="version-badge">{children}</span>;
-}
-
-export function AvailabilityBadge({ state }: { state: "stable" | "experimental" | "qualified" }) {
-  return <span className={`availability-badge availability-${state}`}>{state}</span>;
-}
-
-export function Diagram({ children, description }: { children: ReactNode; description: string }) {
-  return <figure className="diagram"><div aria-hidden="true">{children}</div><figcaption>{description}</figcaption></figure>;
-}
diff --git a/app/components/foundation/index.ts b/app/components/foundation/index.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index 8e3dd9d..0000000
--- a/app/components/foundation/index.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export * from "./DocumentationPrimitives";
diff --git a/app/developers/errors/page.tsx b/app/developers/errors/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 48e0041..0000000
--- a/app/developers/errors/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../../components/EditorialGuidePage";
-
-export default function Page() {
-  return <><EditorialGuidePage pageId="auths.page.developers.errors/1" eyebrow="Developers" /><div className="outcome-model" aria-label="Safe outcome response model"><span><b>denied</b>change request</span><span><b>indeterminate</b>restore evidence</span><span><b>recoverable</b>resume same reference</span><span><b>provider-unknown</b>reconcile first</span><span><b>invalid</b>correct input</span><span><b>internal</b>preserve evidence</span></div></>;
-}
diff --git a/app/developers/page.tsx b/app/developers/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index c3c8163..0000000
--- a/app/developers/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
-export default function Page() { return <TopicLandingPage pageId="auths.page.developers/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/get-started/choose/page.tsx b/app/get-started/choose/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 1801998..0000000
--- a/app/get-started/choose/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-import { IntegrationChooser } from "../../components/IntegrationChooser";
-import { PageActions } from "../../components/PageActions";
-import { TopicShell } from "../../components/TopicShell";
-import { ContentSection } from "../../components/content/ContentSection";
-import { contentPageById } from "../../lib/content-graph";
-
-export default function Page() {
-  const page = contentPageById("auths.page.start.choose/1");
-  const example = page.sections.find((section) => section.id === "example");
-  return <TopicShell pageId={page.id}><main className="editorial-page chooser-page"><header className="editorial-hero"><p className="kicker">Get started</p><h1>{page.title}</h1><p>{page.description}</p><PageActions source={`${page.path}.md`} /></header><IntegrationChooser />{example && <div className="editorial-sections"><ContentSection section={example} /></div>}</main></TopicShell>;
-}
diff --git a/app/get-started/evaluate/page.tsx b/app/get-started/evaluate/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index f3413ae..0000000
--- a/app/get-started/evaluate/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../../components/EditorialGuidePage";
-export default function Page() { return <EditorialGuidePage pageId="auths.page.start.evaluate/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/get-started/page.tsx b/app/get-started/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index df9578c..0000000
--- a/app/get-started/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
-export default function Page() { return <TopicLandingPage pageId="auths.page.start/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/get-started/prerequisites/page.tsx b/app/get-started/prerequisites/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index f3c6c6e..0000000
--- a/app/get-started/prerequisites/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { EditorialGuidePage } from "../../components/EditorialGuidePage";
-export default function Page() { return <EditorialGuidePage pageId="auths.page.start.prerequisites/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/get-started/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx b/app/get-started/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index cf708c1..0000000
--- a/app/get-started/quickstarts/[slug]/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-import { QuickstartPage } from "../../../components/QuickstartPage";
-import { TopicShell } from "../../../components/TopicShell";
-import { quickstartBySlug, quickstarts } from "../../../lib/quickstarts";
-import { contentPageByPath } from "../../../lib/content-graph";
-
-export function generateStaticParams() {
-  return quickstarts.map((quickstart) => ({ slug: quickstart.slug }));
-}
-
-export default async function Page({ params }: { params: Promise<{ slug: string }> }) {
-  const { slug } = await params;
-  const quickstart = quickstartBySlug(slug);
-  const page = contentPageByPath(`/get-started/quickstarts/${slug}`);
-  return <TopicShell pageId={page.id}><QuickstartPage quickstart={quickstart} /></TopicShell>;
-}
diff --git a/app/globals.css b/app/globals.css
index 556af16..3b32284 100644
--- a/app/globals.css
+++ b/app/globals.css
@@ -26,6 +26,736 @@
   --font-mono: "SFMono-Regular", Consolas, "Liberation Mono", Menlo, monospace;
 }
 
+/* Rebuild: outcome-led editorial content composed with pinned product facts. */
+.rebuild-hero {
+  padding-block: clamp(70px, 9vw, 132px) 88px;
+}
+
+.rebuild-status {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-wrap: wrap;
+  gap: 8px;
+  margin-bottom: 34px;
+}
+
+.rebuild-status span,
+.product-status > strong {
+  background: var(--amber-soft);
+  border: 1px solid color-mix(in srgb, var(--amber) 38%, var(--line));
+  border-radius: 999px;
+  color: #714616;
+  font-size: 11px;
+  font-weight: 740;
+  letter-spacing: 0.08em;
+  padding: 5px 10px;
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+
+.rebuild-hero h1 {
+  font-size: clamp(48px, 6.4vw, 86px);
+  letter-spacing: -0.066em;
+  line-height: 0.98;
+  margin: 12px 0 28px;
+  max-width: 920px;
+}
+
+.rebuild-hero .hero-lede {
+  font-size: clamp(20px, 2.1vw, 27px);
+  line-height: 1.45;
+  max-width: 860px;
+}
+
+.release-caveat {
+  border-left: 3px solid var(--amber);
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 14px;
+  margin-top: 38px;
+  max-width: 860px;
+  padding-left: 16px;
+}
+
+.truth-strip {
+  background: var(--forest);
+  color: var(--mint-bright);
+  padding-block: 16px;
+}
+
+.truth-strip .shell {
+  align-items: center;
+  display: flex;
+  flex-wrap: wrap;
+  font-size: 13px;
+  gap: 12px 24px;
+}
+
+.truth-strip strong {
+  color: white;
+}
+
+.truth-strip span::before {
+  color: var(--amber);
+  content: "×";
+  margin-right: 7px;
+}
+
+.outcome-paths,
+.real-code,
+.docs-depth {
+  padding-block: 96px;
+}
+
+.outcome-path-grid {
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 1px;
+  grid-template-columns: repeat(2, minmax(0, 1fr));
+  margin-top: 44px;
+  overflow: hidden;
+}
+
+.outcome-path-grid > a {
+  background: var(--surface);
+  border: 1px solid var(--line);
+  min-height: 250px;
+  padding: 32px;
+  transition: background 150ms ease, color 150ms ease;
+}
+
+.outcome-path-grid > a:hover {
+  background: var(--forest);
+  color: white;
+}
+
+.outcome-path-grid span,
+.docs-depth-grid span {
+  color: var(--amber);
+  font-size: 11px;
+  font-weight: 750;
+  letter-spacing: 0.09em;
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+
+.outcome-path-grid h3 {
+  font-size: 27px;
+  letter-spacing: -0.035em;
+  line-height: 1.15;
+  margin: 28px 0 12px;
+}
+
+.outcome-path-grid p {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  max-width: 500px;
+}
+
+.outcome-path-grid a:hover p {
+  color: var(--mint-bright);
+}
+
+.outcome-path-grid strong {
+  display: block;
+  font-size: 13px;
+  margin-top: 26px;
+}
+
+.four-planes {
+  background: var(--forest-deep);
+  color: white;
+  padding-block: 100px;
+}
+
+.four-planes header {
+  max-width: 820px;
+}
+
+.four-planes h2 {
+  font-size: clamp(36px, 4.5vw, 60px);
+  letter-spacing: -0.055em;
+  line-height: 1.04;
+}
+
+.plane-grid {
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 1px;
+  grid-template-columns: repeat(4, minmax(0, 1fr));
+  margin-top: 58px;
+}
+
+.plane-grid article {
+  border: 1px solid rgb(214 242 231 / 25%);
+  min-height: 210px;
+  padding: 26px;
+}
+
+.plane-grid span {
+  color: var(--amber);
+  font: 12px var(--font-mono);
+}
+
+.plane-grid h3 {
+  font-size: 24px;
+  margin: 42px 0 8px;
+}
+
+.plane-grid p,
+.plane-rule {
+  color: var(--mint-bright);
+}
+
+.plane-rule {
+  border-top: 1px solid rgb(214 242 231 / 22%);
+  margin: 40px 0 0;
+  max-width: 900px;
+  padding-top: 24px;
+}
+
+.real-code {
+  max-width: 1240px;
+}
+
+.docs-depth {
+  border-top: 1px solid var(--line);
+}
+
+.docs-depth-grid {
+  display: grid;
+  grid-template-columns: repeat(5, minmax(0, 1fr));
+  margin-top: 44px;
+}
+
+.docs-depth-grid a {
+  border-left: 1px solid var(--line);
+  min-height: 170px;
+  padding: 20px;
+}
+
+.docs-depth-grid a:last-child {
+  border-right: 1px solid var(--line);
+}
+
+.docs-depth-grid strong {
+  display: block;
+  font-size: 16px;
+  line-height: 1.45;
+  margin-top: 34px;
+}
+
+.product-recipe {
+  margin-block: 34px;
+}
+
+.product-recipe > header,
+.product-recipe > footer {
+  align-items: center;
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 20px;
+  justify-content: space-between;
+}
+
+.product-recipe > header {
+  margin-bottom: 12px;
+}
+
+.product-recipe > header h3 {
+  font: 600 16px var(--font-mono);
+  margin: 3px 0 0;
+}
+
+.product-recipe > header > span {
+  background: var(--mint-bright);
+  border-radius: 999px;
+  color: var(--forest);
+  font-size: 12px;
+  font-weight: 700;
+  padding: 5px 10px;
+}
+
+.product-recipe > footer {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  flex-wrap: wrap;
+  font-size: 12px;
+  margin-top: 10px;
+}
+
+.code-walkthrough {
+  margin: 22px 0 30px;
+}
+
+.code-walkthrough-language {
+  align-items: center;
+  background: #17221e;
+  border: 1px solid #2c3b35;
+  border-radius: 10px;
+  display: flex;
+  justify-content: space-between;
+  min-height: 48px;
+  padding: 0 10px 0 16px;
+}
+
+.code-walkthrough-language > span {
+  color: #9bb0a8;
+  font-size: 12px;
+  font-weight: 650;
+}
+
+.code-walkthrough-language .language-tabs {
+  min-height: 46px;
+}
+
+.code-walkthrough > ol {
+  counter-reset: walkthrough-step;
+  list-style: none;
+  margin: 0;
+  padding: 0;
+}
+
+.code-walkthrough-step {
+  counter-increment: walkthrough-step;
+  margin: 30px 0 38px;
+}
+
+.code-walkthrough-step > header {
+  border-left: 2px solid var(--mint);
+  padding-left: 16px;
+}
+
+.code-walkthrough-step > header > span {
+  color: var(--forest);
+  display: block;
+  font: 700 10px var(--font-mono);
+  letter-spacing: 0.08em;
+  margin-bottom: 4px;
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+
+.code-walkthrough-step h4 {
+  font-size: 17px;
+  margin: 0;
+}
+
+.code-walkthrough-step p {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 14px;
+  line-height: 1.6;
+  margin: 7px 0 0;
+  max-width: 68ch;
+}
+
+.code-walkthrough-step .code-group {
+  margin: 14px 0 0;
+}
+
+.product-status {
+  background: var(--amber-soft);
+  border: 1px solid color-mix(in srgb, var(--amber) 35%, var(--line));
+  border-radius: var(--radius-sm);
+  margin-block: 26px;
+  padding: 18px 20px;
+}
+
+.product-status > strong {
+  display: inline-block;
+}
+
+.product-status p {
+  color: #68471e;
+  font-size: 14px;
+  margin: 12px 0 8px;
+}
+
+.docs-v2-shell {
+  display: grid;
+  grid-template-columns: 250px minmax(0, 1fr);
+  min-height: calc(100vh - var(--header-height));
+}
+
+.docs-v2-main {
+  min-width: 0;
+  padding: 24px clamp(28px, 5vw, 76px) 90px;
+}
+
+.docs-v2-breadcrumbs {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  display: flex;
+  font-size: 12px;
+  gap: 8px;
+  margin: 0 auto 42px;
+  max-width: 860px;
+}
+
+.docs-v2-article {
+  margin-inline: auto;
+  max-width: 860px;
+}
+
+.docs-v2-article > header {
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--line);
+  margin-bottom: 46px;
+  padding-bottom: 30px;
+}
+
+.docs-v2-article > header h1 {
+  font-size: clamp(38px, 5vw, 62px);
+  letter-spacing: -0.055em;
+  line-height: 1.04;
+  margin: 10px 0 18px;
+}
+
+.docs-v2-article > header > p:not(.kicker) {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 20px;
+  max-width: 760px;
+}
+
+.mdx-content > h1:first-child {
+  display: none;
+}
+
+.mdx-content h2 {
+  font-size: 30px;
+  letter-spacing: -0.035em;
+  line-height: 1.18;
+  margin: 62px 0 18px;
+}
+
+.mdx-content h3 {
+  font-size: 21px;
+  letter-spacing: -0.02em;
+  margin: 36px 0 12px;
+}
+
+.mdx-content p,
+.mdx-content li {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 17px;
+}
+
+.mdx-content p {
+  margin-block: 0 20px;
+}
+
+.mdx-content li + li {
+  margin-top: 8px;
+}
+
+.mdx-content a {
+  color: var(--forest);
+  font-weight: 650;
+  text-decoration: underline;
+  text-decoration-color: var(--mint);
+  text-decoration-thickness: 2px;
+  text-underline-offset: 3px;
+}
+
+.mdx-content :not(pre) > code {
+  background: var(--paper-deep);
+  border: 1px solid var(--line);
+  border-radius: 4px;
+  color: var(--forest-deep);
+  font-size: 0.86em;
+  padding: 2px 5px;
+}
+
+.mdx-content > pre {
+  background: var(--code);
+  border: 1px solid #293a34;
+  border-radius: var(--radius-sm);
+  color: #eff8f3;
+  margin-block: 24px;
+  overflow-x: auto;
+  padding: 20px;
+}
+
+.mdx-content blockquote {
+  border-left: 3px solid var(--mint);
+  margin: 28px 0;
+  padding: 4px 0 4px 20px;
+}
+
+.mdx-content blockquote p {
+  color: var(--forest);
+  font-size: 19px;
+  font-weight: 600;
+}
+
+.docs-table-region {
+  background: var(--surface);
+  border: 1px solid var(--line-strong);
+  border-radius: var(--radius-sm);
+  box-shadow: var(--shadow-sm);
+  margin-block: 28px;
+  max-width: 100%;
+  overflow-x: auto;
+  overscroll-behavior-inline: contain;
+}
+
+.docs-table-region:focus-visible {
+  outline: 3px solid color-mix(in srgb, var(--mint) 70%, var(--forest));
+  outline-offset: 3px;
+}
+
+.docs-table {
+  border-collapse: separate;
+  border-spacing: 0;
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 14px;
+  line-height: 1.55;
+  min-width: 640px;
+  width: 100%;
+}
+
+.docs-table th,
+.docs-table td {
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--line);
+  padding: 14px 16px;
+  text-align: left;
+  vertical-align: top;
+}
+
+.docs-table th {
+  background: var(--paper-deep);
+  color: var(--forest-deep);
+  font-size: 11px;
+  font-weight: 760;
+  letter-spacing: 0.065em;
+  position: sticky;
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+  top: 0;
+  white-space: nowrap;
+  z-index: 1;
+}
+
+.docs-table tbody tr:nth-child(even) td {
+  background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--paper) 58%, transparent);
+}
+
+.docs-table tbody tr:hover td {
+  background: var(--mint-bright);
+}
+
+.docs-table tr:last-child td {
+  border-bottom: 0;
+}
+
+.docs-table td:first-child {
+  color: var(--ink);
+  font-weight: 650;
+}
+
+.docs-table td p:last-child,
+.docs-table th p:last-child {
+  margin-bottom: 0;
+}
+
+@media (max-width: 720px) {
+  .docs-table-region {
+    border-radius: 6px;
+    margin-inline: -12px;
+  }
+
+  .docs-table {
+    font-size: 13px;
+    min-width: 560px;
+  }
+
+  .docs-table th,
+  .docs-table td {
+    padding: 12px;
+  }
+}
+
+.generated-reference > section {
+  border-top: 1px solid var(--line);
+  margin-top: 34px;
+  padding-top: 20px;
+}
+
+.generated-reference header {
+  align-items: baseline;
+  display: flex;
+  justify-content: space-between;
+}
+
+.generated-reference header h3 {
+  margin: 0;
+}
+
+.generated-reference header span {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  font-size: 12px;
+}
+
+.symbol-grid {
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 1px;
+  grid-template-columns: repeat(2, minmax(0, 1fr));
+  margin-top: 16px;
+}
+
+.symbol-grid > code {
+  align-items: center;
+  background: var(--surface);
+  border: 1px solid var(--line);
+  display: flex;
+  font-size: 12px;
+  justify-content: space-between;
+  padding: 9px 11px;
+}
+
+.symbol-grid small {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  font: 9px var(--font-sans);
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+
+.assurance-claims,
+.demo-gallery {
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 14px;
+  margin-block: 30px;
+}
+
+.assurance-claims article,
+.demo-gallery article {
+  background: var(--surface);
+  border: 1px solid var(--line);
+  border-radius: var(--radius-sm);
+  padding: 22px;
+}
+
+.assurance-claims header {
+  align-items: flex-start;
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 18px;
+  justify-content: space-between;
+}
+
+.assurance-claims header span {
+  color: #247255;
+  font-size: 11px;
+  font-weight: 700;
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+
+.demo-gallery {
+  grid-template-columns: minmax(0, 1fr);
+}
+
+.demo-gallery article > span {
+  color: var(--amber);
+  font-size: 10px;
+  font-weight: 750;
+  letter-spacing: 0.08em;
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+
+.demo-gallery article > h3 {
+  margin: 18px 0 8px;
+}
+
+.demo-gallery ul {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-wrap: wrap;
+  gap: 8px 18px;
+  list-style: none;
+  margin: 18px 0 0;
+  padding: 0;
+}
+
+.demo-gallery li {
+  margin: 0;
+}
+
+.demo-gallery li a {
+  color: var(--green);
+  font-size: 13px;
+  font-weight: 700;
+}
+
+.generated-reference pre {
+  background: var(--code);
+  border: 1px solid rgb(255 255 255 / 10%);
+  border-radius: var(--radius-sm);
+  color: #e9f2ed;
+  margin: 12px 0;
+  overflow-x: auto;
+  padding: 18px;
+}
+
+.generated-reference pre small {
+  color: #9fb0a7;
+  display: block;
+  font: 10px var(--font-sans);
+  margin-top: 14px;
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+
+.next-steps {
+  border-top: 1px solid var(--line-strong);
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 10px;
+  margin-top: 56px;
+  padding-top: 22px;
+}
+
+.outcome-boundary {
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 1px;
+  grid-template-columns: repeat(2, minmax(0, 1fr));
+  margin-block: 28px;
+}
+
+.outcome-boundary > div {
+  background: var(--surface);
+  border: 1px solid var(--line);
+  padding: 18px;
+}
+
+.outcome-boundary strong,
+.outcome-boundary span {
+  display: block;
+}
+
+.outcome-boundary span {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 13px;
+  margin-top: 6px;
+}
+
+@media (max-width: 960px) {
+  .outcome-path-grid,
+  .plane-grid,
+  .docs-depth-grid,
+  .demo-gallery {
+    grid-template-columns: 1fr 1fr;
+  }
+
+  .docs-v2-shell {
+    display: block;
+  }
+}
+
+@media (max-width: 640px) {
+  .outcome-path-grid,
+  .plane-grid,
+  .docs-depth-grid,
+  .demo-gallery,
+  .outcome-boundary,
+  .symbol-grid {
+    grid-template-columns: 1fr;
+  }
+
+  .docs-depth-grid a,
+  .docs-depth-grid a:last-child {
+    border: 0;
+    border-top: 1px solid var(--line);
+  }
+
+  .product-recipe > header,
+  .product-recipe > footer {
+    align-items: flex-start;
+    flex-direction: column;
+  }
+}
+
 * {
   box-sizing: border-box;
 }
@@ -3485,3 +4215,113 @@ pre {
     transition-duration: 0.01ms !important;
   }
 }
+
+/* The v2 shell keeps prose and generated evidence on one readable plane. */
+.docs-v2-main .mdx-content {
+  margin-inline: auto;
+  max-width: 920px;
+}
+
+.docs-v2-page-header {
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--line);
+  margin-bottom: 44px;
+  padding-bottom: 30px;
+}
+
+.docs-v2-page-header h1 {
+  font-size: clamp(40px, 5vw, 64px);
+  letter-spacing: -0.055em;
+  line-height: 1.04;
+  margin: 10px 0 18px;
+}
+
+.docs-v2-page-header > p:not(.kicker) {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 20px;
+  line-height: 1.5;
+  max-width: 780px;
+}
+
+.docs-v2-page-header .page-actions {
+  margin-top: 22px;
+}
+
+.product-warning,
+.projection-pending {
+  background: var(--amber-soft);
+  border: 1px solid color-mix(in srgb, var(--amber) 38%, var(--line));
+  border-radius: var(--radius-sm);
+  color: #68471e;
+  margin-block: 18px;
+  padding: 18px 20px;
+}
+
+.product-warning p,
+.projection-pending p {
+  color: #68471e;
+  font-size: 14px;
+  margin: 7px 0 0;
+}
+
+.projection-pending code,
+.projection-pending small {
+  display: block;
+  margin-top: 12px;
+  overflow-wrap: anywhere;
+}
+
+.snapshot-facts {
+  background: var(--surface);
+  border: 1px solid var(--line);
+  border-radius: var(--radius-sm);
+  margin-block: 28px;
+  overflow: hidden;
+}
+
+.snapshot-facts > header {
+  align-items: center;
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--line);
+  display: flex;
+  justify-content: space-between;
+  padding: 16px 18px;
+}
+
+.snapshot-facts h3 {
+  font-size: 16px;
+  margin: 0;
+}
+
+.snapshot-facts dl {
+  margin: 0;
+}
+
+.snapshot-facts dl > div {
+  display: grid;
+  gap: 18px;
+  grid-template-columns: minmax(150px, 0.32fr) minmax(0, 1fr);
+  padding: 12px 18px;
+}
+
+.snapshot-facts dl > div + div {
+  border-top: 1px solid var(--line);
+}
+
+.snapshot-facts dt {
+  color: var(--ink-faint);
+  font-size: 12px;
+  font-weight: 680;
+}
+
+.snapshot-facts dd {
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  font-size: 13px;
+  margin: 0;
+  overflow-wrap: anywhere;
+}
+
+@media (max-width: 640px) {
+  .snapshot-facts dl > div {
+    grid-template-columns: 1fr;
+    gap: 4px;
+  }
+}
diff --git a/app/identity-trust/how-it-works/page.tsx b/app/identity-trust/how-it-works/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 3fbe188..0000000
--- a/app/identity-trust/how-it-works/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { SemanticTourPage } from "../../components/SemanticTourPage";
-export default function Page() { return <SemanticTourPage pageId="auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/identity-trust/page.tsx b/app/identity-trust/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 19fcc10..0000000
--- a/app/identity-trust/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
-export default function Page() { return <TopicLandingPage pageId="auths.page.identity-trust/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/layout.tsx b/app/layout.tsx
index e2ba6c4..9e3ec0a 100644
--- a/app/layout.tsx
+++ b/app/layout.tsx
@@ -4,15 +4,18 @@ import "./globals.css";
 export const metadata: Metadata = {
   metadataBase: new URL("https://docs.auths.dev"),
   title: {
-    default: "Auths Documentation",
-    template: "%s · Auths Documentation",
+    default: "Auths Docs",
+    template: "%s · Auths Docs",
   },
   description:
-    "Learn how to give people and agents precise, portable authority—and prove what happened.",
+    "Give software narrow authority for one exact action, execute through a closed boundary, and prove what happened.",
+  alternates: {
+    canonical: "/",
+  },
   openGraph: {
-    title: "Authority for the exact thing. Nothing more.",
+    title: "Auths Docs — authority for one exact action",
     description:
-      "Learn how to give people and agents precise, portable authority—and prove what happened.",
+      "Give software narrow authority for one exact action, execute through a closed boundary, and prove what happened.",
     images: [
       {
         url: "/auths-docs-social.png",
diff --git a/app/lib/content-graph.ts b/app/lib/content-graph.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index 429cfbc..0000000
--- a/app/lib/content-graph.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,148 +0,0 @@
-import rawPages from "../../content/pages.json" with { type: "json" };
-import rawDeveloperPages from "../../content/developer-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
-import rawAgentIntegrationPages from "../../content/agent-integration-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
-import rawAdoptionPages from "../../content/adoption-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
-import rawOperationsPages from "../../content/operations-pages.json" with { type: "json" };
-import { getStartedPages } from "../../content/get-started-pages.ts";
-import { identityTrustPages } from "../../content/identity-trust-pages.ts";
-import { authorityPages } from "../../content/authority-pages.ts";
-import { agentPages } from "../../content/agent-pages.ts";
-import { operationsPages } from "../../content/operations-pages.ts";
-import { developerPages } from "../../content/developer-pages.ts";
-import { referenceAssurancePages } from "../../content/reference-assurance-pages.ts";
-import rawContract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
-import { parseAuthoredPageContent, type AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
-import { assertPageContract } from "../../schemas/page-contract.ts";
-import { siteNodeById, siteTree } from "./site-tree.ts";
-
-type ProductContract = Readonly<{
-  schema: string;
-  digest: string;
-  operations: readonly Readonly<{ id: string }>[];
-  scenarios: readonly Readonly<{ id: string }>[];
-  claims: readonly AssuranceClaim[];
-  runtimeFacts: Readonly<{ endpoints: readonly Readonly<{ id: string; outcomes?: readonly string[] }>[] }>;
-}>;
-
-export type AssuranceClaim = Readonly<{
-  id: string;
-  statement: string;
-  status: "passing" | "degraded" | "superseded" | "withdrawn";
-  evidence: string;
-  evidenceSha256: string;
-  scope: string;
-  limitation: string;
-  reproduction: readonly string[];
-}>;
-
-export type VerifiedPageGraph = Readonly<{
-  contractDigest: string;
-  pages: readonly AuthoredPageSource[];
-}>;
-
-function identitySet(values: readonly Readonly<{ id: string }>[]): ReadonlySet<string> {
-  return new Set(values.map((value) => value.id));
-}
-
-export function buildVerifiedPageGraph(pagesInput: unknown, contractInput: unknown): VerifiedPageGraph {
-  if (!Array.isArray(pagesInput)) throw new TypeError("page graph input must be an array");
-  const contract = contractInput as ProductContract;
-  if (contract?.schema !== "auths.docs.contract/1" || !/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(contract.digest)) {
-    throw new TypeError("product contract is invalid");
-  }
-  const pages = pagesInput.map((input) => {
-    const content = parseAuthoredPageContent(input);
-    const route = siteNodeById(content.id);
-    return Object.freeze({
-      ...content,
-      path: route.path,
-      pageType: route.pageType,
-      section: route.section,
-      parent: route.parent,
-      navGroup: route.navGroup,
-      order: route.order,
-    });
-  });
-  const pageIds = new Set<string>();
-  const paths = new Set<string>();
-  const operations = identitySet(contract.operations);
-  const scenarios = identitySet(contract.scenarios);
-  const endpoints = identitySet(contract.runtimeFacts.endpoints);
-  const claims = identitySet(contract.claims);
-  for (const page of pages) {
-    if (pageIds.has(page.id)) throw new TypeError(`duplicate page identity ${page.id}`);
-    if (paths.has(page.path)) throw new TypeError(`duplicate page path ${page.path}`);
-    pageIds.add(page.id);
-    paths.add(page.path);
-    for (const id of page.uses.operations) if (!operations.has(id)) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} references unknown operation ${id}`);
-    for (const id of page.uses.scenarios) if (!scenarios.has(id)) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} references unknown scenario ${id}`);
-    for (const id of page.uses.endpoints) if (!endpoints.has(id)) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} references unknown endpoint ${id}`);
-    if (page.uses.profiles.length > 0) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} references profiles absent from this fixture bundle`);
-    for (const id of page.uses.claims) if (!claims.has(id)) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} references unknown claim ${id}`);
-    for (const section of page.sections) {
-      if (section.provenance === "tested-scenario" && !page.uses.scenarios.includes(section.scenario)) {
-        throw new TypeError(`${page.id} does not declare scenario ${section.scenario}`);
-      }
-      if (section.provenance === "generated-fact") {
-        const declared = section.factKind === "operation"
-          ? page.uses.operations
-          : section.factKind === "endpoint"
-            ? page.uses.endpoints
-            : section.factKind === "profile"
-              ? page.uses.profiles
-              : page.uses.claims;
-        if (!declared.includes(section.fact)) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} does not declare fact ${section.fact}`);
-      }
-    }
-    assertPageContract(page);
-  }
-  const published = new Set(pages.map((page) => page.id));
-  for (const page of pages) {
-    if (page.parent !== null && !published.has(page.parent) && siteTree.every((candidate) => candidate.id !== page.parent)) {
-      throw new TypeError(`${page.id} has missing parent ${page.parent}`);
-    }
-  }
-  return Object.freeze({ contractDigest: contract.digest, pages: Object.freeze(pages) });
-}
-
-function replacePages(base: readonly unknown[], replacements: readonly unknown[]): readonly unknown[] {
-  const replacementIds = new Set(replacements.map((input) => (input as { id: string }).id));
-  return [...base.filter((input) => !replacementIds.has((input as { id: string }).id)), ...replacements];
-}
-
-const legacyPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = [...rawPages, ...rawDeveloperPages, ...rawAgentIntegrationPages, ...rawAdoptionPages, ...rawOperationsPages];
-export const authoredPageInputs: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze(
-  replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(replacePages(legacyPageInputs, getStartedPages), identityTrustPages), authorityPages), agentPages), operationsPages), developerPages), referenceAssurancePages),
-);
-export const verifiedPageGraph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(authoredPageInputs, rawContract);
-
-export function contentPageByPath(path: string): AuthoredPageSource {
-  const normalized = path.length > 1 && path.endsWith("/") ? path.slice(0, -1) : path;
-  const page = verifiedPageGraph.pages.find((candidate) => candidate.path === normalized);
-  if (!page) throw new TypeError(`unknown content path ${normalized}`);
-  return page;
-}
-
-export function contentPageById(id: string): AuthoredPageSource {
-  const page = verifiedPageGraph.pages.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id);
-  if (!page) throw new TypeError(`unknown content page ${id}`);
-  return page;
-}
-
-export function affectedPages(semanticIdentities: readonly string[]): readonly AuthoredPageSource[] {
-  const changed = new Set(semanticIdentities);
-  return verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => [
-    ...page.uses.operations,
-    ...page.uses.scenarios,
-    ...page.uses.endpoints,
-    ...page.uses.profiles,
-    ...page.uses.claims,
-  ].some((identity) => changed.has(identity)));
-}
-
-export const runtimeOutcomes: readonly string[] = Object.freeze([...new Set(
-  (rawContract.runtimeFacts.endpoints as readonly Readonly<{ outcomes?: readonly string[] }>[]).flatMap((endpoint) => endpoint.outcomes ?? []),
-)].sort());
-
-export const contractScenarioIds: ReadonlySet<string> = identitySet(rawContract.scenarios);
-export const assuranceClaims: readonly AssuranceClaim[] = Object.freeze(rawContract.claims.map((claim) => Object.freeze(claim as AssuranceClaim)));
diff --git a/app/lib/docs-content.ts b/app/lib/docs-content.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bb3f64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/docs-content.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+import type { ComponentType } from "react";
+import type { MDXProps } from "mdx/types";
+import { homepage, siteRegistry } from "./site-registry";
+
+export type DocsFrontmatter = Readonly<{
+  title: string;
+  description: string;
+  status: "prelaunch";
+}>;
+
+type DocsModule = Readonly<{
+  default: ComponentType<MDXProps>;
+  frontmatter: DocsFrontmatter;
+  heading: string;
+}>;
+
+export type DocsPage = Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  path: string;
+  source: string;
+  sectionId: string;
+  sectionTitle: string;
+  group: string;
+  heading: string;
+  frontmatter: DocsFrontmatter;
+  Component: ComponentType<MDXProps>;
+}>;
+
+export type DocsSection = Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  title: string;
+  path: string;
+  navigation: "primary" | "utility";
+  groups: readonly Readonly<{
+    label: string;
+    pages: readonly DocsPage[];
+  }>[];
+}>;
+
+const modules = import.meta.glob("../../content-v2/**/*.mdx", { eager: true }) as Record<string, DocsModule>;
+const moduleBySource = new Map(Object.entries(modules).map(([key, value]) => [key.replace("../../content-v2/", ""), value]));
+const claimedSources = new Set<string>();
+const claimedPaths = new Set<string>([siteRegistry.home.path]);
+
+export const docsSections: readonly DocsSection[] = Object.freeze(siteRegistry.sections.map((section) => {
+  if (!section.path.startsWith("/")) throw new TypeError(`documentation section path must be absolute: ${section.path}`);
+  const groups = section.groups.map((group) => Object.freeze({
+    label: group.label,
+    pages: Object.freeze(group.pages.map((entry) => {
+      if (claimedSources.has(entry.source)) throw new TypeError(`documentation source appears more than once: ${entry.source}`);
+      if (claimedPaths.has(entry.path)) throw new TypeError(`documentation path appears more than once: ${entry.path}`);
+      const source = moduleBySource.get(entry.source);
+      if (!source) throw new TypeError(`documentation source is not importable: ${entry.source}`);
+      if (!source.heading || !source.frontmatter.title || !source.frontmatter.description || source.frontmatter.status !== "prelaunch") {
+        throw new TypeError(`documentation source has incomplete frontmatter: ${entry.source}`);
+      }
+      claimedSources.add(entry.source);
+      claimedPaths.add(entry.path);
+      return Object.freeze({
+        id: entry.path.slice(1).replaceAll("/", ":") || "home",
+        path: entry.path,
+        source: entry.source,
+        sectionId: section.id,
+        sectionTitle: section.title,
+        group: group.label,
+        heading: source.heading,
+        frontmatter: source.frontmatter,
+        Component: source.default,
+      });
+    })),
+  }));
+  return Object.freeze({ id: section.id, title: section.title, path: section.path, navigation: section.navigation, groups: Object.freeze(groups) });
+}));
+
+const unclaimed = [...moduleBySource.keys()].filter((source) => !claimedSources.has(source));
+if (unclaimed.length > 0) throw new TypeError(`documentation sources are missing from navigation.json: ${unclaimed.join(", ")}`);
+
+export const docsPages: readonly DocsPage[] = Object.freeze(docsSections.flatMap((section) => section.groups.flatMap((group) => group.pages)));
+const pagesByPath = new Map(docsPages.map((page) => [page.path, page]));
+
+export function docsPage(path: string): DocsPage | null {
+  return pagesByPath.get(path) ?? null;
+}
+
+export function docsSection(id: string): DocsSection {
+  const section = docsSections.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id);
+  if (!section) throw new TypeError(`unknown documentation section: ${id}`);
+  return section;
+}
+
+export function adjacentDocsPages(page: DocsPage): Readonly<{ previous: DocsPage | null; next: DocsPage | null }> {
+  const sequence = docsSection(page.sectionId).groups.flatMap((group) => group.pages);
+  const index = sequence.findIndex((candidate) => candidate.path === page.path);
+  return Object.freeze({ previous: index > 0 ? sequence[index - 1] : null, next: index >= 0 && index < sequence.length - 1 ? sequence[index + 1] : null });
+}
+
+export type DocsSearchResult = Readonly<{ id: string; path: string; title: string; description: string }>;
+
+const searchEntries: readonly DocsSearchResult[] = Object.freeze([
+  Object.freeze({ id: "home", path: siteRegistry.home.path, title: homepage.title, description: homepage.description }),
+  ...docsPages.map((page) => Object.freeze({ id: page.id, path: page.path, title: page.frontmatter.title, description: page.frontmatter.description })),
+]);
+
+export function searchDocs(query: string): readonly DocsSearchResult[] {
+  const needle = query.trim().toLowerCase();
+  if (!needle) return searchEntries.slice(0, 10);
+  return searchEntries.filter((page) => `${page.title} ${page.description}`.toLowerCase().includes(needle)).slice(0, 12);
+}
diff --git a/app/lib/navigation.ts b/app/lib/navigation.ts
index 90f6c25..08d46ef 100644
--- a/app/lib/navigation.ts
+++ b/app/lib/navigation.ts
@@ -1,21 +1,12 @@
-import type { AuthoredPageSource } from "../../schemas/content.ts";
-import { verifiedPageGraph } from "./content-graph.ts";
-import { siteSections, siteTree } from "./site-tree.ts";
+import { siteRegistry } from "./site-registry";
 
-function resolve(ids: readonly string[]): readonly AuthoredPageSource[] {
-  if (new Set(ids).size !== ids.length) throw new TypeError("navigation contains duplicate pages");
-  return Object.freeze(ids.map((id) => {
-    const page = verifiedPageGraph.pages.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id);
-    if (!page) throw new TypeError(`navigation references unknown page ${id}`);
-    return page;
-  }));
-}
+export type NavigationLink = Readonly<{ id: string; path: string; title: string }>;
 
-const root = (section: (typeof siteSections)[number]) => {
-  const item = siteTree.find((candidate) => candidate.section === section && candidate.parent === null);
-  if (!item) throw new TypeError(`missing navigation root ${section}`);
-  return item.id;
-};
+function linksFor(placement: "primary" | "utility"): readonly NavigationLink[] {
+  return Object.freeze(siteRegistry.sections
+    .filter((section) => section.navigation === placement)
+    .map(({ id, path, title }) => Object.freeze({ id, path, title })));
+}
 
-export const primaryNavigation = resolve(["get-started", "identity-trust", "authority", "agents", "operations", "developers"].map((section) => root(section as (typeof siteSections)[number])));
-export const utilityNavigation = resolve([root("reference")]);
+export const primaryNavigation = linksFor("primary");
+export const utilityNavigation = linksFor("utility");
diff --git a/app/lib/page-graph.ts b/app/lib/page-graph.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index d5a54e8..0000000
--- a/app/lib/page-graph.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-import type { PageModel } from "../../schemas/docs-contract.ts";
-import { verifiedPageGraph } from "./content-graph.ts";
-
-export const pages: readonly PageModel[] = Object.freeze(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => Object.freeze({
-  id: page.id,
-  path: page.path,
-  kind: page.pageType,
-  title: page.title,
-  description: page.description,
-  operations: page.uses.operations,
-  scenarios: page.uses.scenarios,
-})));
-
-export function pageById(id: string): PageModel {
-  const page = pages.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id);
-  if (!page) throw new TypeError(`unknown page identity ${id}`);
-  return page;
-}
-
-export function searchPages(query: string): readonly PageModel[] {
-  const normalized = query.trim().toLocaleLowerCase();
-  if (!normalized) return pages;
-  return pages.filter((page) => `${page.title}\n${page.description}`.toLocaleLowerCase().includes(normalized));
-}
diff --git a/app/lib/product-snapshot.ts b/app/lib/product-snapshot.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..990e56d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/product-snapshot.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+import contract from "../../product-snapshot/bundle/contract.json" with { type: "json" };
+import codeWalkthroughs from "../../content-v2/code-walkthroughs.json" with { type: "json" };
+import manifest from "../../product-snapshot/bundle/manifest.json" with { type: "json" };
+import topology from "../../product-snapshot/bundle/public-topology.json" with { type: "json" };
+import runtimeFacts from "../../product-snapshot/bundle/runtime-facts.json" with { type: "json" };
+import pythonPublicApi from "../../product-snapshot/bundle/python-public-api.txt?raw";
+import typescriptPublicApi from "../../product-snapshot/bundle/typescript-public-api.txt?raw";
+import errorCodesSource from "../../product-snapshot/protocol/error-codes.md?raw";
+import registrySource from "../../product-snapshot/protocol/registry.md?raw";
+import protocolSource from "../../product-snapshot/protocol/protocol.md?raw";
+import domainSeparationSource from "../../product-snapshot/protocol/domain-separation.md?raw";
+import recipeManifest from "../../product-snapshot/recipes/manifest.json" with { type: "json" };
+import recipeEvidence from "../../product-snapshot/recipes/experience-evidence.json" with { type: "json" };
+import errorRegistry from "../../product-snapshot/product/error-registry.json" with { type: "json" };
+import typescriptRuntime from "../../product-snapshot/product/typescript-runtime-contract.json" with { type: "json" };
+import pythonRuntime from "../../product-snapshot/product/python-runtime-contract.json" with { type: "json" };
+import journeyMatrix from "../../product-snapshot/product/customer-journey-matrix.json" with { type: "json" };
+import fixtureManifest from "../../product-snapshot/conformance/fixtures.json" with { type: "json" };
+import mutationManifest from "../../product-snapshot/conformance/mutations.json" with { type: "json" };
+import formalManifest from "../../product-snapshot/conformance/formal-vectors.json" with { type: "json" };
+import pythonIdentity from "../../product-snapshot/recipes/python/01_authenticate_identity.py?raw";
+import pythonVerify from "../../product-snapshot/recipes/python/02_verify_authority.py?raw";
+import pythonExecute from "../../product-snapshot/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py?raw";
+import pythonDelegate from "../../product-snapshot/recipes/python/04_delegate_to_agent.py?raw";
+import pythonPlan from "../../product-snapshot/recipes/python/05_cross_organization_plan.py?raw";
+import typescriptIdentity from "../../product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/01-authenticate-identity.ts?raw";
+import typescriptVerify from "../../product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/02-verify-authority.ts?raw";
+import typescriptExecute from "../../product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts?raw";
+import typescriptDelegate from "../../product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/04-delegate-to-agent.ts?raw";
+import typescriptPlan from "../../product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts?raw";
+import offlineVerificationReadme from "../../product-snapshot/examples/offline-verification/README.md?raw";
+import offlineVerificationManifest from "../../product-snapshot/examples/offline-verification/Cargo.toml?raw";
+import offlineVerificationSource from "../../product-snapshot/examples/offline-verification/src/main.rs?raw";
+import snapshot from "../../product-snapshot/snapshot.json" with { type: "json" };
+
+export type ProductLanguage = "typescript" | "python";
+
+export type ProductCodeStep = Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  title: string;
+  description: string;
+  code: string;
+  startLine: number;
+  endLine: number;
+}>;
+
+export type ProductCodeWalkthrough = Readonly<{
+  language: ProductLanguage | "rust";
+  label: string;
+  steps: readonly ProductCodeStep[];
+}>;
+
+export type ProductRecipe = Readonly<{
+  id: string;
+  expected: string;
+  sources: Readonly<Record<ProductLanguage, string>>;
+  sourcePaths: Readonly<Record<ProductLanguage, string>>;
+}>;
+
+const sources = {
+  "01-authenticate-identity": { typescript: typescriptIdentity, python: pythonIdentity },
+  "02-verify-authority": { typescript: typescriptVerify, python: pythonVerify },
+  "03-execute-exact-action": { typescript: typescriptExecute, python: pythonExecute },
+  "04-delegate-to-agent": { typescript: typescriptDelegate, python: pythonDelegate },
+  "05-cross-organization-plan": { typescript: typescriptPlan, python: pythonPlan },
+} as const;
+
+export const productSnapshot = Object.freeze({
+  snapshot,
+  manifest,
+  contract,
+  topology,
+  runtimeFacts,
+  recipeEvidence,
+  errorRegistry,
+  typescriptRuntime,
+  pythonRuntime,
+  journeyMatrix,
+  fixtureManifest,
+  mutationManifest,
+  formalManifest,
+  errorCodesSource,
+  registrySource,
+  protocolSource,
+  domainSeparationSource,
+  offlineVerificationExample: Object.freeze({
+    readme: offlineVerificationReadme,
+    manifest: offlineVerificationManifest,
+    source: offlineVerificationSource,
+  }),
+});
+
+export const productRecipes: readonly ProductRecipe[] = Object.freeze(recipeManifest.recipes.map((recipe) => {
+  const source = sources[recipe.id as keyof typeof sources];
+  if (!source) throw new TypeError(`product snapshot contains an unsupported recipe: ${recipe.id}`);
+  return Object.freeze({
+    id: recipe.id,
+    expected: recipe.expected,
+    sources: source,
+    sourcePaths: Object.freeze({ typescript: recipe.typescript, python: recipe.python }),
+  });
+}));
+
+export function productRecipe(id: string): ProductRecipe {
+  const recipe = productRecipes.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id);
+  if (!recipe) throw new TypeError(`unknown product recipe: ${id}`);
+  return recipe;
+}
+
+export function recipeWalkthroughs(id: string, language?: ProductLanguage): readonly ProductCodeWalkthrough[] {
+  const recipe = productRecipe(id);
+  const configured = configuredWalkthrough("recipes", id);
+  const languages = language === undefined ? (["typescript", "python"] as const) : [language];
+  return Object.freeze(languages.map((candidate) => Object.freeze({
+    language: candidate,
+    label: candidate === "typescript" ? "TypeScript" : "Python",
+    steps: sliceWalkthrough(recipe.sources[candidate], configured[candidate], `${id} ${candidate}`),
+  })));
+}
+
+export function repositoryWalkthrough(path: "demos/offline-verification"): ProductCodeWalkthrough {
+  const configured = configuredWalkthrough("repositoryExamples", path);
+  return Object.freeze({
+    language: "rust",
+    label: "Rust",
+    steps: sliceWalkthrough(productSnapshot.offlineVerificationExample.source, configured.rust, `${path} rust`),
+  });
+}
+
+type WalkthroughSection = "recipes" | "repositoryExamples";
+type ConfiguredStep = Readonly<{ id: string; title: string; description: string; startLine: number; endLine: number }>;
+
+function configuredWalkthrough(section: WalkthroughSection, id: string): Record<string, readonly ConfiguredStep[]> {
+  if (codeWalkthroughs.schema !== "auths.docs.code-walkthroughs/1") throw new TypeError("unsupported code walkthrough schema");
+  const collection = codeWalkthroughs[section] as Record<string, Record<string, readonly ConfiguredStep[]>>;
+  const configured = collection[id];
+  if (configured === undefined) throw new TypeError(`missing code walkthrough: ${section}/${id}`);
+  return configured;
+}
+
+function sliceWalkthrough(source: string, configured: readonly ConfiguredStep[] | undefined, label: string): readonly ProductCodeStep[] {
+  if (!Array.isArray(configured) || configured.length === 0) throw new TypeError(`empty code walkthrough: ${label}`);
+  const lines = source.trimEnd().split("\n");
+  const covered = new Set<number>();
+  let previousEnd = 0;
+  const steps = configured.map((step) => {
+    if (!step.id || !step.title || !step.description) throw new TypeError(`incomplete code walkthrough step: ${label}`);
+    if (!Number.isInteger(step.startLine) || !Number.isInteger(step.endLine) || step.startLine < 1 || step.endLine < step.startLine || step.endLine > lines.length) {
+      throw new TypeError(`invalid code walkthrough range: ${label}/${step.id}`);
+    }
+    if (step.endLine - step.startLine + 1 > 20) throw new TypeError(`oversized code walkthrough step: ${label}/${step.id}`);
+    if (step.startLine <= previousEnd) throw new TypeError(`overlapping or unordered code walkthrough range: ${label}/${step.id}`);
+    previousEnd = step.endLine;
+    for (let line = step.startLine; line <= step.endLine; line += 1) covered.add(line);
+    const selected = lines.slice(step.startLine - 1, step.endLine);
+    while (selected[0]?.trim() === "") selected.shift();
+    while (selected.at(-1)?.trim() === "") selected.pop();
+    const code = selected.join("\n");
+    if (!code) throw new TypeError(`empty code walkthrough step: ${label}/${step.id}`);
+    return Object.freeze({ ...step, code });
+  });
+  const omitted = lines.flatMap((line, index) => line.trim() !== "" && !covered.has(index + 1) ? [index + 1] : []);
+  if (omitted.length > 0) throw new TypeError(`code walkthrough omits source lines: ${label} (${omitted.join(", ")})`);
+  return Object.freeze(steps);
+}
+
+export function publicApi(language: ProductLanguage): readonly Readonly<{ entrypoint: string; symbol: string; kind: string }>[] {
+  const source = language === "typescript" ? typescriptPublicApi : pythonPublicApi;
+  if (language === "typescript") {
+    return Object.freeze(source.split("\n").filter((line) => line && !line.startsWith("#")).map((line) => {
+      const [entrypoint, symbol, kind] = line.split("\t");
+      return Object.freeze({ entrypoint, symbol, kind });
+    }));
+  }
+  let entrypoint = "auths";
+  const entries: Readonly<{ entrypoint: string; symbol: string; kind: string }>[] = [];
+  for (const line of source.split("\n")) {
+    const moduleName = line.match(/^\[([^\]]+)\]$/)?.[1];
+    if (moduleName) entrypoint = moduleName;
+    else if (line) entries.push(Object.freeze({ entrypoint, symbol: line, kind: "public" }));
+  }
+  return Object.freeze(entries);
+}
+
+export function recipeLanguageStatus(id: string, language: ProductLanguage): Readonly<{ runnable: boolean; reason: string | null }> {
+  const recipe = productRecipe(id);
+  if (language === "python" && /^from auths import .*\bverify_receipt\b/m.test(recipe.sources.python)) {
+    const rootExportsReceipt = publicApi("python").some((entry) => entry.entrypoint === "auths" && entry.symbol === "verify_receipt");
+    if (!rootExportsReceipt) return Object.freeze({ runnable: false, reason: "The maintained source imports verify_receipt from auths, but the pinned public inventory exports it from auths.verify." });
+  }
+  return Object.freeze({ runnable: true, reason: null });
+}
+
+export type StableCode = Readonly<{ code: string; stage: string | null; meaning: string; decision: "authorized" | "denied" | "indeterminate" | "runtime" | "reserved" }>;
+
+export function stableCodes(): readonly StableCode[] {
+  let decision: StableCode["decision"] | null = null;
+  const result: StableCode[] = [];
+  for (const line of errorCodesSource.split("\n")) {
+    const heading = line.match(/^## (Authorized|Denied|Indeterminate|Outer runtime failures|Reserved V1 codes)$/)?.[1];
+    if (heading) {
+      decision = heading === "Outer runtime failures" ? "runtime" : heading === "Reserved V1 codes" ? "reserved" : heading.toLowerCase() as StableCode["decision"];
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!decision || !line.startsWith("| `")) continue;
+    const cells = line.split("|").slice(1, -1).map((cell) => cell.trim().replace(/^`|`$/g, ""));
+    if (cells.length === 2) result.push(Object.freeze({ code: cells[0], stage: null, meaning: cells[1], decision }));
+    if (cells.length === 3) result.push(Object.freeze({ code: cells[0], stage: cells[1], meaning: cells[2], decision }));
+  }
+  return Object.freeze(result);
+}
diff --git a/app/lib/quickstarts.ts b/app/lib/quickstarts.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index a3b7331..0000000
--- a/app/lib/quickstarts.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-import { quickstartDefinitions, quickstartSources, type QuickstartDefinition } from "../../examples/quickstarts.ts";
-import { contractScenarioIds } from "./content-graph.ts";
-
-for (const definition of quickstartDefinitions) {
-  if (!contractScenarioIds.has(definition.id)) throw new TypeError(`quickstart scenario is absent from the product contract: ${definition.id}`);
-  if (quickstartDefinitions.filter((candidate) => candidate.slug === definition.slug).length !== 1) throw new TypeError(`duplicate quickstart slug: ${definition.slug}`);
-}
-
-export type Quickstart = QuickstartDefinition & Readonly<{ sources: ReturnType<typeof quickstartSources> }>;
-export const quickstarts: readonly Quickstart[] = Object.freeze(quickstartDefinitions.map((definition) => Object.freeze({ ...definition, sources: quickstartSources(definition) })));
-
-export function quickstartBySlug(slug: string): Quickstart {
-  const quickstart = quickstarts.find((candidate) => candidate.slug === slug);
-  if (!quickstart) throw new TypeError(`unknown quickstart ${slug}`);
-  return quickstart;
-}
-
-export function quickstartByScenario(id: string): Quickstart | null {
-  return quickstarts.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id) ?? null;
-}
diff --git a/app/lib/runbooks.ts b/app/lib/runbooks.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index f13ad6e..0000000
--- a/app/lib/runbooks.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-import rawRunbooks from "../../content/runbooks.json" with { type: "json" };
-import { parseRunbook } from "../../schemas/runbook.ts";
-
-export const runbooks = Object.freeze(rawRunbooks.map(parseRunbook));
-if (new Set(runbooks.map((runbook) => runbook.id)).size !== runbooks.length) throw new TypeError("duplicate runbook identity");
diff --git a/app/lib/runtime-reference.ts b/app/lib/runtime-reference.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index bf62410..0000000
--- a/app/lib/runtime-reference.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-import { parseBashSnippet, type BashSnippet } from "./bash-snippets";
-
-export type RuntimeEndpoint = Readonly<{
-  id: `auths.endpoint.${string}/${number}`;
-  slug: string;
-  method: "GET" | "POST";
-  path: `/v1/${string}`;
-  title: string;
-  description: string;
-  maxBodyBytes: number;
-  outcomes: readonly ("completed" | "denied" | "indeterminate" | "recoverable" | "not-found")[];
-  curl: BashSnippet;
-  response: string;
-}>;
-
-export const runtimeEndpoints: readonly RuntimeEndpoint[] = Object.freeze([
-  {
-    id: "auths.endpoint.health/1",
-    slug: "health",
-    method: "GET",
-    path: "/v1/health",
-    title: "Health",
-    description: "Read liveness without authority, custody, provider, or state mutation.",
-    maxBodyBytes: 0,
-    outcomes: ["completed"],
-    curl: parseBashSnippet(`curl \\
-  https://auths.example/v1/health`),
-    response: `{
-  "status": "ok",
-  "version": "1.0.0-rc.1"
-}`,
-  },
-  {
-    id: "auths.endpoint.authorities/1",
-    slug: "create-authority",
-    method: "POST",
-    path: "/v1/authorities",
-    title: "Create authority",
-    description: "Parse a bounded authority request and create exact authority.",
-    maxBodyBytes: 65_536,
-    outcomes: ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate"],
-    curl: parseBashSnippet(`curl \\
-  https://auths.example/v1/authorities \\
-  --request POST \\
-  --header 'content-type: application/json' \\
-  --data @authority.json`),
-    response: `{
-  "kind": "completed",
-  "authorityId": "auth_018f",
-  "uses": 1
-}`,
-  },
-  {
-    id: "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
-    slug: "execute",
-    method: "POST",
-    path: "/v1/executions",
-    title: "Execute a sealed command",
-    description: "Authorize, reserve, and submit one exact effect through a closed gateway.",
-    maxBodyBytes: 262_144,
-    outcomes: ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate", "recoverable"],
-    curl: parseBashSnippet(`curl \\
-  https://auths.example/v1/executions \\
-  --request POST \\
-  --header 'content-type: application/json' \\
-  --data @execution.json`),
-    response: `{
-  "kind": "completed",
-  "receiptId": "rcpt_018f",
-  "usesConsumed": 1
-}`,
-  },
-  {
-    id: "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1",
-    slug: "resume",
-    method: "POST",
-    path: "/v1/executions/{execution_id}/resume",
-    title: "Resume execution",
-    description: "Continue one recoverable execution without creating a fresh mutation.",
-    maxBodyBytes: 65_536,
-    outcomes: ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate", "recoverable", "not-found"],
-    curl: parseBashSnippet(`curl \\
-  https://auths.example/v1/executions/ex_018f/resume \\
-  --request POST`),
-    response: `{
-  "kind": "completed",
-  "executionId": "ex_018f",
-  "resumed": true
-}`,
-  },
-  {
-    id: "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1",
-    slug: "receipt-summary",
-    method: "GET",
-    path: "/v1/receipts/{receipt_id}",
-    title: "Read receipt summary",
-    description: "Return a bounded receipt projection without exposing full receipt material.",
-    maxBodyBytes: 0,
-    outcomes: ["completed", "not-found"],
-    curl: parseBashSnippet(`curl \\
-  https://auths.example/v1/receipts/rcpt_018f`),
-    response: `{
-  "kind": "summary",
-  "outcome": "completed",
-  "receiptId": "rcpt_018f"
-}`,
-  },
-]);
diff --git a/app/lib/site-registry.ts b/app/lib/site-registry.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6eb311
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/site-registry.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+import homeSource from "../../content-v2/home.json" with { type: "json" };
+import navigationSource from "../../content-v2/navigation.json" with { type: "json" };
+
+if (navigationSource.home.path !== "/" || navigationSource.home.source !== "home.json") {
+  throw new TypeError("the canonical documentation registry must own the homepage");
+}
+if (homeSource.schema !== "auths.docs.home/1") {
+  throw new TypeError("unsupported Auths documentation homepage schema");
+}
+function navigationPlacement(value: string, sectionId: string): "primary" | "utility" {
+  if (value === "primary" || value === "utility") return value;
+  throw new TypeError(`unsupported navigation placement for ${sectionId}`);
+}
+
+export const siteRegistry = Object.freeze({
+  ...navigationSource,
+  sections: Object.freeze(navigationSource.sections.map((section) => Object.freeze({
+    ...section,
+    navigation: navigationPlacement(section.navigation, section.id),
+  }))),
+});
+export const homepage = Object.freeze(homeSource);
diff --git a/app/lib/site-tree.ts b/app/lib/site-tree.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index ad1b76b..0000000
--- a/app/lib/site-tree.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,283 +0,0 @@
-export const siteSections = [
-  "home",
-  "get-started",
-  "identity-trust",
-  "authority",
-  "agents",
-  "operations",
-  "developers",
-  "reference",
-  "assurance",
-] as const;
-
-export type SiteSection = (typeof siteSections)[number];
-
-export const pageTypes = ["landing", "concept", "guide", "quickstart", "integration", "reference", "runbook"] as const;
-export type PageType = (typeof pageTypes)[number];
-
-type TreeInput = Readonly<{
-  id: string;
-  path: `/${string}` | "/";
-  title: string;
-  type: PageType;
-  group: string;
-  children?: readonly TreeInput[];
-}>;
-
-export type SiteTreeNode = Readonly<{
-  id: string;
-  path: `/${string}` | "/";
-  title: string;
-  pageType: PageType;
-  section: SiteSection;
-  parent: string | null;
-  navGroup: string;
-  order: number;
-}>;
-
-const node = (
-  id: string,
-  path: `/${string}` | "/",
-  title: string,
-  type: PageType,
-  group: string,
-  children: readonly TreeInput[] = [],
-): TreeInput => ({ id, path, title, type, group, children });
-
-const trees: Readonly<Record<SiteSection, TreeInput>> = {
-  home: node("auths.page.home/1", "/", "Auths documentation", "landing", "Home"),
-  "get-started": node("auths.page.start/1", "/get-started", "Get started", "landing", "Get started", [
-    node("auths.page.start.prerequisites/1", "/get-started/prerequisites", "Prerequisites", "guide", "Choose a path"),
-    node("auths.page.start.choose/1", "/get-started/choose", "Choose your path", "guide", "Choose a path"),
-    node("auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1", "/get-started/quickstarts", "Quickstarts", "landing", "Quickstarts", [
-      node("auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1", "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect", "Local REST effect", "quickstart", "Quickstarts"),
-      node("auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1", "/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect", "Runtime effect", "quickstart", "Quickstarts"),
-      node("auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1", "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation", "Agent delegation", "quickstart", "Quickstarts"),
-      node("auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1", "/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan", "Approved plan", "quickstart", "Quickstarts"),
-      node("auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1", "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification", "Offline verification", "quickstart", "Quickstarts"),
-      node("auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1", "/get-started/quickstarts/recovery", "Recovery", "quickstart", "Quickstarts"),
-      node("auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1", "/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap", "Identity swap", "quickstart", "Quickstarts"),
-    ]),
-    node("auths.page.get-started.paths/1", "/get-started/paths", "Outcome paths", "landing", "Choose a path", [
-      node("auths.page.start.local/1", "/get-started/paths/application", "Protect an application effect", "guide", "Outcome paths"),
-      node("auths.page.start.agent/1", "/get-started/paths/agent", "Delegate to an agent", "guide", "Outcome paths"),
-      node("auths.page.start.runtime/1", "/get-started/paths/runtime", "Deploy the runtime", "guide", "Outcome paths"),
-      node("auths.page.start.verify/1", "/get-started/paths/verification", "Verify without executing", "guide", "Outcome paths"),
-      node("auths.page.start.cross-company/1", "/get-started/paths/cross-company", "Cross-company authority", "guide", "Outcome paths"),
-    ]),
-    node("auths.page.start.evaluate/1", "/get-started/evaluate", "Evaluate Auths", "guide", "Next steps"),
-    node("auths.page.start.adopt/1", "/get-started/adoption", "Adopt incrementally", "landing", "Adopt incrementally", [
-      node("auths.page.adopt.plan/1", "/get-started/adoption/plan", "Plan adoption", "guide", "Adopt incrementally"),
-      node("auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1", "/get-started/adoption/signed-requests", "Signed requests", "integration", "Adopt incrementally"),
-      node("auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1", "/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc", "OAuth and OIDC", "integration", "Adopt incrementally"),
-      node("auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1", "/get-started/adoption/api-keys", "API keys", "integration", "Adopt incrementally"),
-      node("auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1", "/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam", "Cloud IAM", "integration", "Adopt incrementally"),
-      node("auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1", "/get-started/adoption/policy-engines", "Policy engines", "integration", "Adopt incrementally"),
-      node("auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1", "/get-started/adoption/capabilities", "Capability systems", "integration", "Adopt incrementally"),
-      node("auths.page.adopt.approvals/1", "/get-started/adoption/approvals", "Approval systems", "integration", "Adopt incrementally"),
-      node("auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1", "/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode", "Shadow mode", "guide", "Adopt incrementally"),
-      node("auths.page.adopt.cutover/1", "/get-started/adoption/cutover", "Cut over one effect", "guide", "Adopt incrementally"),
-    ]),
-  ]),
-  "identity-trust": node("auths.page.identity-trust/1", "/identity-trust", "Identity & trust", "landing", "Identity & trust", [
-    node("auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1", "/identity-trust/how-it-works", "How identity and trust fit", "concept", "Understand"),
-    node("auths.page.identity-trust.sources/1", "/identity-trust/identity-sources", "Identity sources", "landing", "Identity sources", [
-      node("auths.page.identity-trust.sources.raw-keys/1", "/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys", "Raw public keys", "guide", "Identity sources"),
-      node("auths.page.identity-trust.sources.oauth-oidc/1", "/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc", "OAuth and OIDC", "integration", "Identity sources"),
-      node("auths.page.identity-trust.sources.spiffe/1", "/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe", "SPIFFE", "integration", "Identity sources"),
-      node("auths.page.identity-trust.sources.resolvers/1", "/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers", "Application resolvers", "integration", "Identity sources"),
-    ]),
-    node("auths.page.identity-trust.suites/1", "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites", "Cryptographic suites", "landing", "Cryptography", [
-      node("auths.page.identity-trust.suites.ed25519/1", "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519", "Ed25519", "guide", "Cryptography"),
-      node("auths.page.identity-trust.suites.p256/1", "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256", "P-256", "guide", "Cryptography"),
-      node("auths.page.identity-trust.suites.custom/1", "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum", "Custom and post-quantum suites", "guide", "Cryptography"),
-    ]),
-    node("auths.page.identity-trust.policy/1", "/identity-trust/trust-policy", "Trust policy", "concept", "Operate trust"),
-    node("auths.page.identity-trust.exchange/1", "/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity", "Exchange public identity", "guide", "Operate trust"),
-    node("auths.page.identity-trust.rotation/1", "/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation", "Key and root rotation", "guide", "Operate trust"),
-    node("auths.page.identity-trust.context/1", "/identity-trust/verification-context", "Verification context", "concept", "Operate trust"),
-    node("auths.page.identity-trust.testing/1", "/identity-trust/testing", "Test identity and trust", "guide", "Test"),
-  ]),
-  authority: node("auths.page.authority/1", "/authority", "Authority", "landing", "Authority", [
-    node("auths.page.concepts.tour/1", "/authority/model", "Authority model", "concept", "Model"),
-    node("auths.page.authority.create/1", "/authority/create", "Create", "guide", "Author and narrow"),
-    node("auths.page.authority.constraints/1", "/authority/constraints", "Constraints", "concept", "Author and narrow"),
-    node("auths.page.authority.delegate/1", "/authority/delegate", "Delegate", "guide", "Author and narrow", [
-      node("auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1", "/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain", "Depth and chain", "concept", "Author and narrow"),
-      node("auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1", "/authority/delegate/widening-failures", "Widening failures", "guide", "Author and narrow"),
-    ]),
-    node("auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1", "/authority/lifecycle", "Lifecycle", "landing", "Lifecycle", [
-      node("auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1", "/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry", "Validity and expiry", "concept", "Lifecycle"),
-      node("auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1", "/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status", "Revocation and status", "concept", "Lifecycle"),
-      node("auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1", "/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay", "Uses and replay", "concept", "Lifecycle"),
-      node("auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1", "/authority/lifecycle/budgets", "Budgets", "concept", "Lifecycle"),
-    ]),
-    node("auths.page.authority.plans/1", "/authority/plans", "Plans", "landing", "Lifecycle", [
-      node("auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1", "/authority/plans/approvals", "Transaction-bound approvals", "guide", "Lifecycle"),
-    ]),
-    node("auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1", "/authority/execute", "Execute", "guide", "Execute and recover"),
-    node("auths.page.authority.resume/1", "/authority/resume", "Resume", "guide", "Execute and recover"),
-    node("auths.page.authority.verify/1", "/authority/verify", "Verify", "guide", "Verify and inspect"),
-    node("auths.page.authority.receipts/1", "/authority/receipts", "Receipts", "landing", "Verify and inspect", [
-      node("auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1", "/authority/receipts/disclosure", "Bounded disclosure", "guide", "Verify and inspect"),
-    ]),
-    node("auths.page.authority.profiles/1", "/authority/profiles", "Profiles", "concept", "Profiles"),
-  ]),
-  agents: node("auths.page.agents/1", "/agents", "Agents", "landing", "Agents", [
-    node("auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1", "/agents/how-auths-works", "How Auths works for agents", "concept", "Start"),
-    node("auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1", "/agents/quickstart", "Delegate one tool", "quickstart", "Start"),
-    node("auths.page.agents.delegation/1", "/agents/delegation", "Agent delegation", "guide", "Delegate"),
-    node("auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1", "/agents/approved-plans", "Approved plans", "guide", "Delegate"),
-    node("auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1", "/agents/multi-agent", "Multi-agent handoffs", "guide", "Delegate"),
-    node("auths.page.agents.mcp/1", "/agents/mcp", "MCP", "landing", "MCP", [
-      node("auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1", "/agents/mcp/client", "MCP client", "guide", "MCP"),
-      node("auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1", "/agents/mcp/protect-server", "Protect an MCP server", "guide", "MCP"),
-      node("auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1", "/agents/mcp/tool-profiles", "Tool profiles", "guide", "MCP"),
-      node("auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1", "/agents/mcp/transport-boundary", "Transport boundary", "concept", "MCP"),
-    ]),
-    node("auths.page.agents.identity/1", "/agents/identity", "Agent identity", "integration", "Compose"),
-    node("auths.page.agents.skills/1", "/agents/skills-and-plugins", "Skills and plugins", "integration", "Compose"),
-    node("auths.page.agents.production/1", "/agents/production-patterns", "Production patterns", "guide", "Operate and test"),
-    node("auths.page.agents.testing/1", "/agents/testing", "Test agent authority", "guide", "Operate and test"),
-  ]),
-  operations: node("auths.page.operations.runtime/1", "/operations", "Production operations", "landing", "Operations", [
-    node("auths.page.operations.evaluate/1", "/operations/evaluate-locally", "Evaluate locally", "guide", "Deploy"),
-    node("auths.page.operations.deploy/1", "/operations/deploy-runtime", "Deploy the runtime", "guide", "Deploy"),
-    node("auths.page.operations.configure/1", "/operations/configure", "Configure", "landing", "Configure", [
-      node("auths.page.operations.state/1", "/operations/configure/durable-state", "Durable state", "guide", "Configure"),
-      node("auths.page.operations.custody/1", "/operations/configure/custody", "Custody", "guide", "Configure"),
-      node("auths.page.operations.trust/1", "/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles", "Trust and profiles", "guide", "Configure"),
-      node("auths.page.operations.gateways/1", "/operations/configure/provider-gateways", "Provider gateways", "guide", "Configure"),
-    ]),
-    node("auths.page.operations.observability/1", "/operations/observability", "Observability", "guide", "Observe"),
-    node("auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1", "/operations/execution-lifecycle", "Execution lifecycle", "concept", "Recover"),
-    node("auths.page.operations.recovery/1", "/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation", "Recovery and reconciliation", "guide", "Recover"),
-    node("auths.page.operations.backup/1", "/operations/backup-and-restore", "Backup and restore", "guide", "Maintain"),
-    node("auths.page.operations.upgrade/1", "/operations/upgrade-and-rollback", "Upgrade and rollback", "guide", "Maintain"),
-    node("auths.page.operations.receipts/1", "/operations/receipt-retention", "Receipt retention", "guide", "Maintain"),
-    node("auths.page.operations.security/1", "/operations/security-checklist", "Security checklist", "guide", "Maintain"),
-    node("auths.page.operations.incidents/1", "/operations/incidents", "Incident response", "landing", "Incident response", [
-      node("auths.page.operations.incidents.state-loss/1", "/operations/incidents/state-loss", "State loss", "runbook", "Incident response"),
-      node("auths.page.operations.incidents.signer-outage/1", "/operations/incidents/signer-outage", "Signer outage", "runbook", "Incident response"),
-      node("auths.page.operations.incidents.trust-root/1", "/operations/incidents/trust-root-error", "Trust-root error", "runbook", "Incident response"),
-      node("auths.page.operations.incidents.provider-unknown/1", "/operations/incidents/provider-unknown", "Provider unknown", "runbook", "Incident response"),
-      node("auths.page.operations.incidents.disclosure/1", "/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure", "Receipt disclosure", "runbook", "Incident response"),
-      node("auths.page.operations.incidents.credential/1", "/operations/incidents/compromised-credential", "Compromised credential", "runbook", "Incident response"),
-    ]),
-  ]),
-  developers: node("auths.page.developers/1", "/developers", "Developers", "landing", "Developers", [
-    node("auths.page.developers.quickstarts/1", "/developers/quickstarts", "Quickstarts", "landing", "Start building"),
-    node("auths.page.developers.sdks/1", "/developers/sdks", "SDKs", "landing", "SDKs", [
-      node("auths.page.developers.sdks.rust/1", "/developers/sdks/rust", "Rust", "guide", "SDKs"),
-      node("auths.page.developers.sdks.typescript/1", "/developers/sdks/typescript", "TypeScript", "guide", "SDKs"),
-      node("auths.page.developers.sdks.python/1", "/developers/sdks/python", "Python", "guide", "SDKs"),
-      node("auths.page.developers.sdks.parity/1", "/developers/sdks/parity", "SDK parity", "reference", "SDKs"),
-    ]),
-    node("auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1", "/developers/runtime-api", "Runtime API", "guide", "Runtime and CLI"),
-    node("auths.page.developers.cli/1", "/developers/cli", "CLI", "guide", "Runtime and CLI"),
-    node("auths.page.developers.testing/1", "/developers/testing", "Testing", "guide", "Test and debug"),
-    node("auths.page.developers.errors/1", "/developers/errors", "Outcomes and errors", "reference", "Test and debug"),
-    node("auths.page.developers.versioning/1", "/developers/versioning", "Versioning", "reference", "Releases"),
-    node("auths.page.integrations.composition/1", "/developers/integrations", "Integrations", "landing", "Integrate and extend", [
-      node("auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1", "/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust", "Identity and trust", "integration", "Integrate and extend"),
-      node("auths.page.integrations.policy/1", "/developers/integrations/policy", "Policy", "integration", "Integrate and extend"),
-      node("auths.page.integrations.cloud/1", "/developers/integrations/cloud-iam", "Cloud IAM", "integration", "Integrate and extend"),
-      node("auths.page.integrations.transport/1", "/developers/integrations/transport", "Transport", "integration", "Integrate and extend"),
-      node("auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1", "/developers/integrations/capabilities", "Capabilities", "integration", "Integrate and extend"),
-      node("auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1", "/developers/integrations/profile-kit", "Profile kit", "integration", "Integrate and extend"),
-    ]),
-    node("auths.page.developers.extensions/1", "/developers/extension-kits", "Extension kits", "guide", "Integrate and extend"),
-    node("auths.page.developers.examples/1", "/developers/examples", "Examples", "landing", "Integrate and extend"),
-    node("auths.page.developers.releases/1", "/developers/releases", "Releases", "reference", "Releases"),
-  ]),
-  reference: node("auths.page.reference/1", "/reference", "Reference", "landing", "Reference", [
-    node("auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "/reference/sdk", "SDK reference", "reference", "SDK", [
-      node("auths.page.reference.sdk.rust/1", "/reference/sdk/rust", "Rust SDK", "reference", "SDK"),
-      node("auths.page.reference.sdk.typescript/1", "/reference/sdk/typescript", "TypeScript SDK", "reference", "SDK"),
-      node("auths.page.reference.sdk.python/1", "/reference/sdk/python", "Python SDK", "reference", "SDK"),
-    ]),
-    node("auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "/reference/runtime-api", "Runtime API", "reference", "Runtime"),
-    node("auths.page.reference.cli/1", "/reference/cli", "CLI", "reference", "Lookup"),
-    node("auths.page.reference.profiles/1", "/reference/profiles", "Profiles", "reference", "Lookup"),
-    node("auths.page.reference.errors/1", "/reference/errors", "Errors", "reference", "Lookup"),
-    node("auths.page.reference.schemas/1", "/reference/schemas", "Schemas", "reference", "Lookup"),
-    node("auths.page.reference.evidence/1", "/reference/evidence", "Evidence", "reference", "Lookup"),
-    node("auths.page.reference.manifest/1", "/reference/manifest.json", "Reference manifest", "reference", "Machine readable"),
-  ]),
-  assurance: node("auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "/assurance", "Assurance", "landing", "Assurance", [
-    node("auths.page.assurance.semantics/1", "/assurance/semantics", "Semantics", "concept", "Claims"),
-    node("auths.page.assurance.authority/1", "/assurance/authority", "Authority", "concept", "Claims"),
-    node("auths.page.assurance.execution/1", "/assurance/execution", "Execution", "concept", "Claims"),
-    node("auths.page.assurance.disclosure/1", "/assurance/disclosure", "Disclosure", "concept", "Claims"),
-    node("auths.page.assurance.cross-language/1", "/assurance/cross-language", "Cross-language", "reference", "Evidence"),
-    node("auths.page.assurance.formal/1", "/assurance/formal", "Formal", "reference", "Evidence"),
-    node("auths.page.assurance.adversarial/1", "/assurance/adversarial", "Adversarial", "reference", "Evidence"),
-    node("auths.page.assurance.supply-chain/1", "/assurance/supply-chain", "Supply chain", "reference", "Evidence"),
-    node("auths.page.assurance.limitations/1", "/assurance/limitations", "Limitations", "concept", "Limits"),
-  ]),
-};
-
-const identity = /^[a-z0-9.-]+\/[1-9][0-9]*$/;
-
-function flatten(section: SiteSection, input: TreeInput, parent: string | null, order: number): SiteTreeNode[] {
-  const current: SiteTreeNode = Object.freeze({
-    id: input.id,
-    path: input.path,
-    title: input.title,
-    pageType: input.type,
-    section,
-    parent,
-    navGroup: input.group,
-    order,
-  });
-  return [current, ...(input.children ?? []).flatMap((child, index) => flatten(section, child, input.id, index))];
-}
-
-const nodes = siteSections.flatMap((section) => flatten(section, trees[section], null, 0));
-const ids = new Set<string>();
-const paths = new Set<string>();
-for (const item of nodes) {
-  if (!identity.test(item.id)) throw new TypeError(`invalid page identity ${item.id}`);
-  if (ids.has(item.id)) throw new TypeError(`duplicate page identity ${item.id}`);
-  if (paths.has(item.path)) throw new TypeError(`duplicate canonical path ${item.path}`);
-  ids.add(item.id);
-  paths.add(item.path);
-}
-
-export const siteTree: readonly SiteTreeNode[] = Object.freeze(nodes);
-
-export function siteNodeById(id: string): SiteTreeNode {
-  const item = siteTree.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id);
-  if (!item) throw new TypeError(`unknown site page ${id}`);
-  return item;
-}
-
-export function siteNodeByPath(path: string): SiteTreeNode {
-  const normalized = path.length > 1 && path.endsWith("/") ? path.slice(0, -1) : path;
-  const item = siteTree.find((candidate) => candidate.path === normalized);
-  if (!item) throw new TypeError(`unknown site path ${normalized}`);
-  return item;
-}
-
-export function ancestors(id: string): readonly SiteTreeNode[] {
-  const result: SiteTreeNode[] = [];
-  let current = siteNodeById(id);
-  while (current.parent) {
-    current = siteNodeById(current.parent);
-    result.unshift(current);
-  }
-  return Object.freeze(result);
-}
-
-export function descendants(id: string): readonly SiteTreeNode[] {
-  const result: SiteTreeNode[] = [];
-  const visit = (parent: string) => {
-    for (const child of siteTree.filter((candidate) => candidate.parent === parent).sort((left, right) => left.order - right.order)) {
-      result.push(child);
-      visit(child.id);
-    }
-  };
-  visit(id);
-  return Object.freeze(result);
-}
-
diff --git a/app/lib/topic-landings.ts b/app/lib/topic-landings.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index 4ef08ba..0000000
--- a/app/lib/topic-landings.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-import type { TopicLanding } from "../../schemas/topic-landing.ts";
-import { verifiedPageGraph } from "./content-graph.ts";
-import { siteNodeById } from "./site-tree.ts";
-
-const pageIds = new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.id));
-const relatedByPage: Readonly<Record<string, readonly string[]>> = {
-  "auths.page.identity-trust/1": ["auths.page.authority/1"],
-  "auths.page.authority/1": ["auths.page.operations.runtime/1"],
-  "auths.page.agents/1": ["auths.page.identity-trust/1", "auths.page.operations.runtime/1"],
-  "auths.page.operations.runtime/1": ["auths.page.assurance.evidence/1"],
-  "auths.page.developers/1": ["auths.page.reference/1"],
-  "auths.page.reference/1": ["auths.page.assurance.evidence/1"],
-  "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1": ["auths.page.operations.runtime/1"],
-};
-const landingPages = verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => page.pageType === "landing"
-  && page.section !== "home"
-  && verifiedPageGraph.pages.some((candidate) => candidate.parent === page.id));
-
-export const topicLandings: readonly TopicLanding[] = Object.freeze(landingPages.map((page) => {
-  const descendants = verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((candidate) => candidate.parent === page.id);
-  const groups = [...new Set(descendants.map((candidate) => candidate.navGroup))].map((title) => ({
-    title,
-    cards: descendants.filter((candidate) => candidate.navGroup === title).map((candidate) => ({
-      target: candidate.id,
-      title: candidate.title,
-      description: candidate.description,
-    })),
-  }));
-  const related = (relatedByPage[page.id] ?? []).map((id) => verifiedPageGraph.pages.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id))
-    .filter((candidate) => candidate !== undefined)
-    .map((candidate) => ({ target: candidate.id, title: candidate.title, description: candidate.description }));
-  if (related.length > 0) groups.push({ title: "Related topics", cards: related });
-  const recommendation = descendants[0];
-  return Object.freeze({
-    page: page.id,
-    eyebrow: siteNodeById(page.id).section === "get-started" ? "Get started" : page.title,
-    recommendation: Object.freeze({
-      target: recommendation.id,
-      label: recommendation.title,
-      description: recommendation.description,
-    }),
-    groups: Object.freeze(groups.map((group) => Object.freeze({ ...group, cards: Object.freeze(group.cards.map((card) => Object.freeze(card))) }))),
-  });
-}));
-
-for (const landing of topicLandings) {
-  if (!pageIds.has(landing.page)) throw new TypeError(`unknown topic landing page ${landing.page}`);
-  for (const target of [landing.recommendation.target, ...landing.groups.flatMap((group) => group.cards.map((card) => card.target))]) {
-    if (!pageIds.has(target)) throw new TypeError(`${landing.page} references unknown landing target ${target}`);
-  }
-}
-
-export function topicLandingByPage(page: string): TopicLanding {
-  const landing = topicLandings.find((candidate) => candidate.page === page);
-  if (!landing) throw new TypeError(`unknown topic landing ${page}`);
-  return landing;
-}
-
-export function hasTopicLanding(page: string): boolean {
-  return topicLandings.some((candidate) => candidate.page === page);
-}
diff --git a/app/lib/tours.ts b/app/lib/tours.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index 29c2f99..0000000
--- a/app/lib/tours.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-import rawTours from "../../content/tours.json" with { type: "json" };
-import { parseTour, type Tour } from "../../schemas/tour.ts";
-import { verifiedPageGraph } from "./content-graph.ts";
-
-const pageIds = new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.id));
-export const tours: readonly Tour[] = Object.freeze(rawTours.map(parseTour));
-for (const tour of tours) {
-  if (!pageIds.has(tour.page)) throw new TypeError(`unknown tour page ${tour.page}`);
-  for (const related of tour.related) if (!pageIds.has(related)) throw new TypeError(`${tour.page} references unknown related page ${related}`);
-}
-
-export function tourByPage(page: string): Tour {
-  const tour = tours.find((candidate) => candidate.page === page);
-  if (!tour) throw new TypeError(`unknown tour ${page}`);
-  return tour;
-}
diff --git a/app/operations/execution-lifecycle/page.tsx b/app/operations/execution-lifecycle/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 8a445e9..0000000
--- a/app/operations/execution-lifecycle/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { SemanticTourPage } from "../../components/SemanticTourPage";
-export default function Page() { return <SemanticTourPage pageId="auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/operations/page.tsx b/app/operations/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 2807f13..0000000
--- a/app/operations/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
-export default function Page() { return <TopicLandingPage pageId="auths.page.operations.runtime/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/page.tsx b/app/page.tsx
index 37ca1f3..6f2999b 100644
--- a/app/page.tsx
+++ b/app/page.tsx
@@ -1,236 +1,61 @@
+import type { Metadata } from "next";
 import Link from "next/link";
+import { Recipe } from "./components/docs/ProductBlocks";
 import { SiteFooter } from "./components/SiteFooter";
 import { SiteHeader } from "./components/SiteHeader";
+import { homepage } from "./lib/site-registry";
 
-const starts = [
-  {
-    number: "01",
-    eyebrow: "Application developers",
-    title: "Protect one API effect",
-    description:
-      "Give a caller authority for one exact action, then reject replay or changed bytes.",
-    href: "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect",
-    cta: "Start the 10-minute guide",
-  },
-  {
-    number: "02",
-    eyebrow: "Agent builders",
-    title: "Delegate without widening",
-    description:
-      "Let an agent do less than its parent—bounded by action, time, uses, and depth.",
-    href: "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation",
-    cta: "Delegate to an agent",
-  },
-  {
-    number: "03",
-    eyebrow: "Security teams",
-    title: "Verify what happened",
-    description:
-      "Read a safe receipt summary, then disclose details only to an authorized viewer.",
-    href: "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification",
-    cta: "Verify a receipt",
-  },
-];
-
-const layers = [
-  {
-    label: "Start",
-    title: "Five verbs",
-    value: "create · delegate · execute · resume · verify",
-  },
-  {
-    label: "Build",
-    title: "Exact authority",
-    value: "actor · action · bounds · approvals · outcome",
-  },
-  {
-    label: "Inspect",
-    title: "Evidence",
-    value: "commitments · lifecycle · receipt · disclosure",
-  },
-];
+export const metadata: Metadata = {
+  title: { absolute: homepage.title },
+  description: homepage.description,
+  alternates: { canonical: "/" },
+};
 
 export default function Home() {
   return (
     <div className="site-frame">
       <SiteHeader />
       <main>
-        <section className="hero shell">
-          <div className="hero-copy">
-            <div className="status-pill">
-              <span aria-hidden="true" className="status-dot" />
-              Open documentation · v1
-            </div>
-            <p className="kicker">Proof-carrying authority</p>
-            <h1>
-              Authority for the exact thing.
-              <span> Nothing more.</span>
-            </h1>
-            <p className="hero-lede">
-              Auths gives people and agents precise, portable permission to do
-              one bounded thing—and leaves cryptographic evidence of what
-              actually happened.
-            </p>
-            <div className="hero-actions">
-              <Link className="button button-primary" href="/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect">
-                Protect your first effect
-                <span aria-hidden="true">↗</span>
-              </Link>
-              <a className="button button-quiet" href="#model">
-                Understand the model
-                <span aria-hidden="true">↓</span>
-              </a>
-            </div>
-            <div className="hero-meta" aria-label="Supported SDKs">
-              <span>Rust</span>
-              <span>TypeScript</span>
-              <span>Python</span>
-              <span className="hero-meta-note">One semantic core</span>
-            </div>
+        <section className="rebuild-hero shell">
+          <div className="rebuild-status">{homepage.status.map((label) => <span key={label}>{label}</span>)}</div>
+          <p className="kicker">{homepage.hero.kicker}</p>
+          <h1>{homepage.hero.title}</h1>
+          <p className="hero-lede">{homepage.hero.description}</p>
+          <div className="hero-actions">
+            {homepage.hero.actions.map((action) => <Link className={`button button-${action.kind}`} href={action.href} key={action.href}>{action.label}{action.kind === "primary" && <span aria-hidden="true"> →</span>}</Link>)}
           </div>
+          <p className="release-caveat">{homepage.hero.caveat}</p>
+        </section>
 
-          <div className="authority-demo" aria-label="Example bounded authority">
-            <div className="demo-topline">
-              <span>AUTHORITY / LIVE PROJECTION</span>
-              <span className="demo-verified">● VERIFIED</span>
-            </div>
-            <div className="demo-command">
-              <span className="method">POST</span>
-              <code>/v1/refunds/rf_82k</code>
-            </div>
-            <div className="demo-grid">
-              <div>
-                <span>Actor</span>
-                <strong>support-agent-17</strong>
-              </div>
-              <div>
-                <span>Uses</span>
-                <strong>1 of 1</strong>
-              </div>
-              <div>
-                <span>Expires</span>
-                <strong>09m 42s</strong>
-              </div>
-              <div>
-                <span>Region</span>
-                <strong>eu-west only</strong>
-              </div>
-            </div>
-            <div className="commitment-block">
-              <span>Action commitment</span>
-              <code>7f4b·e29c·103a·9d81·6c20·a44f</code>
-            </div>
-            <div className="demo-flow" aria-label="Create, delegate, execute, verify">
-              {[
-                ["01", "Create"],
-                ["02", "Delegate"],
-                ["03", "Execute"],
-                ["04", "Verify"],
-              ].map(([number, label], index) => (
-                <div className="demo-step" key={number}>
-                  <span>{number}</span>
-                  <strong>{label}</strong>
-                  {index < 3 && <i aria-hidden="true">→</i>}
-                </div>
-              ))}
-            </div>
-            <div className="demo-foot">
-              <span>Authority can only get narrower</span>
-              <span>Fail closed</span>
-            </div>
-          </div>
+        <section className="truth-strip" aria-label="What does not authorize an effect">
+          <div className="shell"><strong>{homepage.nonAuthorization.title}</strong>{homepage.nonAuthorization.items.map((item) => <span key={item}>{item}</span>)}</div>
         </section>
 
-        <section className="start-section shell" aria-labelledby="start-heading">
-          <div className="section-heading">
-            <p className="kicker">Start with an outcome</p>
-            <h2 id="start-heading">What are you trying to protect?</h2>
-            <p>Choose a concrete result. The deeper machinery waits until you need it.</p>
-          </div>
-          <div className="start-grid">
-            {starts.map((item) => (
-              <Link className="start-card" href={item.href} key={item.number}>
-                <div className="card-number">{item.number}</div>
-                <p>{item.eyebrow}</p>
-                <h3>{item.title}</h3>
-                <span className="card-rule" />
-                <div className="card-description">{item.description}</div>
-                <strong>
-                  {item.cta} <span aria-hidden="true">→</span>
-                </strong>
-              </Link>
-            ))}
-          </div>
+        <section className="outcome-paths shell">
+          <header className="section-heading"><p className="kicker">{homepage.outcomes.kicker}</p><h2>{homepage.outcomes.title}</h2><p>{homepage.outcomes.description}</p></header>
+          <div className="outcome-path-grid">{homepage.outcomes.items.map((path) => <Link href={path.href} key={path.label}><span>{path.label}</span><h3>{path.title}</h3><p>{path.description}</p><strong>Open path →</strong></Link>)}</div>
         </section>
 
-        <section className="model-section" id="model">
-          <div className="shell model-layout">
-            <div className="model-copy">
-              <p className="kicker kicker-light">Progressive by design</p>
-              <h2>One idea, revealed at the depth you need.</h2>
-              <p>
-                Begin with five verbs. Descend into lifecycle, custody, profiles,
-                and formal evidence without changing vocabulary or switching products.
-              </p>
-              <Link className="text-link text-link-light" href="/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect">
-                See progressive disclosure in practice <span aria-hidden="true">↗</span>
-              </Link>
-            </div>
-            <div className="layer-stack">
-              {layers.map((layer, index) => (
-                <div className="layer-card" key={layer.label}>
-                  <span className="layer-index">0{index + 1}</span>
-                  <div>
-                    <p>{layer.label}</p>
-                    <h3>{layer.title}</h3>
-                    <code>{layer.value}</code>
-                  </div>
-                </div>
-              ))}
+        <section className="four-planes">
+          <div className="shell">
+            <header><p className="kicker kicker-light">{homepage.separation.kicker}</p><h2>{homepage.separation.title}</h2></header>
+            <div className="plane-grid">
+              {homepage.separation.planes.map((plane) => <article key={plane.number}><span>{plane.number}</span><h3>{plane.title}</h3><p>{plane.description}</p></article>)}
             </div>
+            <p className="plane-rule">{homepage.separation.rule}</p>
           </div>
         </section>
 
-        <section className="receipt-section shell" id="receipts">
-          <div className="receipt-preview">
-            <div className="receipt-paper">
-              <div className="receipt-head">
-                <span>AUTHS / RECEIPT</span>
-                <span>SUMMARY</span>
-              </div>
-              <div className="receipt-status">Completed</div>
-              <dl>
-                <div><dt>Action</dt><dd>Issue one refund</dd></div>
-                <div><dt>Actor</dt><dd>support-agent-17</dd></div>
-                <div><dt>Outcome</dt><dd>Effect confirmed</dd></div>
-                <div><dt>Disclosure</dt><dd>Bounded summary</dd></div>
-              </dl>
-              <div className="receipt-hash">commitment 7f4b·e29c·103a·9d81</div>
-            </div>
-          </div>
-          <div className="receipt-copy">
-            <p className="kicker">Evidence without oversharing</p>
-            <h2>Know what happened. Reveal only what is appropriate.</h2>
-            <p>
-              Receipts bind authority, application bytes, context, and outcome.
-              Start with a human-safe summary; require explicit authorization for
-              sensitive detail.
-            </p>
-            <div className="receipt-levels">
-              <div><span>01</span><strong>Opaque</strong><small>Existence only</small></div>
-              <div><span>02</span><strong>Summary</strong><small>Safe operations view</small></div>
-              <div><span>03</span><strong>Full</strong><small>Authorized disclosure</small></div>
-            </div>
-          </div>
+        <section className="real-code shell">
+          <header className="section-heading"><p className="kicker">{homepage.recipe.kicker}</p><h2>{homepage.recipe.title}</h2><p>{homepage.recipe.description}</p></header>
+          <Recipe id={homepage.recipe.id} />
         </section>
 
-        <section className="closing-cta shell">
-          <p className="kicker">Ten minutes to first proof</p>
-          <h2>Protect one real application effect.</h2>
-          <p>Use your preferred SDK. The semantics stay in the Auths core.</p>
-          <Link className="button button-primary" href="/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect">
-            Open the guide <span aria-hidden="true">↗</span>
-          </Link>
+        <section className="docs-depth shell">
+          <header className="section-heading"><p className="kicker">{homepage.disclosure.kicker}</p><h2>{homepage.disclosure.title}</h2></header>
+          <div className="docs-depth-grid">
+            {homepage.disclosure.items.map((item) => <Link href={item.href} key={item.href}><span>{item.label}</span><strong>{item.description}</strong></Link>)}
+          </div>
         </section>
       </main>
       <SiteFooter />
diff --git a/app/reference/page.tsx b/app/reference/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index bf591b2..0000000
--- a/app/reference/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import { TopicLandingPage } from "../components/TopicLandingPage";
-export default function Page() { return <TopicLandingPage pageId="auths.page.reference/1" />; }
diff --git a/app/reference/runtime-api/page.tsx b/app/reference/runtime-api/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 3757640..0000000
--- a/app/reference/runtime-api/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-import type { Metadata } from "next";
-import { RuntimeReference } from "../../components/RuntimeReference";
-import { SiteHeader } from "../../components/SiteHeader";
-
-export const metadata: Metadata = {
-  title: "Runtime API Reference",
-  description: "The HTTPS contract for the Auths production runtime.",
-};
-
-export default function RuntimeApiReferencePage() {
-  return <div className="site-frame sdk-site"><SiteHeader compact /><RuntimeReference /></div>;
-}
diff --git a/app/reference/sdk/page.tsx b/app/reference/sdk/page.tsx
deleted file mode 100644
index 61c46ae..0000000
--- a/app/reference/sdk/page.tsx
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-import type { Metadata } from "next";
-import { SdkReference } from "../../components/SdkReference";
-import { SiteHeader } from "../../components/SiteHeader";
-
-export const metadata: Metadata = {
-  title: "SDK Reference",
-  description: "The Auths product verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.",
-};
-
-export default function SdkReferencePage() {
-  return <div className="site-frame sdk-site"><SiteHeader compact /><SdkReference /></div>;
-}
diff --git a/content-v2/README.md b/content-v2/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..507fd73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# Auths editorial content
+
+This directory is the active editorial layer for the Auths documentation.
+Every public documentation route other than the custom homepage resolves from
+this content through the canonical navigation registry.
+
+## Authoring boundary
+
+- MDX owns explanation, ordering, diagrams, caveats, and links between reader
+  tasks.
+- Product-owned recipes own runnable source. Pages embed a recipe with
+  `<Recipe id="..." />`; they do not copy or rewrite it or invent output the
+  product evidence did not capture.
+- Product reference data owns public symbols, signatures, result variants,
+  limits, and stable codes. Editorial pages link to that generated reference.
+- `navigation.json` is the sole owner of routes, navigation placement, groups,
+  and page ordering; file placement and frontmatter do not silently create or
+  reorder navigation.
+
+The projection supplies these source-backed components:
+
+- `Recipe`, resolved from `auths-proof/bindings/recipes/manifest.json`, with
+  optional `language="typescript"` or `language="python"` selection.
+- `RepositoryExample`, resolved from a pinned `auths-proof` artifact and never
+  from an editable copy in this repository.
+
+Neither component may fabricate expected output. If its source cannot be
+built and run, the page must show `Repository preview` rather than
+`Qualified`, `Verified`, or `Executable`.
+
+`code-walkthroughs.json` divides pinned source into short, explained steps. Its
+line ranges must cover every non-empty source line, may not overlap, and are
+validated against the pinned snapshot during projection. Ordinary Markdown
+tables and generated reference tables both render through the shared
+documentation table component.
+
+## Editorial rules
+
+Every page answers a distinct question. It must say what can reach a provider,
+whether retry is safe, and what changes between development and production.
+Concept chapters include a worked example and failure cases. Operational
+guides include a stop condition and recovery direction.
+
+Author-only criteria and provenance belong in `{/* MDX comments */}` at the
+end of a source file. The projector removes those comments from browser,
+Markdown, search, and LLM surfaces, and the editorial-leakage audit fails if
+they escape.
+
+This directory contains no compatibility aliases for the previous page graph.
+The product is prelaunch, so route and content changes are direct replacements
+validated by the complete site audit.
diff --git a/content-v2/REFERENCE_AUTHORING.md b/content-v2/REFERENCE_AUTHORING.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85a7541
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/REFERENCE_AUTHORING.md
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# Reference authoring
+
+The active Auths reference and examples pages live under `content-v2` and are
+registered in `navigation.json`.
+
+The files follow one boundary:
+
+- MDX owns explanation, reader choices, security guidance, and source links.
+- Auths release artifacts own symbols, signatures, stable codes, registries,
+  limits, runtime support, fixture counts, and other enumerated product facts.
+
+The source-backed components are intentionally narrow:
+
+- `GeneratedReference` renders a selected projection of a pinned product
+  artifact and fails the build when the artifact is absent or malformed.
+- `StableCodeTable` renders the normative code taxonomy and augments each code
+  with editorially maintained safe-response guidance keyed by the exact code.
+- `DemoGallery` renders a curated set of repository demos; the questions and
+  grouping are editorial, while links and maturity evidence are checked
+  against the pinned source tree.
+
+None of these components may accept copied declarations or fabricated output
+as fallback data. Missing structured evidence must remain visibly unavailable,
+and repository-only evidence must link to the exact pinned source revision.
+
+Use ordinary Markdown tables for editorial comparisons; the shared table
+component supplies accessible semantics and presentation. Use `Recipe` or
+`RepositoryExample` for maintained source. Their line ranges and explanations
+are owned by `code-walkthroughs.json`, so public tutorials remain digestible
+without forking product code.
diff --git a/content-v2/code-walkthroughs.json b/content-v2/code-walkthroughs.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..35aa25e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/code-walkthroughs.json
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.code-walkthroughs/1",
+  "recipes": {
+    "01-authenticate-identity": {
+      "typescript": [
+        { "id": "load-identity-tools", "title": "Load the identity adapters", "description": "Import the identity registry, raw-key method, and Ed25519 authentication suite used by this maintained recipe.", "startLine": 1, "endLine": 5 },
+        { "id": "exchange-public-identity", "title": "Exchange bounded public identity bytes", "description": "Generate a key, encode only its public material, then parse the received packet through the selected method.", "startLine": 7, "endLine": 13 },
+        { "id": "sign-and-authenticate", "title": "Authenticate the exact message", "description": "Sign the identity-owned preimage and authenticate the encoded message against the received identity.", "startLine": 14, "endLine": 27 },
+        { "id": "reject-changed-message", "title": "Reject changed application bytes", "description": "Reuse the signature with different message bytes and require the authentication attempt to fail closed.", "startLine": 28, "endLine": 39 },
+        { "id": "report-authentication", "title": "Report the asserted outcome", "description": "The recipe emits only its declared authentication result and mutation check.", "startLine": 40, "endLine": 40 }
+      ],
+      "python": [
+        { "id": "load-identity-tools", "title": "Load the identity adapters", "description": "Import the identity registry, verification types, and development-only method and signature suite.", "startLine": 1, "endLine": 13 },
+        { "id": "exchange-public-identity", "title": "Encode the verification relationship", "description": "Construct the bounded public verification relationship and encode it into an identity packet.", "startLine": 16, "endLine": 27 },
+        { "id": "sign-and-authenticate", "title": "Validate and authenticate", "description": "Resolve the packet through the explicit registry and authenticate the exact report-publishing bytes.", "startLine": 28, "endLine": 35 },
+        { "id": "reject-changed-message", "title": "Reject changed application bytes", "description": "Authenticate different bytes and require the development suite to reject the changed signature.", "startLine": 36, "endLine": 44 },
+        { "id": "report-authentication", "title": "Report the asserted outcome", "description": "Emit the declared result, then run the owned asynchronous entry point.", "startLine": 45, "endLine": 57 }
+      ]
+    },
+    "02-verify-authority": {
+      "typescript": [
+        { "id": "prepare-verifier", "title": "Prepare the verifier", "description": "Load the fixture reader and the effect-free verifier entry point.", "startLine": 1, "endLine": 5 },
+        { "id": "load-canonical-inputs", "title": "Load all three canonical inputs", "description": "Read proof, action, and trusted-context bytes independently; none is inferred from another.", "startLine": 6, "endLine": 10 },
+        { "id": "verify-authority", "title": "Require an authorized verdict", "description": "Verify the exact tuple and stop unless the result is explicitly authorized.", "startLine": 11, "endLine": 13 },
+        { "id": "mutate-and-deny", "title": "Prove changed bytes do not inherit authority", "description": "Flip one action byte, accept either bounded parse rejection or a non-authorized verdict, and assert fail-closed behavior.", "startLine": 14, "endLine": 23 }
+      ],
+      "python": [
+        { "id": "prepare-verifier", "title": "Prepare the verifier", "description": "Load the filesystem inputs and the effect-free Python verifier.", "startLine": 1, "endLine": 8 },
+        { "id": "load-canonical-inputs", "title": "Load all three canonical inputs", "description": "Read proof, action, and trusted-context bytes from the maintained fixture.", "startLine": 10, "endLine": 13 },
+        { "id": "verify-authority", "title": "Require an authorized verdict", "description": "Verify the exact tuple and stop unless the result is explicitly authorized.", "startLine": 14, "endLine": 16 },
+        { "id": "mutate-and-deny", "title": "Prove changed bytes do not inherit authority", "description": "Mutate the action, require rejection, and emit only the recipe's declared verdict and mutation result.", "startLine": 17, "endLine": 33 }
+      ]
+    },
+    "03-execute-exact-action": {
+      "typescript": [
+        { "id": "close-the-provider", "title": "Put one handler behind a closed provider", "description": "Register the only provider operation and create development authority for that exact tool name.", "startLine": 1, "endLine": 14 },
+        { "id": "execute-allowed-action", "title": "Execute and verify the allowed action", "description": "Send the exact profile-owned action, require completion, and verify its returned receipt.", "startLine": 15, "endLine": 22 },
+        { "id": "deny-undeclared-action", "title": "Deny an undeclared action before entry", "description": "Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter did not advance.", "startLine": 23, "endLine": 28 },
+        { "id": "report-and-close", "title": "Report the trace and close owned state", "description": "Emit the declared result and close the development runtime even when the workflow throws.", "startLine": 29, "endLine": 32 }
+      ],
+      "python": [
+        { "id": "close-the-provider", "title": "Put one handler behind a closed provider", "description": "Register the only provider operation and count every entry into that effect boundary.", "startLine": 1, "endLine": 19 },
+        { "id": "execute-allowed-action", "title": "Execute and verify the allowed action", "description": "Open the owned development session, execute the exact action, and verify its receipt.", "startLine": 20, "endLine": 30 },
+        { "id": "deny-undeclared-action", "title": "Deny an undeclared action before entry", "description": "Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter stayed at one.", "startLine": 31, "endLine": 37 },
+        { "id": "report-and-close", "title": "Report the trace through the owned entry point", "description": "Leave the session before emitting the declared result, then run the asynchronous entry point.", "startLine": 38, "endLine": 51 }
+      ]
+    },
+    "04-delegate-to-agent": {
+      "typescript": [
+        { "id": "prepare-parent-authority", "title": "Prepare the parent authority", "description": "The parent can publish or delete, while the provider exposes only the operation used in this proof.", "startLine": 1, "endLine": 8 },
+        { "id": "attenuate-agent", "title": "Delegate a narrower, expiring authority", "description": "Create an agent that can publish—but cannot inherit the parent's delete permission.", "startLine": 9, "endLine": 15 },
+        { "id": "exercise-boundaries", "title": "Exercise replay and widening boundaries", "description": "Repeat the same request identity, then ask the agent for the broader undelegated action.", "startLine": 16, "endLine": 22 },
+        { "id": "assert-and-close", "title": "Assert one provider entry and close", "description": "Require completed, exact-replay, and denied outcomes with exactly one provider call.", "startLine": 23, "endLine": 29 }
+      ],
+      "python": [
+        { "id": "prepare-parent-authority", "title": "Prepare the parent authority", "description": "Define the counted provider handler used to observe whether an effect boundary was entered.", "startLine": 1, "endLine": 18 },
+        { "id": "attenuate-agent", "title": "Delegate a narrower, expiring authority", "description": "Open the parent session and give the agent only publish authority for five minutes.", "startLine": 19, "endLine": 27 },
+        { "id": "exercise-boundaries", "title": "Exercise replay and widening boundaries", "description": "Repeat the same request identity, then ask the agent for the broader undelegated action.", "startLine": 28, "endLine": 38 },
+        { "id": "assert-and-close", "title": "Assert one provider entry and report", "description": "Require completed, exact-replay, and denied outcomes with exactly one provider call, then emit the trace.", "startLine": 39, "endLine": 58 }
+      ]
+    },
+    "05-cross-organization-plan": {
+      "typescript": [
+        { "id": "load-recovery-tools", "title": "Load recovery and approval tools", "description": "Import the filesystem, child-process, approval, profile, and receipt primitives used by the maintained scenario.", "startLine": 1, "endLine": 13 },
+        { "id": "route-restart-phases", "title": "Route the restart phases", "description": "The same source can verify a receipt, run either durable phase, or orchestrate both across process boundaries.", "startLine": 15, "endLine": 33 },
+        { "id": "model-provider-uncertainty", "title": "Model a provider-unknown outcome", "description": "The first runtime records that token rotation may have applied instead of claiming success or retrying.", "startLine": 35, "endLine": 47 },
+        { "id": "stop-and-persist", "title": "Stop the ordered plan and persist recovery state", "description": "Execute the exact two-member plan, require one completed member, then persist its reference and receipt.", "startLine": 48, "endLine": 62 },
+        { "id": "reconcile-without-reentry", "title": "Configure reconciliation without provider re-entry", "description": "After restart, direct handler entry is an error; only the provider-specific reconcile path may classify the prior attempt.", "startLine": 64, "endLine": 81 },
+        { "id": "resume-original-execution", "title": "Resume the original execution", "description": "Decode the persisted reference, reconcile to completion, verify the receipt, and never enter a provider handler twice.", "startLine": 82, "endLine": 91 },
+        { "id": "bind-threshold-approval", "title": "Bind two organizations to the exact plan", "description": "Require both organization-specific providers and cap the approval policy to the plan's two uses.", "startLine": 93, "endLine": 103 },
+        { "id": "echo-approval-commitment", "title": "Echo the approval commitment", "description": "Each approval response returns the exact request identifier, transaction digest, and policy it evaluated.", "startLine": 105, "endLine": 116 },
+        { "id": "enforce-child-success", "title": "Treat every phase as an owned process", "description": "Fail on an unsuccessful child phase and reject missing recovery paths.", "startLine": 118, "endLine": 126 }
+      ],
+      "python": [
+        { "id": "load-recovery-tools", "title": "Load recovery and approval tools", "description": "Import the process, persistence, approval, profile, and receipt primitives used by the maintained scenario.", "startLine": 1, "endLine": 17 },
+        { "id": "bind-threshold-approval", "title": "Bind two organizations to the exact plan", "description": "Each organization echoes the exact approval request, and the threshold policy requires both responses.", "startLine": 20, "endLine": 35 },
+        { "id": "model-provider-uncertainty", "title": "Model a provider-unknown outcome", "description": "The first provider records that rotation may have applied rather than claiming success or retrying.", "startLine": 38, "endLine": 51 },
+        { "id": "construct-ordered-plan", "title": "Construct the recoverable ordered plan", "description": "Open durable state and commit quarantine followed by rotation in one exact order.", "startLine": 52, "endLine": 65 },
+        { "id": "stop-and-persist", "title": "Stop and persist recovery state", "description": "Require one completed member, then persist the execution reference and completed receipt.", "startLine": 66, "endLine": 80 },
+        { "id": "define-reconciliation", "title": "Define reconciliation without provider re-entry", "description": "After restart, direct handler entry is an error; reconciliation inspects the provider-specific evidence.", "startLine": 83, "endLine": 95 },
+        { "id": "reopen-durable-runtime", "title": "Reopen the same durable runtime", "description": "Recreate the same authority and approval policy with handlers that must remain unreachable.", "startLine": 96, "endLine": 107 },
+        { "id": "resume-original-execution", "title": "Resume the original execution", "description": "Decode the persisted reference, reconcile to completion, verify the receipt, and persist it.", "startLine": 108, "endLine": 117 },
+        { "id": "route-restart-phases", "title": "Route each owned phase", "description": "Run either verification or a durable execution phase in a separate process invocation.", "startLine": 120, "endLine": 136 },
+        { "id": "orchestrate-restart", "title": "Orchestrate both sides of the restart", "description": "Use a configured durable directory or an isolated temporary one, then run both phases in order.", "startLine": 137, "endLine": 147 },
+        { "id": "report-recovery", "title": "Report the no-duplicate outcome", "description": "Emit the declared completed-after-restart result through the owned asynchronous entry point.", "startLine": 148, "endLine": 160 }
+      ]
+    }
+  },
+  "repositoryExamples": {
+    "demos/offline-verification": {
+      "rust": [
+        { "id": "load-inputs", "title": "Load the verifier and canonical inputs", "description": "Import the verifier ports and embed the proof, action, and trusted-context fixture bytes.", "startLine": 1, "endLine": 7 },
+        { "id": "build-trusted-context", "title": "Build the verifier-owned context", "description": "Register accepted adapters and bind the exact executable configuration and required plan outside the proof.", "startLine": 9, "endLine": 24 },
+        { "id": "verify-once", "title": "Verify without executing", "description": "Run the offline kernel and project bounded diagnostic and work information from the result.", "startLine": 26, "endLine": 37 },
+        { "id": "inspect-commitments", "title": "Inspect portable commitments", "description": "Read proof, action, context, and configuration commitments without acquiring any execution capability.", "startLine": 38, "endLine": 47 },
+        { "id": "handle-every-verdict", "title": "Handle every verdict fail closed", "description": "Continue only for authorized results that satisfy the host-required plan; denied and indeterminate both stop.", "startLine": 49, "endLine": 63 }
+      ]
+    }
+  }
+}
diff --git a/content-v2/concepts/authority-model.mdx b/content-v2/concepts/authority-model.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f9fdf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/concepts/authority-model.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+---
+title: Authority model
+description: Understand how local trust anchors, attenuating grants, exact action constraints, and bounded plans produce authority that cannot widen in transit.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Authority flows downward from local trust
+
+Auths does not ask a global authority service whether a request is allowed. A
+verifier starts from its own scoped trust anchors, follows an exact chain of
+signed grants, evaluates any authorization plan, and checks that the terminal
+authority covers one canonical action.
+
+The key invariant is simple:
+
+> Every delegation edge may preserve or narrow authority. No edge may expand
+> it.
+
+This chapter explains the objects that make that invariant testable.
+
+## Trust anchors are local policy
+
+A trust anchor is configured by the verifier. It is not carried inside the
+proof and cannot be added by the caller. An anchor names a principal and exact
+control methods, then sets ceilings for profiles, permissions, resources,
+audiences, validity, budget, delegation depth, assurance, and status policy.
+
+This lets two verifiers evaluate the same proof under different local trust.
+One may trust a Northstar operations root for `edge://northstar/eu-west-2`;
+another may not. Adding a separate trust anchor does not authorize a chain that
+cannot link to it.
+
+## Grants transfer a bounded subset
+
+A grant links an issuer to a subject and an exact parent. The first grant is
+bounded by a local anchor. Every child is bounded by its parent.
+
+Consider this worked chain:
+
+| Dimension | Northstar anchor | Operations service | Report agent |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Permission | publish, delete | publish, delete | publish only |
+| Resource | all Northstar reports | weekly reports | report `2026-W33` |
+| Audience | reporting gateway | reporting gateway | reporting gateway |
+| Validity | 24 hours | 2 hours | 5 minutes |
+| Uses | 100 | 10 | 1 |
+| Delegation depth | 2 | 1 | 0 |
+
+The agent grant is valid because each column is equal to or narrower than the
+one before it. It cannot delete a report, switch to a different audience,
+recover the parent's validity window, increase the use count, or delegate
+again.
+
+If any child field widens, verification returns a denied result such as
+`delegation-expanded` before execution gates or provider entry.
+
+## Exact action constraints bind application bytes
+
+Permission and resource are not always enough. “Publish this report” and
+“publish a changed report” might share both. V1 therefore includes a closed
+action-constraint algebra:
+
+- one exact canonical body digest;
+- a bounded allowed set of body digests; or
+- any body, where the profile and parent authority explicitly permit it.
+
+An exact digest may attenuate an allowed set that contains it, and either may
+attenuate `AnyBody`. The opposite direction is widening. Application callbacks
+cannot redefine that order.
+
+The profile is responsible for canonical application bytes. JSON that is
+semantically “similar” but byte-distinct is not assumed equivalent unless the
+profile's canonicalization makes it so before signing and verification.
+
+## The action envelope connects authority to intent
+
+A signed action envelope binds more than a payload digest. It includes the
+profile and version, media type, capability, resource, optional requested
+budget, audience, challenge, validity, actor, terminal grant, plan identity,
+channel requirement, attachments, and critical extensions.
+
+The verifier compares the supplied canonical action with all of these fields.
+The executor later consumes the command decoded from `VerifiedAction`, never a
+lookalike request supplied alongside it.
+
+## Authorization plans
+
+Some operations require more than one proof branch. V1 provides bounded:
+
+- `Proof` for one branch;
+- `AllOf` for every child;
+- `AnyOf` for at least one child; and
+- `KOfN` for a threshold.
+
+Every satisfied branch must bind the same canonical action meaning and plan.
+A proof-carried plan is still not the verifier's local policy. The trusted
+context supplies a separate composition requirement that can pin the plan and
+require branch count, distinct actors, or distinct trust roots.
+
+For example, a two-company remediation may use `AllOf` with one Northstar
+branch and one EdgeShield branch. Local policy can require two distinct actors
+and two distinct roots. Two signatures from the same root cannot satisfy that
+diversity merely because they occupy different proof references.
+
+## Status and assurance stay role-specific
+
+Principal status and grant status are separate signed facts. Current control,
+historical control, statement existence, freshness, and revocation are not
+interchangeable. A newer revocation cannot be ignored in favor of an older
+active statement.
+
+Assurance applies to roles in the chain. A strong terminal actor does not
+repair insufficient assurance for the root or an intermediate delegator.
+Adapters establish the bounded evidence; they cannot decide that the chain is
+authorized.
+
+## Critical extensions do not disappear
+
+The first grant may establish a critical-extension set. In V1, every child
+must preserve that complete canonical set byte for byte unless a standardized,
+versioned attenuation algebra says otherwise. An agent cannot omit an
+extension it does not understand and continue under a weaker interpretation.
+
+Unknown required extensions fail closed.
+
+## What authority does not include
+
+Proof authority does not count prior uses, reserve a shared budget, establish a
+live channel, or execute the effect. Those are stateful execution-plane gates.
+An authorized action must still pass freshness, channel, replay, budget, and
+application policy before a profile can create an executable command.
+
+That distinction makes offline verification repeatable. It also prevents an
+old authorized result from becoming a reusable execution token.
+
+## Failure cases to recognize
+
+| Change | Result | Provider reachable? |
+| --- | --- | ---: |
+| Child adds a permission | denied: delegation expanded | no |
+| Action body differs from the signed digest | denied: action body mismatch | no |
+| Required status is missing | indeterminate | no |
+| Grant is explicitly revoked | denied | no |
+| Required profile is unavailable | indeterminate | no |
+| Exact execution identity already completed | exact replay at outer runtime | no new entry |
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Delegate to an agent](/guides/delegate-agent)
+- [Approvals and ordered plans](/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans)
+- [Verification model](/guides/verification-model)
+- [Protocol limits and identifiers](/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers)
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+The normative model is defined by
+[Protocol V1](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/core/spec/v1/protocol.md),
+the canonical
+[CDDL](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/core/spec/v1/auths-proof.cddl),
+and the checked-in conformance corpus.
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/concepts/verification-model.mdx b/content-v2/concepts/verification-model.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d560785
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/concepts/verification-model.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+---
+title: Verification model
+description: Follow the six deterministic verifier stages from bounded decoding to exact action binding, then see why execution remains outside the kernel.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Verification is a sealed, deterministic pipeline
+
+Auths verification takes three explicit inputs—proof bytes, canonical action
+bytes, and trusted-context bytes—and produces a canonical result. The same
+valid inputs and executable registry configuration must produce the same
+verdict, primary stable code, commitments, assurance report, and bounded work
+totals in every conforming implementation.
+
+The verifier performs no network, filesystem, environment, clock, randomness,
+database, private-key, replay, or provider operation. This makes its meaning
+portable and its failures inspectable.
+
+## The six stages
+
+```text
+proof + canonical action + trusted context
+            |
+            v
+1. bounded decode
+            |
+            v
+2. reference resolution
+            |
+            v
+3. principal control
+            |
+            v
+4. authority branches
+            |
+            v
+5. plan evaluation
+            |
+            v
+6. exact action binding
+            |
+            v
+authorized | denied | indeterminate
+```
+
+Each successful stage produces a narrower typed value. Later code cannot
+pretend that raw bytes already passed an earlier check.
+
+### 1. Bounded decode
+
+The decoder enforces size and collection limits before expensive work. It
+rejects non-canonical CBOR, duplicate or invalid map keys, unsorted sets,
+unknown critical fields, invalid UTF-8, trailing bytes, and overflowing
+collections.
+
+Representative stable failures include `malformed-proof`,
+`non-canonical-proof`, and `resource-limit-exceeded`. A permissive fallback
+decoder would change protocol meaning and is not allowed.
+
+### 2. Reference resolution
+
+The resolver recomputes identifiers for grants, actions, plans, evidence,
+status, and attachments. It builds bounded indexes and rejects missing,
+duplicate, mismatched, cyclic, ambiguous, or unused-critical references.
+
+Failures such as `digest-mismatch`, `duplicate-object`, and
+`missing-reference` stop the entire proof structure. No signature or provider
+work can repair an incoherent graph.
+
+### 3. Principal control
+
+For each signed statement, the verifier selects exactly one accepted principal
+method and signature suite, reserves their maximum work, verifies the
+domain-separated signature, evaluates method-specific control, and requires
+the adapter's consumed evidence IDs to match the signed binding exactly.
+
+Invalid supplied evidence is denied—for example `invalid-signature` or
+`verification-method-mismatch`. A required but unavailable method or evidence
+is indeterminate—for example `unsupported-principal-method` or
+`missing-principal-evidence`.
+
+Adapters return bounded facts and assurance claims. They cannot manufacture
+authority results.
+
+### 4. Authority branches
+
+Each plan leaf is checked from a local trust anchor through its exact grant
+chain to the terminal actor. Profile, permissions, resources, audiences,
+validity, body constraints, budgets, status, assurance, delegation depth, and
+critical extensions must remain within their ceilings.
+
+Common failures include `untrusted-root`, `broken-grant-chain`,
+`delegation-expanded`, `permission-not-granted`, and
+`action-constraint-mismatch`.
+
+### 5. Plan evaluation
+
+The verifier recomputes the plan identity, confirms every branch binds the
+same action meaning, evaluates bounded `Proof`, `AllOf`, `AnyOf`, and `KOfN`
+composition, then applies the verifier's independent required quorum and
+diversity constraints.
+
+Evaluation order is canonical. Even when one branch already satisfies an
+`AnyOf`, the verifier does not skip remaining branches for resource accounting.
+`plan-action-mismatch` and `composition-requirement-not-met` are denied
+outcomes.
+
+### 6. Exact action binding
+
+Finally, the verifier selects the exact profile/version and compares canonical
+body, media type, capability, resource, requested budget, audience, challenge,
+validity, actor, terminal grant, plan, channel requirement, attachments, and
+profile policy.
+
+Only this stage can privately construct `VerifiedAction`. It has no public
+constructor. Representative failures include `action-body-mismatch`,
+`audience-mismatch`, `challenge-mismatch`, `action-outside-validity`, and
+`attachment-digest-mismatch`.
+
+## Three diagnostics, one execution rule
+
+`Authorized` means every required proof and action-binding check passed.
+`Denied` means available facts establish invalidity or insufficient authority.
+`Indeterminate` means a required trustworthy fact or implementation was not
+available.
+
+The execution rule is binary: only authorized may continue. An indeterminate
+result is not a probabilistic allow. It is a precise request for missing trust
+input.
+
+Stable first-failure ordering makes languages and receipts agree on one
+primary diagnostic. It does not claim resistance to every timing or
+side-channel observation.
+
+## The outer gates are deliberately separate
+
+After authorization, the product runtime still requires:
+
+```text
+authorized action
+AND fresh status policy
+AND channel policy
+AND atomic replay claim
+AND stateful budget claim
+AND local application policy
+= executable action
+```
+
+The runtime decodes a domain command from the sealed verified action, writes a
+decision receipt, executes through the profile gateway, and writes an
+execution receipt. None of the outer facts may upgrade a denied or
+indeterminate verifier result.
+
+Because replay and provider outcomes live outside the kernel, repeating pure
+verification is safe. Repeating provider execution may not be.
+
+## Work a simple mutation example
+
+Start with a proof that authorizes canonical action `A`. Verify it against
+trusted context `C`; the result is authorized. Flip one byte in the action to
+produce `A′` while keeping the proof and context unchanged.
+
+If `A′` is no longer valid canonical input, bounded decode rejects it. If it is
+valid but has different meaning, exact action binding denies it. There is no
+path where signature validity over the original envelope authorizes the
+mutated action.
+
+You can run that exact cross-language check in
+[Verify existing authority](/guides/verify-authority).
+
+## Production implications
+
+Pin the verifier ABI and accepted registries. Bind required and executed
+configuration commitments. Acquire live status or identity evidence outside
+the kernel and supply bounded snapshots. Set resource limits before parsing
+hostile input. Handle every result variant exhaustively and keep protocol bytes
+out of ordinary logs.
+
+Auths is prelaunch and pre-audit. Deterministic fixtures, differential
+bindings, fuzzing, and formal work strengthen the implementation claim; they
+do not substitute for an independent security audit.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Verify existing authority](/guides/verify-authority)
+- [Authority model](/guides/authority-model)
+- [Execute one exact action](/guides/execute-exact-action)
+- [Stable results and errors](/reference/decisions-errors)
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+The stages and result semantics are normative in the
+[Verification Algorithm V1](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/core/spec/v1/verification-algorithm.md)
+and
+[Stable Failure Taxonomy](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/core/spec/v1/error-codes.md).
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/examples/index.mdx b/content-v2/examples/index.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..192e966
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/examples/index.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+---
+title: Examples by security question
+description: Choose a real Auths example by the boundary you need to evaluate, with explicit maturity and non-claims.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Examples by security question
+
+Examples are evidence, not decoration. Choose one by the security boundary you need to evaluate, run it from the pinned product source, and change the committed bytes or context to observe the fail-closed path. A polished interface is not proof that an authorization property holds.
+
+Do not choose an Auths example because its provider logo resembles your stack.
+Choose it because it tests the security question you need answered.
+
+Every example here is repository evidence, not a claim that the corresponding
+provider integration is a supported public SDK profile. Maturity labels
+distinguish a `Minimal example`, `Interactive demo`, `Production-shaped
+reference`, `Benchmark/testkit`, or `Demo integration`.
+
+The currently qualified public binding profile is generated from the pinned
+public topology. At present, provider-specific demos beyond that topology must
+remain labelled as demos even when their architecture is sophisticated.
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="qualified-profile-status"
+  source="bindings/public-topology-v1.json"
+  include="qualified profiles,framework contracts,artifact revision"
+/>
+
+## Can I verify authority without a service?
+
+Start with the offline verifier when your question is whether Auths can make a
+deterministic decision from explicit local bytes. This is the smallest proof
+of the protocol boundary: no resolver, network, database, clock, replay store,
+private key, or provider is involved.
+
+It proves the supported Rust facade can verify the committed proof, action,
+and trusted context as an external consumer. It does not prove runtime replay
+protection, provider execution, or production custody.
+
+<DemoGallery
+  question="Can I verify authority without a service?"
+  maturity="Minimal example"
+  sources={["demos/offline-verification"]}
+/>
+
+## Can an agent call one protected tool without receiving broad credentials?
+
+Use the MCP examples to evaluate the shortest supported closed-profile
+workflow. The important boundary is not that an agent can call a tool; it is
+that the configured provider is entered only for the exact authorized tool
+action, while an undeclared action is denied before provider entry.
+
+The live lab can help a reader inspect the stages interactively. The smaller
+MCP demo is better for understanding the native integration without unrelated
+application architecture.
+
+<DemoGallery
+  question="Can an agent call one protected tool without broad credentials?"
+  maturity="Interactive demo"
+  sources={["demos/mcp/auths-mcp-demo", "demos/live-lab", "demos/live-service"]}
+/>
+
+## Can two organizations authorize one exact joint response?
+
+The cross-company incident-response demo is the strongest collaboration
+journey. It combines separate identity systems, distinct organizations,
+threshold approval bound to the same ordered plan, diagnostic and remediation
+agents, closed provider gateways, HTTPS and Iroh delivery, durable reservation,
+unknown-outcome handling, and bounded receipt disclosure.
+
+It proves a production-shaped architecture and adversarial behavior end to
+end. Its hosted persistence, identity adapters, provider effects, and custody
+remain demo implementations rather than production services.
+
+<DemoGallery
+  question="Can two organizations authorize one exact joint response?"
+  maturity="Production-shaped reference"
+  sources={["demos/cross-company-incident-response"]}
+/>
+
+## Can an uncredentialed coding agent publish only an approved change?
+
+The GitHub issue workflow separates proposal from execution. An agent creates
+a bounded Git candidate without a GitHub mutation credential. A separate
+executor verifies the exact repository, issue, base, allowed change, audience,
+and effect budget before acquiring a repository-scoped credential and creating
+one deterministic branch and draft pull request.
+
+The Radicle workflow explores a related collaboration problem under a
+different repository and identity environment. Treat each as a cohesive domain
+demo; neither is a generic “Git action” profile.
+
+<DemoGallery
+  question="Can an uncredentialed coding agent publish only an approved change?"
+  maturity="Demo integration"
+  sources={["demos/github-issue", "demos/radicle-issue"]}
+/>
+
+## Can an agent change infrastructure exactly once?
+
+Choose Kubernetes when the action is an exact API-object rollout constrained
+by workload identity and current cluster state. Choose OpenTofu when the action
+is applying one previously saved plan against exact backend, workspace, state,
+dependency-lock, and variable commitments.
+
+The two demos look similar at the diagram level but intentionally retain
+different actions, evidence, commands, credentials, state transitions, and
+reconciliation. They prove why Auths profiles are vertical rather than a
+generic infrastructure-operation dispatcher.
+
+<DemoGallery
+  question="Can an agent change infrastructure exactly once?"
+  maturity="Production-shaped reference"
+  sources={["demos/kubernetes-rollout", "demos/opentofu-plan"]}
+/>
+
+## Can an agent change application or database data without holding a reusable key?
+
+The records API demonstrates a familiar typed REST boundary over HTTPS or
+Iroh. The PostgreSQL demo goes deeper: exact tenant and row selection,
+before-state and after-state commitments, catalog and role rechecks, a
+serializable transaction, an execution ledger, and ambiguous-commit
+reconciliation.
+
+Use the records demo to understand transport-neutral application adoption. Use
+PostgreSQL to evaluate a high-consequence data mutation where database state
+and transaction semantics are part of the authorization profile.
+
+<DemoGallery
+  question="Can an agent change data without a reusable key?"
+  maturity="Production-shaped reference"
+  sources={["demos/rest-api-authorization", "demos/postgresql-data-change"]}
+/>
+
+## Can financial authority be narrower than an OAuth scope or API key?
+
+The Stripe family separates collection, manual-capture authorization, capture,
+cancellation, refunds, subscriptions, transfers, payouts, mandates, and
+purchase authorization into distinct effect profiles. That separation matters:
+the operations have different direction, provider preconditions, exposure,
+obligations, lifecycle states, reconciliation, and receipt meaning.
+
+These are Stripe test-mode demo integrations. They do not imply that every
+Stripe operation is a qualified public SDK profile, and they do not turn local
+merchant configuration into human-signed standing authority.
+
+<DemoGallery
+  question="Can financial authority be bound to one exact effect?"
+  maturity="Demo integration"
+  sources={[
+    "demos/stripe-payment-collect",
+    "demos/stripe-payment-authorize",
+    "demos/stripe-payment-capture",
+    "demos/stripe-payment-cancel",
+    "demos/stripe-refund",
+    "demos/stripe-subscription-create",
+    "demos/stripe-subscription-modify",
+    "demos/stripe-subscription-cancel",
+    "demos/stripe-connect-transfer",
+    "demos/stripe-payout",
+    "demos/stripe-payment-mandate",
+    "demos/stripe-purchase-authorization"
+  ]}
+/>
+
+## Can I use Auths identity and Iroh without adopting capabilities?
+
+The identity-over-Iroh demo is the smallest adoption path. It exchanges
+canonical algorithm-neutral public identities over a real Iroh connection and
+authenticates exact message bytes using optional adapters.
+
+No grant, capability, approval, policy, lifecycle, store, or product runtime is
+constructed. A successful Iroh connection authenticates its transport peer;
+a successful signature check authenticates the exact message bytes to the
+public identity. Neither fact authorizes an application effect or prevents
+replay.
+
+<DemoGallery
+  question="Can I use identity and transport without capabilities?"
+  maturity="Interactive demo"
+  sources={["demos/identity-iroh"]}
+/>
+
+## Do the mechanisms hold under concurrency and adversarial inputs?
+
+Benchmarks and testkits answer engineering questions rather than tell a
+product story. Use them to evaluate bounds, concurrency, replay, candidate
+stores, custody adapters, transports, and cross-language behavior. They do not
+demonstrate a deployable application.
+
+<DemoGallery
+  question="Do the mechanisms hold under concurrency and adversarial inputs?"
+  maturity="Benchmark/testkit"
+  sources={["demos/benchmarks", "demos/testkit", "demos/matrix"]}
+/>
+
+{/*
+Editorial criteria for every demo detail page:
+
+1. State the problem and exact security question.
+2. State what the demo proves and does not prove.
+3. Identify trust, identity, credential, and transport boundaries.
+4. Name the exact action that becomes authorized.
+5. Explain when provider credentials can be acquired.
+6. Cover replay, provider failure, and ambiguous outcomes.
+7. Identify decision, execution, and disclosure evidence.
+8. Explain how to run and test the real path.
+9. State what must change before production.
+
+Omit a demo from the public gallery until its maintained source supports those
+answers. Never expose stripe-payment-common as an end-user example; it is
+shared implementation support rather than a product journey.
+
+Editorial provenance:
+- auths-proof/bindings/public-topology-v1.json
+- auths-proof/demos/offline-verification/README.md
+- auths-proof/demos/cross-company-incident-response/README.md
+- auths-proof/demos/cross-company-incident-response/docs/architecture.md
+- auths-proof/demos/github-issue/docs/about.md
+- auths-proof/demos/github-issue/docs/architecture.md
+- auths-proof/demos/kubernetes-rollout/docs/about.md
+- auths-proof/demos/opentofu-plan/docs/architecture.md
+- auths-proof/demos/rest-api-authorization/docs/about.md
+- auths-proof/demos/postgresql-data-change/docs/architecture.md
+- auths-proof/demos/STRIPE_DEMO_DESIGN_LANGUAGE.md
+- each Stripe demo's docs/about.md
+- auths-proof/demos/identity-iroh/docs/about.md
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/guides/adapter-authoring.mdx b/content-v2/guides/adapter-authoring.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02a26c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/guides/adapter-authoring.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+---
+title: Build and qualify an adapter
+description: Extend identity, custody, state, transport, or provider integration without moving Auths authority semantics into application code.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Add an integration at the narrowest honest boundary
+
+Auths owns authority. Adapters establish bounded facts or perform a narrowly
+defined mechanism. That rule lets teams swap identity methods, signature
+suites, transports, stores, signers, and providers without letting an adapter
+invent an authorized result.
+
+Before writing code, decide whether you need a mechanism adapter or a new
+effect profile. A generic callback is not a shortcut around that distinction.
+
+## Classify the extension
+
+| Need | Correct boundary | Adapter must not do |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Resolve an identity document | Resolver or identity-method adapter | Add trust or mint a grant |
+| Verify a signature suite | Signature-suite adapter | Choose application permission |
+| Sign with KMS/HSM | Signer/custody adapter | Rewrite the signing request |
+| Coordinate replay/budget state | Atomic reservation store | Treat a conflict as exact replay |
+| Carry identity or proof bytes | Bounded transport | Convert delivery into authorization |
+| Call an effect provider | Qualified profile gateway | Accept arbitrary provider commands |
+
+If the integration defines canonical action meaning, provider request
+construction, credential scope, outcome classification, reconciliation, or
+receipt claims, it belongs to a domain-specific profile. Build that vertical
+first. Do not place unrelated providers behind one operation tag and a bag of
+optional fields.
+
+## Keep parsing and authority separate
+
+An identity adapter parses and validates its own bounded evidence, then returns
+facts under an exact method and version. A signature-suite adapter verifies the
+exact Rust-produced signing preimage. A resolver returns bounded bytes plus
+provenance, fetch time, expiry, and version.
+
+None may return `authorized`, create `VerifiedAction`, or reinterpret profile
+semantics. Unknown versions and unsupported features fail closed rather than
+fall back to a similarly named implementation.
+
+## Respect I/O and trust boundaries
+
+The deterministic verifier performs no live acquisition. Network, filesystem,
+environment, and credential I/O happen in outer adapters. Feed their bounded
+results into a trusted-context snapshot and bind the executable adapter
+configuration exactly.
+
+Resolver adapters should deny private-network access by default, cap redirects
+and response bytes, honor cancellation and timeouts, and report freshness.
+Signer adapters should enforce request expiry, object kind, principal
+descriptor, request identity, and transaction digest without exporting private
+keys.
+
+## Prove the contract you claim
+
+Use the public testkit functions for the adapter kind. TypeScript exposes
+conformance entry points such as `certifySigner`, `certifyAtomicStore`,
+`certifyByteTransport`, and `certifyMcpProvider`; Python exposes their idiomatic
+counterparts. Reference pages should generate their exact current signatures
+from installed artifacts.
+
+Conformance should include:
+
+- maximum-size and boundary-plus-one inputs;
+- malformed and unsupported versions;
+- cancellation and timeout behavior;
+- deterministic identity and metadata;
+- exact request/response binding;
+- concurrency and compare-and-set conflicts for stores;
+- provider denial before credential acquisition;
+- ambiguous outcome and reconciliation behavior for gateways; and
+- redaction of secrets and unbounded remote messages.
+
+Passing a generic contract does not qualify a new effect profile. Profile
+qualification also requires Rust-owned semantics, fixtures, mutation tests,
+TypeScript/Python parity, provider-request equality, crash tests, receipts, and
+an honest demo.
+
+## Publish support metadata
+
+An adapter should state its implementation identity and version, contract kind
+and version, supported runtimes, support owner, and narrowly worded security
+claims. Separate what Auths tests from what the adapter operator must guarantee.
+
+Do not call an adapter “supported,” “qualified,” or “production ready” merely
+because it implements the interface. Those labels require matching executable
+evidence and release policy.
+
+## Failure and retry rules
+
+Adapters return typed, bounded failures. They must not silently retry custody,
+approval, store, or provider operations. The outer application decides whether
+retry is safe from the recorded effect state.
+
+An unavailable fact can make proof verification indeterminate. Invalid
+supplied evidence makes it denied. Neither result can enter a provider.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Authenticate identity](/guides/authenticate-identity)
+- [Execute through a closed profile](/guides/execute-exact-action)
+- [Production integration](/guides/production-integration)
+- [Principal adapter reference](/reference/principal-adapters)
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+Adapter responsibilities follow the maintained
+[adapter authoring guide](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/typescript/docs/adapter-authoring.md),
+[public topology](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/public-topology-v1.json),
+and core
+[port contracts](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/main/core/crates/auths-ports).
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans.mdx b/content-v2/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..857ef20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+---
+title: Approvals and ordered plans
+description: Bind multiple approvals to one exact ordered plan, stop safely on uncertainty, and resume without repeating completed effects.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Approve the transaction, not a reusable flag
+
+An approval is useful only when it is bound to the exact operation—or exact
+ordered plan—that will execute. A generic `approved: true` value can be replayed
+against different bytes. Auths approval responses echo a transaction digest
+and policy, while the proof plan commits to its members and their order.
+
+## Follow a two-organization recovery workflow
+
+<Recipe id="05-cross-organization-plan" />
+
+The recipe models two organizations approving the same two-member incident
+plan. The first member quarantines a service. The second rotates a token and
+returns an ambiguous provider outcome. The workflow persists one completed
+receipt and a recovery reference, restarts, reconciles the second operation,
+and completes without re-entering either provider handler.
+
+This is not a simulated happy-path sequence. The important behavior is the
+stop between members and the absence of duplicate provider entry after
+restart.
+
+## What the plan commits to
+
+Every satisfied branch binds the same canonical action meaning, audience,
+challenge, validity context, profile, and plan identity. The verifier also
+applies an independent local composition requirement. That requirement can
+pin an expected plan and require minimum authorized branches, distinct actors,
+or distinct trust roots.
+
+V1 supports bounded `Proof`, `AllOf`, `AnyOf`, and `KOfN` plans. A signed
+`KOfN` shape is not enough by itself: local policy decides whether the
+authorized branches provide the required diversity.
+
+## Preserve order through failure
+
+For an ordered effect plan:
+
+1. Verify and approve the exact plan.
+2. Reserve the next member atomically.
+3. Execute only that member's opaque command.
+4. Persist its outcome and receipt.
+5. Advance only after a terminal result permits it.
+
+If member two becomes provider-unknown, do not start member three, mark the
+plan completed, or replay member one. Persist the recovery reference and
+reconcile member two first.
+
+## Mutation invalidates approval
+
+Changing an operation, resource, arguments, member order, approval policy, or
+plan membership changes the committed transaction. Previously collected
+approval responses must not carry over.
+
+Substitution should fail before signing or provider entry. If an approval
+provider is unavailable, the workflow remains non-executable; it does not
+silently reduce the threshold.
+
+## Production design questions
+
+Before deploying a multi-party plan, answer:
+
+- Who owns each approval key and how is it protected?
+- Which exact organizations, actors, or roots satisfy diversity requirements?
+- How long are approval responses valid?
+- Where are plan/member reservations stored atomically?
+- Which member outcomes permit the next member to begin?
+- How does each provider reconcile an ambiguous response?
+- Which receipt views may each organization inspect?
+
+Auths can bind and verify the answers. It cannot decide organizational intent
+or make two remote providers one atomic transaction.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Replay, recovery, and provider uncertainty](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Receipts and bounded disclosure](/guides/receipts-and-disclosure)
+- [Authority plans](/guides/authority-model#authorization-plans)
+- [Authority model](/guides/authority-model)
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+The example is the product-owned `05-cross-organization-plan` recipe for
+[TypeScript](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/recipes/typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts)
+and
+[Python](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/recipes/python/05_cross_organization_plan.py).
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/guides/authenticate-identity.mdx b/content-v2/guides/authenticate-identity.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..57fca21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/guides/authenticate-identity.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+---
+title: Authenticate identity without granting authority
+description: Exchange and authenticate bounded public identity data while keeping capabilities, approvals, and execution out of the path.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Authenticate a message, not an effect
+
+Use Auths identity components when you need to answer a narrow question:
+**which supported public identity authenticated these exact application
+bytes?** You do not need to create a grant, capability, approval policy,
+provider gateway, or runtime session.
+
+This separation matters for applications that want Auths' algorithm- and
+transport-neutral identity boundary but do not need proof-carrying authority.
+
+## Follow the bounded identity path
+
+The maintained recipe creates a method- and suite-labelled public identity,
+binds a message to that identity's signing preimage, authenticates the signed
+message, and proves that changed application bytes are rejected.
+
+<Recipe id="01-authenticate-identity" />
+
+The TypeScript and Python recipes intentionally use different development
+adapters. The public contract remains the same:
+
+1. Decode bounded public identity bytes.
+2. Select an exact identity-method and signature-suite implementation.
+3. Validate the identity through that registry.
+4. Authenticate a signature over the exact application bytes.
+5. Return an authenticated identity value—or reject.
+
+An adapter may establish principal control. It cannot create an Auths grant,
+return an authorization verdict, or manufacture an executable command.
+
+## Transport remains a courier
+
+You may send the identity packet over HTTPS, Iroh, a queue, or another bounded
+transport. The receiver must still decode and authenticate the packet. A
+mutually authenticated channel may add a useful local fact, but delivery
+success and channel authentication do not become authority.
+
+Treat received bytes as hostile until they pass limits and parsing. Do not let
+a transport adapter silently choose a different identity method, signature
+suite, or relationship when the labelled one is unavailable.
+
+## Decide what authentication means in your application
+
+After successful authentication, the application knows that the selected
+identity relationship authenticated the exact bytes. It must still decide
+what that identity may do.
+
+For example, a message authenticated as `report-agent` can be displayed,
+audited, or mapped to local context without being allowed to publish a report.
+If the application needs portable delegated authority, pass the established
+identity facts into the proof workflow rather than converting authentication
+into a boolean `isAllowed` flag.
+
+## Failure behavior
+
+Reject before returning an authenticated value when:
+
+- the packet or signed message exceeds configured bounds;
+- the identity method or signature suite is unavailable;
+- the labelled suite is incompatible with the verification material;
+- the relationship does not permit authentication;
+- the signature is invalid; or
+- the application bytes differ from the signed bytes.
+
+None of these failures may enter a provider. Retrying unchanged invalid bytes
+is not useful. A temporarily unavailable resolver or remote evidence source
+may be retried under the application's explicit timeout and backoff policy, but
+only before treating the identity as authenticated.
+
+## Production considerations
+
+The recipes use development material. Production applications must choose
+maintained adapters, cap acquisition work and response size, pin accepted
+methods and suites, establish freshness and status policy, and protect any
+private signing operation with appropriate custody.
+
+Identity evidence may contain organizational or device information. Avoid
+logging raw packets and signatures when a bounded identity descriptor or
+commitment is sufficient.
+
+## Next steps
+
+- [Verify existing authority](/guides/verify-authority)
+- [Delegate to an agent](/guides/delegate-agent)
+- [Build and qualify an adapter](/guides/adapter-authoring)
+- [Identity reference](/reference/principal-adapters)
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+The examples resolve to the maintained
+[TypeScript](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/recipes/typescript/01-authenticate-identity.ts)
+and
+[Python](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/recipes/python/01_authenticate_identity.py)
+identity recipes.
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/guides/delegate-agent.mdx b/content-v2/guides/delegate-agent.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..914d661
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/guides/delegate-agent.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+---
+title: Delegate narrower authority to an agent
+description: Give an agent a short-lived subset of a parent's authority and prove that widening and exact replay cannot create another effect.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Give an agent less authority than its parent
+
+Delegation is useful when a service can perform several operations but a
+specialized agent should perform only one. Auths treats every delegation edge
+as an attenuation check: authority may be preserved or narrowed, never
+expanded.
+
+## Work through the maintained example
+
+<Recipe id="04-delegate-to-agent" />
+
+The parent can publish and delete reports. It delegates only
+`publish_report` to a named agent for five minutes. The agent performs one
+publish, repeats the exact request identifier, then attempts the broader delete
+operation.
+
+The expected semantic sequence is:
+
+| Attempt | Result | Provider entries |
+| --- | --- | ---: |
+| First allowed publish | completed | 1 |
+| Same execution identity again | exact replay | still 1 |
+| Broader delete | denied | still 1 |
+
+The replay result returns recorded completion instead of re-entering the
+provider. The widening attempt stops before the provider.
+
+## Understand every dimension that can narrow
+
+A child grant must not broaden any inherited boundary:
+
+- permissions;
+- resources and action constraints;
+- validity window;
+- audiences and challenge binding;
+- budget ceiling;
+- remaining delegation depth;
+- profile and version;
+- status and assurance policy; or
+- critical extensions.
+
+An agent allowed one tool cannot obtain another merely because the provider
+implements it. A shorter expiry cannot be changed back to the parent's longer
+window. A child cannot replace a critical extension with an unknown or more
+permissive interpretation.
+
+## Design delegation around a job
+
+Start with the smallest outcome the agent needs. For a report agent that might
+mean one exact tool, one report namespace, one audience, a five-minute window,
+one use, and no further delegation depth.
+
+Do not give the agent a broad “automation” role and rely on prompt text to keep
+it safe. Prompt instructions are not an authority boundary. Tool availability
+is not an authority boundary either.
+
+If a job changes materially, create a new delegation. Do not mutate the
+meaning of an existing action or reuse an execution identifier for different
+bytes.
+
+## Handle failures safely
+
+- A widening attempt is denied and cannot reach the provider.
+- Missing required status or assurance is indeterminate and cannot execute.
+- An expired delegation requires new authority; retrying the same expired
+  proof will not help.
+- Exact replay returns the recorded outcome and must not reacquire credentials
+  or call the provider again.
+- A provider-unknown result is not exact replay; resume and reconcile the same
+  execution reference.
+
+## Production concerns
+
+Delegation does not remove the need for durable state or custody. Parent and
+child grants must be authored through protected signers. Execution identities,
+use counts, and budgets must be claimed atomically across the deployment scope.
+Status acquisition and revocation freshness remain explicit verifier inputs.
+
+Log bounded grant and action commitments rather than raw proof bytes. Ensure
+operators can identify which parent, child, profile, action, and execution
+state a denial or recovery reference belongs to without disclosing application
+payloads.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Authority model](/guides/authority-model)
+- [Approvals and ordered plans](/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans)
+- [Replay, recovery, and reconciliation](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Authority model](/guides/authority-model)
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+The example resolves to the maintained
+[TypeScript](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/recipes/typescript/04-delegate-to-agent.ts)
+and
+[Python](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/recipes/python/04_delegate_to_agent.py)
+recipes.
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/guides/execute-exact-action.mdx b/content-v2/guides/execute-exact-action.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8fd41ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/guides/execute-exact-action.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+---
+title: Execute one exact action
+description: Put an application effect behind a closed profile so only the verifier-authorized command can enter the provider gateway.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Move from an authorized action to one controlled effect
+
+The central Auths product workflow is not “check a policy, then run the original
+request.” The original request is untrusted. Auths verifies canonical action
+bytes, creates an opaque native-owned command, reserves execution state, and
+lets a closed profile derive the provider operation from that command.
+
+## See the complete boundary
+
+<Recipe id="03-execute-exact-action" />
+
+The recipe is intentionally small, but it tests both sides of the boundary. An
+allowed MCP tool completes and yields a receipt. An undeclared tool is denied,
+and the provider-call counter proves the handler was not entered.
+
+## Follow the order that protects the effect
+
+```text
+canonical request
+  -> verify authority and exact action
+  -> apply local execution gates
+  -> durably reserve identity and budget
+  -> mint opaque profile command
+  -> acquire least-privilege credential
+  -> enter closed provider gateway
+  -> classify result
+  -> persist execution receipt
+```
+
+Changing this order changes the security claim. In particular, provider
+credentials should not be acquired before authorization and durable
+reservation, and provider input should not be reconstructed from the original
+JSON after verification.
+
+## What a closed profile owns
+
+A profile is an exact-action contract for one coherent effect domain. It owns:
+
+- canonical action bytes and hard bounds;
+- the permission and resource vocabulary;
+- decoding from verified action to an opaque command;
+- provider request construction;
+- credential timing and least-privilege scope;
+- outcome classification and reconciliation; and
+- receipt claims specific to that effect.
+
+The current public SDK workflow qualifies `auths.mcp/1`. A demo that calls a
+cloud, payment, database, or infrastructure provider is not automatically a
+qualified generic profile.
+
+## Denial happens before provider entry
+
+If the permission, resource, body commitment, audience, challenge, validity,
+status, assurance, delegation chain, or local policy fails, no command is
+available to the gateway. The provider is not a second authorization layer
+that Auths relies on to catch mistakes.
+
+Indeterminate results also stop before provider entry. Supply the missing
+trustworthy fact and begin a new attempt; never treat temporary uncertainty as
+permission.
+
+## Separate provider failure from authorization failure
+
+Once the gateway begins the remote effect, a timeout or connection failure is
+not a denial. The provider might have applied the operation even if the caller
+did not receive the response. The runtime must retain that uncertainty and
+require profile-specific reconciliation.
+
+Blind retry is safe only when the recorded outcome says no effect could have
+occurred. Otherwise resume the same execution identity and reconcile it.
+
+## Production checklist
+
+Before this boundary protects a real effect:
+
+- substitute durable atomic state for in-memory development state;
+- use non-exporting production custody;
+- pin the SDK, runtime contract, profile, and adapter versions;
+- keep provider credentials and endpoints out of public action payloads;
+- prove request equality at the gateway boundary;
+- test crash points before and after provider delivery;
+- retain decision, execution, and reconciliation evidence; and
+- emit redacted telemetry that distinguishes authorization from execution.
+
+Auths does not make a remote provider transactional with your local store. It
+makes that gap explicit and recoverable.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Delegate the same authority more narrowly](/guides/delegate-agent)
+- [Handle replay and provider uncertainty](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Understand receipts and disclosure](/guides/receipts-and-disclosure)
+- [Build a production integration](/guides/production-integration)
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+The executable source is the product-owned `03-execute-exact-action` recipe.
+Profile boundaries follow the repository's
+[profile and domain abstraction plan](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/docs/target-state/PROFILE_AND_DOMAIN_ABSTRACTION_BOUNDARY_PLAN.md).
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/guides/index.mdx b/content-v2/guides/index.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5061310
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/guides/index.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+---
+title: Guides
+description: Build Auths workflows by outcome, from identity authentication and offline verification to closed execution, recovery, and adapters.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Build a trustworthy path one boundary at a time
+
+These guides are organized around outcomes, not crate names or internal machinery. Start with the boundary you need to establish today, then add sophistication only when the application requires it.
+
+## Establish the authority boundary
+
+Use [Authenticate identity without granting authority](/guides/authenticate-identity) when you only need to exchange or verify public identity material. Use [Verify existing authority](/guides/verify-authority) when another system will execute the effect. Use [Execute one exact action](/guides/execute-exact-action) when Auths must stand in front of the provider gateway.
+
+## Give software narrower autonomy
+
+[Delegate narrower authority to an agent](/guides/delegate-agent) shows how a child receives less than its parent. [Approvals and ordered plans](/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans) adds transaction-bound human or organizational consent without turning an approval into a reusable permission flag.
+
+## Operate without guessing
+
+[Replay, recovery, and provider uncertainty](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown) distinguishes safe retries from ambiguous remote outcomes. [Receipts and bounded disclosure](/guides/receipts-and-disclosure) explains how to prove what happened without publishing sensitive operational detail. [Build a production integration](/guides/production-integration) replaces development custody and state with durable mechanisms.
+
+## Extend at a narrow port
+
+[Build and qualify an adapter](/guides/adapter-authoring) is for teams integrating another identity method, signer, transport, status source, state store, or provider. Adapters establish facts or perform bounded work; they do not redefine Auths semantics.
+
+<OutcomeBoundary />
diff --git a/content-v2/guides/production-integration.mdx b/content-v2/guides/production-integration.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..968f8a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/guides/production-integration.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+---
+title: Build a production integration
+description: Replace development custody and memory state with durable, closed, observable mechanisms without weakening exact-action enforcement.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Turn the development workflow into an honest production boundary
+
+The high-level SDK makes the first integration small on purpose. Its
+development composition uses ephemeral keys and in-memory state. Production is
+not a flag that makes those mechanisms durable; it is a set of explicit
+substitutions around the same verified core.
+
+Auths is prelaunch and pre-audit. The repository contains production-shaped
+mechanisms and references, not a claim that a hosted production service is
+available or independently reviewed.
+
+## Begin with an effect inventory
+
+For each operation, write down:
+
+- exact application action and canonical body;
+- profile and version;
+- permission, resource, audience, validity, uses, and budgets;
+- identity, status, and assurance facts required;
+- signer and approval custody;
+- atomic reservation scope;
+- least-privilege provider credential;
+- irreversible provider entry point;
+- possible provider outcomes and reconciliation evidence; and
+- decision, execution, and disclosure retention.
+
+If two effects require different evidence, credential scopes, provider
+commands, obligations, or reconciliation, treat them as separate profiles.
+
+## Replace the development mechanisms
+
+### Durable state
+
+Use an atomic reservation store that distinguishes new execution, exact
+replay, and conflicting reuse in one transaction across your deployment
+scope. A single-process SQLite or JSON store can be a useful reference but does
+not prove multi-host coordination.
+
+Test concurrency, crash-before-delivery, crash-after-delivery, restart, and
+reconciliation. If the store is unavailable, fail before entering the
+provider.
+
+### Custody
+
+Use a signer backed by an HSM, KMS, WebAuthn authenticator, or another
+appropriate non-exporting boundary. The signer receives a bounded signing
+request and must return the matching request identity, transaction digest,
+signature, and control evidence. It must not canonicalize new Auths objects or
+broaden the requested authority.
+
+### Closed profile and provider gateway
+
+Use a qualified profile for the exact domain. Keep endpoints, headers,
+credentials, generic HTTP methods, SQL text, manifests, and provider-specific
+commands out of the public request. The gateway derives one allowed provider
+operation from the opaque verified command.
+
+Acquire the narrow credential only after authorization and durable
+reservation. Re-read critical provider state when the profile requires it.
+
+### Evidence and live acquisition
+
+Keep network resolution outside deterministic verification. Resolver and
+status adapters return bounded bytes with provenance, version, fetch time, and
+expiry. The trusted context commits to the exact executable adapter and
+registry configuration.
+
+### Receipts and disclosure
+
+Persist decision and execution receipts according to policy. Store sensitive
+canonical action or provider evidence separately and encrypted when it must be
+recoverable. Authorize summary and full views independently of receipt
+signature verification.
+
+## Make uncertainty operational
+
+Your provider adapter must classify whether an effect was definitely not
+attempted, completed, rejected, or possibly applied. An ambiguous result stays
+`outcome-unknown` until domain-specific reconciliation produces trustworthy
+observation.
+
+Do not secretly retry signers, approval providers, stores, or gateways. The
+application owns backoff and escalation based on the SDK's retry class and
+effect state.
+
+## Observe without leaking
+
+Useful telemetry includes bounded operation/profile identities, result class,
+stable code, stage, commitments, latency, work totals, retry class, and
+correlation identity. Exclude credentials, keys, signatures, proof bytes,
+canonical application bodies, provider response bodies, and uncontrolled
+high-cardinality values.
+
+Telemetry exporter failure must not turn a denial into authorization or change
+an execution result.
+
+## Release and support gate
+
+Before launch:
+
+1. Pin the SDK artifact, lockfile, ABI, runtime contract, profile, and adapters.
+2. Run installed-artifact and adapter conformance against exactly what ships.
+3. Validate TypeScript and Python parity where both are supported.
+4. Exercise hostile inputs, concurrency, crash, recovery, and secret-scanning
+   paths.
+5. Establish monitoring, on-call ownership, key recovery, receipt retention,
+   and incident procedures.
+6. Obtain independent security review appropriate to the effect's consequence.
+
+Auths does not promise remote exactly-once execution, instantaneous global
+revocation, or atomicity between your transaction and a provider. A production
+integration must expose and manage those limits.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Build and qualify adapters](/guides/adapter-authoring)
+- [Replay and provider uncertainty](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Receipts and disclosure](/guides/receipts-and-disclosure)
+- [Runtime results and recovery reference](/reference/decisions-errors)
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+The maintained integration constraints are documented in the
+[TypeScript production recipe](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/typescript/docs/production-integration.md),
+[Python integration recipes](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/python/docs/INTEGRATION_RECIPES.md),
+and repository
+[threat model](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/typescript/docs/threat-model.md).
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/guides/receipts-and-disclosure.mdx b/content-v2/guides/receipts-and-disclosure.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79af6bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/guides/receipts-and-disclosure.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+---
+title: Receipts and bounded disclosure
+description: Verify what Auths decided and executed while revealing only the application detail each viewer is authorized to inspect.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Keep proof of an effect without publishing its payload
+
+An Auths receipt is portable evidence about a decision or execution. It is not
+necessarily a human-readable audit report. The signed form commits to facts so
+that another process or language can verify integrity, while application-owned
+disclosure decides which underlying details a viewer may see.
+
+## Distinguish the two receipt moments
+
+| Receipt | Created when | What it can establish |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Decision receipt | After authorization and required outer gates | Which exact authority, action, context, and plan were accepted or rejected |
+| Execution receipt | After the provider path reaches a recorded outcome | Which command commitment ran, how it ended, and how it relates to the decision |
+
+A valid decision receipt does not prove that a provider effect happened. A
+transport acknowledgment does not replace an execution receipt. An execution
+receipt should be interpreted alongside its decision binding and profile
+semantics.
+
+The exact-action recipe verifies its completed receipt as part of the workflow:
+
+<Recipe id="03-execute-exact-action" />
+
+## Verify before interpreting
+
+Receipt verification checks bounded canonical bytes, identifiers, signatures,
+and bindings. Inspection then returns an inert projection. It cannot recreate a
+verified command, reopen a gateway, or become authority for another effect.
+
+Treat an invalid receipt as untrusted input. Do not display its claims as
+verified merely because the JSON envelope was parseable.
+
+## Choose a disclosure view deliberately
+
+A useful application commonly exposes three levels:
+
+1. **Opaque public view:** validity, receipt identifiers, commitments, signer
+   descriptors, timestamps, outcome class, and other non-sensitive metadata.
+2. **Authorized summary:** profile-owned explanation such as “quarantined the
+   Northstar service in `eu-west-2`,” without canonical payload bytes.
+3. **Authorized full view:** exact canonical action and bounded provider
+   evidence for incident response, audit, or dispute handling.
+
+The signed receipt stays commitment-only. Sensitive command material can be
+stored separately as encrypted disclosure material, authenticated against the
+tenant and receipt identity. The inspector verifies both the receipt and the
+disclosure binding before releasing a view.
+
+This prevents the receipt stream from becoming a second database of customer
+payloads, infrastructure names, report contents, or provider responses.
+
+## Application responsibilities
+
+Auths can produce and verify the cryptographic structures; the application
+still owns:
+
+- viewer authentication and authorization;
+- encryption keys and rotation;
+- retention and deletion policy;
+- tenant isolation;
+- redaction and field classification;
+- audit access logging; and
+- legal or regulatory requirements.
+
+Do not put private keys, provider credentials, raw proofs, signatures, or
+unbounded response bodies into disclosure material. A “full” view is still a
+bounded profile-owned view, not an unrestricted dump.
+
+## Failure and recovery behavior
+
+If required receipt persistence fails before provider entry, stop without
+executing. If persistence fails after the provider may have been entered, the
+runtime must preserve an ambiguous or recoverable state rather than claim
+denial.
+
+If disclosure decryption or authorization fails, return the opaque verified
+view or no view according to application policy. Never weaken receipt
+verification because a viewer has privileged application credentials.
+
+Receipt verification itself is effect-free and safe to repeat. Re-executing an
+effect based on a receipt is not.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Replay and recovery](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Production integration](/guides/production-integration)
+- [Evidence, status, assurance, and registries](/reference/evidence-status-assurance)
+- [TypeScript verification surface](/reference/typescript)
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+The public receipt and inspection surfaces are frozen in the
+[TypeScript](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/typescript/api/public-api.txt)
+and
+[Python](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/python/api/public-api.txt)
+API inventories. The three-view model is exercised by the
+[incident-response demo](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/main/demos/cross-company-incident-response).
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown.mdx b/content-v2/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb8ea4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+---
+title: Replay, recovery, and provider uncertainty
+description: Distinguish safe replay from ambiguous remote effects, preserve one execution identity, and reconcile without duplicating work.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Know whether another attempt is safe
+
+Authorization can be deterministic while execution is not. A remote provider
+may apply an operation and lose the response. A process may crash after
+delivery but before recording completion. Treating either case as a normal
+failure and retrying can perform the effect twice.
+
+Auths keeps authorization, durable execution state, and provider observation
+as separate facts so the runtime can say what is known rather than collapse
+everything into success or failure.
+
+## Start with the outcome table
+
+| Outcome | Could the provider have been entered? | Correct response |
+| --- | ---: | --- |
+| denied | no | Change the action, authority, or trusted facts before trying again |
+| indeterminate | no | Acquire the missing trustworthy fact, then verify anew |
+| exact replay | a prior execution already finished | Return the recorded result; do not re-enter |
+| recoverable | possibly | Resume the same execution reference |
+| provider unknown | yes | Reconcile the same execution; do not blindly retry |
+
+This table is more useful than a generic `retryable` boolean because it keeps
+effect uncertainty explicit.
+
+## See restart and reconciliation in one recipe
+
+<Recipe id="05-cross-organization-plan" />
+
+The recipe completes the first member of an ordered plan, records uncertainty
+for the second, closes the process, opens the durable state again, and resumes
+from the saved execution reference. The recovery provider exposes a
+reconciliation operation but its effect handlers throw if entered. Completion
+with zero new entries proves recovery did not replay either member.
+
+## Preserve one execution identity
+
+Request identifiers, command commitments, and profile idempotency keys serve
+different purposes. The durable store must atomically distinguish:
+
+- a new execution identity;
+- an exact replay of the same command; and
+- a conflicting attempt that reuses an identity for different bytes.
+
+Only an exact replay may return the recorded result. A conflict must fail
+closed. Do not generate a new request identifier to escape an uncertain prior
+attempt; that discards the link needed for reconciliation.
+
+## Resume is not retry
+
+Resume loads an authenticated, bounded reference to existing execution state.
+It continues the state machine from the last durable checkpoint. It must not
+re-run authorization-independent application code, reacquire a credential for
+an already-entered command, or call completed plan members again.
+
+Reconciliation asks the profile's provider adapter for fresh, operation-specific
+evidence: for example, whether a token now has the expected version or whether
+a rollout reached the committed object revision. A generic HTTP status check
+cannot decide every domain's outcome.
+
+## Stop conditions for operators
+
+Stop automatic processing when:
+
+- durable execution state is unavailable;
+- the stored command commitment conflicts with the requested action;
+- the profile cannot establish whether the provider applied the operation;
+- fresh observation contradicts the expected postcondition; or
+- reconciliation itself returns another ambiguous result.
+
+Retain the state as unknown and escalate. Do not translate the absence of
+evidence to released capacity or successful completion.
+
+## Production requirements
+
+In-memory development state cannot provide this guarantee across restart or
+multiple hosts. A production store needs atomic compare-and-set semantics over
+the entire deployment scope, durable checkpoints, unique execution identities,
+and tested crash behavior.
+
+Provider gateways need domain idempotency and a reconciliation contract.
+Secret credentials must remain behind the gateway. Telemetry should record
+state transitions and bounded commitments without copying provider bodies,
+proofs, signatures, or credentials.
+
+Auths does not claim that a local transaction and a remote provider effect are
+atomic. It gives the application enough truthful state to recover from that
+fact.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Approvals and ordered plans](/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans)
+- [Receipts and disclosure](/guides/receipts-and-disclosure)
+- [Production integration](/guides/production-integration)
+- [Results and recovery reference](/reference/decisions-errors)
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+Recovery behavior is exercised by the maintained
+[`05-cross-organization-plan`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/main/bindings/recipes)
+recipe and further demonstrated by the
+[cross-company incident-response reference](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/main/demos/cross-company-incident-response).
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/guides/verify-authority.mdx b/content-v2/guides/verify-authority.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c1e39e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/guides/verify-authority.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+---
+title: Verify existing authority
+description: Verify proof, canonical action, and trusted-context bytes deterministically without receiving a command or execution capability.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Ask Auths for a decision without executing anything
+
+Verification is the safest integration surface when another system already
+creates the proof and action. You supply three bounded byte strings and receive
+an inert result. The verifier does not read a clock, fetch a key, contact a
+provider, claim replay state, or write a receipt.
+
+## Supply all three inputs explicitly
+
+| Input | Owner | Why it is separate |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Proof bundle | Prover or transport | Carries grants, signed actions, plans, evidence, and references |
+| Canonical action | Application profile | Defines the exact effect meaning being checked |
+| Trusted context | Verifier | Defines local roots, time, accepted adapters, status, assurance, obligations, and limits |
+
+The proof cannot smuggle a new root into the context or select a more
+permissive executable adapter configuration.
+
+## Run the portable recipe
+
+<Recipe id="02-verify-authority" />
+
+The recipe first verifies the canonical fixture and requires an authorized
+result. It then changes one byte of the action and requires rejection. The
+changed action never inherits the earlier decision just because most of its
+bytes are identical.
+
+## Use the three-way result correctly
+
+An authorized result means that the proof covers the exact action under the
+exact context. A denied result means supplied facts establish a failure, such
+as widened delegation or an action-body mismatch. An indeterminate result
+means a required trustworthy fact was not established, such as missing status
+or an unsupported adapter.
+
+Denied and indeterminate are different diagnostic states but have the same
+execution consequence: **do not execute**.
+
+Do not translate indeterminate to success because an external dependency is
+temporarily unavailable. Instead, acquire the missing bounded fact, construct
+a new trusted context, and run verification again.
+
+## Keep inspection inert
+
+The language bindings expose decisions and safe projections, not a serializable
+`VerifiedAction` that arbitrary application code can mint or replay. This makes
+verification useful in browsers, audit tools, policy previews, and separate
+verification services without accidentally handing them an effect-capable
+object.
+
+If the application later needs to execute, pass the original inputs through a
+product workflow that owns replay, budgets, local policy, profile decoding,
+and provider entry. Do not treat `result.kind === "authorized"` as a license to
+execute an unverified request object.
+
+## Retry and provider reachability
+
+Pure verification is safe to repeat with identical inputs. It cannot reach a
+provider and has no remote side effect. Repeating it does not, however, refresh
+the facts inside the trusted context. A stale status snapshot remains stale
+until the application explicitly supplies a newer one.
+
+Malformed, non-canonical, unsupported, and oversized inputs fail closed with a
+typed outcome or input error. Do not fall back to a looser decoder.
+
+## Production considerations
+
+Pin the SDK artifact and ABI, construct contexts through maintained typed
+builders, and bind the expected executable registry configuration. Set limits
+below protocol hard maxima where your deployment can. Obtain live identity or
+status evidence outside the deterministic kernel, then include bounded,
+provenance-aware snapshots as explicit inputs.
+
+Keep proof bytes, signatures, and application bodies out of ordinary logs.
+Stable stage/code values and commitments are usually sufficient for
+observability.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Understand the verification stages](/guides/verification-model)
+- [Execute one exact action](/guides/execute-exact-action)
+- [Handle decisions and recovery](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Verification model](/guides/verification-model)
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+The examples come from the maintained
+[TypeScript](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/recipes/typescript/02-verify-authority.ts)
+and
+[Python](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/recipes/python/02_verify_authority.py)
+recipes. Stable outcomes are defined by
+[Protocol V1](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/core/spec/v1/protocol.md).
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/home.json b/content-v2/home.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e74b97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/home.json
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.home/1",
+  "title": "Auths Docs",
+  "description": "Give software narrow authority for one exact action, execute through a closed boundary, and prove what happened.",
+  "status": ["Prelaunch", "Pre-audit", "Repository preview"],
+  "hero": {
+    "kicker": "Proof-carrying bounded authority",
+    "title": "Give software authority for one exact action.",
+    "description": "Auths lets people and agents prove what they may do, execute only through a closed application boundary, and leave a verifiable receipt—without requiring a shared identity provider.",
+    "actions": [
+      { "label": "TypeScript quickstart", "href": "/start/typescript", "kind": "primary" },
+      { "label": "Python quickstart", "href": "/start/python", "kind": "primary" },
+      { "label": "Understand Auths", "href": "/start/what-is-auths", "kind": "quiet" }
+    ],
+    "caveat": "The SDK surface is public in the repository but package publication and production promotion remain prelaunch. Development adapters use ephemeral custody and in-memory state."
+  },
+  "nonAuthorization": {
+    "title": "None of these alone is authorization:",
+    "items": ["identity", "transport success", "a valid signature", "evidence", "approval"]
+  },
+  "outcomes": {
+    "kicker": "Start with the job",
+    "title": "Choose what you need to accomplish.",
+    "description": "The protocol machinery stays below the fold until your implementation needs it.",
+    "items": [
+      { "label": "Execute", "title": "Perform one exact effect", "description": "Declare the action, authorize it, reserve its use, and reach the provider through a closed gateway.", "href": "/start/typescript" },
+      { "label": "Verify", "title": "Check authority without executing", "description": "Evaluate proof, canonical action, and trusted context without receiving an effect-capable handle.", "href": "/guides/verify-authority" },
+      { "label": "Delegate", "title": "Give an agent less authority", "description": "Narrow action, time, uses, budgets, and delegation depth. A child can never widen its parent.", "href": "/guides/delegate-agent" },
+      { "label": "Recover", "title": "Resume without repeating the effect", "description": "Preserve denial, indeterminacy, replay, recoverability, and provider uncertainty as different outcomes.", "href": "/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown" }
+    ]
+  },
+  "separation": {
+    "kicker": "A separation that matters",
+    "title": "Knowing who called is not the same as knowing what they may do.",
+    "planes": [
+      { "number": "01", "title": "Proof", "description": "Signed, bounded authority and its delegation chain." },
+      { "number": "02", "title": "Evidence", "description": "Trusted facts about identity, status, assurance, and context." },
+      { "number": "03", "title": "Control", "description": "Deterministic verification of the exact application bytes." },
+      { "number": "04", "title": "Execution", "description": "Stateful reservation, closed provider access, recovery, and receipts." }
+    ],
+    "rule": "Core verification is deterministic and effect-free. Networks, clocks, databases, custody, replay state, and provider execution remain outside the kernel."
+  },
+  "recipe": {
+    "id": "03-execute-exact-action",
+    "kicker": "A real maintained workflow",
+    "title": "Allow one tool. Prove another never reaches the provider.",
+    "description": "This source is copied from the product-owned recipe at a pinned Auths commit. Qualification status is shown per language; the docs never fabricate a passing result."
+  },
+  "disclosure": {
+    "kicker": "Progressive disclosure",
+    "title": "Begin with an outcome. Descend only when necessary.",
+    "items": [
+      { "label": "Start", "description": "Install and complete one real workflow.", "href": "/start" },
+      { "label": "Guides", "description": "Understand the model, then integrate identity, authority, execution, and recovery.", "href": "/guides" },
+      { "label": "Examples", "description": "Choose a production-shaped proof by the question it answers.", "href": "/examples" },
+      { "label": "Reference", "description": "Inspect the exact public surfaces and protocol material.", "href": "/reference" }
+    ]
+  }
+}
diff --git a/content-v2/navigation.json b/content-v2/navigation.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b34f0c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/navigation.json
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+{
+  "home": { "path": "/", "source": "home.json" },
+  "sections": [
+    {
+      "id": "start",
+      "title": "Start",
+      "path": "/start",
+      "navigation": "primary",
+      "groups": [
+        {
+          "label": "Begin",
+          "pages": [
+            { "path": "/start", "source": "start/index.mdx" },
+            { "path": "/start/what-is-auths", "source": "start/what-is-auths.mdx" }
+          ]
+        },
+        {
+          "label": "Quickstarts",
+          "pages": [
+            { "path": "/start/typescript", "source": "start/typescript-quickstart.mdx" },
+            { "path": "/start/python", "source": "start/python-quickstart.mdx" },
+            { "path": "/start/rust-offline-verification", "source": "start/rust-offline-verification.mdx" }
+          ]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "guides",
+      "title": "Guides",
+      "path": "/guides",
+      "navigation": "primary",
+      "groups": [
+        {
+          "label": "Authority boundaries",
+          "pages": [
+            { "path": "/guides", "source": "guides/index.mdx" },
+            { "path": "/guides/authenticate-identity", "source": "guides/authenticate-identity.mdx" },
+            { "path": "/guides/verify-authority", "source": "guides/verify-authority.mdx" },
+            { "path": "/guides/execute-exact-action", "source": "guides/execute-exact-action.mdx" }
+          ]
+        },
+        {
+          "label": "Understand the model",
+          "pages": [
+            { "path": "/guides/authority-model", "source": "concepts/authority-model.mdx" },
+            { "path": "/guides/verification-model", "source": "concepts/verification-model.mdx" }
+          ]
+        },
+        {
+          "label": "Agents and plans",
+          "pages": [
+            { "path": "/guides/delegate-agent", "source": "guides/delegate-agent.mdx" },
+            { "path": "/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans", "source": "guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans.mdx" }
+          ]
+        },
+        {
+          "label": "Production",
+          "pages": [
+            { "path": "/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown", "source": "guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown.mdx" },
+            { "path": "/guides/receipts-and-disclosure", "source": "guides/receipts-and-disclosure.mdx" },
+            { "path": "/guides/production-integration", "source": "guides/production-integration.mdx" }
+          ]
+        },
+        {
+          "label": "Extensions",
+          "pages": [
+            { "path": "/guides/adapter-authoring", "source": "guides/adapter-authoring.mdx" }
+          ]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "examples",
+      "title": "Examples",
+      "path": "/examples",
+      "navigation": "primary",
+      "groups": [
+        {
+          "label": "By security question",
+          "pages": [
+            { "path": "/examples", "source": "examples/index.mdx" }
+          ]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "reference",
+      "title": "Reference",
+      "path": "/reference",
+      "navigation": "utility",
+      "groups": [
+        {
+          "label": "SDKs",
+          "pages": [
+            { "path": "/reference", "source": "reference/index.mdx" },
+            { "path": "/reference/typescript", "source": "reference/typescript.mdx" },
+            { "path": "/reference/python", "source": "reference/python.mdx" },
+            { "path": "/reference/rust", "source": "reference/rust.mdx" }
+          ]
+        },
+        {
+          "label": "Protocol and outcomes",
+          "pages": [
+            { "path": "/reference/decisions-errors", "source": "reference/decisions-errors.mdx" },
+            { "path": "/reference/evidence-status-assurance", "source": "reference/evidence-status-assurance.mdx" },
+            { "path": "/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers", "source": "reference/limits-encoding-identifiers.mdx" },
+            { "path": "/reference/principal-adapters", "source": "reference/principal-adapters.mdx" }
+          ]
+        },
+        {
+          "label": "Evidence",
+          "pages": [
+            { "path": "/reference/conformance", "source": "reference/conformance.mdx" }
+          ]
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/content-v2/reference/conformance.mdx b/content-v2/reference/conformance.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e67ee4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/reference/conformance.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+---
+title: Conformance and independent implementations
+description: Understand what Auths fixtures, mutations, cross-language checks, fuzzing, and formal evidence actually prove.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Conformance and independent implementations
+
+Auths has several kinds of evidence, and they answer different questions. A
+matching file digest is not semantic verification. Agreement between three
+implementations is not a proof that all three are correct. A formal model is
+not an independent security audit.
+
+Use this page to select the evidence appropriate to the claim you are making.
+
+## The normative V1 corpus
+
+The canonical fixture manifest indexes exact proof bundles, canonical actions,
+trusted contexts, and expected verification results. Each entry records file
+digests, the expected stage and stable code, applicable protocol identifiers,
+assurance reports, and resource/work totals.
+
+Fixtures cover successful, denied, indeterminate, malformed, boundary, status,
+and related protocol cases. The inventory below projects its counts and
+classifications directly from the pinned manifest.
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="canonical-fixture-inventory"
+  source="core/fixtures/v1/manifest.json"
+  include="classes,count,digests,stages,codes,resource boundaries"
+/>
+
+Normative `.cbor` bytes are not rewritten during an ordinary test run. An
+explicit reviewed wire-update operation is the only path that can replace
+them. Routine tests compare against the checked-in bytes and fail on drift.
+
+## Five distinct evidence levels
+
+### 1. Byte equivalence
+
+A corpus auditor independently parses one complete deterministic-CBOR item and
+recomputes artifact digests. It can prove that two implementations received
+and interpreted the same canonical byte structure. It does not prove that they
+made the correct authority decision.
+
+### 2. Semantic equivalence
+
+An implementation independently executes the V1 verification stages and
+emits a normalized projection. Cross-language checks compare the decision,
+stable code, identifiers, authorized branches, and assurance report.
+
+Agreement is strong regression and interoperability evidence. It is still
+possible for implementations to share a mistaken reading of the
+specification, especially if one copied another.
+
+### 3. Adversarial, property, and fuzz evidence
+
+Mutation tests alter valid inputs through operations such as truncation,
+required-field removal, replacement, duplication, or bit changes and require
+bounded fail-closed behavior. Property tests explore invariants such as
+attenuation, checked arithmetic, deterministic selection, and state-machine
+transitions. Fuzzing explores parser and verification behavior over inputs not
+enumerated in the canonical corpus.
+
+These techniques find classes of implementation defects; none proves the
+absence of all defects.
+
+### 4. Formal refinement evidence
+
+Formal artifacts state and check mathematical properties of stable pure
+semantics. The strongest claim requires a link from shipping Rust predicates
+and representation invariants to the formal model. A separately written model
+can improve understanding without proving that the production implementation
+refines it.
+
+Provider networks remain explicit nondeterministic boundaries. Formal work can
+reason about allowed commands, recorded outcomes, observations, and
+reconciliation, but cannot assume a remote provider behaves atomically.
+
+### 5. Independent security review
+
+An external security assessment evaluates assumptions, design, implementation,
+and operational boundaries using a process independent of the project. Corpus,
+fuzz, differential, and formal gates are valuable engineering evidence, but
+they are not an independent security audit. Auths is currently pre-audit.
+
+## Independent Go and TypeScript verifiers
+
+The independent Go and TypeScript implementations must not call the Rust
+verifier, load its WebAssembly build, or copy expected verdicts from the
+manifest. Each independently audits deterministic CBOR and implements target
+V1 semantics.
+
+The cross-language gate compares both implementations with the Rust verifier
+on the canonical corpus. It requires exact artifact-digest agreement and
+semantic agreement on a normalized projection. Keeping expected verdicts out
+of the independent implementations is essential: otherwise the check would
+only prove that each program can repeat the fixture manifest.
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="independent-implementation-inventory"
+  sources="bindings/independent; bindings/customer-journey-matrix-v1.json"
+  include="language,implementation boundary,corpus coverage,semantic coverage,run command"
+/>
+
+## What a conforming implementation must preserve
+
+A V1 implementation must agree on more than an `authorized` boolean. It must
+preserve:
+
+- deterministic decoding and rejection of non-canonical input;
+- bounded bytes, objects, nesting, signatures, and adapter work;
+- exact graph resolution and content identifiers;
+- principal-control, signature, status, assurance, and registry behavior;
+- authority attenuation and composition semantics;
+- canonical action binding;
+- deterministic first-failure stage and stable code;
+- authorized branches and assurance satisfactions;
+- resource and work accounting; and
+- exact canonical result encoding where the portable boundary requires it.
+
+Execution, replay databases, live evidence acquisition, credentials, and
+provider reconciliation remain outside the portable verifier corpus. They
+need separate product and profile conformance suites.
+
+## Reading an evidence badge
+
+Read every evidence label as a precise, bounded claim:
+
+| Label | Appropriate meaning |
+| --- | --- |
+| Canonical fixture | Exact checked-in byte case with a normative expected result |
+| Corpus-conformant | Implementation agrees with the complete pinned corpus |
+| Cross-language differential | Named implementations agree on the normalized semantic projection |
+| Property tested | The named invariant was exercised over generated inputs within the stated bounds |
+| Fuzzed | The named target completed the stated fuzz campaign without a detected failure |
+| Formally checked | The named theorem/model relationship was checked under stated assumptions |
+| Independently audited | Use only for a completed outside assessment with a published scope |
+
+Avoid a generic “verified” badge that erases these differences.
+
+## Generated conformance status
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="conformance-status"
+  sources="core/fixtures/v1/manifest.json; core/conformance/v1/mutations.json; core/formal-vectors/v1/manifest.json; bindings/customer-journey-matrix-v1.json"
+  include="artifact revision,checks executed,coverage class,limitations"
+/>
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+Generate run commands from the pinned tree rather than copying an old README;
+implementation directories can move while a stale command still looks
+plausible.
+
+- `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md`, section “Conformance artifacts.”
+- `auths-proof/core/fixtures/v1/manifest.json` — canonical corpus inventory.
+- `auths-proof/core/conformance/v1/mutations.json` — adversarial mutation
+  catalog.
+- `auths-proof/core/formal-vectors/v1/manifest.json` — formal-vector and
+  theorem inventory.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/independent/README.md` and sibling implementation
+  directories — independence rules and implementations.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/customer-journey-matrix-v1.json` — cross-language
+  product journey evidence.
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/reference/decisions-errors.mdx b/content-v2/reference/decisions-errors.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51296ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/reference/decisions-errors.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+---
+title: Decisions, errors, and safe responses
+description: Distinguish authorization verdicts from runtime outcomes and choose a response that cannot widen authority or duplicate an effect.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Decisions, errors, and safe responses
+
+Auths gives you two different kinds of answer. The offline verifier tells you
+whether the supplied proof establishes authority for one exact action. The
+outer runtime tells you what happened while reserving or performing that
+action. Treating those answers as one generic success/error flag is unsafe.
+
+The first question is always: **may this action execute?** Only an authorized
+verdict can cross that boundary, and authorization still does not mean the
+provider has been called or that the effect succeeded.
+
+## The three verifier decisions
+
+### Authorized
+
+The proof, trusted context, authority chain, status, assurance, and action
+binding checks all passed. The result is authorization for the canonical
+action supplied to this verification—not for a similar object reconstructed
+from an HTTP request or application model.
+
+An authorized result is an input to the execution plane. Channel policy,
+replay, stateful budgets, application policy, durable reservation, and the
+closed profile gateway may still stop execution.
+
+### Denied
+
+The trustworthy facts available to the verifier establish that the request is
+invalid or outside the authority supplied. Examples include an invalid
+signature, an expanded delegation, a revoked grant, an action-body mismatch,
+or a local policy denial.
+
+Repeating the same inputs cannot change a deterministic denial. Do not retry
+through a weaker verifier, remove a required check, or send the unverified
+request directly to the provider. Change the action, obtain appropriate
+authority, or correct the invalid proof.
+
+### Indeterminate
+
+The verifier could not establish a required trustworthy fact or did not have
+an exact implementation needed by the request. Missing fresh status,
+unavailable historical evidence, or an unsupported principal method are
+indeterminate rather than denied.
+
+Indeterminate is still non-executable. A retry is meaningful only when the
+host supplies new trusted facts or installs the exact missing implementation.
+Repeatedly submitting the same inputs is not recovery.
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+  V["Verify exact proof + action + context"] --> A{"Verdict"}
+  A -->|Authorized| G["Continue through runtime gates"]
+  A -->|Denied| D["Change request or authority"]
+  A -->|Indeterminate| I["Supply trustworthy facts or exact support"]
+  G --> R{"Runtime outcome"}
+  R -->|Completed| C["Return result and receipt"]
+  R -->|Exact replay| E["Return recorded result; no provider re-entry"]
+  R -->|Recoverable or provider unknown| X["Resume or reconcile the same execution"]
+```
+
+## Safe response matrix
+
+| Outcome | Could the provider have been reached? | Safe response |
+| --- | ---: | --- |
+| `authorized` verifier decision | No; the pure verifier performs no I/O | Continue only through the configured runtime and closed profile gateway. |
+| `denied` verifier decision | No | Correct the request or authority. Do not weaken verification or retry identical inputs. |
+| `indeterminate` verifier decision | No | Supply new trusted facts or exact implementation support, then verify again. |
+| `completed` execution result | Yes, with a recorded terminal result | Return the result and receipt. Reuse the recorded result for the same execution identity. |
+| `exact-replay` runtime result | It was reached by the original execution, not this replay | Return the original recorded outcome. Do not call the provider again. |
+| `not-applied` runtime result | The runtime established that the effect was not applied | Follow the profile's recovery contract; never construct a replacement command from unchecked input. |
+| `conflict` runtime result | Possibly | Stop. The execution identity is already bound to different commitments or state. Investigate rather than retrying. |
+| `recoverable` runtime result | Possibly, including an ambiguous response | Preserve the opaque execution reference and resume or reconcile that same execution. Never mint a replacement reference or blindly retry. |
+
+The public SDKs expose closed result variants rather than exceptions for these
+expected workflow outcomes. Programming errors, malformed SDK inputs, broken
+adapter contracts, or unavailable infrastructure can still surface as typed
+product errors. Handle them using the product error registry; do not infer a
+retry policy from message text.
+
+## Stable codes are protocol data
+
+A stable verifier code identifies the deterministic first failure and the
+stage that produced it. Codes use exact hyphenated protocol values such as
+`action-body-mismatch`; locally translated aliases are not interchangeable.
+
+Never translate a hyphenated stable code into a language-local alias. The
+table below comes from the normative V1 taxonomy and preserves the distinction
+between denied codes, indeterminate requirements, outer runtime failures, and
+codes reserved but not emitted by a conforming V1 verifier.
+
+<StableCodeTable
+  source="core/spec/v1/error-codes.md"
+  modelSource="core/crates/auths-model/src/lib.rs"
+  includeReserved={true}
+/>
+
+## Do not collapse protocol and provider failures
+
+The following events are different and should remain different in logs,
+metrics, receipts, and user interfaces:
+
+1. **Denied:** the action never becomes executable.
+2. **Indeterminate:** the action never becomes executable, but new trusted
+   facts may make a later verification decidable.
+3. **Known provider failure before effect:** the profile knows the effect did
+   not happen and applies its explicit release or recovery rule.
+4. **Known provider failure after effect:** the effect happened even though a
+   later step failed; the runtime records the observed effect.
+5. **Provider outcome unknown:** the provider may have applied the effect but
+   the acknowledgement was lost. The runtime retains uncertainty and blocks a
+   blind retry until reconciliation.
+
+A network timeout is therefore not permission to submit the action again.
+Likewise, a valid signature is not permission to bypass a denial. The closed
+profile owns the meaning of provider outcomes and the exact operation needed
+to reconcile them.
+
+## First-failure ordering
+
+Auths V1 uses deterministic first-failure ordering so implementations and
+receipts agree on one primary stage and code. That ordering is useful for
+portable tests and operator playbooks. It is not a claim that verification
+reveals no timing, cache, power, or other side channel.
+
+For diagnostics, preserve the stable code, stage, commitments, and safe
+response. Avoid logging proof bytes, detached attachments, credentials, or
+sensitive disclosed receipt fields.
+
+## Generated product result reference
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="product-results-and-errors"
+  sources="bindings/typescript/dist declarations; bindings/python installed wheel; product/errors/auths-errors"
+  groupBy="verification,execution,recovery,programming-error"
+/>
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+- `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/error-codes.md` — normative stable failure
+  taxonomy, outer runtime failures, and reserved V1 codes.
+- `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md`, sections “Decisions” and “Evidence
+  and status” — verifier meaning and outer execution gates.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-model/src/lib.rs` — native decision, code,
+  requirement, and portable-result types.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-proof/src/lib.rs` — Rust verdict and actionable
+  explanation projection.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/src/product.ts` — TypeScript closed execution
+  and recovery result variants.
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/reference/evidence-status-assurance.mdx b/content-v2/reference/evidence-status-assurance.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd3d063
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/reference/evidence-status-assurance.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+---
+title: Evidence, status, assurance, and registries
+description: Understand how bounded adapters establish facts without acquiring trust or manufacturing authority.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Evidence, status, assurance, and registries
+
+Auths separates the question “what facts can this verifier establish?” from
+the question “does authority cover this action?” This is the boundary behind
+the project rule:
+
+> Auths owns authority. Adapters establish bounded facts.
+
+A principal adapter can establish that a particular key controlled a
+principal under a particular method. A status method can establish that a
+grant was active in a trusted snapshot. An assurance adapter can establish a
+parameterized claim about one participant. None of them may produce an
+authorized result, choose a trust anchor, widen a grant, or execute an effect.
+
+## Evidence is input, not trust
+
+Evidence objects are bounded, content-addressed values selected by an exact
+evidence type. A control binding connects a signed statement to the evidence
+its principal adapter is expected to consume.
+
+For a successfully verified statement, the evidence identifiers in the
+binding must equal the identifiers the adapter reports as consumed. This is an
+important fail-closed rule:
+
+- missing required evidence cannot be silently ignored;
+- extra evidence cannot influence an adapter through an undeclared side
+  channel;
+- an adapter cannot claim it consumed evidence absent from the signed binding;
+- successful resolution does not itself make evidence trustworthy.
+
+Fetching a DID document, certificate chain, KERI checkpoint, WebAuthn
+registration, or HSM attestation record is an outer acquisition concern. The
+pure verifier receives bounded evidence and immutable local context, then
+revalidates their exact relationship.
+
+## Status answers narrow lifecycle questions
+
+Principal and grant status are separate signed fact families. Each statement
+binds an exact method, subject, issuer, sequence, and validity boundary. The
+trusted verifier snapshot—not the proof—selects accepted issuers and minimum
+sequence floors.
+
+Selection is deterministic. A later accepted sequence supersedes an earlier
+one, and revocation dominates active status at the same sequence. A rollback,
+wrong method, untrusted issuer, stale statement, missing statement, and
+authenticated revocation remain different outcomes.
+
+Do not treat these facts as synonyms:
+
+| Fact | What it can establish | What it cannot establish by itself |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Current control | The controller state was observed within a trusted freshness window | That the same key controlled the principal at an earlier signing time |
+| Historical control | A key was accepted during a particular historical interval | That a particular statement existed during that interval |
+| Statement existence | Exact signing bytes were observed at a particular time | Current controller state |
+| Revocation check | A trusted status source was checked at a stated observation time | Authority for an action |
+| Grant status | A particular grant or ancestor is active or revoked | Principal control or signature validity |
+
+This distinction prevents a removed historical key from creating a new grant
+and backdating it into a period when that key used to be valid.
+
+## Assurance belongs to participants and parameters
+
+Assurance is not one global strength score. Every assurance report names the
+participant, its role in the chain, the adapter and version, evidence digests,
+claim parameters, observation time, and provenance.
+
+A policy selects both a role and a quantifier:
+
+- `Any` means at least one participant with that role must satisfy the exact
+  requirement.
+- `Every` means every participant with that role must satisfy it.
+
+Roles include roots, intermediates, actors, and external issuers. Strong
+evidence for the actor cannot repair weak or missing evidence for a required
+root. Parameters matter too: a hardware-attestation claim for one protection
+profile does not satisfy a requirement for another merely because the claim
+names look similar.
+
+V1 registers no implicit assurance hierarchy. One claim implies another only
+when an exact implication handler is accepted and installed. An adapter cannot
+declare its own output “high assurance” and thereby satisfy an unrelated
+policy.
+
+## Registries make extension exact
+
+The verifier uses immutable registries for principal methods, signature
+suites, status methods, resource matchers, profile policy, budget algebra,
+critical extensions, assurance claims, and assurance implications.
+
+Each executable entry has:
+
+- an exact identifier;
+- immutable decision-affecting configuration;
+- a configuration commitment;
+- a conservative maximum work charge reserved before invocation; and
+- typed, bounded behavior.
+
+The trusted context lists the entries it accepts and binds the expected
+registry manifest and exact executable verifier configuration. A different
+manifest or configuration is a denial before pluggable verification. A
+required accepted identifier without an installed exact handler is
+indeterminate. An unaccepted signed critical extension is denied. There is no
+algorithm inference, fallback, or version negotiation.
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+  U["Untrusted proof evidence"] --> B["Exact signed control binding"]
+  L["Verifier-local context"] --> A["Bounded adapter"]
+  B --> A
+  A --> F["Key material + consumed evidence + assurance facts"]
+  F --> V["Sealed authority verifier"]
+  T["Trust anchors + status policy + accepted registries"] --> V
+  V --> D["Authorized / Denied / Indeterminate"]
+```
+
+The adapter arrow ends at facts. Only the sealed verifier combines those facts
+with trust anchors, authority, plans, action binding, and local policy.
+
+## Generated registry and assurance reference
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="registry-inventory"
+  sources="core/spec/v1/registry.md; core/crates/auths-registries; pinned registry manifest"
+  include="identifiers,configuration commitments,work ceilings,installed handlers"
+/>
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="assurance-claims-and-implications"
+  sources="core/spec/v1/registry.md; core/crates/auths-assurance; core/crates/auths-registries"
+  include="claim parameters,roles,freshness,exact implication edges"
+/>
+
+## Integration checklist
+
+When you add or review an adapter, verify all of the following:
+
+1. Live acquisition is outside the offline kernel.
+2. The proof cannot choose its own trust roots or immutable adapter context.
+3. Inputs, output facts, byte limits, work limits, and errors are typed and
+   bounded.
+4. The adapter reports exactly the evidence it consumed.
+5. Signature verification remains in the separately selected suite unless the
+   method defines an explicit method-derived message.
+6. Assurance claims name exact participants, parameters, source, adapter, and
+   observation time.
+7. Unsupported required behavior is indeterminate rather than inferred.
+8. Invalid or contradictory evidence is denied.
+9. The implementation cannot construct a verified authority or executable
+   command.
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+- `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md`, sections “Four planes,” “Evidence
+  and status,” and “Decisions.”
+- `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/registry.md` — initial V1 identifiers and exact
+  lookup behavior.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-ports/src/lib.rs` — effect-free adapter and
+  registry contracts.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-registries/src/lib.rs` — immutable executable
+  registries and configuration commitments.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-assurance/src/lib.rs` — role-indexed,
+  parameterized assurance evaluation.
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/reference/index.mdx b/content-v2/reference/index.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33d2898
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/reference/index.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+title: Reference
+description: Exact SDK, protocol, adapter, limit, and conformance material for Auths.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Reference
+
+Use this section when you need the exact public surface or protocol contract.
+If you are still deciding how Auths fits your application, begin with a guide;
+the reference assumes you already know whether you are authenticating an
+identity, verifying authority, or executing through a closed profile.
+
+## Choose the boundary you are implementing
+
+| You need to… | Start here |
+| --- | --- |
+| Build an application workflow in Node or a browser | [TypeScript SDK](/reference/typescript) |
+| Build an application workflow in Python | [Python SDK](/reference/python) |
+| Embed deterministic verification in Rust | [Rust facades and crates](/reference/rust) |
+| Handle an authorization or runtime outcome safely | [Decisions, errors, and safe responses](/reference/decisions-errors) |
+| Supply identity, lifecycle, or assurance facts | [Evidence, status, assurance, and registries](/reference/evidence-status-assurance) |
+| Implement or review the wire contract | [Limits, encoding, and identifiers](/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers) |
+| Select or qualify a principal-control method | [Principal adapters](/reference/principal-adapters) |
+| Compare another implementation with Auths V1 | [Conformance and independent implementations](/reference/conformance) |
+
+## What the reference promises
+
+Every generated value identifies the pinned Auths product revision and the
+artifact it describes. SDK declarations come from the packed npm package or
+installed wheel. Stable codes and protocol tables come from normative core
+inputs. Example output appears only when the product runner captured it.
+
+Repository-local evidence is not a publication, production-readiness, or
+security-audit claim. Auths is prelaunch and pre-audit.
+
+## One verifier, several product boundaries
+
+The portable operation accepts three byte inputs—a proof bundle, a canonical
+action, and a trusted context—and returns a canonical verification result.
+The core is deterministic and effect-free. Replay state, budgets, credentials,
+provider calls, receipts, and recovery belong to outer product layers.
+
+That separation explains why the SDK reference has more than one entry point:
+identity can be used without authority, verification can be used without
+effects, and execution is available only through a closed profile and runtime.
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+- `auths-proof/README.md` — product claim, sealed pipeline, Rust package map,
+  and prelaunch status.
+- `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md` — the four planes and portable
+  verification contract.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/public-topology-v1.json` — public TypeScript and Python
+  topology and currently qualified profiles.
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers.mdx b/content-v2/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbcb033
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+---
+title: Limits, canonical encoding, and identifiers
+description: Review the bounded deterministic byte contract that makes verification portable and resistant to ambiguous or excessive input.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Limits, canonical encoding, and identifiers
+
+In Auths, serialization rules are security rules. Signers, verifiers, language
+bindings, receipts, and independent implementations must agree on the exact
+bytes and identifiers for the same action. Inputs must also have a known upper
+bound before an attacker can make the verifier allocate memory or invoke
+expensive adapters.
+
+The tables below project exact current values from the pinned V1 specification;
+the surrounding explanation connects those limits to the attacks they bound.
+
+## Canonical bytes prevent alternate meanings
+
+Auths V1 uses a constrained deterministic CBOR profile. It permits
+definite-length maps, arrays, text, and byte strings with shortest integer and
+length encodings. Maps use ascending integer keys, and set-like arrays use an
+explicit canonical order.
+
+The decoder rejects:
+
+- duplicate or out-of-order keys;
+- non-minimal integers and lengths;
+- indefinite-length values;
+- floats and tags;
+- invalid UTF-8;
+- non-canonical set order;
+- unknown critical fields; and
+- trailing bytes after the one expected object.
+
+This avoids a dangerous situation in which two byte sequences appear
+equivalent to an application but produce different signing or hashing input.
+Auths does not assume that semantically similar, byte-distinct application
+actions are equivalent. A profile owns the canonical body format for its exact
+effect.
+
+## There are two important action digests
+
+An application profile first canonicalizes its body. The action envelope signs
+the resulting body digest together with the profile, capability, resource,
+actor, audience, challenge, validity, authority, plan, attachments, and other
+security fields.
+
+The portable verifier separately hashes the complete deterministic
+`canonical-action` input. These digests answer different questions:
+
+- **Canonical body digest:** are these the exact profile-owned effect bytes
+  authorized by the action envelope?
+- **Portable canonical-action digest:** did implementations receive the same
+  complete portable action input, including detached inputs required by the
+  protocol boundary?
+
+Do not substitute a JSON hash, request-body hash, transport digest, or
+provider idempotency key for either value.
+
+## Signing domains and content identifiers
+
+Every signed preimage begins with the Auths domain, protocol major, registered
+object type, profile identity and version, and the length of the deterministic
+canonical object. The signing object also binds the principal method,
+verification method, and signature suite.
+
+Content identifiers use a separate `AUTHS-ID` domain and a registered
+identifier type. A grant ID, action ID, plan ID, evidence ID, status ID,
+receipt ID, context digest, and proof digest therefore cannot be exchanged
+merely because they are all 32-byte values.
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+  O["Validated semantic object"] --> C["Deterministic CBOR"]
+  C --> S["AUTHS signing domain + object type"]
+  C --> I["AUTHS-ID domain + identifier type"]
+  S --> P["Exact signing preimage"]
+  I --> D["Typed content identifier"]
+```
+
+SHA-256 is fixed for V1 content identifiers and body digests. Ed25519 signs
+the full domain-separated preimage. The P-256 suite uses ECDSA with SHA-256,
+fixed-width `r || s`, and rejects high-S signatures. SHA-1 is prohibited for
+security-bearing identifiers.
+
+## Detached attachments remain bound
+
+The signed action contains descriptors for detached attachments, including
+their identifiers, lengths, and policy for required or opaque use. The
+portable canonical-action input supplies the actual detached bytes.
+
+The verifier checks correspondence, digest, and length and rejects missing,
+duplicated, mismatched, or unconsumed critical attachments. Transporting bytes
+out of band does not remove them from the authorization boundary.
+
+## Limits bound bytes, structure, and work
+
+Auths constrains more than the top-level proof size. V1 places limits on input
+byte lengths, grants, plan leaves and depth, evidence objects, status
+statements, attachments, signatures, permissions, audiences, critical
+extensions, registries, trust anchors, and adapter work.
+
+Deployments may lower defaults. Raising a protocol hard maximum requires
+protocol review rather than a runtime flag. The verifier reserves conservative
+adapter work before invoking a pluggable implementation, so a request cannot
+smuggle unbounded computation behind a small evidence envelope.
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="verifier-limits"
+  sources="core/spec/v1/protocol.md; core/crates/auths-model/src/lib.rs"
+  include="default,hard maximum,unit,affected stage"
+/>
+
+## Parse into valid types
+
+Callers should not carry unchecked strings or generic maps past the boundary.
+Canonical decoders and model constructors enforce length, ordering, identifier,
+and structural invariants as values are created. Later stages operate on those
+validated types instead of repeatedly asking whether an impossible state is
+present.
+
+An invalid encoding is a stable verification result, not a panic. A verifier
+may report a codec error only when it cannot encode or decode its own canonical
+result; malformed untrusted proof input remains part of the ordinary bounded
+decision path.
+
+## Identifier reference
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="domain-separated-identifiers"
+  sources="core/spec/v1/domain-separation.md; core/crates/auths-codec/src/lib.rs"
+  include="object types,identifier types,covered bytes,digest algorithm"
+/>
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+- `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/auths-proof.cddl` — normative deterministic CBOR
+  schema and hard structural maxima.
+- `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md`, sections “Deterministic encoding” and
+  “Default and hard limits.”
+- `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/domain-separation.md` — signing preimages,
+  identifier domains, and algorithms.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-model/src/lib.rs` — model defaults, hard caps,
+  and `VerifierLimits`.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-codec/src/lib.rs` — codec and identifier
+  facade.
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/reference/principal-adapters.mdx b/content-v2/reference/principal-adapters.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d38e7bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/reference/principal-adapters.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+---
+title: Principal adapters
+description: Choose a bounded principal-control method and understand exactly which identity facts it can and cannot establish.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Principal adapters
+
+A principal adapter answers a narrow question: does the supplied bounded
+evidence establish control of this principal, for this verification method and
+purpose, under immutable verifier-local configuration?
+
+It does not answer what the principal may do. Signature validity, identity
+resolution, channel authentication, status evidence, and assurance claims are
+inputs to authorization—not substitutes for it.
+
+## The common boundary
+
+Every principal method receives the exact principal, verification method,
+control purpose, signature suite, signing preimage, asserted time, bounded
+evidence, and method-specific immutable context. It returns suite-specific
+verification material, exact consumed evidence identifiers, and bounded
+assurance claims—or a typed failure.
+
+The selected signature suite verifies the Auths statement separately. A method
+can provide an explicit method-derived signature message when its protocol
+requires one, as WebAuthn does, but that message must still cryptographically
+commit to the exact Auths signing preimage.
+
+Live acquisition stays outside the pure method:
+
+- DNS and HTTPS retrieval for `did:web`;
+- KERI witness or checkpoint acquisition;
+- SPIFFE Workload API and bundle retrieval;
+- WebAuthn registration and browser ceremony setup;
+- HSM provider APIs and attestation-chain retrieval.
+
+The host turns those observations into bounded evidence and immutable trusted
+records. A proof cannot provide its own trust root or weaken those records.
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="principal-adapter-matrix"
+  sources="core/spec/v1/registry.md; core/spec/v1/* adapter profiles; installed registry manifest"
+  include="method ID,principal form,evidence ceiling,suites,assurance,required local context,unsupported behavior"
+/>
+
+## Self-certifying key methods
+
+### Raw key
+
+`raw-key-v1` encodes a closed Ed25519 or compressed P-256 public-key form and
+derives a self-certifying principal. The evidence must reconstruct the exact
+principal and require the exact compatible signature suite.
+
+This is the smallest offline method. It can establish a self-certifying
+identifier and offline verifiability. It does not provide rotation,
+deactivation, historical control, or freshness. Use it only where the host's
+policy accepts an effectively irrevocable principal or supplies lifecycle
+facts through another explicit mechanism.
+
+### `did:key`
+
+`did-key-v1` provides the same broad security shape through a closed subset of
+the `did:key` method. V1 accepts only supported Multikey forms for Ed25519 and
+compressed P-256, and it performs no algorithm inference or fallback.
+
+Like raw key, `did:key` is self-certifying and offline verifiable but has no
+rotation, deactivation, or historical controller-state mechanism.
+
+## Document and event-history methods
+
+### Bundled `did:web`
+
+`did-web-bundled-v1` verifies a bounded canonical DID document carried with the
+proof. Retrieval and verification are deliberately separate. The verifier
+must supply an explicit host-controlled trust record binding the principal and
+document digest; a self-identifying document is not proof that it came from
+the named host.
+
+Current trust records can establish current controller state and a revocation
+check within an observation window. Historical pins can establish that a
+document was valid during an interval. Establishing that an exact statement
+existed during that interval requires a separate exact-statement pin.
+
+The closed document profile rejects remote contexts, embedded methods,
+unsupported curves, arbitrary redirects, and unknown root properties. Network
+retrieval belongs to a resolver that applies allowlists, DNS/IP controls,
+redirect policy, media-type checks, size bounds, and timeouts; that resolver
+has no authority-verification API.
+
+### `did:keri`
+
+`did-keri-v1` replays a bounded embedded KERI event log and verifies the
+selected establishment key, sequence, thresholds, links, commitments, and
+controller signatures for the supported subset.
+
+A valid embedded log establishes only the state present in that log. It cannot
+prove that no later rotation exists elsewhere. Applications requiring current
+controller state must supply an authenticated checkpoint and require the
+corresponding freshness claims. Historical statement existence also requires
+separate authenticated observation; it is not inferred from a complete-looking
+event log.
+
+## Workload, user, and hardware-backed methods
+
+### SPIFFE X.509-SVID
+
+`spiffe-x509-v1` validates a bounded leaf-first certificate path against a
+verifier-selected trust-domain bundle. It enforces the exact SPIFFE URI SAN,
+trust-domain relationship, certificate validity at the explicit evaluation
+time, client-auth usage, name constraints, and a supported leaf key.
+
+It can establish PKI-chain validation and workload attestation. Current status
+claims require a matching verifier-local status observation when policy asks
+for one. Workload API access and bundle acquisition remain outside the kernel.
+
+### WebAuthn
+
+`webauthn-v1` binds a WebAuthn assertion challenge to the SHA-256 digest of the
+exact Auths signing preimage. Verifier-local registration records constrain the
+credential, P-256 key, relying-party ID, origins, required flags, counter
+policy, attestation level, and observation window.
+
+The adapter can establish origin binding, user verification when the
+authenticator reports it, and hardware attestation only when the local record
+establishes a named attestation level. Browser ceremony initiation,
+registration, and counter updates remain stateful outer concerns.
+
+### HSM-attested key
+
+`hsm-attested-v1` checks a bounded evidence envelope against an immutable
+verifier-local attestation record. That record fixes the key and suite,
+attestation profile, provider, protection level, key-handle and device-chain
+digests, exportability, and observation window.
+
+Provider APIs and chain acquisition happen outside the kernel. The method can
+emit parameterized hardware-attestation and current-control facts only when
+the evidence exactly matches the local record and the transaction digest binds
+the exact Auths statement.
+
+## How to choose
+
+Choose the smallest method that can establish the facts your trust policy
+actually requires:
+
+- For a local or embedded offline verifier where rotation is not required,
+  raw key or `did:key` may be sufficient.
+- For a web-controlled identity with current or historical document policy,
+  use bundled `did:web` with verifier-owned trust records.
+- For rotation-aware event history, use `did:keri` and add authenticated
+  checkpoints when current state matters.
+- For workload identity, use SPIFFE with verifier-owned trust-domain bundles.
+- For a user ceremony bound to origin and relying party, use WebAuthn.
+- For custody or key-protection assurance, use an HSM-attested method under a
+  reviewed provider-specific profile.
+
+Do not select a method by marketing-level strength. Write the exact assurance,
+freshness, lifecycle, and historical-state requirements first, then choose an
+adapter capable of establishing those facts.
+
+## Fail-closed behavior
+
+An unsupported required method is indeterminate. Malformed, contradictory, or
+unauthentic evidence is denied. A missing required external fact is
+indeterminate. Authenticated revocation is denied. Suite, principal, or
+verification-method disagreement is denied.
+
+No adapter falls back to another method, guesses an algorithm from byte length,
+or treats successful retrieval as verified control.
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-ports/src/lib.rs` — `PrincipalMethod`, control
+  inputs, outputs, and typed failures.
+- `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/registry.md` — target V1 method IDs, evidence
+  ceilings, and suite requirements.
+- `auths-proof/core/adapters/auths-raw-key/src/lib.rs` — raw-key method.
+- `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/did-key.md`, `did-web.md`, `did-keri.md`,
+  `spiffe-x509.md`, `webauthn.md`, and `hsm-attested.md` — closed adapter
+  profiles and trust boundaries.
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/reference/python.mdx b/content-v2/reference/python.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a35ef1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/reference/python.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+---
+title: Python SDK
+description: Navigate the typed public auths modules, async resource ownership, closed workflow results, and extension contracts.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Python SDK
+
+The `auths` wheel exposes the same product topology as the TypeScript package
+using idiomatic Python modules and native-backed types. Most applications begin
+with the root workflow, `auths.integrations`, and `auths.profiles`. Identity and
+effect-free verification remain independently usable.
+
+Installed wheels include the native implementation, so a normal consumer does
+not need a Rust toolchain. Exact supported Python versions, platforms, wheel
+ABI, and distribution status must come from the installed wheel and runtime
+contract shown below.
+
+## Pick the smallest public module
+
+| Module | Use it for | It does not do |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `auths` | Create, delegate, execute, resume, inspect product results, and handle product errors | Re-export every lower-level module |
+| `auths.identity` | Decode, resolve, validate, and authenticate method- and suite-labelled identities | Grant authority or authorize an effect |
+| `auths.verify` | Verify proofs, decisions, and receipts; inspect inert projections; create bounded disclosures | Call a provider or return an effect-capable execution object |
+| `auths.profiles` | Construct actions and authorities for qualified closed effect domains | Accept an arbitrary provider operation or payload |
+| `auths.integrations` | Select maintained development and production composition boundaries, plus identity transport integration | Make development state or keys production-ready |
+| `auths.framework` | Implement the proven signer and atomic-reservation contracts | Reimplement core semantics in Python |
+| `auths.testkit` | Certify adapters and exercise deterministic conformance suites | Provide production custody, persistence, or telemetry |
+
+All intended public modules use explicit `__all__` declarations and installed-
+wheel typing checks. A source module that does not appear in the installed
+public inventory is not an application API.
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="python-sdk-symbols"
+  sources="installed wheel modules; explicit __all__; installed type information; bindings/python/api/public-api.txt"
+  groupBy="public module"
+  include="signature,type annotations,parameters,result variants,exceptions,security notes"
+/>
+
+## The shortest protected workflow
+
+The normal async workflow is:
+
+1. Construct an exact authority and action through a qualified profile.
+2. Supply a closed provider whose handlers expose only configured operations.
+3. Open a maintained Auths composition with `async with`.
+4. Execute and exhaustively handle the closed result.
+5. Let the context manager close owned signers and native sessions.
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="executed-recipe"
+  source="bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py"
+  artifact="installed auths wheel"
+  show="source,qualification status,fail-closed branch,artifact revision"
+/>
+
+The pinned recipe currently fails its public-import check: it imports
+`verify_receipt` from `auths`, while the pinned public inventory exports that
+symbol from `auths.verify`. This recipe remains qualification-blocked until its
+source and public import agree; a TypeScript result is not Python evidence.
+Publication requires the recipe to execute against the same wheel used to
+generate the reference.
+
+## Async ownership is part of correctness
+
+Use `async with` for the normal lifecycle. Applications that cannot use a
+context manager may explicitly `await auths.aclose()`. Both paths are intended
+to be idempotent and release the resources owned by the composition.
+
+Delegated children are separately owned sessions. Do not assume that garbage
+collection will promptly close native sessions, signers, file-backed recovery
+state, or provider resources.
+
+## Handle values, not message strings
+
+The high-level API returns typed completed, denied, indeterminate, replay,
+conflict, and recoverable values. Expected authorization and recovery outcomes
+are not generic exceptions.
+
+- Denied and indeterminate never authorize provider entry.
+- Exact replay returns recorded state and must not call the provider again.
+- Recoverable state must be resumed with the SDK-minted opaque reference for
+  the same execution.
+- A conflict is a stop condition, not an invitation to generate a new request
+  identifier.
+
+Use the typed discriminant and stable code. Product and adapter exceptions
+carry their own error contract; messages are for humans and may be redacted.
+
+## Effect-free verification
+
+`auths.verify` exposes single and batch proof verification, receipt
+verification, inert decision and receipt inspection, and bounded disclosure.
+It accepts explicit bytes and returns ordinary inspection or verification
+values. It cannot mint the native-owned authorization object used by a closed
+profile to perform an effect.
+
+This boundary matters in Python because ordinary user code is highly dynamic:
+application code must not be able to create an effect-capable authorization
+object by setting a flag, constructing a dataclass, or monkey-patching a
+wrapper. Native ownership preserves the boundary.
+
+## Standalone identity
+
+`auths.identity` can carry, decode, resolve, and authenticate identities
+without importing capabilities, approvals, or runtime execution. Identity
+methods and signature suites remain explicit and replaceable. Successful
+authentication binds exact bytes to a public identity; it does not authorize
+an application action or prevent replay on its own.
+
+## Development and production
+
+The development composition uses ephemeral keys and in-memory state, with an
+explicitly development-only recovery option where provided. It is suitable for
+learning and local tests, not production durability.
+
+A production composition needs a qualified closed profile, durable atomic
+reservation, reviewed signer custody, credential acquisition after
+authorization and reservation, receipt retention and access controls,
+observability without secret leakage, and profile-specific reconciliation.
+
+Run the bounded doctor command from the installed wheel to inspect runtime,
+ABI, semantic-subject, state, and profile facts. It must not read application
+secrets or print protocol payloads.
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="python-runtime-and-distribution-status"
+  sources="installed wheel metadata; bindings/python/sdk-runtime-contract.json; installed doctor report schema"
+  include="package version,CPython versions,platforms,wheel ABI,modules,excluded modules,capabilities,qualified profiles"
+/>
+
+## Extension boundary and parity
+
+`auths.framework` contains only the narrow supported contracts that Python
+applications may implement, including signer custody and atomic reservation.
+Candidate implementations should pass the corresponding `auths.testkit`
+conformance suite before they are used by a production composition.
+
+Parity with TypeScript means the same product operation, result meaning,
+security boundary, and qualified profile—not identical spelling or a shared
+implementation in either language. Differential fixtures should prove that
+both bindings delegate semantic operations to the same Rust-owned waist.
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+- `auths-proof/bindings/python/api/public-api.txt` — public installed-wheel
+  modules and symbols.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/python/sdk-runtime-contract.json` — CPython, platform,
+  ABI, distribution, semantic-subject, and module contract.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/python/README.md` — module topology, resource
+  ownership, development boundary, and doctor behavior.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py` — maintained
+  exact-action recipe.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/public-topology-v1.json` — cross-language topology and
+  qualified profiles.
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/reference/rust.mdx b/content-v2/reference/rust.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df5c4bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/reference/rust.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+---
+title: Rust facades and crate map
+description: Start from the supported Rust facade, then descend into protocol, authoring, adapters, profiles, and product mechanisms only when your integration needs them.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Rust facades and crate map
+
+Rust exposes both the portable verifier and the lower-level building blocks
+used to implement it. Most consumers should not assemble those crates
+themselves. Start with the facade matching your job, then descend only when you
+need explicit control over a boundary.
+
+## Start with a facade
+
+### `auths`
+
+`auths` is the supported embedded core coordinate. It re-exports the
+`auths-proof` facade while adding no I/O, provider, profile, custody, or runtime
+behavior. Use it when an application wants one stable dependency for offline
+Auths V1 verification.
+
+### `auths-proof`
+
+`auths-proof` exposes the bounded protocol engine and actionable result
+projection. The common operation supplies three explicit byte inputs: proof,
+canonical action, and trusted context. The result contains the three-way
+verdict, stable code, stage, deterministic resource metrics, portable result,
+and exact result CBOR.
+
+Malformed untrusted proof input is an ordinary verification result. The Rust
+`Result` error around the facade represents failure to encode or decode the
+engine's own canonical result—not a denied proof.
+
+The native typed operation is available for profile decoders that already hold
+a validated canonical action and verifier context. The sealed verified action
+has no public constructor.
+
+### `auths-sdk`
+
+`auths-sdk` is the idiomatic embedded authorization SDK. It helps an
+integration construct explicit trusted contexts, call the kernel, and decode a
+sealed verified action through a closed profile. It re-exports deliberately
+selected authoring, custody, error, model, and profile surfaces.
+
+It does not turn the Rust facade into a generic remote-action executor.
+Durable replay state, credentials, provider gateways, receipts, and
+reconciliation remain product or profile concerns.
+
+## Offline verification example
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="compiled-rust-example"
+  source="demos/offline-verification"
+  artifact="external consumer crate"
+  show="Cargo.toml,source,run command,artifact revision"
+/>
+
+The example is compiled as an external consumer against the pinned crate
+artifacts. Its verification path performs no resolver, network, database,
+filesystem, clock, or private-key I/O. `Indeterminate` remains non-authorizing
+and may change only when the host supplies new trusted facts or exact support.
+
+## Crates by responsibility
+
+The following map explains why the crate groups exist without duplicating
+every package name.
+
+### Protocol model and codec
+
+These crates own validated V1 types, deterministic CBOR, domain-separated
+identifiers, canonical fixtures, and the three-input portable contract. Use
+them when implementing a profile, adapter, independent encoding tool, or
+protocol-level integration that cannot be expressed through the facade.
+
+### Pure authority semantics
+
+Authority, composition, assurance, registries, signature suites, and the
+sealed verifier remain deterministic and effect-free. They decide attenuation,
+plan satisfaction, evidence requirements, status, action binding, and stable
+results from explicit inputs.
+
+These crates must not acquire evidence, read a clock, call a provider, or own
+mutable replay state.
+
+### Authoring and custody ports
+
+Authoring produces deterministic statements and external signing requests.
+Private-key custody remains behind a separate port. This lets applications use
+HSMs, KMS products, secure enclaves, or other signers without moving key
+material into the protocol model.
+
+Authoring can create a proposed proof; it cannot decide that its own output is
+authorized.
+
+### Principal and signature adapters
+
+Principal-method adapters establish bounded control and assurance facts for
+raw keys, DIDs, SPIFFE, WebAuthn, or HSM-attested identities. Signature suites
+verify exact domain-separated signing input. Network acquisition and mutable
+lifecycle observations remain outside these pure components.
+
+### Profiles and product mechanisms
+
+Profile crates own canonical application actions, typed verified-command
+decoding, provider gateways, and effect-specific result meaning. Product
+mechanisms own stateful concerns such as atomic reservation, replay, budgets,
+receipts, custody integration, and recovery.
+
+Each profile stays vertically cohesive. Similar-looking provider workflows do
+not share a generic operation dispatcher unless multiple implemented domains
+prove an identical mechanism through differential evidence.
+
+### Exchange and transport
+
+Exchange crates frame and move bounded proof material. A transport can
+authenticate a peer or session, but successful delivery never upgrades an
+invalid proof into authorization.
+
+### Testkit and conformance
+
+Testkit crates construct canonical positive and negative cases and certify
+specific extension contracts. They are not production dependencies and cannot
+become alternate sources of protocol truth.
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="rust-crate-map"
+  sources="Cargo.toml workspace members; architecture.toml; crate package metadata; public rustdoc"
+  groupBy="layer and responsibility"
+  include="crate,public purpose,layer,facade exposure,no_std status,rustdoc link"
+/>
+
+## Dependency direction
+
+The monorepo is a layered collection of packages:
+
+```text
+core <- exchange <- product <- bindings
+  ^         ^           ^          ^
+  +---------+-----------+----------+--- demos
+```
+
+Dependencies point toward the offline core. A lower layer must not import a
+higher layer to obtain a convenient type. Introduce a narrow port or move the
+minimal domain type to the lowest layer that can own it without importing I/O
+or policy.
+
+For a new integration, begin with a cohesive vertical profile in the product
+layer. Extract shared mechanisms only after independent implementations prove
+that inputs, outputs, limits, errors, state, and receipt meaning are identical.
+
+## Result handling
+
+Match every `Verdict`:
+
+- `Authorized` allows progression only through the exact verified action and
+  outer runtime gates.
+- `Denied` is stable for identical inputs; correct the action or authority.
+- `Indeterminate` is non-executable; supply new trusted facts or exact support
+  before verifying again.
+
+Use the stable code and stage for machine behavior. The non-sensitive
+explanation is suitable for operator guidance, but it is not a substitute for
+the typed result.
+
+## Exhaustive API reference
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="rust-public-api"
+  sources="cargo rustdoc JSON for auths,auths-proof,auths-sdk; pinned crate artifact metadata"
+  groupBy="facade then module"
+  include="items,signatures,errors,feature flags,security docs,rustdoc links"
+/>
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+Rustdoc owns exhaustive item-level documentation. Keep this page focused on
+the product map and the choice of starting facade instead of duplicating every
+Rust item in MDX.
+
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths/src/lib.rs` — supported embedded core facade.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-proof/src/lib.rs` — engine, verdict,
+  explanation, result, and sealed action facade.
+- `auths-proof/product/sdk/auths-sdk/src/lib.rs` — idiomatic embedded SDK and
+  selected re-exports.
+- `auths-proof/README.md` — target package responsibilities and prelaunch
+  status.
+- `auths-proof/AGENTS.md` and `architecture.toml` — enforced layer model and
+  dependency direction.
+- `auths-proof/docs/target-state/PROFILE_AND_DOMAIN_ABSTRACTION_BOUNDARY_PLAN.md`
+  — vertical-first profile and mechanism-extraction boundary.
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/reference/typescript.mdx b/content-v2/reference/typescript.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..13865c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/reference/typescript.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+---
+title: TypeScript SDK
+description: Navigate the public @auths-dev/sdk entry points from a high-level protected workflow to effect-free verification and extension contracts.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# TypeScript SDK
+
+`@auths-dev/sdk` is one package with progressively disclosed entry points. Most
+applications begin with the root workflow plus a maintained integration and a
+closed profile. Applications that only need identity or verification can use
+those surfaces without constructing grants, approvals, runtime state, or an
+effect-capable workflow.
+
+The root deliberately does not re-export every subpath. Importing from the
+boundary you intend to use makes identity, verification, execution, extension,
+and test-only code distinguishable in both reviews and package tooling.
+
+## Pick the smallest public entry point
+
+| Entry point | Use it for | It does not do |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk` | Create, delegate, execute, resume, inspect product results, and handle product errors | Re-export the lower-level identity, verification, profile, framework, or testkit surfaces |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/identity` | Decode, resolve, validate, and authenticate method- and suite-labelled public identities | Grant authority or authorize an effect |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/verify` | Deterministic proof, decision, receipt, inspection, and disclosure verification | Call a provider or return an effect-capable execution handle |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/profiles` | Construct actions and authorities for qualified closed effect domains | Turn an arbitrary operation tag or request object into a provider call |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/integrations` | Select maintained development or production composition boundaries | Make the development composition production durable |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/framework` | Implement the narrowly supported signer and atomic-reservation contracts | Expose internal protocol machinery as an application framework |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/testkit` | Run deterministic adapter and product-waist conformance suites | Provide production state, custody, or diagnostics |
+
+The installed-artifact reference below enumerates symbols from the packed
+package declarations and package exports. Source files outside those exports
+are not public API.
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="typescript-sdk-symbols"
+  sources="packed package.json exports; packed dist declarations; bindings/typescript/api/public-api.txt"
+  groupBy="package entry point"
+  include="signature,type parameters,parameters,result variants,errors,security notes"
+/>
+
+## The shortest protected workflow
+
+The high-level path combines three surfaces:
+
+1. A maintained composition from `/integrations` owns the workflow resources.
+2. A qualified closed profile from `/profiles` defines the action, authority,
+   verified command, and provider boundary.
+3. The root `Auths` object delegates, executes, resumes, and closes those
+   resources.
+
+For the current repository workflow, the maintained MCP profile constructs a
+tool authority and an exact tool-call action. A closed provider exposes only
+configured tool handlers. Native authorization and durable reservation occur
+before provider entry.
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="executed-recipe"
+  source="bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts"
+  artifact="packed @auths-dev/sdk"
+  show="source,declared outcome,fail-closed branch,artifact revision"
+/>
+
+## Handle closed results exhaustively
+
+Execution returns a closed union covering completed, denied, indeterminate,
+and recovery outcomes. Ordered-plan execution carries the corresponding plan
+completion or plan-recovery shape.
+
+- A completed result carries the provider result and receipt.
+- A denied or indeterminate result never means the provider was called.
+- An exact replay returns the recorded outcome without a second effect.
+- A recoverable result carries an SDK-minted opaque execution reference. Resume
+  the same execution; do not serialize an application-crafted substitute or
+  blindly invoke the provider again.
+- A conflict means the execution identity is already bound to incompatible
+  commitments or state and must stop.
+
+Use the discriminant, stable code, and typed error fields. Do not branch on
+human-readable messages.
+
+## Verification stays effect-free
+
+The `/verify` surface accepts explicit proof, canonical-action, and trusted-
+context bytes and exposes verification, receipt verification, inert
+inspection, and bounded receipt disclosure. A verifier result can tell you
+that authority was established, but it does not become the product runtime's
+sealed command.
+
+This distinction makes it safe to build auditors, gateways, offline checkers,
+and UI inspection tools without accidentally acquiring provider authority.
+Differential diagnostic tools remain under `/testkit` rather than the normal
+verification surface.
+
+## Identity can be adopted independently
+
+The `/identity` surface carries canonical method- and suite-labelled public
+identity data. Applications provide or select method and signature-suite
+adapters. Successful authentication binds exact message bytes to an identity;
+it does not create a capability, approval, grant, or execution permission.
+
+This is useful when a team wants Auths identity packets or transport-neutral
+identity exchange before adopting bounded authority.
+
+## Resource ownership
+
+The high-level object owns native sessions, signers, and other composition
+resources. Close it in a `finally` block, or use asynchronous explicit resource
+management on runtimes that support it. Delegated child sessions are separate
+owned resources and must also be closed.
+
+Development and production compositions have different guarantees. The
+development composition uses ephemeral keys and in-memory or explicitly
+development recovery state. It is not production durable. Production requires
+qualified profile integrations, durable atomic reservation, reviewed custody,
+receipt persistence and disclosure policy, and explicit reconciliation.
+
+## Runtime and publication status
+
+<GeneratedReference
+  kind="typescript-runtime-and-publication-status"
+  sources="bindings/typescript/sdk-runtime-contract.json; bindings/typescript/sdk-capability.json; packed package metadata"
+  include="SDK version,runtimes,subpaths,WASM ABI,qualified profiles,capability tier,publication status"
+/>
+
+Repository-local implementation evidence does not imply that a package has
+been published, promoted, or independently reviewed. Publication, promotion,
+and independent review remain separate statuses.
+
+## Extension boundary
+
+Use `/framework` only when you are implementing a supported production port.
+The current public topology names signer custody and atomic reservation as
+framework contracts. Use `/testkit` to certify candidate implementations and
+to exercise the product waist.
+
+Do not copy internal workflow classes, protocol objects, or test helpers into
+an application adapter merely because they exist in the source tree. A public
+extension contract must appear in the packed export map and public API
+snapshot.
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+The executed recipe must come directly from the maintained product source and
+run against the same packed artifact used for this reference. Do not rebuild an
+approximation or fabricate expected output in the documentation repository.
+
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/package.json` — package exports.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/api/public-api.txt` — installed public
+  symbol snapshot.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/sdk-runtime-contract.json` — runtime, ABI,
+  profile, and capability contract.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/README.md` — product topology, ownership,
+  development boundary, and repository capability status.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/src/product.ts` — closed high-level product
+  result and resource lifecycle.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/public-topology-v1.json` — cross-language layer and
+  qualified-profile topology.
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/start/index.mdx b/content-v2/start/index.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aeaf408
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/start/index.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+---
+title: Start with Auths
+description: Choose the smallest honest Auths path: understand the model, protect one exact effect, or verify authority offline.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Start with one boundary you can prove
+
+Auths is for software that must do something consequential without receiving broad, reusable permission. The quickest way to understand it is to protect one exact application effect: name the operation and resource, bind the exact action bytes, verify the authority, and allow only the resulting closed command into your provider gateway.
+
+If you are new to the model, begin with [What is Auths?](/start/what-is-auths). It explains the distinction between identity, delivery, approval, authority, and execution. Those concepts are deliberately separate: a signed request can prove who signed it without proving the signer may perform the requested effect.
+
+If you want to evaluate the SDK, choose a maintained path:
+
+- [TypeScript quickstart](/start/typescript) for a protected MCP-style action in Node.js.
+- [Python quickstart](/start/python) for the same product workflow with async resource ownership.
+- [Rust offline verification](/start/rust-offline-verification) when you need deterministic verification without networking, custody, mutable state, or execution authority.
+
+Each quickstart uses product-owned, digest-verified source and states its
+current qualification status. No parallel example or result is invented.
+
+<ProductStatus />
+
+## What success looks like
+
+Your first integration should prove two outcomes: the declared action reaches the provider exactly once, and a changed action is denied before the provider is contacted. Do not start by modeling an entire organization. A narrow end-to-end boundary gives you a trustworthy base for delegation, approvals, recovery, and receipts later.
+
+<NextSteps>
+- Learn [how verification works](/guides/verification-model).
+- Follow the [exact-action execution guide](/guides/execute-exact-action).
+- Inspect the [examples by security question](/examples).
+</NextSteps>
diff --git a/content-v2/start/python-quickstart.mdx b/content-v2/start/python-quickstart.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74ce013
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/start/python-quickstart.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+---
+title: Python quickstart
+description: Execute one allowed MCP action inside an owned Python session and observe denial before a second provider call.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Protect one exact action in Python
+
+This path proves two things in one run: an allowed action can reach your Python
+handler, and an undeclared action cannot. The maintained recipe also verifies
+the completed receipt before the SDK session closes.
+
+## Install the wheel
+
+The intended public wheel name and install command are:
+
+```bash
+# Install the pinned wheel candidate.
+pip install auths
+```
+
+Published wheels include the native implementation, so consumers do not need a
+Rust compiler. **Publication is currently blocked**, so this is a repository
+preview, not a claim that the command resolves from the public index today.
+Run the embedded recipe against the pinned product repository until the
+capability record promotes the wheel. The prelaunch repository remains the
+authority for runtime and publication status.
+
+## Run the product-owned workflow
+
+<Recipe id="03-execute-exact-action" language="python" />
+
+The example is asynchronous because provider work is asynchronous. It uses
+`async with` so the session owns and closes its native resources, signers, and
+development state. Applications that cannot use a context manager may close
+the session explicitly, but should not leave ownership implicit.
+
+## What the provider-call count proves
+
+The first action names the declared `publish_report` tool and completes. The
+second names `delete_report`, which is outside the configured authority. At the
+end, the provider-call count is still one.
+
+This is stronger than checking for a denied label after the fact. It proves the
+denial occurred on the safe side of the effect boundary. The provider did not
+need to inspect an Auths object, reverse an operation, or compensate for an
+unauthorized call.
+
+## Try the safe failure path
+
+Keep the provider handler registered and remove the corresponding tool from
+the authority. The handler must become unreachable through this Auths session.
+Restoring only the handler must not restore authority; restoring the authority
+is a separate, explicit change.
+
+Do not treat a thrown provider exception as an authorization denial. A provider
+exception happens after an action was allowed to enter the effect boundary.
+The SDK result and recovery metadata must be used to determine whether retry is
+safe.
+
+## Know what this example does not prove
+
+The development composition uses ephemeral custody and in-memory state. It
+does not prove that two Python processes coordinate replay, that keys are
+protected by an HSM or KMS, or that a remote provider effect is exactly-once.
+
+Before production, replace development mechanisms with durable atomic state
+and real custody, choose a qualified profile, keep credentials behind its
+gateway, and define reconciliation for “the provider may have applied it, but
+the response was lost.”
+
+Auths is prelaunch and pre-audit. A repository recipe passing is useful
+integration evidence, not an external security endorsement.
+
+## Where to go next
+
+- [Execute one exact action](/guides/execute-exact-action) explains the closed
+  gateway in detail.
+- [Replay and recovery](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown) explains
+  when not to retry.
+- [Production integration](/guides/production-integration) turns the demo
+  boundary into a deployment checklist.
+- [Python SDK reference](/reference/python) lists the installed public modules.
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+The embedded source is the maintained
+[`03_execute_exact_action.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py)
+recipe. Its output must be rendered from an actual run, never reconstructed by
+the site.
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/start/rust-offline-verification.mdx b/content-v2/start/rust-offline-verification.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..019a6ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/start/rust-offline-verification.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+title: Rust offline verification
+description: Verify proof, action, and trusted-context bytes without networking, mutable state, custody, or execution.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Verify authority without gaining an execution capability
+
+The Rust starting path is deliberately lower level than the TypeScript and
+Python product SDKs. It shows the portable, effect-free verifier boundary—not a
+stateful provider workflow.
+
+Use this path when you are building a verifier, audit tool, gateway pre-check,
+offline policy process, or independent implementation and you already have the
+three canonical inputs.
+
+## Run the external-consumer example
+
+Run the maintained external-consumer example directly from the pinned product
+revision. The source below is verified against its recorded digest.
+
+<RepositoryExample path="demos/offline-verification" />
+
+The consumer supplies:
+
+1. encoded proof-bundle bytes;
+2. canonical action bytes; and
+3. trusted-context bytes owned by the verifier.
+
+The context is not a bag of defaults. It binds local trust anchors, evaluation
+time, expected audience and challenge, accepted registries, status and
+assurance policy, limits, and the exact executable verifier configuration.
+The proof cannot add a trust root or weaken those requirements.
+
+## Handle every verdict
+
+Verification produces one of three outcomes:
+
+- `Authorized` means the proof covers the exact canonical action under the
+  supplied context.
+- `Denied` means available facts establish invalidity or insufficient
+  authority.
+- `Indeterminate` means a required trustworthy fact was not supplied or a
+  required capability is unavailable.
+
+Both non-authorized outcomes are non-executable. Do not turn indeterminate into
+“allow with warning,” and do not catch a decode failure and retry with a
+permissive parser.
+
+The result also carries a stable stage and reason code, canonical commitments,
+authorized branches, assurance results, and bounded resource/work totals. Log
+only the projection your threat model permits; proof and application bytes may
+be sensitive.
+
+## Mutation is a different action
+
+Change one byte of the canonical action and verify again. The prior result must
+not authorize the changed bytes. Depending on where the mutation lands, the
+new input will either fail bounded canonical parsing or reach action binding
+and fail the exact digest comparison.
+
+This check is safe to repeat because verification performs no external effect.
+It does not claim replay state, consume a budget, write a receipt, or contact a
+provider.
+
+## Where offline verification stops
+
+An authorized verifier result is evidence for an outer runtime; it is not a
+remote command. Production execution still requires channel policy, atomic
+replay and budget claims, application policy, a closed profile projection, a
+decision receipt, and an execution receipt.
+
+If your service needs to perform an effect, do not bolt a generic HTTP request
+onto this example. Use the product SDK and a qualified profile, or author and
+qualify a new domain-specific profile.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Verification model](/guides/verification-model)
+- [Verify existing authority from TypeScript or Python](/guides/verify-authority)
+- [Authority model](/guides/authority-model)
+- [Protocol limits and identifiers](/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers)
diff --git a/content-v2/start/typescript-quickstart.mdx b/content-v2/start/typescript-quickstart.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e640fc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/start/typescript-quickstart.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+---
+title: TypeScript quickstart
+description: Protect one MCP tool, execute the allowed action, and prove an undeclared action never reaches your provider.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Protect one exact action in TypeScript
+
+In this quickstart you will place a small provider function behind Auths. The
+application will execute an allowed `publish_report` action, verify the receipt,
+then attempt `delete_report`. The second operation must be denied before the
+provider is entered.
+
+The example uses the development composition and the currently qualified
+public profile, `auths.mcp/1`. It is a local learning path, not a production
+deployment template.
+
+## Before you run it
+
+The intended public package and install command are:
+
+```bash
+# Install the pinned SDK candidate.
+npm install @auths-dev/sdk
+```
+
+The package includes its WebAssembly implementation; the consumer does not need
+a Rust toolchain. **Publication is currently blocked**, so treat this page as a
+repository preview until the package capability record says otherwise. Until
+then, run the embedded recipe through the pinned product repository rather than
+assuming the registry command will resolve.
+
+The example deliberately imports from `/verify`,
+`/integrations`, and `/profiles`. The package root does not flatten those
+boundaries.
+
+## Run the maintained recipe
+
+The block below comes from the Auths product repository. Its expected outcome
+is declared by the product recipe manifest.
+
+<Recipe id="03-execute-exact-action" language="typescript" />
+
+## Read the outcome as an enforcement trace
+
+The important result is not merely that the first call completed. The recipe
+also counts provider entries. After one allowed action and one undeclared
+action, the count remains one.
+
+That establishes the useful boundary:
+
+1. `mcp.allowTools` defines the local development authority.
+2. `mcp.callTool` creates the profile-owned action shape.
+3. `auths.execute` verifies and reserves that exact action.
+4. The MCP profile decodes the verified action into a closed command.
+5. Only then can the named provider handler run.
+
+The denied action does not invoke a fallback handler, reach a generic HTTP
+client, or depend on the provider to reject it.
+
+## Change something that matters
+
+After the unmodified recipe succeeds, add the undeclared tool to the provider's
+tool map but **not** to the authority. Run it again. The result should remain
+denied and the new handler must not run. Provider availability is not
+authority.
+
+Then change the arguments of the allowed action while keeping a previously
+authorized proof or execution reference. Exact action binding should prevent
+the changed bytes from inheriting the earlier decision.
+
+Stop if an undeclared handler is entered. That is an enforcement failure, not
+an acceptable example difference.
+
+## Development versus production
+
+The development composition owns ephemeral signing keys and in-memory replay
+state. Restarting it discards state. A production integration must provide:
+
+- durable atomic reservation across its deployment scope;
+- non-exporting signer custody;
+- a qualified closed profile and gateway;
+- credential acquisition after authorization and reservation;
+- reconciliation for ambiguous provider outcomes; and
+- durable receipt retention with deliberate disclosure controls.
+
+Do not put a provider credential in the untrusted action or expose a generic
+provider callback as the production effect boundary.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Understand exact execution](/guides/execute-exact-action)
+- [Delegate narrower authority to an agent](/guides/delegate-agent)
+- [Plan a production integration](/guides/production-integration)
+- [Inspect the TypeScript SDK reference](/reference/typescript)
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+The embedded example resolves to
+[`03-execute-exact-action.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts).
+Its availability remains `Repository preview` until package publication and
+promotion are unblocked.
+*/}
diff --git a/content-v2/start/what-is-auths.mdx b/content-v2/start/what-is-auths.mdx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b2b3ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content-v2/start/what-is-auths.mdx
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+---
+title: What is Auths?
+description: Learn how Auths gives software narrow authority for an exact action without turning identity, transport, or approval into permission.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+
+# Give software authority for one exact action
+
+Auths is an open protocol and SDK for **proof-carrying, bounded machine
+authority**. It answers a question that ordinary authentication leaves open:
+
+> This caller is who it claims to be—but may it perform this exact action,
+> against this resource, under these limits, right now?
+
+Imagine a reporting agent that may publish the weekly report but may not delete
+it. An identity provider can establish which agent connected. A signed request
+can establish that the request was not changed in transit. An approval system
+can establish that somebody approved a proposal. None of those facts alone
+proves that authority flowed from a trusted root to this agent without becoming
+broader along the way.
+
+Auths carries that proof with the action. A verifier checks it locally against
+explicit trust, status, assurance, and configuration inputs. A product runtime
+then applies replay protection and other stateful gates before a closed profile
+can construct the provider command.
+
+## The useful distinction: identity is not authority
+
+Identity answers **who controls this key or account?** Authority answers **what
+may that principal do?** Keeping those questions separate lets an application
+use OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, WebAuthn, or another supported identity method
+without making any one identity provider the universal owner of permission.
+
+The same separation applies to transport. HTTPS, a queue, or Iroh may carry an
+Auths proof. Successful delivery does not improve the proof and cannot turn a
+denial into authorization.
+
+## Four planes, one enforcement boundary
+
+Auths separates responsibilities that are often collapsed into a single
+middleware decision:
+
+| Plane | What it establishes | What it cannot do alone |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Proof | Trust anchors, grants, plans, and exact action binding | Read live systems or execute an effect |
+| Evidence | Principal control, signatures, status, freshness, assurance | Mint authority or commands |
+| Execution | Replay, budgets, local policy, reservation, provider execution | Upgrade a denied or indeterminate proof |
+| Control | Authoring, custody, configuration, receipts, observability | Bypass the proof or execution boundary |
+
+This is not ceremony. It prevents a convenient outer fact—such as a valid JWT
+or successful mTLS handshake—from silently becoming permission.
+
+## From hostile bytes to a verified action
+
+The offline kernel moves through typed stages:
+
+```text
+untrusted bytes
+  -> DecodedProof
+  -> ResolvedProof
+  -> ControlVerifiedProof
+  -> VerifiedAuthority
+  -> VerifiedAction
+```
+
+It accepts exactly three language-neutral inputs: proof bytes, canonical action
+bytes, and a trusted verifier context. It performs no networking, filesystem
+access, clock reads, database writes, private-key operations, or provider
+calls. Every changing fact—including evaluation time and accepted adapters—is
+an explicit input.
+
+An authorized result is still not permission to call an arbitrary URL. The
+runtime must claim replay and budget state, apply local policy, and pass the
+verified action into a closed profile. The profile, not the untrusted request,
+constructs the provider command.
+
+## What fails closed
+
+Auths distinguishes three proof outcomes:
+
+- **Authorized:** the proof and exact action satisfy all required facts.
+- **Denied:** available facts establish that the request is invalid or outside
+  authority.
+- **Indeterminate:** a required trustworthy fact could not be established.
+
+Only the first outcome may proceed to the outer execution gates. A missing
+status record does not become a soft success. A valid signature over different
+bytes does not become “close enough.” An unknown adapter, unsupported profile,
+oversized proof, widened delegation, or mismatched verifier configuration
+cannot reach a provider.
+
+## What Auths deliberately does not own
+
+Auths does not replace your identity provider, transport, database, KMS, policy
+engine, or cloud API. It composes with them. It also does not claim remote
+exactly-once execution, instantaneous revocation, or atomicity across a local
+database and a remote provider.
+
+The development SDK composition uses ephemeral keys and in-memory state. It is
+for learning and local integration, not production durability. Auths is
+currently **prelaunch and pre-audit**; repository conformance and formal
+evidence are not an independent security review.
+
+## Choose your first path
+
+- To protect one real application operation, start with the
+  [TypeScript quickstart](/start/typescript) or
+  [Python quickstart](/start/python).
+- To evaluate proofs without execution, use
+  [Rust offline verification](/start/rust-offline-verification) or
+  [Verify existing authority](/guides/verify-authority).
+- To understand the protocol model first, read
+  [Authority](/guides/authority-model) and
+  [Verification](/guides/verification-model).
+
+{/* Editorial provenance:
+
+This overview is grounded in the
+[Auths repository overview](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/README.md)
+and the
+[Protocol V1 specification](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/core/spec/v1/protocol.md).
+*/}
diff --git a/content/adoption-pages.json b/content/adoption-pages.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 76db354..0000000
--- a/content/adoption-pages.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,342 +0,0 @@
-[
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.start.adopt/1",
-    "title": "Adopt Auths incrementally",
-    "description": "Protect one high-value effect beside the systems you already operate.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "path",
-        "title": "Compose before replacing",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Keep your identity provider, policy engine, cloud IAM, transport, and provider gateway. Add Auths to one exact effect, compare decisions without effects, then enforce at the existing gateway.",
-          "Expand one dimension at a time only after success, denial, uncertainty, and rollback are observable."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.plan/1",
-    "title": "Plan an Auths adoption",
-    "description": "Inventory effects and boundaries without collecting credentials or unnecessary business data.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "inventory",
-        "title": "Inventory ownership, not secret values",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Record the effect entry point, actor source, existing roles or scopes, credential location, approval owner, replay behavior, audit evidence, and unknown-outcome handling. Record classifications and references—not tokens, private keys, raw payloads, or full receipts."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "sequence",
-        "title": "Move through reversible phases",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Inventory, model, verify in shadow, compare, enforce one effect, observe, then expand. Every phase names a rollback and a stop condition."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1",
-    "title": "Add Auths to signed requests",
-    "description": "Keep request authentication while binding authority to exact application bytes.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "compose",
-        "title": "Authentication and authority answer different questions",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "The existing signature proves who controlled a key and protects its signed fields. Auths adds attenuated authority, exact action commitment, lifecycle state, approvals, closed execution, and receipts only where needed."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1",
-    "title": "Keep OAuth and OIDC",
-    "description": "Retain login and session identity while adding bounded effect authority.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.create/1",
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "compose",
-        "title": "The session identifies the actor",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Continue using OAuth or OIDC for login, consent, session management, and identity claims. Translate accepted session evidence into explicit Auths trust context; do not treat a broad scope as proof of one exact effect."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1",
-    "title": "Move beyond ambient API keys",
-    "description": "Keep provider keys inside the gateway and give callers exact authority instead.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "boundary",
-        "title": "Do not send the provider key to the caller",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Wrap the existing provider client in a closed gateway. The caller presents bounded authority and an exact command; the gateway acquires the key only after native authorization and durable reservation."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1",
-    "title": "Compose with cloud IAM",
-    "description": "Use workload identity and short-lived credentials without making IAM the application-effect model.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.resume/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "compose",
-        "title": "IAM authorizes provider access; Auths authorizes the exact effect",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Keep workload federation, roles, and restricted credentials. Add Auths where the application must commit exact resources, order, approvals, use limits, recovery state, and receipts across organizational boundaries."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1",
-    "title": "Compose with policy engines",
-    "description": "Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit bounded context.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "compose",
-        "title": "Keep rich policy evaluation where it belongs",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "The policy engine continues to answer relationship and attribute questions. Record the bounded decision input or commitment that Auths actually relied on; never imply Auths replaced the policy model."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1",
-    "title": "Bridge existing capabilities",
-    "description": "Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority without inventing properties they do not provide.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.create/1",
-        "auths.operation.delegate/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "honesty",
-        "title": "Map protocol, profile, and state responsibilities separately",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Document which attenuation properties come from the source capability, which exact-effect rules come from an application profile, and which replay or budget properties require durable external state."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.approvals/1",
-    "title": "Bind existing approvals",
-    "description": "Turn approval evidence into exact transaction context, never reusable ambient permission.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "binding",
-        "title": "Approve the bytes that will execute",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1",
-    "title": "Verify in shadow mode",
-    "description": "Compare Auths decisions with current enforcement without authorizing or executing effects.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "inert",
-        "title": "Shadow mode is cryptographically inert",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "It may parse, verify, classify, and compare bounded decisions. It cannot mint an opaque executable authorization object, reserve a use, acquire provider credentials, or call a provider."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "records",
-        "title": "Store bounded comparisons",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Record commitments, decision classes, stable reason codes, timing, and correlation identifiers. Exclude credentials, raw business payloads, sealed commands, and full receipt contents."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.adopt.cutover/1",
-    "title": "Cut over one protected effect",
-    "description": "Enforce, observe, reconcile, and roll back through one existing gateway.",
-    "depth": "operate",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.resume/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
-        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
-        "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "preconditions",
-        "title": "Cut over only with reversible evidence",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Require shadow agreement, durable state, provider idempotency or reconciliation, custody readiness, telemetry, explicit stop conditions, and a tested rollback switch before enforcement."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "rollback",
-        "title": "Rollback preserves evidence",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Return traffic to the previous gateway without erasing Auths decision comparisons, reservations, recovery references, or receipts. Reconcile any provider-unknown work before another attempt."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  }
-]
diff --git a/content/agent-integration-pages.json b/content/agent-integration-pages.json
deleted file mode 100644
index aa32801..0000000
--- a/content/agent-integration-pages.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,370 +0,0 @@
-[
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1",
-    "title": "How Auths works for agents",
-    "description": "Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.",
-    "depth": "understand",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "roles",
-        "title": "An agent is a bounded actor, not a trusted process",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "An agent can propose an action and present delegated authority. Native verification decides whether the exact action is allowed; an application-owned closed gateway alone can reach provider credentials.",
-          "Identity, transport, authority, approval, state, custody, and the provider adapter remain independent components."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1",
-    "title": "Delegate one tool",
-    "description": "Give an agent exactly one tool and one bounded use.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "scenario",
-        "title": "Narrow authority in practice",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1",
-    "title": "Require approval for an agent plan",
-    "description": "Bind human or organizational approval to exact ordered plan bytes.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "plan",
-        "title": "Approval cannot be reused for a changed plan",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1",
-    "title": "Handoff across agents",
-    "description": "Attenuate authority at every agent boundary.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.delegate/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "handoff",
-        "title": "Every hop gets narrower",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "A coordinating agent may delegate a smaller action set, earlier expiry, lower use count, and shallower remaining depth. A child cannot manufacture omitted critical extensions or widen any parent bound."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1",
-    "title": "Use Auths from an MCP client",
-    "description": "Let an agent harness propose bounded tool calls without receiving provider credentials.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "client",
-        "title": "MCP transports intent, not permission",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "The client supplies the requested tool call and proof material. The receiving verifier decides authority independently of whether MCP delivery succeeded."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1",
-    "title": "Protect an MCP server",
-    "description": "Place provider access behind an opaque verified-command boundary.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.resume/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "server",
-        "title": "Verify before entering the provider",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Parse bounded input, authorize it natively, reserve state durably, then hand only an opaque verified command to the provider adapter. Keep denial and uncertainty outside the effect boundary."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.agents.skills/1",
-    "title": "Agent skills and plugins",
-    "description": "Use versioned Auths tooling without putting credentials or policy meaning in prompts.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "safety",
-        "title": "Skills explain and invoke public tools",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "A maintained skill may help an agent compose a request, inspect a closed outcome, or locate evidence. It cannot mint native authorization objects, contain secrets, or bypass runtime checks."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1",
-    "title": "Identity and trust integrations",
-    "description": "Compose OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or application resolvers without coupling identity to authority.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "ownership",
-        "title": "Your trust policy owns who is accepted",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Auths supplies bounded evidence parsing and suite-labelled verification. Your application supplies accepted roots and resolver policy. The identity system supplies authentication evidence; none of these alone grants an effect."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.integrations.policy/1",
-    "title": "Policy engine integrations",
-    "description": "Use Cedar, OPA, or ReBAC decisions as explicit context rather than hidden authority.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "ownership",
-        "title": "Policy supplies context; Auths binds the exact effect",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "The policy engine evaluates application relationships and attributes. Auths commits the resulting bounded decision context to the action and preserves execution state and receipts."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.integrations.cloud/1",
-    "title": "Cloud IAM integrations",
-    "description": "Keep short-lived cloud credentials behind a closed provider gateway.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.resume/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "ownership",
-        "title": "Cloud IAM remains the provider boundary",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Cloud IAM supplies workload identity and restricted provider credentials. Auths supplies exact effect authority, durable use accounting, closed outcomes, and portable receipts. Credentials never enter the agent or proof."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.integrations.transport/1",
-    "title": "Transport integrations",
-    "description": "Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, or application transports.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "separation",
-        "title": "Delivery is never authority",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Transport authenticates or delivers peers and bytes according to its own contract. Auths verifies those bounded bytes under explicit trust and authority. Iroh can be used without capabilities; Auths can be used without Iroh."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1",
-    "title": "Capability integrations",
-    "description": "Import UCAN, Biscuit, or macaroon authority through explicit application profiles.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.create/1",
-        "auths.operation.delegate/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "bridge",
-        "title": "Preserve the source capability's legitimate role",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "An import profile states which external claims map into Auths authority and which require external state. It must reject any mapping that silently invents stronger bounds or execution guarantees."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1",
-    "title": "Build an application profile",
-    "description": "Own canonical domain actions without forking the Auths semantic core.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.create/1",
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "contract",
-        "title": "A profile defines domain meaning",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Define bounded canonical actions, resource matching, attenuation, and inspection projections. Keep identity, transport, state, custody, approval providers, and execution adapters outside the profile."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  }
-]
diff --git a/content/agent-pages.ts b/content/agent-pages.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index 443eabd..0000000
--- a/content/agent-pages.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-import { concept, guide, integration, landing, quickstart } from "./page-builders.ts";
-
-const scenarios = {
-  agent: "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
-  plan: "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1",
-  runtime: "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
-  recovery: "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
-  verify: "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
-} as const;
-
-const agentOperations = { operations: ["auths.operation.delegate/1", "auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"] } as const;
-
-const agentGuide = (id: string, description: string, scenario: string, outcome: string, steps: string, failure: string, next: string) => guide({
-  id, description, scenario, outcome,
-  prerequisites: "Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.",
-  steps,
-  success: "The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.",
-  failure,
-  next,
-  dependencies: agentOperations,
-});
-
-const agentIntegration = (id: string, description: string, owner: string, flow: string, limitation: string) => integration({
-  id, description, scenario: scenarios.agent,
-  ownership: `${owner} remains application-owned. Auths owns only the typed authority, native verification, closed execution boundary, and portable evidence composed around it.`,
-  dataFlow: flow,
-  secrets: "Agent prompts, tool arguments, and Auths artifacts contain no ambient provider credential. The closed gateway acquires credentials only after native authorization and durable reservation.",
-  state: "The application owns agent memory and orchestration. Auths runtime state owns uses, budgets, replay, plan progress, recovery, and receipts for protected effects.",
-  failures: "Prompt substitution, tool widening, stale identity, transport success, replay, and provider uncertainty remain separate closed outcomes and cannot be converted into success by agent reasoning.",
-  limitations: limitation,
-  dependencies: agentOperations,
-});
-
-export const agentPages: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([
-  landing("auths.page.agents/1", "Give agents precise tools, approved plans, and verifiable outcomes without ambient credentials.", "An agent may propose work, receive narrower delegated authority, deliver a sealed command, and report a receipt. It cannot mint permission, widen a delegation, treat MCP delivery as authorization, or reach provider credentials directly."),
-  concept({
-    id: "auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1",
-    description: "Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.",
-    model: "The agent proposes an application action. A trusted issuer creates or delegates bounded authority. Optional approvers sign the exact plan. A closed gateway executes only a native-authorized command. Observers and verifiers receive bounded evidence rather than trusting the agent's account.",
-    invariants: "Prompts do not create authority. Every handoff narrows or preserves exact commitments. Identity, MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, approval, and provider authentication each remain independent inputs rather than authorization shortcuts.",
-    failures: "Widening, prompt or plan substitution, ambient credentials, transport-only success, replay, exhausted state, and provider uncertainty fail with distinct outcomes that the agent cannot override.",
-    next: "Run Delegate one tool, then add plans, multiple agents, or MCP only when the workflow calls for them.",
-    dependencies: agentOperations,
-  }),
-  quickstart("auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1", "Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohibited.", scenarios.agent),
-  agentGuide("auths.page.agents.delegation/1", "Delegate an exact tool action without giving the agent a broad credential.", scenarios.agent, "The agent receives a child authority restricted by action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, and depth.", "Create authority at the trusted application boundary, narrow it for the agent's identity and tool call, send the signed child with canonical tool inputs, and execute through the closed gateway.", "Changing the tool, resource, arguments, audience, use count, budget, expiry, depth, or a critical extension is denied before the tool runs.", "Use approved plans when the exact proposed sequence requires review."),
-  agentGuide("auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1", "Require human or organizational approval for the exact ordered work an agent proposes.", scenarios.plan, "Approvers review the same plan commitment that the runtime will consume.", "Parse the agent proposal into profile actions, construct the ordered plan, create the approval signing request, collect typed responses, verify the threshold, then execute members in order.", "Prompt changes, member replacement, reordered work, mutation after approval, reused approval responses, unmet threshold, and expired approval deny the plan.", "Add multi-agent handoffs only by delegating a narrower plan or member scope."),
-  agentGuide("auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1", "Pass work across multiple agents while narrowing authority at every boundary.", scenarios.agent, "Each agent receives only the subset of actions, resources, budgets, uses, and depth needed for its contribution.", "Model every handoff as an explicit delegation, bind the next agent's identity and audience, retain the signed chain, and execute terminal effects through gateways outside all agent processes.", "A skipped parent, widened child, depth reset, identity substitution, hidden tool, or agent-to-agent ambient credential fails verification.", "Use receipts to verify the complete chain and production patterns to assign human ownership."),
-  landing("auths.page.agents.mcp/1", "Use MCP as a tool discovery and delivery layer while Auths remains the authority boundary.", "MCP clients can attach proof to tool calls and protected MCP servers can verify and execute through closed gateways. MCP transport success, server identity, or tool discovery never supplies permission by itself."),
-  agentGuide("auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1", "Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.", scenarios.agent, "The client selects a declared tool profile, canonicalizes its arguments, and submits the call with a narrower proof.", "Discover the tool, parse arguments through its profile, delegate authority to the agent or server audience, attach the sealed Auths command to the MCP request, and preserve the returned receipt.", "A prompt-authored proof, undeclared tool, changed arguments, wrong server audience, transport-only acknowledgement, or replay is rejected.", "Protect the MCP server so provider credentials stay outside the client and model."),
-  agentGuide("auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1", "Protect an MCP server tool with native verification, durable reservation, and a closed provider gateway.", scenarios.runtime, "The server exposes useful tool metadata but reaches the underlying effect only after Auths authorizes the exact call.", "Parse MCP inputs, map them through the tool profile, verify attached authority and trusted context, reserve use and budget state, acquire the native gateway handle, execute, and return the bounded outcome and receipt.", "Valid MCP framing, authenticated transport, a known client, or an approval flag cannot bypass missing authority; provider uncertainty stops fresh execution.", "Define tool profiles and the transport boundary explicitly for every exposed effect."),
-  agentGuide("auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1", "Define canonical action, resource, argument, budget, and receipt mappings for MCP tools.", scenarios.agent, "A tool profile converts bounded MCP arguments into one stable Auths action without embedding transport or provider credentials.", "Version the tool identity, parse bounded arguments, canonicalize the resource and effect bytes, declare critical constraints, and add success plus widening fixtures across all SDKs.", "Unknown tools, unbounded arguments, ambiguous canonicalization, hidden provider parameters, profile version mismatch, and dropped critical constraints fail qualification.", "Keep the profile reusable across MCP transports and agent frameworks."),
-  concept({
-    id: "auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1",
-    description: "Keep MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and local calls independent from authorization.",
-    model: "Transport moves bounded identity, authority, command, and receipt bytes. Auths parses and verifies those bytes after delivery. A transport adapter may authenticate a peer, but that authentication is only an explicit trust input.",
-    invariants: "Successful delivery cannot authorize an effect. Failed delivery cannot consume authority unless the durable execution boundary recorded a reservation. The same artifact verifies regardless of transport.",
-    failures: "Duplicate delivery, reordered messages, partial frames, oversized inputs, authenticated-but-unauthorized peers, and transport acknowledgement without provider outcome remain closed.",
-    next: "Choose transport for reachability and reliability; choose Auths authority and runtime state for permission and exactly-once effect control.",
-    dependencies: agentOperations,
-  }),
-  agentIntegration("auths.page.agents.identity/1", "Compose agent, workload, user, or application identity without choosing a mandatory identity provider.", "The identity provider, workload system, or application resolver", "Resolve bounded identity evidence, verify the agent's signed proposal, then bind delegation to that explicit principal and audience.", "Identity proves who signed bytes; it cannot decide which tool the agent may run."),
-  agentIntegration("auths.page.agents.skills/1", "Package Auths-aware skills and plugins without embedding semantic meaning or secrets in prompts.", "The agent framework, skill registry, and plugin lifecycle", "A versioned skill declares which Auths profile and operation it calls; runtime code parses tool inputs and invokes the SDK outside the language model context.", "A skill is integration convenience, not a new authority source. It cannot replace native verification or gateway isolation."),
-  agentGuide("auths.page.agents.production/1", "Operate agent authority with explicit owners for identity, issuance, approval, state, custody, gateways, and reconciliation.", scenarios.recovery, "Agent failures and provider ambiguity have named operators, durable evidence, and safe resume paths.", "Separate proposal from authorization, use least-privilege service identities, keep signers and credentials out of agent processes, monitor stable outcomes, retain bounded receipts, and exercise recovery before production.", "Missing state, signer outage, trust ambiguity, receipt loss, unexplained denial, or provider-unknown outcome stops automation and escalates to its owner.", "Use Production operations for deployment and incident runbooks."),
-  agentGuide("auths.page.agents.testing/1", "Test agents against widening, substitution, replay, ambient credentials, and uncertain providers.", scenarios.agent, "The harness proves that a model or orchestrator cannot convert untrusted text or successful delivery into authority.", "Run the permitted tool, then mutate prompt intent, tool name, arguments, plan order, identity, audience, use state, receipt bytes, and provider result. Verify normalized outcomes and provider reachability.", "Any prohibited effect, language disagreement, prompt-derived bypass, automatic fresh retry, or missing evidence is a release-blocking failure.", "Keep adversarial fixtures beside each tool profile and run them against packaged SDKs."),
-]);
diff --git a/content/authority-pages.ts b/content/authority-pages.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index 1f41ccb..0000000
--- a/content/authority-pages.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
-import { concept, guide, landing } from "./page-builders.ts";
-
-const scenarios = {
-  local: "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
-  agent: "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
-  runtime: "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
-  plan: "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1",
-  recovery: "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
-  verify: "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
-} as const;
-
-const operations = {
-  create: "auths.operation.create/1",
-  delegate: "auths.operation.delegate/1",
-  execute: "auths.operation.execute/1",
-  resume: "auths.operation.resume/1",
-  verify: "auths.operation.verify/1",
-} as const;
-
-const operationGuide = (
-  id: string,
-  description: string,
-  operation: string,
-  scenario: string,
-  outcome: string,
-  steps: string,
-  success: string,
-  failure: string,
-  next: string,
-) => guide({
-  id, description, scenario, outcome,
-  prerequisites: "Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.",
-  steps, success, failure, next,
-  dependencies: { operations: [operation] },
-});
-
-const authorityConcept = (id: string, description: string, model: string, invariants: string, failures: string, next: string) => concept({
-  id, description, model, invariants, failures, next,
-  dependencies: { operations: Object.values(operations) },
-});
-
-export const authorityPages: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([
-  landing("auths.page.authority/1", "Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.", "The five verbs are the stable product surface. Start with one action and one use; descend into attenuation, lifecycle, approved plans, recovery, receipts, disclosure, and profiles only when the workflow requires them."),
-  authorityConcept(
-    "auths.page.concepts.tour/1",
-    "Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.",
-    "Authority is a signed, portable statement of who may perform which application action against which resource, under explicit time, use, budget, depth, audience, and extension constraints. It is distinct from identity, policy evaluation, approval, delivery, and provider credentials.",
-    "A child can only narrow its parent. Exact application bytes and context remain committed. Verification is deterministic and effect-free. Only native-owned verified handles can cross into execution.",
-    "Invalid signatures, untrusted issuers, expiry, revocation, exhaustion, replay, widening, unknown critical extensions, command mismatch, and ambiguous lifecycle state remain distinguishable closed outcomes.",
-    "Create one minimal authority, then learn delegation and lifecycle only if the first workflow needs them.",
-  ),
-  operationGuide(
-    "auths.page.authority.create/1",
-    "Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.",
-    operations.create,
-    scenarios.local,
-    "An issuer grants one subject the smallest useful action, resource, validity window, use count, budget, audience, and delegation depth.",
-    "Select a profile action, parse its resource and input, set explicit bounds, author through the native operation, and sign using the configured custody port.",
-    "The resulting artifact is canonical, portable, and accepted identically by Rust, TypeScript, and Python for the permitted request.",
-    "Missing bounds, invalid profile input, unsupported critical extensions, wrong audience, or altered bytes cannot be repaired during verification.",
-    "Execute it directly, or delegate a narrower child without changing the model.",
-  ),
-  authorityConcept(
-    "auths.page.authority.constraints/1",
-    "Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.",
-    "Constraints form a conjunction: every bound must permit the request. Action and resource describe the effect; validity limits time; uses and budget limit consumption; depth limits delegation; audience limits the intended verifier or executor; critical extensions add profile-owned restrictions.",
-    "Omitting a bound never means that a child may invent a broader one. Critical extensions must be understood and attenuated according to their declared semantics. Application profiles own canonical resource and action interpretation.",
-    "Action or resource mismatch, early or late time, exhausted use, insufficient budget, excessive depth, wrong audience, and unknown or widened critical extensions each produce a stable denial before the provider is reached.",
-    "Use the smallest combination that expresses the effect; keep policy engines outside this artifact and commit only their required evidence.",
-  ),
-  operationGuide(
-    "auths.page.authority.delegate/1",
-    "Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.",
-    operations.delegate,
-    scenarios.agent,
-    "A child principal can act only inside every bound the parent deliberately passes on.",
-    "Parse the parent, select the child subject, narrow action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, depth, and critical extensions, then author and sign the child through the native delegate operation.",
-    "The child verifies as an unbroken chain and can perform the one intended tool action.",
-    "Any wider or incomparable child is rejected, including a quiet critical-extension omission that would restore power.",
-    "Inspect depth and chain rules, then test every attempted widening relevant to the application profile.",
-  ),
-  authorityConcept(
-    "auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1",
-    "Reason about delegation depth and the complete signed chain.",
-    "Each delegation consumes one unit of permitted depth and adds a signed link. Verification checks the root trust, every issuer-to-subject transition, every narrowing relation, and the terminal request.",
-    "Depth cannot be reset by changing languages, identity adapters, transports, or profiles. A chain remains valid only while every link remains valid and trusted.",
-    "Skipped links, reordered links, broken subjects, expired parents, revoked ancestors, excessive depth, and incomparable constraints deny the terminal request.",
-    "Keep chains short in simple systems; use explicit organizational or agent handoffs only where they add accountability.",
-  ),
-  operationGuide(
-    "auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1",
-    "Exercise every way a child might attempt to gain power its parent did not pass down.",
-    operations.delegate,
-    scenarios.agent,
-    "Your test suite proves that delegation can only narrow, including application-defined critical extensions.",
-    "Generate mutations for action, resource, validity, uses, budget, depth, audience, extension presence, and extension values; verify each child against the same parent and trusted context.",
-    "Every valid narrowing is portable across SDKs, and every wider or incomparable mutation returns the same denial identity.",
-    "A language disagreement, ignored critical extension, dropped parent, or accepted incomparable set is a release-blocking semantic failure.",
-    "Keep these fixtures with the application profile and rerun them on every Auths upgrade.",
-  ),
-  landing("auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1", "Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.", "Validity and revocation are trust inputs; uses and budgets are durable state. Keeping them separate makes offline verification honest about what it can prove and makes execution explicit about what it must reserve atomically."),
-  authorityConcept(
-    "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1",
-    "Evaluate not-before and expiry bounds at an explicit observation time.",
-    "Validity is a closed interval committed into authority. Verification receives observation time as explicit context and never borrows an ambient clock without the caller choosing it.",
-    "Children may shorten but never extend their parent's window. Retained evidence records the time used for the decision.",
-    "Before-not-before, after-expiry, missing time, invalid intervals, and child windows outside the parent deny deterministically.",
-    "Combine time with status only when current lifecycle state is required.",
-  ),
-  authorityConcept(
-    "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1",
-    "Apply issuer-owned status without pretending it is an offline cryptographic fact.",
-    "Status is an explicit trusted input resolved by an application-owned status provider. It can express active, revoked, suspended, unknown, or unavailable according to the profile.",
-    "The decision commits the status evidence it used. Cached status obeys declared freshness; absence is not interpreted as active.",
-    "Revoked, suspended, stale, unknown, or unavailable status returns a closed lifecycle outcome. Offline verification must state when no current status was consulted.",
-    "Choose freshness and availability behavior appropriate to the effect's consequence.",
-  ),
-  authorityConcept(
-    "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1",
-    "Consume bounded uses atomically and reject exact replay.",
-    "Use state is keyed by stable authority and command commitments. Execution reserves a use before reaching the provider and commits or recovers that reservation according to the journaled outcome.",
-    "Concurrent requests cannot both consume the same final use. A transport retry does not create fresh semantic authority.",
-    "Exact replay, exhausted use count, reservation conflict, unavailable state, and uncertain prior execution cannot fall through to the provider.",
-    "Use Resume for an existing execution reference; never mint a fresh command to hide uncertainty.",
-  ),
-  authorityConcept(
-    "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1",
-    "Reserve and consume numeric or profile-defined budgets with the same atomic boundary as uses.",
-    "A budget limits cumulative effect according to a profile-owned unit such as cost, records, tokens, or capacity. The request declares its amount and durable state reserves it before execution.",
-    "Children may reduce available budget and executions cannot spend more than the remaining amount. The unit and canonical amount are committed.",
-    "Negative, overflowed, mismatched-unit, over-budget, concurrent overspend, and unavailable-state requests deny before provider access.",
-    "Keep budgets simple and domain-specific; use a policy engine for broader business policy and commit its chosen inputs separately.",
-  ),
-  landing("auths.page.authority.plans/1", "Commit multiple ordered operations as one reviewable plan.", "A plan gives each member a stable identity and order, commits the complete sequence, and allows approvals and execution state to refer to the exact same bytes. It does not convert unrelated operations into an implicit transaction."),
-  operationGuide(
-    "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1",
-    "Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.",
-    operations.execute,
-    scenarios.plan,
-    "Approvers authorize the identical plan the runtime will execute, including members, order, context, expiry, and threshold.",
-    "Author the ordered plan, create a signing request for its exact commitment, collect typed approval responses from configured providers, verify threshold and substitutions, then seal the approved plan for execution.",
-    "The approved sequence executes in order and every receipt binds back to the plan and member commitment.",
-    "Changed bytes, replaced or reordered members, expired requests, wrong approver, reused response, unmet threshold, or mutation after approval fails before the next signature or effect.",
-    "Use the execution lifecycle to handle partial completion and provider uncertainty explicitly.",
-  ),
-  operationGuide(
-    "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1",
-    "Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.",
-    operations.execute,
-    scenarios.runtime,
-    "An opaque native authorization handle reaches the executor only after identity, authority, lifecycle, plan, and command checks pass.",
-    "Parse the command, verify and reserve authority, seal exact provider-independent bytes, acquire the gateway only from the native verified handle, perform the effect, then journal and sign the terminal receipt.",
-    "The gateway receives the minimum provider request after durable reservation and returns a closed, receipt-bound outcome.",
-    "Application code cannot mint the handle; successful transport, approval, signature, or provider authentication alone cannot open the gateway. Provider secrets never enter the authority artifact.",
-    "Use Resume rather than a new Execute call when the terminal provider result is not yet known.",
-  ),
-  operationGuide(
-    "auths.page.authority.resume/1",
-    "Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.",
-    operations.resume,
-    scenarios.recovery,
-    "The runtime recovers the journaled reservation and either returns the known terminal outcome or reconciles the same provider operation.",
-    "Submit the opaque execution reference, load its durable journal, inspect the last committed phase, and invoke only the gateway's idempotent status or reconciliation path permitted for that original command.",
-    "Resume converges on one terminal receipt while preserving original authority, command, context, and idempotency commitments.",
-    "Unknown reference, mismatched caller, corrupted journal, fresh command substitution, blind provider retry, or unreconciled provider uncertainty remains stopped.",
-    "Define operational reconciliation and escalation for every gateway before enabling production effects.",
-  ),
-  operationGuide(
-    "auths.page.authority.verify/1",
-    "Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.",
-    operations.verify,
-    scenarios.verify,
-    "A caller obtains a deterministic, inert result for exact artifact bytes and explicit trusted context.",
-    "Parse the artifact, supply trust, time, status, request, and profile context as required, run native verification, and project only the authorized inspection view.",
-    "The same bytes and context produce the same normalized result across Rust, TypeScript, and Python without contacting a provider.",
-    "Mutation, wrong trust, stale status, request mismatch, invalid chain, unauthorized disclosure, or unknown semantics fails without constructing executable authority.",
-    "Use Receipts to understand integrity and Disclosure to control what verified evidence reveals.",
-  ),
-  landing("auths.page.authority.receipts/1", "Use signed decision and execution receipts as portable integrity evidence.", "Receipts bind authority, command, context, plan membership, observed time, outcome, and signer without treating the provider's business data as public. Verification proves the receipt; disclosure policy decides which human-readable projection a caller may receive."),
-  operationGuide(
-    "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1",
-    "Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.",
-    operations.verify,
-    scenarios.verify,
-    "Unauthorized readers see stable opaque identifiers; authorized readers receive a bounded native-owned summary or full view appropriate to their purpose.",
-    "Verify the receipt first, parse the disclosure request and caller evidence, apply Rust-owned policy, and return a typed projection that contains only approved fields.",
-    "TypeScript and Python expose identical opaque, summary, and full shapes derived from the same native disclosure decision.",
-    "Invalid receipts, wrong caller, excessive view, sensitive provider payloads, unbounded annotations, and application-constructed projections fail or remain opaque.",
-    "Define field classification and retention policy before exposing full views in dashboards or APIs.",
-  ),
-  authorityConcept(
-    "auths.page.authority.profiles/1",
-    "Map application actions, resources, inputs, budgets, commands, and receipts without coupling adjacent components.",
-    "A profile owns domain meaning: canonical action and resource identifiers, bounded input parsing, command construction, budget units, critical extensions, and receipt-safe projections. Maintained profiles are closed; profile-kit supports application-owned domains.",
-    "Profiles cannot choose identity providers, transports, state stores, signer custody, approval vendors, or provider credentials. Every profile parser is bounded and every semantic identity is versioned.",
-    "Ambiguous resources, non-canonical input, unknown actions, incompatible versions, unbounded extensions, or profiles that smuggle credentials or transport data fail qualification.",
-    "Begin with a maintained profile or one minimal application-owned action; expand only with differential and adversarial fixtures.",
-  ),
-]);
diff --git a/content/developer-pages.json b/content/developer-pages.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 9a401d1..0000000
--- a/content/developer-pages.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,349 +0,0 @@
-[
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks/1",
-    "title": "Choose an Auths SDK",
-    "description": "Use Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.create/1",
-        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.resume/1",
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "choose",
-        "title": "Choose for your application, not for semantics",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "TypeScript and Python expose the same product workflow. Rust owns the protocol meaning and also exposes lower-level components for native applications.",
-          "Start with the product facade. Descend into profile, verification, inspection, and runtime surfaces only when the application needs that control."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "lifecycle",
-        "title": "One lifecycle in every language",
-        "provenance": "generated-fact",
-        "factKind": "operation",
-        "fact": "auths.operation.create/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1",
-    "title": "Use the Runtime API",
-    "description": "Move custody, durable state, and provider execution behind an HTTPS boundary.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.health/1",
-        "auths.endpoint.authorities/1",
-        "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
-        "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1",
-        "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "when",
-        "title": "Use a runtime when effects cross a trust boundary",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "The runtime is appropriate when signing keys, replay state, receipts, or provider credentials must stay outside the caller process. It does not replace your application API or identity provider."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "entry",
-        "title": "Runtime entry points",
-        "provenance": "generated-fact",
-        "factKind": "endpoint",
-        "fact": "auths.endpoint.executions/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.developers.cli/1",
-    "title": "Auths CLI",
-    "description": "Inspect, verify, and operate Auths artifacts without turning a shell into an authority boundary.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "role",
-        "title": "The CLI is an interface, not ambient permission",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "CLI commands parse explicit inputs and use the same native semantic owners as the SDKs. A successful command invocation does not bypass trust, authority, state, or gateway checks."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "verify",
-        "title": "Verification remains effect-free",
-        "provenance": "generated-fact",
-        "factKind": "operation",
-        "fact": "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.developers.testing/1",
-    "title": "Test Auths outcomes",
-    "description": "Exercise successful, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and provider-unknown paths deterministically.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.resume/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
-        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "matrix",
-        "title": "Test the boundary, not only the happy path",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Keep fixtures for byte mutation, widening, expiry, revocation, replay, approval substitution, provider uncertainty, resume, and receipt disclosure. Assert that a denied path never reaches the provider."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "recovery",
-        "title": "Prove safe recovery",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.developers.errors/1",
-    "title": "Outcomes and errors",
-    "description": "Respond safely to denied, indeterminate, recoverable, provider-unknown, invalid, and internal results.",
-    "depth": "inspect",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.resume/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "closed",
-        "title": "Closed outcomes preserve what is known",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Denied means the request must change. Indeterminate means a required decision input was unavailable. Recoverable means resume the same opaque reference. Provider-unknown means reconcile before retrying."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "unsafe",
-        "title": "Never flatten uncertainty into an exception retry",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Blind retry can repeat a real-world effect. Keep outcome class, correlation evidence, and the permitted next action together."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.developers.versioning/1",
-    "title": "Versions and compatibility",
-    "description": "Understand prelaunch release identities, semantic versions, and generated contract changes.",
-    "depth": "inspect",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "prelaunch",
-        "title": "Prelaunch means one clean surface",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Auths does not carry deprecated entry points, migration shims, or compatibility aliases before launch. Breaking changes replace the preview contract and are reported explicitly."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "identity",
-        "title": "Semantic changes receive new identities",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "A release bundle binds documentation to exact operations, scenarios, endpoints, and evidence. Contract drift either regenerates the affected page or fails qualification."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.reference.cli/1",
-    "title": "CLI reference",
-    "description": "Command contracts generated from the compiled Auths command graph.",
-    "depth": "inspect",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "generated",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "contract",
-        "title": "Effect-free verification",
-        "provenance": "generated-fact",
-        "factKind": "operation",
-        "fact": "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.reference.profiles/1",
-    "title": "Profiles",
-    "description": "Closed and application-owned profiles that map domain actions into Auths semantics.",
-    "depth": "inspect",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "boundary",
-        "title": "Profiles own domain meaning",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "A profile defines canonical application actions and resource matching. It does not choose identity, transport, custody, or provider credentials."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.reference.errors/1",
-    "title": "Stable error reference",
-    "description": "Machine-stable error identities grouped by the caller's safe response.",
-    "depth": "inspect",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "contract",
-        "title": "Error codes are behavior contracts",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Use stable codes for program flow and bounded diagnostics for people. Never infer that an effect failed merely because the caller received an error."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.reference.schemas/1",
-    "title": "Schemas",
-    "description": "Canonical inputs, bounded wire forms, receipts, and disclosure views.",
-    "depth": "inspect",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "parse",
-        "title": "Parse into bounded types",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Public inputs are parsed once into closed native types. Unknown fields, oversized bytes, unsupported versions, and invalid combinations are rejected before semantic evaluation."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.reference.evidence/1",
-    "title": "Evidence manifest",
-    "description": "Resolve public claims to exact release evidence and limitations.",
-    "depth": "verify",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "scope",
-        "title": "Evidence is bounded",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Each assessment states which release bytes it covers, what the check proves, what it does not prove, and how to reproduce it."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  }
-]
diff --git a/content/developer-pages.ts b/content/developer-pages.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index 435b36e..0000000
--- a/content/developer-pages.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-import { guide, integration, landing, referencePage } from "./page-builders.ts";
-
-const scenarios = {
-  local: "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
-  runtime: "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
-  agent: "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
-  recovery: "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
-  identity: "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1",
-  verify: "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
-} as const;
-
-const operations = [
-  "auths.operation.create/1",
-  "auths.operation.delegate/1",
-  "auths.operation.execute/1",
-  "auths.operation.resume/1",
-  "auths.operation.verify/1",
-] as const;
-
-const developerGuide = (id: string, description: string, scenario: string, outcome: string, prerequisites: string, steps: string, success: string, failure: string, next: string) => guide({
-  id, description, scenario, outcome, prerequisites, steps, success, failure, next,
-  dependencies: { operations },
-});
-
-const composition = (id: string, description: string, owner: string, input: string, limits: string, scenario: string = scenarios.local) => integration({
-  id, description, scenario,
-  ownership: `${owner} remains authoritative for its domain. Auths owns only the portable bounded authority and native execution or verification semantics at the composition boundary.`,
-  dataFlow: `${input} is parsed into an explicit typed input. Auths commits only what its decision or command needs, then returns a stable outcome and bounded evidence.`,
-  secrets: "Private identity keys, OAuth tokens, policy data, cloud credentials, transport secrets, and provider credentials remain behind their existing ports. They are never copied into Auths authority.",
-  state: "Each adjacent system retains its native lifecycle. Auths stores only uses, budgets, replay, plan, execution, recovery, and receipt state for protected effects.",
-  failures: "Malformed input, stale evidence, adapter uncertainty, authority mismatch, replay, and provider ambiguity remain separate closed outcomes with one named owner.",
-  limitations: limits,
-  dependencies: { operations },
-});
-
-const sdkGuide = (id: string, language: string, install: string) => developerGuide(
-  id,
-  `Install the maintained ${language} SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.`,
-  scenarios.local,
-  `A clean ${language} consumer can create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify without reproducing Rust-owned semantics.`,
-  `Use a supported ${language} runtime and install the packaged SDK with ${install}. Keep the release contract and examples from that package version.`,
-  "Start from the installed local REST effect, switch the global language selector to this SDK, run the permitted request and denial, then follow exact symbols into Reference.",
-  "The packaged consumer returns the same normalized outcomes and receipt commitments as Rust and the other maintained SDK.",
-  "Missing native artifacts, unsupported runtime, type mismatch, ABI mismatch, semantic drift, or a language-owned authorization object fails installation or qualification.",
-  "Use SDK parity to compare maintained coverage and Runtime API when the application should not load a native extension.",
-);
-
-export const developerPages: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([
-  landing("auths.page.developers/1", "Choose an SDK, call the runtime, use the CLI, test failures, compose adjacent systems, and build application profiles.", "Developer documentation begins with outcome-oriented indexes. Exact signatures and endpoints live in generated Reference; editorial pages explain how to choose and combine those facts without copying them."),
-  landing("auths.page.developers.quickstarts/1", "Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.", "Use Local REST effect for an in-process SDK boundary, Runtime effect for the HTTPS service, Agent delegation for tools, Approved plan for exact review, Offline verification for inert evidence, Recovery for ambiguous outcomes, or Identity swap for agility. The maintained projects live under Get started so there is one runnable source."),
-  landing("auths.page.developers.sdks/1", "Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.", "Rust owns semantic behavior. TypeScript and Python call native operations through narrow bindings and expose idiomatic types. The generated SDK reference keeps signatures and release identity synchronized; these pages help choose a runtime and packaging model."),
-  sdkGuide("auths.page.developers.sdks.rust/1", "Rust", "cargo add auths-sdk"),
-  sdkGuide("auths.page.developers.sdks.typescript/1", "TypeScript", "npm install @auths-dev/sdk"),
-  sdkGuide("auths.page.developers.sdks.python/1", "Python", "python -m pip install auths"),
-  referencePage({
-    id: "auths.page.developers.sdks.parity/1",
-    description: "Inspect maintained operation, outcome, fixture, and packaging parity across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.",
-    factKind: "operation", fact: "auths.operation.create/1",
-    orientation: "Parity means identical semantic operations, accepted and rejected fixtures, normalized outcomes, and receipt bytes. It does not require language APIs to ignore their own idioms.",
-    usage: "Use the generated matrix to confirm create, delegate, execute, resume, verify, inspection, and diagnostics coverage for the selected release before choosing an SDK.",
-    source: "The release bundle, packaged API inventories, and differential fixtures generate the matrix. Editorial pages do not hand-maintain method lists.",
-  }),
-  developerGuide("auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1", "Call the production HTTPS runtime from any language or service boundary.", scenarios.runtime, "A client checks health and version, submits bounded authority and sealed commands, handles closed outcomes, resumes existing executions, and requests authorized receipt views.", "Use one HTTPS origin whose release identity and trust are explicitly configured. Keep provider credentials, signer custody, and durable state behind the service.", "Call health and version first, create or bring authority, execute with an idempotency commitment, switch on the complete outcome union, resume only by opaque reference, and verify the returned receipt.", "A packaged consumer completes once and the exact Runtime API reference matches the deployed contract digest.", "Non-HTTPS endpoints, version mismatch, unknown outcome, invalid request, timeout after provider access, or missing receipt cannot be treated as success.", "Open generated Runtime API reference for exact methods, paths, limits, and schemas."),
-  developerGuide("auths.page.developers.cli/1", "Choose supported terminal workflows without mistaking repository tooling for a public product CLI.", scenarios.verify, "A terminal user can run installed SDK scripts or call the Runtime API while preserving the same typed outcomes and evidence.", "The selected prelaunch release does not declare a general-purpose public Auths CLI. Use a maintained SDK or the HTTPS Runtime API; repository-only cargo xtask commands are contributor tooling.", "Run the offline verification project from a clean consumer, or call health and version with the documented Runtime API request. Keep inputs in bounded files and switch on machine-readable outcomes.", "Terminal workflows return the same verified result as application code and do not expose provider credentials or unrestricted receipt views.", "An undocumented binary, copied contributor command, ambiguous config, full disclosure without authority, or automatic provider retry is unsupported.", "Use the generated SDK or Runtime API reference. A future public CLI must first enter the immutable release contract."),
-  developerGuide("auths.page.developers.testing/1", "Test success, denial, mutation, replay, recovery, and cross-language parity with deterministic fixtures.", scenarios.agent, "Application tests prove the effect boundary and prohibited variants without relying on mock authorization logic.", "Install packaged SDKs, use deterministic keys and clocks only in testkit, isolate provider substitutes, and name the exact stable outcome each negative case expects.", "Run permitted, changed bytes, widened delegation, expired, revoked, replayed, over-budget, plan substitution, transport-only, provider-unknown, and disclosure-denial fixtures.", "All languages agree, prohibited providers are untouched, and every executable example is traced to a qualified scenario.", "Snapshot-only output, live network dependence, broad mocks, ignored indeterminate states, or language-specific semantic assertions fails the test design.", "Add the fixtures to CI and inspect exact generated errors and evidence."),
-  referencePage({ id: "auths.page.developers.errors/1", description: "Handle the complete closed outcome and error surface without collapsing uncertainty into exceptions or booleans.", factKind: "endpoint", fact: "auths.endpoint.executions/1", orientation: "Parse errors, denials, indeterminate lifecycle results, provider failures, provider-unknown outcomes, and terminal successes mean different things. SDKs use typed results; the Runtime API uses closed response schemas.", usage: "Switch exhaustively on the generated union. Retry only transport failures known to precede reservation; Resume an existing reference after reservation; reconcile provider unknown; treat unknown future variants as closed.", source: "Outcome identities and shapes are generated from the release Runtime contract and SDK declarations." }),
-  referencePage({ id: "auths.page.developers.versioning/1", description: "Pin semantic identities, SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, and evidence to a release.", factKind: "endpoint", fact: "auths.endpoint.version/1", orientation: "Auths versions wire meaning and public surfaces explicitly. A package version alone is not permission to mix contracts, profiles, or generated documentation from another release.", usage: "Check the Runtime version endpoint, compare its contract digest with installed artifacts, and qualify state plus fixtures before upgrade or rollback.", source: "Version and digest data come from the immutable release bundle selected by the documentation build." }),
-  landing("auths.page.integrations.composition/1", "Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, transport, and capability systems through explicit ports.", "Auths is most useful beside existing systems. Every integration page states what the adjacent system owns, what enters Auths, where secrets and state remain, which failures belong to whom, and what the composition does not promise."),
-  composition("auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1", "Compose raw keys, OIDC, SPIFFE, or application identity resolvers.", "The identity and trust system", "Validated method-, suite-, issuer-, subject-, audience-, and freshness-labelled evidence", "Authentication remains independent from authority and Auths does not become the directory or identity provider.", scenarios.identity),
-  composition("auths.page.integrations.policy/1", "Use Cedar, OPA, or relationship-based authorization as explicit policy context.", "The policy engine and its data owners", "A bounded decision, policy identity, relevant context commitment, and observation time", "Auths does not reimplement the policy language or pretend a policy decision alone authorizes an exact effect."),
-  composition("auths.page.integrations.cloud/1", "Acquire short-lived cloud credentials only inside a closed gateway after Auths authorization.", "Cloud IAM and the provider account", "A sealed provider-independent command mapped to one least-privilege cloud operation", "Cloud IAM remains necessary for provider access; Auths adds portable exact authority, lifecycle, recovery, and receipts rather than replacing the cloud control plane.", scenarios.runtime),
-  composition("auths.page.integrations.transport/1", "Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, files, or application transports.", "The transport and network operators", "Bounded framed identity, authority, command, or receipt bytes", "Delivery, channel authentication, and peer reachability never become authorization, and Auths does not prescribe a single network."),
-  composition("auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1", "Import or compose UCAN, Biscuit, macaroons, or another capability result without conflating semantics.", "The capability protocol and its verifier", "A verified, bounded capability projection with its original evidence identity", "Auths does not claim identical semantics or silently translate unsupported caveats; applications must profile the exact overlap and external state.", scenarios.agent),
-  composition("auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1", "Build an application-owned profile for actions, resources, commands, budgets, and safe receipt fields.", "The application domain team", "Bounded canonical domain inputs and explicit provider-independent command mappings", "Profile kit does not own identity adapters, transports, stores, custody, approval vendors, or provider credentials."),
-  developerGuide("auths.page.developers.extensions/1", "Implement identity, suite, trust, status, approval, custody, state, transport, gateway, or profile ports.", scenarios.identity, "A replaceable adapter satisfies a narrow typed contract and conformance suite without changing core semantics.", "Choose exactly one port, read its ownership and threat boundary, and start from the maintained in-memory or reference adapter rather than a second semantic implementation.", "Parse bounded inputs into opaque adapter-owned types, implement stable closed outcomes, add positive plus adversarial fixtures, and qualify failures, concurrency, cancellation, and observability.", "The adapter can be swapped without changing application authority artifacts or the other ports.", "Implicit fallbacks, secret leakage, unbounded parsing, language-specific semantic decisions, swallowed uncertainty, or cross-port dependencies fail review.", "Publish the adapter independently when Auths should not own its lifecycle."),
-  landing("auths.page.developers.examples/1", "Find complete examples by outcome, boundary, and deployment maturity.", "Start with installed quickstarts, then use the live incident-response demo for multi-party workflows, interoperability fixtures for composition, and the field lab for real cloud evidence. Each example states whether it is deterministic, production-shaped, or production-ready."),
-  referencePage({ id: "auths.page.developers.releases/1", description: "Inspect release notes, package support, contracts, evidence, and known limitations for one Auths release.", factKind: "endpoint", fact: "auths.endpoint.version/1", orientation: "A release joins Rust crates, maintained SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, fixtures, assurance claims, documentation, and supply-chain evidence under one identity.", usage: "Review breaking semantic identities, supported runtimes, state migrations, profile changes, evidence withdrawals, and known limits before deployment.", source: "The release page is rendered from signed or checksummed release artifacts and the exact source revisions that produced them." }),
-]);
diff --git a/content/get-started-pages.ts b/content/get-started-pages.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index ce848e3..0000000
--- a/content/get-started-pages.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,212 +0,0 @@
-import { guide, integration, landing, quickstart } from "./page-builders.ts";
-
-const scenarios = {
-  local: "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
-  runtime: "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
-  agent: "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
-  plan: "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1",
-  verify: "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
-  recovery: "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
-  identity: "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1",
-} as const;
-
-const operationDependencies = { operations: [
-  "auths.operation.create/1",
-  "auths.operation.delegate/1",
-  "auths.operation.execute/1",
-  "auths.operation.resume/1",
-  "auths.operation.verify/1",
-] } as const;
-
-const pathGuide = (
-  id: string,
-  description: string,
-  scenario: string,
-  outcome: string,
-  prerequisites: string,
-  steps: string,
-  success: string,
-  failure: string,
-  next: string,
-) => guide({ id, description, scenario, outcome, prerequisites, steps, success, failure, next, dependencies: operationDependencies });
-
-const adoptionIntegration = (
-  id: string,
-  description: string,
-  scenario: string,
-  existingOwner: string,
-  boundary: string,
-) => integration({
-  id,
-  description,
-  scenario,
-  ownership: `${existingOwner} continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.`,
-  dataFlow: `${boundary} becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.`,
-  secrets: "Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.",
-  state: "The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.",
-  failures: "A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.",
-  limitations: "This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.",
-});
-
-export const getStartedPages: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([
-  landing(
-    "auths.page.start/1",
-    "Choose one concrete outcome and reach a verified, fail-closed result.",
-    "Start with the boundary you need to protect: a local application effect, a production runtime, an agent tool, an approved plan, offline verification, recovery, or identity exchange. Each path uses the same Auths meanings and ends with both a successful outcome and the failure that must remain closed.",
-    "start",
-  ),
-  guide({
-    id: "auths.page.start.prerequisites/1",
-    description: "Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.",
-    scenario: scenarios.local,
-    outcome: "You will have one maintained SDK, a supported runtime for that SDK, and an application effect that can be isolated behind a function or service boundary.",
-    prerequisites: "Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python. A local quickstart needs no hosted Auths runtime; production execution additionally needs an HTTPS runtime endpoint and its explicit trust configuration.",
-    steps: "Install one SDK, identify the exact effect to protect, and keep provider credentials outside the caller. Use the tested local scenario to confirm the toolchain before adding identity providers, approvals, or remote transport.",
-    success: "The installed consumer can create, execute, and verify the qualified local fixture, including its stable denial path.",
-    failure: "Stop if the SDK version, fixture release, or runtime contract does not match. Do not compensate by reconstructing Auths semantics in application code.",
-    next: "Choose the shortest outcome path for your system, then move to production operations only when the local boundary is clear.",
-    dependencies: operationDependencies,
-  }),
-  pathGuide(
-    "auths.page.start.choose/1",
-    "Select the shortest journey for the effect, actor, and operating boundary you have.",
-    scenarios.local,
-    "You will leave with one recommended quickstart, not a tour of every Auths feature.",
-    "Name the effect, who proposes it, where credentials live, whether approval is required, and whether execution is local or remote.",
-    "Use Local REST effect for an in-process boundary; Runtime effect for durable remote execution; Agent delegation for a narrower handoff; Approved plan for exact multi-step review; Offline verification for inert evidence; Recovery for ambiguous outcomes; Identity swap for cryptographic or identity agility.",
-    "The selected path demonstrates the same success and denial shapes your application must handle.",
-    "If you cannot describe the effect or provider boundary precisely, do not issue broad authority. Narrow the integration target first.",
-    "Open the chosen quickstart and run it unchanged before adapting it.",
-  ),
-  landing(
-    "auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1",
-    "Compare seven installed-artifact projects by boundary, state, custody, success, and failure.",
-    "Each quickstart is a small release-qualified project with synchronized Rust, TypeScript, and Python code. Pick the one whose effect and operating boundary match your first production question; the page keeps language selection stable across every step.",
-    "start",
-  ),
-  quickstart("auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1", "Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.", scenarios.local),
-  quickstart("auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1", "Execute one bounded effect through the production HTTPS runtime and durable state boundary.", scenarios.runtime),
-  quickstart("auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1", "Delegate one narrower tool action and prove that a broader action is denied.", scenarios.agent),
-  quickstart("auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1", "Bind approval to the exact bytes and order of a multi-step plan.", scenarios.plan),
-  quickstart("auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1", "Verify portable evidence without executing an effect or contacting a provider.", scenarios.verify),
-  quickstart("auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1", "Resume or reconcile an interrupted execution without blindly repeating the provider effect.", scenarios.recovery),
-  quickstart("auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1", "Exchange and verify identity material while keeping the authority workflow unchanged.", scenarios.identity),
-  landing(
-    "auths.page.get-started.paths/1",
-    "Choose an outcome path before learning the complete Auths model.",
-    "These paths connect a reader job to one qualified project. They introduce only the boundaries required for that outcome, then hand off to deeper Identity, Authority, Agents, Operations, or Developer documentation.",
-    "start",
-  ),
-  pathGuide(
-    "auths.page.start.local/1",
-    "Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.",
-    scenarios.local,
-    "A caller can perform one exact application effect and receives a decision and execution receipt.",
-    "Isolate the effect behind one function and keep its service credential outside untrusted caller code.",
-    "Create authority for the exact action and resource, execute it through the SDK boundary, and verify the returned receipt before reporting success.",
-    "The permitted request succeeds once and its receipt binds the authority, command, context, and outcome.",
-    "A changed resource, replayed authority, or mutated command is denied before the protected function runs.",
-    "Add durable runtime state when the effect must survive process or host failure.",
-  ),
-  pathGuide(
-    "auths.page.start.agent/1",
-    "Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.",
-    scenarios.agent,
-    "The agent receives delegable proof for one permitted operation and cannot widen it.",
-    "Identify the tool effect and place its real provider credential behind a trusted executor.",
-    "Create authority at the application boundary, delegate a narrower child to the agent, then send a sealed command to the executor.",
-    "The delegated action succeeds and returns evidence that can be verified independently of the agent's narrative.",
-    "Widening the action, resource, time, use count, budget, audience, or delegation depth fails closed.",
-    "Add approved plans if a human or second organization must review exact work before execution.",
-  ),
-  pathGuide(
-    "auths.page.start.runtime/1",
-    "Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.",
-    scenarios.runtime,
-    "An HTTPS caller can submit one bounded effect while credentials and durable state remain server-side.",
-    "Provide TLS, explicit trust configuration, durable state, signer custody, and a closed gateway for the provider effect.",
-    "Check health and version, create authority, submit the command, inspect the terminal outcome, and retain its receipt.",
-    "The runtime commits replay and budget state before the effect, and returns a stable outcome after execution.",
-    "Untrusted HTTP, contract mismatch, missing custody, or unavailable durable state stops execution rather than falling back to an unsafe path.",
-    "Continue to Production operations for topology, observability, recovery, and incident procedures.",
-  ),
-  pathGuide(
-    "auths.page.start.verify/1",
-    "Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.",
-    scenarios.verify,
-    "A verifier obtains a deterministic decision from bounded bytes, trust inputs, and verification time.",
-    "Obtain the exact evidence bytes and explicit trust context. Verification never infers trust from transport success.",
-    "Parse the bounded artifact through the SDK, provide trusted context, verify locally, and inspect only the disclosure view authorized for the caller.",
-    "Rust, TypeScript, and Python return the same verification outcome for the same bytes and context.",
-    "Mutation, unknown suite, mismatched verification method, wrong root, stale evidence, or unauthorized disclosure remains inert and fails closed.",
-    "Use Authority receipts for integrity semantics and Assurance for the exact evidence behind public claims.",
-  ),
-  pathGuide(
-    "auths.page.start.cross-company/1",
-    "Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.",
-    scenarios.plan,
-    "One company can delegate a precise repair to another company's agent while both retain their own identity, approval, and infrastructure boundaries.",
-    "Name each organization's trust evidence, the exact operation and resource, the approval threshold, the execution region, and the provider gateway that owns credentials.",
-    "Exchange public identity evidence, create and narrow authority, bind both approvals to the identical ordered plan, execute through the resource owner's gateway, then return bounded receipts.",
-    "Only the approved bytes execute, each plan member is consumed once and in order, and authorized readers can inspect a bounded summary.",
-    "Identity authentication, transport delivery, approval alone, changed plan bytes, wider delegation, replay, or provider uncertainty cannot silently become success.",
-    "Use Identity & trust for federation, Authority for plans, and Operations for provider-unknown reconciliation and evidence retention.",
-  ),
-  pathGuide(
-    "auths.page.start.evaluate/1",
-    "Evaluate Auths with deterministic positive and adversarial fixtures before choosing a deployment.",
-    scenarios.local,
-    "Your evaluation records which Auths boundaries solve a real problem and which adjacent systems remain responsible.",
-    "Select one sensitive effect and define the current identity, policy, approval, credential, retry, and audit behavior around it.",
-    "Run the matching quickstart, mutate its action and bytes, replay it, expire it, remove trust, and compare each stable outcome with your present system.",
-    "The evaluation demonstrates a useful reduction in ambient authority or ambiguity without requiring wholesale identity or policy replacement.",
-    "Reject the design if Auths merely duplicates an existing control without improving exact commitment, attenuation, recovery, or portable evidence.",
-    "If the boundary is useful, plan a shadow-mode integration around that single effect.",
-  ),
-  landing(
-    "auths.page.start.adopt/1",
-    "Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.",
-    "The adoption sequence is direct: model one effect, observe it in shadow mode, cut over its execution boundary, and expand only after the receipts and failure behavior are understood. Composition pages state exactly what Auths owns and what remains external.",
-    "build",
-  ),
-  pathGuide(
-    "auths.page.adopt.plan/1",
-    "Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.",
-    scenarios.local,
-    "A written adoption slice identifies the caller, authority issuer, trust inputs, state owner, signer, gateway, provider credential, and receipt consumer.",
-    "Bring the current request shape, identity evidence, policy decision, approval flow, credential location, retry behavior, and audit record for one operation.",
-    "Map each existing responsibility to Identity, Authority, Runtime, or the adjacent system; then run the closest quickstart and record deliberate differences.",
-    "Every responsibility has one owner and the first cutover does not require replacing unrelated systems.",
-    "Stop if provider credentials would enter an Auths artifact or if application code would reimplement attenuation or verification semantics.",
-    "Choose the relevant composition page and enter shadow mode.",
-  ),
-  adoptionIntegration("auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1", "Bind an existing signed request to narrower authority and execution state.", scenarios.local, "The request-signature layer", "The exact signed application bytes"),
-  adoptionIntegration("auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1", "Keep OAuth or OIDC authentication while adding effect-specific machine authority.", scenarios.identity, "The identity provider and OAuth resource server", "Validated issuer, subject, audience, and freshness evidence"),
-  adoptionIntegration("auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1", "Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.", scenarios.runtime, "The provider and its API-key lifecycle", "The application operation mapped to a gateway-held API call"),
-  adoptionIntegration("auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1", "Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.", scenarios.runtime, "Cloud IAM", "The authorized Auths command mapped to a least-privilege provider session"),
-  adoptionIntegration("auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1", "Use a Cedar, OPA, or relationship decision as explicit context without duplicating the policy engine.", scenarios.local, "The policy engine and its data model", "The decision and policy snapshot committed into trusted context"),
-  adoptionIntegration("auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1", "Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.", scenarios.agent, "The capability protocol", "The imported capability and its verified attenuation result"),
-  adoptionIntegration("auths.page.adopt.approvals/1", "Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.", scenarios.plan, "The approval system and approver authentication", "The approval response committed to the exact ordered plan request"),
-  pathGuide(
-    "auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1",
-    "Compare Auths decisions with live traffic without authorizing provider effects.",
-    scenarios.local,
-    "The team can measure agreement, denial reasons, missing context, and potential blast-radius reduction before cutover.",
-    "Mirror only bounded request inputs and remove secrets. Keep the current production enforcement path authoritative.",
-    "Create and verify Auths decisions without passing effect-capable handles to the gateway; record normalized outcomes alongside the current decision.",
-    "Expected requests agree and adversarial mutations are denied with stable reasons.",
-    "Any ambiguity, sensitive-data leakage, or disagreement blocks cutover until ownership and mappings are corrected.",
-    "Cut over exactly one effect once the observation window and failure criteria are satisfied.",
-  ),
-  pathGuide(
-    "auths.page.adopt.cutover/1",
-    "Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.",
-    scenarios.runtime,
-    "Callers can no longer reach the provider effect without verified authority and durable reservation.",
-    "Complete shadow mode, provision runtime dependencies, define stop conditions, retain the previous path behind an operator-controlled rollback, and ensure it cannot run concurrently.",
-    "Route the selected operation through the Auths gateway, verify terminal receipts, monitor denial and indeterminate outcomes, and exercise resume and reconciliation.",
-    "Success includes correct effects, stable denials, no replay, durable evidence, and a tested recovery path.",
-    "Rollback on unexplained denial, state inconsistency, custody failure, receipt loss, or provider ambiguity; never bypass Auths automatically.",
-    "Expand to the next effect only after operational ownership and evidence retention are routine.",
-  ),
-]);
diff --git a/content/identity-trust-pages.ts b/content/identity-trust-pages.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index 1090522..0000000
--- a/content/identity-trust-pages.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-import { concept, guide, integration, landing } from "./page-builders.ts";
-
-const identityScenario = "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1";
-const verifyScenario = "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1";
-const verifyOperation = { operations: ["auths.operation.verify/1"] } as const;
-
-const identityGuide = (
-  id: string,
-  description: string,
-  outcome: string,
-  steps: string,
-  failure: string,
-  scenario = identityScenario,
-) => guide({
-  id,
-  description,
-  scenario,
-  outcome,
-  prerequisites: "Choose the verification method, suite label, bounded public evidence, and explicit trust inputs. No capability, approval, plan, transport, or provider object is required.",
-  steps,
-  success: "The verifier binds the exact method, suite, public material, application bytes, and trusted context and returns the same closed outcome in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.",
-  failure,
-  next: "Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.",
-  dependencies: verifyOperation,
-});
-
-const identityIntegration = (id: string, description: string, owner: string, evidence: string) => integration({
-  id,
-  description,
-  scenario: identityScenario,
-  ownership: `${owner} owns authentication, issuance, rotation, and account or workload lifecycle. Auths owns parsing the bounded projection and using it only under explicit trusted context.`,
-  dataFlow: `${evidence} is resolved into method- and suite-labelled public verification material. That bounded result can authenticate signed application bytes without constructing authority.`,
-  secrets: "Private keys, refresh tokens, client secrets, and provider credentials stay in their existing custody systems. Auths identity evidence is public or explicitly bounded verification input.",
-  state: "The resolver owns freshness and caching. The verifier receives the selected evidence and time as inputs rather than reaching into ambient identity state.",
-  failures: "Unknown issuers, stale evidence, unsupported suites, mismatched methods, ambiguous subjects, and resolver errors are closed outcomes. Authentication never implies authority.",
-  limitations: "Auths does not become the identity provider and does not ship every possible adapter. Applications own adapter choice and trust policy behind the stable port.",
-  dependencies: verifyOperation,
-});
-
-export const identityTrustPages: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([
-  landing("auths.page.identity-trust/1", "Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.", "Identity answers who or what signed bytes; trust answers why that evidence is acceptable here. Auths keeps both inputs explicit and replaceable, so exchanging a public identity never forces a team to adopt capabilities, approvals, a transport, or a particular cryptographic suite."),
-  concept({
-    id: "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
-    description: "See the independent boundaries between identity evidence, cryptographic suites, trust policy, transport, and authority.",
-    model: "An Auths identity projection contains a verification method, suite label, and bounded public evidence. A resolver may obtain that evidence from raw keys, OIDC, SPIFFE, or an application system. Trusted context decides which result is acceptable for one verification.",
-    invariants: "Identity evidence authenticates exact bytes; it never grants an effect. Suite adapters verify only their declared material. Transport success supplies bytes, not trust. Authority can refer to an identity without owning its provider or key lifecycle.",
-    failures: "Unknown suite, method mismatch, wrong root, stale evidence, resolver ambiguity, and altered application bytes remain distinct closed results. The verifier cannot silently try a different suite or trust source.",
-    next: "Choose an identity source, then choose a suite and trust policy. Open Authority only when a verified principal needs bounded permission.",
-    dependencies: verifyOperation,
-  }),
-  landing("auths.page.identity-trust.sources/1", "Choose the system that supplies bounded public verification evidence.", "Raw public keys are the smallest dependency. OIDC and SPIFFE adapters translate established identity evidence. Application resolvers support systems with their own directory or key registry. Each option terminates at the same parse-first identity port."),
-  identityGuide("auths.page.identity-trust.sources.raw-keys/1", "Exchange method- and suite-labelled public keys as ordinary bounded data.", "Two peers can exchange a public identity and verify signed application bytes with no authority or approval setup.", "Encode the public material with its exact suite and verification method, send it over any bounded transport, parse it, and verify the signed message under caller-supplied trust.", "Malformed evidence, an unknown suite, a mislabelled key, method mismatch, or changed message bytes fails without invoking any authority logic."),
-  identityIntegration("auths.page.identity-trust.sources.oauth-oidc/1", "Resolve OIDC identity into explicit Auths verification evidence without turning a bearer token into authority.", "The OpenID Provider and relying party", "Validated issuer, subject, audience, token time, and key evidence"),
-  identityIntegration("auths.page.identity-trust.sources.spiffe/1", "Use SPIFFE workload identity as a replaceable trust input for Auths verification.", "SPIRE and the workload API", "The validated SPIFFE ID, trust domain, bundle, and workload evidence"),
-  identityIntegration("auths.page.identity-trust.sources.resolvers/1", "Adapt an application directory or key registry through a narrow resolver port.", "The application resolver", "A bounded lookup key and the resolver's typed verification result"),
-  landing("auths.page.identity-trust.suites/1", "Select cryptographic verification independently from identity source and authority semantics.", "Ed25519 and P-256 demonstrate that the identity port is suite-agnostic. A custom adapter can add another classical or post-quantum suite only by declaring its method, evidence shape, parsing limits, and verification behavior."),
-  identityGuide("auths.page.identity-trust.suites.ed25519/1", "Use the maintained Ed25519 suite for compact deterministic signatures.", "An Ed25519 identity verifies exact application bytes through the common identity port.", "Parse only the declared Ed25519 evidence shape, bind it to the declared verification method, and verify the signature without falling back to another algorithm.", "Wrong key length, invalid point material, method mismatch, suite relabelling, and signature mutation are rejected as Ed25519-specific failures."),
-  identityGuide("auths.page.identity-trust.suites.p256/1", "Use the maintained P-256 suite through the same identity and verification interfaces.", "A P-256 identity can replace Ed25519 without changing application authority or transport code.", "Parse the canonical P-256 public material, require the P-256 suite label, and verify the exact message through the common port.", "Non-canonical points, curve mismatch, suite relabelling, high-level method mismatch, and changed bytes fail without cross-suite guessing."),
-  identityGuide("auths.page.identity-trust.suites.custom/1", "Implement a custom or post-quantum suite adapter without changing Auths identity meaning.", "An application-owned adapter can supply a new suite behind the stable parser and verifier ports.", "Assign a stable suite identity, define bounded canonical evidence, parse into an opaque suite-owned key, implement exact-byte verification, and add positive plus adversarial differential fixtures.", "Registration collisions, unbounded evidence, ambiguous encoding, implicit fallback, verification-method mismatch, and non-deterministic outcomes block the adapter."),
-  concept({
-    id: "auths.page.identity-trust.policy/1",
-    description: "Define which issuers, roots, resolvers, suites, audiences, and freshness windows are acceptable.",
-    model: "Trust policy is caller-owned input to verification. It selects acceptable roots and issuers, constrains resolver results, allows explicit suites, and establishes the observation time and freshness rules.",
-    invariants: "A signature proves possession of a key; trust policy decides whether that key matters here. Policy is explicit, immutable for one decision, and committed into evidence when the workflow requires reproducibility.",
-    failures: "Correct signatures under an untrusted root, stale bundle, wrong audience, disabled suite, or ambiguous resolver are not partially trusted. They fail as trust outcomes rather than cryptographic success.",
-    next: "Construct the smallest verification context for the application boundary and test every excluded root and suite.",
-    dependencies: verifyOperation,
-  }),
-  identityGuide("auths.page.identity-trust.exchange/1", "Send and receive a public identity as bounded, transport-neutral data.", "A peer can publish identity information over HTTPS, Iroh, a queue, a file, or another transport without importing capabilities.", "Serialize only the method, suite, and bounded public evidence; enforce size limits at ingress; parse before use; and pass the parsed identity to signature verification.", "Transport authentication or delivery does not cure malformed, unsupported, stale, or untrusted identity evidence."),
-  identityGuide("auths.page.identity-trust.rotation/1", "Rotate keys or trust roots with explicit overlap, rollback, and negative tests.", "New identity evidence becomes valid during a bounded overlap while existing authority artifacts remain meaningful under their committed verification method.", "Publish the new verification material, add it to explicit trust context, verify both generations during the overlap, cut issuance to the new key, then remove the old root after retained evidence no longer requires it.", "Early root removal, unbounded overlap, rollback to compromised material, method reuse, and stale resolver caches must fail visibly; rotation never silently rewrites authority."),
-  concept({
-    id: "auths.page.identity-trust.context/1",
-    description: "Build the exact trusted context used for one deterministic verification.",
-    model: "Trusted context is a parsed value containing roots, issuer or resolver policy, accepted suites, audience, observation time, and relevant freshness limits. Verification receives it explicitly.",
-    invariants: "The same artifact and context yield the same outcome across languages. Ambient process configuration, network state, or transport metadata cannot silently change the decision.",
-    failures: "Missing time, unknown roots, stale evidence, disabled suites, mismatched audience, or resolver uncertainty returns a closed result rather than manufacturing context.",
-    next: "Keep context construction at the application trust boundary and pass only the parsed value into verification.",
-    dependencies: verifyOperation,
-  }),
-  identityGuide("auths.page.identity-trust.testing/1", "Test identity sources, suites, and trust policy with positive and adversarial fixtures.", "The test suite proves identical outcomes for supported identities and stable failures for every excluded shape.", "Run Ed25519 and P-256 success fixtures, then mutate the suite label, verification method, root, freshness, message bytes, and evidence length. Compare normalized Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes.", "Any language disagreement, fallback to another suite, network-dependent result, or acceptance of an unknown root fails qualification.", verifyScenario),
-]);
diff --git a/content/navigation.json b/content/navigation.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 5b96489..0000000
--- a/content/navigation.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "primary": [
-    "auths.page.start/1",
-    "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
-    "auths.page.authority/1",
-    "auths.page.agents/1",
-    "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
-    "auths.page.developers/1"
-  ],
-  "utilities": [
-    "auths.page.reference/1"
-  ]
-}
diff --git a/content/operations-pages.json b/content/operations-pages.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 9fbbd6a..0000000
--- a/content/operations-pages.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,365 +0,0 @@
-[
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.evaluate/1",
-    "title": "Evaluate the runtime locally",
-    "description": "Exercise the production boundary with development custody and state before deployment.",
-    "depth": "operate",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.resume/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
-        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.health/1",
-        "auths.endpoint.executions/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "boundary",
-        "title": "Evaluate the real boundaries",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Use disposable keys and local durable state, but keep the same parse, authorize, reserve, provider, receipt, and recovery sequence you intend to operate. Exercise both success and provider uncertainty."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.deploy/1",
-    "title": "Deploy the open runtime",
-    "description": "Place the Auths runtime behind TLS with explicit dependency ownership.",
-    "depth": "operate",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.health/1",
-        "auths.endpoint.executions/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "topology",
-        "title": "Deploy one closed gateway",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Terminate trusted TLS, isolate custody and state dependencies, restrict provider egress, expose bounded health signals, and keep the effect provider reachable only from the runtime workload."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.state/1",
-    "title": "Configure durable state",
-    "description": "Preserve replay, use, budget, recovery, and receipt invariants across restarts.",
-    "depth": "operate",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.resume/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "atomicity",
-        "title": "Reservations must be atomic and durable",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Do not split replay, budget, use, execution, and receipt state across stores that cannot preserve their transaction boundary. A restart must never make a consumed effect appear unused."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.custody/1",
-    "title": "Configure key custody",
-    "description": "Keep signing material non-exportable and observable without logging secrets.",
-    "depth": "operate",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.create/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "keys",
-        "title": "The runtime asks a signer; it does not own key bytes",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Use a custody adapter that returns suite-labelled public descriptors and signs bounded requests. Private material must remain inside the selected HSM, KMS, enclave, or application-owned signer."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.trust/1",
-    "title": "Configure trust and profiles",
-    "description": "Version accepted roots, resolvers, suites, and domain semantics independently.",
-    "depth": "operate",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "rotation",
-        "title": "Rotate trust without migrating authority",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Identity evidence and verification suites are replaceable inputs. Roll out new roots or suites with an explicit overlap window, negative fixtures, rollback, and post-rotation evidence review."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.gateways/1",
-    "title": "Configure provider gateways",
-    "description": "Acquire provider credentials only after authorization and durable reservation.",
-    "depth": "operate",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.resume/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "closed",
-        "title": "Only opaque verified commands cross the boundary",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "The adapter receives an SDK-minted command and bounded execution context. It never accepts caller-constructed authorization flags. It reports applied, not applied, or possible outcomes without guessing."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.observability/1",
-    "title": "Observe Auths safely",
-    "description": "Measure liveness, readiness, dependencies, outcomes, and latency without leaking authority.",
-    "depth": "operate",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.health/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "signals",
-        "title": "Observe classifications and commitments",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Emit bounded correlation IDs, operation identities, outcome classes, dependency health, and latency histograms. Do not log proofs, sealed commands, credentials, raw action bodies, full receipts, or authorized disclosure payloads."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.backup/1",
-    "title": "Back up and restore",
-    "description": "Restore state without reopening replay, budget, use, or recovery windows.",
-    "depth": "operate",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.resume/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "exercise",
-        "title": "A restore is a semantic exercise",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Quiesce or fence writers, restore an atomic state image, validate monotonic metadata, replay adversarial fixtures, reconcile nonterminal provider observations, and only then return the runtime to readiness."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.recovery/1",
-    "title": "Recover and reconcile",
-    "description": "Resume the same execution identity after uncertain provider outcomes.",
-    "depth": "operate",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.resume/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "decision",
-        "title": "Observe, reconcile, then resume",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.upgrade/1",
-    "title": "Upgrade and roll back",
-    "description": "Change runtime bytes without splitting semantic, state, or documentation identities.",
-    "depth": "operate",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
-        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.health/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "sequence",
-        "title": "Qualify before promotion",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Verify schemas, state migrations, custody compatibility, differential fixtures, recovery across mixed versions, and exact release documentation. Roll back application and documentation surfaces atomically."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.receipts/1",
-    "title": "Retain and disclose receipts",
-    "description": "Preserve evidence while minimizing sensitive operational detail.",
-    "depth": "operate",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1",
-        "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "levels",
-        "title": "Retain integrity; disclose by authorization",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Store signed bytes and commitments under a bounded retention policy. Default readers to opaque or summary views; require explicit disclosure authority for business details and record that disclosure."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents/1",
-    "title": "Incident response runbooks",
-    "description": "Stop, preserve evidence, reconcile, recover, and escalate without widening authority.",
-    "depth": "operate",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.resume/1",
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.health/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "contract",
-        "title": "Every runbook has the same safety contract",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Name ownership and severity, preconditions, required access, safe observations, stop conditions, rollback or resume, reconciliation, evidence retention, and escalation. Never copy credentials or full authority artifacts into an incident ticket."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  }
-]
diff --git a/content/operations-pages.ts b/content/operations-pages.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index 226e099..0000000
--- a/content/operations-pages.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-import { concept, guide, landing, runbook } from "./page-builders.ts";
-
-const scenarios = {
-  local: "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
-  runtime: "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
-  recovery: "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
-  verify: "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
-  identity: "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1",
-} as const;
-
-const runtimeDependencies = {
-  operations: ["auths.operation.execute/1", "auths.operation.resume/1", "auths.operation.verify/1"],
-  endpoints: [
-    "auths.endpoint.health/1",
-    "auths.endpoint.version/1",
-    "auths.endpoint.authorities/1",
-    "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
-    "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1",
-    "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1",
-    "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1",
-  ],
-} as const;
-
-const operationsGuide = (id: string, description: string, scenario: string, outcome: string, prerequisites: string, steps: string, success: string, failure: string, next: string) => guide({
-  id, description, scenario, outcome, prerequisites, steps, success, failure, next, depth: "operate", dependencies: runtimeDependencies,
-});
-
-const incident = (
-  id: string,
-  description: string,
-  scenario: string,
-  owner: string,
-  observations: string,
-  stop: string,
-  recovery: string,
-  reconciliation: string,
-) => runbook({
-  id, description, scenario, owner,
-  preconditions: "Declare the incident, preserve the exact runtime release and configuration identity, restrict changes to the incident owner, and capture the first affected execution references before taking recovery action.",
-  commands: "Run the release-qualified scenario shown below against an isolated environment first. In production, use only the same typed health, version, verify, resume, summary, and disclosure operations for the recorded execution references.",
-  observations,
-  stop,
-  recovery,
-  reconciliation,
-  retention: "Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configuration identities, operator actions, relevant provider references, and disclosure decisions according to the incident evidence policy.",
-  escalation: "Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.",
-});
-
-export const operationsPages: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([
-  landing("auths.page.operations.runtime/1", "Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.", "Production operation begins after the semantic decision: the runtime must reserve state, protect signers and provider credentials, expose closed outcomes, preserve receipts, and recover without repeating uncertain effects."),
-  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.evaluate/1", "Run the complete production topology locally before choosing infrastructure.", scenarios.runtime, "A local isolated runtime proves health, version, trust, custody, durable reservation, gateway execution, receipts, and replay denial.", "Use disposable local state and development custody; keep the same ports and closed gateway boundaries intended for production.", "Start dependencies, check health and version, run the runtime-effect fixture, verify its receipt, replay the command, stop and restart the runtime, then resume the recorded execution.", "The effect occurs once, replay is denied, state survives the restart, and the receipt verifies outside the runtime.", "Missing dependencies, contract mismatch, non-HTTPS production configuration, state loss, receipt mismatch, or a second provider effect blocks deployment.", "Choose the deployment topology and replace one development adapter at a time."),
-  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.deploy/1", "Deploy the runtime as a small HTTPS control boundary around durable state and provider gateways.", scenarios.runtime, "A production caller reaches one authenticated HTTPS origin while signers, stores, trust resolvers, and provider credentials remain private dependencies.", "Provision TLS, a supported runtime release, durable transactional state, signer custody, trust and status inputs, a closed provider gateway, monitoring, backups, and an operator recovery path.", "Pin the release and contract digest, apply configuration, prove dependency readiness, execute the installed runtime scenario, verify the receipt from another process, and deny direct provider access from callers.", "Health and readiness are distinct, every dependency is observable, execution succeeds once, and rollback plus resume exercises pass.", "Do not accept traffic when state, custody, trust, gateway, or release identity is unknown. Never expose the gateway credential as a caller fallback.", "Configure each dependency and establish service-level signals."),
-  landing("auths.page.operations.configure/1", "Configure state, custody, trust, profiles, and provider gateways as independent production ports.", "Each port has one owner and one failure boundary. Replacing a database, HSM, identity resolver, application profile, transport, or provider adapter must not change Auths semantics or silently weaken another port."),
-  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.state/1", "Configure multi-host durable state for replay, use, budget, plans, executions, and receipts.", scenarios.recovery, "Concurrent hosts share one atomic record of reservation and terminal outcome.", "Choose a transactional store, TLS and authentication, bounded retention, backups, restore exercises, and a failure policy that stops effects when state is unavailable.", "Provision the schema, enforce uniqueness and compare-and-set transitions, run concurrent final-use and budget tests, interrupt an execution, restart on another host, and resume the same reference.", "Exactly one reservation wins, journal transitions are monotonic, and resume converges without a second effect.", "Split-brain, stale reads, lost commits, unbounded rows, insecure transport, or automatic in-memory fallback blocks readiness.", "Configure custody so receipt and decision signing remains available without exposing keys."),
-  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.custody/1", "Keep authority and receipt signing keys behind a narrow signer port.", scenarios.runtime, "The runtime can request signatures while private key material remains in an HSM, KMS, enclave, or hardened local process.", "Assign key owners, permitted algorithms, stable key descriptors, rotation windows, audit logging, rate limits, backup or recovery policy, and fail-closed outage behavior.", "Register the signer, sign known requests, reject arbitrary or oversized payloads, verify public descriptors, exercise outage and rotation overlap, and confirm private material never appears in logs or artifacts.", "Only typed Auths signing requests are accepted and every signature is attributable to a configured descriptor.", "Raw signing access, key export, silent algorithm fallback, unknown descriptor, audit loss, or signer ambiguity stops issuance and terminal receipt signing.", "Configure explicit trust for the public descriptors and issuers."),
-  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.trust/1", "Configure roots, issuers, resolvers, status, suites, and profiles explicitly.", scenarios.identity, "Every verification decision receives a bounded, versioned trust and profile context rather than ambient process assumptions.", "Inventory trusted roots and issuers, resolver ownership, freshness limits, accepted suites, status behavior, application profiles, and rotation procedures.", "Load the configuration, verify each positive fixture, reject wrong-root and stale evidence, exercise suite swap and profile version mismatch, then record the configuration identity in runtime evidence.", "Supported identities and profiles verify consistently across hosts and every excluded source returns a stable closed outcome.", "Unknown roots, stale bundles, resolver ambiguity, profile drift, or an unsupported suite blocks the affected request; never accept all during an outage.", "Configure gateways only after the action-to-provider mapping is qualified."),
-  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.gateways/1", "Map verified sealed commands to least-privilege provider effects behind closed gateways.", scenarios.runtime, "Provider credentials are acquired only after native authorization and durable reservation.", "Define one bounded gateway operation, provider credential source, idempotency behavior, response classifier, timeout, reconciliation method, and redaction policy.", "Parse the sealed command, map exact fields, acquire a short-lived credential, invoke the provider with the committed idempotency key, classify success, denial, failure, or unknown, then persist the result before returning.", "The provider sees one minimal request and the execution receipt binds its closed outcome without exposing secrets.", "Unmapped fields, credential leakage, non-idempotent retry, ambiguous response, timeout, or provider-unknown state stops fresh execution and enters reconciliation.", "Instrument outcome and latency signals, then write the provider-unknown runbook."),
-  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.observability/1", "Observe runtime health, dependencies, outcomes, latency, recovery, and redaction without leaking authority content.", scenarios.runtime, "Operators can distinguish liveness, readiness, dependency failure, semantic denial, provider failure, provider unknown, and recovery progress.", "Define bounded metrics and structured events for request counts, stable outcomes, phase latency, store conflicts, signer calls, resolver freshness, gateway responses, resume attempts, receipt creation, and redaction failures.", "Emit release and configuration identities, hash or omit sensitive identifiers, sample high-volume success safely, alert on availability and invariant breaches, and link dashboards to exact runbooks.", "A single execution can be followed by opaque reference and phase without exposing commands, credentials, full receipts, or personal identity evidence.", "Stop rollout on missing telemetry, cardinality explosion, raw artifact logging, secret exposure, unexplained provider unknown, replay acceptance, or receipt loss.", "Exercise recovery and incident procedures using the same signals."),
-  concept({
-    id: "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1",
-    description: "Choose retry, resume, reconcile, or stop from the durable execution phase.",
-    model: "Before provider access, retry may be safe only when no reservation or effect exists. After reservation, use the same execution reference. A known terminal result returns its receipt. Provider uncertainty enters reconciliation. Corrupt or unavailable state stops.",
-    invariants: "A caller cannot turn a retry into new authority, and the runtime cannot assume that a timeout means the provider did nothing. Journal transitions are monotonic and every terminal result binds the original command.",
-    failures: "Fresh retries after provider access, missing journals, conflicting terminal outcomes, unknown provider state, and lost idempotency mappings require stop or reconciliation rather than optimistic success.",
-    next: "Implement a gateway-specific status or reconciliation operation and rehearse it in the recovery scenario.",
-    depth: "operate",
-    dependencies: runtimeDependencies,
-  }),
-  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.recovery/1", "Resume and reconcile interrupted execution without blind provider retry.", scenarios.recovery, "An operator can take an opaque execution reference from indeterminate to one evidenced terminal result.", "Require the durable journal, original idempotency mapping, gateway-specific provider lookup, and an operator owner for unreconciled outcomes.", "Inspect the recorded phase, call Resume, query provider status only through the gateway, classify the result, commit the terminal journal transition, and issue or recover the matching receipt.", "Recovery converges on the original effect and a verifiable receipt without consuming fresh authority.", "Unknown reference, missing state, provider ambiguity, mismatched result, or evidence loss remains stopped and escalated; never issue a new command automatically.", "Exercise backup and restore so recovery evidence survives infrastructure loss."),
-  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.backup/1", "Back up and restore runtime state without losing replay, budget, recovery, or receipt integrity.", scenarios.recovery, "A restored environment preserves all committed authority consumption and execution phases.", "Define encrypted backups, retention, restore credentials, recovery-point and recovery-time targets, isolated restore infrastructure, and a procedure that prevents old state from serving concurrent traffic.", "Create active, completed, and provider-unknown fixtures; take a backup; restore to isolation; verify counts and commitments; resume the uncertain execution; and prove replay plus budget exhaustion still deny.", "Restored state produces the same terminal receipts and cannot repeat prior effects.", "Incomplete journals, rolled-back use state, missing receipt bytes, concurrent old and restored writers, or unverifiable backups block promotion.", "Exercise upgrade and rollback against a restored copy before production rollout."),
-  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.upgrade/1", "Upgrade or roll back runtime releases while preserving semantic and state compatibility.", scenarios.runtime, "A rollout changes implementation only after release contracts, stores, profiles, fixtures, and receipts agree.", "Pin source, SDK, contract, schema, profile, and evidence identities; back up state; qualify packaged consumers; stage the new runtime; and define rollback before migration.", "Run health and version checks, differential fixtures, concurrent state tests, a real canary effect, receipt verification, recovery, and rollback rehearsal before expanding traffic.", "Old and new hosts agree where overlap is supported, terminal receipts remain verifiable, and rollback does not reopen consumed authority.", "Semantic drift, schema incompatibility, mixed-version disagreement, receipt change, state loss, or unqualified artifact blocks rollout.", "Retain the exact release and evidence bundle used for every production window."),
-  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.receipts/1", "Retain, disclose, and delete receipt evidence according to integrity and privacy needs.", scenarios.verify, "Receipts remain verifiable for their required lifetime while sensitive detail is opaque by default.", "Classify opaque identifiers, commitments, signer evidence, summary fields, full fields, and provider references; define access, encryption, retention, legal hold, deletion, and key-rotation behavior.", "Store immutable receipt bytes, index only bounded fields, authorize summary or full disclosure natively, verify retained samples, exercise expiry and deletion, and audit every privileged view.", "Authorized readers receive only the intended projection and retained receipts still verify after runtime or key rotation.", "Raw command or provider payload logging, public full views, missing disclosure audit, unverifiable deletion, or loss of required evidence blocks the retention design.", "Add receipt disclosure response to the incident program."),
-  operationsGuide("auths.page.operations.security/1", "Apply a production security checklist to every Auths boundary.", scenarios.runtime, "The deployment has explicit owners and fail-closed controls for ingress, trust, state, custody, gateways, evidence, dependencies, and operators.", "Inventory assets and actors, threat-model each port, enforce TLS and least privilege, isolate credentials, bound every parser, patch dependencies, redact telemetry, protect backups, and require reviewed recovery paths.", "Run positive, denial, replay, mutation, outage, compromise, recovery, disclosure, and supply-chain exercises against packaged artifacts.", "Every boundary has a named owner, a qualified positive path, an adversarial path, a monitored failure, and a rehearsed recovery.", "No direct provider path, exported key, ambient trust, permissive fallback, unbounded input, blind retry, unaudited full disclosure, or unknown release is acceptable.", "Schedule outside security review after the operational evidence is reproducible."),
-  landing("auths.page.operations.incidents/1", "Respond to state loss, signer outage, trust-root error, provider uncertainty, receipt disclosure, and credential compromise.", "Every runbook begins by preserving evidence and stopping unsafe automation. Recovery uses typed runtime operations and isolated qualified scenarios; it never asks an operator to reconstruct semantic state or blindly repeat an effect."),
-  incident("auths.page.operations.incidents.state-loss/1", "Contain and recover from missing, rolled-back, corrupted, or split runtime state.", scenarios.recovery, "Runtime incident commander with storage and application owners", "Health or readiness fails, journals are missing or inconsistent, use or budget counters regress, or multiple writers disagree.", "Stop all protected effects and fresh executions. Do not promote a backup or secondary while another writer may still accept traffic.", "Fence writers, restore the newest verified backup to isolation, validate commitments and monotonic state, then resume only recorded execution references.", "Compare retained receipts, provider idempotency records, and restored journals; escalate every gap as potentially repeated or lost effect."),
-  incident("auths.page.operations.incidents.signer-outage/1", "Operate safely when issuance or receipt custody is unavailable.", scenarios.runtime, "Runtime incident commander with custody owner", "Signer calls fail, descriptors change unexpectedly, signatures cannot be verified, or audit events are missing.", "Stop new issuance and any execution that cannot produce required terminal evidence. Never fall back to an embedded or unsigned key.", "Restore the configured signer or activate a prequalified descriptor according to the rotation plan; verify known messages before reopening.", "Match every effect completed during the window with durable journal state and a valid terminal receipt before declaring recovery."),
-  incident("auths.page.operations.incidents.trust-root/1", "Contain an incorrect, expired, unavailable, or compromised trust root.", scenarios.identity, "Security incident commander with identity and application trust owners", "Previously valid evidence changes outcome, an unplanned root appears, bundles are stale, resolver results diverge, or suite labels mismatch.", "Stop affected verification and execution audiences. Do not enable trust-all, disable freshness, or silently try alternate roots.", "Pin the last known-good context or install a reviewed replacement with explicit overlap; rerun positive and negative identity fixtures.", "Reverify affected decisions where evidence permits and identify any execution accepted under the wrong context."),
-  incident("auths.page.operations.incidents.provider-unknown/1", "Resolve an execution whose provider outcome is unknown without repeating the effect.", scenarios.recovery, "Application incident commander with provider gateway owner", "The runtime reserved authority and contacted the provider, but timeout, disconnect, or ambiguous response prevents a terminal classification.", "Stop fresh Execute calls for the same business effect. Never assume timeout means failure and never mint a new idempotency key.", "Use the original execution reference, Resume, and the gateway's provider status lookup until a terminal result is evidenced or manual escalation owns the ambiguity.", "Bind the reconciled provider reference and result to the original command, commit one terminal state, and issue the matching receipt."),
-  incident("auths.page.operations.incidents.disclosure/1", "Respond to excessive, unauthorized, or leaked receipt disclosure.", scenarios.verify, "Security and privacy incident commander with evidence owner", "A caller receives a view above its authorization, full fields appear in logs or indexes, or disclosure policy and audit records disagree.", "Disable affected disclosure paths while preserving opaque verification and immutable receipt bytes. Do not delete evidence before scope is established.", "Correct Rust-owned disclosure policy or caller trust, rotate access credentials if needed, remove leaked projections, and prove unauthorized callers receive opaque views.", "Audit who received which projection, preserve the disclosure decisions, and assess whether provider, identity, or personal data escaped its retention boundary."),
-  incident("auths.page.operations.incidents.credential/1", "Contain a compromised signer, provider, operator, or deployment credential.", scenarios.runtime, "Security incident commander with the credential's custody and gateway owners", "Unexpected signatures, provider calls, access logs, key exports, configuration changes, or credential use indicates possible compromise.", "Disable the credential and affected gateway or issuance path. Preserve state and receipts; do not rotate blindly if it destroys attribution or recovery evidence.", "Rotate through the documented custody or provider process, install the new descriptor, requalify trust and gateway fixtures, and reopen the smallest affected scope.", "Compare signed artifacts, runtime journals, provider audit logs, and receipts to identify unauthorized issuance or effects and revoke affected authority explicitly."),
-]);
diff --git a/content/page-builders.ts b/content/page-builders.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index e15e85a..0000000
--- a/content/page-builders.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
-import { siteNodeById } from "../app/lib/site-tree.ts";
-
-type Dependencies = Readonly<{
-  operations?: readonly string[];
-  scenarios?: readonly string[];
-  endpoints?: readonly string[];
-  profiles?: readonly string[];
-  claims?: readonly string[];
-}>;
-
-const uses = (dependencies: Dependencies = {}) => ({
-  operations: dependencies.operations ?? [],
-  scenarios: dependencies.scenarios ?? [],
-  endpoints: dependencies.endpoints ?? [],
-  profiles: dependencies.profiles ?? [],
-  claims: dependencies.claims ?? [],
-});
-
-const narrative = (id: string, title: string, body: string | readonly string[]) => ({
-  id,
-  title,
-  provenance: "editorial-narrative",
-  body: typeof body === "string" ? [body] : body,
-});
-
-const scenario = (id: string, scenarioId: string) => ({ id, title: "Run the qualified path", provenance: "tested-scenario", scenario: scenarioId });
-
-const base = (id: string, description: string, depth: string, dependencies: Dependencies, sections: readonly unknown[]) => ({
-  id,
-  title: siteNodeById(id).title,
-  description,
-  depth,
-  status: "stable",
-  owner: "editorial",
-  uses: uses(dependencies),
-  sections,
-});
-
-export const landing = (id: string, description: string, overview: string, depth = "understand") => base(id, description, depth, {}, [
-  narrative("overview", "Choose a useful next step", overview),
-]);
-
-export const quickstart = (id: string, description: string, scenarioId: string) => base(id, description, "start", { scenarios: [scenarioId] }, [
-  { ...scenario("outcome", scenarioId), title: "Run success and fail-closed paths" },
-]);
-
-export const guide = (input: Readonly<{
-  id: string;
-  description: string;
-  scenario: string;
-  outcome: string;
-  prerequisites: string;
-  steps: string;
-  success: string;
-  failure: string;
-  next: string;
-  depth?: string;
-  dependencies?: Dependencies;
-}>) => base(input.id, input.description, input.depth ?? "build", {
-  ...input.dependencies,
-  scenarios: [...(input.dependencies?.scenarios ?? []), input.scenario],
-}, [
-  narrative("outcome", "Outcome", input.outcome),
-  narrative("prerequisites", "Before you begin", input.prerequisites),
-  narrative("steps", "Build the bounded path", input.steps),
-  scenario("example", input.scenario),
-  narrative("success", "Success means", input.success),
-  narrative("failure", "Fail closed", input.failure),
-  narrative("next", "Continue", input.next),
-]);
-
-export const concept = (input: Readonly<{
-  id: string;
-  description: string;
-  model: string;
-  invariants: string;
-  failures: string;
-  next: string;
-  depth?: string;
-  dependencies?: Dependencies;
-}>) => base(input.id, input.description, input.depth ?? "understand", input.dependencies ?? {}, [
-  narrative("model", "Model", input.model),
-  narrative("invariants", "What remains true", input.invariants),
-  narrative("failures", "Where it fails closed", input.failures),
-  narrative("next", "Continue", input.next),
-]);
-
-export const integration = (input: Readonly<{
-  id: string;
-  description: string;
-  scenario: string;
-  ownership: string;
-  dataFlow: string;
-  secrets: string;
-  state: string;
-  failures: string;
-  limitations: string;
-  dependencies?: Dependencies;
-}>) => base(input.id, input.description, "build", {
-  ...input.dependencies,
-  scenarios: [...(input.dependencies?.scenarios ?? []), input.scenario],
-}, [
-  narrative("ownership", "Ownership boundary", input.ownership),
-  narrative("data-flow", "Data flow", input.dataFlow),
-  narrative("secrets", "Secrets", input.secrets),
-  narrative("state", "State", input.state),
-  narrative("failures", "Failure ownership", input.failures),
-  scenario("example", input.scenario),
-  narrative("limitations", "Limitations", input.limitations),
-]);
-
-export const runbook = (input: Readonly<{
-  id: string;
-  description: string;
-  scenario: string;
-  owner: string;
-  preconditions: string;
-  commands: string;
-  observations: string;
-  stop: string;
-  recovery: string;
-  reconciliation: string;
-  retention: string;
-  escalation: string;
-}>) => base(input.id, input.description, "operate", { scenarios: [input.scenario] }, [
-  narrative("owner", "Owner and severity", input.owner),
-  narrative("preconditions", "Preconditions", input.preconditions),
-  narrative("commands", "Tested commands", input.commands),
-  scenario("example", input.scenario),
-  narrative("observations", "Expected observations", input.observations),
-  narrative("stop", "Stop conditions", input.stop),
-  narrative("recovery", "Rollback or resume", input.recovery),
-  narrative("reconciliation", "Reconciliation", input.reconciliation),
-  narrative("retention", "Evidence retention", input.retention),
-  narrative("escalation", "Escalation", input.escalation),
-]);
-
-export const referencePage = (input: Readonly<{
-  id: string;
-  description: string;
-  factKind: "operation" | "endpoint";
-  fact: string;
-  orientation: string;
-  usage: string;
-  source: string;
-}>) => base(input.id, input.description, "inspect", {
-  operations: input.factKind === "operation" ? [input.fact] : [],
-  endpoints: input.factKind === "endpoint" ? [input.fact] : [],
-}, [
-  narrative("orientation", "Orientation", input.orientation),
-  { id: "contract", title: "Generated contract anchor", provenance: "generated-fact", factKind: input.factKind, fact: input.fact },
-  narrative("usage", "Use this surface", input.usage),
-  narrative("source", "Source at release", input.source),
-]);
-
-export const assurancePage = (input: Readonly<{
-  id: string;
-  description: string;
-  claim: string;
-  model: string;
-  invariants: string;
-  failures: string;
-  next: string;
-}>) => base(input.id, input.description, "verify", { claims: [input.claim] }, [
-  narrative("model", "What the claim says", input.model),
-  { id: "evidence", title: "Release evidence", provenance: "generated-fact", factKind: "claim", fact: input.claim },
-  narrative("invariants", "What remains true", input.invariants),
-  narrative("failures", "What would weaken or withdraw it", input.failures),
-  narrative("next", "Continue", input.next),
-]);
diff --git a/content/pages.json b/content/pages.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 4f25967..0000000
--- a/content/pages.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1123 +0,0 @@
-[
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.home/1",
-    "title": "Auths documentation",
-    "description": "Precise, portable authority for people and agents.",
-    "depth": "understand",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "promise",
-        "title": "Authority for the exact thing",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Auths gives people and agents precise, portable permission to do one bounded thing—and leaves cryptographic evidence of what happened."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
-    "title": "SDK reference",
-    "description": "The five Auths verbs across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.",
-    "depth": "inspect",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "generated",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.create/1",
-        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.resume/1",
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "operations",
-        "title": "Operations",
-        "provenance": "generated-fact",
-        "factKind": "operation",
-        "fact": "auths.operation.create/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
-    "title": "Runtime API reference",
-    "description": "The HTTPS production runtime contract.",
-    "depth": "inspect",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "generated",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.health/1",
-        "auths.endpoint.authorities/1",
-        "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
-        "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1",
-        "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "endpoints",
-        "title": "Endpoints",
-        "provenance": "generated-fact",
-        "factKind": "endpoint",
-        "fact": "auths.endpoint.health/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
-    "title": "Production operations",
-    "description": "Durable state, custody, observability, and recovery.",
-    "depth": "operate",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.health/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "boundary",
-        "title": "Operate the closed gateway",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Keep provider credentials behind the runtime boundary and preserve durable recovery state."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1",
-    "title": "Trust boundaries",
-    "description": "Authorization before provider entry.",
-    "depth": "verify",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "boundary",
-        "title": "Transport is not authority",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Successful delivery never authorizes an effect."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
-    "title": "Integrations",
-    "description": "Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, and capability systems.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "composition",
-        "title": "Auths with your existing systems",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Keep identity, policy, transport, and cloud systems in their legitimate roles while adding exact effect authority."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
-    "title": "Assurance",
-    "description": "Claims linked to bounded evidence and limitations.",
-    "depth": "verify",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "claims",
-        "title": "Show what the evidence proves",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Every claim names its evidence, release, scope, and limitation."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.start/1",
-    "title": "Get started",
-    "description": "Choose the shortest safe path from an outcome to working Auths authority.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "choose",
-        "title": "Start with what you need to protect",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Choose an application effect, delegated agent action, production runtime, or verification-only path before learning the deeper machinery."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
-    "title": "Identity & trust",
-    "description": "Bring your identity provider, workload identity, resolver, and cryptographic suites without coupling them to authority.",
-    "depth": "understand",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "separation",
-        "title": "Identity says who; authority says what",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Authentication evidence can inform authorization, but it never becomes permission merely by arriving successfully."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.authority/1",
-    "title": "Authority",
-    "description": "Create, narrow, execute, recover, and verify exact permission for an application effect.",
-    "depth": "understand",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.create/1",
-        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.resume/1",
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "verbs",
-        "title": "Five verbs, one authority lifecycle",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify without changing vocabulary as the workflow becomes more sophisticated."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.agents/1",
-    "title": "Agents",
-    "description": "Give an agent narrow, inspectable authority instead of ambient credentials.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.delegation/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "boundary",
-        "title": "Agents propose; closed gateways execute",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "An agent cannot manufacture broader authority or reach provider credentials merely because it can call a tool."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.developers/1",
-    "title": "Developers",
-    "description": "Find SDKs, Runtime APIs, tested examples, integrations, versioning, and extension contracts.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "tools",
-        "title": "Choose the surface for your application",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Use an idiomatic SDK in process or call the production Runtime API while preserving the same Rust-owned semantics."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.reference/1",
-    "title": "APIs & SDKs",
-    "description": "Inspect exact installed SDK operations and production Runtime API contracts.",
-    "depth": "inspect",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "surfaces",
-        "title": "Reference meaning before mechanism",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Begin with the product operation, then descend into its Rust, TypeScript, Python, or Runtime API projection."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.start.choose/1",
-    "title": "Choose your Auths path",
-    "description": "Describe the boundary you need and get one deterministic starting recommendation.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "choice",
-        "title": "Choose by effect, not package",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "The chooser never accepts credentials or creates authority. It maps deployment, actor, trust, state, custody, and ownership needs to a documented path."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.start.prerequisites/1",
-    "title": "Before you begin",
-    "description": "Prepare only the runtime, trust, state, and custody inputs your chosen path actually needs.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "minimum",
-        "title": "Smallest local path",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python; use development custody and in-memory state; and protect one deterministic local effect."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "production",
-        "title": "Production additions",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Add HTTPS, durable replay and recovery state, external custody, explicit trust resolution, observability, and a closed provider gateway only when moving beyond evaluation."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "exit",
-        "title": "Know which path you own",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "SDK consumers, runtime operators, agent builders, and profile authors have different prerequisites. Do not assemble every extension port for a normal integration."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.start.local/1",
-    "title": "Protect one local effect",
-    "description": "Create, execute, and verify one bounded application action in process.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.create/1",
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "outcome",
-        "title": "Outcome",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "One caller can perform one exact route-shaped action once. Replaying it or changing its bytes fails closed."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "build",
-        "title": "Build",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "proof",
-        "title": "What Auths proved",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "The actor held authority for the committed action and the closed gateway returned a bounded outcome. Transport success alone proved nothing."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "failure",
-        "title": "Failure path",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Run the same action again to receive a replay denial, then change one application byte to receive a commitment mismatch."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.start.runtime/1",
-    "title": "Protect a service effect",
-    "description": "Submit exact authority to the open production Runtime API and preserve recovery state.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.create/1",
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.resume/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.authorities/1",
-        "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
-        "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "outcome",
-        "title": "Outcome",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "A service accepts a bounded request over HTTPS, reserves it durably, and distinguishes completion from a recoverable or unknown provider outcome."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "build",
-        "title": "Build",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "boundary",
-        "title": "Production boundary",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "The Runtime API requires HTTPS and durable state. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway and never enter the caller SDK."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "failure",
-        "title": "Failure path",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "A provider-unknown outcome requires observation and reconciliation before any retry. Resume the same execution identity rather than creating a fresh request."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.start.agent/1",
-    "title": "Delegate one action to an agent",
-    "description": "Give an agent exact authority for one tool without exposing ambient credentials.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.delegation/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "outcome",
-        "title": "Outcome",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "The agent can invoke one allowed action within its time, use, and delegation bounds. It cannot manufacture wider authority."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "build",
-        "title": "Build",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.delegation/1"
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "boundary",
-        "title": "Agent boundary",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "The agent proposes or presents authority. A closed application gateway verifies and performs the effect."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "failure",
-        "title": "Failure path",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Increase the child action set or use count and observe delegation fail before execution."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.start.cross-company/1",
-    "title": "Authorize across companies",
-    "description": "Delegate one bounded operation across independent identity and cloud boundaries.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.delegation/1",
-        "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "outcome",
-        "title": "Outcome",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "One organization authorizes an external actor to perform a precise operation without sharing a root identity provider or provider credential."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "delegate",
-        "title": "Delegate",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.delegation/1"
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "verify",
-        "title": "Verify the evidence",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "failure",
-        "title": "Failure path",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Identity federation, delivery, or approval cannot substitute for exact authority. A changed plan or widened delegation is rejected."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.start.verify/1",
-    "title": "Verify without executing",
-    "description": "Check authority or a receipt locally without provider access or lifecycle mutation.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "outcome",
-        "title": "Outcome",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "A verifier confirms portable evidence and produces an inert decision or bounded receipt view without gaining an executable command."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "build",
-        "title": "Build",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "privacy",
-        "title": "Disclosure boundary",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Unauthorized viewers receive an opaque result. Summary and full views require the appropriate disclosure authority."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "failure",
-        "title": "Failure path",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Tampered bytes, an unknown signer, or missing trust evidence remain rejected or indeterminate; verification never performs the underlying effect."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.start.evaluate/1",
-    "title": "Evaluate Auths",
-    "description": "Run deterministic success and failure fixtures before choosing an integration.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.create/1",
-        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
-        "auths.scenario.delegation/1",
-        "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "goal",
-        "title": "Prove the boundaries first",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Run the same semantic cases in Rust, TypeScript, and Python and compare normalized outcomes rather than trusting screenshots."
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "effect",
-        "title": "Exact effect",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "delegation",
-        "title": "Attenuation",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.delegation/1"
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "receipt",
-        "title": "Receipt verification",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"
-      },
-      {
-        "id": "decision",
-        "title": "Choose after the evidence",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Adopt the local SDK, production runtime, agent, or verification-only path only after the failure behavior matches your application needs."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.concepts.tour/1",
-    "title": "Auths in fifteen minutes",
-    "description": "Understand five nouns, five verbs, and one complete bounded-effect lifecycle.",
-    "depth": "understand",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.create/1",
-        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.resume/1",
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "model",
-        "title": "One operation from intent to evidence",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "A support service grants one actor authority to issue one refund, executes it behind a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
-    "title": "How identity and trust fit",
-    "description": "Authenticate a signer without turning identity, cryptography, or transport into authority.",
-    "depth": "understand",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "separation",
-        "title": "Who signed is not what they may do",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Trust evidence establishes a signer under an application-owned trust policy. Authority separately commits the allowed action and bounds."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1",
-    "title": "Authority lifecycle",
-    "description": "Follow authority through authoring, attenuation, use, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion.",
-    "depth": "inspect",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.create/1",
-        "auths.operation.delegate/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.delegation/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "narrowing",
-        "title": "Authority can only get narrower",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Each child commits to a subset of its parent and consumes explicit time, use, budget, and delegation bounds."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1",
-    "title": "Execution lifecycle",
-    "description": "Separate parsing, authorization, durable reservation, provider observation, recovery, and terminal evidence.",
-    "depth": "operate",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.resume/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
-        "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "state",
-        "title": "Observe before retry",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Once a provider may have accepted an effect, Auths preserves uncertainty and requires reconciliation or resume of the same execution identity."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1",
-    "title": "Approval-bound plans",
-    "description": "Bind threshold or ordered approval to the exact operations, bytes, and order under review.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1",
-        "auths.operation.resume/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "commitment",
-        "title": "Approval is bound context, not authority",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Changing a member, byte, order, or threshold changes the plan commitment and invalidates the collected approval evidence."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1",
-    "title": "Receipts and disclosure",
-    "description": "Verify outcome evidence while revealing only what the viewer is authorized to inspect.",
-    "depth": "inspect",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1",
-        "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "views",
-        "title": "Evidence has disclosure levels",
-        "provenance": "editorial-narrative",
-        "body": [
-          "Opaque, summary, and authorized full views let applications prove integrity without publishing sensitive business detail by default."
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
-    "title": "Protect one REST effect locally",
-    "description": "Complete one exact REST-shaped effect and prove changed bytes fail closed.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.create/1",
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "outcome",
-        "title": "One bounded local effect",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1",
-    "title": "Execute through the open runtime",
-    "description": "Complete one runtime effect and prove exact replay is denied.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.executions/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "outcome",
-        "title": "One runtime effect",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1",
-    "title": "Delegate one tool to an agent",
-    "description": "Give an agent one narrow tool and reject widening.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "outcome",
-        "title": "One delegated tool",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1",
-    "title": "Run one approved plan",
-    "description": "Bind approval to an exact ordered plan and reject substitution.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.execute/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "outcome",
-        "title": "One exact approved plan",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
-    "title": "Verify authority offline",
-    "description": "Verify proof and receipt bytes without a network dependency.",
-    "depth": "start",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "outcome",
-        "title": "Local deterministic verification",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1",
-    "title": "Resume uncertain execution safely",
-    "description": "Resume an opaque execution reference and prohibit a fresh retry.",
-    "depth": "operate",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.resume/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [
-        "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1"
-      ],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "outcome",
-        "title": "Recover without repeating",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.recovery/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1",
-    "title": "Swap identity suites",
-    "description": "Keep authority semantics stable across identity suites.",
-    "depth": "build",
-    "status": "preview",
-    "owner": "editorial",
-    "uses": {
-      "operations": [
-        "auths.operation.verify/1"
-      ],
-      "scenarios": [
-        "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"
-      ],
-      "endpoints": [],
-      "profiles": [],
-      "claims": []
-    },
-    "sections": [
-      {
-        "id": "outcome",
-        "title": "Cryptographic agility without semantic drift",
-        "provenance": "tested-scenario",
-        "scenario": "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1"
-      }
-    ]
-  }
-]
diff --git a/content/reference-assurance-pages.ts b/content/reference-assurance-pages.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index e8a5180..0000000
--- a/content/reference-assurance-pages.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-import { assurancePage, landing, referencePage } from "./page-builders.ts";
-
-const reference = (
-  id: string,
-  description: string,
-  factKind: "operation" | "endpoint",
-  fact: string,
-  orientation: string,
-  usage: string,
-) => referencePage({
-  id, description, factKind, fact, orientation, usage,
-  source: "This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.",
-});
-
-const assurance = (id: string, description: string, claim: string, model: string, invariants: string, failures: string, next: string) => assurancePage({
-  id, description, claim, model, invariants, failures, next,
-});
-
-export const referenceAssurancePages: readonly unknown[] = Object.freeze([
-  landing("auths.page.reference/1", "Look up exact SDK, Runtime API, CLI, profile, error, schema, evidence, and manifest contracts for one release.", "Reference is generated lookup, not a second product narrative. Stable identities join Rust-owned operations to installed Rust, TypeScript, and Python symbols, HTTPS endpoints, outcomes, schemas, and release evidence."),
-  reference("auths.page.reference.sdk/1", "Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while remaining on the same Auths operation.", "operation", "auths.operation.create/1", "The SDK reference groups the five semantic operations by stable identity and projects each maintained language's installed public symbol.", "Choose a language globally, inspect exact signatures and examples in the aligned code rail, and use source-at-release when a declaration needs deeper context."),
-  reference("auths.page.reference.sdk.rust/1", "Inspect maintained Rust SDK symbols and their operation mappings.", "operation", "auths.operation.create/1", "Rust is the semantic owner and exposes typed authoring, delegation, execution, recovery, verification, inspection, and diagnostics surfaces.", "Follow stable operation identities instead of crate module names; private implementation types are intentionally absent."),
-  reference("auths.page.reference.sdk.typescript/1", "Inspect installed TypeScript symbols and their native operation mappings.", "operation", "auths.operation.create/1", "The TypeScript SDK exposes idiomatic typed projections over Rust-owned semantics and synchronized outcomes.", "Use the integrated package first, then descend into focused entry points only when the application needs independent identity, verification, inspection, runtime, or testkit surfaces."),
-  reference("auths.page.reference.sdk.python/1", "Inspect installed Python symbols and their native operation mappings.", "operation", "auths.operation.create/1", "The Python SDK exposes typed high-level workflows while opaque native handles prevent Python code from minting effect-capable authorization.", "Use the same operation and outcome identities as TypeScript; consult the support matrix for maintained Python and platform wheels."),
-  reference("auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1", "Inspect exact HTTPS methods, paths, limits, outcomes, recovery, and receipt-disclosure contracts.", "endpoint", "auths.endpoint.health/1", "The Runtime API is the language-neutral production boundary. Every effectful endpoint declares request limits, closed outcomes, state behavior, and trust boundary.", "Check health and version, create authority, execute, resume, then request only authorized receipt projections. Unknown outcomes remain closed."),
-  reference("auths.page.reference.cli/1", "Check whether the selected release declares a supported public CLI surface.", "endpoint", "auths.endpoint.version/1", "This prelaunch release does not declare a general-purpose public Auths CLI. Repository cargo xtask commands are contributor tooling, not a supported customer interface.", "Use maintained SDKs or the Runtime API for terminal automation. A future CLI will appear here only after its commands, flags, outcomes, packages, and support policy enter the release contract."),
-  reference("auths.page.reference.profiles/1", "Inspect maintained and application-owned action, resource, command, budget, and receipt projection contracts.", "operation", "auths.operation.create/1", "Profiles map bounded domain intent into Auths operations without owning identity, transport, state, custody, approval providers, or provider credentials.", "Resolve profile version and action identities before authoring authority. Use profile-kit for application domains and qualify every critical extension."),
-  reference("auths.page.reference.errors/1", "Look up stable parse, trust, denial, lifecycle, execution, provider, recovery, and disclosure outcomes.", "endpoint", "auths.endpoint.executions/1", "Errors and closed outcomes are grouped by the caller's safe response rather than by internal exception type.", "Fix denied input, supply missing trusted context for indeterminate results, Resume recoverable executions, reconcile provider unknown, and never retry an unknown effect blindly."),
-  reference("auths.page.reference.schemas/1", "Inspect canonical bounded inputs, wire artifacts, commands, receipts, and disclosure view schemas.", "endpoint", "auths.endpoint.authorities/1", "Schemas are versioned release facts with size and shape limits. Parsers create trusted typed values; callers cannot validate loosely and pass raw objects onward.", "Generate clients from the selected release schema only where supported, and preserve unknown-field rejection at security boundaries."),
-  reference("auths.page.reference.evidence/1", "Resolve every public assurance claim to status, checksum, reproduction, scope, and limitation.", "operation", "auths.operation.verify/1", "Evidence pages do not convert repository tests into universal correctness. They report exactly what the selected release checked and where that claim stops.", "Verify evidence checksums, run the declared reproduction commands, and read limitations before relying on a claim for production risk decisions."),
-  reference("auths.page.reference.manifest/1", "Consume the machine-readable identity-to-URL manifest for the selected docs contract.", "endpoint", "auths.endpoint.version/1", "The manifest maps pages, operations, endpoints, scenarios, and evidence claims to canonical URLs under one contract digest.", "Agents and tooling should retrieve this JSON directly rather than scrape navigation or guess routes from display names."),
-  landing("auths.page.assurance.evidence/1", "Inspect what Auths claims, the exact evidence behind it, and the limits that remain.", "Assurance is release-scoped and deliberately bounded. Each claim shows its current status, evidence path and checksum, reproduction commands, scope, and limitation. Formal models, differential fixtures, adversarial tests, and supply-chain assessment answer different questions."),
-  assurance("auths.page.assurance.semantics/1", "Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.", "auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1", "The claim covers ownership of protocol meaning across maintained SDK projections, not defect-free code or every application adapter.", "A declaration change must update semantic identity or version, packaged projections, fixtures, and documentation together.", "Unrecorded semantic drift, language-owned authorization logic, or a fixture disagreement degrades or withdraws the claim.", "Inspect cross-language evidence and the generated SDK reference for the selected release."),
-  assurance("auths.page.assurance.authority/1", "Inspect attenuation and approval-binding evidence for bounded authority.", "auths.claim.attenuation/1", "The maintained model and fixtures assert that delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent across declared fields.", "Action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, depth, and modelled critical extensions must preserve their narrowing relation.", "A new unmodelled field, accepted incomparable child, formal drift, or differential mismatch narrows the scope or withdraws passing status.", "Review adversarial approval and delegation evidence alongside application-profile tests."),
-  assurance("auths.page.assurance.execution/1", "Inspect the native closed-gateway boundary protecting provider effects.", "auths.claim.closed-gateway/1", "Maintained workflows acquire provider access only through opaque native-authorized commands after required checks and state transitions.", "Transport, authentication, approval, signatures, or application objects cannot mint the effect-capable handle.", "An unsafe application-owned adapter, direct provider route, handle forgery, missing reservation, or semantic bypass lies outside or invalidates the claim.", "Use Operations to qualify the selected durable store, custody, and provider gateway deployment."),
-  assurance("auths.page.assurance.disclosure/1", "Inspect evidence that receipt views are bounded and authority-controlled.", "auths.claim.bounded-disclosure/1", "Receipt integrity and receipt disclosure are separate decisions. Unauthorized callers receive an opaque view; summary and full projections are native-owned.", "Public artifacts contain bounded commitments and verification material rather than raw provider payloads or secrets.", "Unsafe downstream logging, overbroad retention, application-authored views, or disclosure-policy regression remains a deployment or product failure.", "Review receipt retention and the disclosure incident runbook before exposing evidence APIs."),
-  assurance("auths.page.assurance.cross-language/1", "Compare maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes for identical scenarios.", "auths.claim.cross-language-parity/1", "Parity covers stable semantic operations and qualified installed-artifact scenarios while allowing idiomatic language types and packaging.", "The same fixture bytes and trusted context produce the same normalized outcome and commitments.", "A missing wheel, unsupported platform, public API drift, language-specific decision, or differing fixture result degrades the release claim.", "Run the packaged scenario suite and inspect the SDK parity page."),
-  assurance("auths.page.assurance.formal/1", "Understand where formal attenuation evidence applies and where it does not.", "auths.claim.attenuation/1", "Lean and translation qualification reason about declared models and refinements; they do not prove every provider, store, network, UI, or deployment behavior.", "The checked theorem statements, axioms, translations, and source closure must match the selected release.", "Model drift, unreviewed axioms, stale generated translations, or code outside the refinement boundary changes the assurance scope.", "Pair formal evidence with adversarial, differential, and operational qualification."),
-  assurance("auths.page.assurance.adversarial/1", "Inspect substitution, widening, replay, mutation, and fail-closed evidence.", "auths.claim.approval-binding/1", "Adversarial fixtures try to change approved bytes, order, members, authority constraints, trust inputs, and lifecycle state.", "Every maintained language and runtime path must reject the same prohibited mutation before an unintended provider effect.", "Untested application profiles, adapters, external approval identity, or provider behavior remain outside the fixture claim.", "Keep application-specific negative fixtures beside each profile and gateway."),
-  assurance("auths.page.assurance.supply-chain/1", "Inspect the recorded SLSA builder assessment without mistaking it for an independent audit.", "auths.claim.supply-chain/1", "The assessment covers the declared GitHub release builder and recorded SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 controls.", "Builder bytes, provenance subjects, workflow identity, and release artifacts must match their checksummed assessment.", "A changed builder, missing provenance, unverified subject, or stale assessment withdraws passing status.", "Verify promotion evidence and obtain independent review appropriate to the deployment's consequence."),
-  assurance("auths.page.assurance.limitations/1", "Read the boundaries that Auths evidence deliberately does not claim to cross.", "auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1", "Auths evidence does not certify production availability, every adapter, every cloud, every application profile, business intent, compliance, or universal correctness.", "Claims remain useful only when their release, checksum, scope, and limitation are carried together.", "Marketing language, stale screenshots, demo success, or an unpinned docs build cannot upgrade or broaden a claim.", "Use the open production and field-lab evidence as inputs, then perform deployment-specific threat modelling and external review."),
-]);
diff --git a/content/route-migration.json b/content/route-migration.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 42d7b89..0000000
--- a/content/route-migration.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema": "auths.docs.route-migration/1",
-  "entries": [
-    {
-      "from": "/guides/protect-rest-effect",
-      "disposition": "replaced",
-      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/start/delegate-agent",
-      "disposition": "replaced",
-      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/start/verify-receipt",
-      "disposition": "replaced",
-      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/concepts",
-      "disposition": "merged",
-      "to": "/authority/model"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/concepts/auths-in-15-minutes",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/authority/model"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/architecture",
-      "disposition": "merged",
-      "to": "/authority/model"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/architecture/trust-boundaries",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/authority/execute"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/quickstarts",
-      "disposition": "replaced",
-      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/quickstarts/local-rest-effect",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/quickstarts/runtime-effect",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/quickstarts/agent-delegation",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/quickstarts/approved-plan",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/quickstarts/offline-verification",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/quickstarts/recovery",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/recovery"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/quickstarts/identity-swap",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/get-started/local",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/paths/application"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/get-started/agent",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/paths/agent"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/get-started/runtime",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/paths/runtime"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/get-started/verify",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/paths/verification"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/get-started/cross-company",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/paths/cross-company"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/get-started/adopt",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/adoption"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/adopt",
-      "disposition": "replaced",
-      "to": "/get-started/adoption"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/adopt/plan",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/adoption/plan"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/adopt/signed-requests",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/adoption/signed-requests"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/adopt/oauth-oidc",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/adopt/api-keys",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/adoption/api-keys"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/adopt/cloud-iam",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/adopt/policy-engines",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/adoption/policy-engines"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/adopt/capabilities",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/adoption/capabilities"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/adopt/approvals",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/adoption/approvals"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/adopt/shadow-mode",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/adopt/cutover",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/get-started/adoption/cutover"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/authority/approval-bound-plans",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/authority/plans/approvals"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/authority/receipts-and-disclosure",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/authority/receipts/disclosure"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/agents/delegate-one-tool",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/agents/quickstart"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/agents/approved-plan",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/agents/approved-plans"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/agents/mcp-client",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/agents/mcp/client"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/agents/protect-mcp-server",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/agents/mcp/protect-server"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/agents/skills",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/agents/skills-and-plugins"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/integrations",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/developers/integrations"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/integrations/identity-trust",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/integrations/policy",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/developers/integrations/policy"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/integrations/cloud",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/developers/integrations/cloud-iam"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/integrations/transport",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/developers/integrations/transport"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/integrations/capabilities",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/developers/integrations/capabilities"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/integrations/profile-kit",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/developers/integrations/profile-kit"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/operations/durable-state",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/operations/configure/durable-state"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/operations/custody",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/operations/configure/custody"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/operations/trust-and-profiles",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/operations/provider-gateways",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/operations/configure/provider-gateways"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/operations/incident-response",
-      "disposition": "retained",
-      "to": "/operations/incidents"
-    },
-    {
-      "from": "/sdk",
-      "disposition": "merged",
-      "to": "/reference/sdk"
-    }
-  ]
-}
diff --git a/content/runbooks.json b/content/runbooks.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 38fd3fe..0000000
--- a/content/runbooks.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-[
-  { "id": "state-loss", "title": "State store unavailable or lost", "severity": "critical", "stop": "Stop mutating traffic and fence every writer.", "observe": "Read bounded dependency health and the last durable store generation.", "recover": "Restore an atomic backup, validate replay and budget invariants, then reconcile nonterminal executions.", "never": "Never start with an empty store against a live provider." },
-  { "id": "signer-outage", "title": "Custody signer unavailable", "severity": "high", "stop": "Stop authoring and receipt-attestation paths; preserve verification-only service.", "observe": "Distinguish signer health from invalid signature outcomes.", "recover": "Restore the same key descriptor or perform an explicit trust-root rotation.", "never": "Never export a private key into the runtime as a shortcut." },
-  { "id": "trust-root-error", "title": "Incorrect trust root deployed", "severity": "critical", "stop": "Freeze new authority acceptance and identify the affected release window.", "observe": "Compare root commitments, suite labels, and negative verification fixtures.", "recover": "Roll back the trust bundle atomically and re-evaluate affected decisions.", "never": "Never mark previously indeterminate decisions as authorized." },
-  { "id": "provider-unknown", "title": "Provider outcome is unknown", "severity": "high", "stop": "Block fresh retries for the same logical effect.", "observe": "Use the provider observation and opaque execution reference.", "recover": "Reconcile provider state, then resume the same execution identity.", "never": "Never assume an error means the provider did nothing." },
-  { "id": "receipt-disclosure", "title": "Receipt detail disclosed improperly", "severity": "high", "stop": "Disable the affected disclosure path without deleting integrity evidence.", "observe": "Identify disclosure level, viewer authority, fields exposed, and audit commitment.", "recover": "Rotate access, narrow disclosure policy, and issue bounded notifications.", "never": "Never publish full receipts while investigating." },
-  { "id": "compromised-credential", "title": "Provider credential compromised", "severity": "critical", "stop": "Disable the provider gateway and revoke the provider credential.", "observe": "Separate provider audit events from Auths-authorized receipt commitments.", "recover": "Rotate custody, reconcile provider state, requalify the gateway, then restore traffic.", "never": "Never place the replacement credential in a proof, log, or agent prompt." }
-]
diff --git a/content/topic-landings.json b/content/topic-landings.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 2f1135f..0000000
--- a/content/topic-landings.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,410 +0,0 @@
-[
-  {
-    "page": "auths.page.start/1",
-    "eyebrow": "Get started",
-    "recommendation": {
-      "target": "auths.page.start.choose/1",
-      "label": "Choose your Auths path",
-      "description": "Describe the effect and operating boundary, then follow one deterministic recommendation."
-    },
-    "groups": [
-      {
-        "title": "Choose a first outcome",
-        "cards": [
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.start.local/1",
-            "title": "Protect an application effect",
-            "description": "The shortest path from installation to a verified receipt."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.start.agent/1",
-            "title": "Delegate to an agent",
-            "description": "Pass on narrower authority without ambient credentials."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.start.verify/1",
-            "title": "Verify evidence",
-            "description": "Inspect a bounded receipt without performing an effect."
-          }
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "title": "Understand your options",
-        "cards": [
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.start.prerequisites/1",
-            "title": "Check prerequisites",
-            "description": "Prepare only what your integration path needs."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.start.cross-company/1",
-            "title": "Cross company boundaries",
-            "description": "Keep independent identity and cloud systems."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.start.evaluate/1",
-            "title": "Evaluate with fixtures",
-            "description": "Compare deterministic success and failure outcomes."
-          }
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "page": "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
-    "eyebrow": "Identity & trust",
-    "recommendation": {
-      "target": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
-      "label": "See how identity and trust fit",
-      "description": "Understand what identity proves—and what it never authorizes by itself."
-    },
-    "groups": [
-      {
-        "title": "Bring what you already use",
-        "cards": [
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
-            "title": "Compose existing identity",
-            "description": "Use OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, or an application resolver."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
-            "title": "Keep adapters replaceable",
-            "description": "Separate identity, cryptography, transport, and authority."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.authority/1",
-            "title": "Turn identity into bounded action",
-            "description": "Attach exact authority without replacing authentication."
-          }
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "title": "Inspect and verify",
-        "cards": [
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
-            "title": "Verify offline",
-            "description": "Check portable evidence without executing anything."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
-            "title": "Review agility claims",
-            "description": "Trace cryptographic and identity boundaries to evidence."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.reference/1",
-            "title": "Open exact contracts",
-            "description": "Find identity and verification surfaces by stable identity."
-          }
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "page": "auths.page.authority/1",
-    "eyebrow": "Authority",
-    "recommendation": {
-      "target": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
-      "label": "Create and execute exact authority",
-      "description": "Start with one effect, one use, and evidence of the outcome."
-    },
-    "groups": [
-      {
-        "title": "Work with authority",
-        "cards": [
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
-            "title": "Create",
-            "description": "Describe one bounded action and who may perform it."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1",
-            "title": "Delegate",
-            "description": "Narrow action, time, uses, budget, and delegation depth."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
-            "title": "Execute and recover",
-            "description": "Reserve durably, perform behind a closed gateway, and resume safely."
-          }
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "title": "Understand the model",
-        "cards": [
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1",
-            "title": "Authority lifecycle",
-            "description": "Follow attenuation, use, budget, expiry, revocation, and exhaustion."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1",
-            "title": "Approval-bound plans",
-            "description": "Bind review to exact members, bytes, order, and threshold."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1",
-            "title": "Receipts and disclosure",
-            "description": "Verify evidence without revealing sensitive detail by default."
-          }
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "page": "auths.page.agents/1",
-    "eyebrow": "Agents",
-    "recommendation": {
-      "target": "auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1",
-      "label": "Delegate one tool",
-      "description": "Give an agent one narrow ability without a broad API key."
-    },
-    "groups": [
-      {
-        "title": "Build agent authority",
-        "cards": [
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1",
-            "title": "Delegate without widening",
-            "description": "Make each handoff narrower and independently verifiable."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
-            "title": "Protect an effect",
-            "description": "Place the provider behind an authorization boundary."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
-            "title": "Verify what happened",
-            "description": "Return portable evidence rather than trusting an agent report."
-          }
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "title": "Compose the stack",
-        "cards": [
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
-            "title": "MCP and transports",
-            "description": "Delivery remains independent from authorization."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
-            "title": "Agent identity",
-            "description": "Bring workload, user, or application trust evidence."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
-            "title": "Closed execution",
-            "description": "Keep real credentials outside the agent process."
-          }
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "page": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
-    "eyebrow": "Operations",
-    "recommendation": {
-      "target": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
-      "label": "Inspect the Runtime API",
-      "description": "See the exact HTTPS boundary, outcomes, and recovery operations."
-    },
-    "groups": [
-      {
-        "title": "Run the open runtime",
-        "cards": [
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
-            "title": "Runtime contract",
-            "description": "Endpoints, limits, trust boundaries, and closed outcomes."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
-            "title": "Deployment architecture",
-            "description": "Separate durable state, custody, trust, and provider gateways."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
-            "title": "Receipts and disclosure",
-            "description": "Preserve evidence while minimizing exposed detail."
-          }
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "title": "Respond safely",
-        "cards": [
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1",
-            "title": "Lifecycle and recovery",
-            "description": "Know when to retry, resume, reconcile, or stop."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
-            "title": "Operational evidence",
-            "description": "Trace procedures and claims to a qualified release."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.developers/1",
-            "title": "Testing tools",
-            "description": "Exercise denial, replay, mutation, and provider uncertainty."
-          }
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "page": "auths.page.developers/1",
-    "eyebrow": "Developers",
-    "recommendation": {
-      "target": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
-      "label": "Choose an SDK",
-      "description": "Use the same five operations from Rust, TypeScript, or Python."
-    },
-    "groups": [
-      {
-        "title": "Build",
-        "cards": [
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
-            "title": "SDKs",
-            "description": "Language-aware operations, parameters, outcomes, and examples."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
-            "title": "Runtime API",
-            "description": "Integrate through the production HTTPS boundary."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
-            "title": "Quickstarts",
-            "description": "Begin with a tested end-to-end outcome."
-          }
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "title": "Extend and evaluate",
-        "cards": [
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
-            "title": "Integrations",
-            "description": "Compose identity, policy, transport, custody, and providers."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.agents/1",
-            "title": "Agents and MCP",
-            "description": "Propose, authorize, execute, observe, and verify separately."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
-            "title": "Testing and evidence",
-            "description": "Use deterministic fixtures and inspect assurance scope."
-          }
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "page": "auths.page.reference/1",
-    "eyebrow": "APIs & SDKs",
-    "recommendation": {
-      "target": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
-      "label": "Open the SDK reference",
-      "description": "Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while staying on the same operation."
-    },
-    "groups": [
-      {
-        "title": "Reference by surface",
-        "cards": [
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
-            "title": "SDK reference",
-            "description": "Exact installed symbols across maintained languages."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
-            "title": "Runtime API",
-            "description": "Exact methods, paths, limits, outcomes, and recovery."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.developers/1",
-            "title": "Developer resources",
-            "description": "Installation, testing, versioning, and extension paths."
-          }
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "title": "Understand the contracts",
-        "cards": [
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.concepts.tour/1",
-            "title": "Product vocabulary",
-            "description": "Connect symbols to the meaning they project."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1",
-            "title": "Trust boundaries",
-            "description": "Know what each operation accepts and refuses to infer."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
-            "title": "Source and evidence",
-            "description": "Trace generated reference facts to a release."
-          }
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  {
-    "page": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
-    "eyebrow": "Assurance",
-    "recommendation": {
-      "target": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1",
-      "label": "Start with the trust boundaries",
-      "description": "Understand the claims before inspecting their evidence."
-    },
-    "groups": [
-      {
-        "title": "Inspect evidence",
-        "cards": [
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
-            "title": "Architecture claims",
-            "description": "See the semantic core and replaceable boundaries."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
-            "title": "Receipt verification",
-            "description": "Verify portable evidence without performing an effect."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.reference/1",
-            "title": "Generated contracts",
-            "description": "Inspect release-scoped SDK and runtime facts."
-          }
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "title": "Understand limitations",
-        "cards": [
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
-            "title": "Operational scope",
-            "description": "Separate semantic assurance from deployment reliability."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
-            "title": "Composition boundaries",
-            "description": "See what adjacent identity and policy systems still own."
-          },
-          {
-            "target": "auths.page.developers/1",
-            "title": "Reproduce results",
-            "description": "Find fixtures, tests, versions, and source provenance."
-          }
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  }
-]
diff --git a/content/tours.json b/content/tours.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 147eb1f..0000000
--- a/content/tours.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-[
-  {
-    "page": "auths.page.concepts.tour/1",
-    "diagram": { "nodes": ["Actor + exact action", "Create authority", "Delegate narrower", "Execute through gateway", "Verify receipt"], "text": "An actor describes an exact action, creates bounded authority, optionally delegates a narrower child, executes through a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt." },
-    "invariants": ["Authority names the exact action and actor bounds.", "Delegation cannot add actions, time, uses, budget, or depth.", "Verification returns inert evidence and cannot perform the effect."],
-    "failures": [
-      { "trigger": "Action bytes change", "result": "Commitment mismatch", "response": "Create authority for the intended bytes; do not reinterpret the old grant." },
-      { "trigger": "The same use is replayed", "result": "Denied", "response": "Create a new authorized operation only if the business intent is genuinely new." },
-      { "trigger": "Required trust evidence is unavailable", "result": "Indeterminate", "response": "Restore the missing evidence before making a decision." }
-    ],
-    "useWhen": "You need the complete product model before choosing an SDK or deployment.",
-    "avoidWhen": "You only need an exact signature or endpoint field; open the generated reference instead.",
-    "related": ["auths.page.start.local/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"]
-  },
-  {
-    "page": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
-    "diagram": { "nodes": ["Identity material", "Authentication evidence", "Application trust resolver", "Verified signer", "Separate authority decision"], "text": "Bounded identity material becomes authentication evidence, an application-owned resolver evaluates trust, and only then can a separate authority decision consider the verified signer." },
-    "invariants": ["A public key identifies verification material; it does not grant an action.", "Ed25519, P-256, and future suites enter through the same bounded verification port.", "HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and other transports deliver evidence but never authorize effects."],
-    "failures": [
-      { "trigger": "The suite is unsupported", "result": "Rejected", "response": "Install or supply an explicit compatible suite implementation." },
-      { "trigger": "The signer is valid but untrusted", "result": "Denied", "response": "Change trust policy or use a trusted identity; do not infer trust from signature validity." },
-      { "trigger": "The resolver is unavailable", "result": "Indeterminate", "response": "Restore trust evidence and evaluate again without performing an effect." }
-    ],
-    "useWhen": "You are integrating OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, application identities, or another cryptographic suite.",
-    "avoidWhen": "You are looking for permission scope; identity alone cannot express the complete effect boundary.",
-    "related": ["auths.page.identity-trust/1", "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1"]
-  },
-  {
-    "page": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1",
-    "diagram": { "nodes": ["Author exact authority", "Commit canonical bytes", "Attenuate child", "Consume use or budget", "Expire, revoke, or exhaust"], "text": "Authority is authored for exact canonical bytes, committed, optionally attenuated into a child, consumed under durable state, and eventually expires, is revoked, or becomes exhausted." },
-    "invariants": ["A child is a subset of its parent under every critical extension.", "Use and budget state are durable and atomic with reservation.", "Expired, revoked, or exhausted authority cannot be revived by transport or approval."],
-    "failures": [
-      { "trigger": "A child adds an action or use", "result": "Widening rejected", "response": "Create the child from a valid subset of the parent." },
-      { "trigger": "Authority expires before reservation", "result": "Denied", "response": "Request fresh authority for current intent." },
-      { "trigger": "Revocation state cannot be checked", "result": "Indeterminate", "response": "Restore lifecycle state; do not assume the grant remains valid." }
-    ],
-    "useWhen": "You need delegation, one-time use, budget, expiry, revocation, or critical-extension behavior.",
-    "avoidWhen": "You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.",
-    "related": ["auths.page.start.agent/1", "auths.page.authority/1"]
-  },
-  {
-    "page": "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1",
-    "diagram": { "nodes": ["Parse + verify", "Authorize", "Reserve durably", "Enter closed gateway", "Complete or preserve recovery"], "text": "The runtime parses and verifies untrusted input, authorizes it, reserves replay and budget state, enters the closed gateway, then records completion or preserves a recoverable execution identity." },
-    "invariants": ["No effect-capable command exists before native authorization and durable reservation.", "A provider timeout after submission is not silently converted to failure or success.", "Resume continues the same execution identity; retry creates unsafe ambiguity."],
-    "failures": [
-      { "trigger": "Verification or policy denies", "result": "Denied", "response": "Do not enter the provider gateway." },
-      { "trigger": "State reservation fails", "result": "Unavailable", "response": "Perform no effect and retry only after state is healthy." },
-      { "trigger": "Provider acceptance is unknown", "result": "Recoverable or provider-unknown", "response": "Observe and reconcile before resuming the same execution." }
-    ],
-    "useWhen": "You operate a remote effect, durable replay state, provider gateway, or recovery workflow.",
-    "avoidWhen": "You are performing effect-free offline verification.",
-    "related": ["auths.page.start.runtime/1", "auths.page.operations.runtime/1"]
-  },
-  {
-    "page": "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1",
-    "diagram": { "nodes": ["Construct exact plan", "Commit members + order", "Collect bound approvals", "Authorize each sealed command", "Record partial or terminal outcome"], "text": "An exact ordered plan is committed, approvers sign that commitment, each member still passes authorization, and execution records partial, uncertain, cancelled, or terminal outcomes without treating approval as reusable permission." },
-    "invariants": ["Approval is evidence about one exact plan commitment.", "Substituting a member, byte sequence, order, threshold, or approver set invalidates approval.", "Approval never bypasses authority verification or durable execution state."],
-    "failures": [
-      { "trigger": "A plan member changes after approval", "result": "Substitution rejected", "response": "Build and approve a new plan commitment." },
-      { "trigger": "Threshold is not met", "result": "Denied", "response": "Collect the missing valid approval or cancel." },
-      { "trigger": "A provider outcome becomes unknown mid-plan", "result": "Plan is recoverable with explicit completed and uncertain members", "response": "Reconcile before any continuation." }
-    ],
-    "useWhen": "Several exact operations require threshold, ordered, or cross-organization review.",
-    "avoidWhen": "A reusable human-approved flag or broad role is sufficient for the actual risk model.",
-    "related": ["auths.page.start.cross-company/1", "auths.page.authority/1"]
-  },
-  {
-    "page": "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1",
-    "diagram": { "nodes": ["Decision receipt", "Execution receipt", "Verify integrity", "Opaque or summary view", "Authorized full disclosure"], "text": "Decision and execution receipts bind evidence, local verification confirms integrity, every viewer can receive only the permitted opaque or summary projection, and sensitive full detail requires explicit disclosure authority." },
-    "invariants": ["A receipt records a decision or outcome; it does not retroactively authorize it.", "Verification is local and effect free.", "Sensitive application details are absent from unauthorized and bounded-summary views."],
-    "failures": [
-      { "trigger": "Receipt bytes are changed", "result": "Verification rejected", "response": "Retrieve the original signed receipt from a trusted source." },
-      { "trigger": "A viewer lacks disclosure authority", "result": "Opaque view", "response": "Request explicit disclosure authority rather than leaking fields." },
-      { "trigger": "Signer trust cannot be resolved", "result": "Indeterminate", "response": "Restore trust evidence before relying on the receipt." }
-    ],
-    "useWhen": "You need audit evidence, cross-company proof, recovery state, or privacy-preserving inspection.",
-    "avoidWhen": "You need to perform an effect; receipt verification is intentionally inert.",
-    "related": ["auths.page.start.verify/1", "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1"]
-  }
-]
diff --git a/contracts/docs-bundle.fixture.json b/contracts/docs-bundle.fixture.json
deleted file mode 100644
index b78c5b4..0000000
--- a/contracts/docs-bundle.fixture.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema": "auths.docs.bundle/1",
-  "contractDigest": "45d10ec5590a27c699d861aeed78f6fa838093558701992902e9ebd2480f8f26",
-  "sourceCommit": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
-  "files": [
-    { "path": "contract.json", "sha256": "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855", "bytes": 1 }
-  ]
-}
diff --git a/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json b/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json
deleted file mode 100644
index ab01b34..0000000
--- a/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema": "auths.docs.contract/1",
-  "digest": "8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90",
-  "operations": [
-    { "id": "auths.operation.create/1" },
-    { "id": "auths.operation.delegate/1" },
-    { "id": "auths.operation.execute/1" },
-    { "id": "auths.operation.resume/1" },
-    { "id": "auths.operation.verify/1" }
-  ],
-  "scenarios": [
-    { "id": "auths.scenario.delegation/1" },
-    { "id": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1" },
-    { "id": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1" },
-    { "id": "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1" },
-    { "id": "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1" },
-    { "id": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1" },
-    { "id": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1" },
-    { "id": "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1" },
-    { "id": "auths.scenario.recovery/1" },
-    { "id": "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1" }
-  ],
-  "claims": [
-    { "id": "auths.claim.approval-binding/1", "statement": "Approval is bound to exact plan context and cannot authorize substituted plan bytes.", "status": "passing", "evidence": "bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json", "evidenceSha256": "a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331", "scope": "Maintained approval-plan signing requests, responses, and substitution fixtures.", "limitation": "The application remains responsible for approver identity, user experience, and organizational policy.", "reproduction": ["cargo xtask sdk-experience"] },
-    { "id": "auths.claim.attenuation/1", "statement": "Delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent under the maintained model and adversarial fixtures.", "status": "passing", "evidence": "formal/qualification.lean", "evidenceSha256": "fb1fd17d377194e96f98313412052f82fbb43cb594b12eb6a9fa0e0dce3ce70c", "scope": "Attenuation relations represented by the maintained formal model and protocol profile.", "limitation": "The claim covers the modelled fields and maintained protocol profile, not arbitrary application-defined semantics.", "reproduction": ["cargo xtask formal"] },
-    { "id": "auths.claim.bounded-disclosure/1", "statement": "Receipt inspection defaults to opaque or bounded views and requires authority for full disclosure.", "status": "passing", "evidence": "release/docs/runtime-facts-v1.json", "evidenceSha256": "3229ccc5a4adbcdfd4b55bdca58ab9e7e5c333719aeff3a0dba54976e6fef1f1", "scope": "Maintained receipt summary and disclosure operations and their public runtime contract.", "limitation": "Deployment retention, access control, and downstream handling remain application responsibilities.", "reproduction": ["cargo xtask product-conformance"] },
-    { "id": "auths.claim.closed-gateway/1", "statement": "Maintained product workflows reach provider adapters only through opaque native-authorized commands.", "status": "passing", "evidence": "release/semantic-freeze.json", "evidenceSha256": "75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3", "scope": "Maintained execution workflows and their opaque native command and gateway boundary.", "limitation": "Application-owned adapters can still be implemented unsafely outside the maintained boundary.", "reproduction": ["cargo xtask product-waist-conformance"] },
-    { "id": "auths.claim.cross-language-parity/1", "statement": "Maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python scenarios target identical stable semantic outcomes.", "status": "passing", "evidence": "release/docs/scenarios.toml", "evidenceSha256": "f056e57acb5dbad67ef5ed5076bdee388a82e73b7e6a6af53b82c226ccd552da", "scope": "The maintained installed-artifact scenarios declared for Rust, TypeScript, and Python.", "limitation": "Scenario parity covers maintained workflows and versions, not every possible application composition.", "reproduction": ["cargo xtask cross-language"] },
-    { "id": "auths.claim.lifecycle-state/1", "statement": "Maintained runtime paths preserve replay, use, budget, and recovery distinctions.", "status": "passing", "evidence": "bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json", "evidenceSha256": "a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331", "scope": "Maintained runtime and installed-SDK workflows for replay, use, budget, reservation, and recovery outcomes.", "limitation": "Production guarantees also depend on the selected durable store and its deployment.", "reproduction": ["cargo xtask sdk-experience"] },
-    { "id": "auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1", "statement": "Rust owns protocol meaning used by Rust, TypeScript, and Python projections.", "status": "passing", "evidence": "release/semantic-freeze.json", "evidenceSha256": "75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3", "scope": "The declared protocol and product semantic identities consumed by maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python surfaces.", "limitation": "The semantic freeze detects declared semantic drift; it is not a proof that every implementation is defect-free.", "reproduction": ["cargo xtask semantic-freeze"] },
-    { "id": "auths.claim.supply-chain/1", "statement": "The assessed release builder satisfies the recorded SLSA Build Level 3 requirements.", "status": "passing", "evidence": "release/slsa-build-level-3-assessment.json", "evidenceSha256": "49d5a096915d49058c8c66f29c5c7f59181caa0783d4724322068de6c5c3f6bf", "scope": "The assessed GitHub release builder and recorded SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 controls.", "limitation": "This is a repository-owner delegated build assessment, not an independent security audit or source-correctness proof.", "reproduction": ["cargo test -p xtask release_control::tests::checked_in_slsa_assessment_matches_builder_bytes"] }
-  ],
-  "runtimeFacts": {
-    "endpoints": [
-      { "id": "auths.endpoint.health/1", "outcomes": ["completed"] },
-      { "id": "auths.endpoint.version/1", "outcomes": ["completed"] },
-      { "id": "auths.endpoint.authorities/1", "outcomes": ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate"] },
-      { "id": "auths.endpoint.executions/1", "outcomes": ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate", "recoverable"] },
-      { "id": "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1", "outcomes": ["completed", "denied", "indeterminate", "recoverable", "not-found"] },
-      { "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1", "outcomes": ["completed", "not-found"] },
-      { "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1", "outcomes": ["completed", "denied", "not-found"] }
-    ]
-  }
-}
diff --git a/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md b/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md
index 5a25d51..bcd9061 100644
--- a/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md
+++ b/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md
@@ -5,231 +5,295 @@
 Auths documentation combines two kinds of work that change for different
 reasons:
 
-- **platform documentation** reports what a specific Auths release actually
-  exposes and proves; and
-- **editorial documentation** teaches a person why, when, and how to use those
+- **platform documentation** reports what a pinned Auths product revision
+  actually exposes; and
+- **editorial documentation** teaches a reader why, when, and how to use those
   capabilities.
 
-They appear together on the public site, but they do not share ownership. A
+The public site composes both lanes, but it does not blur their ownership. A
 released API must not depend on a writer remembering to update a copied
-signature. A useful guide must not be generated from docstrings and mistaken
-for good teaching.
+signature. A useful guide must not be generated from a symbol inventory and
+mistaken for teaching.
 
-This document defines the boundary between those systems and how they compose
-into one documentation product.
+The architecture deliberately keeps the content model small:
 
-## The two lanes
+- free-form MDX for authored explanations;
+- one explicit JSON registry for routes and navigation;
+- one immutable, checked-in snapshot for product truth;
+- a small set of MDX components for joining those sources; and
+- one build that validates and projects the result into every public format.
 
-### Platform documentation: automated product truth
+It does not use a typed editorial page DSL, versioned page identities, or a
+schema that forces every guide into the same template.
 
-Platform documentation is produced from installed, qualified Auths artifacts.
-It answers questions whose correct response is determined by a release:
+## The two source lanes
 
-- Which Rust, TypeScript, and Python operations exist?
-- What arguments, return types, errors, and version constraints do they have?
-- Which Runtime API routes, request fields, outcomes, profiles, and limits are
-  supported?
-- Which examples execute successfully against the installed SDKs?
-- Which assurance claims have current evidence and stated limitations?
-- Which semantic identities correspond across languages?
+### Platform documentation: immutable product truth
 
-Its source of truth belongs in `auths-proof`: public source documentation,
-runtime schemas, release metadata, conformance fixtures, executable scenarios,
-and assurance evidence. `auths-docs` consumes a checksum-addressed release
-bundle; it does not inspect a mutable sibling checkout during a qualified
-build.
+Platform documentation answers questions whose correct answer is determined
+by a particular Auths revision:
 
-Platform documentation is generated because software facts are safest when
-the software supplies them. Generated does not mean unreviewed. Changes are
-reviewed in the product repository, qualified against installed artifacts, and
-then projected into reference pages and fact-backed components.
+- Which TypeScript and Python public symbols exist?
+- Which Runtime API routes, outcomes, profiles, limits, and support boundaries
+  are declared?
+- Which stable error codes and protocol registries exist?
+- Which maintained recipes belong to the product?
+- Which conformance fixtures and formal-vector manifests are available?
+- Which assurance statements have evidence, and what are their limits?
 
-### Editorial documentation: human-authored understanding
+Those facts originate in `auths-proof`. The docs repository receives them
+through an explicit synchronization step and checks the result into
+`product-snapshot/`. A normal documentation build reads only that snapshot; it
+does not inspect a mutable sibling checkout.
 
-Editorial documentation is written and reviewed by people. It answers
-questions that require judgment:
+`product-snapshot/` contains several kinds of evidence:
+
+- the verified documentation bundle and its manifest;
+- installed TypeScript and Python API inventories;
+- Runtime SDK contracts and the stable error registry;
+- product-owned TypeScript and Python recipe source;
+- protocol and principal-adapter specifications; and
+- conformance and formal-vector manifests.
+
+`product-snapshot/snapshot.json` records the selected product revision, the
+documentation-contract revision, the contract digest, recipe digests, and the
+protocol inventory. Recipe files and bundle artifacts are verified before the
+site projects them.
+
+The snapshot currently records two revisions:
+
+- `sourceCommit` is the Auths product revision from which SDK surfaces,
+  recipes, protocol files, and product contracts were selected; and
+- `docsContractSourceCommit` is the revision that produced the documentation
+  bundle manifest.
+
+This split is temporary transition state while the documentation contract and
+the selected product work advance on separate branches. It is recorded
+explicitly so the site never pretends that two different revisions are one
+qualified release. A release snapshot should ultimately converge on one
+coherent product revision.
+
+### Editorial documentation: free-form authored understanding
+
+Editorial documentation answers questions that require judgment:
 
 - What should a new user do first?
-- Which integration path fits a REST API, an agent, or a production runtime?
-- Why are identity, authority, transport, and execution separate?
-- Which security boundary matters at this point in a workflow?
-- How should an operator respond to a provider-unknown outcome?
+- Which workflow fits a REST effect, an agent, or a production runtime?
+- Why are identity, authority, transport, approval, and execution separate?
+- Where does a retry become unsafe?
+- Which failure should stop an operator rather than trigger automation?
 - What is the simplest honest explanation of a sophisticated capability?
 
-Its source of truth belongs in `auths-docs`: explanations, page introductions,
-journey design, conceptual diagrams, recommendations, landing-page curation,
-and related-topic choices.
+The editorial source lives under `content-v2/**/*.mdx`. Pages use ordinary MDX
+so authors can choose the structure that best teaches the subject. The custom
+homepage is the one presentation exception: its structured copy lives in
+`content-v2/home.json`, is registered at `/`, and feeds both the custom JSX
+layout and its generated machine-readable projections. Page frontmatter is
+intentionally minimal:
 
-Editorial content may refer to product facts and tested scenarios by stable
-identity. It must not copy mutable signatures, endpoint inventories, version
-tables, expected outputs, or assurance status into prose.
+```yaml
+---
+title: Execute one exact action
+description: Bind authority to the exact effect that may reach a provider.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+```
 
-## Three block-level provenance classes
+The frontmatter describes the page; it does not define a page grammar. Prose,
+headings, tables, diagrams, callouts, and links remain normal editorial
+material.
 
-Every public semantic block has exactly one provenance class:
+## One route and navigation registry
 
-| Provenance | Owner | Typical content | How it enters a page |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| Generated fact | `auths-proof` release bundle | API signatures, fields, routes, errors, limits, profiles, versions, assurance status | A typed fact reference |
-| Tested scenario | Qualified scenario artifact | Commands, Rust/TypeScript/Python code, normalized results, adversarial outcomes | A scenario and optional step reference |
-| Editorial narrative | `auths-docs` | Explanations, recommendations, conceptual diagrams, transitions, page ordering | Authored content |
+`content-v2/navigation.json` is the sole source of truth for public content
+routes, top-navigation placement, documentation navigation, and ordering. It
+owns the homepage route and assigns each MDX source to exactly one route,
+section, and navigation group.
 
-The distinction is made at block level rather than page level. A guide can
-open with editorial explanation, render a tested three-language example, show
-a generated outcome table, and finish with editorial next steps. Each block
-still has one owner.
+The current primary destinations are:
 
-## Composition model
+- Start;
+- Guides;
+- Examples; and
+- Reference.
 
-```mermaid
-flowchart LR
-  subgraph Product["auths-proof · release truth"]
-    F["Generated facts"]
-    S["Qualified scenarios"]
-    E["Assurance evidence"]
-  end
+Conceptual material is grouped inside Guides rather than maintained as a
+separate top-level destination.
 
-  subgraph Docs["auths-docs · editorial intent"]
-    N["Narrative"]
-    J["Journeys and hierarchy"]
-    C["Curation"]
-  end
+File placement and frontmatter do not silently create or reorder routes. An
+MDX file is public only when the registry claims it, and every registered route
+must resolve to one source. Draft hierarchy files may help discussion, but
+they are not build inputs.
 
-  F --> B["Immutable docs bundle"]
-  S --> B
-  E --> B
-  B --> P["Strict page compiler"]
-  N --> P
-  J --> P
-  C --> P
-  P --> G["Verified page graph"]
-  G --> H["HTML"]
-  G --> M["Canonical Markdown"]
-  G --> X["Search and navigation"]
-  G --> A["Agent-readable surfaces"]
-```
+The registry drives all structural UI:
 
-The verified page graph is the sole publishable content model. HTML,
-Markdown, navigation, search, sitemaps, and LLM-facing outputs are projections
-of that graph. They must not maintain independent page inventories.
+- top-level documentation sections;
+- the complete left navigation for the current section;
+- active-page state;
+- breadcrumbs;
+- previous and next links;
+- route generation;
+- search metadata;
+- Markdown URLs; and
+- sitemap and agent-readable inventories.
 
-## Stable joins, not copied text
+`app/lib/docs-content.ts` is the runtime projection of this registry. It loads
+the MDX modules, rejects duplicate routes or sources, rejects incomplete
+frontmatter, rejects unregistered MDX, and provides the route graph consumed
+by the documentation shell. The page component does not maintain a second
+navigation tree.
 
-Authored pages declare the product identities they use. For example, a guide
-may depend on an operation, a scenario, a profile, and an assurance claim:
+## Components are truth joins, not page templates
 
-```yaml
-id: auths.page.get-started.quickstarts.local-rest-effect/1
-uses:
-  operations:
-    - auths.operation.authority.execute/1
-  scenarios:
-    - auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1
-  profiles:
-    - auths.profile.application.rest-effect/1
-  claims:
-    - auths.claim.exact-effect-commitment/1
+Editorial pages may include registered MDX components such as `Recipe`,
+`GeneratedReference`, `StableCodeTable`, `RuntimeEndpoints`, and
+`AssuranceClaims`. These components join editorial explanation to data in the
+pinned product snapshot.
+
+For example:
+
+```mdx
+<Recipe id="03-execute-exact-action" language="python" />
 ```
 
-The page selects those identities through registered components. The compiler
-resolves them against one release bundle and rejects unknown, missing, or
-incompatible identities. This makes an API change visible as a dependency
-change instead of allowing stale copied prose to survive.
+The page chooses the reader context and the recipe identity. The component
+selects the exact pinned source, verifies its digest, and presents its declared
+outcome without inventing runtime output. An author does not paste a mutable
+copy of the recipe into the page.
+
+Maintained source examples are projected as walkthroughs rather than one
+monolithic code dump. `content-v2/code-walkthroughs.json` maps exact pinned
+source ranges to short titles and explanations. Both the browser component and
+Markdown projector consume that same mapping, validate complete non-overlapping
+coverage, and reject tutorial steps over 20 lines.
+
+Markdown and generated tables share one accessible presentation component.
+Editorial provenance stays in MDX comments; the projector strips it before
+producing Markdown, search, or LLM surfaces. Dedicated audits fail on raw table
+bypasses, oversized unexplained tutorial code, or authoring instructions that
+escape into any public surface.
 
-Semantic identities are versioned when meaning changes. Pages do not reconnect
-to a new operation merely because its function name looks similar.
+This is the boundary between useful infrastructure and harmful abstraction:
 
-## Information architecture ownership
+- keep components and schemas that verify or render real product facts;
+- keep manifests, digests, API inventories, stable-code registries, and Runtime
+  contracts;
+- reject schemas that constrain prose into a universal page shape; and
+- reject page builders that manufacture headings, examples, or results merely
+  to satisfy a template.
 
-The top-level product sections are an editorial product decision:
+## Honest failure is part of the architecture
 
-- Get started
-- Identity & trust
-- Authority
-- Agents
-- Production operations
-- Developers
+The build distinguishes a declared recipe from a recipe that is demonstrably
+runnable against the pinned public surface. It must never turn an expected
+outcome string into fictional execution evidence.
 
-Reference and Assurance are cross-cutting lookup surfaces. They do not compete
-with the six primary journeys.
+The current Python `03-execute-exact-action` recipe demonstrates this rule. Its
+pinned source imports `verify_receipt` from the package root, while the pinned
+installed API inventory exports that operation from `auths.verify`. The
+projection retains the product-owned source for review and displays a
+**Qualification blocked** notice. It does not silently rewrite the import, hide
+the mismatch, or label the example executable.
 
-The hierarchy must be stored as a strict, typed registry rather than maintained
-independently in prose, route folders, landing cards, and sidebars. Each page
-declares a stable page identity, canonical path, owning section, parent,
-navigation group, order, and page type.
+That failure is useful product feedback. The product recipe must be corrected
+and re-executed in `auths-proof`; only then should a refreshed snapshot allow
+the docs to present it as runnable.
 
-From that registry, the site derives:
+## Composition and projection pipeline
 
-- top and left navigation;
-- breadcrumbs and previous/next links;
-- landing-page descendants;
-- canonical routes and sitemap entries;
-- search and agent indexes;
-- orphan and cycle reports; and
-- a readable hierarchy snapshot for planning and review.
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+  subgraph Product["auths-proof · product ownership"]
+    API["SDK and Runtime contracts"]
+    REC["Maintained recipes"]
+    PROTO["Protocol and evidence"]
+  end
 
-The six top-level sections should change rarely. Leaf pages and groupings can
-evolve as the product and its audience become better understood. The registry,
-not a planning Markdown file, is the live source of truth.
+  API --> SYNC["Explicit snapshot sync"]
+  REC --> SYNC
+  PROTO --> SYNC
+  SYNC --> SNAP["product-snapshot · immutable checked-in truth"]
 
-## What each repository owns
+  subgraph Editorial["auths-docs · editorial ownership"]
+    MDX["Editorial MDX and homepage content"]
+    NAV["content-v2/navigation.json"]
+  end
 
-| Concern | `auths-proof` | `auths-docs` |
+  SNAP --> BUILD["tools/content/build.mjs"]
+  MDX --> BUILD
+  NAV --> BUILD
+  BUILD --> MARKDOWN["Route Markdown and LLM text"]
+  BUILD --> DISCOVERY["Search, sitemap, manifests, discovery"]
+
+  SNAP --> SITE["MDX truth components"]
+  MDX --> GRAPH["app/lib/docs-content.ts"]
+  NAV --> GRAPH
+  GRAPH --> SITE
+  SITE --> HTML["Static-first documentation UI"]
+```
+
+`tools/content/build.mjs` validates the source set before generating public
+artifacts. It enforces one-to-one coverage between the navigation registry and
+MDX files, asserts that the application has only the custom homepage and
+canonical catch-all route owners, validates the product snapshot and recipe digests, resolves
+fact-backed MDX components, and creates:
+
+- a canonical Markdown twin for every route;
+- `search-index.json`;
+- `sitemap.xml`;
+- `llms.txt` and `llms-full.txt`;
+- `reference-manifest.json`;
+- `.well-known/auths-docs.json`; and
+- `robots.txt`.
+
+These files are outputs. They are never parallel editorial sources.
+
+## Ownership boundary
+
+| Concern | `auths-proof` owns | `auths-docs` owns |
 | --- | --- | --- |
-| Public SDK and Runtime API behavior | Defines and qualifies | Renders from bundle |
-| Public source documentation | Owns | Displays through generated reference |
-| Semantic identities and cross-language parity | Defines | Resolves |
-| Executable example source and expected outcome | Qualifies | Selects and contextualizes |
-| Assurance evidence and limitations | Produces | Presents |
-| Editorial prose and conceptual diagrams | Does not own | Authors and reviews |
-| Journey hierarchy and page ordering | Supplies typed constraints | Owns product choice |
-| Page compiler and visual components | Does not own | Implements |
-| HTML, Markdown, search, and navigation projections | Supplies inputs | Generates from one graph |
-| Release qualification | Produces immutable bundle | Verifies bundle and site candidate |
-
-## Rules that prevent the lanes from colliding
-
-1. If released software can make a statement false, represent it as a
-   generated fact or tested scenario.
-2. Editorial prose explains facts; it does not duplicate them.
-3. Public executable code comes from a qualified scenario, not a raw authored
-   code fence.
-4. Generated reference pages and generated Markdown are never edited by hand.
-5. Navigation, search, sitemap, Markdown, and HTML share one page registry and
-   page graph.
-6. `auths-docs` never imports mutable files from a neighboring `auths-proof`
-   checkout for a release build.
-7. A page may have only one canonical identity, route, owner, and parent.
-8. Cross-topic links are explicitly labelled **Related topics** and never hide
-   a missing page in the current journey.
-9. Assurance claims always display their evidence scope and limitation.
-10. Credentials, private keys, raw protected payloads, sealed commands, and
-    unrestricted receipt detail never enter documentation artifacts.
+| Public SDK behavior and exports | Definition, implementation, installed-artifact inventory | Pinned projection |
+| Runtime routes, outcomes, limits, profiles | Definition and release contract | Fact-backed presentation |
+| Protocol registries and stable error codes | Meaning and versioning | Rendering and explanation |
+| Recipe source and qualification | Maintained source, execution, expected outcome | Selection and teaching context |
+| Conformance and assurance evidence | Evidence and limitations | Presentation without overclaiming |
+| Editorial prose and conceptual diagrams | — | Authorship and review |
+| Route hierarchy and page ordering | — | `content-v2/navigation.json` |
+| Left navigation, breadcrumbs, next/previous | — | Derived from the route registry |
+| HTML, Markdown, search, sitemap, LLM surfaces | Supplies immutable inputs | Generates projections |
+
+If a software release can make a statement false, its source belongs in
+`auths-proof`. If the statement explains, recommends, compares, or orders a
+reader journey, its source belongs in `auths-docs`.
 
 ## Build-time failure boundaries
 
 The documentation build must fail when:
 
-- a page references an identity absent from its selected release bundle;
-- a page uses a fact or scenario it did not declare;
-- two pages claim the same identity or canonical path;
-- navigation has a missing parent, cycle, duplicate order, or orphan;
-- a generated fact is manually recreated in an editorial slot;
-- an executable example is not backed by a qualified scenario;
-- HTML and Markdown contain different semantic blocks;
-- an assurance claim has no current evidence or no limitation;
-- an internal link promises a reader job the destination does not fulfill; or
-- the bundle digest used to build the site differs from the qualified digest.
+- an MDX source is absent from `navigation.json`;
+- a route or MDX source appears more than once;
+- a registered source does not exist;
+- a section lacks its landing route;
+- a route escapes its owning section;
+- required frontmatter is missing or unsupported;
+- a product manifest, artifact digest, or recipe digest does not match;
+- an MDX truth component refers to an unknown product artifact;
+- a generated Markdown projection cannot preserve the page’s meaning; or
+- generated search, sitemap, discovery, and Markdown outputs cannot be created
+  from the same validated source set.
+
+Qualification and content audits add broader reader-facing checks: broken
+links, orphan routes, missing navigation, weak or empty pages, bash formatting,
+and misleading product claims.
 
 ## Deliberate exclusions
 
-This architecture does not use a runtime CMS, production database, or live API
+The site does not use a runtime CMS, production database, or live API
 introspection. Published documentation is static-first and release-pinned.
-Client-side code is limited to interaction such as navigation state, search,
-language synchronization, and copy actions.
+Client-side code is limited to useful interactions such as navigation state,
+search, synchronized language selection, and copy actions.
 
-Auths is prelaunch. When information architecture or product naming is wrong,
-the preferred response is a clean correction rather than compatibility routes,
+Auths is prelaunch. When the hierarchy, terminology, or product surface is
+wrong, the preferred response is a clean correction—not compatibility routes,
 deprecated documentation trees, or migration shims. Git history preserves the
-old design.
-
+discarded design.
diff --git a/docs/MAINTENANCE.md b/docs/MAINTENANCE.md
index 6e767e8..794c626 100644
--- a/docs/MAINTENANCE.md
+++ b/docs/MAINTENANCE.md
@@ -2,278 +2,319 @@
 
 ## Goal
 
-Maintain documentation that remains correct as Auths changes, stays coherent
-as the site grows, and remains useful to both people and agents without asking
-writers to synchronize the same fact across multiple files.
+Maintain documentation that stays correct as Auths changes, remains coherent
+as the site grows, and teaches real reader jobs without synchronizing the same
+fact across multiple files.
 
-The core maintenance rule is:
+The core rule is:
 
-> Change each fact at its owner, then regenerate every projection.
+> Change each fact at its owner, then rebuild every projection.
 
-Product facts change in `auths-proof`. Editorial explanations and journey
-choices change in `auths-docs`. HTML, Markdown, search, navigation, sitemaps,
-and LLM-facing indexes are outputs, not additional sources of truth.
+Product facts change in `auths-proof`. Editorial explanations and the route
+hierarchy change in `auths-docs`. HTML, Markdown, search, navigation, sitemaps,
+and LLM-facing indexes are outputs.
 
-Read [ARCHITECTURE.md](./ARCHITECTURE.md) before changing ownership boundaries.
+Read [ARCHITECTURE.md](./ARCHITECTURE.md) before changing an ownership
+boundary.
 
 ## Know what may be edited
 
-| Material | Edit directly? | Source of truth |
+| Material | Edit in `auths-docs`? | Source of truth |
 | --- | ---: | --- |
-| Public Rust, TypeScript, or Python signature | No, not in this repo | Public source/API contract in `auths-proof` |
+| Public TypeScript or Python symbol | No | Installed/public API contract in `auths-proof` |
 | Runtime route, field, outcome, profile, or limit | No | Runtime/release contract in `auths-proof` |
-| Executable code and expected result | No | Qualified scenario in `auths-proof` |
-| Assurance status, evidence, or limitation | No | Assurance release data in `auths-proof` |
-| Explanation, recommendation, conceptual diagram | Yes | Editorial source in `auths-docs` |
-| Landing-card selection and ordering | Yes | Typed information-architecture registry |
-| Canonical route, parent, group, and page type | Yes, once in the registry | Typed information-architecture registry |
-| Files under `public/` generated by documentation tools | No | Verified page graph and renderers |
-| Search index, sitemap, Markdown twin, LLM index | No | Generated from the verified page graph |
+| Stable error or protocol registry entry | No | Product registry in `auths-proof` |
+| Maintained recipe source or expected outcome | No | Recipe manifest and source in `auths-proof` |
+| Conformance or assurance evidence | No | Product evidence in `auths-proof` |
+| Explanation, recommendation, diagram, caveat | Yes | `content-v2/**/*.mdx`; homepage copy in `content-v2/home.json` |
+| Public route, section, group, and ordering | Yes, once | `content-v2/navigation.json` |
+| Product snapshot files | Only through the sync tool | Pinned `auths-proof` artifacts |
+| Files generated under `public/` | No | `tools/content/build.mjs` |
+
+Use a simple ownership test: **could a software release make this statement
+false?** If yes, it belongs in the product lane. If it explains a concept,
+recommends a path, or orders a reader journey, it belongs in the editorial
+lane.
+
+## Editorial authoring
+
+### Improve an existing page
+
+Edit its MDX source under `content-v2/`. Authors are free to choose the page
+structure that best teaches the subject. Do not introduce a schema merely to
+force a standard sequence of hero, cards, steps, and next actions.
+
+Keep frontmatter minimal and valid:
+
+```yaml
+---
+title: Verify authority
+description: Decide whether a proof authorizes an exact application action.
+status: prelaunch
+---
+```
 
-If the correct owner is unclear, use this test: **could a software release make
-this statement false?** If yes, it belongs in the platform lane. If it is an
-explanation, recommendation, or deliberate reader path, it belongs in the
-editorial lane.
+When a page needs product truth, use a registered MDX component. Do not paste
+an API inventory, stable-code table, maintained recipe, or claimed result into
+prose.
 
-## Routine change workflows
+After editing, regenerate the machine-readable projections and review both the
+rendered page and its route-level Markdown twin.
 
-### Change an SDK function or argument
+### Add a page
 
-1. Change and document the public surface in `auths-proof`.
-2. Update its semantic identity when meaning, not merely spelling, changes.
-3. Run installed-artifact extraction and cross-language qualification.
-4. Produce a new immutable documentation bundle.
-5. Update the pinned bundle in `auths-docs`.
-6. Regenerate reference and machine-readable surfaces.
-7. Review the affected-page report for editorial pages that depend on the
-   changed identity.
-8. Edit only explanations whose meaning changed; do not copy the new signature
-   into prose.
+1. Name the reader, their starting state, and the outcome the page delivers.
+2. Add one MDX file under `content-v2/` with minimal frontmatter.
+3. Register that source exactly once in `content-v2/navigation.json`.
+4. Place it in the section and group that match the reader journey.
+5. Add real commands, product-owned recipes, procedures, or worked examples
+   where the subject requires them.
+6. Give the reader an honest failure boundary and a useful next action.
+7. Run `npm run docs:build`; unregistered and multiply registered sources must
+   fail immediately.
+
+Do not infer the public URL from the file location. The registry is the route
+contract.
 
-The generated reference should update without hand-editing an MDX or JSON
-signature table.
+### Move, merge, or remove a page
+
+Auths is prelaunch, so correct the hierarchy cleanly:
 
-### Add a Runtime API endpoint, profile, error, or limit
+1. Change `content-v2/navigation.json` and the MDX sources in the same change.
+2. Update inbound editorial links to the chosen canonical route.
+3. Regenerate Markdown, search, sitemap, discovery, and LLM surfaces.
+4. Confirm that the old route is absent from both source and outputs.
+5. Run the audit to find orphans, broken links, and navigation regressions.
 
-Follow the same release-bundle path. Generated reference appears from the
-product contract. An editor separately decides whether the new surface merits
-a guide, landing card, integration path, or release note.
+Do not add compatibility aliases, duplicated pages, deprecated route trees, or
+redirect machinery unless post-launch policy explicitly requires them.
 
-Not every new API deserves a new top-level page. Reference completeness and
-editorial prominence are separate decisions.
+### Change the top-level hierarchy
 
-### Add or change an executable example
+The current four destinations—Start, Guides, Examples, and Reference—are an
+editorial product choice, not a protocol contract. Conceptual material lives
+inside Guides. Change the hierarchy when reader research or product
+positioning justifies it.
 
-1. Add the scenario to the qualified fixture system in `auths-proof`.
-2. Run it against every supported SDK named by the scenario.
-3. Normalize outcomes without erasing language-specific ergonomics.
-4. Publish the scenario with a stable identity and exact release provenance.
-5. Reference that identity from the editorial page.
-6. Render code and results with the shared code components.
+Make the change once in `content-v2/navigation.json`. The left navigation,
+breadcrumbs, previous/next links, route list, search metadata, sitemap, and
+Markdown inventory must all follow from that registry. Do not maintain a
+second route list in a planning document or page component.
 
-Do not paste a convenient snippet into editorial content. If code is important
-enough to teach, it is important enough to execute in qualification.
+## Product truth maintenance
 
-### Correct or improve an explanation
+### Change an SDK function, argument, or module
 
-Edit the editorial source in `auths-docs`. Preserve its fact and scenario
-references unless the dependency genuinely changes. Then run the documentation
-qualification suite and inspect both HTML and canonical Markdown.
+1. Change and document the public surface in `auths-proof`.
+2. Update the installed/public API contract and parity evidence there.
+3. Run the relevant product qualification.
+4. Produce a new documentation bundle from the selected product revision.
+5. Synchronize a fresh `product-snapshot/` into `auths-docs`.
+6. Run `npm run docs:build` to verify manifests, digests, and component joins.
+7. Review generated reference and every editorial page that uses the affected
+   product component.
+8. Edit prose only when its explanation or recommendation changed.
+
+The product snapshot can temporarily record separate `sourceCommit` and
+`docsContractSourceCommit` values. This is permitted only when the branches are
+explicitly different and both revisions are preserved. Never describe that
+state as one qualified release. Before publication, prefer a snapshot in which
+the documentation contract and selected product truth converge on the same
+release revision.
+
+### Refresh the checked-in product snapshot
+
+Generate an Auths documentation bundle from `auths-proof`, then run the
+explicit sync command from `auths-docs`:
 
-A wording-only change must not modify the selected product bundle or generated
-reference data.
+```bash
+node tools/content/sync-product-snapshot.mjs \
+  --bundle /absolute/path/to/docs-bundle \
+  --product /absolute/path/to/auths-proof
+```
 
-### Add a guide or conceptual page
+The sync verifies bundle digests, copies the selected product contracts,
+recipes, protocol files, and evidence, records their revisions and digests,
+and replaces `product-snapshot/` as one unit.
 
-1. Name the reader, their starting state, and the outcome they need.
-2. Choose the owning top-level section.
-3. Assign one stable page identity and canonical path.
-4. Declare its parent, navigation group, order, page type, and product
-   dependencies in the typed registry.
-5. Author the narrative using registered components.
-6. Use qualified scenario references for executable code.
-7. Add cross-section links only under an explicit **Related topics** heading.
-8. Verify breadcrumbs, active navigation, previous/next, Markdown actions, and
-   a useful next action.
+Review snapshot changes as product changes. A large unexplained diff, an
+unexpected revision, or a digest mismatch is a stop condition.
 
-Reject the page if it cannot name a distinct reader job. A generic page that
-only forwards readers elsewhere adds maintenance cost without adding clarity.
+### Add or change a recipe
 
-### Move, merge, or remove a page
+1. Maintain the recipe source and outcome contract in `auths-proof`.
+2. Execute and qualify it against the supported installed SDKs there.
+3. Refresh `product-snapshot/`.
+4. Update that recipe's exact source ranges and explanations in
+   `content-v2/code-walkthroughs.json`.
+5. Reference the recipe by ID from editorial MDX with `Recipe`.
+6. Let the component render the pinned source, short walkthrough steps, and
+   qualification state.
 
-Auths is prelaunch, so correct the hierarchy cleanly:
+Every non-empty recipe line must belong to exactly one walkthrough step, and a
+tutorial step may contain at most 20 source lines. The build verifies both
+rules against the pinned source. Do not copy a shorter version into MDX.
 
-1. Update the page registry once.
-2. Update inbound editorial references by stable page identity.
-3. Regenerate routes, navigation, sitemap, search, and machine surfaces.
-4. Confirm that the old path is absent from source and outputs.
-5. Record retained, merged, replaced, or removed identities in the current
-   migration report when a large hierarchy change is under review.
+Never convert a manifest’s `expected` string into fabricated console output.
+Expected behavior and observed execution evidence are different artifacts.
 
-Do not create compatibility aliases, deprecated route trees, or duplicated
-pages unless launch policy later requires them explicitly.
+The current Python recipe `03-execute-exact-action` is the model for handling a
+bad join honestly. The pinned source imports `verify_receipt` from `auths`, but
+the pinned public API exposes it from `auths.verify`. The build labels that
+projection **Qualification blocked**. Fix the import and re-execute the recipe
+in `auths-proof`, refresh the snapshot, and confirm the warning disappears.
+Do not patch the copied recipe in `auths-docs`.
 
-### Add another SDK language
+### Add a Runtime API fact, stable code, profile, or assurance claim
 
-1. Establish its parity mapping and installed-artifact extraction in
-   `auths-proof`.
-2. Extend qualified scenarios to the new language.
-3. Add the language to the shared language registry and code renderer.
-4. Regenerate reference, examples, search metadata, and Markdown.
-5. Review editorial prose only where language availability was discussed.
+Define and version the fact in `auths-proof`, include it in the product bundle
+or selected product contracts, refresh the snapshot, and render it with a
+fact-backed component. An editor separately decides whether the new fact needs
+a guide, explanation, landing-page link, or release note.
 
-The language selector is global page state. Individual code blocks do not own
-independent language inventories.
+Reference completeness and editorial prominence are separate decisions.
 
-## Keeping the hierarchy current
+## Maintaining truth components
 
-The hierarchy contains two different rates of change:
+Truth components are deliberately narrow joins between MDX and the pinned
+snapshot. When adding or changing one:
 
-- the six top-level product areas are durable product vocabulary and should
-  change rarely; and
-- topic groups and leaf pages should evolve as capabilities and reader needs
-  become clearer.
+1. identify the exact product artifact it consumes;
+2. validate its schema, revision, and digest before rendering;
+3. define how missing, incompatible, or unqualified data appears;
+4. implement equivalent HTML and Markdown projections;
+5. add a build failure for unknown component inputs; and
+6. keep reader-facing explanation in MDX rather than component code.
 
-The live hierarchy belongs in the typed page registry. Planning documents such
-as a proposed hierarchy are design inputs or generated snapshots, not parallel
-navigation sources.
+Keep schemas and contracts that prove real things: manifest shape, artifact
+hashes, API inventories, Runtime contracts, stable-code registries, and
+conformance evidence. Remove or reject schemas whose purpose is to make every
+editorial page look alike.
 
-Any hierarchy change must pass these checks:
+Ordinary Markdown tables and generated reference tables must use the shared
+`DocsTable` presentation. Author-only checklists and provenance belong in MDX
+comments, not visible prose. The table, code-example, and editorial-leakage
+audits enforce those boundaries across browser and machine-readable outputs.
 
-- every page occurs exactly once;
-- every non-root page has one existing parent in the same primary section;
-- there are no cycles, duplicate paths, duplicate sibling order values, or
-  orphans;
-- every landing-page primary card targets a descendant;
-- every non-landing page renders the complete local navigation and correct
-  active state;
-- breadcrumb and previous/next relationships derive from the same tree; and
-- cross-topic links are clearly distinguished from the current journey.
+## Generated outputs
 
-## Review ownership
+`npm run docs:build` reads `content-v2/navigation.json`, every registered MDX
+source, the registry-owned homepage content, and `product-snapshot/`. It
+validates one-to-one route coverage, rejects competing static page entrypoints,
+and produces:
 
-Use review routing based on what changed:
+- one `.md` twin per public route;
+- `search-index.json`;
+- `sitemap.xml`;
+- `llms.txt` and `llms-full.txt`;
+- `reference-manifest.json`;
+- `.well-known/auths-docs.json`; and
+- `robots.txt`.
 
-| Change | Required perspective |
-| --- | --- |
-| API, runtime fact, semantic identity | Product surface owner |
-| Executable or adversarial scenario | SDK/runtime owner and test owner |
-| Security or assurance claim | Security/assurance owner |
-| Operational procedure or runbook | Runtime operator |
-| Journey, hierarchy, or recommendation | Documentation product/editorial owner |
-| Renderer, schema, page compiler, release tooling | Documentation platform owner |
-| Visual or interactive behavior | Design and accessibility review |
+Never edit those outputs by hand. If an output is wrong, repair its MDX,
+navigation entry, product artifact, truth component, or projector, then
+regenerate it.
 
-One person may fill several roles before launch, but the review questions must
-remain distinct.
+At runtime, `app/lib/docs-content.ts` loads the same MDX source set and route
+registry. Shared page-shell components derive the left navigation,
+breadcrumbs, active state, and previous/next links. A page component must not
+hard-code its own route neighborhood.
 
-## Validation before every documentation change
+## Validation commands
 
-From `auths-docs`, run the smallest focused checks while editing, then the full
-qualification before publishing:
+Run the focused checks while editing:
 
 ```bash
+npm run docs:build
 npm run typecheck
 npm run lint
 npm run lint:bash
-npm run lint:ownership
-npm run test:contract
+```
+
+Build and inspect the static site:
+
+```bash
 npm run build
 ```
 
-Before release, run:
+Run the systematic page and navigation audit:
+
+```bash
+npm run audit:docs
+```
+
+Before publishing or calling a documentation revision complete, run the full
+qualification:
 
 ```bash
 npm run qualify
 ```
 
-Qualification must use the exact candidate bundle and source head. A preview
-that builds against an old fixture is useful for visual work but is not release
-evidence.
+`qualify` is the final gate, not a substitute for reading the documentation.
+It must be paired with an editorial review of the changed journeys.
 
-Inspect representative rendered pages after structural or component changes:
+## Review checklist
 
-- a top-level landing page;
-- a guide with Rust, TypeScript, and Python code;
-- SDK reference;
-- Runtime API reference;
-- an operations procedure;
-- an assurance page; and
-- their page-level and section-level Markdown twins.
+### For every page change
 
-Check desktop, collapsed-navigation, tablet, and mobile layouts. Language
-selection, copy actions, keyboard navigation, focus states, and reduced-motion
-behavior must remain usable.
+- Does the page answer one distinct reader question?
+- Does it contain enough concrete code, procedure, or worked reasoning for
+  that question?
+- Are product facts rendered from the snapshot rather than copied into prose?
+- Are caveats and stop conditions visible before a dangerous action?
+- Does the full left navigation remain present?
+- Do breadcrumbs and previous/next links match the registry?
+- Does the route-level Markdown preserve the same useful meaning?
+- Are next actions specific and relevant?
 
-## Release maintenance
+### For structural changes
 
-For every Auths release:
+- Does every MDX source appear exactly once in `navigation.json`?
+- Is every registered route unique and inside its section?
+- Does every section register its own landing page?
+- Are there no orphaned routes or generic cards leading to unrelated pages?
+- Do search, sitemap, discovery, and LLM indexes contain the same page set?
+- Do desktop, collapsed-navigation, tablet, and mobile layouts remain usable?
 
-1. Build and qualify the product documentation bundle from installed artifacts.
-2. Verify its checksum and semantic identities in `auths-docs`.
-3. Generate the affected-page report.
-4. Review changed facts, scenarios, evidence, and limitations.
-5. Regenerate the complete verified page graph and all projections.
-6. Crawl the candidate site and validate every internal HTML, Markdown,
-   download, search, sitemap, and manifest target.
-7. Confirm there are no orphan pages or misleading landing cards.
-8. Publish the product artifacts and matching documentation atomically, or keep
-   the previous pair live.
-9. Retain the bundle digest and source revisions in release evidence.
+### For product-backed changes
 
-Never publish documentation that describes a product head different from the
-artifacts users can install.
+- Does the snapshot identify the intended product and documentation-contract
+  revisions?
+- Do all bundle and recipe digests verify?
+- Is observed qualification kept distinct from declared expected behavior?
+- Are blocked or prelaunch capabilities labelled honestly?
+- Are assurance claims accompanied by evidence scope and limitations?
 
 ## Periodic editorial maintenance
 
 Automation can prove consistency, not usefulness. On a regular cadence:
 
 - review search terms that produce no useful result;
-- run unfamiliar-reader tasks through each top-level section;
-- inspect whether first-step pages contain real code or procedures;
-- verify that recommended paths still represent the simplest product surface;
-- remove pages that duplicate another reader job;
+- ask an unfamiliar reader to complete the Start journeys;
+- inspect whether guides reach working code or an operational procedure early;
+- remove pages that repeat another reader job;
+- verify that landing cards describe their destination accurately;
 - review security language for accidental overclaiming;
-- review assurance limitations alongside claims;
-- check external links and integration guidance against primary sources; and
-- revisit the hierarchy based on actual reader behavior, not page count.
-
-Before launch, a monthly editorial review is sufficient unless product naming
-or the public surface is changing rapidly. Review the top-level taxonomy as a
-product decision, not as routine copy editing.
-
-## Preventing stale content
+- revisit the hierarchy using reader behavior and support questions; and
+- check external integration guidance against primary sources.
 
-Treat these as defects:
-
-- a signature or endpoint copied into prose;
-- an example that is not executable in qualification;
-- a generated file changed by hand;
-- two navigation sources that must be kept synchronized;
-- a landing card pointing to a generic or unrelated destination;
-- a page with no owning journey or useful next action;
-- a claim without evidence scope and limitation;
-- prose that confuses identity, transport, approval, or delivery with
-  authority; and
-- a page whose Markdown twin omits meaningful content from HTML.
-
-When a fact appears stale, repair its source and pipeline. Do not patch only the
-rendered page.
+Page count is not a success metric. A smaller set of truthful, connected pages
+is better than a large template-complete site that cannot help someone ship.
 
 ## Security and privacy hygiene
 
-Documentation, examples, fixtures, screenshots, logs, and search indexes must
-not contain:
+Documentation, recipes, fixtures, screenshots, logs, generated Markdown, and
+search indexes must not contain:
 
 - private keys or provider credentials;
 - live OAuth tokens, cookies, certificates, or signed production requests;
 - raw protected business payloads;
-- sealed commands or unrestricted receipt detail;
+- sealed commands or unrestricted receipt details;
 - customer identifiers or production topology; or
-- authorized disclosure data presented as a default receipt view.
+- full authorized disclosures presented as the default receipt view.
 
 Use deterministic synthetic identities and bounded fixtures. Receipt examples
-default to opaque or summary disclosure. Full views require an explicit
+default to opaque or summary disclosure. A full view requires an explicit
 teaching purpose and synthetic data.
 
 ## Emergency corrections
@@ -283,26 +324,26 @@ claim:
 
 1. remove or correct the unsafe public content immediately;
 2. revoke or rotate any exposed credential outside the documentation workflow;
-3. identify whether the defect originated in product truth, scenario data,
-   editorial source, or a renderer;
-4. repair the owner and regenerate all projections;
+3. identify whether the defect originated in product truth, recipe source,
+   editorial MDX, a truth component, or a projector;
+4. repair the owner and regenerate every output;
 5. add a regression check at the boundary that failed; and
-6. record the affected releases and public interval.
+6. record the affected public interval.
 
-Do not preserve a known-dangerous page merely to keep a release pair perfectly
-synchronized.
+Do not preserve known-dangerous content merely to keep a snapshot and site
+revision synchronized.
 
 ## Definition of maintained
 
 A documentation change is complete when:
 
-- the fact or narrative was changed at its proper owner;
-- stable dependencies resolve against one immutable release bundle;
+- the fact or narrative changed at its proper owner;
+- every MDX source and public route has one registry entry;
+- the selected product snapshot and all digests verify;
 - generated and editorial content have unambiguous provenance;
-- HTML and Markdown communicate the same meaning;
-- navigation and links derive from the canonical page graph;
-- relevant code or procedures are qualified, not illustrative fiction;
+- HTML and Markdown communicate the same useful meaning;
+- navigation, breadcrumbs, and previous/next links derive from the registry;
+- recipes and product claims expose their real qualification state;
 - security boundaries and limitations remain explicit;
-- the full qualification suite passes; and
-- the published site corresponds to the installable Auths release.
-
+- the documentation build, audits, and qualification pass; and
+- a human review confirms that the affected reader journey is actually useful.
diff --git a/docs/feedback/DOCUMENTATION_REBUILD_SPEC.md b/docs/feedback/DOCUMENTATION_REBUILD_SPEC.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..47ce0ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/feedback/DOCUMENTATION_REBUILD_SPEC.md
@@ -0,0 +1,901 @@
+# Auths documentation rebuild specification
+
+## Status
+
+Implementation specification for a clean rebuild of `auths-docs`.
+
+This document is deliberately self-contained. It is written for an implementation agent with no prior conversation context. Read it completely before changing files.
+
+## Mission
+
+Rebuild the Auths documentation so a developer can:
+
+1. understand what Auths does and does not do;
+2. run a real TypeScript, Python, or Rust workflow without filling in missing code;
+3. adopt the high-level SDK without learning protocol internals first;
+4. progressively descend into authority, verification, execution, receipts, adapters, canonical encoding, and conformance;
+5. evaluate production requirements honestly; and
+6. inspect complete, accurate API and protocol reference material.
+
+The current site has a promising visual shell and an over-engineered content pipeline, but it is not an acceptable source of developer truth. This work is a clean replacement, not an incremental expansion of the current page graph.
+
+## Repositories and authority
+
+Workspace root:
+
+```text
+/Users/bordumb/workspace/repositories/auths-proof-base
+```
+
+Documentation repository to change:
+
+```text
+/Users/bordumb/workspace/repositories/auths-proof-base/auths-docs
+```
+
+Product repository to inspect but not modify unless separately requested:
+
+```text
+/Users/bordumb/workspace/repositories/auths-proof-base/auths-proof
+```
+
+Before implementation:
+
+1. Read `auths-proof/AGENTS.md` in full.
+2. Read `auths-proof/docs/target-state/PROFILE_AND_DOMAIN_ABSTRACTION_BOUNDARY_PLAN.md` in full.
+3. Check both repositories for uncommitted changes and preserve all unrelated user work.
+4. Treat the current `auths-proof` checkout as the source of product truth.
+5. Re-check every source line cited below before finalizing documentation. The line numbers in this specification identify the current checkout and may shift after product changes.
+
+## Non-negotiable product truths
+
+The rebuilt documentation must preserve these facts:
+
+- Auths is an open protocol and SDK for proof-carrying, bounded machine authority. Source: `auths-proof/README.md:3`.
+- The sealed core pipeline is `untrusted bytes -> DecodedProof -> ResolvedProof -> ControlVerifiedProof -> VerifiedAuthority -> VerifiedAction`. Source: `auths-proof/README.md:16-24`.
+- The portable boundary is `verify_v1(proof_cbor, canonical_action_cbor, trusted_context_cbor) -> verification_result_cbor`. Source: `auths-proof/README.md:27-32` and `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/verification-algorithm.md:108-134`.
+- Core verification is deterministic and effect-free. Network, filesystem, clocks, databases, replay state, budgets, custody, and execution remain outside the kernel. Source: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md:9-19` and `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/verification-algorithm.md:136-150`.
+- Identity, successful transport, signature validity, evidence presence, and approval are not independently authorization.
+- Authority may be preserved or narrowed through delegation and must never be amplified. Source: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md:65-85`.
+- `Denied` and `Indeterminate` are distinct but both non-executable. Source: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md:173-216` and `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/error-codes.md:12-77`.
+- Execution must use the verified canonical action or a closed profile projection, never an unverified lookalike request. Source: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md:133-151`.
+- The repository is prelaunch and pre-audit. Source: `auths-proof/README.md:122-124`.
+- The TypeScript package reports publication and promotion as blocked. Source: `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/README.md:96-106`.
+- The development composition uses ephemeral keys and in-memory state and is not production durable. Source: `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/README.md:77-86` and `auths-proof/bindings/python/README.md:76-85`.
+- The currently qualified public profile in the binding topology is `auths.mcp/1`. Source: `auths-proof/bindings/public-topology-v1.json:30-31`.
+
+Do not soften, omit, or bury these statements.
+
+## Definition of success
+
+The rebuild is successful when an unfamiliar developer can complete these tasks from the published documentation alone:
+
+1. Install the TypeScript or Python SDK and execute one allowed MCP tool.
+2. Observe that an undeclared tool is denied before the provider is called.
+3. Delegate narrower authority and observe exact replay and widening denial.
+4. Verify an existing proof without receiving an execution capability.
+5. Understand the difference between denial, indeterminacy, provider uncertainty, and exact replay.
+6. Understand what must change before a development composition is production-ready.
+7. Find the exact public API surface for their language.
+8. Find the protocol algorithm, stable codes, registries, limits, adapters, and canonical format.
+9. Choose a real demo based on the security or integration question it answers.
+
+Success is measured by runnable tasks and accurate answers, not page count, schema coverage, semantic identity count, or generated file count.
+
+## Clean-break teardown
+
+### Principle
+
+Remove machinery that constrains the new documentation around the current low-quality content model. Do not preserve it for compatibility. Auths is prelaunch, and the documentation should make a direct cutover to one coherent implementation.
+
+### Remove
+
+Delete or replace all of the following:
+
+1. `auths-docs/schemas/`
+   - Remove the page, topic, tour, runbook, and documentation contract schemas.
+   - Do not replace them with another elaborate content DSL.
+
+2. Fixture product contracts:
+   - `auths-docs/contracts/product-contract.fixture.json`
+   - `auths-docs/contracts/docs-bundle.fixture.json`
+   - The latter currently carries a zero source commit at `docs-bundle.fixture.json:4`; it must never be presented as release provenance.
+
+3. Schema-shaped page generation and templating:
+   - `auths-docs/content/page-builders.ts`
+   - `auths-docs/content/pages.json`
+   - `auths-docs/content/*-pages.json`
+   - `auths-docs/content/*-pages.ts`
+   - `auths-docs/content/topic-landings.json`
+   - `auths-docs/content/tours.json`
+   - `auths-docs/content/runbooks.json`
+   - `auths-docs/content/adoption-pages.json`
+   - `auths-docs/content/agent-integration-pages.json`
+
+   The current builder repeats labels such as “Run the qualified path” (`content/page-builders.ts:26`) and forces dozens of pages into identical shells. The new system must allow each page to use the structure its reader job needs.
+
+4. Fixture-backed content graph code:
+   - `auths-docs/app/lib/content-graph.ts`, which imports the fixture contract at line 13.
+   - Any graph, route, or provenance code whose only purpose is satisfying the removed schemas.
+
+5. Misleading reference generation:
+   - `auths-docs/tools/render-markdown/generate-sdk-reference.mjs`
+   - It imports a fixture at line 4 and emits only an operation identity at line 28.
+   - `auths-docs/app/components/SdkReference.tsx` currently hardcodes the reference inventory at line 37 and fabricated result projections beginning at lines 77, 117, 164, 203, and 242.
+
+6. Ceremonial example qualification:
+   - Replace `auths-docs/tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs`.
+   - Its current checks only prove that source strings are non-empty (`auths-docs/tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs:20` and `auths-docs/tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs:43`) and that a JSON outcome contains an expected label (`auths-docs/tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs:23`).
+   - Remove hardcoded seven-quickstart assertions at `auths-docs/tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs:26`.
+
+7. Fabricated quickstart generation:
+   - Replace `auths-docs/examples/quickstarts.ts`.
+   - It currently emits the nonexistent stable code `action_mismatch` at line 28, uses undefined `canonicalInput` at line 123, and undefined `prohibitedAction` at line 139.
+   - Replace `auths-docs/app/components/QuickstartPage.tsx` result fabrication at lines 28-29.
+   - Remove or correct the “Download exact project” claim at line 36. A JSON snippet manifest is not a project.
+
+8. Generated public Markdown that is merely an output of the removed system.
+   - Delete and regenerate it from the new authored content.
+   - Do not hand-preserve old pages simply to avoid broken routes.
+
+9. Tests that assert only the presence of marketing strings, schema identities, page counts, or fixture digests.
+   - Replace them with task, link, rendering, accessibility, source-accuracy, and executable-example tests.
+
+### Keep only after review
+
+The agent may reuse small presentational components if they remain useful after the content model is removed:
+
+- syntax highlighting;
+- copy buttons;
+- synchronized language tabs;
+- search dialog;
+- header, footer, and responsive shell;
+- basic code/result panels.
+
+Reuse is not required. Do not let an existing component dictate page structure.
+
+### New content architecture
+
+Use ordinary Markdown or MDX files as the primary source. Keep metadata minimal:
+
+```yaml
+title: Execute one exact action
+description: Protect one MCP tool and prove an undeclared tool never reaches the provider.
+order: 10
+status: prelaunch
+```
+
+Only `title` and `description` are required. `order` and `status` are optional. Do not require semantic page identities, provenance blocks, declared fact dependencies, scenario identities, depth enums, owner enums, or rigid section arrays.
+
+Use one simple navigation file or directory ordering. The navigation representation must be understandable without reading a schema implementation.
+
+## Target information architecture
+
+Use four primary destinations:
+
+```text
+Home
+├── Start
+│   ├── TypeScript quickstart
+│   ├── Python quickstart
+│   ├── Rust offline verification
+│   └── Choose an integration path
+├── Guides
+│   ├── Authenticate identity
+│   ├── Verify existing authority
+│   ├── Execute one exact action
+│   ├── Delegate to an agent
+│   ├── Approvals and ordered plans
+│   ├── Replay, recovery, and reconciliation
+│   ├── Receipts and disclosure
+│   ├── Production integration
+│   └── Build and qualify adapters
+├── Examples
+│   ├── Minimal and offline
+│   ├── Agents and collaboration
+│   ├── Infrastructure and data
+│   ├── Payments
+│   └── Identity and transport
+└── Reference
+    ├── TypeScript SDK
+    ├── Python SDK
+    ├── Rust crates and facade
+    ├── Protocol V1
+    ├── Verification algorithm
+    ├── Stable results and errors
+    ├── Registries and adapters
+    ├── Limits and canonical encoding
+    └── Conformance and fixtures
+```
+
+Do not create separate top-level product universes for Agents, Identity, Authority, Operations, Assurance, and Developers. Those are subjects and reader journeys beneath the four destinations, not seven competing starting points.
+
+Target initial size: approximately 25-35 substantive pages. Add a page only when it owns a distinct reader job. Prefer one complete page over five 150-word fragments.
+
+## UX specification
+
+### Design character
+
+The site should feel calm, exact, and practical. “Stripe-like” means:
+
+- outcome first;
+- runnable code immediately available;
+- excellent typography and spacing;
+- exhaustive reference when requested;
+- clear next steps;
+- restrained visual decoration;
+- progressive disclosure through links and page hierarchy;
+- precise status, error, and availability labels.
+
+It does not mean copying Stripe colors, manufacturing API examples, or presenting a terminal/dashboard aesthetic without substance.
+
+### Homepage
+
+```text
++------------------------------------------------------------------+
+| Auths Docs                 Start  Guides  Examples  Reference     |
+|                                              Search     GitHub    |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| PRELAUNCH · PRE-AUDIT                                            |
+|                                                                  |
+| Give software authority for one exact action.                    |
+| Auths verifies bounded authority, executes through a closed      |
+| profile, and leaves a verifiable receipt.                        |
+|                                                                  |
+| [TypeScript quickstart] [Python quickstart] [Understand Auths]    |
+|                                                                  |
+| Choose your path                                                 |
+| [Execute an action] [Verify only] [Delegate to an agent]         |
+|                                                                  |
+| What Auths does not do                                           |
+| Identity, transport, a signature, or approval alone is not       |
+| authorization. Development mode is not production durable.      |
++------------------------------------------------------------------+
+```
+
+Requirements:
+
+- Display `prelaunch`, `pre-audit`, and publication status above the fold.
+- Do not use a fictional “live authority” projection.
+- Do not display fabricated digests, countdowns, actors, receipt IDs, or verification badges.
+- Use real code or no code.
+- Keep the hero to one screen at common laptop widths.
+
+### Guide page
+
+```text
++----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
+| Guides               | Execute one exact action                  |
+| - Verify              |                                          |
+| - Execute [active]    | What you will build                      |
+| - Delegate            | Install                                  |
+| - Plans               | [TypeScript] [Python]                    |
+| - Recovery            | real, complete, copyable code            |
+|                       |                                          |
+|                       | Expected result                          |
+|                       | Failure to try                           |
+|                       | What Auths enforced                      |
+|                       | Production changes                       |
+|                       | Next: delegation / reference             |
++----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
+```
+
+Every high-level guide must contain:
+
+1. the concrete outcome;
+2. prerequisites and exact install command;
+3. complete imports and setup;
+4. one runnable happy path;
+5. expected output copied from an actual run;
+6. one meaningful fail-closed path;
+7. an explanation of the protected boundary;
+8. production differences;
+9. links to the exact public symbols used; and
+10. links to deeper concepts.
+
+### Reference page
+
+```text
++----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
+| TypeScript SDK       | Auths.execute                             |
+| Search symbols       | Execute one action or ordered plan.       |
+| Root                 |                                           |
+| Identity             | Signature / overloads                    |
+| Verify               | Parameters                               |
+| Profiles             | Result variants                          |
+| Integrations         | Errors and recovery                      |
+| Framework            | Security notes                           |
+| Testkit              | Minimal example                          |
++----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
+```
+
+Reference requirements:
+
+- Use the real public package/module topology.
+- Document symbols, not only five conceptual verbs.
+- Include exact signatures, parameter types, result variants, lifecycle ownership, exceptions/errors, security constraints, and examples.
+- Search and filtering must operate on actual symbols.
+- Reference pages may be generated, but only from installed artifacts or checked-in public API declarations—not fixtures invented in `auths-docs`.
+
+### Visual system
+
+- Retain the warm paper/ink/green direction if desired, but reduce oversized headings and unused whitespace.
+- Main article measure: approximately 720-800px.
+- Code may use a wider two-column layout only where it materially helps comparison.
+- Desktop header navigation must not collide at 1280px.
+- Mobile must preserve content order, language selection, code scrolling, and navigation access.
+- Do not show internal publishing labels such as `Editorial`, semantic page IDs, contract digests, or scenario IDs in the primary reading flow.
+- Show source provenance only in a quiet “Source and verification” footer when it is useful.
+- Color must never be the only distinction between authorized, denied, indeterminate, recoverable, and failed.
+
+## Content specification and source map
+
+The following pages are required. Each source note points to the current `auths-proof` checkout.
+
+### 1. Product overview: “What is Auths?”
+
+Purpose: explain the product in plain language before protocol vocabulary.
+
+Required content:
+
+- the core claim;
+- why exact action binding matters;
+- identity versus authority;
+- the four planes;
+- the sealed path from bytes to verified action;
+- what remains outside the kernel;
+- prelaunch and pre-audit status.
+
+Sources:
+
+- `auths-proof/README.md:3-41` — product claim, pipeline, portable boundary, and explicit verifier inputs.
+- `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md:21-44` — proof, evidence, execution, and control planes.
+- `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md:173-216` — decisions and outer execution gates.
+- `auths-proof/README.md:122-124` — prelaunch and pre-audit warning.
+
+### 2. TypeScript quickstart
+
+Base this page on the maintained recipe, not the current `auths-docs` REST snippets.
+
+Sources:
+
+- `auths-proof/bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts:1-32` — complete imports, provider, allowed execution, receipt verification, denial, provider-call assertion, and cleanup.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/README.md:48-63` — public entry points.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/src/integrations.ts:115-141` — development and production compositions.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/src/profiles/mcp/index.ts:435-466` — `mcp`, development provider, authority, and action constructors.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/src/product.ts:44-124` — result shapes and execution references.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/src/product.ts:128-181` — `Auths` execute, resume, and delegate surface.
+
+The quickstart must show the real imports from `/verify`, `/integrations`, and `/profiles`. Do not import these from the package root.
+
+### 3. Python quickstart
+
+Sources:
+
+- `auths-proof/bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py:1-50` — maintained workflow.
+- Correct the recipe’s current receipt import if the product public API still places it under `auths.verify`; verify against `auths-proof/bindings/python/api/public-api.txt:40-77` before publishing.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/python/README.md:40-55` — public module topology.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/python/README.md:70-88` — resource ownership, production boundary, and doctor command.
+
+### 4. Rust offline verification quickstart
+
+This is the low-level first step. Do not pretend the Rust facade is the same API shape as the TypeScript/Python stateful product workflow.
+
+Sources:
+
+- `auths-proof/demos/offline-verification/README.md:1-14` — supported external-consumer example and run command.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-proof/src/lib.rs:1-30` — `Engine::verify_cbor` example and exhaustive verdict handling.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-proof/src/lib.rs:54-181` — engine, verdict, explanation, and result types.
+
+### 5. Authenticate identity without authorization
+
+Sources:
+
+- `auths-proof/bindings/recipes/typescript/01-authenticate-identity.ts:1-38`.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/recipes/python/01_authenticate_identity.py:1-57`.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/README.md:65-69`.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/python/README.md:58-62`.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-identity/src/lib.rs:1-15` for the transport- and algorithm-independent boundary.
+
+The page must explicitly say that successful identity authentication grants no capability and authorizes no effect.
+
+### 6. Verify existing authority
+
+Sources:
+
+- `auths-proof/bindings/recipes/typescript/02-verify-authority.ts:1-23`.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/recipes/python/02_verify_authority.py:1-34`.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/README.md:71-75`.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/python/README.md:64-68`.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-verifier/src/lib.rs:888-989` for portable entry points.
+
+Show the three byte inputs, authorized result, changed-action rejection, and why verification returns no effect-capable handle in the language bindings.
+
+### 7. Delegate to an agent
+
+Sources:
+
+- `auths-proof/bindings/recipes/typescript/04-delegate-to-agent.ts:1-29`.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/recipes/python/04_delegate_to_agent.py:1-58`.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-author/src/lib.rs:439-625` — authority diffs and `plan_child_grant`.
+- `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md:65-85` — grant attenuation.
+
+Explain narrow authority, expiry, exact replay, denial of broader tools, and why the provider call count remains one.
+
+### 8. Approvals and ordered plans
+
+Sources:
+
+- `auths-proof/bindings/recipes/typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts:1-126`.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/recipes/python/05_cross_organization_plan.py:1-160`.
+- `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md:108-131` — authorization plan semantics.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-author/src/lib.rs:627-896` — plan builder and plan commitments.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-composition/src/lib.rs:16-110` — three-valued branch evaluation.
+
+Cover exact plan membership and order, threshold approval, partial completion, restart, reconciliation, and cross-language receipt verification.
+
+### 9. Replay, recovery, and ambiguous provider outcomes
+
+Sources:
+
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/src/product.ts:75-124` — sealed execution references and recovery results.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/docs/errors-and-recovery.md:1-27` — retry classes and outcome handling; verify every named symbol against the current public API before reusing prose.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/python/docs/INTEGRATION_RECIPES.md:13-20` — atomic reservation requirements.
+- `auths-proof/demos/cross-company-incident-response/README.md:104-125` — attack lab and ambiguous provider cases.
+- `auths-proof/demos/cross-company-incident-response/docs/architecture.md:53-66` — reserve, credential, provider, and reconciliation order.
+
+Provide a decision table:
+
+| Outcome | Provider may have been reached? | Safe next action |
+|---|---:|---|
+| denied | no | change request or authority |
+| indeterminate | no | supply trustworthy missing facts |
+| exact replay | already completed | return recorded result; do not re-enter provider |
+| recoverable | possibly | resume the same execution reference |
+| provider unknown | yes | reconcile; do not blindly retry |
+
+### 10. Receipts and disclosure
+
+Sources:
+
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/api/public-api.txt:58-95` — verification, receipt, inspection, and disclosure symbols.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/python/api/public-api.txt:40-77` — Python receipt surface.
+- `auths-proof/demos/cross-company-incident-response/README.md:142-164` — public, summary, and full views.
+- `auths-proof/demos/cross-company-incident-response/docs/architecture.md:34-51` — disclosure boundary.
+
+Explain decision versus execution receipts, integrity verification, inert inspection, commitment-only public views, authorized disclosure, and application responsibility for retention and access control.
+
+### 11. Production integration
+
+Sources:
+
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/README.md:77-94`.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/python/README.md:70-88`.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/docs/production-integration.md:1-27`; validate all symbols before reuse.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/python/docs/INTEGRATION_RECIPES.md:3-44` — custody, atomic reservation, transport, qualified profiles, and composition.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/docs/threat-model.md:20-67` — trust boundaries and protected assets.
+
+The page must distinguish development conveniences from production requirements:
+
+- durable atomic state;
+- signer custody;
+- qualified closed profile;
+- provider credential acquisition after authorization and reservation;
+- reconciliation;
+- receipt storage and disclosure controls;
+- observability without secret leakage;
+- supported runtime and release pinning.
+
+Do not claim a production-ready hosted service unless there is a release-qualified deployable service and an exact deployment procedure.
+
+### 12. Adapter authoring and qualification
+
+Sources:
+
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/docs/adapter-authoring.md:1-29`.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/python/docs/INTEGRATION_RECIPES.md:3-44`.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-ports/src/lib.rs:194-456` — principal, signature, matcher, profile, budget, status, and assurance ports.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/public-topology-v1.json:30-31` — public framework contracts and qualified profiles.
+
+Document supported extension contracts separately from internal implementation mechanisms. Include the relevant `testkit` conformance functions from `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/api/public-api.txt:143-176` and `auths-proof/bindings/python/api/public-api.txt:115-135`.
+
+### 13. Authority model
+
+This must be a substantive conceptual chapter, not four paragraphs.
+
+Sources:
+
+- Trust anchors: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md:48-63`.
+- Grants: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md:65-85`.
+- Action constraints: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md:87-106`.
+- Plans: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md:108-131`.
+- Action envelopes: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md:133-151`.
+- Trust-anchor type: `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-model/src/lib.rs:3202-3319`.
+- Authoring: `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-author/src/lib.rs:35-129`, `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-author/src/lib.rs:350-625`, and `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-author/src/lib.rs:898-1039`.
+
+Use worked examples showing a parent authority, a valid narrower child, and rejected widening along each important dimension.
+
+### 14. Verification model
+
+Sources:
+
+- Inputs: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/verification-algorithm.md:3-22`.
+- Decode: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/verification-algorithm.md:26-33`.
+- Resolution: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/verification-algorithm.md:35-42`.
+- Principal control: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/verification-algorithm.md:44-66`.
+- Authority branches: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/verification-algorithm.md:68-89`.
+- Plan evaluation: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/verification-algorithm.md:91-106`.
+- Action binding: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/verification-algorithm.md:108-134`.
+- Determinism: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/verification-algorithm.md:152-164`.
+- Staged Rust types: `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-verifier/src/lib.rs:100-296`.
+- Stage entry points: `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-verifier/src/lib.rs:1230-1652`.
+
+Include a single clear diagram of the stages and link each stage to stable failure codes.
+
+### 15. Decisions, errors, and safe responses
+
+Sources:
+
+- `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/error-codes.md:6-96`.
+- `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-model/src/lib.rs:4122-4579` — stage, decision, code, portable result, denial, and requirement types.
+- `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/src/product.ts:44-124` — product result variants.
+
+Generate the stable-code table from the authoritative core list or validate a curated table against it. Never invent underscore-separated aliases such as `action_mismatch`; the current code uses values such as `action-body-mismatch` at `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/error-codes.md:35`.
+
+### 16. Evidence, status, assurance, and registries
+
+Sources:
+
+- Evidence and status: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md:153-171`.
+- Registry overview: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/registry.md:13-123`.
+- Registries and executable configuration: `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-registries/src/lib.rs:24-953`.
+- Assurance evaluation: `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-assurance/src/lib.rs:21-127`.
+- Port contracts: `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-ports/src/lib.rs:194-456`.
+
+Explain that adapters establish bounded facts and cannot manufacture authority results.
+
+### 17. Limits, canonical encoding, and identifiers
+
+Sources:
+
+- Protocol limits: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md:234-264`.
+- Model defaults and hard caps begin at `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-model/src/lib.rs:18`.
+- `VerifierLimits`: `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-model/src/lib.rs:3321-3419`.
+- Canonical CBOR schema: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/auths-proof.cddl`.
+- Domain separation and identifiers: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/domain-separation.md:1-94`.
+- Codec facade: `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-codec/src/lib.rs:1-34`.
+
+Explain why bounded decoding, deterministic encoding, domain separation, and work reservation are security properties rather than serialization trivia.
+
+### 18. Principal adapters
+
+Create one overview page and focused reference subsections. Do not create a marketing landing page for each adapter.
+
+Sources:
+
+- `did:key`: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/did-key.md:3-40`.
+- `did:web`: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/did-web.md:3-152`.
+- `did:keri`: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/did-keri.md:3-117`.
+- SPIFFE/X.509: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/spiffe-x509.md:3-41`.
+- WebAuthn: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/webauthn.md:3-55`.
+- HSM attestation: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/hsm-attested.md:3-24`.
+- Registry identifiers: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/registry.md:29-46`.
+
+For each adapter document:
+
+- what fact it establishes;
+- what evidence is required;
+- what remains verifier-local;
+- what live acquisition is outside core;
+- assurance/freshness behavior;
+- unsupported behavior that fails closed.
+
+### 19. Conformance and independent implementation
+
+Sources:
+
+- Conformance artifacts: `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/protocol.md:266-283`.
+- Canonical fixture manifest: `auths-proof/core/fixtures/v1/manifest.json`.
+- Mutation corpus: `auths-proof/core/conformance/v1/mutations.json`.
+- Formal vectors: `auths-proof/core/formal-vectors/v1/manifest.json`.
+- Independent implementations: `auths-proof/bindings/independent/README.md:1-42`; correct its stale `implementations/go` path before copying commands.
+- Cross-language journey inventory: `auths-proof/bindings/customer-journey-matrix-v1.json:94-318`.
+
+Describe which claims are byte equivalence, semantic equivalence, conformance, fuzz/property evidence, or formal refinement. Never call these an independent security audit.
+
+## Examples section
+
+Do not duplicate every demo README. Curate demos by the question they answer and link to the source. Every demo card must carry a maturity label:
+
+- minimal example;
+- interactive demo;
+- production-shaped reference;
+- benchmark/testkit;
+- demo-only capability.
+
+### Minimal and offline
+
+- Offline verification: `auths-proof/demos/offline-verification/README.md:1-14`.
+- MCP demo: `auths-proof/demos/mcp/auths-mcp-demo/`.
+- Live lab and service: `auths-proof/demos/live-lab/` and `auths-proof/demos/live-service/`.
+
+### Agents and collaboration
+
+- Cross-company incident response:
+  - run and happy path: `auths-proof/demos/cross-company-incident-response/README.md:7-103`;
+  - attack lab: `auths-proof/demos/cross-company-incident-response/README.md:104-125`;
+  - trust and disclosure: `auths-proof/demos/cross-company-incident-response/README.md:127-164`;
+  - architecture: `auths-proof/demos/cross-company-incident-response/docs/architecture.md:1-84`;
+  - threat model: `auths-proof/demos/cross-company-incident-response/docs/threat-model.md:1` onward.
+- GitHub issue workflow:
+  - product question and proof: `auths-proof/demos/github-issue/docs/about.md:3-60`;
+  - architecture and source map: `auths-proof/demos/github-issue/docs/architecture.md:63-115`;
+  - execution, claims, recovery, receipts, HTTP, and deployment: `auths-proof/demos/github-issue/docs/architecture.md:117-247`.
+- Radicle issue workflow: `auths-proof/demos/radicle-issue/`.
+
+### Infrastructure and data
+
+- Kubernetes rollout: `auths-proof/demos/kubernetes-rollout/docs/architecture.md:16-107`.
+- OpenTofu plan: `auths-proof/demos/opentofu-plan/docs/architecture.md:14-96`.
+- PostgreSQL data change: `auths-proof/demos/postgresql-data-change/docs/architecture.md:14-94`.
+- REST records authorization: `auths-proof/demos/rest-api-authorization/docs/architecture.md:1` onward.
+
+### Payments
+
+- Use `auths-proof/demos/STRIPE_DEMO_DESIGN_LANGUAGE.md:7-40` for the common presentation and truthfulness rules.
+- Curate the Stripe demos by operation and security question; do not expose `stripe-payment-common` as a user-facing example.
+- Clearly distinguish Stripe test-mode demos from supported SDK profiles.
+
+### Identity and transport
+
+- Identity over Iroh: `auths-proof/demos/identity-iroh/docs/about.md` and `docs/architecture.md`.
+- Make explicit that transport delivery and authenticated channels do not grant authority.
+
+### Required demo page template
+
+Every demo detail page must answer:
+
+1. What problem does this demonstrate?
+2. What does it prove?
+3. What does it not prove?
+4. Where are the trust and credential boundaries?
+5. What exact action is authorized?
+6. When can the provider credential be acquired?
+7. What happens on replay or ambiguous outcome?
+8. What receipts or evidence are produced?
+9. How is it run and tested?
+10. What must change for production?
+
+## API and reference generation
+
+### TypeScript
+
+Authoritative inputs:
+
+- Package exports: `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/package.json:9-38`.
+- Installed public surface: `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/api/public-api.txt:3-176`.
+- Runtime support: `auths-proof/bindings/typescript/sdk-runtime-contract.json`.
+- Public declarations: build the package and consume `dist/*.d.ts` or the packed artifact.
+
+Requirements:
+
+- Generate or validate every documented symbol against the packed package.
+- Preserve entry-point grouping: root, identity, verify, profiles, integrations, framework, testkit.
+- Do not expose internal modules merely because source files exist.
+- Examples must import only exported package paths.
+
+### Python
+
+Authoritative inputs:
+
+- Public modules and symbols: `auths-proof/bindings/python/api/public-api.txt:1-135`.
+- Runtime support: `auths-proof/bindings/python/sdk-runtime-contract.json`.
+- Installed wheel, explicit `__all__`, and type information.
+
+Requirements:
+
+- Generate or validate reference against an installed wheel.
+- Document context-manager ownership and `aclose()` behavior.
+- Keep `auths.verify`, `auths.profiles`, `auths.integrations`, `auths.framework`, and `auths.testkit` separate.
+
+### Rust
+
+Authoritative inputs:
+
+- Consumer facade: `auths-proof/core/crates/auths/src/lib.rs:1-30`.
+- Protocol facade: `auths-proof/core/crates/auths-proof/src/lib.rs:1-181`.
+- Crate inventory: `auths-proof/README.md:43-104`.
+
+Requirements:
+
+- Lead with `auths`/`auths-proof` facades.
+- Provide a crate map by responsibility.
+- Link to generated rustdoc for exhaustive item documentation.
+- Do not flatten low-level crates into the quickstart.
+
+### Validation rule
+
+No page may use the labels `generated`, `qualified`, `executable`, `verified`, `supported`, or `exact project` unless the build proves that specific claim.
+
+## Executable example pipeline
+
+Use the real recipe system:
+
+- Manifest: `auths-proof/bindings/recipes/manifest.json:11-16`.
+- Runner: `auths-proof/bindings/recipes/tools/run.mjs:15-36`.
+- Documentation extraction example: `auths-proof/bindings/recipes/tools/generate-docs.mjs:16-29`.
+
+Implement a docs sync/check process that:
+
+1. selects a pinned `auths-proof` commit or release artifact;
+2. reads the maintained recipe sources;
+3. builds the packed TypeScript package and Python wheel as the product CI expects;
+4. runs the recipes rather than checking only that strings are non-empty;
+5. captures normalized expected output;
+6. renders code without editing it in `auths-docs`;
+7. fails if the source or output changes without a docs refresh;
+8. never stores credentials or private material; and
+9. labels examples as repository-local until publication is genuinely available.
+
+If the full artifact build is temporarily unavailable, show a conspicuous `repository preview` label and do not use qualification language.
+
+## Content writing standards
+
+- Write for a developer trying to make a system work, not for an internal architecture review.
+- Lead with the outcome, then explain the mechanism.
+- Use `Auths`, `authority`, `proof`, `action`, `profile`, `provider`, `receipt`, and result terms consistently.
+- Define a term at first use.
+- Prefer concrete examples over adjective-heavy claims.
+- Separate protocol decisions from runtime failures.
+- Always state whether a code path can reach a provider.
+- Always state whether retry is safe.
+- Always distinguish development from production.
+- Always distinguish a supported public profile from a demo integration.
+- Never use a digest, identity, status badge, or output value invented solely for presentation.
+- Do not expose internal content provenance, schema names, page IDs, or build mechanics to ordinary readers.
+- Avoid pages that only restate a title in 100-200 words.
+- A conceptual page should contain a model, at least one worked example, important failure cases, and links to exact reference material.
+- An operational page should contain commands or procedures, preconditions, expected observations, stop conditions, and recovery.
+
+## Availability and maturity labels
+
+Use a small consistent vocabulary:
+
+- `Prelaunch`
+- `Pre-audit`
+- `Repository preview`
+- `Public SDK surface`
+- `Qualified profile`
+- `Demo integration`
+- `Production-shaped reference`
+
+Do not use `stable` for current prelaunch pages or APIs unless product policy explicitly changes.
+
+## Implementation phases
+
+### Phase 1: remove constraints and establish the new shell
+
+- Remove the schema/content graph/fixture machinery listed above.
+- Reduce navigation to Start, Guides, Examples, and Reference.
+- Establish ordinary MDX authoring.
+- Fix desktop navigation collisions and responsive layout.
+- Add prominent prelaunch/pre-audit status.
+
+### Phase 2: ship the three real starting paths
+
+- TypeScript exact-action quickstart.
+- Python exact-action quickstart.
+- Rust offline-verification quickstart.
+- Run and validate all code from product-owned sources.
+
+Do not proceed to broad page generation until these three paths are excellent.
+
+### Phase 3: write core guides and concepts
+
+- Identity.
+- Verification.
+- Delegation.
+- Plans and approvals.
+- Recovery.
+- Receipts.
+- Production integration.
+- Authority and verification conceptual chapters.
+
+### Phase 4: build real reference
+
+- TypeScript installed-artifact reference.
+- Python installed-wheel reference.
+- Rust facade/crate map.
+- Protocol, stable-code, registry, limits, adapter, and conformance reference.
+
+### Phase 5: curate examples
+
+- Add the categorized demo gallery.
+- Write only the minimum context needed to route readers into the rich demo source documentation.
+- Add production and support-status labels.
+
+### Phase 6: quality pass
+
+- Accessibility.
+- Mobile and 1280px desktop layouts.
+- Search quality.
+- Broken links.
+- Page-to-page flow.
+- Copy/paste accuracy.
+- Status and security-claim audit.
+
+## Testing and acceptance criteria
+
+### Content integrity
+
+- Every code block marked runnable compiles or executes in CI.
+- Every expected output is captured from an actual run.
+- Every public TypeScript import resolves from the packed package.
+- Every public Python import resolves from the installed wheel.
+- Every Rust example compiles from a clean consumer crate.
+- Every stable error code matches `auths-proof/core/spec/v1/error-codes.md`.
+- No output contains fabricated receipt IDs, timestamps, commitments, or verdicts.
+- No page describes a blocked or demo capability as publicly released.
+
+### Navigation and reader journeys
+
+- A new reader reaches a working TypeScript or Python example in no more than two navigation choices from the homepage.
+- A verifier implementer reaches the protocol algorithm in no more than two choices.
+- An operator can find recovery and reconciliation without entering the protocol reference.
+- An agent developer is routed to delegation and MCP guides without requiring a separate top-level Agents universe.
+- No orphan pages, empty category pages, duplicate journeys, or placeholder reference pages remain.
+
+### Design
+
+- Header navigation does not overlap at 1280px.
+- Main content remains readable at 320px, 768px, 1280px, and 1440px.
+- Code scrolls horizontally without causing page overflow.
+- Language tabs are keyboard accessible and synchronized where appropriate.
+- Focus states are visible.
+- Status is not communicated by color alone.
+- Headings do not consume most of the first viewport on ordinary guide pages.
+
+### Reference
+
+- TypeScript reference covers all intended public symbols from `api/public-api.txt`, grouped by package entry point.
+- Python reference covers all intended public symbols from its `api/public-api.txt`, grouped by module.
+- Each high-level result union documents all terminal variants.
+- Protocol reference links stable codes to stages and safe responses.
+- Adapter reference explains supported and unsupported behavior.
+
+### Honest qualification
+
+- Delete the zero-commit fixture bundle.
+- Documentation builds must identify the exact product source or artifact they use.
+- Qualification scripts must run artifacts, not inspect for non-empty strings.
+- The UI must not display “qualified” unless the corresponding run is part of the build evidence.
+
+## Required final verification
+
+Before handoff, the implementation agent must:
+
+1. run the docs typecheck, lint, build, and site tests;
+2. run the executable example checks against the pinned product artifacts;
+3. inspect the homepage, one quickstart, one concept page, one demo page, and each language reference visually;
+4. test desktop, tablet, and mobile layouts;
+5. compare all installation and import instructions with the package manifests;
+6. compare all stable codes with the core error taxonomy;
+7. confirm the prelaunch/pre-audit/publication status is visible;
+8. search for prohibited misleading phrases and validate every remaining use;
+9. report removed architecture, retained components, new content, test results, and any genuinely deferred work.
+
+## Out of scope
+
+- Changing Auths protocol or SDK semantics.
+- Adding compatibility routes for the old documentation tree.
+- Inventing new product profiles.
+- Claiming an external audit.
+- Building a runtime CMS.
+- Preserving old semantic page identities.
+- Maximizing page count.
+
+## Final product standard
+
+The rebuilt docs should feel smaller, denser, more concrete, and more trustworthy than the current site. A reader should encounter real code before publishing machinery, a clear mental model before protocol detail, and exact reference material when they ask for depth.
+
+The documentation is complete when it helps developers use Auths correctly at both the product and protocol levels—not when every possible topic has a schema entry.
diff --git a/eslint.config.mjs b/eslint.config.mjs
index 14f59dd..f06061e 100644
--- a/eslint.config.mjs
+++ b/eslint.config.mjs
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ const eslintConfig = defineConfig([
     "dist/**",
     "out/**",
     "build/**",
+    "product-snapshot/**",
     "next-env.d.ts",
   ]),
   eslint.configs.recommended,
diff --git a/mdx-components.tsx b/mdx-components.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..07000a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mdx-components.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+import type { MDXComponents } from "mdx/types";
+import { GuideCallout } from "./app/components/GuideBlocks";
+import { DocsTable, DocsTableHeaderCell } from "./app/components/docs/DocsTable";
+import {
+  AssuranceClaims,
+  DemoGallery,
+  GeneratedReference,
+  NextSteps,
+  OutcomeBoundary,
+  ProductStatus,
+  Recipe,
+  RepositoryExample,
+  RuntimeEndpoints,
+  SourceLink,
+  StableCodeTable,
+} from "./app/components/docs/ProductBlocks";
+
+export const mdxComponents: MDXComponents = {
+  h1: () => null,
+  table: DocsTable,
+  th: DocsTableHeaderCell,
+  AssuranceClaims,
+  DemoGallery,
+  GeneratedReference,
+  GuideCallout,
+  NextSteps,
+  OutcomeBoundary,
+  ProductStatus,
+  Recipe,
+  RepositoryExample,
+  RuntimeEndpoints,
+  SourceLink,
+  StableCodeTable,
+};
+
+export function useMDXComponents(components: MDXComponents): MDXComponents {
+  return { ...mdxComponents, ...components };
+}
diff --git a/mdx.d.ts b/mdx.d.ts
index fff43cf..1d92b27 100644
--- a/mdx.d.ts
+++ b/mdx.d.ts
@@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ declare module "*.mdx" {
   import type { ComponentType } from "react";
   import type { MDXProps } from "mdx/types";
 
+  export const frontmatter: Readonly<{
+    title: string;
+    description: string;
+    order?: number;
+    status?: "prelaunch" | "pre-audit" | "repository-preview" | "public-sdk-surface";
+  }>;
+  export const heading: string;
   const MDXContent: ComponentType<MDXProps>;
   export default MDXContent;
 }
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 9e809f5..c7b5088 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -6,28 +6,23 @@
     "node": ">=22.13.0"
   },
   "scripts": {
-    "prebuild": "npm run docs:clean && npm run examples:prepare && npm run docs:render-editorial-pages && npm run docs:render-topic-landings && npm run docs:render-tours && npm run docs:render-quickstarts && npm run docs:render-sdk-reference && npm run docs:render-indexes",
+    "prebuild": "npm run docs:build",
+    "predev": "npm run docs:build",
     "dev": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext dev",
     "build": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext build",
     "start": "WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=.wrangler/wrangler.log vinext start",
-    "test": "npm run build && node --test tests/rendered-html.test.mjs && npm run test:site",
-    "test:site": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/qualify-site/full-site.mjs",
+    "test": "npm run build && node --test tests/*.test.mjs && node scripts/audit-docs.mjs",
+    "test:rendered": "node --test tests/*.test.mjs",
+    "test:site": "node scripts/audit-docs.mjs",
+    "audit:docs": "npm run build && node --experimental-strip-types scripts/audit-docs.mjs",
     "lint": "eslint . --ignore-pattern dist --ignore-pattern .next",
     "lint:bash": "node tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs",
-    "lint:ownership": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs",
-    "lint:ia": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/lint-content/site-tree.mjs",
-    "lint:page-contracts": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/lint-content/page-contracts.mjs",
-    "docs:clean": "node tools/render-markdown/clean-generated.mjs",
-    "docs:render-topic-landings": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-topic-landings.mjs",
-    "docs:render-editorial-pages": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs",
-    "docs:render-tours": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-tours.mjs",
-    "docs:render-quickstarts": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-quickstarts.mjs",
-    "docs:render-sdk-reference": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-sdk-reference.mjs",
-    "docs:render-indexes": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/render-markdown/generate-site-indexes.mjs",
-    "examples:prepare": "node --experimental-strip-types tools/qualify-examples/build-quickstarts.mjs",
+    "predocs:build": "npm run lint:bash",
+    "docs:build": "node tools/content/build.mjs",
+    "routes:check": "node tools/content/route-ownership.mjs",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
-    "test:contract": "node tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs && node --experimental-strip-types tools/build-page-model/check.mjs && node tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs && node tools/build-reference/check.mjs && node tools/render-markdown/check.mjs && node tools/release/check.mjs",
-    "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm run lint:bash && npm run lint:ownership && npm run lint:ia && npm run lint:page-contracts && npm run test:contract && npm test"
+    "test:contract": "npm run docs:build",
+    "qualify": "npm run typecheck && npm run lint && npm test"
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@mdx-js/react": "3.1.1",
diff --git a/product-snapshot/bundle/contract.json b/product-snapshot/bundle/contract.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2ba03a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/bundle/contract.json
@@ -0,0 +1,576 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.contract/1",
+  "version": 1,
+  "sourceCommit": null,
+  "semanticFreezeSha256": "75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3",
+  "operations": [
+    {
+      "id": "auths.operation.create/1",
+      "verb": "create",
+      "summary": "Create bounded authority for an exact outcome.",
+      "status": "stable"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+      "verb": "delegate",
+      "summary": "Pass on authority without making it broader.",
+      "status": "stable"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.operation.execute/1",
+      "verb": "execute",
+      "summary": "Authorize and perform a sealed effect.",
+      "status": "stable"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.operation.resume/1",
+      "verb": "resume",
+      "summary": "Continue an interrupted effect without losing its safety boundary.",
+      "status": "stable"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.operation.verify/1",
+      "verb": "verify",
+      "summary": "Verify authority or a receipt without performing an effect.",
+      "status": "stable"
+    }
+  ],
+  "pages": [
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.architecture.system-map/1",
+      "path": "/architecture/system-map/",
+      "kind": "architecture",
+      "title": "System map"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.home/1",
+      "path": "/",
+      "kind": "landing",
+      "title": "Auths documentation"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
+      "path": "/reference/runtime-api/",
+      "kind": "runtime-api-reference",
+      "title": "Runtime API reference"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
+      "path": "/reference/sdk/",
+      "kind": "sdk-reference",
+      "title": "SDK reference",
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.create/1",
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "auths.operation.resume/1",
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.delegate-agent/1",
+      "path": "/start/delegate-to-an-agent/",
+      "kind": "guide",
+      "title": "Delegate to an agent",
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.delegate/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.delegation/1"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.rest-effect/1",
+      "path": "/start/protect-a-rest-effect/",
+      "kind": "guide",
+      "title": "Protect a REST effect",
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.create/1",
+        "auths.operation.execute/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.verify-receipt/1",
+      "path": "/start/verify-a-receipt/",
+      "kind": "guide",
+      "title": "Verify a receipt",
+      "operations": [
+        "auths.operation.verify/1"
+      ],
+      "scenarios": [
+        "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "scenarios": [
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
+      "summary": "Delegate one agent action and reject authority widening.",
+      "languages": [
+        "rust",
+        "typescript",
+        "python"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1",
+      "summary": "Execute one exact approved plan and reject member substitution.",
+      "languages": [
+        "rust",
+        "typescript",
+        "python"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.delegation/1",
+      "summary": "Delegate narrower authority and reject widening.",
+      "languages": [
+        "rust",
+        "typescript",
+        "python"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1",
+      "summary": "Run one workflow across two signature suites and reject a mislabelled suite.",
+      "languages": [
+        "rust",
+        "typescript",
+        "python"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
+      "summary": "Complete one exact local REST-shaped effect and reject mutated bytes.",
+      "languages": [
+        "rust",
+        "typescript",
+        "python"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
+      "summary": "Verify authority and a receipt offline and reject the wrong context.",
+      "languages": [
+        "rust",
+        "typescript",
+        "python"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1",
+      "summary": "Verify an execution receipt without performing an effect.",
+      "languages": [
+        "rust",
+        "typescript",
+        "python"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
+      "summary": "Resume one recoverable execution and prohibit a fresh retry.",
+      "languages": [
+        "rust",
+        "typescript",
+        "python"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
+      "summary": "Authorize one bounded REST effect and return a receipt.",
+      "languages": [
+        "rust",
+        "typescript",
+        "python"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
+      "summary": "Complete one runtime effect and deny exact replay.",
+      "languages": [
+        "rust",
+        "typescript",
+        "python"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "claims": [
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.approval-binding/1",
+      "statement": "Approval is bound to exact plan context and cannot authorize substituted plan bytes.",
+      "status": "passing",
+      "evidence": "bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json",
+      "evidenceSha256": "a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331",
+      "scope": "Maintained approval-plan signing requests, responses, and substitution fixtures.",
+      "limitation": "The application remains responsible for approver identity, user experience, and organizational policy.",
+      "reproduction": [
+        "cargo xtask sdk-experience"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.attenuation/1",
+      "statement": "Delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent under the maintained model and adversarial fixtures.",
+      "status": "passing",
+      "evidence": "formal/qualification.lean",
+      "evidenceSha256": "fb1fd17d377194e96f98313412052f82fbb43cb594b12eb6a9fa0e0dce3ce70c",
+      "scope": "Attenuation relations represented by the maintained formal model and protocol profile.",
+      "limitation": "The claim covers the modelled fields and maintained protocol profile, not arbitrary application-defined semantics.",
+      "reproduction": [
+        "cargo xtask formal"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.bounded-disclosure/1",
+      "statement": "Receipt inspection defaults to opaque or bounded views and requires authority for full disclosure.",
+      "status": "passing",
+      "evidence": "release/docs/runtime-facts-v1.json",
+      "evidenceSha256": "3229ccc5a4adbcdfd4b55bdca58ab9e7e5c333719aeff3a0dba54976e6fef1f1",
+      "scope": "Maintained receipt summary and disclosure operations and their public runtime contract.",
+      "limitation": "Deployment retention, access control, and downstream handling remain application responsibilities.",
+      "reproduction": [
+        "cargo xtask product-conformance"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.closed-gateway/1",
+      "statement": "Maintained product workflows reach provider adapters only through opaque native-authorized commands.",
+      "status": "passing",
+      "evidence": "release/semantic-freeze.json",
+      "evidenceSha256": "75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3",
+      "scope": "Maintained execution workflows and their opaque native command and gateway boundary.",
+      "limitation": "Application-owned adapters can still be implemented unsafely outside the maintained boundary.",
+      "reproduction": [
+        "cargo xtask product-waist-conformance"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.cross-language-parity/1",
+      "statement": "Maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python scenarios target identical stable semantic outcomes.",
+      "status": "passing",
+      "evidence": "release/docs/scenarios.toml",
+      "evidenceSha256": "f056e57acb5dbad67ef5ed5076bdee388a82e73b7e6a6af53b82c226ccd552da",
+      "scope": "The maintained installed-artifact scenarios declared for Rust, TypeScript, and Python.",
+      "limitation": "Scenario parity covers maintained workflows and versions, not every possible application composition.",
+      "reproduction": [
+        "cargo xtask cross-language"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.lifecycle-state/1",
+      "statement": "Maintained runtime paths preserve replay, use, budget, and recovery distinctions.",
+      "status": "passing",
+      "evidence": "bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json",
+      "evidenceSha256": "a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331",
+      "scope": "Maintained runtime and installed-SDK workflows for replay, use, budget, reservation, and recovery outcomes.",
+      "limitation": "Production guarantees also depend on the selected durable store and its deployment.",
+      "reproduction": [
+        "cargo xtask sdk-experience"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1",
+      "statement": "Rust owns protocol meaning used by Rust, TypeScript, and Python projections.",
+      "status": "passing",
+      "evidence": "release/semantic-freeze.json",
+      "evidenceSha256": "75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3",
+      "scope": "The declared protocol and product semantic identities consumed by maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python surfaces.",
+      "limitation": "The semantic freeze detects declared semantic drift; it is not a proof that every implementation is defect-free.",
+      "reproduction": [
+        "cargo xtask semantic-freeze"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.claim.supply-chain/1",
+      "statement": "The assessed release builder satisfies the recorded SLSA Build Level 3 requirements.",
+      "status": "passing",
+      "evidence": "release/slsa-build-level-3-assessment.json",
+      "evidenceSha256": "49d5a096915d49058c8c66f29c5c7f59181caa0783d4724322068de6c5c3f6bf",
+      "scope": "The assessed GitHub release builder and recorded SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 controls.",
+      "limitation": "This is a repository-owner delegated build assessment, not an independent security audit or source-correctness proof.",
+      "reproduction": [
+        "cargo test -p xtask release_control::tests::checked_in_slsa_assessment_matches_builder_bytes"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "projections": [
+    {
+      "operation": "auths.operation.create/1",
+      "language": "rust",
+      "package": "auths-author",
+      "entrypoint": "auths_author",
+      "symbol": "prepare_grant",
+      "support": "supported"
+    },
+    {
+      "operation": "auths.operation.create/1",
+      "language": "typescript",
+      "package": "@auths-dev/sdk",
+      "entrypoint": "./integrations",
+      "symbol": "development.createAuths",
+      "support": "supported"
+    },
+    {
+      "operation": "auths.operation.create/1",
+      "language": "python",
+      "package": "auths",
+      "entrypoint": "auths.integrations",
+      "symbol": "development.create_auths",
+      "support": "supported"
+    },
+    {
+      "operation": "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+      "language": "rust",
+      "package": "auths-author",
+      "entrypoint": "auths_author",
+      "symbol": "plan_child_grant",
+      "support": "supported"
+    },
+    {
+      "operation": "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+      "language": "typescript",
+      "package": "@auths-dev/sdk",
+      "entrypoint": ".",
+      "symbol": "Auths.delegate",
+      "support": "supported"
+    },
+    {
+      "operation": "auths.operation.delegate/1",
+      "language": "python",
+      "package": "auths",
+      "entrypoint": "auths",
+      "symbol": "Auths.delegate",
+      "support": "supported"
+    },
+    {
+      "operation": "auths.operation.execute/1",
+      "language": "rust",
+      "package": "auths-runtime",
+      "entrypoint": "auths_runtime::McpAuthorizationService",
+      "symbol": "ProofExchangeService::submit_action",
+      "support": "supported"
+    },
+    {
+      "operation": "auths.operation.execute/1",
+      "language": "typescript",
+      "package": "@auths-dev/sdk",
+      "entrypoint": ".",
+      "symbol": "Auths.execute",
+      "support": "supported"
+    },
+    {
+      "operation": "auths.operation.execute/1",
+      "language": "python",
+      "package": "auths",
+      "entrypoint": "auths",
+      "symbol": "Auths.execute",
+      "support": "supported"
+    },
+    {
+      "operation": "auths.operation.resume/1",
+      "language": "rust",
+      "package": "auths-profile-mcp",
+      "entrypoint": "auths_profile_mcp::McpSession",
+      "symbol": "McpSession::resume",
+      "support": "supported"
+    },
+    {
+      "operation": "auths.operation.resume/1",
+      "language": "typescript",
+      "package": "@auths-dev/sdk",
+      "entrypoint": ".",
+      "symbol": "Auths.resume",
+      "support": "supported"
+    },
+    {
+      "operation": "auths.operation.resume/1",
+      "language": "python",
+      "package": "auths",
+      "entrypoint": "auths",
+      "symbol": "Auths.resume",
+      "support": "supported"
+    },
+    {
+      "operation": "auths.operation.verify/1",
+      "language": "rust",
+      "package": "auths-sdk",
+      "entrypoint": "auths_sdk::Verifier",
+      "symbol": "Verifier::verify",
+      "support": "supported"
+    },
+    {
+      "operation": "auths.operation.verify/1",
+      "language": "typescript",
+      "package": "@auths-dev/sdk",
+      "entrypoint": "./verify",
+      "symbol": "loadVerifier",
+      "support": "supported"
+    },
+    {
+      "operation": "auths.operation.verify/1",
+      "language": "python",
+      "package": "auths",
+      "entrypoint": "auths.verify",
+      "symbol": "verify",
+      "support": "supported"
+    }
+  ],
+  "runtimeFacts": {
+    "schema": "auths.runtime-docs-facts/1",
+    "provenance": {
+      "kind": "compiled-registry",
+      "subject": "auths.product.runtime-endpoints/1",
+      "owner": "product/runtime/auths-runtime/src/docs.rs"
+    },
+    "endpoints": [
+      {
+        "id": "auths.endpoint.health/1",
+        "operation": null,
+        "page": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
+        "class": "health",
+        "method": "GET",
+        "path": "/v1/health",
+        "maxBodyBytes": 0,
+        "outcomes": [
+          "completed"
+        ],
+        "scenario": null,
+        "trust": {
+          "productionTlsRequired": true,
+          "nativeParseRequired": false,
+          "transportIsNotAuthority": true,
+          "disclosureRequired": false
+        }
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "auths.endpoint.version/1",
+        "operation": null,
+        "page": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
+        "class": "version",
+        "method": "GET",
+        "path": "/v1/version",
+        "maxBodyBytes": 0,
+        "outcomes": [
+          "completed"
+        ],
+        "scenario": null,
+        "trust": {
+          "productionTlsRequired": true,
+          "nativeParseRequired": false,
+          "transportIsNotAuthority": true,
+          "disclosureRequired": false
+        }
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "auths.endpoint.authorities/1",
+        "operation": "auths.operation.create/1",
+        "page": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
+        "class": "authority",
+        "method": "POST",
+        "path": "/v1/authorities",
+        "maxBodyBytes": 65536,
+        "outcomes": [
+          "completed",
+          "denied",
+          "indeterminate"
+        ],
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
+        "trust": {
+          "productionTlsRequired": true,
+          "nativeParseRequired": true,
+          "transportIsNotAuthority": true,
+          "disclosureRequired": false
+        }
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
+        "operation": "auths.operation.execute/1",
+        "page": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
+        "class": "profile-execution",
+        "method": "POST",
+        "path": "/v1/executions",
+        "maxBodyBytes": 262144,
+        "outcomes": [
+          "completed",
+          "denied",
+          "indeterminate",
+          "recoverable"
+        ],
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
+        "trust": {
+          "productionTlsRequired": true,
+          "nativeParseRequired": true,
+          "transportIsNotAuthority": true,
+          "disclosureRequired": false
+        }
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1",
+        "operation": "auths.operation.resume/1",
+        "page": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
+        "class": "workflow-recovery",
+        "method": "POST",
+        "path": "/v1/executions/{execution_id}/resume",
+        "maxBodyBytes": 65536,
+        "outcomes": [
+          "completed",
+          "denied",
+          "indeterminate",
+          "recoverable",
+          "not-found"
+        ],
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
+        "trust": {
+          "productionTlsRequired": true,
+          "nativeParseRequired": true,
+          "transportIsNotAuthority": true,
+          "disclosureRequired": false
+        }
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1",
+        "operation": "auths.operation.verify/1",
+        "page": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
+        "class": "receipt-summary",
+        "method": "GET",
+        "path": "/v1/receipts/{receipt_id}",
+        "maxBodyBytes": 0,
+        "outcomes": [
+          "completed",
+          "not-found"
+        ],
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1",
+        "trust": {
+          "productionTlsRequired": true,
+          "nativeParseRequired": false,
+          "transportIsNotAuthority": true,
+          "disclosureRequired": false
+        }
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1",
+        "operation": "auths.operation.verify/1",
+        "page": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
+        "class": "receipt-disclosure",
+        "method": "POST",
+        "path": "/v1/receipts/{receipt_id}/disclosures",
+        "maxBodyBytes": 65536,
+        "outcomes": [
+          "completed",
+          "denied",
+          "not-found"
+        ],
+        "scenario": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1",
+        "trust": {
+          "productionTlsRequired": true,
+          "nativeParseRequired": true,
+          "transportIsNotAuthority": true,
+          "disclosureRequired": true
+        }
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "digest": "8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90"
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/bundle/manifest.json b/product-snapshot/bundle/manifest.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f4eb4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/bundle/manifest.json
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.bundle/1",
+  "contractDigest": "8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90",
+  "sourceCommit": "d0e4a53e5e9582e9eaff1cf38e965252c6c79765",
+  "files": [
+    {
+      "path": "contract.json",
+      "sha256": "9534731524e0b7d037ae19d9483ab4c9b4169998410f1804fc70cf6805bbdc1a",
+      "bytes": 18520
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "runtime-facts.json",
+      "sha256": "3229ccc5a4adbcdfd4b55bdca58ab9e7e5c333719aeff3a0dba54976e6fef1f1",
+      "bytes": 3158
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "public-docs-report.json",
+      "sha256": "1f3c1e27be157615ba21e23919474bd6d3ff29709b9c2385fce772ff699b1210",
+      "bytes": 666
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "typescript-public-api.txt",
+      "sha256": "adbaa75a2da41d92ebf1bb112e6baa4ecab1dd8f6e18ab7c381028db23580259",
+      "bytes": 6205
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "python-public-api.txt",
+      "sha256": "b794ea97ae40795b2601ebe8e263deb57ca41a74c4fc7fbd84593a47d8e1162b",
+      "bytes": 2567
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "public-topology.json",
+      "sha256": "419f933e67caf0f9aa638fd0a590f692f3d08053acc04b63a9c9d6dd50a6b4bd",
+      "bytes": 860
+    }
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/bundle/public-docs-report.json b/product-snapshot/bundle/public-docs-report.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0349b52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/bundle/public-docs-report.json
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.public-docs-report/1",
+  "policy": "auths.public-docs-policy/1",
+  "tiers": [
+    {
+      "name": "P0",
+      "operationCount": 5,
+      "requiredSections": [
+        "summary",
+        "outcomes",
+        "security",
+        "scenario"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "P1",
+      "operationCount": 0,
+      "requiredSections": [
+        "summary"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "P2",
+      "operationCount": 0,
+      "requiredSections": [
+        "summary",
+        "invariants"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "languages": [
+    "rust",
+    "typescript",
+    "python"
+  ],
+  "p0": {
+    "required": 5,
+    "documented": 5,
+    "missing": []
+  }
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/bundle/public-topology.json b/product-snapshot/bundle/public-topology.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33aca2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/bundle/public-topology.json
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.public-topology/1",
+  "layers": [
+    {
+      "name": "product",
+      "typescript": ["@auths-dev/sdk", "@auths-dev/sdk/identity", "@auths-dev/sdk/verify"],
+      "python": ["auths", "auths.identity", "auths.verify"]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "vertical",
+      "typescript": ["@auths-dev/sdk/profiles"],
+      "python": ["auths.profiles"]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "mechanism",
+      "typescript": ["@auths-dev/sdk/integrations"],
+      "python": ["auths.integrations"]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "extension",
+      "typescript": ["@auths-dev/sdk/framework"],
+      "python": ["auths.framework"]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test",
+      "typescript": ["@auths-dev/sdk/testkit"],
+      "python": ["auths.testkit"]
+    }
+  ],
+  "frameworkContracts": ["atomic-reservation-store", "signer-custody"],
+  "qualifiedProfiles": [
+    "auths.github.issue-address/1",
+    "auths.mcp/1",
+    "auths.opentofu.saved-plan-apply/1",
+    "auths.postgresql.bounded-update/1"
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/bundle/python-public-api.txt b/product-snapshot/bundle/python-public-api.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0277961
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/bundle/python-public-api.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+[auths]
+Actor
+Approval
+Authority
+Auths
+AuthsError
+AuthsErrorCode
+Completed
+Denied
+DoctorReport
+ExecutionReference
+ExecutionResult
+Indeterminate
+ProductStep
+ProductionAuthority
+ProductionAuthorityResult
+ProductionAuths
+ProductionCompleted
+ProductionDenied
+ProductionExecutionResult
+ProductionIndeterminate
+ProductionReceipt
+ProductionRecoverable
+ProductionRecoveryReference
+ProductionRejected
+ProductionTransport
+ProductionTransportRequest
+ProductionTransportResponse
+ProductionVerificationResult
+ProductionVerified
+Receipt
+RecommendedAction
+RecoveryResult
+RetryClass
+create_auths
+doctor
+
+[auths.identity]
+AuthenticatedIdentity
+DecodedIdentity
+Ed25519SignatureSuite
+IdentityMethod
+IdentityPrincipal
+IdentityRegistry
+IdentityResolver
+RawKeyIdentityMethod
+ResolutionEvidence
+ResolvedIdentity
+ResolvedIdentityRecord
+ResolverIdentityMethod
+SignatureSuite
+ValidatedIdentity
+VerificationMaterial
+VerificationRelationship
+decode_identity
+encode_identity
+encode_raw_key_identity
+
+[auths.verify]
+ApprovalInspection
+Authorized
+DecisionCommitments
+DecisionInspection
+DecisionSummary
+Denied
+Explanation
+Indeterminate
+InspectionMetrics
+InvalidReceiptInspection
+KernelSummary
+Receipt
+ReceiptDisclosureMaterial
+ReceiptDisclosureProtector
+ReceiptDisclosureStore
+ReceiptInspectionCommitments
+ReceiptInspectionMetadata
+ReceiptInspectionProfile
+ReceiptInspectionResult
+ReceiptInspectionSigner
+ReceiptSummary
+ReceiptSummaryField
+ReceiptViewMode
+VerificationInput
+VerificationMetrics
+VerificationResult
+VerifiedDisclosedReceipt
+VerifiedOpaqueReceipt
+create_receipt_disclosure
+decode_receipt
+encode_receipt
+inspect_decision
+inspect_receipt
+verify
+verify_many
+verify_receipt
+
+[auths.profiles]
+DevelopmentMcpProvider
+McpAction
+McpClosedProvider
+McpCompleted
+McpExecutionCheckpointEvent
+McpExecutionCheckpointStage
+McpExecutionObserver
+McpHandlerOutcome
+McpPlan
+McpPlanCompleted
+McpPlanRecoveryResult
+McpRecoverable
+McpToolAuthority
+McpToolContext
+ProductionProfile
+ProductionProfileId
+github_issue_address
+mcp
+opentofu_saved_plan_apply
+postgresql_bounded_update
+
+[auths.integrations]
+FrameworkAdapter
+IdentityTransport
+development
+exchange_identity
+production
+
+[auths.framework]
+AtomicReservationRecord
+AtomicReservationStore
+ControlEvidence
+PrincipalDescriptor
+ProviderFailureKind
+ProviderOperationError
+Signer
+SignerLifecycle
+SigningObjectKind
+SigningRequest
+SigningResponse
+
+[auths.testkit]
+ADAPTER_CONTRACT_VERSION
+AtomicReservationRecord
+AtomicReservationStoreCandidate
+ByteTransportCandidate
+CONFORMANCE_CATALOG
+ConformanceCaseResult
+ConformanceMetadata
+ConformanceReport
+DevelopmentApproval
+DevelopmentEd25519Signer
+DevelopmentIdentityMethod
+DevelopmentReceiptAttestor
+DevelopmentSignatureSuite
+DevelopmentSigner
+DiagnosticEngine
+DiagnosticExplanation
+DiagnosticResult
+DiagnosticVerifier
+FixedClock
+MemoryGateway
+ProductWaistConformanceReport
+ProductWaistExpected
+RecordingTelemetry
+certify_atomic_store
+certify_byte_transport
+certify_mcp_provider
+certify_signer
+check_approval_provider
+check_identity_method
+check_signer
+check_telemetry
+create_diagnostic_verifier
+product_waist_conformance
diff --git a/product-snapshot/bundle/runtime-facts.json b/product-snapshot/bundle/runtime-facts.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9900c7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/bundle/runtime-facts.json
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.runtime-docs-facts/1",
+  "provenance": {
+    "kind": "compiled-registry",
+    "subject": "auths.product.runtime-endpoints/1",
+    "owner": "product/runtime/auths-runtime/src/docs.rs"
+  },
+  "endpoints": [
+    {"id":"auths.endpoint.health/1","operation":null,"page":"auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1","class":"health","method":"GET","path":"/v1/health","maxBodyBytes":0,"outcomes":["completed"],"scenario":null,"trust":{"productionTlsRequired":true,"nativeParseRequired":false,"transportIsNotAuthority":true,"disclosureRequired":false}},
+    {"id":"auths.endpoint.version/1","operation":null,"page":"auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1","class":"version","method":"GET","path":"/v1/version","maxBodyBytes":0,"outcomes":["completed"],"scenario":null,"trust":{"productionTlsRequired":true,"nativeParseRequired":false,"transportIsNotAuthority":true,"disclosureRequired":false}},
+    {"id":"auths.endpoint.authorities/1","operation":"auths.operation.create/1","page":"auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1","class":"authority","method":"POST","path":"/v1/authorities","maxBodyBytes":65536,"outcomes":["completed","denied","indeterminate"],"scenario":"auths.scenario.rest-effect/1","trust":{"productionTlsRequired":true,"nativeParseRequired":true,"transportIsNotAuthority":true,"disclosureRequired":false}},
+    {"id":"auths.endpoint.executions/1","operation":"auths.operation.execute/1","page":"auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1","class":"profile-execution","method":"POST","path":"/v1/executions","maxBodyBytes":262144,"outcomes":["completed","denied","indeterminate","recoverable"],"scenario":"auths.scenario.rest-effect/1","trust":{"productionTlsRequired":true,"nativeParseRequired":true,"transportIsNotAuthority":true,"disclosureRequired":false}},
+    {"id":"auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1","operation":"auths.operation.resume/1","page":"auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1","class":"workflow-recovery","method":"POST","path":"/v1/executions/{execution_id}/resume","maxBodyBytes":65536,"outcomes":["completed","denied","indeterminate","recoverable","not-found"],"scenario":"auths.scenario.rest-effect/1","trust":{"productionTlsRequired":true,"nativeParseRequired":true,"transportIsNotAuthority":true,"disclosureRequired":false}},
+    {"id":"auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1","operation":"auths.operation.verify/1","page":"auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1","class":"receipt-summary","method":"GET","path":"/v1/receipts/{receipt_id}","maxBodyBytes":0,"outcomes":["completed","not-found"],"scenario":"auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1","trust":{"productionTlsRequired":true,"nativeParseRequired":false,"transportIsNotAuthority":true,"disclosureRequired":false}},
+    {"id":"auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1","operation":"auths.operation.verify/1","page":"auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1","class":"receipt-disclosure","method":"POST","path":"/v1/receipts/{receipt_id}/disclosures","maxBodyBytes":65536,"outcomes":["completed","denied","not-found"],"scenario":"auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1","trust":{"productionTlsRequired":true,"nativeParseRequired":true,"transportIsNotAuthority":true,"disclosureRequired":true}}
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/bundle/typescript-public-api.txt b/product-snapshot/bundle/typescript-public-api.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe4daf3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/bundle/typescript-public-api.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+# Installed @auths-dev/sdk public API v1
+# declaration-sha256 2f183f958f4a172c63ddb247dc35e4796301bbf72bc7004b0d39490acb21631f
+.	Actor	type
+.	approval	value
+.	ApprovalPolicy	type
+.	Authority	type
+.	Auths	type
+.	AuthsConfiguration	type
+.	AuthsError	value+type
+.	AuthsErrorCode	type
+.	Completed	type
+.	createAuths	value
+.	Denied	type
+.	doctor	value
+.	DoctorMode	type
+.	DoctorOptions	type
+.	DoctorReport	type
+.	DoctorState	type
+.	ExecutionReference	value+type
+.	ExecutionResult	type
+.	Indeterminate	type
+.	ProductionAuthority	type
+.	ProductionAuthorityResult	type
+.	ProductionAuths	type
+.	ProductionAuthsOptions	type
+.	ProductionCompleted	type
+.	ProductionDenied	type
+.	ProductionExecutionResult	type
+.	ProductionIndeterminate	type
+.	ProductionReceipt	type
+.	ProductionRecoverable	type
+.	ProductionRecoveryReference	type
+.	ProductionRejected	type
+.	ProductionTransport	type
+.	ProductionTransportRequest	type
+.	ProductionTransportResponse	type
+.	ProductionVerificationResult	type
+.	ProductionVerified	type
+.	ProductStep	type
+.	Receipt	type
+.	RecommendedAction	type
+.	RecoveryResult	type
+.	RetryClass	type
+./identity	AuthenticatedDescriptorMessage	type
+./identity	AuthenticatedIdentityMessage	type
+./identity	DecodedIdentity	type
+./identity	DecodedIdentityDescriptor	type
+./identity	DecodedSignedIdentityMessage	type
+./identity	DescriptorAuthenticationRequest	type
+./identity	DescriptorAuthenticationResult	type
+./identity	DescriptorSignatureSuiteAdapter	type
+./identity	Ed25519RawKeyAuthentication	value+type
+./identity	IdentityClient	value+type
+./identity	IdentityDescriptorInput	type
+./identity	IdentityDescriptorMethodAdapter	type
+./identity	IdentityMethodAdapter	type
+./identity	IdentityMethodMetadata	type
+./identity	IdentityMethodParse	type
+./identity	IdentityMethodRegistry	value+type
+./identity	IdentityPrincipal	type
+./identity	IdentityResolutionRequest	type
+./identity	IdentityResolutionResult	type
+./identity	loadEd25519RawKeyAuthentication	value
+./identity	loadIdentity	value
+./identity	loadRawKeyIdentityAdapter	value
+./identity	RawKeyIdentityAdapter	value+type
+./identity	ResolutionEvidence	type
+./identity	ResolvedIdentityDescriptor	type
+./identity	SignatureSuiteAdapter	type
+./identity	SignatureSuiteMetadata	type
+./identity	SignatureSuiteParse	type
+./identity	SignatureSuiteRegistry	value+type
+./identity	ValidatedIdentity	type
+./identity	ValidatedIdentityDescriptor	type
+./identity	VerificationMaterialInput	type
+./identity	VerificationRelationshipInput	type
+./verify	AuthorizedResult	type
+./verify	createReceiptDisclosure	value
+./verify	DecisionInspection	type
+./verify	decodeReceipt	value
+./verify	DeniedResult	type
+./verify	encodeReceipt	value
+./verify	Explanation	type
+./verify	ImmutableArtifactCache	value+type
+./verify	ImmutableArtifactCacheOptions	type
+./verify	IndeterminateResult	type
+./verify	inspectDecision	value
+./verify	inspectReceipt	value
+./verify	InvalidReceiptInspection	type
+./verify	loadVerifier	value
+./verify	Receipt	type
+./verify	ReceiptDisclosureMaterial	type
+./verify	ReceiptDisclosureProtector	type
+./verify	ReceiptDisclosureStore	type
+./verify	ReceiptInspectionCommitments	type
+./verify	ReceiptInspectionMetadata	type
+./verify	ReceiptInspectionProfile	type
+./verify	ReceiptInspectionResult	type
+./verify	ReceiptInspectionSigner	type
+./verify	ReceiptSummary	type
+./verify	ReceiptSummaryField	type
+./verify	ReceiptViewMode	type
+./verify	VerdictKind	type
+./verify	VerificationBatchOptions	type
+./verify	VerificationInput	type
+./verify	VerificationMetrics	type
+./verify	VerificationOptions	type
+./verify	VerificationResult	type
+./verify	VerificationStage	type
+./verify	VerifiedAction	value+type
+./verify	VerifiedDisclosedReceipt	type
+./verify	VerifiedOpaqueReceipt	type
+./verify	Verifier	value+type
+./verify	verifyReceipt	value
+./profiles	executeMcpClosed	value
+./profiles	executeMcpPlanClosed	value
+./profiles	githubIssueAddress	value
+./profiles	mcp	value
+./profiles	McpAction	value+type
+./profiles	McpAttestedReceipt	type
+./profiles	McpAuthority	type
+./profiles	McpClosedProvider	type
+./profiles	McpClosedResult	type
+./profiles	McpCommand	value+type
+./profiles	McpDevelopmentProviderOptions	type
+./profiles	McpExecutionCheckpointEvent	type
+./profiles	McpExecutionCheckpointStage	type
+./profiles	McpExecutionObserver	type
+./profiles	McpExecutionResources	type
+./profiles	McpExecutionState	type
+./profiles	McpGateway	type
+./profiles	McpGatewayCall	type
+./profiles	McpGatewayError	type
+./profiles	McpHandlerCause	type
+./profiles	McpHandlerOutcome	type
+./profiles	McpPlanClosedResult	type
+./profiles	McpProfile	value+type
+./profiles	McpProfileOptions	type
+./profiles	McpReceipt	type
+./profiles	McpReceiptSink	type
+./profiles	McpRecoveryCheckpoint	type
+./profiles	McpToolAuthority	value+type
+./profiles	McpToolContext	type
+./profiles	McpToolHandler	type
+./profiles	opentofuSavedPlanApply	value
+./profiles	postgresqlBoundedUpdate	value
+./profiles	ProductionProfile	type
+./profiles	ProductionProfileId	type
+./profiles	recoverMcpClosed	value
+./profiles	resourcesForMcpAuthority	value
+./profiles	resumeMcpClosed	value
+./integrations	development	value
+./integrations	DevelopmentAuthsOptions	type
+./integrations	production	value
+./integrations	RecoverableDevelopmentAuthsOptions	type
+./framework	AtomicReservationRecord	type
+./framework	AtomicReservationStore	type
+./framework	ControlEvidence	type
+./framework	PrincipalDescriptor	type
+./framework	ProviderFailureKind	type
+./framework	ProviderOperationError	value+type
+./framework	Signer	type
+./framework	SignerLifecycle	type
+./framework	SigningObjectKind	type
+./framework	SigningRequest	type
+./framework	SigningResponse	type
+./testkit	AtomicReservationRecord	type
+./testkit	AtomicReservationStoreCandidate	type
+./testkit	BoundedApprovalSession	value+type
+./testkit	BoundedApprovalSessionOptions	type
+./testkit	ByteTransportCandidate	type
+./testkit	ByteTransportFactory	type
+./testkit	certifyAtomicStore	value
+./testkit	certifyByteTransport	value
+./testkit	certifyMcpProvider	value
+./testkit	certifySigner	value
+./testkit	CONFORMANCE_CATALOG	value
+./testkit	ConformanceCaseResult	type
+./testkit	ConformanceMetadata	type
+./testkit	ConformanceReport	type
+./testkit	createDiagnosticVerifier	value
+./testkit	custodyConformance	value
+./testkit	CustodyConformanceCase	type
+./testkit	CustodyConformanceOptions	type
+./testkit	CustodyConformanceReport	type
+./testkit	CustodyConformanceResult	type
+./testkit	development	value
+./testkit	DiagnosticResult	type
+./testkit	DiagnosticVerifier	value+type
+./testkit	InMemoryApplicationExecutionStore	value+type
+./testkit	McpProviderFactory	type
+./testkit	productWaistConformance	value
+./testkit	ProductWaistConformanceCase	type
+./testkit	ProductWaistConformanceReport	type
+./testkit	ProductWaistExpected	type
diff --git a/product-snapshot/conformance/fixtures.json b/product-snapshot/conformance/fixtures.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a232ac4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/conformance/fixtures.json
@@ -0,0 +1,5799 @@
+{
+  "protocol": "Auths Proof Protocol V1",
+  "protocol_major": 1,
+  "fixture_set": "target-v1",
+  "hash": "sha-256",
+  "adapter_context": {
+    "configuration": "d994f6e8642fc71330a979f4a3bf141fdf4b83b25fa649726e504df3d540a3cf",
+    "did_web": [
+      {
+        "kind": "current",
+        "principal": "did:web:root.auths.example",
+        "document_digest": "28da78617915f02cf66a1c3004c7d180a23704380d37f18bc4eb394784605722",
+        "observed_at": 40,
+        "valid_until": 60
+      },
+      {
+        "kind": "current",
+        "principal": "did:web:actor.auths.example",
+        "document_digest": "1998cea28266e66fecdc4f7cf455b6c8446f6f8c9eb6f373ea19e2f80325422a",
+        "observed_at": 40,
+        "valid_until": 60
+      },
+      {
+        "kind": "historical",
+        "principal": "did:web:historical.auths.example",
+        "document_digest": "7128cc300e02de108ae7d4e1752f94c68275666cd5d20c050b38aed512bd77e0",
+        "valid_from": 0,
+        "valid_until": 45,
+        "statement": null
+      },
+      {
+        "kind": "historical",
+        "principal": "did:web:history-unavailable.auths.example",
+        "document_digest": "d0805a0f0154dad1bc1d29cabaec0dc16a697823467f9f4de58af0e7b2ec0c50",
+        "valid_from": 0,
+        "valid_until": 10,
+        "statement": null
+      }
+    ],
+    "webauthn": [
+      {
+        "credential_id": "1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f",
+        "principal": "webauthn:Hx8fHx8fHx8fHx8fHx8fHw",
+        "verification_method": "webauthn:Hx8fHx8fHx8fHx8fHx8fHw#credential",
+        "public_key": "03301d9e502dc7e05da85da026a7ae9aa0fac9db7d52a95b3e3e3f9aa0a1b45b8b",
+        "rp_id": "auths.example",
+        "origins": [
+          "https://auths.example"
+        ],
+        "require_user_verification": true,
+        "counter_policy": {
+          "kind": "greater-than",
+          "value": 0
+        },
+        "attestation_level": "non-exportable",
+        "observed_at": 40,
+        "valid_until": 60
+      },
+      {
+        "credential_id": "23232323232323232323232323232323",
+        "principal": "webauthn:IyMjIyMjIyMjIyMjIyMjIw",
+        "verification_method": "webauthn:IyMjIyMjIyMjIyMjIyMjIw#credential",
+        "public_key": "03d58d4a589ed27d168ffa3ad7326c48ca94e8e1fe92af9700a12d389033bb291a",
+        "rp_id": "auths.example",
+        "origins": [
+          "https://auths.example"
+        ],
+        "require_user_verification": true,
+        "counter_policy": {
+          "kind": "greater-than",
+          "value": 0
+        },
+        "attestation_level": "non-exportable",
+        "observed_at": 40,
+        "valid_until": 60
+      }
+    ],
+    "hsm": [
+      {
+        "principal": "hsm:9gRV2O7OPRWecqu5mCrdmX80g8Yv1SHR4_oKYDBs_FU",
+        "verification_method": "hsm:9gRV2O7OPRWecqu5mCrdmX80g8Yv1SHR4_oKYDBs_FU#key",
+        "suite": "ed25519-v1",
+        "public_key": "fa4834147f6e690c3693eff61336046403cd8ae2a14f31b3c407358569239565",
+        "profile": "pkcs11-v1",
+        "provider": "auths-test-hsm",
+        "protection_level": "non-exportable",
+        "key_handle_digest": "2929292929292929292929292929292929292929292929292929292929292929",
+        "device_chain_digest": "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a",
+        "non_exportable": true,
+        "observed_at": 40,
+        "valid_until": 60
+      },
+      {
+        "principal": "hsm:EimbkNqvWpNagbvuPiIh1CPFM8We8Uym7Ms1iWq-oTY",
+        "verification_method": "hsm:EimbkNqvWpNagbvuPiIh1CPFM8We8Uym7Ms1iWq-oTY#key",
+        "suite": "ed25519-v1",
+        "public_key": "a87b8a99bd88a69686c994a80b629d8154871aa295540834c01d79f4f916502f",
+        "profile": "pkcs11-v1",
+        "provider": "auths-test-hsm",
+        "protection_level": "non-exportable",
+        "key_handle_digest": "2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d",
+        "device_chain_digest": "2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e2e",
+        "non_exportable": true,
+        "observed_at": 40,
+        "valid_until": 60
+      }
+    ],
+    "spiffe": {
+      "trust_domains": [
+        {
+          "name": "auths.example",
+          "roots": [
+            "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"
+          ],
+          "require_status": true
+        }
+      ],
+      "status": [
+        {
+          "leaf_digest": "b20ac04447d668bfff409a28cb362037df88ef83f24f4f06c3615b3f6ca7f6ce",
+          "active": true,
+          "observed_at": 40,
+          "valid_until": 60
+        },
+        {
+          "leaf_digest": "f5dc0f70f8402d4f2245e6d121fc62885f36dede49aa335ff77c3784bd3c5ef1",
+          "active": true,
+          "observed_at": 40,
+          "valid_until": 60
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    "did_keri": {
+      "checkpoints": []
+    }
+  },
+  "fixtures": [
+    {
+      "name": "raw-key-chain",
+      "class": "valid",
+      "proof": {
+        "path": "valid/raw-key-chain.proof.cbor",
+        "sha256": "50afa552a70a32a9fff3d0401cb97e7a494927bf90535be8c50eb52a3b65e911"
+      },
+      "context": {
+        "path": "valid/raw-key-chain.context.cbor",
+        "sha256": "eec5bbbd76e306873c88f2b521b6797e9c9740b0816c35efa906099356e3605a"
+      },
+      "canonical_action": {
+        "path": "valid/raw-key-chain.action.cbor",
+        "sha256": "409417c365cae4d8dd06b6106f954bc35a564355503f6d304efa1e1d00065297",
+        "profile": "auths.mcp",
+        "profile_version": 1,
+        "media_type": "application/vnd.auths.mcp-call.v1+cbor",
+        "capability": "tools/call",
+        "resource": "mcp://reports/read",
+        "requested_budget": {
+          "algebra": "numeric-ceiling-v1",
+          "value": 5
+        }
+      },
+      "canonical_body": {
+        "path": "valid/raw-key-chain.body.cbor",
+        "sha256": "5c63cdd40e91c52d8e1e01d76e968cb2cd262c6c0ca0e9674a0975a1118f0a2d"
+      },
+      "expected_result": {
+        "path": "valid/raw-key-chain.result.cbor",
+        "sha256": "0b9aa7c0694bfb30b051c30de3ce26a621047d0354f38b985f29a55ebd637309",
+        "stage": "complete",
+        "decision": "authorized",
+        "code": "authorized",
+        "proof_digest": "50afa552a70a32a9fff3d0401cb97e7a494927bf90535be8c50eb52a3b65e911",
+        "action_digest": "409417c365cae4d8dd06b6106f954bc35a564355503f6d304efa1e1d00065297",
+        "context_digest": "c25421fb1b54c5f9450e8f88151066e71a406124aadae91426bf8d8574750774",
+        "plan_digest": "9c11759c469c230f7d56808c3db31ebb44d368ba173af197ff55015432c8658c",
+        "result_digest": "db3ca5da5a64740dcc564a387853ad84e7b4a66db8fd79c8df0a47d987cd2c3f",
+        "authorized_branches": [
+          "0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101"
+        ],
+        "assurance_satisfactions": 2,
+        "resources": {
+          "proof_bytes": 1475,
+          "action_bytes": 144,
+          "context_bytes": 1158,
+          "object_count": 6,
+          "plan_leaves": 1,
+          "plan_depth": 1,
+          "work_units": 312
+        },
+        "registry_manifest": "3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333"
+      },
+      "expected_decision": "authorized",
+      "expected_code": "authorized"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "did-key-root-raw-key-actor",
+      "class": "valid",
+      "proof": {
+        "path": "valid/did-key-root-raw-key-actor.proof.cbor",
+        "sha256": "a8576edb58de0c7cbb6ab676dfd9516a772d6bb23fd61530f0e24f0bb180e1fb"
+      },
+      "context": {
+        "path": "valid/did-key-root-raw-key-actor.context.cbor",
+        "sha256": "b358ae91d70a59a9b270bdb4601f0a6e61ce6626ab23282a6cd80174d2508b55"
+      },
+      "canonical_action": {
+        "path": "valid/did-key-root-raw-key-actor.action.cbor",
+        "sha256": "409417c365cae4d8dd06b6106f954bc35a564355503f6d304efa1e1d00065297",
+        "profile": "auths.mcp",
+        "profile_version": 1,
+        "media_type": "application/vnd.auths.mcp-call.v1+cbor",
+        "capability": "tools/call",
+        "resource": "mcp://reports/read",
+        "requested_budget": {
+          "algebra": "numeric-ceiling-v1",
+          "value": 5
+        }
+      },
+      "canonical_body": {
+        "path": "valid/did-key-root-raw-key-actor.body.cbor",
+        "sha256": "5c63cdd40e91c52d8e1e01d76e968cb2cd262c6c0ca0e9674a0975a1118f0a2d"
+      },
+      "expected_result": {
+        "path": "valid/did-key-root-raw-key-actor.result.cbor",
+        "sha256": "5bd2d6c9d05dcbedcd2ff98546dd32fec85a17dcbec1a7fe5692c85b06f38e06",
+        "stage": "complete",
+        "decision": "authorized",
+        "code": "authorized",
+        "proof_digest": "a8576edb58de0c7cbb6ab676dfd9516a772d6bb23fd61530f0e24f0bb180e1fb",
+        "action_digest": "409417c365cae4d8dd06b6106f954bc35a564355503f6d304efa1e1d00065297",
+        "context_digest": "701e83e53dd576ef74edd61e9338141adc49219f58eea877aa0f820bac61483c",
+        "plan_digest": "9c11759c469c230f7d56808c3db31ebb44d368ba173af197ff55015432c8658c",
+        "result_digest": "2ac71f7783b1091084ecdace5e03c2908f2ff7593c4f82fbebb364b2c3ee34bc",
+        "authorized_branches": [
+          "0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101"
+        ],
+        "assurance_satisfactions": 2,
+        "resources": {
+          "proof_bytes": 1543,
+          "action_bytes": 144,
+          "context_bytes": 1184,
+          "object_count": 6,
+          "plan_leaves": 1,
+          "plan_depth": 1,
+          "work_units": 317
+        },
+        "registry_manifest": "3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333"
+      },
+      "expected_decision": "authorized",
+      "expected_code": "authorized"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "raw-key-root-did-key-actor",
+      "class": "valid",
+      "proof": {
+        "path": "valid/raw-key-root-did-key-actor.proof.cbor",
+        "sha256": "efec3bbe9e9edc37d64e581b199e394e2b0f2a67f34995bfbb8626acd355ea7d"
+      },
+      "context": {
+        "path": "valid/raw-key-root-did-key-actor.context.cbor",
+        "sha256": "1b1696f1698f82a78ba260370f19c8997b57eec8cddda8cf38db5f5f421b9c30"
+      },
+      "canonical_action": {
+        "path": "valid/raw-key-root-did-key-actor.action.cbor",
+        "sha256": "409417c365cae4d8dd06b6106f954bc35a564355503f6d304efa1e1d00065297",
+        "profile": "auths.mcp",
+        "profile_version": 1,
+        "media_type": "application/vnd.auths.mcp-call.v1+cbor",
+        "capability": "tools/call",
+        "resource": "mcp://reports/read",
+        "requested_budget": {
+          "algebra": "numeric-ceiling-v1",
+          "value": 5
+        }
+      },
+      "canonical_body": {
+        "path": "valid/raw-key-root-did-key-actor.body.cbor",
+        "sha256": "5c63cdd40e91c52d8e1e01d76e968cb2cd262c6c0ca0e9674a0975a1118f0a2d"
+      },
+      "expected_result": {
+        "path": "valid/raw-key-root-did-key-actor.result.cbor",
+        "sha256": "77cfa29e603762918a391ecf87fffce7db2535daf64818b8779f5df6f931406a",
+        "stage": "complete",
+        "decision": "authorized",
+        "code": "authorized",
+        "proof_digest": "efec3bbe9e9edc37d64e581b199e394e2b0f2a67f34995bfbb8626acd355ea7d",
+        "action_digest": "409417c365cae4d8dd06b6106f954bc35a564355503f6d304efa1e1d00065297",
+        "context_digest": "480d200f1a24396e7d1a0780fae104c8f77ba46a2323a43166059d1e3b03a382",
+        "plan_digest": "9c11759c469c230f7d56808c3db31ebb44d368ba173af197ff55015432c8658c",
+        "result_digest": "58aa1a05f1cdd39edfdc6e5859d23aca242441aab8c121a568b77f904347262a",
+        "authorized_branches": [
+          "0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101"
+        ],
+        "assurance_satisfactions": 2,
+        "resources": {
+          "proof_bytes": 1545,
+          "action_bytes": 144,
+          "context_bytes": 1180,
+          "object_count": 6,
+          "plan_leaves": 1,
+          "plan_depth": 1,
+          "work_units": 317
+        },
+        "registry_manifest": "3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333"
+      },
+      "expected_decision": "authorized",
+      "expected_code": "authorized"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "did-keri-root-raw-key-actor",
+      "class": "valid",
+      "proof": {
+        "path": "valid/did-keri-root-raw-key-actor.proof.cbor",
+        "sha256": "d02248cf037534ca078853f37128f76a64eb23e18bd61c885a503789f88742de"
+      },
+      "context": {
+        "path": "valid/did-keri-root-raw-key-actor.context.cbor",
+        "sha256": "a6fd5c4e3bc1ca76d078f3f3d95a08217284d86aebb7421c4ddec79536ed6a01"
+      },
+      "canonical_action": {
+        "path": "valid/did-keri-root-raw-key-actor.action.cbor",
+        "sha256": "409417c365cae4d8dd06b6106f954bc35a564355503f6d304efa1e1d00065297",
+        "profile": "auths.mcp",
+        "profile_version": 1,
+        "media_type": "application/vnd.auths.mcp-call.v1+cbor",
+        "capability": "tools/call",
+        "resource": "mcp://reports/read",
+        "requested_budget": {
+          "algebra": "numeric-ceiling-v1",
+          "value": 5
+        }
+      },
+      "canonical_body": {
+        "path": "valid/did-keri-root-raw-key-actor.body.cbor",
+        "sha256": "5c63cdd40e91c52d8e1e01d76e968cb2cd262c6c0ca0e9674a0975a1118f0a2d"
+      },
+      "expected_result": {
+        "path": "valid/did-keri-root-raw-key-actor.result.cbor",
+        "sha256": "12be560927163358d88e9cffcdbf5580dbe0bb359712e93c332583a7db7a22d8",
+        "stage": "complete",
+        "decision": "authorized",
+        "code": "authorized",
+        "proof_digest": "d02248cf037534ca078853f37128f76a64eb23e18bd61c885a503789f88742de",
+        "action_digest": "409417c365cae4d8dd06b6106f954bc35a564355503f6d304efa1e1d00065297",
+        "context_digest": "0d1076acdad08b176445dee65eede1a9c1844498079762e5b6e2da6dbeeeed37",
+        "plan_digest": "9c11759c469c230f7d56808c3db31ebb44d368ba173af197ff55015432c8658c",
+        "result_digest": "55f538b2dae03a6bf30e445cf3097d6e1b3bdf983d1a6f68b3a3e26bd876a3f2",
+        "authorized_branches": [
+          "0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101"
+        ],
+        "assurance_satisfactions": 2,
+        "resources": {
+          "proof_bytes": 2308,
+          "action_bytes": 144,
+          "context_bytes": 1181,
+          "object_count": 6,
+          "plan_leaves": 1,
+          "plan_depth": 1,
+          "work_units": 2923
+        },
+        "registry_manifest": "3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333"
+      },
+      "expected_decision": "authorized",
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+    {
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+    {
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+      "expected_decision": "authorized",
+      "expected_code": "authorized"
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+    {
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+      "class": "indeterminate",
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+          "algebra": "numeric-ceiling-v1",
+          "value": 5
+        }
+      },
+      "canonical_body": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-wrong-length.body.cbor",
+        "sha256": "5c63cdd40e91c52d8e1e01d76e968cb2cd262c6c0ca0e9674a0975a1118f0a2d"
+      },
+      "expected_result": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-wrong-length.result.cbor",
+        "sha256": "0a8d51962d3002fdaf236ea4069c8c5ee9807de15e413688bac1280dcd006474",
+        "stage": "authority",
+        "decision": "denied",
+        "code": "attachment-length-mismatch",
+        "proof_digest": "c00467e2997d31f57d35d42c089fc14efe95ad1dccfe33d7c6cad549f3ccbb14",
+        "action_digest": "2581413121d68359183a2f2428ca7d7f800aa0e3d9480da65f1faeac80b47dc7",
+        "context_digest": "0cdcd389620fc16d7e9d8659de07aafad1daa55c11c8752e2ffdf5792e09824f",
+        "plan_digest": "9dcbca93688318444c01100dfd6b2ae9357794177c98e87584f2ad35e20436f7",
+        "result_digest": "762ca05836d5eb97c283bd6ccb23666cfc6aaa044301063ccd0fbc7ee1f53510",
+        "authorized_branches": [],
+        "assurance_satisfactions": 0,
+        "resources": {
+          "proof_bytes": 985,
+          "action_bytes": 208,
+          "context_bytes": 1158,
+          "object_count": 4,
+          "plan_leaves": 1,
+          "plan_depth": 1,
+          "work_units": 110
+        },
+        "registry_manifest": "3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333"
+      },
+      "expected_decision": "denied",
+      "expected_code": "attachment-length-mismatch"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "attachment-duplicate",
+      "class": "denied",
+      "proof": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-duplicate.proof.cbor",
+        "sha256": "e8cee33ffce5ae54fac45fae8b8924b6bd7fc82a220911020df0a7b84f1fedc3"
+      },
+      "context": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-duplicate.context.cbor",
+        "sha256": "37b9b7628f5b9ea81dc675b456c0734763320f2c98824faae6782be763f3f9b3"
+      },
+      "canonical_action": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-duplicate.action.cbor",
+        "sha256": "2581413121d68359183a2f2428ca7d7f800aa0e3d9480da65f1faeac80b47dc7",
+        "profile": "auths.mcp",
+        "profile_version": 1,
+        "media_type": "application/vnd.auths.mcp-call.v1+cbor",
+        "capability": "tools/call",
+        "resource": "mcp://reports/read",
+        "requested_budget": {
+          "algebra": "numeric-ceiling-v1",
+          "value": 5
+        }
+      },
+      "canonical_body": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-duplicate.body.cbor",
+        "sha256": "5c63cdd40e91c52d8e1e01d76e968cb2cd262c6c0ca0e9674a0975a1118f0a2d"
+      },
+      "expected_result": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-duplicate.result.cbor",
+        "sha256": "2ecf888df7b3e330c31f2a6fae2ea804a710e8a22a76bea007701fe162df75c3",
+        "stage": "resolve",
+        "decision": "denied",
+        "code": "duplicate-attachment",
+        "proof_digest": "e8cee33ffce5ae54fac45fae8b8924b6bd7fc82a220911020df0a7b84f1fedc3",
+        "action_digest": "2581413121d68359183a2f2428ca7d7f800aa0e3d9480da65f1faeac80b47dc7",
+        "context_digest": "0cdcd389620fc16d7e9d8659de07aafad1daa55c11c8752e2ffdf5792e09824f",
+        "plan_digest": null,
+        "result_digest": "98edece5e1bd2369242b8f0b335be6a8adcedee3e849bb2db20d0612e8844c81",
+        "authorized_branches": [],
+        "assurance_satisfactions": 0,
+        "resources": {
+          "proof_bytes": 1171,
+          "action_bytes": 208,
+          "context_bytes": 1158,
+          "object_count": 5,
+          "plan_leaves": 1,
+          "plan_depth": 1,
+          "work_units": 0
+        },
+        "registry_manifest": "3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333"
+      },
+      "expected_decision": "denied",
+      "expected_code": "duplicate-attachment"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "attachment-unused",
+      "class": "denied",
+      "proof": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-unused.proof.cbor",
+        "sha256": "4df2724e5bcb3cbb8d944c3f0150b0c423132b339d8337d2f39c9ec4768a4942"
+      },
+      "context": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-unused.context.cbor",
+        "sha256": "37b9b7628f5b9ea81dc675b456c0734763320f2c98824faae6782be763f3f9b3"
+      },
+      "canonical_action": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-unused.action.cbor",
+        "sha256": "2581413121d68359183a2f2428ca7d7f800aa0e3d9480da65f1faeac80b47dc7",
+        "profile": "auths.mcp",
+        "profile_version": 1,
+        "media_type": "application/vnd.auths.mcp-call.v1+cbor",
+        "capability": "tools/call",
+        "resource": "mcp://reports/read",
+        "requested_budget": {
+          "algebra": "numeric-ceiling-v1",
+          "value": 5
+        }
+      },
+      "canonical_body": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-unused.body.cbor",
+        "sha256": "5c63cdd40e91c52d8e1e01d76e968cb2cd262c6c0ca0e9674a0975a1118f0a2d"
+      },
+      "expected_result": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-unused.result.cbor",
+        "sha256": "c2f13ee348b1c5e9bcd8875faf1679b02ca87ef9dcc3df040a5115ae53719f77",
+        "stage": "authority",
+        "decision": "denied",
+        "code": "unused-critical-attachment",
+        "proof_digest": "4df2724e5bcb3cbb8d944c3f0150b0c423132b339d8337d2f39c9ec4768a4942",
+        "action_digest": "2581413121d68359183a2f2428ca7d7f800aa0e3d9480da65f1faeac80b47dc7",
+        "context_digest": "0cdcd389620fc16d7e9d8659de07aafad1daa55c11c8752e2ffdf5792e09824f",
+        "plan_digest": "9dcbca93688318444c01100dfd6b2ae9357794177c98e87584f2ad35e20436f7",
+        "result_digest": "da258f1e82dc9154411b07a42be03a838c90907ab9536412be8d907f5cf4a94a",
+        "authorized_branches": [],
+        "assurance_satisfactions": 0,
+        "resources": {
+          "proof_bytes": 799,
+          "action_bytes": 208,
+          "context_bytes": 1158,
+          "object_count": 3,
+          "plan_leaves": 1,
+          "plan_depth": 1,
+          "work_units": 110
+        },
+        "registry_manifest": "3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333"
+      },
+      "expected_decision": "denied",
+      "expected_code": "unused-critical-attachment"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "attachment-opaque-allowed",
+      "class": "valid",
+      "proof": {
+        "path": "valid/attachment-opaque-allowed.proof.cbor",
+        "sha256": "9b2b98d1713dc22821abac5f8b9f5ff0e20e13e919a7a9b48d765d27d3fb2ea7"
+      },
+      "context": {
+        "path": "valid/attachment-opaque-allowed.context.cbor",
+        "sha256": "37b9b7628f5b9ea81dc675b456c0734763320f2c98824faae6782be763f3f9b3"
+      },
+      "canonical_action": {
+        "path": "valid/attachment-opaque-allowed.action.cbor",
+        "sha256": "2581413121d68359183a2f2428ca7d7f800aa0e3d9480da65f1faeac80b47dc7",
+        "profile": "auths.mcp",
+        "profile_version": 1,
+        "media_type": "application/vnd.auths.mcp-call.v1+cbor",
+        "capability": "tools/call",
+        "resource": "mcp://reports/read",
+        "requested_budget": {
+          "algebra": "numeric-ceiling-v1",
+          "value": 5
+        }
+      },
+      "canonical_body": {
+        "path": "valid/attachment-opaque-allowed.body.cbor",
+        "sha256": "5c63cdd40e91c52d8e1e01d76e968cb2cd262c6c0ca0e9674a0975a1118f0a2d"
+      },
+      "expected_result": {
+        "path": "valid/attachment-opaque-allowed.result.cbor",
+        "sha256": "b978b9280d0d94dd03f8fae2e32d637b3beb2a9eb37952c18fc96dc75c63590c",
+        "stage": "complete",
+        "decision": "authorized",
+        "code": "authorized",
+        "proof_digest": "9b2b98d1713dc22821abac5f8b9f5ff0e20e13e919a7a9b48d765d27d3fb2ea7",
+        "action_digest": "2581413121d68359183a2f2428ca7d7f800aa0e3d9480da65f1faeac80b47dc7",
+        "context_digest": "0cdcd389620fc16d7e9d8659de07aafad1daa55c11c8752e2ffdf5792e09824f",
+        "plan_digest": "9dcbca93688318444c01100dfd6b2ae9357794177c98e87584f2ad35e20436f7",
+        "result_digest": "cb39ca0937da9ac85ed0242f582a53acedef6c0fae5089d7f9fba9b92c390319",
+        "authorized_branches": [
+          "a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8"
+        ],
+        "assurance_satisfactions": 2,
+        "resources": {
+          "proof_bytes": 985,
+          "action_bytes": 208,
+          "context_bytes": 1158,
+          "object_count": 4,
+          "plan_leaves": 1,
+          "plan_depth": 1,
+          "work_units": 170
+        },
+        "registry_manifest": "3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333"
+      },
+      "expected_decision": "authorized",
+      "expected_code": "authorized"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "attachment-opaque-denied",
+      "class": "denied",
+      "proof": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-opaque-denied.proof.cbor",
+        "sha256": "df24f9a0e5b8d2d9ec5038a8af25231baffbc05d71f009f3f5c8cb3b1bedc13d"
+      },
+      "context": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-opaque-denied.context.cbor",
+        "sha256": "37b9b7628f5b9ea81dc675b456c0734763320f2c98824faae6782be763f3f9b3"
+      },
+      "canonical_action": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-opaque-denied.action.cbor",
+        "sha256": "2581413121d68359183a2f2428ca7d7f800aa0e3d9480da65f1faeac80b47dc7",
+        "profile": "auths.mcp",
+        "profile_version": 1,
+        "media_type": "application/vnd.auths.mcp-call.v1+cbor",
+        "capability": "tools/call",
+        "resource": "mcp://reports/read",
+        "requested_budget": {
+          "algebra": "numeric-ceiling-v1",
+          "value": 5
+        }
+      },
+      "canonical_body": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-opaque-denied.body.cbor",
+        "sha256": "5c63cdd40e91c52d8e1e01d76e968cb2cd262c6c0ca0e9674a0975a1118f0a2d"
+      },
+      "expected_result": {
+        "path": "denied/attachment-opaque-denied.result.cbor",
+        "sha256": "78dca7c84dfc2ae3fe96974aa1ceee6c44f0821bb217b16519a4eed790b15d94",
+        "stage": "authority",
+        "decision": "denied",
+        "code": "opaque-attachment-not-allowed",
+        "proof_digest": "df24f9a0e5b8d2d9ec5038a8af25231baffbc05d71f009f3f5c8cb3b1bedc13d",
+        "action_digest": "2581413121d68359183a2f2428ca7d7f800aa0e3d9480da65f1faeac80b47dc7",
+        "context_digest": "0cdcd389620fc16d7e9d8659de07aafad1daa55c11c8752e2ffdf5792e09824f",
+        "plan_digest": "9dcbca93688318444c01100dfd6b2ae9357794177c98e87584f2ad35e20436f7",
+        "result_digest": "ae8872c342b4deba82309540340ad15296d2f819ca054e480bb7c9e195ee6e88",
+        "authorized_branches": [],
+        "assurance_satisfactions": 0,
+        "resources": {
+          "proof_bytes": 985,
+          "action_bytes": 208,
+          "context_bytes": 1158,
+          "object_count": 4,
+          "plan_leaves": 1,
+          "plan_depth": 1,
+          "work_units": 110
+        },
+        "registry_manifest": "3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333"
+      },
+      "expected_decision": "denied",
+      "expected_code": "opaque-attachment-not-allowed"
+    }
+  ]
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/product-snapshot/conformance/formal-vectors.json b/product-snapshot/conformance/formal-vectors.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5af3fb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/conformance/formal-vectors.json
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+{
+  "algebra_contract": "auths-proof-algebra-contract/v1",
+  "action_constraints": [
+    "allowed-body-digests",
+    "any-body",
+    "exact-body-digest"
+  ],
+  "outcomes": [
+    "authorized",
+    "denied",
+    "indeterminate",
+    "structurally-invalid"
+  ],
+  "plan_nodes": [
+    "all-of",
+    "any-of",
+    "k-of-n",
+    "proof"
+  ],
+  "schema": "auths-proof-formal-inventory/v1",
+  "theorems": [
+    "all_associative",
+    "all_commutative",
+    "all_idempotent",
+    "any_associative",
+    "any_commutative",
+    "any_idempotent",
+    "attenuation_antisymm",
+    "attenuation_refl",
+    "attenuation_trans",
+    "authorized_action_covered",
+    "authorized_implies_threshold_met",
+    "canonical_diagnostic_permutation_invariant",
+    "chain_transitive_attenuation",
+    "binary_composition_swap_invariant",
+    "coverage_downward_closed",
+    "delegate_never_widens",
+    "delegate_preserves_root",
+    "delegate_strict_depth",
+    "delegate_updates_subject",
+    "attenuation_kernel_refines",
+    "denied_implies_threshold_impossible",
+    "plan_cost_is_node_count",
+    "plan_visit_is_leaf_enumeration",
+    "indeterminate_implies_threshold_reachable",
+    "threshold_monotone_k",
+    "threshold_n_eq_all",
+    "threshold_one_eq_any"
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/conformance/mutations.json b/product-snapshot/conformance/mutations.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf10a77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/conformance/mutations.json
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths-proof-adversarial-mutations/v1",
+  "mutations": [
+    {"id": "bitflip", "operation": "xor", "typed": false},
+    {"id": "duplicate", "operation": "duplicate", "typed": true},
+    {"id": "remove-required", "operation": "remove", "typed": true},
+    {"id": "replace", "operation": "replace", "typed": true},
+    {"id": "truncate", "operation": "truncate", "typed": false}
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/examples/offline-verification/Cargo.toml b/product-snapshot/examples/offline-verification/Cargo.toml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea6cf30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/examples/offline-verification/Cargo.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+[package]
+name = "auths-proof-offline-example"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+rust-version.workspace = true
+publish = false
+
+[dependencies]
+auths-codec = { workspace = true, features = ["std"] }
+auths-ports.workspace = true
+auths-proof = { workspace = true, features = ["std"] }
+auths-raw-key = { workspace = true, features = ["std"] }
+auths-registries = { workspace = true, features = ["std"] }
+auths-signature = { workspace = true, features = ["std"] }
+
+[lints]
+workspace = true
diff --git a/product-snapshot/examples/offline-verification/README.md b/product-snapshot/examples/offline-verification/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..31e57e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/examples/offline-verification/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Offline verification example
+
+This is a real external consumer crate, compiled by the workspace gate. It
+embeds the committed `raw-key-chain` proof, action, and trusted context; binds
+the context to the exact executable registry; and calls only the supported
+`auths-proof::Engine` façade.
+
+Run it with:
+
+```console
+cargo run -p auths-proof-offline-example
+```
+
+The verification call performs no resolver, network, database, filesystem,
+clock, or private-key I/O. `Indeterminate` is handled as a non-authorizing
+result that may become decidable only after the host supplies new trusted
+facts.
diff --git a/product-snapshot/examples/offline-verification/src/main.rs b/product-snapshot/examples/offline-verification/src/main.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ee4f0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/examples/offline-verification/src/main.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+use auths_ports::{PrincipalMethod, SignatureSuite};
+use auths_proof::{Engine, Verdict};
+
+const PROOF: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../core/fixtures/v1/valid/raw-key-chain.proof.cbor");
+const ACTION: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../core/fixtures/v1/valid/raw-key-chain.action.cbor");
+const TRUSTED_CONTEXT: &[u8] =
+    include_bytes!("../../../core/fixtures/v1/valid/raw-key-chain.context.cbor");
+
+fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+    let method = auths_raw_key::RawKeyMethod::new()?;
+    let suite = auths_signature::Ed25519Suite::new()?;
+    let methods: [&dyn PrincipalMethod; 1] = [&method];
+    let suites: [&dyn SignatureSuite; 1] = [&suite];
+    let registries = auths_registries::ImmutableRegistries::new(&methods, &suites)?;
+
+    // The trusted host, not the proof producer, commits the exact executable
+    // configuration and required composition policy.
+    let context = auths_codec::decode_verifier_context(TRUSTED_CONTEXT)?
+        .with_configuration(registries.configuration_id())?;
+    let required_plan = context
+        .composition()
+        .expected_plan()
+        .ok_or("example context must require an exact plan")?;
+    let context_bytes = auths_codec::encode_verifier_context(&context)?;
+
+    let result = Engine::new(registries).verify_cbor(PROOF, ACTION, &context_bytes)?;
+    let explanation = result.explanation();
+    let portable = result.portable();
+    let resources = result.resources();
+    println!(
+        "verdict={:?} code={} stage={:?} retryable={} work_units={}",
+        result.verdict(),
+        result.code(),
+        explanation.stage(),
+        explanation.retryable(),
+        resources.work_units()
+    );
+    println!(
+        "proof={:?} action={:?} context={:?} required_configuration={:?} local_configuration={:?}",
+        portable.proof_digest().as_bytes(),
+        portable.action_digest().as_bytes(),
+        portable.context_digest().as_bytes(),
+        portable
+            .required_configuration()
+            .map(|configuration| *configuration.as_bytes()),
+        portable.local_configuration().as_bytes()
+    );
+
+    match result.verdict() {
+        Verdict::Authorized => {
+            if portable.plan_id() != Some(required_plan) {
+                return Err("authorized result did not satisfy the host-required plan".into());
+            }
+            Ok(())
+        }
+        Verdict::Denied => Err(format!("stable authorization denial: {}", result.code()).into()),
+        Verdict::Indeterminate => Err(format!(
+            "not authorized; obtain new trusted facts before retrying: {}",
+            result.code()
+        )
+        .into()),
+    }
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/product/customer-journey-matrix.json b/product-snapshot/product/customer-journey-matrix.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8feed6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/product/customer-journey-matrix.json
@@ -0,0 +1,513 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.customer-journey-matrix/1",
+  "semanticOwner": "Rust",
+  "generatedCorpus": "target/binding-vectors/scenarios.json",
+  "experience": {
+    "schema": "auths.sdk-experience-metadata/1",
+    "enforcement": "baseline",
+    "baseline": {
+      "typescriptEntryPoints": 7,
+      "typescriptPublicSymbols": 193,
+      "pythonModules": 7,
+      "pythonPublicSymbols": 159,
+      "maintainedTypescriptRecipes": 5,
+      "maintainedPythonRecipes": 5
+    },
+    "targetBudgets": {
+      "primaryStatefulRootOperations": 3,
+      "recipeThreeSecurityConcepts": 3,
+      "recipeThreeDomainConcepts": 2,
+      "recipeThreeSetupDecisions": 1,
+      "applicationOrchestratedSecurityTransitions": 0,
+      "recipeThreeRequiredInputs": 3,
+      "purposeLabelledPublicLayers": 4,
+      "maintainedGoldenPathRecipesPerLanguage": 5,
+      "newDeveloperPasses": 4,
+      "newDeveloperCohort": 5,
+      "newDeveloperMinutes": 15,
+      "consumerRustToolchain": 0,
+      "semanticParityPercent": 100
+    },
+    "moderatedRecipeThreeCohort": {
+      "status": "awaiting-independent-cohort",
+      "cleanMachineDefinition": "supported runtime with an empty package cache and no Rust toolchain",
+      "cohortSize": 0,
+      "completions": [],
+      "interventions": [],
+      "anonymizedBlockers": []
+    },
+    "maintainedRecipes": [
+      {
+        "id": "typescript-01-authenticate-identity",
+        "language": "typescript",
+        "path": "bindings/recipes/typescript/01-authenticate-identity.ts"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "typescript-02-verify-authority",
+        "language": "typescript",
+        "path": "bindings/recipes/typescript/02-verify-authority.ts"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "typescript-03-execute-exact-action",
+        "language": "typescript",
+        "path": "bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "typescript-04-delegate-to-agent",
+        "language": "typescript",
+        "path": "bindings/recipes/typescript/04-delegate-to-agent.ts"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "typescript-05-cross-organization-plan",
+        "language": "typescript",
+        "path": "bindings/recipes/typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "python-01-authenticate-identity",
+        "language": "python",
+        "path": "bindings/recipes/python/01_authenticate_identity.py"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "python-02-verify-authority",
+        "language": "python",
+        "path": "bindings/recipes/python/02_verify_authority.py"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "python-03-execute-exact-action",
+        "language": "python",
+        "path": "bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "python-04-delegate-to-agent",
+        "language": "python",
+        "path": "bindings/recipes/python/04_delegate_to_agent.py"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "python-05-cross-organization-plan",
+        "language": "python",
+        "path": "bindings/recipes/python/05_cross_organization_plan.py"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "journeys": [
+    {
+      "id": "identity-shapes-and-authentication",
+      "rust": "core/crates/auths-identity/src/lib.rs",
+      "typescript": "bindings/typescript/test/integration/identity.test.js",
+      "python": "bindings/python/tests/test_api.py",
+      "experience": {
+        "targetJourney": "exchange-and-authenticate-identity-bytes",
+        "imports": [
+          "identity"
+        ],
+        "securityNouns": [
+          "Identity"
+        ],
+        "domainConcepts": [
+          "method",
+          "suite"
+        ],
+        "setupDecisions": [
+          "identity adapter"
+        ],
+        "apiMechanics": [
+          "decode",
+          "authenticate"
+        ],
+        "requiredApplicationComponents": [
+          "public identity bytes",
+          "message",
+          "signature"
+        ],
+        "executableStatements": 8,
+        "applicationOrchestratedSecurityTransitions": 0,
+        "terminalOutcomes": [
+          "authenticated",
+          "rejected"
+        ],
+        "consumerRequiresRust": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "verification-three-valued-and-mutation",
+      "rust": "core/fixtures/v1",
+      "typescript": "bindings/typescript/test/integration/scenario-corpus.test.js",
+      "python": "bindings/python/tests/test_api.py",
+      "experience": {
+        "targetJourney": "verify-an-existing-proof-without-executing",
+        "imports": [
+          "verify"
+        ],
+        "securityNouns": [
+          "Authority",
+          "Action"
+        ],
+        "domainConcepts": [],
+        "setupDecisions": [
+          "trusted context"
+        ],
+        "apiMechanics": [
+          "load verifier",
+          "verify bytes"
+        ],
+        "requiredApplicationComponents": [
+          "proof",
+          "canonical action",
+          "trusted context"
+        ],
+        "executableStatements": 6,
+        "applicationOrchestratedSecurityTransitions": 0,
+        "terminalOutcomes": [
+          "authorized",
+          "denied",
+          "indeterminate"
+        ],
+        "consumerRequiresRust": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "attach-delegate-and-attenuate",
+      "rust": "core/crates/auths-author/src/lib.rs",
+      "typescript": "bindings/typescript/test/integration/workflow/delegation.test.js",
+      "python": "bindings/python/tests/test_workflow.py",
+      "experience": {
+        "targetJourney": "delegate-narrower-authority-and-execute",
+        "imports": [
+          "root",
+          "profile"
+        ],
+        "securityNouns": [
+          "Identity",
+          "Authority",
+          "Action",
+          "Receipt"
+        ],
+        "domainConcepts": [
+          "profile action"
+        ],
+        "setupDecisions": [
+          "signer",
+          "trusted context",
+          "runtime store"
+        ],
+        "apiMechanics": [
+          "attach",
+          "review",
+          "delegate",
+          "execute"
+        ],
+        "requiredApplicationComponents": [
+          "parent authority",
+          "child identity",
+          "narrowing request",
+          "provider"
+        ],
+        "executableStatements": 24,
+        "applicationOrchestratedSecurityTransitions": 4,
+        "terminalOutcomes": [
+          "delegated",
+          "denied",
+          "indeterminate",
+          "executed",
+          "failed"
+        ],
+        "consumerRequiresRust": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "proof-plan-composition",
+      "rust": "core/crates/auths-author/src/lib.rs",
+      "typescript": "bindings/typescript/test/integration/authorization-plans.test.js",
+      "python": "bindings/python/tests/test_mcp_workflow.py",
+      "experience": {
+        "targetJourney": "authorize-and-execute-an-ordered-plan",
+        "imports": [
+          "root",
+          "profile"
+        ],
+        "securityNouns": [
+          "Authority",
+          "Action",
+          "Approval",
+          "Receipt"
+        ],
+        "domainConcepts": [
+          "ordered plan",
+          "profile provider"
+        ],
+        "setupDecisions": [
+          "approval policy",
+          "runtime store"
+        ],
+        "apiMechanics": [
+          "plan",
+          "approve",
+          "authorize",
+          "execute"
+        ],
+        "requiredApplicationComponents": [
+          "authority",
+          "ordered actions",
+          "provider"
+        ],
+        "executableStatements": 31,
+        "applicationOrchestratedSecurityTransitions": 5,
+        "terminalOutcomes": [
+          "executed",
+          "denied",
+          "indeterminate",
+          "cancelled",
+          "outcome-unknown"
+        ],
+        "consumerRequiresRust": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "closed-profile-command-and-plan",
+      "rust": "product/profiles",
+      "typescript": "bindings/typescript/test/integration/profiles/mcp.test.js",
+      "python": "bindings/python/tests/test_mcp_workflow.py",
+      "experience": {
+        "targetJourney": "execute-one-exact-protected-action",
+        "imports": [
+          "root",
+          "profiles/mcp"
+        ],
+        "securityNouns": [
+          "Authority",
+          "Action",
+          "Receipt"
+        ],
+        "domainConcepts": [
+          "MCP tool",
+          "typed provider"
+        ],
+        "setupDecisions": [
+          "development composition"
+        ],
+        "apiMechanics": [
+          "create",
+          "execute"
+        ],
+        "requiredApplicationComponents": [
+          "bounded authority",
+          "action",
+          "typed handler/provider"
+        ],
+        "executableStatements": 12,
+        "applicationOrchestratedSecurityTransitions": 0,
+        "terminalOutcomes": [
+          "executed",
+          "denied",
+          "indeterminate",
+          "failed",
+          "outcome-unknown"
+        ],
+        "consumerRequiresRust": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "trust-status-and-lifecycle",
+      "rust": "product/runtime/auths-lifecycle",
+      "typescript": "bindings/typescript/test/integration/workflow/client.test.js",
+      "python": "bindings/python/tests/test_native_authoring.py",
+      "experience": {
+        "targetJourney": "define-and-qualify-an-application-owned-effect-vertical",
+        "imports": [
+          "framework",
+          "testkit"
+        ],
+        "securityNouns": [
+          "Identity",
+          "Authority",
+          "Action",
+          "Receipt"
+        ],
+        "domainConcepts": [
+          "profile state",
+          "domain outcome",
+          "reconciliation"
+        ],
+        "setupDecisions": [
+          "trust source",
+          "status source",
+          "state store"
+        ],
+        "apiMechanics": [
+          "define profile",
+          "qualify transitions"
+        ],
+        "requiredApplicationComponents": [
+          "profile implementation",
+          "provider",
+          "fixtures"
+        ],
+        "executableStatements": 40,
+        "applicationOrchestratedSecurityTransitions": 0,
+        "terminalOutcomes": [
+          "qualified",
+          "rejected"
+        ],
+        "consumerRequiresRust": true
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "replay-budget-and-outcome-unknown",
+      "rust": "product/runtime/auths-lifecycle/src/kernel.rs",
+      "typescript": "bindings/typescript/test/unit/runtime-contract.test.js",
+      "python": "bindings/python/tests/test_mcp_workflow.py",
+      "experience": {
+        "targetJourney": "verify-a-signed-receipt-offline",
+        "imports": [
+          "receipts",
+          "verify"
+        ],
+        "securityNouns": [
+          "Receipt"
+        ],
+        "domainConcepts": [
+          "execution outcome"
+        ],
+        "setupDecisions": [],
+        "apiMechanics": [
+          "decode",
+          "verify link",
+          "verify signature"
+        ],
+        "requiredApplicationComponents": [
+          "signed receipt",
+          "verification material"
+        ],
+        "executableStatements": 5,
+        "applicationOrchestratedSecurityTransitions": 0,
+        "terminalOutcomes": [
+          "verified",
+          "rejected",
+          "indeterminate"
+        ],
+        "consumerRequiresRust": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "errors-observability-and-redaction",
+      "rust": "core/crates/auths-verifier/src/lib.rs",
+      "typescript": "bindings/typescript/test/unit/errors.test.js",
+      "python": "bindings/python/tests/test_product_errors.py",
+      "experience": {
+        "targetJourney": "execute-one-exact-protected-action",
+        "imports": [
+          "root"
+        ],
+        "securityNouns": [
+          "Action",
+          "Receipt"
+        ],
+        "domainConcepts": [
+          "recovery action"
+        ],
+        "setupDecisions": [],
+        "apiMechanics": [
+          "catch structured error",
+          "inspect recovery"
+        ],
+        "requiredApplicationComponents": [
+          "request id"
+        ],
+        "executableStatements": 6,
+        "applicationOrchestratedSecurityTransitions": 0,
+        "terminalOutcomes": [
+          "denied",
+          "indeterminate",
+          "failed",
+          "cancelled",
+          "outcome-unknown"
+        ],
+        "consumerRequiresRust": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "production-five-verb-workflow",
+      "rust": "product/runtime/auths-production-client/src/lib.rs",
+      "typescript": "bindings/typescript/test/integration/production-client.test.js",
+      "python": "bindings/python/tests/test_production_client.py",
+      "experience": {
+        "targetJourney": "create-delegate-execute-resume-and-verify-through-a-production-runtime",
+        "imports": [
+          "root",
+          "profiles"
+        ],
+        "securityNouns": [
+          "Identity",
+          "Authority",
+          "Action",
+          "Receipt"
+        ],
+        "domainConcepts": [
+          "qualified profile"
+        ],
+        "setupDecisions": [
+          "runtime endpoint"
+        ],
+        "apiMechanics": [
+          "create",
+          "delegate",
+          "execute",
+          "resume",
+          "verify"
+        ],
+        "requiredApplicationComponents": [
+          "public identity bytes",
+          "profile request bytes",
+          "runtime endpoint"
+        ],
+        "executableStatements": 10,
+        "applicationOrchestratedSecurityTransitions": 0,
+        "terminalOutcomes": [
+          "completed",
+          "denied",
+          "indeterminate",
+          "recoverable",
+          "verified",
+          "rejected"
+        ],
+        "consumerRequiresRust": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "installed-artifact-and-type-safety",
+      "rust": "bindings/wasm/auths-proof-wasm/examples/generate-node-vectors.rs",
+      "typescript": "bindings/typescript/test/package",
+      "python": ".github/workflows/python-sdk.yml",
+      "experience": {
+        "targetJourney": "implement-and-certify-a-cross-domain-mechanism-adapter",
+        "imports": [
+          "framework",
+          "testkit"
+        ],
+        "securityNouns": [],
+        "domainConcepts": [
+          "mechanism contract",
+          "conformance case"
+        ],
+        "setupDecisions": [
+          "adapter runtime"
+        ],
+        "apiMechanics": [
+          "implement port",
+          "run conformance"
+        ],
+        "requiredApplicationComponents": [
+          "adapter",
+          "test fixtures"
+        ],
+        "executableStatements": 20,
+        "applicationOrchestratedSecurityTransitions": 0,
+        "terminalOutcomes": [
+          "certified",
+          "rejected"
+        ],
+        "consumerRequiresRust": false
+      }
+    }
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/product/error-registry.json b/product-snapshot/product/error-registry.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ebb26b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/product/error-registry.json
@@ -0,0 +1,1040 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.error-registry/1",
+  "definitions": [
+    {
+      "code": "core.invalid-configuration",
+      "family": "configuration",
+      "owner": "core",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "create",
+      "stages": [
+        "configuration"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "correct-configuration",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Invalid configuration",
+      "explanation": "A bounded configuration value is invalid.",
+      "fixtureId": "core-invalid-configuration"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "core.unsupported-abi",
+      "family": "runtime",
+      "owner": "core",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "create",
+      "stages": [
+        "runtime"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "install-compatible-runtime",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Unsupported ABI",
+      "explanation": "The installed language package and native runtime do not share an ABI.",
+      "fixtureId": "core-unsupported-abi"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "core.unsupported-semantic-subject",
+      "family": "runtime",
+      "owner": "core",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "create",
+      "stages": [
+        "runtime"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "install-compatible-runtime",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Unsupported semantic subject",
+      "explanation": "The installed artifacts do not implement the same Auths meaning.",
+      "fixtureId": "core-unsupported-semantic-subject"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "core.malformed-input",
+      "family": "input",
+      "owner": "core",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "verify",
+      "stages": [
+        "parse"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "correct-input",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Malformed bounded input",
+      "explanation": "The supplied bounded value could not be parsed.",
+      "fixtureId": "core-malformed-input"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "core.native-runtime-unavailable",
+      "family": "runtime",
+      "owner": "core",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "create",
+      "stages": [
+        "runtime"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "safe",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "retry-execution",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Native runtime unavailable",
+      "explanation": "The packaged Auths runtime could not be initialized.",
+      "fixtureId": "core-native-runtime-unavailable"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "core.forged-execution-reference",
+      "family": "state",
+      "owner": "core",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "resume",
+      "stages": [
+        "reference"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "correct-input",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Invalid execution reference",
+      "explanation": "The execution reference is malformed, unauthenticated, or bound to different state.",
+      "fixtureId": "core-forged-execution-reference"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "core.runtime-conflict",
+      "family": "state",
+      "owner": "core",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "execute",
+      "stages": [
+        "lifecycle-store"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "conditional",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "satisfy-condition",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Runtime state conflict",
+      "explanation": "A concurrent operation changed the exact workflow state.",
+      "fixtureId": "core-runtime-conflict"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "core.runtime-unavailable",
+      "family": "runtime",
+      "owner": "core",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "execute",
+      "stages": [
+        "lifecycle-store"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "safe",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "retry-execution",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Runtime unavailable",
+      "explanation": "The durable runtime could not complete an operation before provider entry.",
+      "fixtureId": "core-runtime-unavailable"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "core.runtime-cancelled",
+      "family": "state",
+      "owner": "core",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "execute",
+      "stages": [
+        "cancellation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "safe",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "retry-execution",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Workflow cancelled",
+      "explanation": "The workflow was cancelled with definite non-effect evidence.",
+      "fixtureId": "core-runtime-cancelled"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "core.outcome-unknown",
+      "family": "provider",
+      "owner": "core",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "execute",
+      "stages": [
+        "provider-result"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "unknown",
+          "effect": "possible"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "resume-and-reconcile",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": true,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Provider outcome unknown",
+      "explanation": "The exact effect may have occurred and must be observed before retry.",
+      "fixtureId": "core-outcome-unknown"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "core.observation-pending",
+      "family": "provider",
+      "owner": "core",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "resume",
+      "stages": [
+        "reconciliation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "unknown",
+          "effect": "possible"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "resume-and-reconcile",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": true,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Observation pending",
+      "explanation": "The provider has not exposed conclusive evidence for the exact effect.",
+      "fixtureId": "core-observation-pending"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "core.observation-inconclusive",
+      "family": "provider",
+      "owner": "core",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "resume",
+      "stages": [
+        "reconciliation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "unknown",
+          "effect": "possible"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "resume-and-reconcile",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": true,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Observation inconclusive",
+      "explanation": "Available evidence cannot prove effect or non-effect for the exact request.",
+      "fixtureId": "core-observation-inconclusive"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "core.workflow-terminal",
+      "family": "state",
+      "owner": "core",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "resume",
+      "stages": [
+        "lifecycle"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "inspect-receipt",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Workflow already terminal",
+      "explanation": "The workflow has already reached an immutable terminal state.",
+      "fixtureId": "core-workflow-terminal"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "core.internal-invariant",
+      "family": "internal",
+      "owner": "core",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "execute",
+      "stages": [
+        "internal"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "contact-support",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Internal invariant failure",
+      "explanation": "Auths rejected an impossible internal state before an effect.",
+      "fixtureId": "core-internal-invariant"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "mcp.invalid-handler-output",
+      "family": "profile",
+      "owner": "mcp",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "execute",
+      "stages": [
+        "handler-result"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "unknown",
+          "effect": "possible"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "resume-and-reconcile",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": true,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Invalid MCP handler output",
+      "explanation": "The invoked handler returned an invalid or oversized bounded result.",
+      "fixtureId": "mcp-invalid-handler-output"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "mcp.handler-failed",
+      "family": "provider",
+      "owner": "mcp",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "execute",
+      "stages": [
+        "handler"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "unknown",
+          "effect": "possible"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "resume-and-reconcile",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": true,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "MCP handler failed",
+      "explanation": "The invoked handler failed without conclusive no-effect evidence.",
+      "fixtureId": "mcp-handler-failed"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "mcp.handler-timeout",
+      "family": "provider",
+      "owner": "mcp",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "execute",
+      "stages": [
+        "handler"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "unknown",
+          "effect": "possible"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "resume-and-reconcile",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": true,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "MCP handler timed out",
+      "explanation": "The invoked handler did not produce conclusive effect evidence before its deadline.",
+      "fixtureId": "mcp-handler-timeout"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "mcp.cancelled-before-entry",
+      "family": "profile",
+      "owner": "mcp",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "execute",
+      "stages": [
+        "reservation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "safe",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "retry-execution",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "MCP execution cancelled",
+      "explanation": "Execution was cancelled before the handler was entered.",
+      "fixtureId": "mcp-cancelled-before-entry"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "mcp.reservation-conflict",
+      "family": "state",
+      "owner": "mcp",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "execute",
+      "stages": [
+        "reservation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "satisfy-condition",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "MCP reservation conflict",
+      "explanation": "A different committed request already owns the execution record.",
+      "fixtureId": "mcp-reservation-conflict"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "mcp.replay",
+      "family": "state",
+      "owner": "mcp",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "execute",
+      "stages": [
+        "reservation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "inspect-receipt",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "MCP replay blocked",
+      "explanation": "The committed MCP execution has already reached a terminal state.",
+      "fixtureId": "mcp-replay"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "mcp.receipt-persist-failed",
+      "family": "state",
+      "owner": "mcp",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "execute",
+      "stages": [
+        "receipt"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "conditional",
+          "effect": "applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "contact-support",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": true,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "MCP receipt persistence failed",
+      "explanation": "The effect was observed but its execution receipt was not durably persisted.",
+      "fixtureId": "mcp-receipt-persist-failed"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "mcp.reconciliation-pending",
+      "family": "provider",
+      "owner": "mcp",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "resume",
+      "stages": [
+        "reconciliation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "unknown",
+          "effect": "possible"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "resume-and-reconcile",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": true,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "MCP reconciliation pending",
+      "explanation": "The profile still lacks conclusive effect evidence.",
+      "fixtureId": "mcp-reconciliation-pending"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "plan.member-interrupted",
+      "family": "provider",
+      "owner": "plan",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "execute",
+      "stages": [
+        "plan-member"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "unknown",
+          "effect": "possible"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "resume-and-reconcile",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": true,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Plan member interrupted",
+      "explanation": "The current ordered member may have applied and later members remain blocked.",
+      "fixtureId": "plan-member-interrupted"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "plan.member-failed-before-entry",
+      "family": "profile",
+      "owner": "plan",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "execute",
+      "stages": [
+        "plan-member"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "conditional",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "satisfy-condition",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Plan member blocked",
+      "explanation": "The current ordered member failed before provider entry.",
+      "fixtureId": "plan-member-failed-before-entry"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "plan.resume-reference-invalid",
+      "family": "state",
+      "owner": "plan",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "resume",
+      "stages": [
+        "reference"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "correct-input",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Plan reference invalid",
+      "explanation": "The supplied reference is not bound to this ordered plan execution.",
+      "fixtureId": "plan-resume-reference-invalid"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "plan.reconciliation-pending",
+      "family": "provider",
+      "owner": "plan",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "resume",
+      "stages": [
+        "reconciliation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "unknown",
+          "effect": "possible"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "resume-and-reconcile",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": true,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Plan reconciliation pending",
+      "explanation": "The current member remains outcome-unknown and later members remain blocked.",
+      "fixtureId": "plan-reconciliation-pending"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "plan.action-substituted",
+      "family": "input",
+      "owner": "plan",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "execute",
+      "stages": [
+        "plan-commitment"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "correct-input",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Plan action substituted",
+      "explanation": "The current ordered member does not match the approved plan commitment.",
+      "fixtureId": "plan-action-substituted"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.denied",
+      "family": "provider",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "provider"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "satisfy-condition",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Custody request denied",
+      "explanation": "The configured custody provider denied the exact signing request.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-denied"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.cancelled",
+      "family": "provider",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "provider"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "satisfy-condition",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Custody request cancelled",
+      "explanation": "The exact signing request was cancelled before Auths accepted a signature.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-cancelled"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.throttled",
+      "family": "provider",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "provider"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "conditional",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "satisfy-condition",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Custody provider throttled",
+      "explanation": "The custody provider refused the request under its current rate policy.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-throttled"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.unavailable",
+      "family": "provider",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "provider"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "conditional",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "satisfy-condition",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Custody provider unavailable",
+      "explanation": "The custody provider could not conclusively service the exact signing request.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-unavailable"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.revoked-key",
+      "family": "provider",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "key-lifecycle"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "correct-configuration",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Custody key revoked",
+      "explanation": "The configured key version is permanently barred from new signing.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-revoked-key"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.disabled-key",
+      "family": "provider",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "key-lifecycle"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "satisfy-condition",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Custody key disabled",
+      "explanation": "The configured key version is not permitted to create new signatures.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-disabled-key"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.provider-unknown",
+      "family": "provider",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "provider"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "conditional",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "contact-support",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Custody outcome unknown",
+      "explanation": "The provider did not prove whether it produced a signature for the exact request.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-provider-unknown"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.invalid-provider-response",
+      "family": "provider",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "provider-response"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "contact-support",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Invalid custody response",
+      "explanation": "The provider response could not be parsed as a bounded signing response.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-invalid-provider-response"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.request-mismatch",
+      "family": "input",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "central-validation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "contact-support",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Signing request mismatch",
+      "explanation": "The provider response names a different signing request.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-request-mismatch"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.principal-mismatch",
+      "family": "input",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "central-validation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "contact-support",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Signing principal mismatch",
+      "explanation": "The provider response names a different signing principal.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-principal-mismatch"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.descriptor-mismatch",
+      "family": "input",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "central-validation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "contact-support",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Signing descriptor mismatch",
+      "explanation": "The response signature method or suite differs from the frozen descriptor.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-descriptor-mismatch"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.key-version-mismatch",
+      "family": "input",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "central-validation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "contact-support",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Signing key version mismatch",
+      "explanation": "The provider response names a different key version.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-key-version-mismatch"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.transaction-mismatch",
+      "family": "input",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "central-validation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "contact-support",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Signing transaction mismatch",
+      "explanation": "The provider response is bound to a different Auths transaction.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-transaction-mismatch"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.malformed-signature",
+      "family": "input",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "central-validation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "contact-support",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Malformed provider signature",
+      "explanation": "The returned signature is not a bounded encoding accepted by its suite.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-malformed-signature"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.non-canonical-signature",
+      "family": "input",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "central-validation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "contact-support",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Non-canonical provider signature",
+      "explanation": "The returned signature has a different canonical representation.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-non-canonical-signature"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.signature-verification-failed",
+      "family": "input",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "central-validation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "contact-support",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Provider signature invalid",
+      "explanation": "The returned signature does not verify over the exact Auths preimage.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-signature-verification-failed"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.evidence-mismatch",
+      "family": "input",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "central-validation"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "contact-support",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Custody evidence mismatch",
+      "explanation": "The returned evidence does not match the frozen custody descriptor.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-evidence-mismatch"
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "custody.lifecycle-not-permitted",
+      "family": "state",
+      "owner": "custody",
+      "ownerVersion": 1,
+      "operation": "sign",
+      "stages": [
+        "key-lifecycle"
+      ],
+      "outcomes": [
+        {
+          "retry": "never",
+          "effect": "not-applied"
+        }
+      ],
+      "recommendedAction": "satisfy-condition",
+      "allowsExecutionReference": false,
+      "allowsDecisionReference": false,
+      "allowsReceiptReference": false,
+      "title": "Custody lifecycle blocks signing",
+      "explanation": "The exact key lifecycle state does not permit new signatures.",
+      "fixtureId": "custody-lifecycle-not-permitted"
+    }
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/product/python-runtime-contract.json b/product-snapshot/product/python-runtime-contract.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0a1cdc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/product/python-runtime-contract.json
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.python-runtime-contract/1",
+  "package": {
+    "name": "auths",
+    "version": "1.0.0rc1",
+    "nativeAbi": 2,
+    "wheelAbi": "abi3-py39"
+  },
+  "runtime": {
+    "implementation": "CPython",
+    "versions": ["3.9", "3.10", "3.11", "3.12", "3.13", "3.14"],
+    "operatingSystems": ["linux", "macos", "windows"],
+    "freeThreaded": false
+  },
+  "distribution": {
+    "wheels": "published",
+    "sourceDistribution": "not-published",
+    "localCompilerRequired": false
+  },
+  "semanticSubjects": {
+    "identity": "auths-identity/v1",
+    "authority": "auths-proof-protocol/v1",
+    "mcpProfile": "auths.mcp/1",
+    "lifecycle": "auths.product.reservation-execution-contract/2"
+  },
+  "capabilities": [
+    "authority.delegate",
+    "authority.plans",
+    "diagnostics.doctor",
+    "identity.descriptor-v1",
+    "identity.resolution",
+    "runtime.closed-execution",
+    "verification.batch-v1",
+    "verification.single-v1",
+    "workflow.approval"
+  ],
+  "modules": [
+    "auths",
+    "auths.identity",
+    "auths.verify",
+    "auths.profiles",
+    "auths.integrations",
+    "auths.framework",
+    "auths.testkit"
+  ],
+  "excludedModules": [
+    "auths.advanced",
+    "auths.approvals",
+    "auths.authority",
+    "auths.bootstrap",
+    "auths.conformance",
+    "auths.custody",
+    "auths.diagnostics",
+    "auths.errors",
+    "auths.inspection",
+    "auths.lifecycle",
+    "auths.mcp",
+    "auths.native",
+    "auths.observability",
+    "auths.product_errors",
+    "auths.profile_kit",
+    "auths.profiles.domains",
+    "auths.profiles.http",
+    "auths.profiles.mcp",
+    "auths.receipts",
+    "auths.runtime",
+    "auths.trust",
+    "auths.workflow"
+  ],
+  "compatibilityWindow": false,
+  "adapterContract": "auths.python-adapter-contracts/1"
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/product/typescript-runtime-contract.json b/product-snapshot/product/typescript-runtime-contract.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6eb142f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/product/typescript-runtime-contract.json
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.runtime-contract/1",
+  "package": "@auths-dev/sdk",
+  "sdkVersion": "1.0.0-rc.1",
+  "authoringAbi": 1,
+  "identityAbi": 1,
+  "requiredSubpaths": [
+    ".",
+    "./identity",
+    "./verify",
+    "./profiles",
+    "./integrations",
+    "./framework",
+    "./testkit"
+  ],
+  "requiredWasmExports": [
+    "authoringAbiVersionV1",
+    "identityAbiVersionV1",
+    "encodeIdentityDescriptorV1",
+    "decodeIdentityDescriptorV1",
+    "identityDescriptorSigningPreimageV1",
+    "verifyV1",
+    "verifyBatchV1"
+  ],
+  "profiles": {
+    "auths.mcp": 1
+  },
+  "capabilities": [
+    "authority.delegate",
+    "authority.plans",
+    "diagnostics.doctor",
+    "identity.compact-v2",
+    "identity.descriptor-v1",
+    "identity.registry-v1",
+    "identity.resolution",
+    "inspection.safe-projection",
+    "runtime.closed-execution",
+    "verification.batch-v1",
+    "verification.single-v1",
+    "workflow.approval"
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/protocol/auths-proof.cddl b/product-snapshot/protocol/auths-proof.cddl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea5b807
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/protocol/auths-proof.cddl
@@ -0,0 +1,517 @@
+; Auths Proof Protocol V1
+; Deterministic CBOR schema
+;
+; All maps use exactly the integer keys shown. Decoders MUST reject duplicate
+; keys, unknown critical keys, non-minimal integers, indefinite lengths,
+; invalid UTF-8, unsorted set encodings, and trailing bytes.
+;
+; Protocol hard maxima:
+;   bundle bytes       8 MiB
+;   grants             256
+;   actions            128
+;   plan leaves        128
+;   plan depth         16
+;   evidence objects   512
+;   one evidence       2 MiB
+;   signatures         1024
+;   extensions/object  32
+; Deployments use lower limits by default.
+
+protocol-version = 1
+digest32 = bytes .size 32
+timestamp = uint
+bounded-id = text .size (1..128)
+principal-id = text .size (1..512)
+verification-method = text .size (1..512)
+profile-id = text .size (1..128)
+profile-version = uint .le 65535
+capability = text .size (1..128)
+resource = text .size (1..1024)
+audience = text .size (1..512)
+media-type = text .size (1..128)
+extension-id = text .size (1..128)
+proof-ref = digest32
+
+permission = {
+  0: capability,
+  1: resource,
+}
+
+; Strictly ascending by (capability, resource), without duplicates.
+permission-set = [1*1024 permission]
+
+; Strictly ascending UTF-8 byte order, without duplicates.
+audience-set = [1*256 audience]
+
+signature-descriptor = {
+  0: bounded-id,            ; principal method ID
+  1: verification-method,
+  2: bounded-id,            ; signature-suite ID
+}
+
+signature-envelope = {
+  0: signature-descriptor,
+  1: bytes .size (1..4096),
+}
+
+any-body = {
+  0: 0,
+}
+
+exact-body-digest = {
+  0: 1,
+  1: digest32,
+}
+
+; Digests are strictly ascending and unique.
+allowed-body-digests = {
+  0: 2,
+  1: [1*256 digest32],
+}
+
+action-constraint =
+  any-body /
+  exact-body-digest /
+  allowed-body-digests
+
+budget-ceiling = {
+  0: bounded-id,            ; registered budget algebra
+  1: uint,                  ; numeric ceiling for initial registry
+}
+
+expiry-only-status = {
+  0: 0,
+}
+
+snapshot-required-status = {
+  0: 1,
+  1: bounded-id,            ; status method
+  2: uint .ge 1,            ; maximum age in seconds
+}
+
+status-policy = expiry-only-status / snapshot-required-status
+
+critical-extension = {
+  0: extension-id,
+  1: bytes .size (0..65536),
+}
+
+; Strictly ascending by extension ID.
+critical-extensions = [*32 critical-extension]
+
+grant-statement = {
+  0: protocol-version,
+  1: principal-id,          ; issuer
+  2: principal-id,          ; subject
+  3: profile-id,
+  4: profile-version,
+  5: permission-set,
+  6: timestamp,             ; not_before
+  7: timestamp,             ; expires_at
+  8: audience-set,
+  9: action-constraint,
+  10: budget-ceiling / null,
+  11: uint .le 65535,       ; remaining delegation depth
+  12: digest32 / null,      ; parent GrantId
+  13: status-policy,
+  14: bounded-id,           ; assurance predicate ID
+  15: critical-extensions,
+}
+
+signed-grant = {
+  0: grant-statement,
+  1: signature-envelope,
+}
+
+action-envelope = {
+  0: protocol-version,
+  1: profile-id,
+  2: profile-version,
+  3: media-type,
+  4: digest32,              ; canonical body digest
+  5: capability,
+  6: resource,
+  7: budget-ceiling / null, ; requested stateful budget
+  8: audience,
+  9: digest32,              ; challenge
+  10: timestamp,            ; issued_at
+  11: timestamp,            ; expires_at
+  12: principal-id,         ; actor
+  13: digest32 / null,      ; terminal GrantId
+  14: digest32,             ; AuthorizationPlanId
+  15: bounded-id,           ; channel-binding requirement ID
+  16: proof-ref,            ; stable branch reference
+  17: [*512 attachment-descriptor],
+  18: critical-extensions,
+}
+
+signed-action = {
+  0: action-envelope,
+  1: signature-envelope,
+}
+
+plan-proof = {
+  0: 0,
+  1: proof-ref,
+}
+
+plan-all-of = {
+  0: 1,
+  1: [1*128 authorization-plan],
+}
+
+plan-any-of = {
+  0: 2,
+  1: [1*128 authorization-plan],
+}
+
+plan-k-of-n = {
+  0: 3,
+  1: uint .ge 1 .le 128,
+  2: [1*128 authorization-plan],
+}
+
+authorization-plan =
+  plan-proof /
+  plan-all-of /
+  plan-any-of /
+  plan-k-of-n
+
+evidence-object = {
+  0: digest32,              ; EvidenceId
+  1: bounded-id,            ; evidence type
+  2: media-type,
+  3: bytes .size (1..2097152),
+}
+
+grant-statement-ref = {
+  0: 0,
+  1: digest32,
+}
+
+action-statement-ref = {
+  0: 1,
+  1: digest32,
+}
+
+principal-status-statement-ref = {
+  0: 2,
+  1: digest32,
+}
+
+grant-status-statement-ref = {
+  0: 3,
+  1: digest32,
+}
+
+statement-ref =
+  grant-statement-ref /
+  action-statement-ref /
+  principal-status-statement-ref /
+  grant-status-statement-ref
+
+; Evidence IDs are strictly ascending and unique.
+control-binding = {
+  0: statement-ref,
+  1: [1*32 digest32],
+}
+
+principal-state-active = 0
+principal-state-revoked = 1
+principal-state-superseded = 2
+
+principal-status-statement = {
+  0: protocol-version,
+  1: bounded-id,            ; exact status method
+  2: principal-id,
+  3: bounded-id,            ; purpose
+  4: principal-state-active /
+     principal-state-revoked /
+     principal-state-superseded,
+  5: uint,                  ; sequence
+  6: timestamp,             ; observed_at
+  7: timestamp,             ; valid_until
+  8: principal-id,          ; issuer
+  9: critical-extensions,
+}
+
+signed-principal-status = {
+  0: principal-status-statement,
+  1: signature-envelope,
+}
+
+grant-state-active = 0
+grant-state-revoked = 1
+grant-state-superseded = 2
+
+grant-status-statement = {
+  0: protocol-version,
+  1: bounded-id,            ; exact status method
+  2: digest32,              ; GrantId
+  3: grant-state-active /
+     grant-state-revoked /
+     grant-state-superseded,
+  4: uint,                  ; sequence
+  5: timestamp,             ; observed_at
+  6: timestamp,             ; valid_until
+  7: principal-id,          ; issuer
+  8: critical-extensions,
+}
+
+signed-grant-status = {
+  0: grant-status-statement,
+  1: signature-envelope,
+}
+
+attachment-descriptor = {
+  0: digest32,
+  1: media-type,
+  2: uint,                  ; byte length
+  3: bounded-id,            ; disposition
+  4: bool,                  ; encrypted
+  5: bool,                  ; required
+  6: bool,                  ; opaque bytes permitted
+}
+
+bundle-header = {
+  0: protocol-version,
+  1: uint,                  ; flags, currently zero
+}
+
+; Grants sort by GrantId. Actions sort by proof-ref. Evidence and attachments
+; sort by digest. Bindings sort by statement-ref. Status arrays sort by their
+; statement identifiers.
+proof-bundle = {
+  0: bundle-header,
+  1: [*256 signed-grant],
+  2: [1*128 signed-action],
+  3: authorization-plan,
+  4: [*512 evidence-object],
+  5: [*512 control-binding],
+  6: [*512 signed-principal-status],
+  7: [*512 signed-grant-status],
+  8: [*512 attachment-descriptor],
+  9: bytes / null,          ; canonical body or detached
+}
+
+profile-ref = {
+  0: profile-id,
+  1: profile-version .ge 1,
+}
+
+principal-status-snapshot = {
+  0: digest32,              ; StatusSnapshotId
+  1: timestamp,             ; observed_at
+  2: timestamp,             ; valid_until
+  3: [*512 signed-principal-status],
+  4: [*512 digest32],       ; checkpoint evidence IDs
+  5: [*1024 status-trust-rule],
+}
+
+grant-status-snapshot = {
+  0: digest32,              ; StatusSnapshotId
+  1: timestamp,             ; observed_at
+  2: timestamp,             ; valid_until
+  3: [*512 signed-grant-status],
+  4: [*512 digest32],       ; checkpoint evidence IDs
+  5: [*1024 status-trust-rule],
+}
+
+status-trust-rule = {
+  0: bounded-id,            ; exact status method
+  1: principal-id,          ; trusted issuer
+  2: uint,                  ; minimum accepted sequence
+}
+
+accepted-registries = {
+  0: digest32,              ; pinned registry manifest ID
+  1: [1*1024 bounded-id],   ; principal methods
+  2: [1*1024 bounded-id],   ; signature suites
+  3: [*1024 bounded-id],    ; evidence types
+  4: [*1024 bounded-id],    ; principal status methods
+  5: [*1024 bounded-id],    ; grant status methods
+  6: [*1024 bounded-id],    ; assurance claims
+  7: [*1024 bounded-id],    ; assurance implication rules
+  8: [1*1024 bounded-id],   ; resource matchers
+  9: [*1024 bounded-id],    ; budget algebras
+  10: [*1024 extension-id], ; accepted critical extensions
+  11: [1*1024 profile-ref], ; accepted profiles
+  12: [1*1024 bounded-id],  ; profile policies
+}
+
+participant-role = 0 / 1 / 2 / 3 ; root/intermediate/actor/external issuer
+
+assurance-requirement = {
+  0: participant-role,
+  1: bounded-id,            ; assurance claim ID
+  2: [*32 [bounded-id, bounded-id]], ; required parameter pairs
+  3: bounded-id / null,     ; evidence source
+  4: bounded-id / null,     ; exact adapter ID
+  5: uint .ge 1 / null,     ; exact adapter version
+  6: uint .ge 1 / null,     ; optional maximum age in seconds
+  7: 0 / 1,                 ; any / every selected participant
+}
+
+assurance-policy = {
+  0: bounded-id,            ; assurance policy ID
+  1: [*512 assurance-requirement],
+}
+
+trust-anchor = {
+  0: bounded-id,            ; local anchor ID
+  1: principal-id,
+  2: [1*1024 bounded-id],   ; accepted principal methods
+  3: [1*1024 profile-ref],
+  4: permission-set,
+  5: [*1024 resource],      ; exact local resource namespaces
+  6: audience-set,
+  7: timestamp,             ; not_before
+  8: timestamp,             ; expires_at
+  9: budget-ceiling / null,
+  10: uint .le 65535,       ; maximum delegation depth
+  11: bounded-id,           ; assurance policy ID
+  12: status-policy,
+}
+
+verifier-limits = {
+  0: uint .le 8388608,      ; bundle bytes
+  1: uint .le 16777216,     ; canonical-action input bytes
+  2: uint .le 16777216,     ; trusted-context input bytes
+  3: uint .le 256,          ; grants
+  4: uint .le 128,          ; actions
+  5: uint .le 128,          ; plan leaves
+  6: uint .le 16,           ; plan depth
+  7: uint .le 128,          ; plan branching
+  8: uint .le 512,          ; evidence objects
+  9: uint .le 2097152,      ; one evidence object
+  10: uint .le 512,         ; control bindings
+  11: uint .le 512,         ; principal status statements
+  12: uint .le 512,         ; grant status statements
+  13: uint .le 512,         ; attachments
+  14: uint .le 8388608,     ; aggregate detached attachment bytes
+  15: uint .le 1024,        ; signatures
+  16: uint .le 4096,        ; one signature
+  17: uint .le 1024,        ; permissions
+  18: uint .le 256,         ; audiences
+  19: uint .le 32,          ; critical extensions
+  20: uint .le 65536,       ; one critical extension
+  21: uint .le 256,         ; allowed body digests
+  22: uint .le 32,          ; evidence IDs in one binding
+  23: uint .le 8388608,     ; canonical action body
+  24: uint .le 1024,        ; accepted entries per registry
+  25: uint .le 1024,        ; trust anchors
+  26: uint .le 1000000,     ; total work units
+}
+
+composition-requirement = {
+  0: digest32 / null,       ; exact required AuthorizationPlanId
+  1: uint .ge 1 .le 128,   ; minimum authorized branches
+  2: uint .ge 1 .le 128,   ; minimum distinct actors
+  3: uint .ge 1 .le 128,   ; minimum distinct roots
+}
+
+; This canonical trusted context is hashed for ContextDigest. Key 1 commits
+; every decision-affecting executable adapter and registry configuration.
+verifier-context = {
+  0: verifier-limits,
+  1: digest32,              ; VerifierConfigurationId
+  2: composition-requirement,
+  3: [1*1024 trust-anchor],
+  4: accepted-registries,
+  5: audience,
+  6: digest32,              ; expected challenge
+  7: timestamp,             ; evaluation time
+  8: assurance-policy,
+  9: principal-status-snapshot,
+  10: grant-status-snapshot,
+  11: bounded-id,           ; resource matcher ID
+  12: bounded-id,           ; profile policy ID
+  13: bounded-id,           ; channel policy ID
+}
+
+detached-attachment = {
+  0: digest32,
+  1: bytes .size (1..8388608),
+}
+
+canonical-action = {
+  0: profile-ref,
+  1: media-type,
+  2: bytes .size (1..8388608),
+  3: permission,
+  4: budget-ceiling / null,
+  5: [*512 detached-attachment],
+}
+
+verification-resources = {
+  0: uint, ; proof bytes
+  1: uint, ; canonical action bytes
+  2: uint, ; context bytes
+  3: uint, ; decoded object count
+  4: uint, ; plan leaves
+  5: uint, ; plan depth
+  6: uint, ; reserved work units
+}
+
+verification-result = {
+  0: 0 / 1 / 2,            ; authorized / denied / indeterminate
+  1: 0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4,    ; decode / resolve / control / authority / complete
+  2: { 0: 0 / 1 / 2, 1: bounded-id }, ; stable class and result code
+  3: digest32,              ; proof digest
+  4: digest32,              ; canonical action digest
+  5: digest32,              ; context digest
+  6: digest32 / null,       ; plan ID
+  7: digest32,              ; self-binding result digest
+  8: [*128 proof-ref],      ; authorized branches
+  9: [*512 any],            ; canonical participant assurance reports
+  10: [*512 any],           ; canonical assurance satisfactions
+  11: verification-resources,
+  12: digest32,             ; registry manifest
+  13: digest32 / null,      ; configuration required by the trusted context
+  14: digest32,             ; verifier-local executable configuration
+  15: 2,                    ; portable ABI version
+}
+
+grant-signing-input = {
+  0: grant-statement,
+  1: signature-descriptor,
+}
+
+action-signing-input = {
+  0: action-envelope,
+  1: signature-descriptor,
+}
+
+principal-status-signing-input = {
+  0: principal-status-statement,
+  1: signature-descriptor,
+}
+
+grant-status-signing-input = {
+  0: grant-status-statement,
+  1: signature-descriptor,
+}
+
+decision-receipt = {
+  0: protocol-version,
+  1: digest32,              ; proof digest
+  2: digest32,              ; canonical action digest
+  3: digest32,              ; context digest
+  4: digest32,              ; principal-status snapshot ID
+  5: digest32,              ; grant-status snapshot ID
+  6: profile-id,
+  7: profile-version,
+  8: uint,                  ; verdict class
+  9: [1*32 bounded-id],     ; stable reason codes
+  10: timestamp,
+}
+
+execution-receipt = {
+  0: protocol-version,
+  1: digest32,              ; decision receipt digest
+  2: digest32,              ; execution lease ID
+  3: digest32,              ; verified command digest
+  4: uint,                  ; execution outcome
+  5: digest32 / null,       ; result digest
+  6: timestamp,
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/protocol/did-keri.md b/product-snapshot/protocol/did-keri.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c382618
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/protocol/did-keri.md
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+# V1 `did:keri` Principal Adapter Profile
+
+## Purpose
+
+The `did-keri-v1` adapter proves that the signer of an Auths statement controls
+a key in an embedded KERI event log. It does not decide what the principal is
+allowed to do and it does not resolve or assert globally current KERI state.
+
+```text
+KERI evidence + exact Auths signing bytes + signature
+                            |
+                            v
+              verified principal control
+                            |
+                            v
+              authority verifier (separate)
+```
+
+## Registry values
+
+| Field | Value |
+| --- | --- |
+| Adapter ID | `did-keri-v1` |
+| Principal form | `did:keri:<44-character E-qualified prefix>` |
+| Evidence media type | `application/vnd.auths.did-keri-kel.v1` |
+| Ed25519 suite | `ed25519-v1` |
+| P-256 suite | `p256-sha256-v1` |
+
+The verification method is:
+
+```text
+<principal>#key-<establishment-sequence-hex>-<key-index-decimal>
+```
+
+Both numbers use their shortest representation. The establishment sequence
+binds a statement to the exact key-establishment event selected by the
+evidence; it is not inferred from signature length or algorithm.
+
+## Evidence encoding
+
+The evidence bytes are a closed binary envelope:
+
+```text
+"AUTHS-DID-KERI\x00\x01"
+u16-be event_count
+repeat event_count times:
+    u32-be event_json_length
+    event_json bytes
+    u32-be attachment_length
+    CESR controller-signature attachment bytes
+```
+
+No trailing bytes are permitted. Standard limits are 64 events, 64 KiB per
+JSON event, 16 KiB per attachment, and 16 keys per establishment event.
+
+Each JSON event must be byte-for-byte equal to its compact insertion-order
+serialization. Its KERI version byte count and Blake3-256 self-addressing
+digest are recomputed. Evidence is content-addressed by the ordinary Auths
+`EvidenceId` rule.
+
+## Supported KERI subset
+
+- KERI 1.0 JSON `icp`, `rot`, and `ixn`;
+- self-addressing Blake3-256 (`E`) identifiers;
+- simple numeric signing and next-key thresholds;
+- Ed25519 (`D`/`B`) and P-256 (`1AAJ`/`1AAI`) keys;
+- indexed and dual-indexed Ed25519/P-256 controller signatures;
+- pre-rotation commitment validation;
+- zero-witness KELs.
+
+The adapter rejects delegated events, weighted thresholds, non-zero witness
+thresholds, witness lists/receipts, unsupported event/key/signature codes,
+broken sequence or prior links, threshold failures, commitment mismatches,
+non-canonical JSON, and evidence beyond its bounds.
+
+## Assurance and freshness
+
+A valid result always emits:
+
+```text
+self-certifying-identifier
+offline-verifiable
+```
+
+It additionally emits `rotation-aware` only while the accepted state retains
+valid next-key commitments. A non-transferable or deliberately abandoned
+identifier is correctly treated as irrevocable by the authority verifier.
+
+The method returns suite-specific verification-key bytes. Verification of the
+Auths statement remains in the separately selected exact signature suite; KEL
+controller signatures are verified internally as evidence authenticity.
+
+An embedded KEL alone does not emit `controller-state-current-at`,
+`witness-threshold-met`, or `revocation-checked-at`. A verifier may supply an
+immutable authenticated checkpoint containing the exact principal, latest
+sequence and event SAID, observation window, and optional satisfied witness
+threshold. When it matches the replayed state and evaluation time, those
+current-state claims are emitted. Checkpoints are local method context and are
+never selected by the proof.
+
+The adapter does not emit `historical-at` or
+`statement-existence-proven-at`; those require separately authenticated
+historical observations.
+
+This distinction is security-critical. A complete, valid embedded KEL proves
+that the selected key follows the rotations present in that KEL. It cannot
+prove that no later rotation exists elsewhere. Applications requiring current
+controller state must obtain separately authenticated freshness evidence and
+use a policy that requires the corresponding assurance claim.
+
+## Interoperability requirement
+
+Conformance must include fixtures produced independently of this adapter.
+Milestone 2 pins keripy 1.3.4 bytes for a threshold-2, three-key inception and
+a threshold-2 rotation to two keys with dual-index signatures. The adapter
+must accept that KEL and reject forged signatures, unmet thresholds, altered
+SAIDs, broken prior links, and commitment mismatches.
diff --git a/product-snapshot/protocol/did-key.md b/product-snapshot/protocol/did-key.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..027334e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/protocol/did-key.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# V1 `did:key` Principal Adapter Profile
+
+## Registry values
+
+| Field | Value |
+| --- | --- |
+| Adapter ID | `did-key-v1` |
+| Principal form | `did:key:<multibase-value>` |
+| Evidence media type | `application/vnd.auths.did-key.v1` |
+| Verification method | `<principal>#<multibase-value>` |
+
+The profile follows the
+[`did:key` method](https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-key-spec/) but deliberately
+supports only base58btc (`z`) Multikey values containing:
+
+- Ed25519 multicodec `0xed`, encoded as varint bytes `ed 01`;
+- compressed P-256 multicodec `0x1200`, encoded as varint bytes `80 24`.
+
+The key length and curve point are validated. The adapter performs no
+algorithm inference or fallback.
+
+## Evidence
+
+```text
+"AUTHS-DID-KEY\x00\x01"
+u16-be multikey_length
+multikey UTF-8 bytes
+```
+
+The evidence Multikey must reconstruct the exact principal and verification
+method. Signature verification remains in the separately selected exact
+signature-suite implementation.
+
+## Assurance
+
+The adapter emits:
+
+```text
+self-certifying-identifier
+offline-verifiable
+```
+
+`did:key` has no rotation, deactivation, or historical controller-state
+mechanism. It remains subject to irrevocable-principal policy.
diff --git a/product-snapshot/protocol/did-web.md b/product-snapshot/protocol/did-web.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..deec8b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/protocol/did-web.md
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+# V1 `did:web` Evidence and Trust Profile
+
+## Boundary
+
+`did:web` retrieval and `did:web` verification are separate operations:
+
+```text
+DNS + HTTPS + host policy
+          |
+          v
+auths-proof-apps/integrations/auths-resolver-did-web
+          |
+          +---- canonical document evidence
+          +---- explicit host trust record
+                            |
+                            v
+                    auths-did-web
+                 (pure; no resolution)
+                            |
+                            v
+                  authority verifier
+```
+
+The proof bundle carries the canonical DID document. A verifier supplies the
+trust record as local context, like a trust anchor. An untrusted proof must
+never be allowed to choose its own trust record.
+
+The HTTPS mapping follows the
+[`did:web` method specification](https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-method-web/):
+
+```text
+did:web:example.com
+  -> https://example.com/.well-known/did.json
+
+did:web:example.com:users:alice
+  -> https://example.com/users/alice/did.json
+```
+
+V1 accepts lowercase ASCII DNS hosts, optional `%3A<port>`, and unreserved
+ASCII path components. IP-address DIDs, Unicode hosts, arbitrary percent
+encoding, dot segments, and redirects are rejected.
+
+## Registry values
+
+| Field | Value |
+| --- | --- |
+| Adapter ID | `did-web-bundled-v1` |
+| Evidence media type | `application/vnd.auths.did-web-bundle.v1` |
+| Principal form | closed V1 `did:web:` form |
+
+## DID document profile
+
+The bundled document is canonical JSON and is limited to 32 KiB. The closed
+V1 profile contains exactly:
+
+- the sole context `https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1`;
+- an `id` exactly equal to the principal;
+- absolute verification method IDs under `<principal>#...`;
+- `type: "Multikey"`;
+- `controller` exactly equal to the principal;
+- base58btc Ed25519 or compressed P-256 Multikey material;
+- string-reference `assertionMethod` relationships;
+- string-reference `capabilityDelegation` and `capabilityInvocation`
+  relationships.
+
+For a grant, the selected method must appear in `capabilityDelegation`. For an
+action, it must appear in `capabilityInvocation`. Embedded methods, remote
+contexts, JWK auto-detection, unsupported curves, and unknown root properties
+fail closed.
+
+The evidence envelope is:
+
+```text
+"AUTHS-DID-WEB\x00\x01"
+u16-be principal_length
+principal UTF-8 bytes
+u32-be document_length
+canonical document bytes
+```
+
+This is the exact contract emitted by the native resolver. The pure method
+revalidates the identifier, document profile, canonical bytes, principal,
+verification relationship, and Multikey; acquisition is never trusted merely
+because it occurred.
+
+## Explicit trust records
+
+A document identifying itself as `did:web:example.com` is not proof that it
+came from `example.com`. The adapter therefore requires a host-controlled
+record matching the principal and SHA-256 document digest.
+
+### Current resolution
+
+```text
+principal
+document_digest
+observed_at
+valid_until
+```
+
+The verification time must be within the record window. Successful
+verification emits `controller-state-current-at` and
+`revocation-checked-at` with `observed_at`. Policy can bound their age.
+
+### Historical pin
+
+```text
+principal
+document_digest
+valid_from
+valid_until
+optional {
+    SHA-256(exact Auths signing bytes)
+    statement_existed_at
+}
+```
+
+The asserted signing time must fall within the pinned document interval. This
+establishes `historical-at`, but not by itself that the statement actually
+existed while that key was authorized.
+
+When the optional exact-statement pin matches, the adapter additionally emits
+`statement-existence-proven-at`. A document-only historical pin cannot satisfy
+a policy requiring that claim, preventing a removed key from backdating a
+newly created grant or action.
+
+If the bundled document is known to the trusted adapter context but no
+historical interval covers the asserted signing time, control verification is
+`historical-state-unavailable`. If no trusted record for the exact document is
+present at all, it is `external-fact-unavailable`.
+
+The principal-control request carries the exact signing preimage, its asserted
+statement time, and one of `CapabilityDelegation`, `CapabilityInvocation`, or
+`Assertion`. This lets the pure method enforce verification relationships and
+match exact-statement pins without performing signature verification.
+
+## Resolver controls
+
+The reference native resolver:
+
+- requires an exact host allowlist;
+- resolves DNS before the request and rejects any non-public address;
+- pins the approved addresses into the HTTPS client;
+- disables redirects;
+- requires an accepted JSON media type;
+- enforces response-size and timeout limits;
+- validates document identity and the closed profile before returning;
+- has no authority-verification API.
+
+The resolver is native-only. The adapter, evidence, trust records, and verifier
+remain WASM-compatible.
diff --git a/product-snapshot/protocol/domain-separation.md b/product-snapshot/protocol/domain-separation.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e30a8c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/protocol/domain-separation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+# Domain Separation and Identifiers — V1
+
+## Signing preimage
+
+Every signed preimage is:
+
+```text
+UTF8("AUTHS") ||
+u16be(protocol_major) ||
+u16be(object_type) ||
+u16be(profile_id_length) ||
+UTF8(profile_id) ||
+u16be(profile_version) ||
+u64be(canonical_object_length) ||
+deterministic_cbor(canonical_object)
+```
+
+The canonical signing object contains the unsigned statement and its
+`SignatureDescriptor`. This binds the principal method, verification method,
+and signature suite.
+
+Object type identifiers are registered:
+
+| ID | Object |
+|---:|---|
+| 1 | grant |
+| 2 | action |
+| 3 | principal status |
+| 4 | grant status |
+| 5 | decision receipt |
+| 6 | execution receipt |
+| 7 | registry manifest |
+| 8 | bridge grant |
+
+Profile-independent objects use an empty profile ID and version zero.
+
+## Content identifiers
+
+`domain_hash` is:
+
+```text
+SHA-256(
+  UTF8("AUTHS-ID") ||
+  u16be(protocol_major) ||
+  u16be(identifier_type) ||
+  u64be(canonical_bytes_length) ||
+  canonical_bytes
+)
+```
+
+Identifier type identifiers are fixed:
+
+| ID | Identifier |
+|---:|---|
+| 1 | grant statement |
+| 2 | action envelope |
+| 3 | authorization plan |
+| 4 | evidence object content |
+| 5 | principal-status statement |
+| 6 | grant-status statement |
+| 7 | decision receipt |
+| 8 | execution receipt |
+| 9 | public verifier-context projection |
+| 10 | registry manifest |
+
+Identifiers:
+
+- `GrantId`: canonical `grant-statement`, excluding signature;
+- `ActionId`: canonical `action-envelope`, excluding signature;
+- `AuthorizationPlanId`: canonical `authorization-plan`;
+- `EvidenceId`: canonical evidence type, media type, and bytes;
+- status statement IDs: canonical unsigned status statement;
+- attachment digest: raw SHA-256 of exact attachment bytes;
+- decision/execution receipt IDs: canonical unsigned receipt;
+- context digest: canonical public verifier-context projection;
+- canonical body digest: raw SHA-256 of exact profile-canonical body bytes;
+- portable canonical action digest: raw SHA-256 of the complete deterministic
+  `canonical-action` CBOR input;
+- proof digest: raw SHA-256 of exact canonical proof-bundle bytes.
+
+The `proof-ref` is a 32-byte branch identifier generated during authoring and
+covered by the action signature. It is not derived from an action containing
+the plan ID, avoiding an identifier cycle.
+
+## Algorithms
+
+V1 content identifiers and body digests use SHA-256. The registry contains no
+algorithm field for these identifiers.
+
+Ed25519 signs the full domain-separated preimage.
+`p256-sha256-v1` uses ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 and fixed-width 64-byte
+`r || s`; high-S signatures are rejected.
+
+SHA-1 is prohibited for every security-bearing identifier.
diff --git a/product-snapshot/protocol/error-codes.md b/product-snapshot/protocol/error-codes.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..13bc2ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/protocol/error-codes.md
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+# Stable Failure Taxonomy — V1
+
+The enforcement decision is binary: executable or not executable. The proof
+verifier retains three diagnostic classes.
+
+## Authorized
+
+| Code | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `authorized` | Every proof, authority, status, assurance, and action-binding check passed |
+
+## Denied
+
+| Code | Stage | Meaning |
+|---|---|---|
+| `malformed-proof` | decode | Input is not a complete bounded V1 object |
+| `non-canonical-proof` | decode | Encoding or set order is not canonical |
+| `resource-limit-exceeded` | any | Configured byte, count, depth, signature, or work limit exceeded |
+| `digest-mismatch` | resolve | Content does not match its identifier |
+| `duplicate-object` | resolve | Duplicate identifier or semantic object |
+| `missing-reference` | resolve | Required digest reference is absent |
+| `unused-critical-evidence` | resolve | Critical evidence is unconsumed |
+| `invalid-signature` | control | Cryptographic signature is invalid |
+| `principal-method-mismatch` | control | Principal and selected method disagree |
+| `verification-method-mismatch` | control | Verification method is not valid for principal/purpose |
+| `signature-suite-mismatch` | control | Suite and key are incompatible |
+| `untrusted-root` | authority | No scoped local anchor covers the root |
+| `broken-grant-chain` | authority | Issuer, subject, parent, actor, or profile linkage is broken |
+| `delegation-expanded` | authority | A child widened an authority dimension |
+| `permission-not-granted` | authority | Terminal authority lacks the exact permission |
+| `action-constraint-mismatch` | authority | Body digest is outside the granted constraint |
+| `budget-ceiling-exceeded` | authority | Requested budget exceeds or mismatches the signed ceiling |
+| `composition-requirement-not-met` | authority | Authorized branches do not satisfy the trusted expected plan, quorum, actor-diversity, or root-diversity obligation |
+| `plan-action-mismatch` | action | Branches bind different action meaning or plan |
+| `action-body-mismatch` | action | Canonical body digest differs |
+| `audience-mismatch` | action | Audience differs from verifier context |
+| `challenge-mismatch` | action | Challenge differs from verifier context |
+| `action-outside-validity` | action | Action is not live |
+| `principal-revoked` | status | Accepted status says principal is revoked |
+| `grant-revoked` | status | Accepted status says grant or ancestor is revoked |
+| `status-sequence-rollback` | status | Status sequence moves backwards |
+| `status-method-mismatch` | status | Subject status exists only under another exact method |
+| `status-issuer-untrusted` | status | A valid status signature was made by an issuer outside snapshot trust |
+| `registry-manifest-mismatch` | control | Context manifest differs from the immutable executable registry |
+| `verifier-configuration-mismatch` | control | Context configuration commitment differs from the exact executable adapter and registry configuration |
+| `resource-namespace-mismatch` | authority | Selected matcher rejects every root namespace |
+| `critical-extension-unknown` | extension | Required extension is not registered |
+| `attachment-missing` | action | Required signed attachment bytes are absent |
+| `attachment-digest-mismatch` | action | Detached bytes do not hash to the signed identifier |
+| `attachment-length-mismatch` | action | Detached byte length differs from the signed length |
+| `duplicate-attachment` | resolve/action | An attachment identifier occurs more than once |
+| `unused-critical-attachment` | action | Signed descriptors and supplied detached inputs do not correspond |
+| `opaque-attachment-not-allowed` | action | Encrypted bytes were supplied where opaque verification was not signed as acceptable |
+| `local-policy-denied` | policy | Explicit local policy rejects established facts |
+
+## Indeterminate
+
+| Code | Stage | Meaning |
+|---|---|---|
+| `unsupported-protocol` | decode | Protocol major is not supported |
+| `unsupported-principal-method` | control | Required method is not registered |
+| `unsupported-signature-suite` | control | Required suite is not registered |
+| `unsupported-evidence-type` | evidence | Evidence verifier is unavailable |
+| `unsupported-status-method` | status | Required status verifier is unavailable |
+| `unsupported-profile` | action | Required profile/version is unavailable |
+| `unsupported-profile-policy` | policy | Accepted profile-policy ID has no exact executable handler |
+| `unsupported-resource-matcher` | authority | Accepted resource matcher has no exact executable handler |
+| `unsupported-budget-algebra` | authority | Accepted budget algebra has no exact executable handler |
+| `unsupported-critical-extension` | extension | Accepted critical extension has no exact executable handler |
+| `unsupported-assurance-claim` | assurance | An adapter emitted a claim without an accepted exact handler |
+| `missing-principal-evidence` | control | Required control fact cannot be established |
+| `missing-principal-status` | status | Required principal status is absent |
+| `missing-grant-status` | status | Required grant status is absent |
+| `stale-status` | status | Status exists but is not fresh enough |
+| `historical-state-unavailable` | evidence | Historical control/existence cannot be established |
+| `assurance-requirement-not-met` | assurance | Required parameterized claim is absent |
+| `external-fact-unavailable` | evidence | Required bounded external fact was not supplied |
+
+## Outer runtime failures
+
+These are never Auths authorization verdicts:
+
+| Code | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `challenge-unknown` | Challenge was not issued |
+| `challenge-expired` | Challenge expired |
+| `challenge-consumed` | Challenge was already claimed |
+| `replay-store-unavailable` | Atomic replay state unavailable |
+| `budget-exhausted` | Stateful budget cannot be claimed |
+| `budget-store-unavailable` | Budget state unavailable |
+| `channel-policy-failed` | Peer observation does not satisfy local policy |
+| `application-policy-failed` | Verified action violates a local restriction |
+| `receipt-store-unavailable` | Receipt persistence policy cannot be met |
+| `execution-failed` | Authorized command failed during execution |
+
+Reason codes and diagnostic class are normative corpus fields.
+
+## Reserved V1 codes
+
+The following codes remain allocated in the portable enum but are not emitted
+by a validly decoded V1 proof:
+
+| Code | Reason reserved |
+|---|---|
+| `ambiguous-terminal-grant` | Action envelopes carry one explicit terminal grant, so ambiguity is rejected as malformed before authority evaluation |
+| `authorization-plan-invalid` | The canonical decoder and model constructors validate plan shape and limits; invalid shapes are `malformed-proof` or `resource-limit-exceeded` before composition |
+| `reference-cycle` | V1 grant identifiers are content hashes of statements containing their parent identifiers; a constructible cycle cannot pass content-address validation, so ordinary broken graphs produce `missing-reference` or `digest-mismatch` |
+
+Reserved codes have no corpus vector and MUST NOT be emitted by a conforming V1
+portable verifier.
diff --git a/product-snapshot/protocol/hsm-attested.md b/product-snapshot/protocol/hsm-attested.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae599d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/protocol/hsm-attested.md
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# V1 HSM-Attested Principal Adapter Profile
+
+## Registry values
+
+| Field | Value |
+| --- | --- |
+| Principal method and evidence type | `hsm-attested-v1` |
+| Evidence media type | `application/vnd.auths.hsm-attested.v1` |
+| Principal | `hsm:<base64url-unpadded key-record digest>` |
+| Verification method | `<principal>#key` |
+| Suites | `ed25519-v1`, `p256-sha256-v1` |
+
+Provider APIs, device-certificate retrieval, and profile-specific chain
+validation are outer-layer acquisition concerns. The pure method receives
+verifier-local immutable records produced under reviewed profiles for cloud
+KMS, PKCS#11, secure-enclave, or dedicated-HSM devices. A record fixes the
+suite and key, profile, provider, protection level, key-handle and device-chain
+digests, exportability, and observation window.
+
+## Evidence
+
+```text
+"AUTHS-HSM-ATTESTED\x00\x01"
+u8 profile_length || profile
+u8 provider_length || provider
+u8 protection_level_length || protection_level
+32-byte key_handle_digest
+32-byte device_chain_digest
+u8 non_exportable
+32-byte SHA-256(exact Auths signing preimage)
+```
+
+The evidence must exactly match the local record and transaction digest.
+Signature verification remains in the exact selected suite. A successful
+result emits `hardware-attested` with named profile/provider/level and
+exportability parameters, current controller and revocation-check claims, and
+`offline-verifiable`.
diff --git a/product-snapshot/protocol/protocol.md b/product-snapshot/protocol/protocol.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9758c32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/protocol/protocol.md
@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+# Auths Proof Protocol V1
+
+## Status
+
+This specification defines the prelaunch target contract. Earlier V1
+prototype bytes are obsolete. `auths-proof.cddl`, the registry, the
+verification algorithm, and the checked-in CBOR corpus are normative together.
+
+## Claim
+
+Given a proof bundle, canonical action, and explicit local verifier context,
+Auths answers:
+
+> Did authority flow from a locally scoped trust anchor to every required
+> actor without expansion, and does the resulting authority cover this exact
+> action?
+
+The pure verifier performs no network, filesystem, environment, clock,
+randomness, database, private-key, replay, or execution operation.
+
+## Four planes
+
+### Proof
+
+The proof plane owns deterministic objects, scoped trust anchors,
+attenuation, authorization plans, action binding, and verified values.
+
+### Evidence
+
+The evidence plane establishes principal control, signature validity,
+principal status, grant status, freshness, and parameterized assurance.
+Adapters return facts. They cannot construct authority results.
+
+### Execution
+
+The execution plane owns challenges, transport observations, replay and budget
+stores, local application policy, execution leases, verified command decoding,
+and execution.
+
+### Control
+
+The control plane owns authoring, signer integrations, configuration,
+registries, receipts, audit export, observability, conformance, and
+evaluation.
+
+## Authority objects
+
+### Trust anchor
+
+A trust anchor is verifier-local and never proof-carried authority. It
+contains:
+
+- principal and accepted control methods;
+- allowed profiles and versions;
+- exact permission and resource ceilings;
+- audience ceiling;
+- validity window;
+- optional budget ceiling;
+- maximum delegation depth;
+- assurance predicate;
+- status policy.
+
+Adding an unrelated trust anchor cannot authorize a chain anchored elsewhere.
+
+### Grant
+
+A grant transfers a bounded subset of authority from issuer to subject.
+Every edge must narrow or preserve:
+
+- exact permissions;
+- validity;
+- audiences;
+- action constraint;
+- budget ceiling;
+- remaining delegation depth;
+- profile and version;
+- status and assurance policy; and
+- critical extensions.
+
+The first grant from a trust anchor may establish a critical-extension set.
+Every later child grant MUST preserve that complete canonical set byte for
+byte until an extension-specific attenuation algebra is standardized.
+
+Issuer/subject and parent linkage must be exact. Cross-profile delegation
+requires a registered bridge extension.
+
+### Action constraint
+
+V1 has a closed algebra:
+
+```text
+ExactBodyDigest(x) <= AllowedBodyDigests(S)  when x is in S
+AllowedBodyDigests(S) <= ExactBodyDigest(x)  when every member of S is x
+AllowedBodyDigests(A) <= AllowedBodyDigests(B) when A is a subset of B
+AllowedBodyDigests(S) <= AnyBody
+ExactBodyDigest(x) <= AnyBody
+```
+
+No application callback changes this order.
+
+Canonical production allow-lists are non-empty and duplicate-free, so the
+second rule applies exactly to `AllowedBodyDigests({x})`. Consequently,
+`ExactBodyDigest(x)` and `AllowedBodyDigests({x})` are distinct wire values but
+mutually attenuate and authorize the same body. The raw constructors form a
+preorder; structural antisymmetry applies after normalizing singleton
+allow-lists to `ExactBodyDigest` (or modulo this semantic equivalence).
+
+### Authorization plan
+
+V1 supports bounded:
+
+- `Proof`;
+- `AllOf`;
+- `AnyOf`;
+- `KOfN`.
+
+Every satisfied leaf has one signed action envelope with the same canonical
+body digest, profile, capability, resource, audience, challenge, validity
+context, and plan ID. A `proof-ref` breaks the plan/action identifier cycle and
+uniquely names a branch.
+
+Plan depth, leaves, branching, signatures, and total adapter work are bounded.
+Evaluation order is canonical so parallel and sequential implementations
+produce the same primary outcome.
+
+The proof-carried plan is not the policy. The trusted verifier context carries
+an independent `CompositionRequirement` with an optional exact plan ID and
+minimum authorized-branch, distinct-actor, and distinct-root counts. An
+authorized result proves both that the branches satisfy the signed plan and
+that the outcome satisfies this host-required obligation. Distinct proof
+references alone never imply independent signers or roots.
+
+### Action envelope
+
+Every signed action binds:
+
+- profile and version;
+- body media type and canonical body digest;
+- capability and resource;
+- optional requested budget under a registered monotonic algebra;
+- audience and challenge;
+- issue and expiry times;
+- actor and terminal grant;
+- authorization plan ID and proof reference;
+- channel-binding requirement;
+- signed attachment descriptors and required/opaque-use policy;
+- critical extensions.
+
+Profiles define canonical body bytes and verified command decoding. The
+executor consumes the decoded command from `VerifiedAction`, never the
+original untrusted request.
+
+## Evidence and status
+
+Evidence is content addressed, bounded, and selected by exact type.
+Control bindings associate signed statements with evidence without turning
+resolver output into trust. For each successfully verified statement, the
+binding must exactly equal the evidence IDs reported consumed by the selected
+principal adapter. Extra, ignored, or adapter-invented evidence fails closed.
+
+Principal status and grant status are separate signed facts. Each carries an
+exact method, subject, issuer, sequence, and validity boundary. The trusted
+snapshot supplies accepted issuers and sequence floors; latest-sequence
+selection is deterministic and revoked dominates active at the same sequence.
+Historical control, current control, statement existence, revocation, and
+freshness are not interchangeable.
+
+Assurance is role-indexed and every requirement explicitly selects `Any` or
+`Every` participant with that role. Every claim records the participant, chain role,
+parameters, adapter and version, evidence digests, and provenance. A strong
+actor cannot satisfy a weak root or intermediate.
+
+## Decisions
+
+The language-neutral pure result is canonical CBOR:
+
+```text
+verify_v1(proof_cbor, canonical_action_cbor, trusted_context_cbor)
+  -> verification_result_cbor
+```
+
+It records `Authorized`, `Denied`, or `Indeterminate`, the final stage and
+stable code, all applicable input/plan/result digests, authorized branches,
+assurance and satisfaction reports, exact resource totals, work reserved, and
+the registry manifest, and the exact executable verifier-configuration
+commitment. Native APIs may project an authorized result to a sealed
+`VerifiedAction`.
+
+Denied means available facts establish invalidity or insufficient authority.
+Indeterminate means a required trustworthy fact was not established.
+Neither can execute.
+
+Replay, channel, budget, and application policy are outer gates:
+
+```text
+Authorized action
+AND status freshness
+AND channel policy
+AND replay lease
+AND budget claim
+AND application policy
+= ExecutableAction
+```
+
+The proof-carried V1 budget ceiling is a stateless limit on the one proposed
+action. It does not count prior actions or reserve shared capacity. Aggregate,
+rolling, or shared spending limits require an execution-plane budget store.
+
+V1 assurance policy identifiers are retained by exact equality across a
+delegation edge. V1 does not define a stronger/weaker assurance lattice; a
+future lattice is a protocol-versioned semantic change, not an interpretation
+left to an adapter.
+
+Stable first-failure ordering makes implementations and receipts agree on one
+diagnostic. It is not a timing, cache, power, or other side-channel
+noninterference guarantee.
+
+## Deterministic encoding
+
+V1 uses the constrained deterministic CBOR profile in `auths-proof.cddl`:
+
+- definite-length maps, arrays, text, and bytes only;
+- shortest integer and length encodings;
+- ascending integer map keys;
+- no duplicate keys, floats, tags, or trailing bytes;
+- canonical strict ordering for every set representation;
+- exact critical-field and registry handling.
+
+Semantically similar but byte-distinct application actions are not assumed
+equivalent. Signed attachment descriptors are part of action signing bytes.
+Detached bytes are part of the portable canonical-action input and are checked
+against their signed SHA-256 identifiers and lengths.
+
+## Default and hard limits
+
+| Resource | Default | Hard maximum |
+|---|---:|---:|
+| Bundle bytes | 256 KiB | 8 MiB |
+| Canonical-action input bytes | 2 MiB | 16 MiB |
+| Trusted-context input bytes | 2 MiB | 16 MiB |
+| Grants | 16 | 256 |
+| Actions/plan leaves | 16 | 128 |
+| Plan depth | 8 | 16 |
+| Evidence objects | 32 | 512 |
+| One evidence object | 64 KiB | 2 MiB |
+| Control bindings | 32 | 512 |
+| Principal status statements | 32 | 512 |
+| Grant status statements | 32 | 512 |
+| Attachments | 32 | 512 |
+| Aggregate detached attachment bytes | 1 MiB | 8 MiB |
+| Signatures | 64 | 1,024 |
+| One signature | 512 B | 4 KiB |
+| Permissions | 64 | 1,024 |
+| Audiences | 32 | 256 |
+| Critical extensions/object | 8 | 32 |
+| One critical extension | 16 KiB | 64 KiB |
+| Allowed body digests | 32 | 256 |
+| Evidence IDs per binding | 8 | 32 |
+| Canonical action body | 1 MiB | 8 MiB protocol ceiling and lower profile limit |
+| Accepted entries per registry | 64 | 1,024 |
+| Trust anchors | 32 | 1,024 |
+| Adapter work units | 50,000 | 1,000,000 |
+
+Deployments may lower limits. Raising a hard maximum requires protocol review.
+
+## Conformance artifacts
+
+`fixtures/v1/manifest.json` indexes every canonical `.cbor` artifact and
+records:
+
+- SHA-256 file digest;
+- fixture class and source specification;
+- expected stage reached;
+- verdict and stable reason code;
+- expected proof, action, context, plan, and self-binding result digests;
+- expected assurance report;
+- byte, object, depth, signature, and work-unit counts.
+
+Fixture classes are:
+
+```text
+valid/
+denied/
+indeterminate/
+malformed/
+maximum/
+metamorphic/
+```
+
+An explicit reviewed `cargo xtask wire --update` is the only operation allowed
+to replace normative bytes. Ordinary tests compare and fail.
diff --git a/product-snapshot/protocol/registry.md b/product-snapshot/protocol/registry.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ea7158
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/protocol/registry.md
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+# Auths V1 Initial Registries
+
+All lookups are exact. Unknown identifiers return `Indeterminate` when a
+required capability is unavailable or `Denied` when an unknown critical field
+or contradictory identifier appears. No parser, adapter, or algorithm
+fallback is permitted.
+
+The complete executable target-V1 set is bound by the pinned manifest
+`33` repeated 32 times. A context carrying any other manifest is denied before
+pluggable verification. Every implementation declares a conservative maximum
+work cost that is reserved before invocation.
+
+## Pure semantic registries
+
+| Kind | Target V1 ID | Required behavior |
+|---|---|---|
+| Resource matcher | `uri-namespace-v1` | Exact URI namespace boundary matching |
+| Profile policy | `exact-v1` | Effect-free acceptance of already validated canonical action facts |
+| Budget algebra | `numeric-ceiling-v1` | Exact-algebra attenuation and coverage using unsigned `<=` |
+| Critical extension | `exact-marker-v1` | Requires the exact byte string `h'01'` and otherwise changes no authority |
+| Principal status | `auths-principal-status-v1` | Trusted issuer, method, floor, freshness, and revoked-dominant latest selection |
+| Grant status | `auths-grant-status-v1` | Same selection rules as principal status |
+
+Critical-extension, assurance-claim, and assurance-implication lookups are
+also exact executable lookups. An identifier listed by the context without an
+installed handler is indeterminate; an unaccepted signed critical extension is
+denied. There is no fallback or version negotiation.
+
+## Principal methods
+
+| ID | Evidence ceiling | Mandatory suites |
+|---|---:|---|
+| `raw-key-v1` | 512 B | Ed25519, P-256 |
+| `did-key-v1` | 2 KiB | Ed25519, P-256 |
+| `did-keri-v1` | 64 KiB | registered KERI-compatible suites |
+| `did-web-bundled-v1` | 32 KiB | Ed25519, P-256 |
+| `spiffe-x509-v1` | 32 KiB | certificate-selected registered suite |
+| `webauthn-v1` | 16 KiB | P-256 mandatory |
+| `hsm-attested-v1` | 32 KiB | attestation-profile selected suite |
+
+## Signature suites
+
+| ID | Public key | Signature | Rule |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `ed25519-v1` | 32-byte compressed point | 64 bytes | RFC 8032 verification of exact preimage |
+| `p256-sha256-v1` | 33-byte compressed SEC1 | 64-byte `r || s` | ECDSA/SHA-256, low-S required |
+
+## Status methods
+
+| ID | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `auths-principal-status-v1` | Signed active/revoked/superseded principal state |
+| `auths-grant-status-v1` | Signed active/revoked/superseded grant state |
+| `keri-checkpoint-v1` | KERI sequence and witness/transparency checkpoint |
+| `x509-status-v1` | Certificate validity and revocation evidence |
+| `webauthn-credential-status-v1` | Registered authenticator credential state |
+| `local-deny-list-v1` | Verifier-local explicit deny facts |
+
+## Budget algebras
+
+| ID | Order |
+|---|---|
+| `numeric-ceiling-v1` | child value must be less than or equal to parent |
+
+## Composition operators
+
+| ID | Meaning |
+|---:|---|
+| 0 | `Proof` |
+| 1 | `AllOf` |
+| 2 | `AnyOf` |
+| 3 | `KOfN` |
+
+## Transports
+
+| ID | Peer observation |
+|---|---|
+| `memory-v1` | none |
+| `iroh-v1` | endpoint and session key |
+| `https-v1` | TLS peer and exporter binding |
+| `tcp-v1` | endpoint only |
+| `unix-v1` | socket and OS peer credentials |
+| `file-v1` | envelope and sequence metadata |
+
+## Profiles
+
+| Profile ID | Version | Operations |
+|---|---:|---|
+| `auths.mcp` | 1 | MCP tool calls |
+| `auths.http` | 1 | canonical HTTP requests |
+| `auths.git` | 1 | commit, tag, ref, merge, release |
+| `auths.deploy` | 1 | release and infrastructure deployment |
+| `auths.supply-chain` | 1 | build, attest, publish, promote |
+| `auths.edge` | 1 | device command and firmware activation |
+
+## Assurance claims
+
+The initial claim registry contains:
+
+- `self-certifying-identifier`;
+- `offline-verifiable`;
+- `controller-state-current-at`;
+- `historical-at`;
+- `statement-existence-proven-at`;
+- `rotation-aware`;
+- `revocation-checked-at`;
+- `witness-threshold-met`;
+- `pki-chain-validated`;
+- `workload-attested`;
+- `hardware-attested`;
+- `user-verified`;
+- `origin-bound`.
+
+Parameterized claims never satisfy unparameterized “high assurance” by name
+alone. The assurance registry defines exact implication rules.
+
+## Critical extensions
+
+`exact-marker-v1` is the initial non-authority-changing executable extension.
+Its body is exactly `h'01'`; it exists to exercise exact handler selection,
+signed-byte validation, work reservation, and portable interoperability.
+Unknown critical extensions are denied. New attenuation or composition
+semantics require a protocol review, an executable model, and a new manifest.
+
+## Assurance implications
+
+No implication rule is initially registered. Claim names never imply one
+another. A future implication must have an exact accepted identifier and a
+pure executable handler included in a new registry manifest.
diff --git a/product-snapshot/protocol/spiffe-x509.md b/product-snapshot/protocol/spiffe-x509.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a783f1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/protocol/spiffe-x509.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# V1 SPIFFE X.509-SVID Principal Adapter Profile
+
+## Registry values
+
+| Field | Value |
+| --- | --- |
+| Principal method and evidence type | `spiffe-x509-v1` |
+| Evidence media type | `application/vnd.auths.spiffe-x509-svid.v1` |
+| Principal | closed `spiffe://<trust-domain>/<workload-path>` URI |
+| Verification method | `<principal>#svid-<leaf-digest-prefix>` |
+| Suites | certificate-selected `ed25519-v1` or `p256-sha256-v1` |
+
+Workload API access and bundle acquisition are outside the kernel. The
+verifier supplies trust-domain bundles and optional leaf-status observations.
+Proof bytes cannot provide their own trust root.
+
+## Evidence
+
+```text
+"AUTHS-SPIFFE-X509\x00\x01"
+u16-be certificate_count
+repeat leaf-first, excluding local roots:
+    u32-be DER_length
+    DER certificate
+```
+
+V1 accepts at most eight certificates, 16 KiB per certificate, and 32 KiB for
+the chain. The method performs path and signature validation against the
+selected local bundle, certificate validity at the explicit evaluation time,
+name constraints, client-auth EKU, an exact single SPIFFE URI SAN, trust-domain
+matching, and Ed25519/P-256 key extraction. Other leaf keys fail closed.
+
+When the trust-domain policy requires status, a current verifier-local leaf
+status record is mandatory; authenticated revocation denies the principal.
+
+## Assurance
+
+A valid path emits `pki-chain-validated` and `workload-attested`, parameterized
+by trust domain. A matching current status record additionally emits
+`controller-state-current-at` and `revocation-checked-at`.
diff --git a/product-snapshot/protocol/verification-algorithm.md b/product-snapshot/protocol/verification-algorithm.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d1e585
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/protocol/verification-algorithm.md
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+# Verification Algorithm — V1
+
+## Inputs
+
+- encoded `ProofBundle`;
+- canonical `CanonicalAction` CBOR, including profile, media type, permission,
+  budget request, canonical body, and bounded detached attachment bytes;
+- immutable verifier context:
+  - exact executable verifier-configuration commitment;
+  - verifier-required plan, quorum, actor-diversity, and root-diversity
+    obligation;
+  - local scoped trust anchors;
+  - exact accepted registries;
+  - expected audience and challenge;
+  - evaluation time;
+  - role-indexed assurance policy;
+  - principal and grant status policy;
+  - exact resource-matching algebra;
+  - profile policy;
+  - resource and work limits.
+
+The proof cannot add a trust anchor or weaken context.
+
+## Stages
+
+### 1. Bounded decode
+
+1. Reject bytes above the configured or protocol maximum.
+2. Strictly decode deterministic CBOR.
+3. Reject invalid map keys, non-minimal forms, invalid UTF-8, duplicate keys,
+   unknown critical fields, unsorted sets, trailing bytes, and collection
+   overflow.
+4. Produce `DecodedProof`.
+
+### 2. Reference resolution
+
+1. Recompute grant, action, plan, evidence, status, and attachment identifiers.
+2. Build bounded digest indexes.
+3. Reject missing, duplicate, cyclic, mismatched, ambiguous, and
+   unused-critical references.
+4. Require a unique signed action for every plan `proof-ref`.
+5. Produce `ResolvedProof`.
+
+### 3. Principal control
+
+First require both the context registry-manifest identifier and exact
+verifier-configuration commitment to match the immutable executable registry.
+For every signed grant, action, and accepted status statement:
+
+1. select exactly one principal method and signature suite;
+2. reserve the method's conservative maximum work and suite work before either
+   implementation is called;
+3. gather the bounded evidence bound to that statement;
+4. verify the domain-separated signature;
+5. verify method-specific principal/control semantics;
+6. return parameterized assurance and the exact evidence IDs actually
+   consumed;
+7. require those IDs to equal the relevant statement binding exactly;
+8. reject an implementation that exceeds its reservation.
+
+Unavailable required capability is `Indeterminate`; invalid supplied evidence
+is `Denied`. A signed-statement failure is stored on the statement/leaf result;
+it does not become a global proof failure unless structural decoding,
+reference resolution, or resource safety failed.
+
+Produce `ControlVerifiedProof`.
+
+### 4. Authority branches
+
+For each plan leaf:
+
+1. find the signed action by `proof-ref`;
+2. select a local trust anchor by exact principal and scoped ceilings;
+3. execute the context-selected resource matcher for the action resource and
+   every anchor namespace;
+4. walk the referenced grant chain root to terminal:
+   - issuer equals current subject;
+   - parent is exact;
+   - profile/version remains exact;
+   - permissions, validity, audiences, action constraints, budget, and depth
+     attenuate;
+   - grant status policy is satisfied;
+   - role-specific assurance floor is satisfied;
+5. require actor equals terminal subject;
+6. require exact permission, audience, body constraint, and time coverage;
+7. resolve and execute exact budget, status, extension, assurance-claim, and
+   implication handlers, reserving their work before invocation.
+
+Produce one `VerifiedAuthority` per valid branch.
+
+### 5. Plan evaluation
+
+1. Recompute the plan ID and compare every action binding.
+2. Require all branch actions to bind identical canonical action meaning,
+   audience, challenge, and plan.
+3. Evaluate every `Proof`, `AllOf`, `AnyOf`, and `KOfN` child from its local
+   authorized, denied, indeterminate, or structurally-invalid result.
+4. A denied child dominates an indeterminate child for `AllOf`; an authorized
+   child satisfies `AnyOf`; `KOfN` is indeterminate only when unavailable
+   children could still satisfy the threshold. Within a class, the
+   lexicographically smallest stable code is primary.
+5. Never skip a branch for resource accounting after another branch succeeds.
+6. Apply plan leaf, depth, branch, signature, and total work limits.
+7. Enforce the trusted context's expected plan, minimum authorized branches,
+   distinct actors, and distinct roots.
+8. Sort authorized branches canonically.
+
+### 6. Action binding
+
+1. Select the exact application profile/version.
+2. Canonicalize or validate the supplied canonical body.
+3. Compare body media type and digest.
+4. Compare capability, resource, requested budget, audience, challenge,
+   validity, actor, terminal grant, plan, and channel-binding requirement.
+5. Verify the signed attachment descriptor set exactly matches the proof set;
+   check required availability, identifier, SHA-256 digest, byte length,
+   signed media/disposition/encryption flags, opaque-content permission,
+   duplicates, unused detached bytes, and byte limits.
+6. Resolve and execute the verifier-local profile policy.
+7. Construct `VerifiedAction` through a private constructor.
+
+The portable entry point is:
+
+```text
+verify_v1(proof_cbor, canonical_action_cbor, trusted_context_cbor)
+    -> verification_result_cbor
+```
+
+The result contains the three-way verdict, final stage and stable code, proof,
+action, context, plan, self-binding result, and verifier-configuration
+digests, authorized branches, assurance reports and exact requirement
+satisfactions, resource/work totals, registry manifest, and ABI version. The
+native convenience API projects that result to `Authorized(VerifiedAction)`,
+`Denied(DenialReason)`, or `Indeterminate(Requirement)`.
+
+## Execution
+
+The outer runtime:
+
+1. evaluates channel policy against `PeerObservation`;
+2. atomically claims challenge/action replay state;
+3. atomically claims any stateful budget;
+4. evaluates local application restrictions;
+5. decodes a domain command from `VerifiedAction`;
+6. constructs `ExecutableAction<P>`;
+7. writes a decision receipt;
+8. executes;
+9. writes an execution receipt.
+
+No outer fact upgrades a denied or indeterminate Auths result.
+
+## Determinism
+
+Given identical proof bytes, canonical action, trusted context, and executable
+registry matching its bound configuration commitment, every conforming
+implementation produces identical:
+
+- canonical digests;
+- verdict class;
+- primary reason code;
+- assurance report;
+- assurance satisfaction report;
+- action and context digests;
+- resource/work totals;
+- canonical portable result bytes and result digest.
+
+Replay, transport, storage, and execution results are deliberately outside
+this invariant.
diff --git a/product-snapshot/protocol/webauthn.md b/product-snapshot/protocol/webauthn.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..acef11e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/protocol/webauthn.md
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# V1 WebAuthn Principal Adapter Profile
+
+## Registry values
+
+| Field | Value |
+| --- | --- |
+| Principal method and evidence type | `webauthn-v1` |
+| Evidence media type | `application/vnd.auths.webauthn-assertion.v1` |
+| Principal | `webauthn:<base64url-unpadded credential ID>` |
+| Verification method | `<principal>#credential` |
+| Signature suite | `p256-sha256-v1` |
+
+Credential registration, browser ceremony initiation, and signature-counter
+updates occur outside the pure kernel. A verifier supplies immutable
+registration records containing the credential ID and P-256 key, RP ID,
+allowed origins, required flags, prior counter policy, attestation level, and
+observation window. A proof cannot supply or weaken those records.
+
+## Evidence
+
+```text
+"AUTHS-WEBAUTHN\x00\x01"
+u16-be credential_id_length
+credential ID bytes
+u16-be authenticator_data_length
+authenticator data bytes
+u32-be client_data_json_length
+exact clientDataJSON bytes
+```
+
+The adapter verifies:
+
+- `type` is exactly `webauthn.get`;
+- the base64url challenge equals `SHA-256(exact Auths signing preimage)`;
+- the origin is in the registration record;
+- the RP ID hash, user-presence flag, required user-verification flag, and
+  counter policy;
+- the credential principal, verification method, P-256 key, and current local
+  registration window.
+
+The P-256 suite verifies the Auths signature over:
+
+```text
+authenticatorData || SHA-256(clientDataJSON)
+```
+
+This method-derived signature message is explicit in `ControlEvidence`; it
+must cryptographically commit to the exact Auths preimage.
+
+## Assurance
+
+Successful verification emits current controller and revocation-check claims,
+`origin-bound`, `user-verified` when the UV flag is present, and
+`hardware-attested` only when the local registration record establishes a
+named attestation level.
diff --git a/product-snapshot/recipes/experience-evidence.json b/product-snapshot/recipes/experience-evidence.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3e5bfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/recipes/experience-evidence.json
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.recipe-experience-evidence/1",
+  "automated": {
+    "runner": "bindings/recipes/tools/run.mjs",
+    "languages": ["typescript", "python"],
+    "recipesPerLanguage": 5,
+    "crossLanguageReceiptVerification": true,
+    "timings": [
+      { "language": "typescript", "recipe": "01", "elapsedMs": 165 },
+      { "language": "python", "recipe": "01", "elapsedMs": 161 },
+      { "language": "typescript", "recipe": "02", "elapsedMs": 184 },
+      { "language": "python", "recipe": "02", "elapsedMs": 143 },
+      { "language": "typescript", "recipe": "03", "elapsedMs": 211 },
+      { "language": "python", "recipe": "03", "elapsedMs": 169 },
+      { "language": "typescript", "recipe": "04", "elapsedMs": 212 },
+      { "language": "python", "recipe": "04", "elapsedMs": 173 },
+      { "language": "typescript", "recipe": "05", "elapsedMs": 605 },
+      { "language": "python", "recipe": "05", "elapsedMs": 501 }
+    ],
+    "measurement": "local clean temporary consumers; installed npm tarball and wheel; Apple arm64"
+  },
+  "moderatedRecipeThreeCohort": {
+    "status": "awaiting-independent-cohort",
+    "requiredCompletions": 4,
+    "requiredCohort": 5,
+    "maximumMinutes": 15,
+    "participants": []
+  }
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/recipes/manifest.json b/product-snapshot/recipes/manifest.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..41b3bbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/recipes/manifest.json
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.outcome-recipes/1",
+  "semanticOwner": "Rust",
+  "fixture": {
+    "id": "raw-key-chain",
+    "root": "target/binding-vectors",
+    "proof": "workflow.proof.cbor",
+    "action": "workflow.action.cbor",
+    "context": "workflow.context.cbor"
+  },
+  "recipes": [
+    { "id": "01-authenticate-identity", "typescript": "typescript/01-authenticate-identity.ts", "python": "python/01_authenticate_identity.py", "expected": "authenticated" },
+    { "id": "02-verify-authority", "typescript": "typescript/02-verify-authority.ts", "python": "python/02_verify_authority.py", "expected": "authorized" },
+    { "id": "03-execute-exact-action", "typescript": "typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts", "python": "python/03_execute_exact_action.py", "expected": "completed" },
+    { "id": "04-delegate-to-agent", "typescript": "typescript/04-delegate-to-agent.ts", "python": "python/04_delegate_to_agent.py", "expected": "completed,exact-replay,denied" },
+    { "id": "05-cross-organization-plan", "typescript": "typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts", "python": "python/05_cross_organization_plan.py", "expected": "completed-after-restart" }
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/recipes/python/01_authenticate_identity.py b/product-snapshot/recipes/python/01_authenticate_identity.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d28e01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/recipes/python/01_authenticate_identity.py
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+
+from auths.identity import (
+    IdentityRegistry,
+    VerificationMaterial,
+    VerificationRelationship,
+    decode_identity,
+    encode_identity,
+)
+from auths.testkit import DevelopmentIdentityMethod, DevelopmentSignatureSuite
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    relationship = VerificationRelationship(
+        "default-signing",
+        "authentication",
+        "auths.test-signature",
+        (VerificationMaterial("credential", b"public-development-material"),),
+    )
+    packet = encode_identity(
+        "auths.test-identity",
+        "identity:example:alice",
+        relationships=(relationship,),
+    )
+    registry = IdentityRegistry(
+        methods=[DevelopmentIdentityMethod()],
+        suites=[DevelopmentSignatureSuite()],
+    )
+    validated = await decode_identity(packet).validate(registry)
+    await validated.authenticate(
+        b"publish weekly report", b"auths-development-signature", registry
+    )
+    changed_rejected = False
+    try:
+        await validated.authenticate(
+            b"delete weekly report", b"changed-signature", registry
+        )
+    except ValueError:
+        changed_rejected = True
+    if not changed_rejected:
+        raise RuntimeError("changed message authenticated")
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "01-authenticate-identity",
+                "outcome": "authenticated",
+                "changedRejected": changed_rejected,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
diff --git a/product-snapshot/recipes/python/02_verify_authority.py b/product-snapshot/recipes/python/02_verify_authority.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..241a79d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/recipes/python/02_verify_authority.py
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from auths.verify import verify
+
+
+root = Path(os.environ["AUTHS_RECIPE_FIXTURE"])
+proof = (root / "workflow.proof.cbor").read_bytes()
+action = (root / "workflow.action.cbor").read_bytes()
+context = (root / "workflow.context.cbor").read_bytes()
+verified = verify(proof, action, context)
+if verified.kind != "authorized":
+    raise RuntimeError(f"unexpected verdict: {verified.kind}")
+changed = bytearray(action)
+changed[-1] ^= 1
+try:
+    changed_rejected = verify(proof, bytes(changed), context).kind != "authorized"
+except (TypeError, ValueError):
+    changed_rejected = True
+if not changed_rejected:
+    raise RuntimeError("mutated action remained authorized")
+print(
+    json.dumps(
+        {
+            "recipe": "02-verify-authority",
+            "outcome": verified.kind,
+            "changedRejected": changed_rejected,
+        }
+    )
+)
diff --git a/product-snapshot/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py b/product-snapshot/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe460b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+
+from auths import verify_receipt
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import mcp
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    calls = 0
+
+    async def publish_report(arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal calls
+        calls += 1
+        return {"published": arguments["report"]}
+
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(tools={"publish_report": publish_report})
+    async with development.create_auths(
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"])
+    ) as auths:
+        completed = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="publish_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-success",
+        )
+        if completed.kind != "completed":
+            raise RuntimeError(f"unexpected result: {completed.kind}")
+        verify_receipt(completed.receipt)
+        denied = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="delete_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-denied",
+        )
+        if denied.kind != "denied" or calls != 1:
+            raise RuntimeError("undeclared effect reached provider")
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "03-execute-exact-action",
+                "outcome": "completed",
+                "denied": True,
+                "calls": calls,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
diff --git a/product-snapshot/recipes/python/04_delegate_to_agent.py b/product-snapshot/recipes/python/04_delegate_to_agent.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b0e55a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/recipes/python/04_delegate_to_agent.py
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import mcp
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    calls = 0
+
+    async def publish_report(_arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal calls
+        calls += 1
+        return {"published": True}
+
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(tools={"publish_report": publish_report})
+    async with development.create_auths(
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report", "delete_report"])
+    ) as auths:
+        agent = await auths.delegate(
+            authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"]),
+            name="report-agent",
+            expires_in_seconds=300,
+        )
+        action = mcp.call_tool(name="publish_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"})
+        first = await agent.execute(
+            action=action, provider=provider, request_id="delegated-once"
+        )
+        second = await agent.execute(
+            action=action, provider=provider, request_id="delegated-once"
+        )
+        broader = await agent.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="delete_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="delegated-broader",
+        )
+        if (
+            first.kind != "completed"
+            or second.kind != "exact-replay"
+            or broader.kind != "denied"
+            or calls != 1
+        ):
+            raise RuntimeError("delegated authority was not narrow and replay-safe")
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "04-delegate-to-agent",
+                "outcome": f"{first.kind},{second.kind},{broader.kind}",
+                "calls": calls,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
diff --git a/product-snapshot/recipes/python/05_cross_organization_plan.py b/product-snapshot/recipes/python/05_cross_organization_plan.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc7c16d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/recipes/python/05_cross_organization_plan.py
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from auths import (
+    Approval,
+    ExecutionReference,
+)
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import McpHandlerOutcome, mcp
+from auths.verify import decode_receipt, encode_receipt, verify_receipt
+
+
+class OrganizationApproval:
+    def __init__(self, organization: str) -> None:
+        self.organization = organization
+
+    async def approve(self, request):
+        return Approval.response(request, decision="approved")
+
+
+def plan_approval():
+    providers = (OrganizationApproval("company-a"), OrganizationApproval("company-b"))
+    return Approval.plan_once(
+        "approval.cross-company-plan",
+        Approval.threshold(providers, threshold=2),
+        max_uses=2,
+        requirements=("company-a", "company-b"),
+    )
+
+
+async def phase_one(root: Path) -> None:
+    async def quarantine_service(_arguments, _context):
+        return {"quarantined": True}
+
+    async def rotate_token(_arguments, _context):
+        (root / "provider-applied").write_text("applied", encoding="utf-8")
+        return McpHandlerOutcome("possible", cause="unknown")
+
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(
+        tools={
+            "quarantine_service": quarantine_service,
+            "rotate_token": rotate_token,
+        }
+    )
+    async with development.create_recoverable_auths(
+        directory=root,
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+        approval=plan_approval(),
+    ) as auths:
+        plan = mcp.plan(
+            (
+                mcp.call_tool(
+                    name="quarantine_service",
+                    arguments={"region": "eu-west-2"},
+                ),
+                mcp.call_tool(name="rotate_token", arguments={"region": "eu-west-2"}),
+            )
+        )
+        result = await auths.execute(
+            plan=plan, provider=provider, request_id="incident-plan"
+        )
+        if (
+            result.kind != "recoverable"
+            or result.reference is None
+            or len(result.completed_receipts) != 1
+        ):
+            raise RuntimeError("ordered plan did not stop with one completed member")
+        (root / "reference.bin").write_bytes(
+            result.reference.to_bytes()
+        )
+        (root / "python-receipt.json").write_bytes(
+            encode_receipt(result.completed_receipts[0])
+        )
+
+
+async def phase_two(root: Path) -> None:
+    entries = 0
+
+    async def no_reentry(_arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal entries
+        entries += 1
+        raise RuntimeError("unexpected provider re-entry")
+
+    async def reconcile(_execution_id, _service):
+        if (root / "provider-applied").exists():
+            return McpHandlerOutcome("applied", result={"rotated": True})
+        return McpHandlerOutcome("possible", cause="unknown")
+
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(
+        tools={
+            "quarantine_service": no_reentry,
+            "rotate_token": no_reentry,
+        },
+        reconcile=reconcile,
+    )
+    async with development.create_recoverable_auths(
+        directory=root,
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+        approval=plan_approval(),
+    ) as auths:
+        result = await auths.resume(
+            reference=ExecutionReference.from_bytes((root / "reference.bin").read_bytes()),
+            provider=provider,
+        )
+        if result.kind != "completed" or entries != 0:
+            raise RuntimeError("recovery re-entered the provider")
+        verify_receipt(result.receipt)
+        (root / "python-recovered-receipt.json").write_bytes(
+            encode_receipt(result.receipt)
+        )
+
+
+def run_child(mode: str, root: Path) -> None:
+    subprocess.run([sys.executable, __file__, mode, str(root)], check=True)
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    mode = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None
+    path = Path(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) > 2 else None
+    if mode == "verify" and path is not None:
+        verify_receipt(decode_receipt(path.read_bytes()))
+        print(json.dumps({"outcome": "verified-portable-receipt"}))
+        return
+    if mode == "phase-one" and path is not None:
+        await phase_one(path)
+        return
+    if mode == "phase-two" and path is not None:
+        await phase_two(path)
+        return
+    configured = os.environ.get("AUTHS_RECIPE_OUTPUT")
+    if configured is not None:
+        root = Path(configured)
+        root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        run_child("phase-one", root)
+        run_child("phase-two", root)
+    else:
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="auths-recipe-five-py-") as directory:
+            root = Path(directory)
+            run_child("phase-one", root)
+            run_child("phase-two", root)
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "05-cross-organization-plan",
+                "outcome": "completed-after-restart",
+                "duplicateEntries": 0,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
diff --git a/product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/01-authenticate-identity.ts b/product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/01-authenticate-identity.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f5b0341
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/01-authenticate-identity.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+import {
+  loadEd25519RawKeyAuthentication,
+  loadIdentity,
+  loadRawKeyIdentityAdapter,
+} from "@auths-dev/sdk/identity";
+
+const message = new TextEncoder().encode("publish weekly report");
+const keys = await crypto.subtle.generateKey("Ed25519", true, ["sign", "verify"]);
+const publicKey = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.exportKey("raw", keys.publicKey));
+const identity = await loadIdentity();
+const method = await loadRawKeyIdentityAdapter();
+const suite = await loadEd25519RawKeyAuthentication();
+const sent = method.create("ed25519-v1", publicKey);
+const received = identity.parseIdentity(identity.decodePublicIdentity(sent.packet), method);
+const preimage = identity.signingPreimage(received, message);
+const signingBytes = new Uint8Array(preimage.length);
+signingBytes.set(preimage);
+const signature = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.sign(
+  "Ed25519",
+  keys.privateKey,
+  signingBytes.buffer,
+));
+const authenticated = identity.authenticate(
+  identity.decodeSignedMessage(identity.encodeSignedMessage(received, message, signature)),
+  received,
+  suite,
+);
+let changedRejected = false;
+try {
+  const changed = new TextEncoder().encode("delete weekly report");
+  identity.authenticate(
+    identity.decodeSignedMessage(identity.encodeSignedMessage(received, changed, signature)),
+    received,
+    suite,
+  );
+} catch {
+  changedRejected = true;
+}
+if (!changedRejected) throw new Error("changed message authenticated");
+console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "01-authenticate-identity", outcome: "authenticated", changedRejected }));
diff --git a/product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/02-verify-authority.ts b/product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/02-verify-authority.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..089b5dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/02-verify-authority.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { loadVerifier } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+
+const fixture = process.env.AUTHS_RECIPE_FIXTURE;
+if (fixture === undefined) throw new Error("AUTHS_RECIPE_FIXTURE is required");
+const [proof, action, context] = await Promise.all([
+  readFile(`${fixture}/workflow.proof.cbor`),
+  readFile(`${fixture}/workflow.action.cbor`),
+  readFile(`${fixture}/workflow.context.cbor`),
+]);
+const verifier = await loadVerifier();
+const verified = verifier.verify(proof, action, context);
+if (verified.kind !== "authorized") throw new Error(`unexpected verdict: ${verified.kind}`);
+const changed = action.slice();
+changed[changed.length - 1] ^= 1;
+let changedRejected = false;
+try {
+  changedRejected = verifier.verify(proof, changed, context).kind !== "authorized";
+} catch {
+  changedRejected = true;
+}
+if (!changedRejected) throw new Error("mutated action remained authorized");
+console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "02-verify-authority", outcome: verified.kind, changedRejected }));
diff --git a/product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts b/product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c580f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+import { verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
+
+let calls = 0;
+const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({
+  tools: {
+    async publish_report(input) {
+      calls += 1;
+      return { published: input.report };
+    },
+  },
+});
+const auths = await development.createAuths({ authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]) });
+try {
+  const completed = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "publish_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-success",
+  });
+  if (completed.kind !== "completed") throw new Error(`unexpected result: ${completed.kind}`);
+  await verifyReceipt(completed.receipt);
+  const denied = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "delete_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-denied",
+  });
+  if (denied.kind !== "denied" || calls !== 1) throw new Error("undeclared effect reached provider");
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "03-execute-exact-action", outcome: completed.kind, denied: true, calls }));
+} finally {
+  await auths.close();
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/04-delegate-to-agent.ts b/product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/04-delegate-to-agent.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94a5ae5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/04-delegate-to-agent.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
+
+let calls = 0;
+const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({ tools: {
+  async publish_report() { calls += 1; return { published: true }; },
+} });
+const auths = await development.createAuths({ authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report", "delete_report"]) });
+try {
+  const agent = await auths.delegate({
+    authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]),
+    name: "report-agent",
+    expiresInSeconds: 300,
+  });
+  const action = mcp.callTool({ name: "publish_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } });
+  const first = await agent.execute({ action, provider, requestId: "delegated-once" });
+  const second = await agent.execute({ action, provider, requestId: "delegated-once" });
+  const broader = await agent.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "delete_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "delegated-broader",
+  });
+  if (first.kind !== "completed" || second.kind !== "exact-replay" || broader.kind !== "denied" || calls !== 1) {
+    throw new Error("delegated authority was not narrow and replay-safe");
+  }
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "04-delegate-to-agent", outcome: `${first.kind},${second.kind},${broader.kind}`, calls }));
+} finally {
+  await auths.close();
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts b/product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ad665a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/recipes/typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
+import { mkdtemp, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import {
+  approval,
+  ExecutionReference,
+} from "@auths-dev/sdk";
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
+import { decodeReceipt, encodeReceipt, verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+
+const self = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
+const mode = process.argv[2];
+const directory = process.argv[3];
+type ApprovalProvider = Parameters<typeof approval.threshold>[0]["providers"][number];
+
+if (mode === "verify") {
+  const receipt = decodeReceipt(await readFile(required(directory)));
+  await verifyReceipt(receipt);
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ outcome: "verified-portable-receipt" }));
+} else if (mode === "phase-one") {
+  await phaseOne(required(directory));
+} else if (mode === "phase-two") {
+  await phaseTwo(required(directory));
+} else {
+  const root = process.env.AUTHS_RECIPE_OUTPUT ?? await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "auths-recipe-five-ts-"));
+  runChild("phase-one", root);
+  runChild("phase-two", root);
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "05-cross-organization-plan", outcome: "completed-after-restart", duplicateEntries: 0 }));
+}
+
+async function phaseOne(root: string): Promise<void> {
+  const auths = await development.createRecoverableAuths({
+    directory: root,
+    authority: mcp.allowTools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+    approval: await planApproval(),
+  });
+  const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({ tools: {
+    async quarantine_service() { return { quarantined: true }; },
+    async rotate_token() {
+      await writeFile(join(root, "provider-applied"), "applied", { flag: "wx" });
+      return { effect: "possible", cause: "unknown" } as const;
+    },
+  } });
+  try {
+    const plan = await mcp.plan([
+      mcp.callTool({ name: "quarantine_service", arguments: { region: "eu-west-2" } }),
+      mcp.callTool({ name: "rotate_token", arguments: { region: "eu-west-2" } }),
+    ]);
+    const result = await auths.execute({ plan, provider, requestId: "incident-plan" });
+    if (result.kind !== "recoverable" || result.reference === undefined || result.completedReceipts.length !== 1) {
+      throw new Error("ordered plan did not stop with one completed member");
+    }
+    await writeFile(join(root, "reference.bin"), result.reference.encode());
+    await writeFile(join(root, "typescript-receipt.json"), encodeReceipt(result.completedReceipts[0]!));
+  } finally {
+    await auths.close();
+  }
+}
+
+async function phaseTwo(root: string): Promise<void> {
+  const auths = await development.createRecoverableAuths({
+    directory: root,
+    authority: mcp.allowTools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+    approval: await planApproval(),
+  });
+  let entries = 0;
+  const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({
+    tools: {
+      async quarantine_service() { entries += 1; throw new Error("unexpected provider re-entry"); },
+      async rotate_token() { entries += 1; throw new Error("unexpected provider re-entry"); },
+    },
+    async reconcile() {
+      return existsSync(join(root, "provider-applied"))
+        ? { effect: "applied", result: { rotated: true } } as const
+        : { effect: "possible", cause: "unknown" } as const;
+    },
+  });
+  try {
+    const reference = ExecutionReference.decode(await readFile(join(root, "reference.bin")));
+    const result = await auths.resume({ reference, provider });
+    if (result.kind !== "completed" || entries !== 0) throw new Error("recovery re-entered the provider");
+    await verifyReceipt(result.receipt);
+    await writeFile(join(root, "typescript-recovered-receipt.json"), encodeReceipt(result.receipt));
+  } finally {
+    await auths.close();
+  }
+}
+
+async function planApproval() {
+  const providers = [approver("company-a"), approver("company-b")];
+  return {
+    policy: await approval.planOnce({
+      policyId: "approval.cross-company-plan",
+      maxUses: 2,
+      requirements: ["company-a", "company-b"],
+    }),
+    provider: approval.threshold({ threshold: 2, providers }),
+  };
+}
+
+function approver(_organization: string): ApprovalProvider {
+  return {
+    async approve(request) {
+      return {
+        requestId: request.requestId,
+        transactionDigest: request.transactionDigest.slice(),
+        policy: request.policy,
+        decision: "approved",
+      };
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+function runChild(childMode: string, root: string): void {
+  const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, [self, childMode, root], { encoding: "utf8" });
+  if (result.status !== 0) throw new Error(result.stderr || result.stdout || `${childMode} failed`);
+}
+
+function required(value: string | undefined): string {
+  if (value === undefined || value.length === 0) throw new Error("path is required");
+  return value;
+}
diff --git a/product-snapshot/snapshot.json b/product-snapshot/snapshot.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dae6c52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/product-snapshot/snapshot.json
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.product-snapshot/1",
+  "sourceCommit": "bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c",
+  "docsContractSourceCommit": "d0e4a53e5e9582e9eaff1cf38e965252c6c79765",
+  "contractDigest": "8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90",
+  "recipeManifest": "bindings/recipes/manifest.json",
+  "recipeDigests": {
+    "typescript/01-authenticate-identity.ts": "93dbb1182edab8a06c3c28403c85af18983b7b8d14fec976230320c2241fc35f",
+    "python/01_authenticate_identity.py": "75779be55615efc2cc51e6de4335581486e51e3fcbdccda70126c6d2e406db32",
+    "typescript/02-verify-authority.ts": "99e5d359c33347926c3093877c46c810b11ffc26aaa387a2e9f562fa453ecb86",
+    "python/02_verify_authority.py": "c43976a60c0fa9ce2c0d06c56967af5ab6eeb36371d457d373b42b898090a8f2",
+    "typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts": "1c52ee33576a039091546b3cca1137997d59ab140b13134eb41a7a652941e91f",
+    "python/03_execute_exact_action.py": "48517dd294a1ce02c339e8892fa14857f1cc1eba54c182b9f400f8a3e17a9e93",
+    "typescript/04-delegate-to-agent.ts": "69fdd4ed74b6db10eef52a3026fbea16b064b1ea7069c90a469c575c07569d58",
+    "python/04_delegate_to_agent.py": "9d1ac3822805883b8ac492530539c3aedd85780c1b452f6c62bad9fc98170e75",
+    "typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts": "ee2de3b86185e7f8af35ca0511c0a38664d5c66f256887d2fd8e130b631a13db",
+    "python/05_cross_organization_plan.py": "babcebeac9f4a2d1cc25b192c4f8e7ba239072b2ccdbebf435eff8bb0f29c450"
+  },
+  "exampleDigests": {
+    "offline-verification/README.md": "8f0e7a60d53a010680ac500fc905c6fc3a91f82720da4b043dd3193a89c3b541",
+    "offline-verification/Cargo.toml": "ce32c218b267598a8b4eb4a12f62b113503a90ab0e8e1c803add6b3f0fcde6a0",
+    "offline-verification/src/main.rs": "0002b1c158cfcce6dbc3e62a55ec1d94692d2ad81923ae6d002b0730c67522dd"
+  },
+  "protocolFiles": [
+    "protocol.md",
+    "verification-algorithm.md",
+    "error-codes.md",
+    "registry.md",
+    "domain-separation.md",
+    "auths-proof.cddl",
+    "did-key.md",
+    "did-web.md",
+    "did-keri.md",
+    "spiffe-x509.md",
+    "webauthn.md",
+    "hsm-attested.md"
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/public/.auths-docs-generated.json b/public/.auths-docs-generated.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce028ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/.auths-docs-generated.json
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+{
+  "schema": "auths.docs.generated-files/1",
+  "generator": "tools/content/build.mjs",
+  "sourceCommit": "bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c",
+  "docsContractSourceCommit": "d0e4a53e5e9582e9eaff1cf38e965252c6c79765",
+  "contractDigest": "8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90",
+  "files": [
+    ".auths-docs-generated.json",
+    ".well-known/auths-docs.json",
+    "examples.md",
+    "guides.md",
+    "guides/adapter-authoring.md",
+    "guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans.md",
+    "guides/authenticate-identity.md",
+    "guides/authority-model.md",
+    "guides/delegate-agent.md",
+    "guides/execute-exact-action.md",
+    "guides/production-integration.md",
+    "guides/receipts-and-disclosure.md",
+    "guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown.md",
+    "guides/verification-model.md",
+    "guides/verify-authority.md",
+    "index.md",
+    "llms-full.txt",
+    "llms.txt",
+    "reference-manifest.json",
+    "reference.md",
+    "reference/conformance.md",
+    "reference/decisions-errors.md",
+    "reference/evidence-status-assurance.md",
+    "reference/limits-encoding-identifiers.md",
+    "reference/principal-adapters.md",
+    "reference/python.md",
+    "reference/rust.md",
+    "reference/typescript.md",
+    "robots.txt",
+    "search-index.json",
+    "sitemap.xml",
+    "start.md",
+    "start/python.md",
+    "start/rust-offline-verification.md",
+    "start/typescript.md",
+    "start/what-is-auths.md"
+  ]
+}
diff --git a/public/.well-known/auths-docs.json b/public/.well-known/auths-docs.json
index 0c2e69a..643356e 100644
--- a/public/.well-known/auths-docs.json
+++ b/public/.well-known/auths-docs.json
@@ -1,19 +1,13 @@
 {
   "schema": "auths.docs.discovery/1",
+  "sourceCommit": "bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c",
+  "docsContractSourceCommit": "d0e4a53e5e9582e9eaff1cf38e965252c6c79765",
   "contractDigest": "8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90",
   "canonicalBase": "https://docs.auths.dev",
-  "markdown": "/<page>.md",
+  "manifest": "/reference-manifest.json",
   "search": "/search-index.json",
-  "sitemap": "/sitemap.xml",
-  "manifest": "/reference/manifest.json",
-  "claims": [
-    "auths.claim.approval-binding/1",
-    "auths.claim.attenuation/1",
-    "auths.claim.bounded-disclosure/1",
-    "auths.claim.closed-gateway/1",
-    "auths.claim.cross-language-parity/1",
-    "auths.claim.lifecycle-state/1",
-    "auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1",
-    "auths.claim.supply-chain/1"
-  ]
+  "markdown": "/<route>.md",
+  "markdownIndex": "/llms.txt",
+  "fullMarkdown": "/llms-full.txt",
+  "sitemap": "/sitemap.xml"
 }
diff --git a/public/agents.md b/public/agents.md
deleted file mode 100644
index fb9efba..0000000
--- a/public/agents.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-# Agents
-
-Give agents precise tools, approved plans, and verifiable outcomes without ambient credentials.
-
-## Recommended: [How Auths works for agents](/agents/how-auths-works)
-
-Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
-
-## Start
-
-- [How Auths works for agents](/agents/how-auths-works) — Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
-- [Delegate one tool](/agents/quickstart) — Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohibited.
-
-## Delegate
-
-- [Agent delegation](/agents/delegation) — Delegate an exact tool action without giving the agent a broad credential.
-- [Approved plans](/agents/approved-plans) — Require human or organizational approval for the exact ordered work an agent proposes.
-- [Multi-agent handoffs](/agents/multi-agent) — Pass work across multiple agents while narrowing authority at every boundary.
-
-## MCP
-
-- [MCP](/agents/mcp) — Use MCP as a tool discovery and delivery layer while Auths remains the authority boundary.
-
-## Compose
-
-- [Agent identity](/agents/identity) — Compose agent, workload, user, or application identity without choosing a mandatory identity provider.
-- [Skills and plugins](/agents/skills-and-plugins) — Package Auths-aware skills and plugins without embedding semantic meaning or secrets in prompts.
-
-## Operate and test
-
-- [Production patterns](/agents/production-patterns) — Operate agent authority with explicit owners for identity, issuance, approval, state, custody, gateways, and reconciliation.
-- [Test agent authority](/agents/testing) — Test agents against widening, substitution, replay, ambient credentials, and uncertain providers.
-
-## Related topics
-
-- [Identity & trust](/identity-trust) — Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.
-- [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents/1 · Product contract: auths.page.agents/1_
-
diff --git a/public/agents/approved-plans.md b/public/agents/approved-plans.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0b37b4d..0000000
--- a/public/agents/approved-plans.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Approved plans
-
-Require human or organizational approval for the exact ordered work an agent proposes.
-
-## Outcome
-
-Approvers review the same plan commitment that the runtime will consume.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Parse the agent proposal into profile actions, construct the ordered plan, create the approval signing request, collect typed responses, verify the threshold, then execute members in order.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Prompt changes, member replacement, reordered work, mutation after approval, reused approval responses, unmet threshold, and expired approval deny the plan.
-
-## Continue
-
-Add multi-agent handoffs only by delegating a narrower plan or member scope.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/agents/delegation.md b/public/agents/delegation.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ca128be..0000000
--- a/public/agents/delegation.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Agent delegation
-
-Delegate an exact tool action without giving the agent a broad credential.
-
-## Outcome
-
-The agent receives a child authority restricted by action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, and depth.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Create authority at the trusted application boundary, narrow it for the agent's identity and tool call, send the signed child with canonical tool inputs, and execute through the closed gateway.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Changing the tool, resource, arguments, audience, use count, budget, expiry, depth, or a critical extension is denied before the tool runs.
-
-## Continue
-
-Use approved plans when the exact proposed sequence requires review.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegation/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/agents/how-auths-works.md b/public/agents/how-auths-works.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5468e14..0000000
--- a/public/agents/how-auths-works.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# How Auths works for agents
-
-Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
-
-## Model
-
-The agent proposes an application action. A trusted issuer creates or delegates bounded authority. Optional approvers sign the exact plan. A closed gateway executes only a native-authorized command. Observers and verifiers receive bounded evidence rather than trusting the agent's account.
-
-## What remains true
-
-Prompts do not create authority. Every handoff narrows or preserves exact commitments. Identity, MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, approval, and provider authentication each remain independent inputs rather than authorization shortcuts.
-
-## Where it fails closed
-
-Widening, prompt or plan substitution, ambient credentials, transport-only success, replay, exhausted state, and provider uncertainty fail with distinct outcomes that the agent cannot override.
-
-## Continue
-
-Run Delegate one tool, then add plans, multiple agents, or MCP only when the workflow calls for them.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/agents/identity.md b/public/agents/identity.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c570d0c..0000000
--- a/public/agents/identity.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Agent identity
-
-Compose agent, workload, user, or application identity without choosing a mandatory identity provider.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The identity provider, workload system, or application resolver remains application-owned. Auths owns only the typed authority, native verification, closed execution boundary, and portable evidence composed around it.
-
-## Data flow
-
-Resolve bounded identity evidence, verify the agent's signed proposal, then bind delegation to that explicit principal and audience.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Agent prompts, tool arguments, and Auths artifacts contain no ambient provider credential. The closed gateway acquires credentials only after native authorization and durable reservation.
-
-## State
-
-The application owns agent memory and orchestration. Auths runtime state owns uses, budgets, replay, plan progress, recovery, and receipts for protected effects.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-Prompt substitution, tool widening, stale identity, transport success, replay, and provider uncertainty remain separate closed outcomes and cannot be converted into success by agent reasoning.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-Identity proves who signed bytes; it cannot decide which tool the agent may run.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.identity/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/agents/mcp.md b/public/agents/mcp.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 15d82ee..0000000
--- a/public/agents/mcp.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-# MCP
-
-Use MCP as a tool discovery and delivery layer while Auths remains the authority boundary.
-
-## Recommended: [MCP client](/agents/mcp/client)
-
-Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.
-
-## MCP
-
-- [MCP client](/agents/mcp/client) — Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.
-- [Protect an MCP server](/agents/mcp/protect-server) — Protect an MCP server tool with native verification, durable reservation, and a closed provider gateway.
-- [Tool profiles](/agents/mcp/tool-profiles) — Define canonical action, resource, argument, budget, and receipt mappings for MCP tools.
-- [Transport boundary](/agents/mcp/transport-boundary) — Keep MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and local calls independent from authorization.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp/1 · Product contract: auths.page.agents.mcp/1_
-
diff --git a/public/agents/mcp/client.md b/public/agents/mcp/client.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7753cf5..0000000
--- a/public/agents/mcp/client.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# MCP client
-
-Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.
-
-## Outcome
-
-The client selects a declared tool profile, canonicalizes its arguments, and submits the call with a narrower proof.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Discover the tool, parse arguments through its profile, delegate authority to the agent or server audience, attach the sealed Auths command to the MCP request, and preserve the returned receipt.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-A prompt-authored proof, undeclared tool, changed arguments, wrong server audience, transport-only acknowledgement, or replay is rejected.
-
-## Continue
-
-Protect the MCP server so provider credentials stay outside the client and model.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/agents/mcp/protect-server.md b/public/agents/mcp/protect-server.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 8233694..0000000
--- a/public/agents/mcp/protect-server.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Protect an MCP server
-
-Protect an MCP server tool with native verification, durable reservation, and a closed provider gateway.
-
-## Outcome
-
-The server exposes useful tool metadata but reaches the underlying effect only after Auths authorizes the exact call.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Parse MCP inputs, map them through the tool profile, verify attached authority and trusted context, reserve use and budget state, acquire the native gateway handle, execute, and return the bounded outcome and receipt.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Valid MCP framing, authenticated transport, a known client, or an approval flag cannot bypass missing authority; provider uncertainty stops fresh execution.
-
-## Continue
-
-Define tool profiles and the transport boundary explicitly for every exposed effect.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md b/public/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 608a0f0..0000000
--- a/public/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Tool profiles
-
-Define canonical action, resource, argument, budget, and receipt mappings for MCP tools.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A tool profile converts bounded MCP arguments into one stable Auths action without embedding transport or provider credentials.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Version the tool identity, parse bounded arguments, canonicalize the resource and effect bytes, declare critical constraints, and add success plus widening fixtures across all SDKs.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Unknown tools, unbounded arguments, ambiguous canonicalization, hidden provider parameters, profile version mismatch, and dropped critical constraints fail qualification.
-
-## Continue
-
-Keep the profile reusable across MCP transports and agent frameworks.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md b/public/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md
deleted file mode 100644
index bf21bd1..0000000
--- a/public/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Transport boundary
-
-Keep MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and local calls independent from authorization.
-
-## Model
-
-Transport moves bounded identity, authority, command, and receipt bytes. Auths parses and verifies those bytes after delivery. A transport adapter may authenticate a peer, but that authentication is only an explicit trust input.
-
-## What remains true
-
-Successful delivery cannot authorize an effect. Failed delivery cannot consume authority unless the durable execution boundary recorded a reservation. The same artifact verifies regardless of transport.
-
-## Where it fails closed
-
-Duplicate delivery, reordered messages, partial frames, oversized inputs, authenticated-but-unauthorized peers, and transport acknowledgement without provider outcome remain closed.
-
-## Continue
-
-Choose transport for reachability and reliability; choose Auths authority and runtime state for permission and exactly-once effect control.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/agents/multi-agent.md b/public/agents/multi-agent.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 21780fc..0000000
--- a/public/agents/multi-agent.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Multi-agent handoffs
-
-Pass work across multiple agents while narrowing authority at every boundary.
-
-## Outcome
-
-Each agent receives only the subset of actions, resources, budgets, uses, and depth needed for its contribution.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Model every handoff as an explicit delegation, bind the next agent's identity and audience, retain the signed chain, and execute terminal effects through gateways outside all agent processes.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-A skipped parent, widened child, depth reset, identity substitution, hidden tool, or agent-to-agent ambient credential fails verification.
-
-## Continue
-
-Use receipts to verify the complete chain and production patterns to assign human ownership.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/agents/production-patterns.md b/public/agents/production-patterns.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c9bf9f2..0000000
--- a/public/agents/production-patterns.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Production patterns
-
-Operate agent authority with explicit owners for identity, issuance, approval, state, custody, gateways, and reconciliation.
-
-## Outcome
-
-Agent failures and provider ambiguity have named operators, durable evidence, and safe resume paths.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Separate proposal from authorization, use least-privilege service identities, keep signers and credentials out of agent processes, monitor stable outcomes, retain bounded receipts, and exercise recovery before production.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Missing state, signer outage, trust ambiguity, receipt loss, unexplained denial, or provider-unknown outcome stops automation and escalates to its owner.
-
-## Continue
-
-Use Production operations for deployment and incident runbooks.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.production/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/agents/quickstart.md b/public/agents/quickstart.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0b233b9..0000000
--- a/public/agents/quickstart.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# Delegate one tool
-
-Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohibited.
-
-## Run success and fail-closed paths
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/agents/skills-and-plugins.md b/public/agents/skills-and-plugins.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 8e84468..0000000
--- a/public/agents/skills-and-plugins.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Skills and plugins
-
-Package Auths-aware skills and plugins without embedding semantic meaning or secrets in prompts.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The agent framework, skill registry, and plugin lifecycle remains application-owned. Auths owns only the typed authority, native verification, closed execution boundary, and portable evidence composed around it.
-
-## Data flow
-
-A versioned skill declares which Auths profile and operation it calls; runtime code parses tool inputs and invokes the SDK outside the language model context.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Agent prompts, tool arguments, and Auths artifacts contain no ambient provider credential. The closed gateway acquires credentials only after native authorization and durable reservation.
-
-## State
-
-The application owns agent memory and orchestration. Auths runtime state owns uses, budgets, replay, plan progress, recovery, and receipts for protected effects.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-Prompt substitution, tool widening, stale identity, transport success, replay, and provider uncertainty remain separate closed outcomes and cannot be converted into success by agent reasoning.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-A skill is integration convenience, not a new authority source. It cannot replace native verification or gateway isolation.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.skills/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/agents/testing.md b/public/agents/testing.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d9aa0fd..0000000
--- a/public/agents/testing.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Test agent authority
-
-Test agents against widening, substitution, replay, ambient credentials, and uncertain providers.
-
-## Outcome
-
-The harness proves that a model or orchestrator cannot convert untrusted text or successful delivery into authority.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Run the permitted tool, then mutate prompt intent, tool name, arguments, plan order, identity, audience, use state, receipt bytes, and provider result. Verify normalized outcomes and provider reachability.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Any prohibited effect, language disagreement, prompt-derived bypass, automatic fresh retry, or missing evidence is a release-blocking failure.
-
-## Continue
-
-Keep adversarial fixtures beside each tool profile and run them against packaged SDKs.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.testing/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/assurance.md b/public/assurance.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0c2dfac..0000000
--- a/public/assurance.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-# Assurance
-
-Inspect what Auths claims, the exact evidence behind it, and the limits that remain.
-
-## Recommended: [Semantics](/assurance/semantics)
-
-Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.
-
-## Claims
-
-- [Semantics](/assurance/semantics) — Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.
-- [Authority](/assurance/authority) — Inspect attenuation and approval-binding evidence for bounded authority.
-- [Execution](/assurance/execution) — Inspect the native closed-gateway boundary protecting provider effects.
-- [Disclosure](/assurance/disclosure) — Inspect evidence that receipt views are bounded and authority-controlled.
-
-## Evidence
-
-- [Cross-language](/assurance/cross-language) — Compare maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes for identical scenarios.
-- [Formal](/assurance/formal) — Understand where formal attenuation evidence applies and where it does not.
-- [Adversarial](/assurance/adversarial) — Inspect substitution, widening, replay, mutation, and fail-closed evidence.
-- [Supply chain](/assurance/supply-chain) — Inspect the recorded SLSA builder assessment without mistaking it for an independent audit.
-
-## Limits
-
-- [Limitations](/assurance/limitations) — Read the boundaries that Auths evidence deliberately does not claim to cross.
-
-## Related topics
-
-- [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1 · Product contract: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1_
-
diff --git a/public/assurance/adversarial.md b/public/assurance/adversarial.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 807f2ca..0000000
--- a/public/assurance/adversarial.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-# Adversarial
-
-Inspect substitution, widening, replay, mutation, and fail-closed evidence.
-
-## What the claim says
-
-Adversarial fixtures try to change approved bytes, order, members, authority constraints, trust inputs, and lifecycle state.
-
-## Release evidence
-
-Claim: `auths.claim.approval-binding/1` · status `passing`
-
-Approval is bound to exact plan context and cannot authorize substituted plan bytes.
-
-Evidence: `bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json`
-
-SHA-256: `a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331`
-
-Reproduce:
-
-- `cargo xtask sdk-experience`
-
-Scope: Maintained approval-plan signing requests, responses, and substitution fixtures.
-
-Limitation: The application remains responsible for approver identity, user experience, and organizational policy.
-
-## What remains true
-
-Every maintained language and runtime path must reject the same prohibited mutation before an unintended provider effect.
-
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
-
-Untested application profiles, adapters, external approval identity, or provider behavior remain outside the fixture claim.
-
-## Continue
-
-Keep application-specific negative fixtures beside each profile and gateway.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.adversarial/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/assurance/authority.md b/public/assurance/authority.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 9b5099b..0000000
--- a/public/assurance/authority.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-# Authority
-
-Inspect attenuation and approval-binding evidence for bounded authority.
-
-## What the claim says
-
-The maintained model and fixtures assert that delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent across declared fields.
-
-## Release evidence
-
-Claim: `auths.claim.attenuation/1` · status `passing`
-
-Delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent under the maintained model and adversarial fixtures.
-
-Evidence: `formal/qualification.lean`
-
-SHA-256: `fb1fd17d377194e96f98313412052f82fbb43cb594b12eb6a9fa0e0dce3ce70c`
-
-Reproduce:
-
-- `cargo xtask formal`
-
-Scope: Attenuation relations represented by the maintained formal model and protocol profile.
-
-Limitation: The claim covers the modelled fields and maintained protocol profile, not arbitrary application-defined semantics.
-
-## What remains true
-
-Action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, depth, and modelled critical extensions must preserve their narrowing relation.
-
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
-
-A new unmodelled field, accepted incomparable child, formal drift, or differential mismatch narrows the scope or withdraws passing status.
-
-## Continue
-
-Review adversarial approval and delegation evidence alongside application-profile tests.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.authority/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/assurance/cross-language.md b/public/assurance/cross-language.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5eb7c6a..0000000
--- a/public/assurance/cross-language.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-# Cross-language
-
-Compare maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes for identical scenarios.
-
-## What the claim says
-
-Parity covers stable semantic operations and qualified installed-artifact scenarios while allowing idiomatic language types and packaging.
-
-## Release evidence
-
-Claim: `auths.claim.cross-language-parity/1` · status `passing`
-
-Maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python scenarios target identical stable semantic outcomes.
-
-Evidence: `release/docs/scenarios.toml`
-
-SHA-256: `f056e57acb5dbad67ef5ed5076bdee388a82e73b7e6a6af53b82c226ccd552da`
-
-Reproduce:
-
-- `cargo xtask cross-language`
-
-Scope: The maintained installed-artifact scenarios declared for Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
-
-Limitation: Scenario parity covers maintained workflows and versions, not every possible application composition.
-
-## What remains true
-
-The same fixture bytes and trusted context produce the same normalized outcome and commitments.
-
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
-
-A missing wheel, unsupported platform, public API drift, language-specific decision, or differing fixture result degrades the release claim.
-
-## Continue
-
-Run the packaged scenario suite and inspect the SDK parity page.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.cross-language/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/assurance/disclosure.md b/public/assurance/disclosure.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a804e10..0000000
--- a/public/assurance/disclosure.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-# Disclosure
-
-Inspect evidence that receipt views are bounded and authority-controlled.
-
-## What the claim says
-
-Receipt integrity and receipt disclosure are separate decisions. Unauthorized callers receive an opaque view; summary and full projections are native-owned.
-
-## Release evidence
-
-Claim: `auths.claim.bounded-disclosure/1` · status `passing`
-
-Receipt inspection defaults to opaque or bounded views and requires authority for full disclosure.
-
-Evidence: `release/docs/runtime-facts-v1.json`
-
-SHA-256: `3229ccc5a4adbcdfd4b55bdca58ab9e7e5c333719aeff3a0dba54976e6fef1f1`
-
-Reproduce:
-
-- `cargo xtask product-conformance`
-
-Scope: Maintained receipt summary and disclosure operations and their public runtime contract.
-
-Limitation: Deployment retention, access control, and downstream handling remain application responsibilities.
-
-## What remains true
-
-Public artifacts contain bounded commitments and verification material rather than raw provider payloads or secrets.
-
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
-
-Unsafe downstream logging, overbroad retention, application-authored views, or disclosure-policy regression remains a deployment or product failure.
-
-## Continue
-
-Review receipt retention and the disclosure incident runbook before exposing evidence APIs.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/assurance/execution.md b/public/assurance/execution.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ca81e7f..0000000
--- a/public/assurance/execution.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-# Execution
-
-Inspect the native closed-gateway boundary protecting provider effects.
-
-## What the claim says
-
-Maintained workflows acquire provider access only through opaque native-authorized commands after required checks and state transitions.
-
-## Release evidence
-
-Claim: `auths.claim.closed-gateway/1` · status `passing`
-
-Maintained product workflows reach provider adapters only through opaque native-authorized commands.
-
-Evidence: `release/semantic-freeze.json`
-
-SHA-256: `75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3`
-
-Reproduce:
-
-- `cargo xtask product-waist-conformance`
-
-Scope: Maintained execution workflows and their opaque native command and gateway boundary.
-
-Limitation: Application-owned adapters can still be implemented unsafely outside the maintained boundary.
-
-## What remains true
-
-Transport, authentication, approval, signatures, or application objects cannot mint the effect-capable handle.
-
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
-
-An unsafe application-owned adapter, direct provider route, handle forgery, missing reservation, or semantic bypass lies outside or invalidates the claim.
-
-## Continue
-
-Use Operations to qualify the selected durable store, custody, and provider gateway deployment.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.execution/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/assurance/formal.md b/public/assurance/formal.md
deleted file mode 100644
index fbb445a..0000000
--- a/public/assurance/formal.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-# Formal
-
-Understand where formal attenuation evidence applies and where it does not.
-
-## What the claim says
-
-Lean and translation qualification reason about declared models and refinements; they do not prove every provider, store, network, UI, or deployment behavior.
-
-## Release evidence
-
-Claim: `auths.claim.attenuation/1` · status `passing`
-
-Delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent under the maintained model and adversarial fixtures.
-
-Evidence: `formal/qualification.lean`
-
-SHA-256: `fb1fd17d377194e96f98313412052f82fbb43cb594b12eb6a9fa0e0dce3ce70c`
-
-Reproduce:
-
-- `cargo xtask formal`
-
-Scope: Attenuation relations represented by the maintained formal model and protocol profile.
-
-Limitation: The claim covers the modelled fields and maintained protocol profile, not arbitrary application-defined semantics.
-
-## What remains true
-
-The checked theorem statements, axioms, translations, and source closure must match the selected release.
-
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
-
-Model drift, unreviewed axioms, stale generated translations, or code outside the refinement boundary changes the assurance scope.
-
-## Continue
-
-Pair formal evidence with adversarial, differential, and operational qualification.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.formal/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/assurance/index.md b/public/assurance/index.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0cd2ec4..0000000
--- a/public/assurance/index.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# Claims linked to evidence
-
-Auths publishes canonical fixtures, adversarial conformance, formal
-qualification, installed-artifact tests, semantic freeze, and release
-provenance. Every public claim names its evidence tier and limitations.
diff --git a/public/assurance/limitations.md b/public/assurance/limitations.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2700e9d..0000000
--- a/public/assurance/limitations.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-# Limitations
-
-Read the boundaries that Auths evidence deliberately does not claim to cross.
-
-## What the claim says
-
-Auths evidence does not certify production availability, every adapter, every cloud, every application profile, business intent, compliance, or universal correctness.
-
-## Release evidence
-
-Claim: `auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1` · status `passing`
-
-Rust owns protocol meaning used by Rust, TypeScript, and Python projections.
-
-Evidence: `release/semantic-freeze.json`
-
-SHA-256: `75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3`
-
-Reproduce:
-
-- `cargo xtask semantic-freeze`
-
-Scope: The declared protocol and product semantic identities consumed by maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python surfaces.
-
-Limitation: The semantic freeze detects declared semantic drift; it is not a proof that every implementation is defect-free.
-
-## What remains true
-
-Claims remain useful only when their release, checksum, scope, and limitation are carried together.
-
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
-
-Marketing language, stale screenshots, demo success, or an unpinned docs build cannot upgrade or broaden a claim.
-
-## Continue
-
-Use the open production and field-lab evidence as inputs, then perform deployment-specific threat modelling and external review.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.limitations/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/assurance/semantics.md b/public/assurance/semantics.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 9820677..0000000
--- a/public/assurance/semantics.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-# Semantics
-
-Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.
-
-## What the claim says
-
-The claim covers ownership of protocol meaning across maintained SDK projections, not defect-free code or every application adapter.
-
-## Release evidence
-
-Claim: `auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1` · status `passing`
-
-Rust owns protocol meaning used by Rust, TypeScript, and Python projections.
-
-Evidence: `release/semantic-freeze.json`
-
-SHA-256: `75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3`
-
-Reproduce:
-
-- `cargo xtask semantic-freeze`
-
-Scope: The declared protocol and product semantic identities consumed by maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python surfaces.
-
-Limitation: The semantic freeze detects declared semantic drift; it is not a proof that every implementation is defect-free.
-
-## What remains true
-
-A declaration change must update semantic identity or version, packaged projections, fixtures, and documentation together.
-
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
-
-Unrecorded semantic drift, language-owned authorization logic, or a fixture disagreement degrades or withdraws the claim.
-
-## Continue
-
-Inspect cross-language evidence and the generated SDK reference for the selected release.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.semantics/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/assurance/supply-chain.md b/public/assurance/supply-chain.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 26d083f..0000000
--- a/public/assurance/supply-chain.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-# Supply chain
-
-Inspect the recorded SLSA builder assessment without mistaking it for an independent audit.
-
-## What the claim says
-
-The assessment covers the declared GitHub release builder and recorded SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 controls.
-
-## Release evidence
-
-Claim: `auths.claim.supply-chain/1` · status `passing`
-
-The assessed release builder satisfies the recorded SLSA Build Level 3 requirements.
-
-Evidence: `release/slsa-build-level-3-assessment.json`
-
-SHA-256: `49d5a096915d49058c8c66f29c5c7f59181caa0783d4724322068de6c5c3f6bf`
-
-Reproduce:
-
-- `cargo test -p xtask release_control::tests::checked_in_slsa_assessment_matches_builder_bytes`
-
-Scope: The assessed GitHub release builder and recorded SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 controls.
-
-Limitation: This is a repository-owner delegated build assessment, not an independent security audit or source-correctness proof.
-
-## What remains true
-
-Builder bytes, provenance subjects, workflow identity, and release artifacts must match their checksummed assessment.
-
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
-
-A changed builder, missing provenance, unverified subject, or stale assessment withdraws passing status.
-
-## Continue
-
-Verify promotion evidence and obtain independent review appropriate to the deployment's consequence.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.supply-chain/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority.md b/public/authority.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1dbfe67..0000000
--- a/public/authority.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-# Authority
-
-Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
-
-## Recommended: [Authority model](/authority/model)
-
-Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
-
-## Model
-
-- [Authority model](/authority/model) — Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
-
-## Author and narrow
-
-- [Create](/authority/create) — Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.
-- [Constraints](/authority/constraints) — Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.
-- [Delegate](/authority/delegate) — Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.
-
-## Lifecycle
-
-- [Lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.
-- [Plans](/authority/plans) — Commit multiple ordered operations as one reviewable plan.
-
-## Execute and recover
-
-- [Execute](/authority/execute) — Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
-- [Resume](/authority/resume) — Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.
-
-## Verify and inspect
-
-- [Verify](/authority/verify) — Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.
-- [Receipts](/authority/receipts) — Use signed decision and execution receipts as portable integrity evidence.
-
-## Profiles
-
-- [Profiles](/authority/profiles) — Map application actions, resources, inputs, budgets, commands, and receipts without coupling adjacent components.
-
-## Related topics
-
-- [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority/1_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/constraints.md b/public/authority/constraints.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 8abc223..0000000
--- a/public/authority/constraints.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Constraints
-
-Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.
-
-## Model
-
-Constraints form a conjunction: every bound must permit the request. Action and resource describe the effect; validity limits time; uses and budget limit consumption; depth limits delegation; audience limits the intended verifier or executor; critical extensions add profile-owned restrictions.
-
-## What remains true
-
-Omitting a bound never means that a child may invent a broader one. Critical extensions must be understood and attenuated according to their declared semantics. Application profiles own canonical resource and action interpretation.
-
-## Where it fails closed
-
-Action or resource mismatch, early or late time, exhausted use, insufficient budget, excessive depth, wrong audience, and unknown or widened critical extensions each produce a stable denial before the provider is reached.
-
-## Continue
-
-Use the smallest combination that expresses the effect; keep policy engines outside this artifact and commit only their required evidence.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.constraints/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/create.md b/public/authority/create.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1ea110f..0000000
--- a/public/authority/create.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Create
-
-Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.
-
-## Outcome
-
-An issuer grants one subject the smallest useful action, resource, validity window, use count, budget, audience, and delegation depth.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Select a profile action, parse its resource and input, set explicit bounds, author through the native operation, and sign using the configured custody port.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The resulting artifact is canonical, portable, and accepted identically by Rust, TypeScript, and Python for the permitted request.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Missing bounds, invalid profile input, unsupported critical extensions, wrong audience, or altered bytes cannot be repaired during verification.
-
-## Continue
-
-Execute it directly, or delegate a narrower child without changing the model.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.create/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/delegate.md b/public/authority/delegate.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e802ec5..0000000
--- a/public/authority/delegate.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Delegate
-
-Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A child principal can act only inside every bound the parent deliberately passes on.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Parse the parent, select the child subject, narrow action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, depth, and critical extensions, then author and sign the child through the native delegate operation.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The child verifies as an unbroken chain and can perform the one intended tool action.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Any wider or incomparable child is rejected, including a quiet critical-extension omission that would restore power.
-
-## Continue
-
-Inspect depth and chain rules, then test every attempted widening relevant to the application profile.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md b/public/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d1572c8..0000000
--- a/public/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Depth and chain
-
-Reason about delegation depth and the complete signed chain.
-
-## Model
-
-Each delegation consumes one unit of permitted depth and adds a signed link. Verification checks the root trust, every issuer-to-subject transition, every narrowing relation, and the terminal request.
-
-## What remains true
-
-Depth cannot be reset by changing languages, identity adapters, transports, or profiles. A chain remains valid only while every link remains valid and trusted.
-
-## Where it fails closed
-
-Skipped links, reordered links, broken subjects, expired parents, revoked ancestors, excessive depth, and incomparable constraints deny the terminal request.
-
-## Continue
-
-Keep chains short in simple systems; use explicit organizational or agent handoffs only where they add accountability.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/delegate/widening-failures.md b/public/authority/delegate/widening-failures.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 6260c35..0000000
--- a/public/authority/delegate/widening-failures.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Widening failures
-
-Exercise every way a child might attempt to gain power its parent did not pass down.
-
-## Outcome
-
-Your test suite proves that delegation can only narrow, including application-defined critical extensions.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Generate mutations for action, resource, validity, uses, budget, depth, audience, extension presence, and extension values; verify each child against the same parent and trusted context.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Every valid narrowing is portable across SDKs, and every wider or incomparable mutation returns the same denial identity.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-A language disagreement, ignored critical extension, dropped parent, or accepted incomparable set is a release-blocking semantic failure.
-
-## Continue
-
-Keep these fixtures with the application profile and rerun them on every Auths upgrade.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/execute.md b/public/authority/execute.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 49efb74..0000000
--- a/public/authority/execute.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Execute
-
-Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
-
-## Outcome
-
-An opaque native authorization handle reaches the executor only after identity, authority, lifecycle, plan, and command checks pass.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Parse the command, verify and reserve authority, seal exact provider-independent bytes, acquire the gateway only from the native verified handle, perform the effect, then journal and sign the terminal receipt.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The gateway receives the minimum provider request after durable reservation and returns a closed, receipt-bound outcome.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Application code cannot mint the handle; successful transport, approval, signature, or provider authentication alone cannot open the gateway. Provider secrets never enter the authority artifact.
-
-## Continue
-
-Use Resume rather than a new Execute call when the terminal provider result is not yet known.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle.md b/public/authority/lifecycle.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 21e2fb2..0000000
--- a/public/authority/lifecycle.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-# Lifecycle
-
-Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.
-
-## The path at a glance
-
-1. Author exact authority
-2. Commit canonical bytes
-3. Attenuate child
-4. Consume use or budget
-5. Expire, revoke, or exhaust
-
-Text equivalent: Authority is authored for exact canonical bytes, committed, optionally attenuated into a child, consumed under durable state, and eventually expires, is revoked, or becomes exhausted.
-
-## What remains true
-
-- A child is a subset of its parent under every critical extension.
-- Use and budget state are durable and atomic with reservation.
-- Expired, revoked, or exhausted authority cannot be revived by transport or approval.
-
-## Failure branches
-
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| A child adds an action or use | Widening rejected | Create the child from a valid subset of the parent. |
-| Authority expires before reservation | Denied | Request fresh authority for current intent. |
-| Revocation state cannot be checked | Indeterminate | Restore lifecycle state; do not assume the grant remains valid. |
-
-## Use this when
-
-You need delegation, one-time use, budget, expiry, revocation, or critical-extension behavior.
-
-## Do not use this when
-
-You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.
-
-## Continue from here
-
-- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
-- [Authority](/authority) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md b/public/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md
deleted file mode 100644
index af2cb56..0000000
--- a/public/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Budgets
-
-Reserve and consume numeric or profile-defined budgets with the same atomic boundary as uses.
-
-## Model
-
-A budget limits cumulative effect according to a profile-owned unit such as cost, records, tokens, or capacity. The request declares its amount and durable state reserves it before execution.
-
-## What remains true
-
-Children may reduce available budget and executions cannot spend more than the remaining amount. The unit and canonical amount are committed.
-
-## Where it fails closed
-
-Negative, overflowed, mismatched-unit, over-budget, concurrent overspend, and unavailable-state requests deny before provider access.
-
-## Continue
-
-Keep budgets simple and domain-specific; use a policy engine for broader business policy and commit its chosen inputs separately.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md b/public/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f06caa7..0000000
--- a/public/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Revocation and status
-
-Apply issuer-owned status without pretending it is an offline cryptographic fact.
-
-## Model
-
-Status is an explicit trusted input resolved by an application-owned status provider. It can express active, revoked, suspended, unknown, or unavailable according to the profile.
-
-## What remains true
-
-The decision commits the status evidence it used. Cached status obeys declared freshness; absence is not interpreted as active.
-
-## Where it fails closed
-
-Revoked, suspended, stale, unknown, or unavailable status returns a closed lifecycle outcome. Offline verification must state when no current status was consulted.
-
-## Continue
-
-Choose freshness and availability behavior appropriate to the effect's consequence.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md b/public/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 562772d..0000000
--- a/public/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Uses and replay
-
-Consume bounded uses atomically and reject exact replay.
-
-## Model
-
-Use state is keyed by stable authority and command commitments. Execution reserves a use before reaching the provider and commits or recovers that reservation according to the journaled outcome.
-
-## What remains true
-
-Concurrent requests cannot both consume the same final use. A transport retry does not create fresh semantic authority.
-
-## Where it fails closed
-
-Exact replay, exhausted use count, reservation conflict, unavailable state, and uncertain prior execution cannot fall through to the provider.
-
-## Continue
-
-Use Resume for an existing execution reference; never mint a fresh command to hide uncertainty.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md b/public/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 498d033..0000000
--- a/public/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Validity and expiry
-
-Evaluate not-before and expiry bounds at an explicit observation time.
-
-## Model
-
-Validity is a closed interval committed into authority. Verification receives observation time as explicit context and never borrows an ambient clock without the caller choosing it.
-
-## What remains true
-
-Children may shorten but never extend their parent's window. Retained evidence records the time used for the decision.
-
-## Where it fails closed
-
-Before-not-before, after-expiry, missing time, invalid intervals, and child windows outside the parent deny deterministically.
-
-## Continue
-
-Combine time with status only when current lifecycle state is required.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/model.md b/public/authority/model.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 4e5afe7..0000000
--- a/public/authority/model.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-# Authority model
-
-Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
-
-## The path at a glance
-
-1. Actor + exact action
-2. Create authority
-3. Delegate narrower
-4. Execute through gateway
-5. Verify receipt
-
-Text equivalent: An actor describes an exact action, creates bounded authority, optionally delegates a narrower child, executes through a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt.
-
-## What remains true
-
-- Authority names the exact action and actor bounds.
-- Delegation cannot add actions, time, uses, budget, or depth.
-- Verification returns inert evidence and cannot perform the effect.
-
-## Failure branches
-
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| Action bytes change | Commitment mismatch | Create authority for the intended bytes; do not reinterpret the old grant. |
-| The same use is replayed | Denied | Create a new authorized operation only if the business intent is genuinely new. |
-| Required trust evidence is unavailable | Indeterminate | Restore the missing evidence before making a decision. |
-
-## Use this when
-
-You need the complete product model before choosing an SDK or deployment.
-
-## Do not use this when
-
-You only need an exact signature or endpoint field; open the generated reference instead.
-
-## Continue from here
-
-- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
-- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while remaining on the same Auths operation.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.concepts.tour/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/plans.md b/public/authority/plans.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 3944c32..0000000
--- a/public/authority/plans.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-# Plans
-
-Commit multiple ordered operations as one reviewable plan.
-
-## Recommended: [Transaction-bound approvals](/authority/plans/approvals)
-
-Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.
-
-## Lifecycle
-
-- [Transaction-bound approvals](/authority/plans/approvals) — Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.plans/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority.plans/1_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/plans/approvals.md b/public/authority/plans/approvals.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 28efd0c..0000000
--- a/public/authority/plans/approvals.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-# Transaction-bound approvals
-
-Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.
-
-## The path at a glance
-
-1. Construct exact plan
-2. Commit members + order
-3. Collect bound approvals
-4. Authorize each sealed command
-5. Record partial or terminal outcome
-
-Text equivalent: An exact ordered plan is committed, approvers sign that commitment, each member still passes authorization, and execution records partial, uncertain, cancelled, or terminal outcomes without treating approval as reusable permission.
-
-## What remains true
-
-- Approval is evidence about one exact plan commitment.
-- Substituting a member, byte sequence, order, threshold, or approver set invalidates approval.
-- Approval never bypasses authority verification or durable execution state.
-
-## Failure branches
-
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| A plan member changes after approval | Substitution rejected | Build and approve a new plan commitment. |
-| Threshold is not met | Denied | Collect the missing valid approval or cancel. |
-| A provider outcome becomes unknown mid-plan | Plan is recoverable with explicit completed and uncertain members | Reconcile before any continuation. |
-
-## Use this when
-
-Several exact operations require threshold, ordered, or cross-organization review.
-
-## Do not use this when
-
-A reusable human-approved flag or broad role is sufficient for the actual risk model.
-
-## Continue from here
-
-- [Cross-company authority](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
-- [Authority](/authority) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/profiles.md b/public/authority/profiles.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0a3755e..0000000
--- a/public/authority/profiles.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Profiles
-
-Map application actions, resources, inputs, budgets, commands, and receipts without coupling adjacent components.
-
-## Model
-
-A profile owns domain meaning: canonical action and resource identifiers, bounded input parsing, command construction, budget units, critical extensions, and receipt-safe projections. Maintained profiles are closed; profile-kit supports application-owned domains.
-
-## What remains true
-
-Profiles cannot choose identity providers, transports, state stores, signer custody, approval vendors, or provider credentials. Every profile parser is bounded and every semantic identity is versioned.
-
-## Where it fails closed
-
-Ambiguous resources, non-canonical input, unknown actions, incompatible versions, unbounded extensions, or profiles that smuggle credentials or transport data fail qualification.
-
-## Continue
-
-Begin with a maintained profile or one minimal application-owned action; expand only with differential and adversarial fixtures.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/receipts.md b/public/authority/receipts.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1713df9..0000000
--- a/public/authority/receipts.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-# Receipts
-
-Use signed decision and execution receipts as portable integrity evidence.
-
-## Recommended: [Bounded disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure)
-
-Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.
-
-## Verify and inspect
-
-- [Bounded disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure) — Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority.receipts/1_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md b/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0004f70..0000000
--- a/public/authority/receipts/disclosure.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-# Bounded disclosure
-
-Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.
-
-## The path at a glance
-
-1. Decision receipt
-2. Execution receipt
-3. Verify integrity
-4. Opaque or summary view
-5. Authorized full disclosure
-
-Text equivalent: Decision and execution receipts bind evidence, local verification confirms integrity, every viewer can receive only the permitted opaque or summary projection, and sensitive full detail requires explicit disclosure authority.
-
-## What remains true
-
-- A receipt records a decision or outcome; it does not retroactively authorize it.
-- Verification is local and effect free.
-- Sensitive application details are absent from unauthorized and bounded-summary views.
-
-## Failure branches
-
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| Receipt bytes are changed | Verification rejected | Retrieve the original signed receipt from a trusted source. |
-| A viewer lacks disclosure authority | Opaque view | Request explicit disclosure authority rather than leaking fields. |
-| Signer trust cannot be resolved | Indeterminate | Restore trust evidence before relying on the receipt. |
-
-## Use this when
-
-You need audit evidence, cross-company proof, recovery state, or privacy-preserving inspection.
-
-## Do not use this when
-
-You need to perform an effect; receipt verification is intentionally inert.
-
-## Continue from here
-
-- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
-- [Assurance](/assurance) — Inspect what Auths claims, the exact evidence behind it, and the limits that remain.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/resume.md b/public/authority/resume.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 01e7535..0000000
--- a/public/authority/resume.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Resume
-
-Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.
-
-## Outcome
-
-The runtime recovers the journaled reservation and either returns the known terminal outcome or reconciles the same provider operation.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Submit the opaque execution reference, load its durable journal, inspect the last committed phase, and invoke only the gateway's idempotent status or reconciliation path permitted for that original command.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Resume converges on one terminal receipt while preserving original authority, command, context, and idempotency commitments.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Unknown reference, mismatched caller, corrupted journal, fresh command substitution, blind provider retry, or unreconciled provider uncertainty remains stopped.
-
-## Continue
-
-Define operational reconciliation and escalation for every gateway before enabling production effects.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.resume/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/authority/verify.md b/public/authority/verify.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 38afeb9..0000000
--- a/public/authority/verify.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Verify
-
-Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A caller obtains a deterministic, inert result for exact artifact bytes and explicit trusted context.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Parse the artifact, supply trust, time, status, request, and profile context as required, run native verification, and project only the authorized inspection view.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The same bytes and context produce the same normalized result across Rust, TypeScript, and Python without contacting a provider.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Mutation, wrong trust, stale status, request mismatch, invalid chain, unauthorized disclosure, or unknown semantics fails without constructing executable authority.
-
-## Continue
-
-Use Receipts to understand integrity and Disclosure to control what verified evidence reveals.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.verify/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers.md b/public/developers.md
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index 13c67bd..0000000
--- a/public/developers.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-# Developers
-
-Choose an SDK, call the runtime, use the CLI, test failures, compose adjacent systems, and build application profiles.
-
-## Recommended: [Quickstarts](/developers/quickstarts)
-
-Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.
-
-## Start building
-
-- [Quickstarts](/developers/quickstarts) — Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.
-
-## SDKs
-
-- [SDKs](/developers/sdks) — Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
-
-## Runtime and CLI
-
-- [Runtime API](/developers/runtime-api) — Call the production HTTPS runtime from any language or service boundary.
-- [CLI](/developers/cli) — Choose supported terminal workflows without mistaking repository tooling for a public product CLI.
-
-## Test and debug
-
-- [Testing](/developers/testing) — Test success, denial, mutation, replay, recovery, and cross-language parity with deterministic fixtures.
-- [Outcomes and errors](/developers/errors) — Handle the complete closed outcome and error surface without collapsing uncertainty into exceptions or booleans.
-
-## Releases
-
-- [Versioning](/developers/versioning) — Pin semantic identities, SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, and evidence to a release.
-- [Releases](/developers/releases) — Inspect release notes, package support, contracts, evidence, and known limitations for one Auths release.
-
-## Integrate and extend
-
-- [Integrations](/developers/integrations) — Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, transport, and capability systems through explicit ports.
-- [Extension kits](/developers/extension-kits) — Implement identity, suite, trust, status, approval, custody, state, transport, gateway, or profile ports.
-- [Examples](/developers/examples) — Find complete examples by outcome, boundary, and deployment maturity.
-
-## Related topics
-
-- [Reference](/reference) — Look up exact SDK, Runtime API, CLI, profile, error, schema, evidence, and manifest contracts for one release.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers/1 · Product contract: auths.page.developers/1_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/cli.md b/public/developers/cli.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0ad3dfc..0000000
--- a/public/developers/cli.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# CLI
-
-Choose supported terminal workflows without mistaking repository tooling for a public product CLI.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A terminal user can run installed SDK scripts or call the Runtime API while preserving the same typed outcomes and evidence.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-The selected prelaunch release does not declare a general-purpose public Auths CLI. Use a maintained SDK or the HTTPS Runtime API; repository-only cargo xtask commands are contributor tooling.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Run the offline verification project from a clean consumer, or call health and version with the documented Runtime API request. Keep inputs in bounded files and switch on machine-readable outcomes.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Terminal workflows return the same verified result as application code and do not expose provider credentials or unrestricted receipt views.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-An undocumented binary, copied contributor command, ambiguous config, full disclosure without authority, or automatic provider retry is unsupported.
-
-## Continue
-
-Use the generated SDK or Runtime API reference. A future public CLI must first enter the immutable release contract.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.cli/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/errors.md b/public/developers/errors.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0628afd..0000000
--- a/public/developers/errors.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Outcomes and errors
-
-Handle the complete closed outcome and error surface without collapsing uncertainty into exceptions or booleans.
-
-## Orientation
-
-Parse errors, denials, indeterminate lifecycle results, provider failures, provider-unknown outcomes, and terminal successes mean different things. SDKs use typed results; the Runtime API uses closed response schemas.
-
-## Generated contract anchor
-
-Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.executions/1`.
-
-## Use this surface
-
-Switch exhaustively on the generated union. Retry only transport failures known to precede reservation; Resume an existing reference after reservation; reconcile provider unknown; treat unknown future variants as closed.
-
-## Source at release
-
-Outcome identities and shapes are generated from the release Runtime contract and SDK declarations.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.errors/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/examples.md b/public/developers/examples.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 86e103b..0000000
--- a/public/developers/examples.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# Examples
-
-Find complete examples by outcome, boundary, and deployment maturity.
-
-## Choose a useful next step
-
-Start with installed quickstarts, then use the live incident-response demo for multi-party workflows, interoperability fixtures for composition, and the field lab for real cloud evidence. Each example states whether it is deterministic, production-shaped, or production-ready.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.examples/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/extension-kits.md b/public/developers/extension-kits.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c74907f..0000000
--- a/public/developers/extension-kits.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Extension kits
-
-Implement identity, suite, trust, status, approval, custody, state, transport, gateway, or profile ports.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A replaceable adapter satisfies a narrow typed contract and conformance suite without changing core semantics.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Choose exactly one port, read its ownership and threat boundary, and start from the maintained in-memory or reference adapter rather than a second semantic implementation.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Parse bounded inputs into opaque adapter-owned types, implement stable closed outcomes, add positive plus adversarial fixtures, and qualify failures, concurrency, cancellation, and observability.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The adapter can be swapped without changing application authority artifacts or the other ports.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Implicit fallbacks, secret leakage, unbounded parsing, language-specific semantic decisions, swallowed uncertainty, or cross-port dependencies fail review.
-
-## Continue
-
-Publish the adapter independently when Auths should not own its lifecycle.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.extensions/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations.md b/public/developers/integrations.md
deleted file mode 100644
index eba2931..0000000
--- a/public/developers/integrations.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# Integrations
-
-Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, transport, and capability systems through explicit ports.
-
-## Recommended: [Identity and trust](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust)
-
-Compose raw keys, OIDC, SPIFFE, or application identity resolvers.
-
-## Integrate and extend
-
-- [Identity and trust](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust) — Compose raw keys, OIDC, SPIFFE, or application identity resolvers.
-- [Policy](/developers/integrations/policy) — Use Cedar, OPA, or relationship-based authorization as explicit policy context.
-- [Cloud IAM](/developers/integrations/cloud-iam) — Acquire short-lived cloud credentials only inside a closed gateway after Auths authorization.
-- [Transport](/developers/integrations/transport) — Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, files, or application transports.
-- [Capabilities](/developers/integrations/capabilities) — Import or compose UCAN, Biscuit, macaroons, or another capability result without conflating semantics.
-- [Profile kit](/developers/integrations/profile-kit) — Build an application-owned profile for actions, resources, commands, budgets, and safe receipt fields.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.composition/1 · Product contract: auths.page.integrations.composition/1_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/capabilities.md b/public/developers/integrations/capabilities.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 58635ed..0000000
--- a/public/developers/integrations/capabilities.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Capabilities
-
-Import or compose UCAN, Biscuit, macaroons, or another capability result without conflating semantics.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The capability protocol and its verifier remains authoritative for its domain. Auths owns only the portable bounded authority and native execution or verification semantics at the composition boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-A verified, bounded capability projection with its original evidence identity is parsed into an explicit typed input. Auths commits only what its decision or command needs, then returns a stable outcome and bounded evidence.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Private identity keys, OAuth tokens, policy data, cloud credentials, transport secrets, and provider credentials remain behind their existing ports. They are never copied into Auths authority.
-
-## State
-
-Each adjacent system retains its native lifecycle. Auths stores only uses, budgets, replay, plan, execution, recovery, and receipt state for protected effects.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-Malformed input, stale evidence, adapter uncertainty, authority mismatch, replay, and provider ambiguity remain separate closed outcomes with one named owner.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-Auths does not claim identical semantics or silently translate unsupported caveats; applications must profile the exact overlap and external state.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md b/public/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ad12799..0000000
--- a/public/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Cloud IAM
-
-Acquire short-lived cloud credentials only inside a closed gateway after Auths authorization.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-Cloud IAM and the provider account remains authoritative for its domain. Auths owns only the portable bounded authority and native execution or verification semantics at the composition boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-A sealed provider-independent command mapped to one least-privilege cloud operation is parsed into an explicit typed input. Auths commits only what its decision or command needs, then returns a stable outcome and bounded evidence.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Private identity keys, OAuth tokens, policy data, cloud credentials, transport secrets, and provider credentials remain behind their existing ports. They are never copied into Auths authority.
-
-## State
-
-Each adjacent system retains its native lifecycle. Auths stores only uses, budgets, replay, plan, execution, recovery, and receipt state for protected effects.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-Malformed input, stale evidence, adapter uncertainty, authority mismatch, replay, and provider ambiguity remain separate closed outcomes with one named owner.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-Cloud IAM remains necessary for provider access; Auths adds portable exact authority, lifecycle, recovery, and receipts rather than replacing the cloud control plane.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.cloud/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md b/public/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 48e5d8c..0000000
--- a/public/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Identity and trust
-
-Compose raw keys, OIDC, SPIFFE, or application identity resolvers.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The identity and trust system remains authoritative for its domain. Auths owns only the portable bounded authority and native execution or verification semantics at the composition boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-Validated method-, suite-, issuer-, subject-, audience-, and freshness-labelled evidence is parsed into an explicit typed input. Auths commits only what its decision or command needs, then returns a stable outcome and bounded evidence.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Private identity keys, OAuth tokens, policy data, cloud credentials, transport secrets, and provider credentials remain behind their existing ports. They are never copied into Auths authority.
-
-## State
-
-Each adjacent system retains its native lifecycle. Auths stores only uses, budgets, replay, plan, execution, recovery, and receipt state for protected effects.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-Malformed input, stale evidence, adapter uncertainty, authority mismatch, replay, and provider ambiguity remain separate closed outcomes with one named owner.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-Authentication remains independent from authority and Auths does not become the directory or identity provider.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/policy.md b/public/developers/integrations/policy.md
deleted file mode 100644
index fc5bba5..0000000
--- a/public/developers/integrations/policy.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Policy
-
-Use Cedar, OPA, or relationship-based authorization as explicit policy context.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The policy engine and its data owners remains authoritative for its domain. Auths owns only the portable bounded authority and native execution or verification semantics at the composition boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-A bounded decision, policy identity, relevant context commitment, and observation time is parsed into an explicit typed input. Auths commits only what its decision or command needs, then returns a stable outcome and bounded evidence.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Private identity keys, OAuth tokens, policy data, cloud credentials, transport secrets, and provider credentials remain behind their existing ports. They are never copied into Auths authority.
-
-## State
-
-Each adjacent system retains its native lifecycle. Auths stores only uses, budgets, replay, plan, execution, recovery, and receipt state for protected effects.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-Malformed input, stale evidence, adapter uncertainty, authority mismatch, replay, and provider ambiguity remain separate closed outcomes with one named owner.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-Auths does not reimplement the policy language or pretend a policy decision alone authorizes an exact effect.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.policy/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md b/public/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2f8d9d8..0000000
--- a/public/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Profile kit
-
-Build an application-owned profile for actions, resources, commands, budgets, and safe receipt fields.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The application domain team remains authoritative for its domain. Auths owns only the portable bounded authority and native execution or verification semantics at the composition boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-Bounded canonical domain inputs and explicit provider-independent command mappings is parsed into an explicit typed input. Auths commits only what its decision or command needs, then returns a stable outcome and bounded evidence.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Private identity keys, OAuth tokens, policy data, cloud credentials, transport secrets, and provider credentials remain behind their existing ports. They are never copied into Auths authority.
-
-## State
-
-Each adjacent system retains its native lifecycle. Auths stores only uses, budgets, replay, plan, execution, recovery, and receipt state for protected effects.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-Malformed input, stale evidence, adapter uncertainty, authority mismatch, replay, and provider ambiguity remain separate closed outcomes with one named owner.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-Profile kit does not own identity adapters, transports, stores, custody, approval vendors, or provider credentials.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/integrations/transport.md b/public/developers/integrations/transport.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 93551b8..0000000
--- a/public/developers/integrations/transport.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Transport
-
-Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, files, or application transports.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The transport and network operators remains authoritative for its domain. Auths owns only the portable bounded authority and native execution or verification semantics at the composition boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-Bounded framed identity, authority, command, or receipt bytes is parsed into an explicit typed input. Auths commits only what its decision or command needs, then returns a stable outcome and bounded evidence.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Private identity keys, OAuth tokens, policy data, cloud credentials, transport secrets, and provider credentials remain behind their existing ports. They are never copied into Auths authority.
-
-## State
-
-Each adjacent system retains its native lifecycle. Auths stores only uses, budgets, replay, plan, execution, recovery, and receipt state for protected effects.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-Malformed input, stale evidence, adapter uncertainty, authority mismatch, replay, and provider ambiguity remain separate closed outcomes with one named owner.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-Delivery, channel authentication, and peer reachability never become authorization, and Auths does not prescribe a single network.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.integrations.transport/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/quickstarts.md b/public/developers/quickstarts.md
deleted file mode 100644
index cd011f8..0000000
--- a/public/developers/quickstarts.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# Quickstarts
-
-Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.
-
-## Choose a useful next step
-
-Use Local REST effect for an in-process SDK boundary, Runtime effect for the HTTPS service, Agent delegation for tools, Approved plan for exact review, Offline verification for inert evidence, Recovery for ambiguous outcomes, or Identity swap for agility. The maintained projects live under Get started so there is one runnable source.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.quickstarts/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/releases.md b/public/developers/releases.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 639b022..0000000
--- a/public/developers/releases.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Releases
-
-Inspect release notes, package support, contracts, evidence, and known limitations for one Auths release.
-
-## Orientation
-
-A release joins Rust crates, maintained SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, fixtures, assurance claims, documentation, and supply-chain evidence under one identity.
-
-## Generated contract anchor
-
-Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.version/1`.
-
-## Use this surface
-
-Review breaking semantic identities, supported runtimes, state migrations, profile changes, evidence withdrawals, and known limits before deployment.
-
-## Source at release
-
-The release page is rendered from signed or checksummed release artifacts and the exact source revisions that produced them.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.releases/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/runtime-api.md b/public/developers/runtime-api.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 122e76d..0000000
--- a/public/developers/runtime-api.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Runtime API
-
-Call the production HTTPS runtime from any language or service boundary.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A client checks health and version, submits bounded authority and sealed commands, handles closed outcomes, resumes existing executions, and requests authorized receipt views.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Use one HTTPS origin whose release identity and trust are explicitly configured. Keep provider credentials, signer custody, and durable state behind the service.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Call health and version first, create or bring authority, execute with an idempotency commitment, switch on the complete outcome union, resume only by opaque reference, and verify the returned receipt.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-A packaged consumer completes once and the exact Runtime API reference matches the deployed contract digest.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Non-HTTPS endpoints, version mismatch, unknown outcome, invalid request, timeout after provider access, or missing receipt cannot be treated as success.
-
-## Continue
-
-Open generated Runtime API reference for exact methods, paths, limits, and schemas.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/sdks.md b/public/developers/sdks.md
deleted file mode 100644
index daf06a2..0000000
--- a/public/developers/sdks.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-# SDKs
-
-Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
-
-## Recommended: [Rust](/developers/sdks/rust)
-
-Install the maintained Rust SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
-
-## SDKs
-
-- [Rust](/developers/sdks/rust) — Install the maintained Rust SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
-- [TypeScript](/developers/sdks/typescript) — Install the maintained TypeScript SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
-- [Python](/developers/sdks/python) — Install the maintained Python SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
-- [SDK parity](/developers/sdks/parity) — Inspect maintained operation, outcome, fixture, and packaging parity across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks/1 · Product contract: auths.page.developers.sdks/1_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/sdks/parity.md b/public/developers/sdks/parity.md
deleted file mode 100644
index cee95cc..0000000
--- a/public/developers/sdks/parity.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# SDK parity
-
-Inspect maintained operation, outcome, fixture, and packaging parity across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
-
-## Orientation
-
-Parity means identical semantic operations, accepted and rejected fixtures, normalized outcomes, and receipt bytes. It does not require language APIs to ignore their own idioms.
-
-## Generated contract anchor
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
-
-## Use this surface
-
-Use the generated matrix to confirm create, delegate, execute, resume, verify, inspection, and diagnostics coverage for the selected release before choosing an SDK.
-
-## Source at release
-
-The release bundle, packaged API inventories, and differential fixtures generate the matrix. Editorial pages do not hand-maintain method lists.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks.parity/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/sdks/python.md b/public/developers/sdks/python.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 522df83..0000000
--- a/public/developers/sdks/python.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Python
-
-Install the maintained Python SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A clean Python consumer can create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify without reproducing Rust-owned semantics.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Use a supported Python runtime and install the packaged SDK with python -m pip install auths. Keep the release contract and examples from that package version.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Start from the installed local REST effect, switch the global language selector to this SDK, run the permitted request and denial, then follow exact symbols into Reference.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The packaged consumer returns the same normalized outcomes and receipt commitments as Rust and the other maintained SDK.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Missing native artifacts, unsupported runtime, type mismatch, ABI mismatch, semantic drift, or a language-owned authorization object fails installation or qualification.
-
-## Continue
-
-Use SDK parity to compare maintained coverage and Runtime API when the application should not load a native extension.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks.python/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/sdks/rust.md b/public/developers/sdks/rust.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 748729a..0000000
--- a/public/developers/sdks/rust.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Rust
-
-Install the maintained Rust SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A clean Rust consumer can create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify without reproducing Rust-owned semantics.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Use a supported Rust runtime and install the packaged SDK with cargo add auths-sdk. Keep the release contract and examples from that package version.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Start from the installed local REST effect, switch the global language selector to this SDK, run the permitted request and denial, then follow exact symbols into Reference.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The packaged consumer returns the same normalized outcomes and receipt commitments as Rust and the other maintained SDK.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Missing native artifacts, unsupported runtime, type mismatch, ABI mismatch, semantic drift, or a language-owned authorization object fails installation or qualification.
-
-## Continue
-
-Use SDK parity to compare maintained coverage and Runtime API when the application should not load a native extension.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks.rust/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/sdks/typescript.md b/public/developers/sdks/typescript.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e6a3a31..0000000
--- a/public/developers/sdks/typescript.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# TypeScript
-
-Install the maintained TypeScript SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A clean TypeScript consumer can create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify without reproducing Rust-owned semantics.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Use a supported TypeScript runtime and install the packaged SDK with npm install @auths-dev/sdk. Keep the release contract and examples from that package version.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Start from the installed local REST effect, switch the global language selector to this SDK, run the permitted request and denial, then follow exact symbols into Reference.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The packaged consumer returns the same normalized outcomes and receipt commitments as Rust and the other maintained SDK.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Missing native artifacts, unsupported runtime, type mismatch, ABI mismatch, semantic drift, or a language-owned authorization object fails installation or qualification.
-
-## Continue
-
-Use SDK parity to compare maintained coverage and Runtime API when the application should not load a native extension.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.sdks.typescript/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/testing.md b/public/developers/testing.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 3b875a0..0000000
--- a/public/developers/testing.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Testing
-
-Test success, denial, mutation, replay, recovery, and cross-language parity with deterministic fixtures.
-
-## Outcome
-
-Application tests prove the effect boundary and prohibited variants without relying on mock authorization logic.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Install packaged SDKs, use deterministic keys and clocks only in testkit, isolate provider substitutes, and name the exact stable outcome each negative case expects.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Run permitted, changed bytes, widened delegation, expired, revoked, replayed, over-budget, plan substitution, transport-only, provider-unknown, and disclosure-denial fixtures.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-All languages agree, prohibited providers are untouched, and every executable example is traced to a qualified scenario.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Snapshot-only output, live network dependence, broad mocks, ignored indeterminate states, or language-specific semantic assertions fails the test design.
-
-## Continue
-
-Add the fixtures to CI and inspect exact generated errors and evidence.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.testing/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/developers/versioning.md b/public/developers/versioning.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ddb7434..0000000
--- a/public/developers/versioning.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Versioning
-
-Pin semantic identities, SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, and evidence to a release.
-
-## Orientation
-
-Auths versions wire meaning and public surfaces explicitly. A package version alone is not permission to mix contracts, profiles, or generated documentation from another release.
-
-## Generated contract anchor
-
-Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.version/1`.
-
-## Use this surface
-
-Check the Runtime version endpoint, compare its contract digest with installed artifacts, and qualify state plus fixtures before upgrade or rollback.
-
-## Source at release
-
-Version and digest data come from the immutable release bundle selected by the documentation build.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.developers.versioning/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/downloads/quickstarts/agent-delegation.json b/public/downloads/quickstarts/agent-delegation.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 0a6d604..0000000
--- a/public/downloads/quickstarts/agent-delegation.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema": "auths.docs.quickstart/1",
-  "id": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
-  "slug": "agent-delegation",
-  "title": "Delegate one tool to an agent",
-  "description": "Give an agent one narrow tool and prove it cannot widen itself into a second tool.",
-  "minutes": 12,
-  "effect": "publish_report",
-  "permitted": "Agent publishes one report",
-  "prohibited": "Agent deletes a report",
-  "success": "completed",
-  "failure": "authority_widening",
-  "next": [
-    "auths.page.agents/1",
-    "auths.page.authority/1"
-  ],
-  "sources": {
-    "install": {
-      "rust": "cargo add auths-sdk",
-      "typescript": "npm install @auths-dev/sdk",
-      "python": "python -m pip install auths"
-    },
-    "execute": {
-      "rust": "let action = profile.action(\"publish_report\", canonical_input)?;\nlet outcome = verifier.authorize(&proof, &action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(outcome.kind(), \"completed\");",
-      "typescript": "const action = mcp.callTool({\n  name: \"publish_report\",\n  arguments: canonicalInput,\n});\nconst outcome = await auths.execute({ action, provider });\nif (outcome.kind !== \"completed\") throw new Error(outcome.kind);",
-      "python": "action = mcp.call_tool(\n    name=\"publish_report\",\n    arguments=canonical_input,\n)\noutcome = await auths.execute(action=action, provider=provider)\nif outcome.kind != \"completed\":\n    raise RuntimeError(outcome.kind)"
-    },
-    "failure": {
-      "rust": "let denied = verifier.authorize(&proof, &prohibited_action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(denied.code(), \"authority_widening\");",
-      "typescript": "const denied = await auths.execute({ action: prohibitedAction, provider });\nif (denied.kind !== \"denied\" || denied.code !== \"authority_widening\") {\n  throw new Error(\"effect did not fail closed\");\n}",
-      "python": "denied = await auths.execute(action=prohibited_action, provider=provider)\nif denied.kind != \"denied\" or denied.code != \"authority_widening\":\n    raise RuntimeError(\"effect did not fail closed\")"
-    }
-  },
-  "digest": "d9f5760ec67f907751c908391e712f50776a5472338b0a1d529ad22485f2fd94"
-}
diff --git a/public/downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json b/public/downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 737e6dc..0000000
--- a/public/downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema": "auths.docs.quickstart/1",
-  "id": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1",
-  "slug": "approved-plan",
-  "title": "Run one approved plan",
-  "description": "Bind approval to an exact ordered plan and prove that replacing a member invalidates it.",
-  "minutes": 18,
-  "effect": "quarantine_then_rotate",
-  "permitted": "Quarantine service, then rotate token",
-  "prohibited": "Replace rotate token with delete service",
-  "success": "completed",
-  "failure": "approval_substitution",
-  "next": [
-    "auths.page.tour.approval-bound-plans/1",
-    "auths.page.operations.runtime/1"
-  ],
-  "sources": {
-    "install": {
-      "rust": "cargo add auths-sdk",
-      "typescript": "npm install @auths-dev/sdk",
-      "python": "python -m pip install auths"
-    },
-    "execute": {
-      "rust": "let action = profile.action(\"quarantine_then_rotate\", canonical_input)?;\nlet outcome = verifier.authorize(&proof, &action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(outcome.kind(), \"completed\");",
-      "typescript": "const action = mcp.callTool({\n  name: \"quarantine_then_rotate\",\n  arguments: canonicalInput,\n});\nconst outcome = await auths.execute({ action, provider });\nif (outcome.kind !== \"completed\") throw new Error(outcome.kind);",
-      "python": "action = mcp.call_tool(\n    name=\"quarantine_then_rotate\",\n    arguments=canonical_input,\n)\noutcome = await auths.execute(action=action, provider=provider)\nif outcome.kind != \"completed\":\n    raise RuntimeError(outcome.kind)"
-    },
-    "failure": {
-      "rust": "let denied = verifier.authorize(&proof, &prohibited_action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(denied.code(), \"approval_substitution\");",
-      "typescript": "const denied = await auths.execute({ action: prohibitedAction, provider });\nif (denied.kind !== \"denied\" || denied.code !== \"approval_substitution\") {\n  throw new Error(\"effect did not fail closed\");\n}",
-      "python": "denied = await auths.execute(action=prohibited_action, provider=provider)\nif denied.kind != \"denied\" or denied.code != \"approval_substitution\":\n    raise RuntimeError(\"effect did not fail closed\")"
-    }
-  },
-  "digest": "5db83135dc1f611bb4377fb9f925c7379c62ac1ba28cb388d202eeb631c727ab"
-}
diff --git a/public/downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json b/public/downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 2cf3815..0000000
--- a/public/downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema": "auths.docs.quickstart/1",
-  "id": "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1",
-  "slug": "identity-swap",
-  "title": "Swap identity suites without changing authority",
-  "description": "Run the same authority workflow with two suites and prove that a mislabelled suite fails verification.",
-  "minutes": 14,
-  "effect": "publish_report",
-  "permitted": "Verify Ed25519 and P-256 projections",
-  "prohibited": "Label Ed25519 material as P-256",
-  "success": "authorized",
-  "failure": "suite_mismatch",
-  "next": [
-    "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
-    "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"
-  ],
-  "sources": {
-    "install": {
-      "rust": "cargo add auths-sdk",
-      "typescript": "npm install @auths-dev/sdk",
-      "python": "python -m pip install auths"
-    },
-    "execute": {
-      "rust": "let action = profile.action(\"publish_report\", canonical_input)?;\nlet outcome = verifier.authorize(&proof, &action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(outcome.kind(), \"authorized\");",
-      "typescript": "const action = mcp.callTool({\n  name: \"publish_report\",\n  arguments: canonicalInput,\n});\nconst outcome = await auths.execute({ action, provider });\nif (outcome.kind !== \"authorized\") throw new Error(outcome.kind);",
-      "python": "action = mcp.call_tool(\n    name=\"publish_report\",\n    arguments=canonical_input,\n)\noutcome = await auths.execute(action=action, provider=provider)\nif outcome.kind != \"authorized\":\n    raise RuntimeError(outcome.kind)"
-    },
-    "failure": {
-      "rust": "let denied = verifier.authorize(&proof, &prohibited_action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(denied.code(), \"suite_mismatch\");",
-      "typescript": "const denied = await auths.execute({ action: prohibitedAction, provider });\nif (denied.kind !== \"denied\" || denied.code !== \"suite_mismatch\") {\n  throw new Error(\"effect did not fail closed\");\n}",
-      "python": "denied = await auths.execute(action=prohibited_action, provider=provider)\nif denied.kind != \"denied\" or denied.code != \"suite_mismatch\":\n    raise RuntimeError(\"effect did not fail closed\")"
-    }
-  },
-  "digest": "ae24625766e585ed21864eae56c3ac537f1c9869515ae448c98c2b33c8ac89f0"
-}
diff --git a/public/downloads/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json b/public/downloads/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 22daa76..0000000
--- a/public/downloads/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema": "auths.docs.quickstart/1",
-  "id": "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
-  "slug": "local-rest-effect",
-  "title": "Protect one REST effect locally",
-  "description": "Complete one exact REST-shaped effect and prove that changed application bytes fail closed.",
-  "minutes": 8,
-  "effect": "publish_report",
-  "permitted": "Publish report weekly",
-  "prohibited": "Publish report monthly",
-  "success": "completed",
-  "failure": "action_mismatch",
-  "next": [
-    "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
-    "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"
-  ],
-  "sources": {
-    "install": {
-      "rust": "cargo add auths-sdk",
-      "typescript": "npm install @auths-dev/sdk",
-      "python": "python -m pip install auths"
-    },
-    "execute": {
-      "rust": "let action = profile.action(\"publish_report\", canonical_input)?;\nlet outcome = verifier.authorize(&proof, &action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(outcome.kind(), \"completed\");",
-      "typescript": "const action = mcp.callTool({\n  name: \"publish_report\",\n  arguments: canonicalInput,\n});\nconst outcome = await auths.execute({ action, provider });\nif (outcome.kind !== \"completed\") throw new Error(outcome.kind);",
-      "python": "action = mcp.call_tool(\n    name=\"publish_report\",\n    arguments=canonical_input,\n)\noutcome = await auths.execute(action=action, provider=provider)\nif outcome.kind != \"completed\":\n    raise RuntimeError(outcome.kind)"
-    },
-    "failure": {
-      "rust": "let denied = verifier.authorize(&proof, &prohibited_action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(denied.code(), \"action_mismatch\");",
-      "typescript": "const denied = await auths.execute({ action: prohibitedAction, provider });\nif (denied.kind !== \"denied\" || denied.code !== \"action_mismatch\") {\n  throw new Error(\"effect did not fail closed\");\n}",
-      "python": "denied = await auths.execute(action=prohibited_action, provider=provider)\nif denied.kind != \"denied\" or denied.code != \"action_mismatch\":\n    raise RuntimeError(\"effect did not fail closed\")"
-    }
-  },
-  "digest": "df24cd1f8736e53ae2d3ca9d2f0c3d43184ed5012a9fc4689815be2b59d8f4ff"
-}
diff --git a/public/downloads/quickstarts/offline-verification.json b/public/downloads/quickstarts/offline-verification.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 94b305c..0000000
--- a/public/downloads/quickstarts/offline-verification.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema": "auths.docs.quickstart/1",
-  "id": "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
-  "slug": "offline-verification",
-  "title": "Verify authority offline",
-  "description": "Verify proof and receipt bytes locally and prove that the wrong trusted context is denied.",
-  "minutes": 7,
-  "effect": "verify_receipt",
-  "permitted": "Verify with the committed trusted context",
-  "prohibited": "Verify under an unrelated trust root",
-  "success": "authorized",
-  "failure": "untrusted_context",
-  "next": [
-    "auths.page.tour.receipts-disclosure/1",
-    "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"
-  ],
-  "sources": {
-    "install": {
-      "rust": "cargo add auths-sdk",
-      "typescript": "npm install @auths-dev/sdk",
-      "python": "python -m pip install auths"
-    },
-    "execute": {
-      "rust": "let action = profile.action(\"verify_receipt\", canonical_input)?;\nlet outcome = verifier.authorize(&proof, &action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(outcome.kind(), \"authorized\");",
-      "typescript": "const action = mcp.callTool({\n  name: \"verify_receipt\",\n  arguments: canonicalInput,\n});\nconst outcome = await auths.execute({ action, provider });\nif (outcome.kind !== \"authorized\") throw new Error(outcome.kind);",
-      "python": "action = mcp.call_tool(\n    name=\"verify_receipt\",\n    arguments=canonical_input,\n)\noutcome = await auths.execute(action=action, provider=provider)\nif outcome.kind != \"authorized\":\n    raise RuntimeError(outcome.kind)"
-    },
-    "failure": {
-      "rust": "let denied = verifier.authorize(&proof, &prohibited_action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(denied.code(), \"untrusted_context\");",
-      "typescript": "const denied = await auths.execute({ action: prohibitedAction, provider });\nif (denied.kind !== \"denied\" || denied.code !== \"untrusted_context\") {\n  throw new Error(\"effect did not fail closed\");\n}",
-      "python": "denied = await auths.execute(action=prohibited_action, provider=provider)\nif denied.kind != \"denied\" or denied.code != \"untrusted_context\":\n    raise RuntimeError(\"effect did not fail closed\")"
-    }
-  },
-  "digest": "c9503d96108a4cf9805287c5613a6e14521013ad3b7f312096438db4c3dccd87"
-}
diff --git a/public/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json b/public/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json
deleted file mode 100644
index a299eee..0000000
--- a/public/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema": "auths.docs.quickstart/1",
-  "id": "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
-  "slug": "recovery",
-  "title": "Resume uncertain execution safely",
-  "description": "Resume one opaque execution reference and prove that a fresh retry cannot repeat the effect.",
-  "minutes": 15,
-  "effect": "rotate_token",
-  "permitted": "Resume the original execution reference",
-  "prohibited": "Create a fresh retry after provider uncertainty",
-  "success": "completed",
-  "failure": "fresh_retry_prohibited",
-  "next": [
-    "auths.page.tour.execution-lifecycle/1",
-    "auths.page.operations.runtime/1"
-  ],
-  "sources": {
-    "install": {
-      "rust": "cargo add auths-sdk",
-      "typescript": "npm install @auths-dev/sdk",
-      "python": "python -m pip install auths"
-    },
-    "execute": {
-      "rust": "let action = profile.action(\"rotate_token\", canonical_input)?;\nlet outcome = verifier.authorize(&proof, &action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(outcome.kind(), \"completed\");",
-      "typescript": "const action = mcp.callTool({\n  name: \"rotate_token\",\n  arguments: canonicalInput,\n});\nconst outcome = await auths.execute({ action, provider });\nif (outcome.kind !== \"completed\") throw new Error(outcome.kind);",
-      "python": "action = mcp.call_tool(\n    name=\"rotate_token\",\n    arguments=canonical_input,\n)\noutcome = await auths.execute(action=action, provider=provider)\nif outcome.kind != \"completed\":\n    raise RuntimeError(outcome.kind)"
-    },
-    "failure": {
-      "rust": "let denied = verifier.authorize(&proof, &prohibited_action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(denied.code(), \"fresh_retry_prohibited\");",
-      "typescript": "const denied = await auths.execute({ action: prohibitedAction, provider });\nif (denied.kind !== \"denied\" || denied.code !== \"fresh_retry_prohibited\") {\n  throw new Error(\"effect did not fail closed\");\n}",
-      "python": "denied = await auths.execute(action=prohibited_action, provider=provider)\nif denied.kind != \"denied\" or denied.code != \"fresh_retry_prohibited\":\n    raise RuntimeError(\"effect did not fail closed\")"
-    }
-  },
-  "digest": "6fe1e70a4ac19266e8c2a55442ec287bbd098036a2b1fe3e8ab680020d5ccc77"
-}
diff --git a/public/downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json b/public/downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json
deleted file mode 100644
index b9da68b..0000000
--- a/public/downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema": "auths.docs.quickstart/1",
-  "id": "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
-  "slug": "runtime-effect",
-  "title": "Execute through the open runtime",
-  "description": "Send one sealed command through the HTTPS runtime and prove that exact replay is denied.",
-  "minutes": 12,
-  "effect": "publish_report",
-  "permitted": "Request report weekly once",
-  "prohibited": "Replay request report weekly",
-  "success": "completed",
-  "failure": "exact_replay",
-  "next": [
-    "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
-    "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1"
-  ],
-  "sources": {
-    "install": {
-      "rust": "cargo add auths-sdk",
-      "typescript": "npm install @auths-dev/sdk",
-      "python": "python -m pip install auths"
-    },
-    "execute": {
-      "rust": "let action = profile.action(\"publish_report\", canonical_input)?;\nlet outcome = verifier.authorize(&proof, &action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(outcome.kind(), \"completed\");",
-      "typescript": "const action = mcp.callTool({\n  name: \"publish_report\",\n  arguments: canonicalInput,\n});\nconst outcome = await auths.execute({ action, provider });\nif (outcome.kind !== \"completed\") throw new Error(outcome.kind);",
-      "python": "action = mcp.call_tool(\n    name=\"publish_report\",\n    arguments=canonical_input,\n)\noutcome = await auths.execute(action=action, provider=provider)\nif outcome.kind != \"completed\":\n    raise RuntimeError(outcome.kind)"
-    },
-    "failure": {
-      "rust": "let denied = verifier.authorize(&proof, &prohibited_action, &trusted_context)?;\nassert_eq!(denied.code(), \"exact_replay\");",
-      "typescript": "const denied = await auths.execute({ action: prohibitedAction, provider });\nif (denied.kind !== \"denied\" || denied.code !== \"exact_replay\") {\n  throw new Error(\"effect did not fail closed\");\n}",
-      "python": "denied = await auths.execute(action=prohibited_action, provider=provider)\nif denied.kind != \"denied\" or denied.code != \"exact_replay\":\n    raise RuntimeError(\"effect did not fail closed\")"
-    }
-  },
-  "digest": "5cff2daf16a286db9bc0f72b22353bb81b1da58be070c5dfd8e702c62873cb9f"
-}
diff --git a/public/examples.md b/public/examples.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a4936e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/examples.md
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+# Examples by security question
+
+Examples are evidence, not decoration. Choose one by the security boundary you need to evaluate, run it from the pinned product source, and change the committed bytes or context to observe the fail-closed path. A polished interface is not proof that an authorization property holds.
+
+Do not choose an Auths example because its provider logo resembles your stack.
+Choose it because it tests the security question you need answered.
+
+Every example here is repository evidence, not a claim that the corresponding
+provider integration is a supported public SDK profile. Maturity labels
+distinguish a `Minimal example`, `Interactive demo`, `Production-shaped
+reference`, `Benchmark/testkit`, or `Demo integration`.
+
+The currently qualified public binding profile is generated from the pinned
+public topology. At present, provider-specific demos beyond that topology must
+remain labelled as demos even when their architecture is sophisticated.
+
+### Pinned public topology
+
+Source: [`bindings/public-topology-v1.json`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/public-topology-v1.json) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+- Qualified profiles: `auths.github.issue-address/1`, `auths.mcp/1`, `auths.opentofu.saved-plan-apply/1`, `auths.postgresql.bounded-update/1`
+- Framework contracts: `atomic-reservation-store`, `signer-custody`
+
+| Layer | TypeScript | Python |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| product | `@auths-dev/sdk`, `@auths-dev/sdk/identity`, `@auths-dev/sdk/verify` | `auths`, `auths.identity`, `auths.verify` |
+| vertical | `@auths-dev/sdk/profiles` | `auths.profiles` |
+| mechanism | `@auths-dev/sdk/integrations` | `auths.integrations` |
+| extension | `@auths-dev/sdk/framework` | `auths.framework` |
+| test | `@auths-dev/sdk/testkit` | `auths.testkit` |
+
+## Can I verify authority without a service?
+
+Start with the offline verifier when your question is whether Auths can make a
+deterministic decision from explicit local bytes. This is the smallest proof
+of the protocol boundary: no resolver, network, database, clock, replay store,
+private key, or provider is involved.
+
+It proves the supported Rust facade can verify the committed proof, action,
+and trusted context as an external consumer. It does not prove runtime replay
+protection, provider execution, or production custody.
+
+**Minimal example**
+
+- [`demos/offline-verification`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/offline-verification)
+
+## Can an agent call one protected tool without receiving broad credentials?
+
+Use the MCP examples to evaluate the shortest supported closed-profile
+workflow. The important boundary is not that an agent can call a tool; it is
+that the configured provider is entered only for the exact authorized tool
+action, while an undeclared action is denied before provider entry.
+
+The live lab can help a reader inspect the stages interactively. The smaller
+MCP demo is better for understanding the native integration without unrelated
+application architecture.
+
+**Interactive demo**
+
+- [`demos/mcp/auths-mcp-demo`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/mcp/auths-mcp-demo)
+- [`demos/live-lab`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/live-lab)
+- [`demos/live-service`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/live-service)
+
+## Can two organizations authorize one exact joint response?
+
+The cross-company incident-response demo is the strongest collaboration
+journey. It combines separate identity systems, distinct organizations,
+threshold approval bound to the same ordered plan, diagnostic and remediation
+agents, closed provider gateways, HTTPS and Iroh delivery, durable reservation,
+unknown-outcome handling, and bounded receipt disclosure.
+
+It proves a production-shaped architecture and adversarial behavior end to
+end. Its hosted persistence, identity adapters, provider effects, and custody
+remain demo implementations rather than production services.
+
+**Production-shaped reference**
+
+- [`demos/cross-company-incident-response`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/cross-company-incident-response)
+
+## Can an uncredentialed coding agent publish only an approved change?
+
+The GitHub issue workflow separates proposal from execution. An agent creates
+a bounded Git candidate without a GitHub mutation credential. A separate
+executor verifies the exact repository, issue, base, allowed change, audience,
+and effect budget before acquiring a repository-scoped credential and creating
+one deterministic branch and draft pull request.
+
+The Radicle workflow explores a related collaboration problem under a
+different repository and identity environment. Treat each as a cohesive domain
+demo; neither is a generic “Git action” profile.
+
+**Demo integration**
+
+- [`demos/github-issue`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/github-issue)
+- [`demos/radicle-issue`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/radicle-issue)
+
+## Can an agent change infrastructure exactly once?
+
+Choose Kubernetes when the action is an exact API-object rollout constrained
+by workload identity and current cluster state. Choose OpenTofu when the action
+is applying one previously saved plan against exact backend, workspace, state,
+dependency-lock, and variable commitments.
+
+The two demos look similar at the diagram level but intentionally retain
+different actions, evidence, commands, credentials, state transitions, and
+reconciliation. They prove why Auths profiles are vertical rather than a
+generic infrastructure-operation dispatcher.
+
+**Production-shaped reference**
+
+- [`demos/kubernetes-rollout`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/kubernetes-rollout)
+- [`demos/opentofu-plan`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/opentofu-plan)
+
+## Can an agent change application or database data without holding a reusable key?
+
+The records API demonstrates a familiar typed REST boundary over HTTPS or
+Iroh. The PostgreSQL demo goes deeper: exact tenant and row selection,
+before-state and after-state commitments, catalog and role rechecks, a
+serializable transaction, an execution ledger, and ambiguous-commit
+reconciliation.
+
+Use the records demo to understand transport-neutral application adoption. Use
+PostgreSQL to evaluate a high-consequence data mutation where database state
+and transaction semantics are part of the authorization profile.
+
+**Production-shaped reference**
+
+- [`demos/rest-api-authorization`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/rest-api-authorization)
+- [`demos/postgresql-data-change`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/postgresql-data-change)
+
+## Can financial authority be narrower than an OAuth scope or API key?
+
+The Stripe family separates collection, manual-capture authorization, capture,
+cancellation, refunds, subscriptions, transfers, payouts, mandates, and
+purchase authorization into distinct effect profiles. That separation matters:
+the operations have different direction, provider preconditions, exposure,
+obligations, lifecycle states, reconciliation, and receipt meaning.
+
+These are Stripe test-mode demo integrations. They do not imply that every
+Stripe operation is a qualified public SDK profile, and they do not turn local
+merchant configuration into human-signed standing authority.
+
+**Demo integration**
+
+- [`demos/stripe-payment-collect`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-payment-collect)
+- [`demos/stripe-payment-authorize`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-payment-authorize)
+- [`demos/stripe-payment-capture`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-payment-capture)
+- [`demos/stripe-payment-cancel`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-payment-cancel)
+- [`demos/stripe-refund`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-refund)
+- [`demos/stripe-subscription-create`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-subscription-create)
+- [`demos/stripe-subscription-modify`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-subscription-modify)
+- [`demos/stripe-subscription-cancel`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-subscription-cancel)
+- [`demos/stripe-connect-transfer`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-connect-transfer)
+- [`demos/stripe-payout`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-payout)
+- [`demos/stripe-payment-mandate`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-payment-mandate)
+- [`demos/stripe-purchase-authorization`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-purchase-authorization)
+
+## Can I use Auths identity and Iroh without adopting capabilities?
+
+The identity-over-Iroh demo is the smallest adoption path. It exchanges
+canonical algorithm-neutral public identities over a real Iroh connection and
+authenticates exact message bytes using optional adapters.
+
+No grant, capability, approval, policy, lifecycle, store, or product runtime is
+constructed. A successful Iroh connection authenticates its transport peer;
+a successful signature check authenticates the exact message bytes to the
+public identity. Neither fact authorizes an application effect or prevents
+replay.
+
+**Interactive demo**
+
+- [`demos/identity-iroh`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/identity-iroh)
+
+## Do the mechanisms hold under concurrency and adversarial inputs?
+
+Benchmarks and testkits answer engineering questions rather than tell a
+product story. Use them to evaluate bounds, concurrency, replay, candidate
+stores, custody adapters, transports, and cross-language behavior. They do not
+demonstrate a deployable application.
+
+**Benchmark/testkit**
+
+- [`demos/benchmarks`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/benchmarks)
+- [`demos/testkit`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/testkit)
+- [`demos/matrix`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/matrix)
diff --git a/public/get-started.md b/public/get-started.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 8bde6a8..0000000
--- a/public/get-started.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Get started
-
-Choose one concrete outcome and reach a verified, fail-closed result.
-
-## Recommended: [Prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites)
-
-Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
-
-## Choose a path
-
-- [Prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites) — Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
-- [Choose your path](/get-started/choose) — Select the shortest journey for the effect, actor, and operating boundary you have.
-- [Outcome paths](/get-started/paths) — Choose an outcome path before learning the complete Auths model.
-
-## Quickstarts
-
-- [Quickstarts](/get-started/quickstarts) — Compare seven installed-artifact projects by boundary, state, custody, success, and failure.
-
-## Next steps
-
-- [Evaluate Auths](/get-started/evaluate) — Evaluate Auths with deterministic positive and adversarial fixtures before choosing a deployment.
-
-## Adopt incrementally
-
-- [Adopt incrementally](/get-started/adoption) — Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start/1_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption.md b/public/get-started/adoption.md
deleted file mode 100644
index bf958a1..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/adoption.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-# Adopt incrementally
-
-Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.
-
-## Recommended: [Plan adoption](/get-started/adoption/plan)
-
-Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
-
-## Adopt incrementally
-
-- [Plan adoption](/get-started/adoption/plan) — Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
-- [Signed requests](/get-started/adoption/signed-requests) — Bind an existing signed request to narrower authority and execution state.
-- [OAuth and OIDC](/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc) — Keep OAuth or OIDC authentication while adding effect-specific machine authority.
-- [API keys](/get-started/adoption/api-keys) — Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.
-- [Cloud IAM](/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam) — Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.
-- [Policy engines](/get-started/adoption/policy-engines) — Use a Cedar, OPA, or relationship decision as explicit context without duplicating the policy engine.
-- [Capability systems](/get-started/adoption/capabilities) — Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.
-- [Approval systems](/get-started/adoption/approvals) — Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.
-- [Shadow mode](/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode) — Compare Auths decisions with live traffic without authorizing provider effects.
-- [Cut over one effect](/get-started/adoption/cutover) — Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.adopt/1 · Product contract: auths.page.start.adopt/1_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md b/public/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md
deleted file mode 100644
index bf8eb5b..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# API keys
-
-Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The provider and its API-key lifecycle continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-The application operation mapped to a gateway-held API call becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
-
-## State
-
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/approvals.md b/public/get-started/adoption/approvals.md
deleted file mode 100644
index aa3e2af..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/approvals.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Approval systems
-
-Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The approval system and approver authentication continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-The approval response committed to the exact ordered plan request becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
-
-## State
-
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.approvals/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md b/public/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 8fd0ab7..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Capability systems
-
-Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The capability protocol continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-The imported capability and its verified attenuation result becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
-
-## State
-
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md b/public/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f3bfc8b..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Cloud IAM
-
-Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-Cloud IAM continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-The authorized Auths command mapped to a least-privilege provider session becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
-
-## State
-
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/cutover.md b/public/get-started/adoption/cutover.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ccf7ed0..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/cutover.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Cut over one effect
-
-Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.
-
-## Outcome
-
-Callers can no longer reach the provider effect without verified authority and durable reservation.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Complete shadow mode, provision runtime dependencies, define stop conditions, retain the previous path behind an operator-controlled rollback, and ensure it cannot run concurrently.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Route the selected operation through the Auths gateway, verify terminal receipts, monitor denial and indeterminate outcomes, and exercise resume and reconciliation.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Success includes correct effects, stable denials, no replay, durable evidence, and a tested recovery path.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Rollback on unexplained denial, state inconsistency, custody failure, receipt loss, or provider ambiguity; never bypass Auths automatically.
-
-## Continue
-
-Expand to the next effect only after operational ownership and evidence retention are routine.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.cutover/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md b/public/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1654b6d..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# OAuth and OIDC
-
-Keep OAuth or OIDC authentication while adding effect-specific machine authority.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The identity provider and OAuth resource server continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-Validated issuer, subject, audience, and freshness evidence becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
-
-## State
-
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/plan.md b/public/get-started/adoption/plan.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c57c196..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/plan.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Plan adoption
-
-Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A written adoption slice identifies the caller, authority issuer, trust inputs, state owner, signer, gateway, provider credential, and receipt consumer.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Bring the current request shape, identity evidence, policy decision, approval flow, credential location, retry behavior, and audit record for one operation.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Map each existing responsibility to Identity, Authority, Runtime, or the adjacent system; then run the closest quickstart and record deliberate differences.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Every responsibility has one owner and the first cutover does not require replacing unrelated systems.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Stop if provider credentials would enter an Auths artifact or if application code would reimplement attenuation or verification semantics.
-
-## Continue
-
-Choose the relevant composition page and enter shadow mode.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.plan/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md b/public/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c1d6f6a..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Policy engines
-
-Use a Cedar, OPA, or relationship decision as explicit context without duplicating the policy engine.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The policy engine and its data model continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-The decision and policy snapshot committed into trusted context becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
-
-## State
-
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md b/public/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1888284..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Shadow mode
-
-Compare Auths decisions with live traffic without authorizing provider effects.
-
-## Outcome
-
-The team can measure agreement, denial reasons, missing context, and potential blast-radius reduction before cutover.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Mirror only bounded request inputs and remove secrets. Keep the current production enforcement path authoritative.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Create and verify Auths decisions without passing effect-capable handles to the gateway; record normalized outcomes alongside the current decision.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Expected requests agree and adversarial mutations are denied with stable reasons.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Any ambiguity, sensitive-data leakage, or disagreement blocks cutover until ownership and mappings are corrected.
-
-## Continue
-
-Cut over exactly one effect once the observation window and failure criteria are satisfied.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md b/public/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e6e851f..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Signed requests
-
-Bind an existing signed request to narrower authority and execution state.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The request-signature layer continues to own its existing decision. Auths owns only the bounded authority and execution evidence added at the effect boundary.
-
-## Data flow
-
-The exact signed application bytes becomes an explicit input to Auths. The application creates or selects narrow authority, executes through the protected boundary, and retains the resulting receipt.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Keep existing provider and identity credentials in their current custody boundary. Auths artifacts carry commitments and public verification material, never ambient provider credentials.
-
-## State
-
-The existing system remains authoritative for its records. Auths state tracks uses, budgets, lifecycle, reservations, recovery, and receipts for the protected effect.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-A valid existing credential or approval is not sufficient by itself. Missing, expired, replayed, widened, or mismatched Auths authority fails before the provider is reached.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-This composition does not replace the adjacent system or silently translate all of its policy. Begin with one effect whose inputs and failure behavior can be stated exactly.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/choose.md b/public/get-started/choose.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a15c597..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/choose.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Choose your path
-
-Select the shortest journey for the effect, actor, and operating boundary you have.
-
-## Outcome
-
-You will leave with one recommended quickstart, not a tour of every Auths feature.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Name the effect, who proposes it, where credentials live, whether approval is required, and whether execution is local or remote.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Use Local REST effect for an in-process boundary; Runtime effect for durable remote execution; Agent delegation for a narrower handoff; Approved plan for exact multi-step review; Offline verification for inert evidence; Recovery for ambiguous outcomes; Identity swap for cryptographic or identity agility.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The selected path demonstrates the same success and denial shapes your application must handle.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-If you cannot describe the effect or provider boundary precisely, do not issue broad authority. Narrow the integration target first.
-
-## Continue
-
-Open the chosen quickstart and run it unchanged before adapting it.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.choose/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/evaluate.md b/public/get-started/evaluate.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1b2d29e..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/evaluate.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Evaluate Auths
-
-Evaluate Auths with deterministic positive and adversarial fixtures before choosing a deployment.
-
-## Outcome
-
-Your evaluation records which Auths boundaries solve a real problem and which adjacent systems remain responsible.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Select one sensitive effect and define the current identity, policy, approval, credential, retry, and audit behavior around it.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Run the matching quickstart, mutate its action and bytes, replay it, expire it, remove trust, and compare each stable outcome with your present system.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The evaluation demonstrates a useful reduction in ambient authority or ambiguity without requiring wholesale identity or policy replacement.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Reject the design if Auths merely duplicates an existing control without improving exact commitment, attenuation, recovery, or portable evidence.
-
-## Continue
-
-If the boundary is useful, plan a shadow-mode integration around that single effect.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.evaluate/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths.md b/public/get-started/paths.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2592fd0..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/paths.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-# Outcome paths
-
-Choose an outcome path before learning the complete Auths model.
-
-## Recommended: [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application)
-
-Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
-
-## Outcome paths
-
-- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application) — Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
-- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
-- [Deploy the runtime](/get-started/paths/runtime) — Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.
-- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification) — Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
-- [Cross-company authority](/get-started/paths/cross-company) — Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.get-started.paths/1 · Product contract: auths.page.get-started.paths/1_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths/agent.md b/public/get-started/paths/agent.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b74fd09..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/paths/agent.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Delegate to an agent
-
-Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
-
-## Outcome
-
-The agent receives delegable proof for one permitted operation and cannot widen it.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Identify the tool effect and place its real provider credential behind a trusted executor.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Create authority at the application boundary, delegate a narrower child to the agent, then send a sealed command to the executor.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The delegated action succeeds and returns evidence that can be verified independently of the agent's narrative.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Widening the action, resource, time, use count, budget, audience, or delegation depth fails closed.
-
-## Continue
-
-Add approved plans if a human or second organization must review exact work before execution.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.agent/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths/application.md b/public/get-started/paths/application.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 374e035..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/paths/application.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Protect an application effect
-
-Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A caller can perform one exact application effect and receives a decision and execution receipt.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Isolate the effect behind one function and keep its service credential outside untrusted caller code.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Create authority for the exact action and resource, execute it through the SDK boundary, and verify the returned receipt before reporting success.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The permitted request succeeds once and its receipt binds the authority, command, context, and outcome.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-A changed resource, replayed authority, or mutated command is denied before the protected function runs.
-
-## Continue
-
-Add durable runtime state when the effect must survive process or host failure.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.local/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths/cross-company.md b/public/get-started/paths/cross-company.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 3c06fa3..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/paths/cross-company.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Cross-company authority
-
-Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
-
-## Outcome
-
-One company can delegate a precise repair to another company's agent while both retain their own identity, approval, and infrastructure boundaries.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Name each organization's trust evidence, the exact operation and resource, the approval threshold, the execution region, and the provider gateway that owns credentials.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Exchange public identity evidence, create and narrow authority, bind both approvals to the identical ordered plan, execute through the resource owner's gateway, then return bounded receipts.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Only the approved bytes execute, each plan member is consumed once and in order, and authorized readers can inspect a bounded summary.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Identity authentication, transport delivery, approval alone, changed plan bytes, wider delegation, replay, or provider uncertainty cannot silently become success.
-
-## Continue
-
-Use Identity & trust for federation, Authority for plans, and Operations for provider-unknown reconciliation and evidence retention.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.cross-company/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths/runtime.md b/public/get-started/paths/runtime.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ca77ba1..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/paths/runtime.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Deploy the runtime
-
-Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.
-
-## Outcome
-
-An HTTPS caller can submit one bounded effect while credentials and durable state remain server-side.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Provide TLS, explicit trust configuration, durable state, signer custody, and a closed gateway for the provider effect.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Check health and version, create authority, submit the command, inspect the terminal outcome, and retain its receipt.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The runtime commits replay and budget state before the effect, and returns a stable outcome after execution.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Untrusted HTTP, contract mismatch, missing custody, or unavailable durable state stops execution rather than falling back to an unsafe path.
-
-## Continue
-
-Continue to Production operations for topology, observability, recovery, and incident procedures.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.runtime/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/paths/verification.md b/public/get-started/paths/verification.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5afad45..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/paths/verification.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Verify without executing
-
-Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A verifier obtains a deterministic decision from bounded bytes, trust inputs, and verification time.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Obtain the exact evidence bytes and explicit trust context. Verification never infers trust from transport success.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Parse the bounded artifact through the SDK, provide trusted context, verify locally, and inspect only the disclosure view authorized for the caller.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Rust, TypeScript, and Python return the same verification outcome for the same bytes and context.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Mutation, unknown suite, mismatched verification method, wrong root, stale evidence, or unauthorized disclosure remains inert and fails closed.
-
-## Continue
-
-Use Authority receipts for integrity semantics and Assurance for the exact evidence behind public claims.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.verify/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/prerequisites.md b/public/get-started/prerequisites.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a6eead4..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/prerequisites.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Prerequisites
-
-Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
-
-## Outcome
-
-You will have one maintained SDK, a supported runtime for that SDK, and an application effect that can be isolated behind a function or service boundary.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python. A local quickstart needs no hosted Auths runtime; production execution additionally needs an HTTPS runtime endpoint and its explicit trust configuration.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Install one SDK, identify the exact effect to protect, and keep provider credentials outside the caller. Use the tested local scenario to confirm the toolchain before adding identity providers, approvals, or remote transport.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The installed consumer can create, execute, and verify the qualified local fixture, including its stable denial path.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Stop if the SDK version, fixture release, or runtime contract does not match. Do not compensate by reconstructing Auths semantics in application code.
-
-## Continue
-
-Choose the shortest outcome path for your system, then move to production operations only when the local boundary is clear.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.start.prerequisites/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 07c55ff..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-# Quickstarts
-
-Compare seven installed-artifact projects by boundary, state, custody, success, and failure.
-
-## Recommended: [Local REST effect](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect)
-
-Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.
-
-## Quickstarts
-
-- [Local REST effect](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect) — Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.
-- [Runtime effect](/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect) — Execute one bounded effect through the production HTTPS runtime and durable state boundary.
-- [Agent delegation](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation) — Delegate one narrower tool action and prove that a broader action is denied.
-- [Approved plan](/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan) — Bind approval to the exact bytes and order of a multi-step plan.
-- [Offline verification](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification) — Verify portable evidence without executing an effect or contacting a provider.
-- [Recovery](/get-started/quickstarts/recovery) — Resume or reconcile an interrupted execution without blindly repeating the provider effect.
-- [Identity swap](/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap) — Exchange and verify identity material while keeping the authority workflow unchanged.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1 · Product contract: auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c1a7962..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-# Delegate one tool to an agent
-
-Give an agent one narrow tool and prove it cannot widen itself into a second tool.
-
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1` · Expected time: 12 minutes
-
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
-
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
-
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
-
-- Allowed: Agent publishes one report
-- Prohibited: Agent deletes a report
-
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
-
-Expected outcome: `completed`.
-
-## 4. Break safely
-
-Expected stable denial: `authority_widening`. The provider is not reached.
-
-## 5. Continue
-
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
-
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/agent-delegation.json)
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 131465b..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-# Run one approved plan
-
-Bind approval to an exact ordered plan and prove that replacing a member invalidates it.
-
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1` · Expected time: 18 minutes
-
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
-
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
-
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
-
-- Allowed: Quarantine service, then rotate token
-- Prohibited: Replace rotate token with delete service
-
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
-
-Expected outcome: `completed`.
-
-## 4. Break safely
-
-Expected stable denial: `approval_substitution`. The provider is not reached.
-
-## 5. Continue
-
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
-
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/approved-plan.json)
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ec3b4aa..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-# Swap identity suites without changing authority
-
-Run the same authority workflow with two suites and prove that a mislabelled suite fails verification.
-
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1` · Expected time: 14 minutes
-
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
-
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
-
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
-
-- Allowed: Verify Ed25519 and P-256 projections
-- Prohibited: Label Ed25519 material as P-256
-
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
-
-Expected outcome: `authorized`.
-
-## 4. Break safely
-
-Expected stable denial: `suite_mismatch`. The provider is not reached.
-
-## 5. Continue
-
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
-
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/identity-swap.json)
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
deleted file mode 100644
index de068d6..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-# Protect one REST effect locally
-
-Complete one exact REST-shaped effect and prove that changed application bytes fail closed.
-
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1` · Expected time: 8 minutes
-
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
-
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
-
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
-
-- Allowed: Publish report weekly
-- Prohibited: Publish report monthly
-
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
-
-Expected outcome: `completed`.
-
-## 4. Break safely
-
-Expected stable denial: `action_mismatch`. The provider is not reached.
-
-## 5. Continue
-
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
-
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.json)
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
deleted file mode 100644
index db3744c..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-# Verify authority offline
-
-Verify proof and receipt bytes locally and prove that the wrong trusted context is denied.
-
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1` · Expected time: 7 minutes
-
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
-
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
-
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
-
-- Allowed: Verify with the committed trusted context
-- Prohibited: Verify under an unrelated trust root
-
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
-
-Expected outcome: `authorized`.
-
-## 4. Break safely
-
-Expected stable denial: `untrusted_context`. The provider is not reached.
-
-## 5. Continue
-
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
-
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/offline-verification.json)
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b78fbf3..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-# Resume uncertain execution safely
-
-Resume one opaque execution reference and prove that a fresh retry cannot repeat the effect.
-
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1` · Expected time: 15 minutes
-
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
-
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
-
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
-
-- Allowed: Resume the original execution reference
-- Prohibited: Create a fresh retry after provider uncertainty
-
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
-
-Expected outcome: `completed`.
-
-## 4. Break safely
-
-Expected stable denial: `fresh_retry_prohibited`. The provider is not reached.
-
-## 5. Continue
-
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
-
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/recovery.json)
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md b/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 4658c87..0000000
--- a/public/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-# Execute through the open runtime
-
-Send one sealed command through the HTTPS runtime and prove that exact replay is denied.
-
-Scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1` · Expected time: 12 minutes
-
-## 1. Start from a clean consumer
-
-Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.
-
-## 2. Name the exact boundary
-
-- Allowed: Request report weekly once
-- Prohibited: Replay request report weekly
-
-## 3. Execute the permitted effect
-
-Expected outcome: `completed`.
-
-## 4. Break safely
-
-Expected stable denial: `exact_replay`. The provider is not reached.
-
-## 5. Continue
-
-Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.
-
-[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/runtime-effect.json)
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/guides.md b/public/guides.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f33c039
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/guides.md
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# Build a trustworthy path one boundary at a time
+
+These guides are organized around outcomes, not crate names or internal machinery. Start with the boundary you need to establish today, then add sophistication only when the application requires it.
+
+## Establish the authority boundary
+
+Use [Authenticate identity without granting authority](/guides/authenticate-identity) when you only need to exchange or verify public identity material. Use [Verify existing authority](/guides/verify-authority) when another system will execute the effect. Use [Execute one exact action](/guides/execute-exact-action) when Auths must stand in front of the provider gateway.
+
+## Give software narrower autonomy
+
+[Delegate narrower authority to an agent](/guides/delegate-agent) shows how a child receives less than its parent. [Approvals and ordered plans](/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans) adds transaction-bound human or organizational consent without turning an approval into a reusable permission flag.
+
+## Operate without guessing
+
+[Replay, recovery, and provider uncertainty](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown) distinguishes safe retries from ambiguous remote outcomes. [Receipts and bounded disclosure](/guides/receipts-and-disclosure) explains how to prove what happened without publishing sensitive operational detail. [Build a production integration](/guides/production-integration) replaces development custody and state with durable mechanisms.
+
+## Extend at a narrow port
+
+[Build and qualify an adapter](/guides/adapter-authoring) is for teams integrating another identity method, signer, transport, status source, state store, or provider. Adapters establish facts or perform bounded work; they do not redefine Auths semantics.
+
+| Outcome | Safe boundary |
+| --- | --- |
+| Denied | Provider was not reached |
+| Indeterminate | Required trustworthy facts were unavailable; provider was not reached |
+| Recoverable | Resume only through the original execution reference |
+| Provider unknown | Reconcile; never blindly retry |
diff --git a/public/guides/adapter-authoring.md b/public/guides/adapter-authoring.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..642afbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/guides/adapter-authoring.md
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+# Add an integration at the narrowest honest boundary
+
+Auths owns authority. Adapters establish bounded facts or perform a narrowly
+defined mechanism. That rule lets teams swap identity methods, signature
+suites, transports, stores, signers, and providers without letting an adapter
+invent an authorized result.
+
+Before writing code, decide whether you need a mechanism adapter or a new
+effect profile. A generic callback is not a shortcut around that distinction.
+
+## Classify the extension
+
+| Need | Correct boundary | Adapter must not do |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Resolve an identity document | Resolver or identity-method adapter | Add trust or mint a grant |
+| Verify a signature suite | Signature-suite adapter | Choose application permission |
+| Sign with KMS/HSM | Signer/custody adapter | Rewrite the signing request |
+| Coordinate replay/budget state | Atomic reservation store | Treat a conflict as exact replay |
+| Carry identity or proof bytes | Bounded transport | Convert delivery into authorization |
+| Call an effect provider | Qualified profile gateway | Accept arbitrary provider commands |
+
+If the integration defines canonical action meaning, provider request
+construction, credential scope, outcome classification, reconciliation, or
+receipt claims, it belongs to a domain-specific profile. Build that vertical
+first. Do not place unrelated providers behind one operation tag and a bag of
+optional fields.
+
+## Keep parsing and authority separate
+
+An identity adapter parses and validates its own bounded evidence, then returns
+facts under an exact method and version. A signature-suite adapter verifies the
+exact Rust-produced signing preimage. A resolver returns bounded bytes plus
+provenance, fetch time, expiry, and version.
+
+None may return `authorized`, create `VerifiedAction`, or reinterpret profile
+semantics. Unknown versions and unsupported features fail closed rather than
+fall back to a similarly named implementation.
+
+## Respect I/O and trust boundaries
+
+The deterministic verifier performs no live acquisition. Network, filesystem,
+environment, and credential I/O happen in outer adapters. Feed their bounded
+results into a trusted-context snapshot and bind the executable adapter
+configuration exactly.
+
+Resolver adapters should deny private-network access by default, cap redirects
+and response bytes, honor cancellation and timeouts, and report freshness.
+Signer adapters should enforce request expiry, object kind, principal
+descriptor, request identity, and transaction digest without exporting private
+keys.
+
+## Prove the contract you claim
+
+Use the public testkit functions for the adapter kind. TypeScript exposes
+conformance entry points such as `certifySigner`, `certifyAtomicStore`,
+`certifyByteTransport`, and `certifyMcpProvider`; Python exposes their idiomatic
+counterparts. Reference pages should generate their exact current signatures
+from installed artifacts.
+
+Conformance should include:
+
+- maximum-size and boundary-plus-one inputs;
+- malformed and unsupported versions;
+- cancellation and timeout behavior;
+- deterministic identity and metadata;
+- exact request/response binding;
+- concurrency and compare-and-set conflicts for stores;
+- provider denial before credential acquisition;
+- ambiguous outcome and reconciliation behavior for gateways; and
+- redaction of secrets and unbounded remote messages.
+
+Passing a generic contract does not qualify a new effect profile. Profile
+qualification also requires Rust-owned semantics, fixtures, mutation tests,
+TypeScript/Python parity, provider-request equality, crash tests, receipts, and
+an honest demo.
+
+## Publish support metadata
+
+An adapter should state its implementation identity and version, contract kind
+and version, supported runtimes, support owner, and narrowly worded security
+claims. Separate what Auths tests from what the adapter operator must guarantee.
+
+Do not call an adapter “supported,” “qualified,” or “production ready” merely
+because it implements the interface. Those labels require matching executable
+evidence and release policy.
+
+## Failure and retry rules
+
+Adapters return typed, bounded failures. They must not silently retry custody,
+approval, store, or provider operations. The outer application decides whether
+retry is safe from the recorded effect state.
+
+An unavailable fact can make proof verification indeterminate. Invalid
+supplied evidence makes it denied. Neither result can enter a provider.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Authenticate identity](/guides/authenticate-identity)
+- [Execute through a closed profile](/guides/execute-exact-action)
+- [Production integration](/guides/production-integration)
+- [Principal adapter reference](/reference/principal-adapters)
diff --git a/public/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans.md b/public/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4db979
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans.md
@@ -0,0 +1,538 @@
+# Approve the transaction, not a reusable flag
+
+An approval is useful only when it is bound to the exact operation—or exact
+ordered plan—that will execute. A generic `approved: true` value can be replayed
+against different bytes. Auths approval responses echo a transaction digest
+and policy, while the proof plan commits to its members and their order.
+
+## Follow a two-organization recovery workflow
+
+> Product-owned recipe `05-cross-organization-plan` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed-after-restart`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
+
+### TypeScript recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Load recovery and approval tools
+
+Import the filesystem, child-process, approval, profile, and receipt primitives used by the maintained scenario.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–13; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
+import { mkdtemp, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import {
+  approval,
+  ExecutionReference,
+} from "@auths-dev/sdk";
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
+import { decodeReceipt, encodeReceipt, verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Route the restart phases
+
+The same source can verify a receipt, run either durable phase, or orchestrate both across process boundaries.
+
+_Pinned source lines 15–33; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+const self = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
+const mode = process.argv[2];
+const directory = process.argv[3];
+type ApprovalProvider = Parameters<typeof approval.threshold>[0]["providers"][number];
+
+if (mode === "verify") {
+  const receipt = decodeReceipt(await readFile(required(directory)));
+  await verifyReceipt(receipt);
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ outcome: "verified-portable-receipt" }));
+} else if (mode === "phase-one") {
+  await phaseOne(required(directory));
+} else if (mode === "phase-two") {
+  await phaseTwo(required(directory));
+} else {
+  const root = process.env.AUTHS_RECIPE_OUTPUT ?? await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "auths-recipe-five-ts-"));
+  runChild("phase-one", root);
+  runChild("phase-two", root);
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "05-cross-organization-plan", outcome: "completed-after-restart", duplicateEntries: 0 }));
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Model a provider-unknown outcome
+
+The first runtime records that token rotation may have applied instead of claiming success or retrying.
+
+_Pinned source lines 35–47; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+async function phaseOne(root: string): Promise<void> {
+  const auths = await development.createRecoverableAuths({
+    directory: root,
+    authority: mcp.allowTools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+    approval: await planApproval(),
+  });
+  const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({ tools: {
+    async quarantine_service() { return { quarantined: true }; },
+    async rotate_token() {
+      await writeFile(join(root, "provider-applied"), "applied", { flag: "wx" });
+      return { effect: "possible", cause: "unknown" } as const;
+    },
+  } });
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Stop the ordered plan and persist recovery state
+
+Execute the exact two-member plan, require one completed member, then persist its reference and receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 48–62; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  try {
+    const plan = await mcp.plan([
+      mcp.callTool({ name: "quarantine_service", arguments: { region: "eu-west-2" } }),
+      mcp.callTool({ name: "rotate_token", arguments: { region: "eu-west-2" } }),
+    ]);
+    const result = await auths.execute({ plan, provider, requestId: "incident-plan" });
+    if (result.kind !== "recoverable" || result.reference === undefined || result.completedReceipts.length !== 1) {
+      throw new Error("ordered plan did not stop with one completed member");
+    }
+    await writeFile(join(root, "reference.bin"), result.reference.encode());
+    await writeFile(join(root, "typescript-receipt.json"), encodeReceipt(result.completedReceipts[0]!));
+  } finally {
+    await auths.close();
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 5: Configure reconciliation without provider re-entry
+
+After restart, direct handler entry is an error; only the provider-specific reconcile path may classify the prior attempt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 64–81; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+async function phaseTwo(root: string): Promise<void> {
+  const auths = await development.createRecoverableAuths({
+    directory: root,
+    authority: mcp.allowTools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+    approval: await planApproval(),
+  });
+  let entries = 0;
+  const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({
+    tools: {
+      async quarantine_service() { entries += 1; throw new Error("unexpected provider re-entry"); },
+      async rotate_token() { entries += 1; throw new Error("unexpected provider re-entry"); },
+    },
+    async reconcile() {
+      return existsSync(join(root, "provider-applied"))
+        ? { effect: "applied", result: { rotated: true } } as const
+        : { effect: "possible", cause: "unknown" } as const;
+    },
+  });
+```
+
+#### Step 6: Resume the original execution
+
+Decode the persisted reference, reconcile to completion, verify the receipt, and never enter a provider handler twice.
+
+_Pinned source lines 82–91; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  try {
+    const reference = ExecutionReference.decode(await readFile(join(root, "reference.bin")));
+    const result = await auths.resume({ reference, provider });
+    if (result.kind !== "completed" || entries !== 0) throw new Error("recovery re-entered the provider");
+    await verifyReceipt(result.receipt);
+    await writeFile(join(root, "typescript-recovered-receipt.json"), encodeReceipt(result.receipt));
+  } finally {
+    await auths.close();
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 7: Bind two organizations to the exact plan
+
+Require both organization-specific providers and cap the approval policy to the plan's two uses.
+
+_Pinned source lines 93–103; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+async function planApproval() {
+  const providers = [approver("company-a"), approver("company-b")];
+  return {
+    policy: await approval.planOnce({
+      policyId: "approval.cross-company-plan",
+      maxUses: 2,
+      requirements: ["company-a", "company-b"],
+    }),
+    provider: approval.threshold({ threshold: 2, providers }),
+  };
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 8: Echo the approval commitment
+
+Each approval response returns the exact request identifier, transaction digest, and policy it evaluated.
+
+_Pinned source lines 105–116; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+function approver(_organization: string): ApprovalProvider {
+  return {
+    async approve(request) {
+      return {
+        requestId: request.requestId,
+        transactionDigest: request.transactionDigest.slice(),
+        policy: request.policy,
+        decision: "approved",
+      };
+    },
+  };
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 9: Treat every phase as an owned process
+
+Fail on an unsuccessful child phase and reject missing recovery paths.
+
+_Pinned source lines 118–126; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+function runChild(childMode: string, root: string): void {
+  const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, [self, childMode, root], { encoding: "utf8" });
+  if (result.status !== 0) throw new Error(result.stderr || result.stdout || `${childMode} failed`);
+}
+
+function required(value: string | undefined): string {
+  if (value === undefined || value.length === 0) throw new Error("path is required");
+  return value;
+}
+```
+
+### Python recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/05_cross_organization_plan.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/05_cross_organization_plan.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Load recovery and approval tools
+
+Import the process, persistence, approval, profile, and receipt primitives used by the maintained scenario.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–17; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from auths import (
+    Approval,
+    ExecutionReference,
+)
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import McpHandlerOutcome, mcp
+from auths.verify import decode_receipt, encode_receipt, verify_receipt
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Bind two organizations to the exact plan
+
+Each organization echoes the exact approval request, and the threshold policy requires both responses.
+
+_Pinned source lines 20–35; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+class OrganizationApproval:
+    def __init__(self, organization: str) -> None:
+        self.organization = organization
+
+    async def approve(self, request):
+        return Approval.response(request, decision="approved")
+
+
+def plan_approval():
+    providers = (OrganizationApproval("company-a"), OrganizationApproval("company-b"))
+    return Approval.plan_once(
+        "approval.cross-company-plan",
+        Approval.threshold(providers, threshold=2),
+        max_uses=2,
+        requirements=("company-a", "company-b"),
+    )
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Model a provider-unknown outcome
+
+The first provider records that rotation may have applied rather than claiming success or retrying.
+
+_Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+async def phase_one(root: Path) -> None:
+    async def quarantine_service(_arguments, _context):
+        return {"quarantined": True}
+
+    async def rotate_token(_arguments, _context):
+        (root / "provider-applied").write_text("applied", encoding="utf-8")
+        return McpHandlerOutcome("possible", cause="unknown")
+
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(
+        tools={
+            "quarantine_service": quarantine_service,
+            "rotate_token": rotate_token,
+        }
+    )
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Construct the recoverable ordered plan
+
+Open durable state and commit quarantine followed by rotation in one exact order.
+
+_Pinned source lines 52–65; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    async with development.create_recoverable_auths(
+        directory=root,
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+        approval=plan_approval(),
+    ) as auths:
+        plan = mcp.plan(
+            (
+                mcp.call_tool(
+                    name="quarantine_service",
+                    arguments={"region": "eu-west-2"},
+                ),
+                mcp.call_tool(name="rotate_token", arguments={"region": "eu-west-2"}),
+            )
+        )
+```
+
+#### Step 5: Stop and persist recovery state
+
+Require one completed member, then persist the execution reference and completed receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 66–80; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        result = await auths.execute(
+            plan=plan, provider=provider, request_id="incident-plan"
+        )
+        if (
+            result.kind != "recoverable"
+            or result.reference is None
+            or len(result.completed_receipts) != 1
+        ):
+            raise RuntimeError("ordered plan did not stop with one completed member")
+        (root / "reference.bin").write_bytes(
+            result.reference.to_bytes()
+        )
+        (root / "python-receipt.json").write_bytes(
+            encode_receipt(result.completed_receipts[0])
+        )
+```
+
+#### Step 6: Define reconciliation without provider re-entry
+
+After restart, direct handler entry is an error; reconciliation inspects the provider-specific evidence.
+
+_Pinned source lines 83–95; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+async def phase_two(root: Path) -> None:
+    entries = 0
+
+    async def no_reentry(_arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal entries
+        entries += 1
+        raise RuntimeError("unexpected provider re-entry")
+
+    async def reconcile(_execution_id, _service):
+        if (root / "provider-applied").exists():
+            return McpHandlerOutcome("applied", result={"rotated": True})
+        return McpHandlerOutcome("possible", cause="unknown")
+```
+
+#### Step 7: Reopen the same durable runtime
+
+Recreate the same authority and approval policy with handlers that must remain unreachable.
+
+_Pinned source lines 96–107; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(
+        tools={
+            "quarantine_service": no_reentry,
+            "rotate_token": no_reentry,
+        },
+        reconcile=reconcile,
+    )
+    async with development.create_recoverable_auths(
+        directory=root,
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+        approval=plan_approval(),
+    ) as auths:
+```
+
+#### Step 8: Resume the original execution
+
+Decode the persisted reference, reconcile to completion, verify the receipt, and persist it.
+
+_Pinned source lines 108–117; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        result = await auths.resume(
+            reference=ExecutionReference.from_bytes((root / "reference.bin").read_bytes()),
+            provider=provider,
+        )
+        if result.kind != "completed" or entries != 0:
+            raise RuntimeError("recovery re-entered the provider")
+        verify_receipt(result.receipt)
+        (root / "python-recovered-receipt.json").write_bytes(
+            encode_receipt(result.receipt)
+        )
+```
+
+#### Step 9: Route each owned phase
+
+Run either verification or a durable execution phase in a separate process invocation.
+
+_Pinned source lines 120–136; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+def run_child(mode: str, root: Path) -> None:
+    subprocess.run([sys.executable, __file__, mode, str(root)], check=True)
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    mode = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None
+    path = Path(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) > 2 else None
+    if mode == "verify" and path is not None:
+        verify_receipt(decode_receipt(path.read_bytes()))
+        print(json.dumps({"outcome": "verified-portable-receipt"}))
+        return
+    if mode == "phase-one" and path is not None:
+        await phase_one(path)
+        return
+    if mode == "phase-two" and path is not None:
+        await phase_two(path)
+        return
+```
+
+#### Step 10: Orchestrate both sides of the restart
+
+Use a configured durable directory or an isolated temporary one, then run both phases in order.
+
+_Pinned source lines 137–147; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    configured = os.environ.get("AUTHS_RECIPE_OUTPUT")
+    if configured is not None:
+        root = Path(configured)
+        root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        run_child("phase-one", root)
+        run_child("phase-two", root)
+    else:
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="auths-recipe-five-py-") as directory:
+            root = Path(directory)
+            run_child("phase-one", root)
+            run_child("phase-two", root)
+```
+
+#### Step 11: Report the no-duplicate outcome
+
+Emit the declared completed-after-restart result through the owned asynchronous entry point.
+
+_Pinned source lines 148–160; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "05-cross-organization-plan",
+                "outcome": "completed-after-restart",
+                "duplicateEntries": 0,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
+
+The recipe models two organizations approving the same two-member incident
+plan. The first member quarantines a service. The second rotates a token and
+returns an ambiguous provider outcome. The workflow persists one completed
+receipt and a recovery reference, restarts, reconciles the second operation,
+and completes without re-entering either provider handler.
+
+This is not a simulated happy-path sequence. The important behavior is the
+stop between members and the absence of duplicate provider entry after
+restart.
+
+## What the plan commits to
+
+Every satisfied branch binds the same canonical action meaning, audience,
+challenge, validity context, profile, and plan identity. The verifier also
+applies an independent local composition requirement. That requirement can
+pin an expected plan and require minimum authorized branches, distinct actors,
+or distinct trust roots.
+
+V1 supports bounded `Proof`, `AllOf`, `AnyOf`, and `KOfN` plans. A signed
+`KOfN` shape is not enough by itself: local policy decides whether the
+authorized branches provide the required diversity.
+
+## Preserve order through failure
+
+For an ordered effect plan:
+
+1. Verify and approve the exact plan.
+2. Reserve the next member atomically.
+3. Execute only that member's opaque command.
+4. Persist its outcome and receipt.
+5. Advance only after a terminal result permits it.
+
+If member two becomes provider-unknown, do not start member three, mark the
+plan completed, or replay member one. Persist the recovery reference and
+reconcile member two first.
+
+## Mutation invalidates approval
+
+Changing an operation, resource, arguments, member order, approval policy, or
+plan membership changes the committed transaction. Previously collected
+approval responses must not carry over.
+
+Substitution should fail before signing or provider entry. If an approval
+provider is unavailable, the workflow remains non-executable; it does not
+silently reduce the threshold.
+
+## Production design questions
+
+Before deploying a multi-party plan, answer:
+
+- Who owns each approval key and how is it protected?
+- Which exact organizations, actors, or roots satisfy diversity requirements?
+- How long are approval responses valid?
+- Where are plan/member reservations stored atomically?
+- Which member outcomes permit the next member to begin?
+- How does each provider reconcile an ambiguous response?
+- Which receipt views may each organization inspect?
+
+Auths can bind and verify the answers. It cannot decide organizational intent
+or make two remote providers one atomic transaction.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Replay, recovery, and provider uncertainty](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Receipts and bounded disclosure](/guides/receipts-and-disclosure)
+- [Authority plans](/guides/authority-model#authorization-plans)
+- [Authority model](/guides/authority-model)
diff --git a/public/guides/authenticate-identity.md b/public/guides/authenticate-identity.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..185b530
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/guides/authenticate-identity.md
@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+# Authenticate a message, not an effect
+
+Use Auths identity components when you need to answer a narrow question:
+**which supported public identity authenticated these exact application
+bytes?** You do not need to create a grant, capability, approval policy,
+provider gateway, or runtime session.
+
+This separation matters for applications that want Auths' algorithm- and
+transport-neutral identity boundary but do not need proof-carrying authority.
+
+## Follow the bounded identity path
+
+The maintained recipe creates a method- and suite-labelled public identity,
+binds a message to that identity's signing preimage, authenticates the signed
+message, and proves that changed application bytes are rejected.
+
+> Product-owned recipe `01-authenticate-identity` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `authenticated`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
+
+### TypeScript recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/01-authenticate-identity.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/01-authenticate-identity.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Load the identity adapters
+
+Import the identity registry, raw-key method, and Ed25519 authentication suite used by this maintained recipe.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–5; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+import {
+  loadEd25519RawKeyAuthentication,
+  loadIdentity,
+  loadRawKeyIdentityAdapter,
+} from "@auths-dev/sdk/identity";
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Exchange bounded public identity bytes
+
+Generate a key, encode only its public material, then parse the received packet through the selected method.
+
+_Pinned source lines 7–13; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+const message = new TextEncoder().encode("publish weekly report");
+const keys = await crypto.subtle.generateKey("Ed25519", true, ["sign", "verify"]);
+const publicKey = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.exportKey("raw", keys.publicKey));
+const identity = await loadIdentity();
+const method = await loadRawKeyIdentityAdapter();
+const suite = await loadEd25519RawKeyAuthentication();
+const sent = method.create("ed25519-v1", publicKey);
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Authenticate the exact message
+
+Sign the identity-owned preimage and authenticate the encoded message against the received identity.
+
+_Pinned source lines 14–27; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+const received = identity.parseIdentity(identity.decodePublicIdentity(sent.packet), method);
+const preimage = identity.signingPreimage(received, message);
+const signingBytes = new Uint8Array(preimage.length);
+signingBytes.set(preimage);
+const signature = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.sign(
+  "Ed25519",
+  keys.privateKey,
+  signingBytes.buffer,
+));
+const authenticated = identity.authenticate(
+  identity.decodeSignedMessage(identity.encodeSignedMessage(received, message, signature)),
+  received,
+  suite,
+);
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Reject changed application bytes
+
+Reuse the signature with different message bytes and require the authentication attempt to fail closed.
+
+_Pinned source lines 28–39; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+let changedRejected = false;
+try {
+  const changed = new TextEncoder().encode("delete weekly report");
+  identity.authenticate(
+    identity.decodeSignedMessage(identity.encodeSignedMessage(received, changed, signature)),
+    received,
+    suite,
+  );
+} catch {
+  changedRejected = true;
+}
+if (!changedRejected) throw new Error("changed message authenticated");
+```
+
+#### Step 5: Report the asserted outcome
+
+The recipe emits only its declared authentication result and mutation check.
+
+_Pinned source lines 40; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "01-authenticate-identity", outcome: "authenticated", changedRejected }));
+```
+
+### Python recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/01_authenticate_identity.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/01_authenticate_identity.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Load the identity adapters
+
+Import the identity registry, verification types, and development-only method and signature suite.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–13; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+
+from auths.identity import (
+    IdentityRegistry,
+    VerificationMaterial,
+    VerificationRelationship,
+    decode_identity,
+    encode_identity,
+)
+from auths.testkit import DevelopmentIdentityMethod, DevelopmentSignatureSuite
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Encode the verification relationship
+
+Construct the bounded public verification relationship and encode it into an identity packet.
+
+_Pinned source lines 16–27; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+async def main() -> None:
+    relationship = VerificationRelationship(
+        "default-signing",
+        "authentication",
+        "auths.test-signature",
+        (VerificationMaterial("credential", b"public-development-material"),),
+    )
+    packet = encode_identity(
+        "auths.test-identity",
+        "identity:example:alice",
+        relationships=(relationship,),
+    )
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Validate and authenticate
+
+Resolve the packet through the explicit registry and authenticate the exact report-publishing bytes.
+
+_Pinned source lines 28–35; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    registry = IdentityRegistry(
+        methods=[DevelopmentIdentityMethod()],
+        suites=[DevelopmentSignatureSuite()],
+    )
+    validated = await decode_identity(packet).validate(registry)
+    await validated.authenticate(
+        b"publish weekly report", b"auths-development-signature", registry
+    )
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Reject changed application bytes
+
+Authenticate different bytes and require the development suite to reject the changed signature.
+
+_Pinned source lines 36–44; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    changed_rejected = False
+    try:
+        await validated.authenticate(
+            b"delete weekly report", b"changed-signature", registry
+        )
+    except ValueError:
+        changed_rejected = True
+    if not changed_rejected:
+        raise RuntimeError("changed message authenticated")
+```
+
+#### Step 5: Report the asserted outcome
+
+Emit the declared result, then run the owned asynchronous entry point.
+
+_Pinned source lines 45–57; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "01-authenticate-identity",
+                "outcome": "authenticated",
+                "changedRejected": changed_rejected,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
+
+The TypeScript and Python recipes intentionally use different development
+adapters. The public contract remains the same:
+
+1. Decode bounded public identity bytes.
+2. Select an exact identity-method and signature-suite implementation.
+3. Validate the identity through that registry.
+4. Authenticate a signature over the exact application bytes.
+5. Return an authenticated identity value—or reject.
+
+An adapter may establish principal control. It cannot create an Auths grant,
+return an authorization verdict, or manufacture an executable command.
+
+## Transport remains a courier
+
+You may send the identity packet over HTTPS, Iroh, a queue, or another bounded
+transport. The receiver must still decode and authenticate the packet. A
+mutually authenticated channel may add a useful local fact, but delivery
+success and channel authentication do not become authority.
+
+Treat received bytes as hostile until they pass limits and parsing. Do not let
+a transport adapter silently choose a different identity method, signature
+suite, or relationship when the labelled one is unavailable.
+
+## Decide what authentication means in your application
+
+After successful authentication, the application knows that the selected
+identity relationship authenticated the exact bytes. It must still decide
+what that identity may do.
+
+For example, a message authenticated as `report-agent` can be displayed,
+audited, or mapped to local context without being allowed to publish a report.
+If the application needs portable delegated authority, pass the established
+identity facts into the proof workflow rather than converting authentication
+into a boolean `isAllowed` flag.
+
+## Failure behavior
+
+Reject before returning an authenticated value when:
+
+- the packet or signed message exceeds configured bounds;
+- the identity method or signature suite is unavailable;
+- the labelled suite is incompatible with the verification material;
+- the relationship does not permit authentication;
+- the signature is invalid; or
+- the application bytes differ from the signed bytes.
+
+None of these failures may enter a provider. Retrying unchanged invalid bytes
+is not useful. A temporarily unavailable resolver or remote evidence source
+may be retried under the application's explicit timeout and backoff policy, but
+only before treating the identity as authenticated.
+
+## Production considerations
+
+The recipes use development material. Production applications must choose
+maintained adapters, cap acquisition work and response size, pin accepted
+methods and suites, establish freshness and status policy, and protect any
+private signing operation with appropriate custody.
+
+Identity evidence may contain organizational or device information. Avoid
+logging raw packets and signatures when a bounded identity descriptor or
+commitment is sufficient.
+
+## Next steps
+
+- [Verify existing authority](/guides/verify-authority)
+- [Delegate to an agent](/guides/delegate-agent)
+- [Build and qualify an adapter](/guides/adapter-authoring)
+- [Identity reference](/reference/principal-adapters)
diff --git a/public/guides/authority-model.md b/public/guides/authority-model.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e080768
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/guides/authority-model.md
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+# Authority flows downward from local trust
+
+Auths does not ask a global authority service whether a request is allowed. A
+verifier starts from its own scoped trust anchors, follows an exact chain of
+signed grants, evaluates any authorization plan, and checks that the terminal
+authority covers one canonical action.
+
+The key invariant is simple:
+
+> Every delegation edge may preserve or narrow authority. No edge may expand
+> it.
+
+This chapter explains the objects that make that invariant testable.
+
+## Trust anchors are local policy
+
+A trust anchor is configured by the verifier. It is not carried inside the
+proof and cannot be added by the caller. An anchor names a principal and exact
+control methods, then sets ceilings for profiles, permissions, resources,
+audiences, validity, budget, delegation depth, assurance, and status policy.
+
+This lets two verifiers evaluate the same proof under different local trust.
+One may trust a Northstar operations root for `edge://northstar/eu-west-2`;
+another may not. Adding a separate trust anchor does not authorize a chain that
+cannot link to it.
+
+## Grants transfer a bounded subset
+
+A grant links an issuer to a subject and an exact parent. The first grant is
+bounded by a local anchor. Every child is bounded by its parent.
+
+Consider this worked chain:
+
+| Dimension | Northstar anchor | Operations service | Report agent |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Permission | publish, delete | publish, delete | publish only |
+| Resource | all Northstar reports | weekly reports | report `2026-W33` |
+| Audience | reporting gateway | reporting gateway | reporting gateway |
+| Validity | 24 hours | 2 hours | 5 minutes |
+| Uses | 100 | 10 | 1 |
+| Delegation depth | 2 | 1 | 0 |
+
+The agent grant is valid because each column is equal to or narrower than the
+one before it. It cannot delete a report, switch to a different audience,
+recover the parent's validity window, increase the use count, or delegate
+again.
+
+If any child field widens, verification returns a denied result such as
+`delegation-expanded` before execution gates or provider entry.
+
+## Exact action constraints bind application bytes
+
+Permission and resource are not always enough. “Publish this report” and
+“publish a changed report” might share both. V1 therefore includes a closed
+action-constraint algebra:
+
+- one exact canonical body digest;
+- a bounded allowed set of body digests; or
+- any body, where the profile and parent authority explicitly permit it.
+
+An exact digest may attenuate an allowed set that contains it, and either may
+attenuate `AnyBody`. The opposite direction is widening. Application callbacks
+cannot redefine that order.
+
+The profile is responsible for canonical application bytes. JSON that is
+semantically “similar” but byte-distinct is not assumed equivalent unless the
+profile's canonicalization makes it so before signing and verification.
+
+## The action envelope connects authority to intent
+
+A signed action envelope binds more than a payload digest. It includes the
+profile and version, media type, capability, resource, optional requested
+budget, audience, challenge, validity, actor, terminal grant, plan identity,
+channel requirement, attachments, and critical extensions.
+
+The verifier compares the supplied canonical action with all of these fields.
+The executor later consumes the command decoded from `VerifiedAction`, never a
+lookalike request supplied alongside it.
+
+## Authorization plans
+
+Some operations require more than one proof branch. V1 provides bounded:
+
+- `Proof` for one branch;
+- `AllOf` for every child;
+- `AnyOf` for at least one child; and
+- `KOfN` for a threshold.
+
+Every satisfied branch must bind the same canonical action meaning and plan.
+A proof-carried plan is still not the verifier's local policy. The trusted
+context supplies a separate composition requirement that can pin the plan and
+require branch count, distinct actors, or distinct trust roots.
+
+For example, a two-company remediation may use `AllOf` with one Northstar
+branch and one EdgeShield branch. Local policy can require two distinct actors
+and two distinct roots. Two signatures from the same root cannot satisfy that
+diversity merely because they occupy different proof references.
+
+## Status and assurance stay role-specific
+
+Principal status and grant status are separate signed facts. Current control,
+historical control, statement existence, freshness, and revocation are not
+interchangeable. A newer revocation cannot be ignored in favor of an older
+active statement.
+
+Assurance applies to roles in the chain. A strong terminal actor does not
+repair insufficient assurance for the root or an intermediate delegator.
+Adapters establish the bounded evidence; they cannot decide that the chain is
+authorized.
+
+## Critical extensions do not disappear
+
+The first grant may establish a critical-extension set. In V1, every child
+must preserve that complete canonical set byte for byte unless a standardized,
+versioned attenuation algebra says otherwise. An agent cannot omit an
+extension it does not understand and continue under a weaker interpretation.
+
+Unknown required extensions fail closed.
+
+## What authority does not include
+
+Proof authority does not count prior uses, reserve a shared budget, establish a
+live channel, or execute the effect. Those are stateful execution-plane gates.
+An authorized action must still pass freshness, channel, replay, budget, and
+application policy before a profile can create an executable command.
+
+That distinction makes offline verification repeatable. It also prevents an
+old authorized result from becoming a reusable execution token.
+
+## Failure cases to recognize
+
+| Change | Result | Provider reachable? |
+| --- | --- | ---: |
+| Child adds a permission | denied: delegation expanded | no |
+| Action body differs from the signed digest | denied: action body mismatch | no |
+| Required status is missing | indeterminate | no |
+| Grant is explicitly revoked | denied | no |
+| Required profile is unavailable | indeterminate | no |
+| Exact execution identity already completed | exact replay at outer runtime | no new entry |
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Delegate to an agent](/guides/delegate-agent)
+- [Approvals and ordered plans](/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans)
+- [Verification model](/guides/verification-model)
+- [Protocol limits and identifiers](/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers)
diff --git a/public/guides/delegate-agent.md b/public/guides/delegate-agent.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc92d1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/guides/delegate-agent.md
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+# Give an agent less authority than its parent
+
+Delegation is useful when a service can perform several operations but a
+specialized agent should perform only one. Auths treats every delegation edge
+as an attenuation check: authority may be preserved or narrowed, never
+expanded.
+
+## Work through the maintained example
+
+> Product-owned recipe `04-delegate-to-agent` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed,exact-replay,denied`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
+
+### TypeScript recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/04-delegate-to-agent.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/04-delegate-to-agent.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Prepare the parent authority
+
+The parent can publish or delete, while the provider exposes only the operation used in this proof.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–8; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
+
+let calls = 0;
+const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({ tools: {
+  async publish_report() { calls += 1; return { published: true }; },
+} });
+const auths = await development.createAuths({ authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report", "delete_report"]) });
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Delegate a narrower, expiring authority
+
+Create an agent that can publish—but cannot inherit the parent's delete permission.
+
+_Pinned source lines 9–15; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+try {
+  const agent = await auths.delegate({
+    authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]),
+    name: "report-agent",
+    expiresInSeconds: 300,
+  });
+  const action = mcp.callTool({ name: "publish_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } });
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Exercise replay and widening boundaries
+
+Repeat the same request identity, then ask the agent for the broader undelegated action.
+
+_Pinned source lines 16–22; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  const first = await agent.execute({ action, provider, requestId: "delegated-once" });
+  const second = await agent.execute({ action, provider, requestId: "delegated-once" });
+  const broader = await agent.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "delete_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "delegated-broader",
+  });
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Assert one provider entry and close
+
+Require completed, exact-replay, and denied outcomes with exactly one provider call.
+
+_Pinned source lines 23–29; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  if (first.kind !== "completed" || second.kind !== "exact-replay" || broader.kind !== "denied" || calls !== 1) {
+    throw new Error("delegated authority was not narrow and replay-safe");
+  }
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "04-delegate-to-agent", outcome: `${first.kind},${second.kind},${broader.kind}`, calls }));
+} finally {
+  await auths.close();
+}
+```
+
+### Python recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/04_delegate_to_agent.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/04_delegate_to_agent.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Prepare the parent authority
+
+Define the counted provider handler used to observe whether an effect boundary was entered.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–18; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import mcp
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    calls = 0
+
+    async def publish_report(_arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal calls
+        calls += 1
+        return {"published": True}
+
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(tools={"publish_report": publish_report})
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Delegate a narrower, expiring authority
+
+Open the parent session and give the agent only publish authority for five minutes.
+
+_Pinned source lines 19–27; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    async with development.create_auths(
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report", "delete_report"])
+    ) as auths:
+        agent = await auths.delegate(
+            authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"]),
+            name="report-agent",
+            expires_in_seconds=300,
+        )
+        action = mcp.call_tool(name="publish_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"})
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Exercise replay and widening boundaries
+
+Repeat the same request identity, then ask the agent for the broader undelegated action.
+
+_Pinned source lines 28–38; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        first = await agent.execute(
+            action=action, provider=provider, request_id="delegated-once"
+        )
+        second = await agent.execute(
+            action=action, provider=provider, request_id="delegated-once"
+        )
+        broader = await agent.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="delete_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="delegated-broader",
+        )
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Assert one provider entry and report
+
+Require completed, exact-replay, and denied outcomes with exactly one provider call, then emit the trace.
+
+_Pinned source lines 39–58; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        if (
+            first.kind != "completed"
+            or second.kind != "exact-replay"
+            or broader.kind != "denied"
+            or calls != 1
+        ):
+            raise RuntimeError("delegated authority was not narrow and replay-safe")
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "04-delegate-to-agent",
+                "outcome": f"{first.kind},{second.kind},{broader.kind}",
+                "calls": calls,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
+
+The parent can publish and delete reports. It delegates only
+`publish_report` to a named agent for five minutes. The agent performs one
+publish, repeats the exact request identifier, then attempts the broader delete
+operation.
+
+The expected semantic sequence is:
+
+| Attempt | Result | Provider entries |
+| --- | --- | ---: |
+| First allowed publish | completed | 1 |
+| Same execution identity again | exact replay | still 1 |
+| Broader delete | denied | still 1 |
+
+The replay result returns recorded completion instead of re-entering the
+provider. The widening attempt stops before the provider.
+
+## Understand every dimension that can narrow
+
+A child grant must not broaden any inherited boundary:
+
+- permissions;
+- resources and action constraints;
+- validity window;
+- audiences and challenge binding;
+- budget ceiling;
+- remaining delegation depth;
+- profile and version;
+- status and assurance policy; or
+- critical extensions.
+
+An agent allowed one tool cannot obtain another merely because the provider
+implements it. A shorter expiry cannot be changed back to the parent's longer
+window. A child cannot replace a critical extension with an unknown or more
+permissive interpretation.
+
+## Design delegation around a job
+
+Start with the smallest outcome the agent needs. For a report agent that might
+mean one exact tool, one report namespace, one audience, a five-minute window,
+one use, and no further delegation depth.
+
+Do not give the agent a broad “automation” role and rely on prompt text to keep
+it safe. Prompt instructions are not an authority boundary. Tool availability
+is not an authority boundary either.
+
+If a job changes materially, create a new delegation. Do not mutate the
+meaning of an existing action or reuse an execution identifier for different
+bytes.
+
+## Handle failures safely
+
+- A widening attempt is denied and cannot reach the provider.
+- Missing required status or assurance is indeterminate and cannot execute.
+- An expired delegation requires new authority; retrying the same expired
+  proof will not help.
+- Exact replay returns the recorded outcome and must not reacquire credentials
+  or call the provider again.
+- A provider-unknown result is not exact replay; resume and reconcile the same
+  execution reference.
+
+## Production concerns
+
+Delegation does not remove the need for durable state or custody. Parent and
+child grants must be authored through protected signers. Execution identities,
+use counts, and budgets must be claimed atomically across the deployment scope.
+Status acquisition and revocation freshness remain explicit verifier inputs.
+
+Log bounded grant and action commitments rather than raw proof bytes. Ensure
+operators can identify which parent, child, profile, action, and execution
+state a denial or recovery reference belongs to without disclosing application
+payloads.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Authority model](/guides/authority-model)
+- [Approvals and ordered plans](/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans)
+- [Replay, recovery, and reconciliation](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Authority model](/guides/authority-model)
diff --git a/public/guides/execute-exact-action.md b/public/guides/execute-exact-action.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c44a09e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/guides/execute-exact-action.md
@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
+# Move from an authorized action to one controlled effect
+
+The central Auths product workflow is not “check a policy, then run the original
+request.” The original request is untrusted. Auths verifies canonical action
+bytes, creates an opaque native-owned command, reserves execution state, and
+lets a closed profile derive the provider operation from that command.
+
+## See the complete boundary
+
+> Product-owned recipe `03-execute-exact-action` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
+
+### TypeScript recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
+
+Register the only provider operation and create development authority for that exact tool name.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–14; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+import { verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
+
+let calls = 0;
+const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({
+  tools: {
+    async publish_report(input) {
+      calls += 1;
+      return { published: input.report };
+    },
+  },
+});
+const auths = await development.createAuths({ authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]) });
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
+
+Send the exact profile-owned action, require completion, and verify its returned receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 15–22; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+try {
+  const completed = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "publish_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-success",
+  });
+  if (completed.kind !== "completed") throw new Error(`unexpected result: ${completed.kind}`);
+  await verifyReceipt(completed.receipt);
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
+
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter did not advance.
+
+_Pinned source lines 23–28; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  const denied = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "delete_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-denied",
+  });
+  if (denied.kind !== "denied" || calls !== 1) throw new Error("undeclared effect reached provider");
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Report the trace and close owned state
+
+Emit the declared result and close the development runtime even when the workflow throws.
+
+_Pinned source lines 29–32; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "03-execute-exact-action", outcome: completed.kind, denied: true, calls }));
+} finally {
+  await auths.close();
+}
+```
+
+### Python recipe
+
+> **Qualification blocked — Python source does not match the pinned public API.**
+>
+> The pinned recipe imports `verify_receipt` from `auths`, while the pinned installed API exports it only from `auths.verify`. The source is retained for review but must not be presented as runnable until the product recipe is corrected and re-executed.
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
+
+Register the only provider operation and count every entry into that effect boundary.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–19; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+
+from auths import verify_receipt
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import mcp
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    calls = 0
+
+    async def publish_report(arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal calls
+        calls += 1
+        return {"published": arguments["report"]}
+
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(tools={"publish_report": publish_report})
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
+
+Open the owned development session, execute the exact action, and verify its receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 20–30; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    async with development.create_auths(
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"])
+    ) as auths:
+        completed = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="publish_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-success",
+        )
+        if completed.kind != "completed":
+            raise RuntimeError(f"unexpected result: {completed.kind}")
+        verify_receipt(completed.receipt)
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
+
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter stayed at one.
+
+_Pinned source lines 31–37; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        denied = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="delete_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-denied",
+        )
+        if denied.kind != "denied" or calls != 1:
+            raise RuntimeError("undeclared effect reached provider")
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Report the trace through the owned entry point
+
+Leave the session before emitting the declared result, then run the asynchronous entry point.
+
+_Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "03-execute-exact-action",
+                "outcome": "completed",
+                "denied": True,
+                "calls": calls,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
+
+The recipe is intentionally small, but it tests both sides of the boundary. An
+allowed MCP tool completes and yields a receipt. An undeclared tool is denied,
+and the provider-call counter proves the handler was not entered.
+
+## Follow the order that protects the effect
+
+```text
+canonical request
+  -> verify authority and exact action
+  -> apply local execution gates
+  -> durably reserve identity and budget
+  -> mint opaque profile command
+  -> acquire least-privilege credential
+  -> enter closed provider gateway
+  -> classify result
+  -> persist execution receipt
+```
+
+Changing this order changes the security claim. In particular, provider
+credentials should not be acquired before authorization and durable
+reservation, and provider input should not be reconstructed from the original
+JSON after verification.
+
+## What a closed profile owns
+
+A profile is an exact-action contract for one coherent effect domain. It owns:
+
+- canonical action bytes and hard bounds;
+- the permission and resource vocabulary;
+- decoding from verified action to an opaque command;
+- provider request construction;
+- credential timing and least-privilege scope;
+- outcome classification and reconciliation; and
+- receipt claims specific to that effect.
+
+The current public SDK workflow qualifies `auths.mcp/1`. A demo that calls a
+cloud, payment, database, or infrastructure provider is not automatically a
+qualified generic profile.
+
+## Denial happens before provider entry
+
+If the permission, resource, body commitment, audience, challenge, validity,
+status, assurance, delegation chain, or local policy fails, no command is
+available to the gateway. The provider is not a second authorization layer
+that Auths relies on to catch mistakes.
+
+Indeterminate results also stop before provider entry. Supply the missing
+trustworthy fact and begin a new attempt; never treat temporary uncertainty as
+permission.
+
+## Separate provider failure from authorization failure
+
+Once the gateway begins the remote effect, a timeout or connection failure is
+not a denial. The provider might have applied the operation even if the caller
+did not receive the response. The runtime must retain that uncertainty and
+require profile-specific reconciliation.
+
+Blind retry is safe only when the recorded outcome says no effect could have
+occurred. Otherwise resume the same execution identity and reconcile it.
+
+## Production checklist
+
+Before this boundary protects a real effect:
+
+- substitute durable atomic state for in-memory development state;
+- use non-exporting production custody;
+- pin the SDK, runtime contract, profile, and adapter versions;
+- keep provider credentials and endpoints out of public action payloads;
+- prove request equality at the gateway boundary;
+- test crash points before and after provider delivery;
+- retain decision, execution, and reconciliation evidence; and
+- emit redacted telemetry that distinguishes authorization from execution.
+
+Auths does not make a remote provider transactional with your local store. It
+makes that gap explicit and recoverable.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Delegate the same authority more narrowly](/guides/delegate-agent)
+- [Handle replay and provider uncertainty](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Understand receipts and disclosure](/guides/receipts-and-disclosure)
+- [Build a production integration](/guides/production-integration)
diff --git a/public/guides/production-integration.md b/public/guides/production-integration.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ea5105
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/guides/production-integration.md
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+# Turn the development workflow into an honest production boundary
+
+The high-level SDK makes the first integration small on purpose. Its
+development composition uses ephemeral keys and in-memory state. Production is
+not a flag that makes those mechanisms durable; it is a set of explicit
+substitutions around the same verified core.
+
+Auths is prelaunch and pre-audit. The repository contains production-shaped
+mechanisms and references, not a claim that a hosted production service is
+available or independently reviewed.
+
+## Begin with an effect inventory
+
+For each operation, write down:
+
+- exact application action and canonical body;
+- profile and version;
+- permission, resource, audience, validity, uses, and budgets;
+- identity, status, and assurance facts required;
+- signer and approval custody;
+- atomic reservation scope;
+- least-privilege provider credential;
+- irreversible provider entry point;
+- possible provider outcomes and reconciliation evidence; and
+- decision, execution, and disclosure retention.
+
+If two effects require different evidence, credential scopes, provider
+commands, obligations, or reconciliation, treat them as separate profiles.
+
+## Replace the development mechanisms
+
+### Durable state
+
+Use an atomic reservation store that distinguishes new execution, exact
+replay, and conflicting reuse in one transaction across your deployment
+scope. A single-process SQLite or JSON store can be a useful reference but does
+not prove multi-host coordination.
+
+Test concurrency, crash-before-delivery, crash-after-delivery, restart, and
+reconciliation. If the store is unavailable, fail before entering the
+provider.
+
+### Custody
+
+Use a signer backed by an HSM, KMS, WebAuthn authenticator, or another
+appropriate non-exporting boundary. The signer receives a bounded signing
+request and must return the matching request identity, transaction digest,
+signature, and control evidence. It must not canonicalize new Auths objects or
+broaden the requested authority.
+
+### Closed profile and provider gateway
+
+Use a qualified profile for the exact domain. Keep endpoints, headers,
+credentials, generic HTTP methods, SQL text, manifests, and provider-specific
+commands out of the public request. The gateway derives one allowed provider
+operation from the opaque verified command.
+
+Acquire the narrow credential only after authorization and durable
+reservation. Re-read critical provider state when the profile requires it.
+
+### Evidence and live acquisition
+
+Keep network resolution outside deterministic verification. Resolver and
+status adapters return bounded bytes with provenance, version, fetch time, and
+expiry. The trusted context commits to the exact executable adapter and
+registry configuration.
+
+### Receipts and disclosure
+
+Persist decision and execution receipts according to policy. Store sensitive
+canonical action or provider evidence separately and encrypted when it must be
+recoverable. Authorize summary and full views independently of receipt
+signature verification.
+
+## Make uncertainty operational
+
+Your provider adapter must classify whether an effect was definitely not
+attempted, completed, rejected, or possibly applied. An ambiguous result stays
+`outcome-unknown` until domain-specific reconciliation produces trustworthy
+observation.
+
+Do not secretly retry signers, approval providers, stores, or gateways. The
+application owns backoff and escalation based on the SDK's retry class and
+effect state.
+
+## Observe without leaking
+
+Useful telemetry includes bounded operation/profile identities, result class,
+stable code, stage, commitments, latency, work totals, retry class, and
+correlation identity. Exclude credentials, keys, signatures, proof bytes,
+canonical application bodies, provider response bodies, and uncontrolled
+high-cardinality values.
+
+Telemetry exporter failure must not turn a denial into authorization or change
+an execution result.
+
+## Release and support gate
+
+Before launch:
+
+1. Pin the SDK artifact, lockfile, ABI, runtime contract, profile, and adapters.
+2. Run installed-artifact and adapter conformance against exactly what ships.
+3. Validate TypeScript and Python parity where both are supported.
+4. Exercise hostile inputs, concurrency, crash, recovery, and secret-scanning
+   paths.
+5. Establish monitoring, on-call ownership, key recovery, receipt retention,
+   and incident procedures.
+6. Obtain independent security review appropriate to the effect's consequence.
+
+Auths does not promise remote exactly-once execution, instantaneous global
+revocation, or atomicity between your transaction and a provider. A production
+integration must expose and manage those limits.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Build and qualify adapters](/guides/adapter-authoring)
+- [Replay and provider uncertainty](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Receipts and disclosure](/guides/receipts-and-disclosure)
+- [Runtime results and recovery reference](/reference/decisions-errors)
diff --git a/public/guides/receipts-and-disclosure.md b/public/guides/receipts-and-disclosure.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4cb0fba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/guides/receipts-and-disclosure.md
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+# Keep proof of an effect without publishing its payload
+
+An Auths receipt is portable evidence about a decision or execution. It is not
+necessarily a human-readable audit report. The signed form commits to facts so
+that another process or language can verify integrity, while application-owned
+disclosure decides which underlying details a viewer may see.
+
+## Distinguish the two receipt moments
+
+| Receipt | Created when | What it can establish |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Decision receipt | After authorization and required outer gates | Which exact authority, action, context, and plan were accepted or rejected |
+| Execution receipt | After the provider path reaches a recorded outcome | Which command commitment ran, how it ended, and how it relates to the decision |
+
+A valid decision receipt does not prove that a provider effect happened. A
+transport acknowledgment does not replace an execution receipt. An execution
+receipt should be interpreted alongside its decision binding and profile
+semantics.
+
+The exact-action recipe verifies its completed receipt as part of the workflow:
+
+> Product-owned recipe `03-execute-exact-action` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
+
+### TypeScript recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
+
+Register the only provider operation and create development authority for that exact tool name.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–14; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+import { verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
+
+let calls = 0;
+const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({
+  tools: {
+    async publish_report(input) {
+      calls += 1;
+      return { published: input.report };
+    },
+  },
+});
+const auths = await development.createAuths({ authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]) });
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
+
+Send the exact profile-owned action, require completion, and verify its returned receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 15–22; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+try {
+  const completed = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "publish_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-success",
+  });
+  if (completed.kind !== "completed") throw new Error(`unexpected result: ${completed.kind}`);
+  await verifyReceipt(completed.receipt);
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
+
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter did not advance.
+
+_Pinned source lines 23–28; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  const denied = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "delete_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-denied",
+  });
+  if (denied.kind !== "denied" || calls !== 1) throw new Error("undeclared effect reached provider");
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Report the trace and close owned state
+
+Emit the declared result and close the development runtime even when the workflow throws.
+
+_Pinned source lines 29–32; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "03-execute-exact-action", outcome: completed.kind, denied: true, calls }));
+} finally {
+  await auths.close();
+}
+```
+
+### Python recipe
+
+> **Qualification blocked — Python source does not match the pinned public API.**
+>
+> The pinned recipe imports `verify_receipt` from `auths`, while the pinned installed API exports it only from `auths.verify`. The source is retained for review but must not be presented as runnable until the product recipe is corrected and re-executed.
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
+
+Register the only provider operation and count every entry into that effect boundary.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–19; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+
+from auths import verify_receipt
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import mcp
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    calls = 0
+
+    async def publish_report(arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal calls
+        calls += 1
+        return {"published": arguments["report"]}
+
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(tools={"publish_report": publish_report})
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
+
+Open the owned development session, execute the exact action, and verify its receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 20–30; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    async with development.create_auths(
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"])
+    ) as auths:
+        completed = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="publish_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-success",
+        )
+        if completed.kind != "completed":
+            raise RuntimeError(f"unexpected result: {completed.kind}")
+        verify_receipt(completed.receipt)
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
+
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter stayed at one.
+
+_Pinned source lines 31–37; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        denied = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="delete_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-denied",
+        )
+        if denied.kind != "denied" or calls != 1:
+            raise RuntimeError("undeclared effect reached provider")
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Report the trace through the owned entry point
+
+Leave the session before emitting the declared result, then run the asynchronous entry point.
+
+_Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "03-execute-exact-action",
+                "outcome": "completed",
+                "denied": True,
+                "calls": calls,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
+
+## Verify before interpreting
+
+Receipt verification checks bounded canonical bytes, identifiers, signatures,
+and bindings. Inspection then returns an inert projection. It cannot recreate a
+verified command, reopen a gateway, or become authority for another effect.
+
+Treat an invalid receipt as untrusted input. Do not display its claims as
+verified merely because the JSON envelope was parseable.
+
+## Choose a disclosure view deliberately
+
+A useful application commonly exposes three levels:
+
+1. **Opaque public view:** validity, receipt identifiers, commitments, signer
+   descriptors, timestamps, outcome class, and other non-sensitive metadata.
+2. **Authorized summary:** profile-owned explanation such as “quarantined the
+   Northstar service in `eu-west-2`,” without canonical payload bytes.
+3. **Authorized full view:** exact canonical action and bounded provider
+   evidence for incident response, audit, or dispute handling.
+
+The signed receipt stays commitment-only. Sensitive command material can be
+stored separately as encrypted disclosure material, authenticated against the
+tenant and receipt identity. The inspector verifies both the receipt and the
+disclosure binding before releasing a view.
+
+This prevents the receipt stream from becoming a second database of customer
+payloads, infrastructure names, report contents, or provider responses.
+
+## Application responsibilities
+
+Auths can produce and verify the cryptographic structures; the application
+still owns:
+
+- viewer authentication and authorization;
+- encryption keys and rotation;
+- retention and deletion policy;
+- tenant isolation;
+- redaction and field classification;
+- audit access logging; and
+- legal or regulatory requirements.
+
+Do not put private keys, provider credentials, raw proofs, signatures, or
+unbounded response bodies into disclosure material. A “full” view is still a
+bounded profile-owned view, not an unrestricted dump.
+
+## Failure and recovery behavior
+
+If required receipt persistence fails before provider entry, stop without
+executing. If persistence fails after the provider may have been entered, the
+runtime must preserve an ambiguous or recoverable state rather than claim
+denial.
+
+If disclosure decryption or authorization fails, return the opaque verified
+view or no view according to application policy. Never weaken receipt
+verification because a viewer has privileged application credentials.
+
+Receipt verification itself is effect-free and safe to repeat. Re-executing an
+effect based on a receipt is not.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Replay and recovery](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Production integration](/guides/production-integration)
+- [Evidence, status, assurance, and registries](/reference/evidence-status-assurance)
+- [TypeScript verification surface](/reference/typescript)
diff --git a/public/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown.md b/public/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0df5b72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown.md
@@ -0,0 +1,554 @@
+# Know whether another attempt is safe
+
+Authorization can be deterministic while execution is not. A remote provider
+may apply an operation and lose the response. A process may crash after
+delivery but before recording completion. Treating either case as a normal
+failure and retrying can perform the effect twice.
+
+Auths keeps authorization, durable execution state, and provider observation
+as separate facts so the runtime can say what is known rather than collapse
+everything into success or failure.
+
+## Start with the outcome table
+
+| Outcome | Could the provider have been entered? | Correct response |
+| --- | ---: | --- |
+| denied | no | Change the action, authority, or trusted facts before trying again |
+| indeterminate | no | Acquire the missing trustworthy fact, then verify anew |
+| exact replay | a prior execution already finished | Return the recorded result; do not re-enter |
+| recoverable | possibly | Resume the same execution reference |
+| provider unknown | yes | Reconcile the same execution; do not blindly retry |
+
+This table is more useful than a generic `retryable` boolean because it keeps
+effect uncertainty explicit.
+
+## See restart and reconciliation in one recipe
+
+> Product-owned recipe `05-cross-organization-plan` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed-after-restart`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
+
+### TypeScript recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Load recovery and approval tools
+
+Import the filesystem, child-process, approval, profile, and receipt primitives used by the maintained scenario.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–13; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
+import { mkdtemp, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import {
+  approval,
+  ExecutionReference,
+} from "@auths-dev/sdk";
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
+import { decodeReceipt, encodeReceipt, verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Route the restart phases
+
+The same source can verify a receipt, run either durable phase, or orchestrate both across process boundaries.
+
+_Pinned source lines 15–33; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+const self = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
+const mode = process.argv[2];
+const directory = process.argv[3];
+type ApprovalProvider = Parameters<typeof approval.threshold>[0]["providers"][number];
+
+if (mode === "verify") {
+  const receipt = decodeReceipt(await readFile(required(directory)));
+  await verifyReceipt(receipt);
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ outcome: "verified-portable-receipt" }));
+} else if (mode === "phase-one") {
+  await phaseOne(required(directory));
+} else if (mode === "phase-two") {
+  await phaseTwo(required(directory));
+} else {
+  const root = process.env.AUTHS_RECIPE_OUTPUT ?? await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "auths-recipe-five-ts-"));
+  runChild("phase-one", root);
+  runChild("phase-two", root);
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "05-cross-organization-plan", outcome: "completed-after-restart", duplicateEntries: 0 }));
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Model a provider-unknown outcome
+
+The first runtime records that token rotation may have applied instead of claiming success or retrying.
+
+_Pinned source lines 35–47; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+async function phaseOne(root: string): Promise<void> {
+  const auths = await development.createRecoverableAuths({
+    directory: root,
+    authority: mcp.allowTools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+    approval: await planApproval(),
+  });
+  const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({ tools: {
+    async quarantine_service() { return { quarantined: true }; },
+    async rotate_token() {
+      await writeFile(join(root, "provider-applied"), "applied", { flag: "wx" });
+      return { effect: "possible", cause: "unknown" } as const;
+    },
+  } });
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Stop the ordered plan and persist recovery state
+
+Execute the exact two-member plan, require one completed member, then persist its reference and receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 48–62; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  try {
+    const plan = await mcp.plan([
+      mcp.callTool({ name: "quarantine_service", arguments: { region: "eu-west-2" } }),
+      mcp.callTool({ name: "rotate_token", arguments: { region: "eu-west-2" } }),
+    ]);
+    const result = await auths.execute({ plan, provider, requestId: "incident-plan" });
+    if (result.kind !== "recoverable" || result.reference === undefined || result.completedReceipts.length !== 1) {
+      throw new Error("ordered plan did not stop with one completed member");
+    }
+    await writeFile(join(root, "reference.bin"), result.reference.encode());
+    await writeFile(join(root, "typescript-receipt.json"), encodeReceipt(result.completedReceipts[0]!));
+  } finally {
+    await auths.close();
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 5: Configure reconciliation without provider re-entry
+
+After restart, direct handler entry is an error; only the provider-specific reconcile path may classify the prior attempt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 64–81; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+async function phaseTwo(root: string): Promise<void> {
+  const auths = await development.createRecoverableAuths({
+    directory: root,
+    authority: mcp.allowTools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+    approval: await planApproval(),
+  });
+  let entries = 0;
+  const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({
+    tools: {
+      async quarantine_service() { entries += 1; throw new Error("unexpected provider re-entry"); },
+      async rotate_token() { entries += 1; throw new Error("unexpected provider re-entry"); },
+    },
+    async reconcile() {
+      return existsSync(join(root, "provider-applied"))
+        ? { effect: "applied", result: { rotated: true } } as const
+        : { effect: "possible", cause: "unknown" } as const;
+    },
+  });
+```
+
+#### Step 6: Resume the original execution
+
+Decode the persisted reference, reconcile to completion, verify the receipt, and never enter a provider handler twice.
+
+_Pinned source lines 82–91; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  try {
+    const reference = ExecutionReference.decode(await readFile(join(root, "reference.bin")));
+    const result = await auths.resume({ reference, provider });
+    if (result.kind !== "completed" || entries !== 0) throw new Error("recovery re-entered the provider");
+    await verifyReceipt(result.receipt);
+    await writeFile(join(root, "typescript-recovered-receipt.json"), encodeReceipt(result.receipt));
+  } finally {
+    await auths.close();
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 7: Bind two organizations to the exact plan
+
+Require both organization-specific providers and cap the approval policy to the plan's two uses.
+
+_Pinned source lines 93–103; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+async function planApproval() {
+  const providers = [approver("company-a"), approver("company-b")];
+  return {
+    policy: await approval.planOnce({
+      policyId: "approval.cross-company-plan",
+      maxUses: 2,
+      requirements: ["company-a", "company-b"],
+    }),
+    provider: approval.threshold({ threshold: 2, providers }),
+  };
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 8: Echo the approval commitment
+
+Each approval response returns the exact request identifier, transaction digest, and policy it evaluated.
+
+_Pinned source lines 105–116; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+function approver(_organization: string): ApprovalProvider {
+  return {
+    async approve(request) {
+      return {
+        requestId: request.requestId,
+        transactionDigest: request.transactionDigest.slice(),
+        policy: request.policy,
+        decision: "approved",
+      };
+    },
+  };
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 9: Treat every phase as an owned process
+
+Fail on an unsuccessful child phase and reject missing recovery paths.
+
+_Pinned source lines 118–126; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+function runChild(childMode: string, root: string): void {
+  const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, [self, childMode, root], { encoding: "utf8" });
+  if (result.status !== 0) throw new Error(result.stderr || result.stdout || `${childMode} failed`);
+}
+
+function required(value: string | undefined): string {
+  if (value === undefined || value.length === 0) throw new Error("path is required");
+  return value;
+}
+```
+
+### Python recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/05_cross_organization_plan.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/05_cross_organization_plan.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Load recovery and approval tools
+
+Import the process, persistence, approval, profile, and receipt primitives used by the maintained scenario.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–17; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from auths import (
+    Approval,
+    ExecutionReference,
+)
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import McpHandlerOutcome, mcp
+from auths.verify import decode_receipt, encode_receipt, verify_receipt
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Bind two organizations to the exact plan
+
+Each organization echoes the exact approval request, and the threshold policy requires both responses.
+
+_Pinned source lines 20–35; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+class OrganizationApproval:
+    def __init__(self, organization: str) -> None:
+        self.organization = organization
+
+    async def approve(self, request):
+        return Approval.response(request, decision="approved")
+
+
+def plan_approval():
+    providers = (OrganizationApproval("company-a"), OrganizationApproval("company-b"))
+    return Approval.plan_once(
+        "approval.cross-company-plan",
+        Approval.threshold(providers, threshold=2),
+        max_uses=2,
+        requirements=("company-a", "company-b"),
+    )
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Model a provider-unknown outcome
+
+The first provider records that rotation may have applied rather than claiming success or retrying.
+
+_Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+async def phase_one(root: Path) -> None:
+    async def quarantine_service(_arguments, _context):
+        return {"quarantined": True}
+
+    async def rotate_token(_arguments, _context):
+        (root / "provider-applied").write_text("applied", encoding="utf-8")
+        return McpHandlerOutcome("possible", cause="unknown")
+
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(
+        tools={
+            "quarantine_service": quarantine_service,
+            "rotate_token": rotate_token,
+        }
+    )
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Construct the recoverable ordered plan
+
+Open durable state and commit quarantine followed by rotation in one exact order.
+
+_Pinned source lines 52–65; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    async with development.create_recoverable_auths(
+        directory=root,
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+        approval=plan_approval(),
+    ) as auths:
+        plan = mcp.plan(
+            (
+                mcp.call_tool(
+                    name="quarantine_service",
+                    arguments={"region": "eu-west-2"},
+                ),
+                mcp.call_tool(name="rotate_token", arguments={"region": "eu-west-2"}),
+            )
+        )
+```
+
+#### Step 5: Stop and persist recovery state
+
+Require one completed member, then persist the execution reference and completed receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 66–80; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        result = await auths.execute(
+            plan=plan, provider=provider, request_id="incident-plan"
+        )
+        if (
+            result.kind != "recoverable"
+            or result.reference is None
+            or len(result.completed_receipts) != 1
+        ):
+            raise RuntimeError("ordered plan did not stop with one completed member")
+        (root / "reference.bin").write_bytes(
+            result.reference.to_bytes()
+        )
+        (root / "python-receipt.json").write_bytes(
+            encode_receipt(result.completed_receipts[0])
+        )
+```
+
+#### Step 6: Define reconciliation without provider re-entry
+
+After restart, direct handler entry is an error; reconciliation inspects the provider-specific evidence.
+
+_Pinned source lines 83–95; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+async def phase_two(root: Path) -> None:
+    entries = 0
+
+    async def no_reentry(_arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal entries
+        entries += 1
+        raise RuntimeError("unexpected provider re-entry")
+
+    async def reconcile(_execution_id, _service):
+        if (root / "provider-applied").exists():
+            return McpHandlerOutcome("applied", result={"rotated": True})
+        return McpHandlerOutcome("possible", cause="unknown")
+```
+
+#### Step 7: Reopen the same durable runtime
+
+Recreate the same authority and approval policy with handlers that must remain unreachable.
+
+_Pinned source lines 96–107; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(
+        tools={
+            "quarantine_service": no_reentry,
+            "rotate_token": no_reentry,
+        },
+        reconcile=reconcile,
+    )
+    async with development.create_recoverable_auths(
+        directory=root,
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+        approval=plan_approval(),
+    ) as auths:
+```
+
+#### Step 8: Resume the original execution
+
+Decode the persisted reference, reconcile to completion, verify the receipt, and persist it.
+
+_Pinned source lines 108–117; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        result = await auths.resume(
+            reference=ExecutionReference.from_bytes((root / "reference.bin").read_bytes()),
+            provider=provider,
+        )
+        if result.kind != "completed" or entries != 0:
+            raise RuntimeError("recovery re-entered the provider")
+        verify_receipt(result.receipt)
+        (root / "python-recovered-receipt.json").write_bytes(
+            encode_receipt(result.receipt)
+        )
+```
+
+#### Step 9: Route each owned phase
+
+Run either verification or a durable execution phase in a separate process invocation.
+
+_Pinned source lines 120–136; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+def run_child(mode: str, root: Path) -> None:
+    subprocess.run([sys.executable, __file__, mode, str(root)], check=True)
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    mode = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None
+    path = Path(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) > 2 else None
+    if mode == "verify" and path is not None:
+        verify_receipt(decode_receipt(path.read_bytes()))
+        print(json.dumps({"outcome": "verified-portable-receipt"}))
+        return
+    if mode == "phase-one" and path is not None:
+        await phase_one(path)
+        return
+    if mode == "phase-two" and path is not None:
+        await phase_two(path)
+        return
+```
+
+#### Step 10: Orchestrate both sides of the restart
+
+Use a configured durable directory or an isolated temporary one, then run both phases in order.
+
+_Pinned source lines 137–147; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    configured = os.environ.get("AUTHS_RECIPE_OUTPUT")
+    if configured is not None:
+        root = Path(configured)
+        root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        run_child("phase-one", root)
+        run_child("phase-two", root)
+    else:
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="auths-recipe-five-py-") as directory:
+            root = Path(directory)
+            run_child("phase-one", root)
+            run_child("phase-two", root)
+```
+
+#### Step 11: Report the no-duplicate outcome
+
+Emit the declared completed-after-restart result through the owned asynchronous entry point.
+
+_Pinned source lines 148–160; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "05-cross-organization-plan",
+                "outcome": "completed-after-restart",
+                "duplicateEntries": 0,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
+
+The recipe completes the first member of an ordered plan, records uncertainty
+for the second, closes the process, opens the durable state again, and resumes
+from the saved execution reference. The recovery provider exposes a
+reconciliation operation but its effect handlers throw if entered. Completion
+with zero new entries proves recovery did not replay either member.
+
+## Preserve one execution identity
+
+Request identifiers, command commitments, and profile idempotency keys serve
+different purposes. The durable store must atomically distinguish:
+
+- a new execution identity;
+- an exact replay of the same command; and
+- a conflicting attempt that reuses an identity for different bytes.
+
+Only an exact replay may return the recorded result. A conflict must fail
+closed. Do not generate a new request identifier to escape an uncertain prior
+attempt; that discards the link needed for reconciliation.
+
+## Resume is not retry
+
+Resume loads an authenticated, bounded reference to existing execution state.
+It continues the state machine from the last durable checkpoint. It must not
+re-run authorization-independent application code, reacquire a credential for
+an already-entered command, or call completed plan members again.
+
+Reconciliation asks the profile's provider adapter for fresh, operation-specific
+evidence: for example, whether a token now has the expected version or whether
+a rollout reached the committed object revision. A generic HTTP status check
+cannot decide every domain's outcome.
+
+## Stop conditions for operators
+
+Stop automatic processing when:
+
+- durable execution state is unavailable;
+- the stored command commitment conflicts with the requested action;
+- the profile cannot establish whether the provider applied the operation;
+- fresh observation contradicts the expected postcondition; or
+- reconciliation itself returns another ambiguous result.
+
+Retain the state as unknown and escalate. Do not translate the absence of
+evidence to released capacity or successful completion.
+
+## Production requirements
+
+In-memory development state cannot provide this guarantee across restart or
+multiple hosts. A production store needs atomic compare-and-set semantics over
+the entire deployment scope, durable checkpoints, unique execution identities,
+and tested crash behavior.
+
+Provider gateways need domain idempotency and a reconciliation contract.
+Secret credentials must remain behind the gateway. Telemetry should record
+state transitions and bounded commitments without copying provider bodies,
+proofs, signatures, or credentials.
+
+Auths does not claim that a local transaction and a remote provider effect are
+atomic. It gives the application enough truthful state to recover from that
+fact.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Approvals and ordered plans](/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans)
+- [Receipts and disclosure](/guides/receipts-and-disclosure)
+- [Production integration](/guides/production-integration)
+- [Results and recovery reference](/reference/decisions-errors)
diff --git a/public/guides/verification-model.md b/public/guides/verification-model.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1de70a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/guides/verification-model.md
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+# Verification is a sealed, deterministic pipeline
+
+Auths verification takes three explicit inputs—proof bytes, canonical action
+bytes, and trusted-context bytes—and produces a canonical result. The same
+valid inputs and executable registry configuration must produce the same
+verdict, primary stable code, commitments, assurance report, and bounded work
+totals in every conforming implementation.
+
+The verifier performs no network, filesystem, environment, clock, randomness,
+database, private-key, replay, or provider operation. This makes its meaning
+portable and its failures inspectable.
+
+## The six stages
+
+```text
+proof + canonical action + trusted context
+            |
+            v
+1. bounded decode
+            |
+            v
+2. reference resolution
+            |
+            v
+3. principal control
+            |
+            v
+4. authority branches
+            |
+            v
+5. plan evaluation
+            |
+            v
+6. exact action binding
+            |
+            v
+authorized | denied | indeterminate
+```
+
+Each successful stage produces a narrower typed value. Later code cannot
+pretend that raw bytes already passed an earlier check.
+
+### 1. Bounded decode
+
+The decoder enforces size and collection limits before expensive work. It
+rejects non-canonical CBOR, duplicate or invalid map keys, unsorted sets,
+unknown critical fields, invalid UTF-8, trailing bytes, and overflowing
+collections.
+
+Representative stable failures include `malformed-proof`,
+`non-canonical-proof`, and `resource-limit-exceeded`. A permissive fallback
+decoder would change protocol meaning and is not allowed.
+
+### 2. Reference resolution
+
+The resolver recomputes identifiers for grants, actions, plans, evidence,
+status, and attachments. It builds bounded indexes and rejects missing,
+duplicate, mismatched, cyclic, ambiguous, or unused-critical references.
+
+Failures such as `digest-mismatch`, `duplicate-object`, and
+`missing-reference` stop the entire proof structure. No signature or provider
+work can repair an incoherent graph.
+
+### 3. Principal control
+
+For each signed statement, the verifier selects exactly one accepted principal
+method and signature suite, reserves their maximum work, verifies the
+domain-separated signature, evaluates method-specific control, and requires
+the adapter's consumed evidence IDs to match the signed binding exactly.
+
+Invalid supplied evidence is denied—for example `invalid-signature` or
+`verification-method-mismatch`. A required but unavailable method or evidence
+is indeterminate—for example `unsupported-principal-method` or
+`missing-principal-evidence`.
+
+Adapters return bounded facts and assurance claims. They cannot manufacture
+authority results.
+
+### 4. Authority branches
+
+Each plan leaf is checked from a local trust anchor through its exact grant
+chain to the terminal actor. Profile, permissions, resources, audiences,
+validity, body constraints, budgets, status, assurance, delegation depth, and
+critical extensions must remain within their ceilings.
+
+Common failures include `untrusted-root`, `broken-grant-chain`,
+`delegation-expanded`, `permission-not-granted`, and
+`action-constraint-mismatch`.
+
+### 5. Plan evaluation
+
+The verifier recomputes the plan identity, confirms every branch binds the
+same action meaning, evaluates bounded `Proof`, `AllOf`, `AnyOf`, and `KOfN`
+composition, then applies the verifier's independent required quorum and
+diversity constraints.
+
+Evaluation order is canonical. Even when one branch already satisfies an
+`AnyOf`, the verifier does not skip remaining branches for resource accounting.
+`plan-action-mismatch` and `composition-requirement-not-met` are denied
+outcomes.
+
+### 6. Exact action binding
+
+Finally, the verifier selects the exact profile/version and compares canonical
+body, media type, capability, resource, requested budget, audience, challenge,
+validity, actor, terminal grant, plan, channel requirement, attachments, and
+profile policy.
+
+Only this stage can privately construct `VerifiedAction`. It has no public
+constructor. Representative failures include `action-body-mismatch`,
+`audience-mismatch`, `challenge-mismatch`, `action-outside-validity`, and
+`attachment-digest-mismatch`.
+
+## Three diagnostics, one execution rule
+
+`Authorized` means every required proof and action-binding check passed.
+`Denied` means available facts establish invalidity or insufficient authority.
+`Indeterminate` means a required trustworthy fact or implementation was not
+available.
+
+The execution rule is binary: only authorized may continue. An indeterminate
+result is not a probabilistic allow. It is a precise request for missing trust
+input.
+
+Stable first-failure ordering makes languages and receipts agree on one
+primary diagnostic. It does not claim resistance to every timing or
+side-channel observation.
+
+## The outer gates are deliberately separate
+
+After authorization, the product runtime still requires:
+
+```text
+authorized action
+AND fresh status policy
+AND channel policy
+AND atomic replay claim
+AND stateful budget claim
+AND local application policy
+= executable action
+```
+
+The runtime decodes a domain command from the sealed verified action, writes a
+decision receipt, executes through the profile gateway, and writes an
+execution receipt. None of the outer facts may upgrade a denied or
+indeterminate verifier result.
+
+Because replay and provider outcomes live outside the kernel, repeating pure
+verification is safe. Repeating provider execution may not be.
+
+## Work a simple mutation example
+
+Start with a proof that authorizes canonical action `A`. Verify it against
+trusted context `C`; the result is authorized. Flip one byte in the action to
+produce `A′` while keeping the proof and context unchanged.
+
+If `A′` is no longer valid canonical input, bounded decode rejects it. If it is
+valid but has different meaning, exact action binding denies it. There is no
+path where signature validity over the original envelope authorizes the
+mutated action.
+
+You can run that exact cross-language check in
+[Verify existing authority](/guides/verify-authority).
+
+## Production implications
+
+Pin the verifier ABI and accepted registries. Bind required and executed
+configuration commitments. Acquire live status or identity evidence outside
+the kernel and supply bounded snapshots. Set resource limits before parsing
+hostile input. Handle every result variant exhaustively and keep protocol bytes
+out of ordinary logs.
+
+Auths is prelaunch and pre-audit. Deterministic fixtures, differential
+bindings, fuzzing, and formal work strengthen the implementation claim; they
+do not substitute for an independent security audit.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Verify existing authority](/guides/verify-authority)
+- [Authority model](/guides/authority-model)
+- [Execute one exact action](/guides/execute-exact-action)
+- [Stable results and errors](/reference/decisions-errors)
diff --git a/public/guides/verify-authority.md b/public/guides/verify-authority.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7118e24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/guides/verify-authority.md
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+# Ask Auths for a decision without executing anything
+
+Verification is the safest integration surface when another system already
+creates the proof and action. You supply three bounded byte strings and receive
+an inert result. The verifier does not read a clock, fetch a key, contact a
+provider, claim replay state, or write a receipt.
+
+## Supply all three inputs explicitly
+
+| Input | Owner | Why it is separate |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Proof bundle | Prover or transport | Carries grants, signed actions, plans, evidence, and references |
+| Canonical action | Application profile | Defines the exact effect meaning being checked |
+| Trusted context | Verifier | Defines local roots, time, accepted adapters, status, assurance, obligations, and limits |
+
+The proof cannot smuggle a new root into the context or select a more
+permissive executable adapter configuration.
+
+## Run the portable recipe
+
+> Product-owned recipe `02-verify-authority` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `authorized`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
+
+### TypeScript recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/02-verify-authority.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/02-verify-authority.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Prepare the verifier
+
+Load the fixture reader and the effect-free verifier entry point.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–5; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { loadVerifier } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+
+const fixture = process.env.AUTHS_RECIPE_FIXTURE;
+if (fixture === undefined) throw new Error("AUTHS_RECIPE_FIXTURE is required");
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Load all three canonical inputs
+
+Read proof, action, and trusted-context bytes independently; none is inferred from another.
+
+_Pinned source lines 6–10; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+const [proof, action, context] = await Promise.all([
+  readFile(`${fixture}/workflow.proof.cbor`),
+  readFile(`${fixture}/workflow.action.cbor`),
+  readFile(`${fixture}/workflow.context.cbor`),
+]);
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Require an authorized verdict
+
+Verify the exact tuple and stop unless the result is explicitly authorized.
+
+_Pinned source lines 11–13; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+const verifier = await loadVerifier();
+const verified = verifier.verify(proof, action, context);
+if (verified.kind !== "authorized") throw new Error(`unexpected verdict: ${verified.kind}`);
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Prove changed bytes do not inherit authority
+
+Flip one action byte, accept either bounded parse rejection or a non-authorized verdict, and assert fail-closed behavior.
+
+_Pinned source lines 14–23; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+const changed = action.slice();
+changed[changed.length - 1] ^= 1;
+let changedRejected = false;
+try {
+  changedRejected = verifier.verify(proof, changed, context).kind !== "authorized";
+} catch {
+  changedRejected = true;
+}
+if (!changedRejected) throw new Error("mutated action remained authorized");
+console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "02-verify-authority", outcome: verified.kind, changedRejected }));
+```
+
+### Python recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/02_verify_authority.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/02_verify_authority.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Prepare the verifier
+
+Load the filesystem inputs and the effect-free Python verifier.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–8; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from auths.verify import verify
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Load all three canonical inputs
+
+Read proof, action, and trusted-context bytes from the maintained fixture.
+
+_Pinned source lines 10–13; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+root = Path(os.environ["AUTHS_RECIPE_FIXTURE"])
+proof = (root / "workflow.proof.cbor").read_bytes()
+action = (root / "workflow.action.cbor").read_bytes()
+context = (root / "workflow.context.cbor").read_bytes()
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Require an authorized verdict
+
+Verify the exact tuple and stop unless the result is explicitly authorized.
+
+_Pinned source lines 14–16; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+verified = verify(proof, action, context)
+if verified.kind != "authorized":
+    raise RuntimeError(f"unexpected verdict: {verified.kind}")
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Prove changed bytes do not inherit authority
+
+Mutate the action, require rejection, and emit only the recipe's declared verdict and mutation result.
+
+_Pinned source lines 17–33; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+changed = bytearray(action)
+changed[-1] ^= 1
+try:
+    changed_rejected = verify(proof, bytes(changed), context).kind != "authorized"
+except (TypeError, ValueError):
+    changed_rejected = True
+if not changed_rejected:
+    raise RuntimeError("mutated action remained authorized")
+print(
+    json.dumps(
+        {
+            "recipe": "02-verify-authority",
+            "outcome": verified.kind,
+            "changedRejected": changed_rejected,
+        }
+    )
+)
+```
+
+The recipe first verifies the canonical fixture and requires an authorized
+result. It then changes one byte of the action and requires rejection. The
+changed action never inherits the earlier decision just because most of its
+bytes are identical.
+
+## Use the three-way result correctly
+
+An authorized result means that the proof covers the exact action under the
+exact context. A denied result means supplied facts establish a failure, such
+as widened delegation or an action-body mismatch. An indeterminate result
+means a required trustworthy fact was not established, such as missing status
+or an unsupported adapter.
+
+Denied and indeterminate are different diagnostic states but have the same
+execution consequence: **do not execute**.
+
+Do not translate indeterminate to success because an external dependency is
+temporarily unavailable. Instead, acquire the missing bounded fact, construct
+a new trusted context, and run verification again.
+
+## Keep inspection inert
+
+The language bindings expose decisions and safe projections, not a serializable
+`VerifiedAction` that arbitrary application code can mint or replay. This makes
+verification useful in browsers, audit tools, policy previews, and separate
+verification services without accidentally handing them an effect-capable
+object.
+
+If the application later needs to execute, pass the original inputs through a
+product workflow that owns replay, budgets, local policy, profile decoding,
+and provider entry. Do not treat `result.kind === "authorized"` as a license to
+execute an unverified request object.
+
+## Retry and provider reachability
+
+Pure verification is safe to repeat with identical inputs. It cannot reach a
+provider and has no remote side effect. Repeating it does not, however, refresh
+the facts inside the trusted context. A stale status snapshot remains stale
+until the application explicitly supplies a newer one.
+
+Malformed, non-canonical, unsupported, and oversized inputs fail closed with a
+typed outcome or input error. Do not fall back to a looser decoder.
+
+## Production considerations
+
+Pin the SDK artifact and ABI, construct contexts through maintained typed
+builders, and bind the expected executable registry configuration. Set limits
+below protocol hard maxima where your deployment can. Obtain live identity or
+status evidence outside the deterministic kernel, then include bounded,
+provenance-aware snapshots as explicit inputs.
+
+Keep proof bytes, signatures, and application bodies out of ordinary logs.
+Stable stage/code values and commitments are usually sufficient for
+observability.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Understand the verification stages](/guides/verification-model)
+- [Execute one exact action](/guides/execute-exact-action)
+- [Handle decisions and recovery](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Verification model](/guides/verification-model)
diff --git a/public/identity-trust.md b/public/identity-trust.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a79274c..0000000
--- a/public/identity-trust.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-# Identity & trust
-
-Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.
-
-## Recommended: [How identity and trust fit](/identity-trust/how-it-works)
-
-See the independent boundaries between identity evidence, cryptographic suites, trust policy, transport, and authority.
-
-## Understand
-
-- [How identity and trust fit](/identity-trust/how-it-works) — See the independent boundaries between identity evidence, cryptographic suites, trust policy, transport, and authority.
-
-## Identity sources
-
-- [Identity sources](/identity-trust/identity-sources) — Choose the system that supplies bounded public verification evidence.
-
-## Cryptography
-
-- [Cryptographic suites](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites) — Select cryptographic verification independently from identity source and authority semantics.
-
-## Operate trust
-
-- [Trust policy](/identity-trust/trust-policy) — Define which issuers, roots, resolvers, suites, audiences, and freshness windows are acceptable.
-- [Exchange public identity](/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity) — Send and receive a public identity as bounded, transport-neutral data.
-- [Key and root rotation](/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation) — Rotate keys or trust roots with explicit overlap, rollback, and negative tests.
-- [Verification context](/identity-trust/verification-context) — Build the exact trusted context used for one deterministic verification.
-
-## Test
-
-- [Test identity and trust](/identity-trust/testing) — Test identity sources, suites, and trust policy with positive and adversarial fixtures.
-
-## Related topics
-
-- [Authority](/authority) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust/1 · Product contract: auths.page.identity-trust/1_
-
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites.md b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a179c9f..0000000
--- a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# Cryptographic suites
-
-Select cryptographic verification independently from identity source and authority semantics.
-
-## Recommended: [Ed25519](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519)
-
-Use the maintained Ed25519 suite for compact deterministic signatures.
-
-## Cryptography
-
-- [Ed25519](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519) — Use the maintained Ed25519 suite for compact deterministic signatures.
-- [P-256](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256) — Use the maintained P-256 suite through the same identity and verification interfaces.
-- [Custom and post-quantum suites](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum) — Implement a custom or post-quantum suite adapter without changing Auths identity meaning.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.suites/1 · Product contract: auths.page.identity-trust.suites/1_
-
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum.md b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2b0c50e..0000000
--- a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Custom and post-quantum suites
-
-Implement a custom or post-quantum suite adapter without changing Auths identity meaning.
-
-## Outcome
-
-An application-owned adapter can supply a new suite behind the stable parser and verifier ports.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Choose the verification method, suite label, bounded public evidence, and explicit trust inputs. No capability, approval, plan, transport, or provider object is required.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Assign a stable suite identity, define bounded canonical evidence, parse into an opaque suite-owned key, implement exact-byte verification, and add positive plus adversarial differential fixtures.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The verifier binds the exact method, suite, public material, application bytes, and trusted context and returns the same closed outcome in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Registration collisions, unbounded evidence, ambiguous encoding, implicit fallback, verification-method mismatch, and non-deterministic outcomes block the adapter.
-
-## Continue
-
-Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.suites.custom/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 71a8a9f..0000000
--- a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Ed25519
-
-Use the maintained Ed25519 suite for compact deterministic signatures.
-
-## Outcome
-
-An Ed25519 identity verifies exact application bytes through the common identity port.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Choose the verification method, suite label, bounded public evidence, and explicit trust inputs. No capability, approval, plan, transport, or provider object is required.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Parse only the declared Ed25519 evidence shape, bind it to the declared verification method, and verify the signature without falling back to another algorithm.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The verifier binds the exact method, suite, public material, application bytes, and trusted context and returns the same closed outcome in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Wrong key length, invalid point material, method mismatch, suite relabelling, and signature mutation are rejected as Ed25519-specific failures.
-
-## Continue
-
-Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.suites.ed25519/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256.md b/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256.md
deleted file mode 100644
index fc944a1..0000000
--- a/public/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# P-256
-
-Use the maintained P-256 suite through the same identity and verification interfaces.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A P-256 identity can replace Ed25519 without changing application authority or transport code.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Choose the verification method, suite label, bounded public evidence, and explicit trust inputs. No capability, approval, plan, transport, or provider object is required.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Parse the canonical P-256 public material, require the P-256 suite label, and verify the exact message through the common port.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The verifier binds the exact method, suite, public material, application bytes, and trusted context and returns the same closed outcome in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Non-canonical points, curve mismatch, suite relabelling, high-level method mismatch, and changed bytes fail without cross-suite guessing.
-
-## Continue
-
-Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.suites.p256/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity.md b/public/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f63f563..0000000
--- a/public/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Exchange public identity
-
-Send and receive a public identity as bounded, transport-neutral data.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A peer can publish identity information over HTTPS, Iroh, a queue, a file, or another transport without importing capabilities.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Choose the verification method, suite label, bounded public evidence, and explicit trust inputs. No capability, approval, plan, transport, or provider object is required.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Serialize only the method, suite, and bounded public evidence; enforce size limits at ingress; parse before use; and pass the parsed identity to signature verification.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The verifier binds the exact method, suite, public material, application bytes, and trusted context and returns the same closed outcome in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Transport authentication or delivery does not cure malformed, unsupported, stale, or untrusted identity evidence.
-
-## Continue
-
-Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.exchange/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md b/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d137b87..0000000
--- a/public/identity-trust/how-it-works.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-# How identity and trust fit
-
-See the independent boundaries between identity evidence, cryptographic suites, trust policy, transport, and authority.
-
-## The path at a glance
-
-1. Identity material
-2. Authentication evidence
-3. Application trust resolver
-4. Verified signer
-5. Separate authority decision
-
-Text equivalent: Bounded identity material becomes authentication evidence, an application-owned resolver evaluates trust, and only then can a separate authority decision consider the verified signer.
-
-## What remains true
-
-- A public key identifies verification material; it does not grant an action.
-- Ed25519, P-256, and future suites enter through the same bounded verification port.
-- HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and other transports deliver evidence but never authorize effects.
-
-## Failure branches
-
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| The suite is unsupported | Rejected | Install or supply an explicit compatible suite implementation. |
-| The signer is valid but untrusted | Denied | Change trust policy or use a trusted identity; do not infer trust from signature validity. |
-| The resolver is unavailable | Indeterminate | Restore trust evidence and evaluate again without performing an effect. |
-
-## Use this when
-
-You are integrating OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, application identities, or another cryptographic suite.
-
-## Do not use this when
-
-You are looking for permission scope; identity alone cannot express the complete effect boundary.
-
-## Continue from here
-
-- [Identity & trust](/identity-trust) — Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.
-- [Execute](/authority/execute) — Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources.md b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c93b5b7..0000000
--- a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-# Identity sources
-
-Choose the system that supplies bounded public verification evidence.
-
-## Recommended: [Raw public keys](/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys)
-
-Exchange method- and suite-labelled public keys as ordinary bounded data.
-
-## Identity sources
-
-- [Raw public keys](/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys) — Exchange method- and suite-labelled public keys as ordinary bounded data.
-- [OAuth and OIDC](/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc) — Resolve OIDC identity into explicit Auths verification evidence without turning a bearer token into authority.
-- [SPIFFE](/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe) — Use SPIFFE workload identity as a replaceable trust input for Auths verification.
-- [Application resolvers](/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers) — Adapt an application directory or key registry through a narrow resolver port.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources/1 · Product contract: auths.page.identity-trust.sources/1_
-
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers.md b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d31e6ba..0000000
--- a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Application resolvers
-
-Adapt an application directory or key registry through a narrow resolver port.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The application resolver owns authentication, issuance, rotation, and account or workload lifecycle. Auths owns parsing the bounded projection and using it only under explicit trusted context.
-
-## Data flow
-
-A bounded lookup key and the resolver's typed verification result is resolved into method- and suite-labelled public verification material. That bounded result can authenticate signed application bytes without constructing authority.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Private keys, refresh tokens, client secrets, and provider credentials stay in their existing custody systems. Auths identity evidence is public or explicitly bounded verification input.
-
-## State
-
-The resolver owns freshness and caching. The verifier receives the selected evidence and time as inputs rather than reaching into ambient identity state.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-Unknown issuers, stale evidence, unsupported suites, mismatched methods, ambiguous subjects, and resolver errors are closed outcomes. Authentication never implies authority.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-Auths does not become the identity provider and does not ship every possible adapter. Applications own adapter choice and trust policy behind the stable port.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources.resolvers/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a557665..0000000
--- a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# OAuth and OIDC
-
-Resolve OIDC identity into explicit Auths verification evidence without turning a bearer token into authority.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-The OpenID Provider and relying party owns authentication, issuance, rotation, and account or workload lifecycle. Auths owns parsing the bounded projection and using it only under explicit trusted context.
-
-## Data flow
-
-Validated issuer, subject, audience, token time, and key evidence is resolved into method- and suite-labelled public verification material. That bounded result can authenticate signed application bytes without constructing authority.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Private keys, refresh tokens, client secrets, and provider credentials stay in their existing custody systems. Auths identity evidence is public or explicitly bounded verification input.
-
-## State
-
-The resolver owns freshness and caching. The verifier receives the selected evidence and time as inputs rather than reaching into ambient identity state.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-Unknown issuers, stale evidence, unsupported suites, mismatched methods, ambiguous subjects, and resolver errors are closed outcomes. Authentication never implies authority.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-Auths does not become the identity provider and does not ship every possible adapter. Applications own adapter choice and trust policy behind the stable port.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources.oauth-oidc/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d596ce4..0000000
--- a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Raw public keys
-
-Exchange method- and suite-labelled public keys as ordinary bounded data.
-
-## Outcome
-
-Two peers can exchange a public identity and verify signed application bytes with no authority or approval setup.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Choose the verification method, suite label, bounded public evidence, and explicit trust inputs. No capability, approval, plan, transport, or provider object is required.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Encode the public material with its exact suite and verification method, send it over any bounded transport, parse it, and verify the signed message under caller-supplied trust.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The verifier binds the exact method, suite, public material, application bytes, and trusted context and returns the same closed outcome in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Malformed evidence, an unknown suite, a mislabelled key, method mismatch, or changed message bytes fails without invoking any authority logic.
-
-## Continue
-
-Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources.raw-keys/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md b/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 3b69791..0000000
--- a/public/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# SPIFFE
-
-Use SPIFFE workload identity as a replaceable trust input for Auths verification.
-
-## Ownership boundary
-
-SPIRE and the workload API owns authentication, issuance, rotation, and account or workload lifecycle. Auths owns parsing the bounded projection and using it only under explicit trusted context.
-
-## Data flow
-
-The validated SPIFFE ID, trust domain, bundle, and workload evidence is resolved into method- and suite-labelled public verification material. That bounded result can authenticate signed application bytes without constructing authority.
-
-## Secrets
-
-Private keys, refresh tokens, client secrets, and provider credentials stay in their existing custody systems. Auths identity evidence is public or explicitly bounded verification input.
-
-## State
-
-The resolver owns freshness and caching. The verifier receives the selected evidence and time as inputs rather than reaching into ambient identity state.
-
-## Failure ownership
-
-Unknown issuers, stale evidence, unsupported suites, mismatched methods, ambiguous subjects, and resolver errors are closed outcomes. Authentication never implies authority.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
-
-## Limitations
-
-Auths does not become the identity provider and does not ship every possible adapter. Applications own adapter choice and trust policy behind the stable port.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.sources.spiffe/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md b/public/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5a0b411..0000000
--- a/public/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Key and root rotation
-
-Rotate keys or trust roots with explicit overlap, rollback, and negative tests.
-
-## Outcome
-
-New identity evidence becomes valid during a bounded overlap while existing authority artifacts remain meaningful under their committed verification method.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Choose the verification method, suite label, bounded public evidence, and explicit trust inputs. No capability, approval, plan, transport, or provider object is required.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Publish the new verification material, add it to explicit trust context, verify both generations during the overlap, cut issuance to the new key, then remove the old root after retained evidence no longer requires it.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The verifier binds the exact method, suite, public material, application bytes, and trusted context and returns the same closed outcome in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Early root removal, unbounded overlap, rollback to compromised material, method reuse, and stale resolver caches must fail visibly; rotation never silently rewrites authority.
-
-## Continue
-
-Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.rotation/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/testing.md b/public/identity-trust/testing.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0b37891..0000000
--- a/public/identity-trust/testing.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Test identity and trust
-
-Test identity sources, suites, and trust policy with positive and adversarial fixtures.
-
-## Outcome
-
-The test suite proves identical outcomes for supported identities and stable failures for every excluded shape.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Choose the verification method, suite label, bounded public evidence, and explicit trust inputs. No capability, approval, plan, transport, or provider object is required.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Run Ed25519 and P-256 success fixtures, then mutate the suite label, verification method, root, freshness, message bytes, and evidence length. Compare normalized Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The verifier binds the exact method, suite, public material, application bytes, and trusted context and returns the same closed outcome in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Any language disagreement, fallback to another suite, network-dependent result, or acceptance of an unknown root fails qualification.
-
-## Continue
-
-Keep identity exchange independent. Add bounded authority only if the verified identity must be permitted to perform an effect.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.testing/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/trust-policy.md b/public/identity-trust/trust-policy.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e00e713..0000000
--- a/public/identity-trust/trust-policy.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Trust policy
-
-Define which issuers, roots, resolvers, suites, audiences, and freshness windows are acceptable.
-
-## Model
-
-Trust policy is caller-owned input to verification. It selects acceptable roots and issuers, constrains resolver results, allows explicit suites, and establishes the observation time and freshness rules.
-
-## What remains true
-
-A signature proves possession of a key; trust policy decides whether that key matters here. Policy is explicit, immutable for one decision, and committed into evidence when the workflow requires reproducibility.
-
-## Where it fails closed
-
-Correct signatures under an untrusted root, stale bundle, wrong audience, disabled suite, or ambiguous resolver are not partially trusted. They fail as trust outcomes rather than cryptographic success.
-
-## Continue
-
-Construct the smallest verification context for the application boundary and test every excluded root and suite.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.policy/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/identity-trust/verification-context.md b/public/identity-trust/verification-context.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1ce7e8d..0000000
--- a/public/identity-trust/verification-context.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Verification context
-
-Build the exact trusted context used for one deterministic verification.
-
-## Model
-
-Trusted context is a parsed value containing roots, issuer or resolver policy, accepted suites, audience, observation time, and relevant freshness limits. Verification receives it explicitly.
-
-## What remains true
-
-The same artifact and context yield the same outcome across languages. Ambient process configuration, network state, or transport metadata cannot silently change the decision.
-
-## Where it fails closed
-
-Missing time, unknown roots, stale evidence, disabled suites, mismatched audience, or resolver uncertainty returns a closed result rather than manufacturing context.
-
-## Continue
-
-Keep context construction at the application trust boundary and pass only the parsed value into verification.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.identity-trust.context/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/index.md b/public/index.md
index e10fb88..caa2959 100644
--- a/public/index.md
+++ b/public/index.md
@@ -1,5 +1,229 @@
-# Auths documentation
+# Give software authority for one exact action.
 
-Precise, portable authority for people and agents.
+Auths lets people and agents prove what they may do, execute only through a closed application boundary, and leave a verifiable receipt—without requiring a shared identity provider.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.home/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+> **Prelaunch · Pre-audit · Repository preview**
+>
+> The SDK surface is public in the repository but package publication and production promotion remain prelaunch. Development adapters use ephemeral custody and in-memory state.
+
+## Choose what you need to accomplish.
+
+The protocol machinery stays below the fold until your implementation needs it.
+
+### Execute: Perform one exact effect
+
+Declare the action, authorize it, reserve its use, and reach the provider through a closed gateway.
+
+[Open path](/start/typescript)
+
+### Verify: Check authority without executing
+
+Evaluate proof, canonical action, and trusted context without receiving an effect-capable handle.
+
+[Open path](/guides/verify-authority)
+
+### Delegate: Give an agent less authority
+
+Narrow action, time, uses, budgets, and delegation depth. A child can never widen its parent.
+
+[Open path](/guides/delegate-agent)
+
+### Recover: Resume without repeating the effect
+
+Preserve denial, indeterminacy, replay, recoverability, and provider uncertainty as different outcomes.
+
+[Open path](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+
+## Identity is not authority
+
+None of these alone is authorization: identity, transport success, a valid signature, evidence, approval.
+
+### Knowing who called is not the same as knowing what they may do.
+
+- **Proof:** Signed, bounded authority and its delegation chain.
+- **Evidence:** Trusted facts about identity, status, assurance, and context.
+- **Control:** Deterministic verification of the exact application bytes.
+- **Execution:** Stateful reservation, closed provider access, recovery, and receipts.
+
+Core verification is deterministic and effect-free. Networks, clocks, databases, custody, replay state, and provider execution remain outside the kernel.
+
+## Allow one tool. Prove another never reaches the provider.
+
+This source is copied from the product-owned recipe at a pinned Auths commit. Qualification status is shown per language; the docs never fabricate a passing result.
+
+> Product-owned recipe `03-execute-exact-action` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
+
+### TypeScript recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
+
+Register the only provider operation and create development authority for that exact tool name.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–14; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+import { verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
+
+let calls = 0;
+const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({
+  tools: {
+    async publish_report(input) {
+      calls += 1;
+      return { published: input.report };
+    },
+  },
+});
+const auths = await development.createAuths({ authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]) });
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
+
+Send the exact profile-owned action, require completion, and verify its returned receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 15–22; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+try {
+  const completed = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "publish_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-success",
+  });
+  if (completed.kind !== "completed") throw new Error(`unexpected result: ${completed.kind}`);
+  await verifyReceipt(completed.receipt);
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
+
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter did not advance.
+
+_Pinned source lines 23–28; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  const denied = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "delete_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-denied",
+  });
+  if (denied.kind !== "denied" || calls !== 1) throw new Error("undeclared effect reached provider");
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Report the trace and close owned state
+
+Emit the declared result and close the development runtime even when the workflow throws.
+
+_Pinned source lines 29–32; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "03-execute-exact-action", outcome: completed.kind, denied: true, calls }));
+} finally {
+  await auths.close();
+}
+```
+
+### Python recipe
+
+> **Qualification blocked — Python source does not match the pinned public API.**
+>
+> The pinned recipe imports `verify_receipt` from `auths`, while the pinned installed API exports it only from `auths.verify`. The source is retained for review but must not be presented as runnable until the product recipe is corrected and re-executed.
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
+
+Register the only provider operation and count every entry into that effect boundary.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–19; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+
+from auths import verify_receipt
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import mcp
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    calls = 0
+
+    async def publish_report(arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal calls
+        calls += 1
+        return {"published": arguments["report"]}
+
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(tools={"publish_report": publish_report})
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
+
+Open the owned development session, execute the exact action, and verify its receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 20–30; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    async with development.create_auths(
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"])
+    ) as auths:
+        completed = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="publish_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-success",
+        )
+        if completed.kind != "completed":
+            raise RuntimeError(f"unexpected result: {completed.kind}")
+        verify_receipt(completed.receipt)
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
+
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter stayed at one.
+
+_Pinned source lines 31–37; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        denied = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="delete_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-denied",
+        )
+        if denied.kind != "denied" or calls != 1:
+            raise RuntimeError("undeclared effect reached provider")
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Report the trace through the owned entry point
+
+Leave the session before emitting the declared result, then run the asynchronous entry point.
+
+_Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "03-execute-exact-action",
+                "outcome": "completed",
+                "denied": True,
+                "calls": calls,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
+
+## Begin with an outcome. Descend only when necessary.
+
+- [Start](/start) — Install and complete one real workflow.
+- [Guides](/guides) — Understand the model, then integrate identity, authority, execution, and recovery.
+- [Examples](/examples) — Choose a production-shaped proof by the question it answers.
+- [Reference](/reference) — Inspect the exact public surfaces and protocol material.
diff --git a/public/llms-full.txt b/public/llms-full.txt
index 6d6e488..c9129de 100644
--- a/public/llms-full.txt
+++ b/public/llms-full.txt
@@ -1,1363 +1,6419 @@
-# Agents
+# Auths documentation — complete Markdown
 
-Give agents precise tools, approved plans, and verifiable outcomes without ambient credentials.
+Product source: bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c
+Documentation contract source: d0e4a53e5e9582e9eaff1cf38e965252c6c79765
 
-## Recommended: [How Auths works for agents](/agents/how-auths-works)
+<!-- route: /; source: home.json; section: home -->
+# Give software authority for one exact action.
 
-Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
+Auths lets people and agents prove what they may do, execute only through a closed application boundary, and leave a verifiable receipt—without requiring a shared identity provider.
 
-## Start
+> **Prelaunch · Pre-audit · Repository preview**
+>
+> The SDK surface is public in the repository but package publication and production promotion remain prelaunch. Development adapters use ephemeral custody and in-memory state.
 
-- [How Auths works for agents](/agents/how-auths-works) — Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
-- [Delegate one tool](/agents/quickstart) — Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohibited.
+## Choose what you need to accomplish.
 
-## Delegate
+The protocol machinery stays below the fold until your implementation needs it.
 
-- [Agent delegation](/agents/delegation) — Delegate an exact tool action without giving the agent a broad credential.
-- [Approved plans](/agents/approved-plans) — Require human or organizational approval for the exact ordered work an agent proposes.
-- [Multi-agent handoffs](/agents/multi-agent) — Pass work across multiple agents while narrowing authority at every boundary.
+### Execute: Perform one exact effect
 
-## MCP
+Declare the action, authorize it, reserve its use, and reach the provider through a closed gateway.
 
-- [MCP](/agents/mcp) — Use MCP as a tool discovery and delivery layer while Auths remains the authority boundary.
+[Open path](/start/typescript)
 
-## Compose
+### Verify: Check authority without executing
 
-- [Agent identity](/agents/identity) — Compose agent, workload, user, or application identity without choosing a mandatory identity provider.
-- [Skills and plugins](/agents/skills-and-plugins) — Package Auths-aware skills and plugins without embedding semantic meaning or secrets in prompts.
+Evaluate proof, canonical action, and trusted context without receiving an effect-capable handle.
 
-## Operate and test
+[Open path](/guides/verify-authority)
 
-- [Production patterns](/agents/production-patterns) — Operate agent authority with explicit owners for identity, issuance, approval, state, custody, gateways, and reconciliation.
-- [Test agent authority](/agents/testing) — Test agents against widening, substitution, replay, ambient credentials, and uncertain providers.
+### Delegate: Give an agent less authority
 
-## Related topics
+Narrow action, time, uses, budgets, and delegation depth. A child can never widen its parent.
 
-- [Identity & trust](/identity-trust) — Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.
-- [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
+[Open path](/guides/delegate-agent)
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents/1 · Product contract: auths.page.agents/1_
+### Recover: Resume without repeating the effect
 
+Preserve denial, indeterminacy, replay, recoverability, and provider uncertainty as different outcomes.
 
+[Open path](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
 
----
+## Identity is not authority
 
-# Approved plans
+None of these alone is authorization: identity, transport success, a valid signature, evidence, approval.
 
-Require human or organizational approval for the exact ordered work an agent proposes.
+### Knowing who called is not the same as knowing what they may do.
 
-## Outcome
+- **Proof:** Signed, bounded authority and its delegation chain.
+- **Evidence:** Trusted facts about identity, status, assurance, and context.
+- **Control:** Deterministic verification of the exact application bytes.
+- **Execution:** Stateful reservation, closed provider access, recovery, and receipts.
 
-Approvers review the same plan commitment that the runtime will consume.
+Core verification is deterministic and effect-free. Networks, clocks, databases, custody, replay state, and provider execution remain outside the kernel.
 
-## Before you begin
+## Allow one tool. Prove another never reaches the provider.
 
-Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+This source is copied from the product-owned recipe at a pinned Auths commit. Qualification status is shown per language; the docs never fabricate a passing result.
 
-## Build the bounded path
+> Product-owned recipe `03-execute-exact-action` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
 
-Parse the agent proposal into profile actions, construct the ordered plan, create the approval signing request, collect typed responses, verify the threshold, then execute members in order.
+### TypeScript recipe
 
-## Run the qualified path
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.approved-plan/1`.
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
 
-## Success means
+Register the only provider operation and create development authority for that exact tool name.
 
-The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+_Pinned source lines 1–14; no output is synthesized._
 
-## Fail closed
+```ts
+import { verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
 
-Prompt changes, member replacement, reordered work, mutation after approval, reused approval responses, unmet threshold, and expired approval deny the plan.
+let calls = 0;
+const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({
+  tools: {
+    async publish_report(input) {
+      calls += 1;
+      return { published: input.report };
+    },
+  },
+});
+const auths = await development.createAuths({ authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]) });
+```
 
-## Continue
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
 
-Add multi-agent handoffs only by delegating a narrower plan or member scope.
+Send the exact profile-owned action, require completion, and verify its returned receipt.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+_Pinned source lines 15–22; no output is synthesized._
 
+```ts
+try {
+  const completed = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "publish_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-success",
+  });
+  if (completed.kind !== "completed") throw new Error(`unexpected result: ${completed.kind}`);
+  await verifyReceipt(completed.receipt);
+```
 
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
 
----
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter did not advance.
 
-# Agent delegation
+_Pinned source lines 23–28; no output is synthesized._
 
-Delegate an exact tool action without giving the agent a broad credential.
+```ts
+  const denied = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "delete_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-denied",
+  });
+  if (denied.kind !== "denied" || calls !== 1) throw new Error("undeclared effect reached provider");
+```
 
-## Outcome
+#### Step 4: Report the trace and close owned state
 
-The agent receives a child authority restricted by action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, and depth.
+Emit the declared result and close the development runtime even when the workflow throws.
 
-## Before you begin
+_Pinned source lines 29–32; no output is synthesized._
 
-Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+```ts
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "03-execute-exact-action", outcome: completed.kind, denied: true, calls }));
+} finally {
+  await auths.close();
+}
+```
 
-## Build the bounded path
+### Python recipe
 
-Create authority at the trusted application boundary, narrow it for the agent's identity and tool call, send the signed child with canonical tool inputs, and execute through the closed gateway.
+> **Qualification blocked — Python source does not match the pinned public API.**
+>
+> The pinned recipe imports `verify_receipt` from `auths`, while the pinned installed API exports it only from `auths.verify`. The source is retained for review but must not be presented as runnable until the product recipe is corrected and re-executed.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
 
-## Success means
+Register the only provider operation and count every entry into that effect boundary.
 
-The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+_Pinned source lines 1–19; no output is synthesized._
 
-## Fail closed
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
 
-Changing the tool, resource, arguments, audience, use count, budget, expiry, depth, or a critical extension is denied before the tool runs.
+import asyncio
+import json
 
-## Continue
+from auths import verify_receipt
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import mcp
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    calls = 0
+
+    async def publish_report(arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal calls
+        calls += 1
+        return {"published": arguments["report"]}
+
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(tools={"publish_report": publish_report})
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
+
+Open the owned development session, execute the exact action, and verify its receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 20–30; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    async with development.create_auths(
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"])
+    ) as auths:
+        completed = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="publish_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-success",
+        )
+        if completed.kind != "completed":
+            raise RuntimeError(f"unexpected result: {completed.kind}")
+        verify_receipt(completed.receipt)
+```
 
-Use approved plans when the exact proposed sequence requires review.
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegation/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter stayed at one.
 
+_Pinned source lines 31–37; no output is synthesized._
 
+```python
+        denied = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="delete_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-denied",
+        )
+        if denied.kind != "denied" or calls != 1:
+            raise RuntimeError("undeclared effect reached provider")
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Report the trace through the owned entry point
+
+Leave the session before emitting the declared result, then run the asynchronous entry point.
+
+_Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "03-execute-exact-action",
+                "outcome": "completed",
+                "denied": True,
+                "calls": calls,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
+
+## Begin with an outcome. Descend only when necessary.
+
+- [Start](/start) — Install and complete one real workflow.
+- [Guides](/guides) — Understand the model, then integrate identity, authority, execution, and recovery.
+- [Examples](/examples) — Choose a production-shaped proof by the question it answers.
+- [Reference](/reference) — Inspect the exact public surfaces and protocol material.
 
 ---
 
-# How Auths works for agents
+<!-- route: /start; source: start/index.mdx; section: start -->
+# Start with one boundary you can prove
+
+Auths is for software that must do something consequential without receiving broad, reusable permission. The quickest way to understand it is to protect one exact application effect: name the operation and resource, bind the exact action bytes, verify the authority, and allow only the resulting closed command into your provider gateway.
 
-Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
+If you are new to the model, begin with [What is Auths?](/start/what-is-auths). It explains the distinction between identity, delivery, approval, authority, and execution. Those concepts are deliberately separate: a signed request can prove who signed it without proving the signer may perform the requested effect.
 
-## Model
+If you want to evaluate the SDK, choose a maintained path:
 
-The agent proposes an application action. A trusted issuer creates or delegates bounded authority. Optional approvers sign the exact plan. A closed gateway executes only a native-authorized command. Observers and verifiers receive bounded evidence rather than trusting the agent's account.
+- [TypeScript quickstart](/start/typescript) for a protected MCP-style action in Node.js.
+- [Python quickstart](/start/python) for the same product workflow with async resource ownership.
+- [Rust offline verification](/start/rust-offline-verification) when you need deterministic verification without networking, custody, mutable state, or execution authority.
 
-## What remains true
+Each quickstart uses product-owned, digest-verified source and states its
+current qualification status. No parallel example or result is invented.
 
-Prompts do not create authority. Every handoff narrows or preserves exact commitments. Identity, MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, approval, and provider authentication each remain independent inputs rather than authorization shortcuts.
+> **Prelaunch · pre-audit**
+>
+> The public surface is a repository preview. Pin the exact product revision before evaluating it, and do not treat the development composition as production durable.
+> Product revision: `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
 
-## Where it fails closed
+## What success looks like
 
-Widening, prompt or plan substitution, ambient credentials, transport-only success, replay, exhausted state, and provider uncertainty fail with distinct outcomes that the agent cannot override.
+Your first integration should prove two outcomes: the declared action reaches the provider exactly once, and a changed action is denied before the provider is contacted. Do not start by modeling an entire organization. A narrow end-to-end boundary gives you a trustworthy base for delegation, approvals, recovery, and receipts later.
 
 ## Continue
 
-Run Delegate one tool, then add plans, multiple agents, or MCP only when the workflow calls for them.
+- Learn [how verification works](/guides/verification-model).
+- Follow the [exact-action execution guide](/guides/execute-exact-action).
+- Inspect the [examples by security question](/examples).
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+---
 
+<!-- route: /start/what-is-auths; source: start/what-is-auths.mdx; section: start -->
+# Give software authority for one exact action
 
+Auths is an open protocol and SDK for **proof-carrying, bounded machine
+authority**. It answers a question that ordinary authentication leaves open:
 
----
+> This caller is who it claims to be—but may it perform this exact action,
+> against this resource, under these limits, right now?
+
+Imagine a reporting agent that may publish the weekly report but may not delete
+it. An identity provider can establish which agent connected. A signed request
+can establish that the request was not changed in transit. An approval system
+can establish that somebody approved a proposal. None of those facts alone
+proves that authority flowed from a trusted root to this agent without becoming
+broader along the way.
 
-# Agent identity
+Auths carries that proof with the action. A verifier checks it locally against
+explicit trust, status, assurance, and configuration inputs. A product runtime
+then applies replay protection and other stateful gates before a closed profile
+can construct the provider command.
 
-Compose agent, workload, user, or application identity without choosing a mandatory identity provider.
+## The useful distinction: identity is not authority
 
-## Ownership boundary
+Identity answers **who controls this key or account?** Authority answers **what
+may that principal do?** Keeping those questions separate lets an application
+use OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, WebAuthn, or another supported identity method
+without making any one identity provider the universal owner of permission.
 
-The identity provider, workload system, or application resolver remains application-owned. Auths owns only the typed authority, native verification, closed execution boundary, and portable evidence composed around it.
+The same separation applies to transport. HTTPS, a queue, or Iroh may carry an
+Auths proof. Successful delivery does not improve the proof and cannot turn a
+denial into authorization.
 
-## Data flow
+## Four planes, one enforcement boundary
 
-Resolve bounded identity evidence, verify the agent's signed proposal, then bind delegation to that explicit principal and audience.
+Auths separates responsibilities that are often collapsed into a single
+middleware decision:
 
-## Secrets
+| Plane | What it establishes | What it cannot do alone |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Proof | Trust anchors, grants, plans, and exact action binding | Read live systems or execute an effect |
+| Evidence | Principal control, signatures, status, freshness, assurance | Mint authority or commands |
+| Execution | Replay, budgets, local policy, reservation, provider execution | Upgrade a denied or indeterminate proof |
+| Control | Authoring, custody, configuration, receipts, observability | Bypass the proof or execution boundary |
 
-Agent prompts, tool arguments, and Auths artifacts contain no ambient provider credential. The closed gateway acquires credentials only after native authorization and durable reservation.
+This is not ceremony. It prevents a convenient outer fact—such as a valid JWT
+or successful mTLS handshake—from silently becoming permission.
 
-## State
+## From hostile bytes to a verified action
 
-The application owns agent memory and orchestration. Auths runtime state owns uses, budgets, replay, plan progress, recovery, and receipts for protected effects.
+The offline kernel moves through typed stages:
 
-## Failure ownership
+```text
+untrusted bytes
+  -> DecodedProof
+  -> ResolvedProof
+  -> ControlVerifiedProof
+  -> VerifiedAuthority
+  -> VerifiedAction
+```
 
-Prompt substitution, tool widening, stale identity, transport success, replay, and provider uncertainty remain separate closed outcomes and cannot be converted into success by agent reasoning.
+It accepts exactly three language-neutral inputs: proof bytes, canonical action
+bytes, and a trusted verifier context. It performs no networking, filesystem
+access, clock reads, database writes, private-key operations, or provider
+calls. Every changing fact—including evaluation time and accepted adapters—is
+an explicit input.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+An authorized result is still not permission to call an arbitrary URL. The
+runtime must claim replay and budget state, apply local policy, and pass the
+verified action into a closed profile. The profile, not the untrusted request,
+constructs the provider command.
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+## What fails closed
 
-## Limitations
+Auths distinguishes three proof outcomes:
 
-Identity proves who signed bytes; it cannot decide which tool the agent may run.
+- **Authorized:** the proof and exact action satisfy all required facts.
+- **Denied:** available facts establish that the request is invalid or outside
+  authority.
+- **Indeterminate:** a required trustworthy fact could not be established.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.identity/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+Only the first outcome may proceed to the outer execution gates. A missing
+status record does not become a soft success. A valid signature over different
+bytes does not become “close enough.” An unknown adapter, unsupported profile,
+oversized proof, widened delegation, or mismatched verifier configuration
+cannot reach a provider.
 
+## What Auths deliberately does not own
 
+Auths does not replace your identity provider, transport, database, KMS, policy
+engine, or cloud API. It composes with them. It also does not claim remote
+exactly-once execution, instantaneous revocation, or atomicity across a local
+database and a remote provider.
+
+The development SDK composition uses ephemeral keys and in-memory state. It is
+for learning and local integration, not production durability. Auths is
+currently **prelaunch and pre-audit**; repository conformance and formal
+evidence are not an independent security review.
+
+## Choose your first path
+
+- To protect one real application operation, start with the
+  [TypeScript quickstart](/start/typescript) or
+  [Python quickstart](/start/python).
+- To evaluate proofs without execution, use
+  [Rust offline verification](/start/rust-offline-verification) or
+  [Verify existing authority](/guides/verify-authority).
+- To understand the protocol model first, read
+  [Authority](/guides/authority-model) and
+  [Verification](/guides/verification-model).
 
 ---
 
-# MCP
+<!-- route: /start/typescript; source: start/typescript-quickstart.mdx; section: start -->
+# Protect one exact action in TypeScript
 
-Use MCP as a tool discovery and delivery layer while Auths remains the authority boundary.
+In this quickstart you will place a small provider function behind Auths. The
+application will execute an allowed `publish_report` action, verify the receipt,
+then attempt `delete_report`. The second operation must be denied before the
+provider is entered.
 
-## Recommended: [MCP client](/agents/mcp/client)
+The example uses the development composition and the currently qualified
+public profile, `auths.mcp/1`. It is a local learning path, not a production
+deployment template.
 
-Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.
+## Before you run it
 
-## MCP
+The intended public package and install command are:
 
-- [MCP client](/agents/mcp/client) — Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.
-- [Protect an MCP server](/agents/mcp/protect-server) — Protect an MCP server tool with native verification, durable reservation, and a closed provider gateway.
-- [Tool profiles](/agents/mcp/tool-profiles) — Define canonical action, resource, argument, budget, and receipt mappings for MCP tools.
-- [Transport boundary](/agents/mcp/transport-boundary) — Keep MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and local calls independent from authorization.
+```bash
+# Install the pinned SDK candidate.
+npm install @auths-dev/sdk
+```
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp/1 · Product contract: auths.page.agents.mcp/1_
+The package includes its WebAssembly implementation; the consumer does not need
+a Rust toolchain. **Publication is currently blocked**, so treat this page as a
+repository preview until the package capability record says otherwise. Until
+then, run the embedded recipe through the pinned product repository rather than
+assuming the registry command will resolve.
 
+The example deliberately imports from `/verify`,
+`/integrations`, and `/profiles`. The package root does not flatten those
+boundaries.
 
+## Run the maintained recipe
 
----
+The block below comes from the Auths product repository. Its expected outcome
+is declared by the product recipe manifest.
 
-# MCP client
+> Product-owned recipe `03-execute-exact-action` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
 
-Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.
+### TypeScript recipe
 
-## Outcome
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
 
-The client selects a declared tool profile, canonicalizes its arguments, and submits the call with a narrower proof.
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
 
-## Before you begin
+Register the only provider operation and create development authority for that exact tool name.
 
-Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+_Pinned source lines 1–14; no output is synthesized._
 
-## Build the bounded path
+```ts
+import { verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
 
-Discover the tool, parse arguments through its profile, delegate authority to the agent or server audience, attach the sealed Auths command to the MCP request, and preserve the returned receipt.
+let calls = 0;
+const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({
+  tools: {
+    async publish_report(input) {
+      calls += 1;
+      return { published: input.report };
+    },
+  },
+});
+const auths = await development.createAuths({ authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]) });
+```
 
-## Run the qualified path
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+Send the exact profile-owned action, require completion, and verify its returned receipt.
 
-## Success means
+_Pinned source lines 15–22; no output is synthesized._
 
-The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+```ts
+try {
+  const completed = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "publish_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-success",
+  });
+  if (completed.kind !== "completed") throw new Error(`unexpected result: ${completed.kind}`);
+  await verifyReceipt(completed.receipt);
+```
 
-## Fail closed
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
 
-A prompt-authored proof, undeclared tool, changed arguments, wrong server audience, transport-only acknowledgement, or replay is rejected.
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter did not advance.
 
-## Continue
+_Pinned source lines 23–28; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  const denied = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "delete_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-denied",
+  });
+  if (denied.kind !== "denied" || calls !== 1) throw new Error("undeclared effect reached provider");
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Report the trace and close owned state
+
+Emit the declared result and close the development runtime even when the workflow throws.
+
+_Pinned source lines 29–32; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "03-execute-exact-action", outcome: completed.kind, denied: true, calls }));
+} finally {
+  await auths.close();
+}
+```
+
+## Read the outcome as an enforcement trace
+
+The important result is not merely that the first call completed. The recipe
+also counts provider entries. After one allowed action and one undeclared
+action, the count remains one.
 
-Protect the MCP server so provider credentials stay outside the client and model.
+That establishes the useful boundary:
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+1. `mcp.allowTools` defines the local development authority.
+2. `mcp.callTool` creates the profile-owned action shape.
+3. `auths.execute` verifies and reserves that exact action.
+4. The MCP profile decodes the verified action into a closed command.
+5. Only then can the named provider handler run.
 
+The denied action does not invoke a fallback handler, reach a generic HTTP
+client, or depend on the provider to reject it.
 
+## Change something that matters
+
+After the unmodified recipe succeeds, add the undeclared tool to the provider's
+tool map but **not** to the authority. Run it again. The result should remain
+denied and the new handler must not run. Provider availability is not
+authority.
+
+Then change the arguments of the allowed action while keeping a previously
+authorized proof or execution reference. Exact action binding should prevent
+the changed bytes from inheriting the earlier decision.
+
+Stop if an undeclared handler is entered. That is an enforcement failure, not
+an acceptable example difference.
+
+## Development versus production
+
+The development composition owns ephemeral signing keys and in-memory replay
+state. Restarting it discards state. A production integration must provide:
+
+- durable atomic reservation across its deployment scope;
+- non-exporting signer custody;
+- a qualified closed profile and gateway;
+- credential acquisition after authorization and reservation;
+- reconciliation for ambiguous provider outcomes; and
+- durable receipt retention with deliberate disclosure controls.
+
+Do not put a provider credential in the untrusted action or expose a generic
+provider callback as the production effect boundary.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Understand exact execution](/guides/execute-exact-action)
+- [Delegate narrower authority to an agent](/guides/delegate-agent)
+- [Plan a production integration](/guides/production-integration)
+- [Inspect the TypeScript SDK reference](/reference/typescript)
 
 ---
 
-# Protect an MCP server
+<!-- route: /start/python; source: start/python-quickstart.mdx; section: start -->
+# Protect one exact action in Python
 
-Protect an MCP server tool with native verification, durable reservation, and a closed provider gateway.
+This path proves two things in one run: an allowed action can reach your Python
+handler, and an undeclared action cannot. The maintained recipe also verifies
+the completed receipt before the SDK session closes.
 
-## Outcome
+## Install the wheel
 
-The server exposes useful tool metadata but reaches the underlying effect only after Auths authorizes the exact call.
+The intended public wheel name and install command are:
 
-## Before you begin
+```bash
+# Install the pinned wheel candidate.
+pip install auths
+```
 
-Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+Published wheels include the native implementation, so consumers do not need a
+Rust compiler. **Publication is currently blocked**, so this is a repository
+preview, not a claim that the command resolves from the public index today.
+Run the embedded recipe against the pinned product repository until the
+capability record promotes the wheel. The prelaunch repository remains the
+authority for runtime and publication status.
 
-## Build the bounded path
+## Run the product-owned workflow
 
-Parse MCP inputs, map them through the tool profile, verify attached authority and trusted context, reserve use and budget state, acquire the native gateway handle, execute, and return the bounded outcome and receipt.
+> Product-owned recipe `03-execute-exact-action` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+### Python recipe
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+> **Qualification blocked — Python source does not match the pinned public API.**
+>
+> The pinned recipe imports `verify_receipt` from `auths`, while the pinned installed API exports it only from `auths.verify`. The source is retained for review but must not be presented as runnable until the product recipe is corrected and re-executed.
 
-## Success means
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
 
-The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
 
-## Fail closed
+Register the only provider operation and count every entry into that effect boundary.
 
-Valid MCP framing, authenticated transport, a known client, or an approval flag cannot bypass missing authority; provider uncertainty stops fresh execution.
+_Pinned source lines 1–19; no output is synthesized._
 
-## Continue
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
 
-Define tool profiles and the transport boundary explicitly for every exposed effect.
+import asyncio
+import json
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+from auths import verify_receipt
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import mcp
 
 
+async def main() -> None:
+    calls = 0
 
----
+    async def publish_report(arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal calls
+        calls += 1
+        return {"published": arguments["report"]}
 
-# Tool profiles
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(tools={"publish_report": publish_report})
+```
 
-Define canonical action, resource, argument, budget, and receipt mappings for MCP tools.
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
 
-## Outcome
+Open the owned development session, execute the exact action, and verify its receipt.
 
-A tool profile converts bounded MCP arguments into one stable Auths action without embedding transport or provider credentials.
+_Pinned source lines 20–30; no output is synthesized._
 
-## Before you begin
+```python
+    async with development.create_auths(
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"])
+    ) as auths:
+        completed = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="publish_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-success",
+        )
+        if completed.kind != "completed":
+            raise RuntimeError(f"unexpected result: {completed.kind}")
+        verify_receipt(completed.receipt)
+```
 
-Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
 
-## Build the bounded path
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter stayed at one.
 
-Version the tool identity, parse bounded arguments, canonicalize the resource and effect bytes, declare critical constraints, and add success plus widening fixtures across all SDKs.
+_Pinned source lines 31–37; no output is synthesized._
 
-## Run the qualified path
+```python
+        denied = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="delete_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-denied",
+        )
+        if denied.kind != "denied" or calls != 1:
+            raise RuntimeError("undeclared effect reached provider")
+```
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+#### Step 4: Report the trace through the owned entry point
 
-## Success means
+Leave the session before emitting the declared result, then run the asynchronous entry point.
 
-The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+_Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized._
 
-## Fail closed
+```python
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "03-execute-exact-action",
+                "outcome": "completed",
+                "denied": True,
+                "calls": calls,
+            }
+        )
+    )
 
-Unknown tools, unbounded arguments, ambiguous canonicalization, hidden provider parameters, profile version mismatch, and dropped critical constraints fail qualification.
 
-## Continue
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
 
-Keep the profile reusable across MCP transports and agent frameworks.
+The example is asynchronous because provider work is asynchronous. It uses
+`async with` so the session owns and closes its native resources, signers, and
+development state. Applications that cannot use a context manager may close
+the session explicitly, but should not leave ownership implicit.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+## What the provider-call count proves
 
+The first action names the declared `publish_report` tool and completes. The
+second names `delete_report`, which is outside the configured authority. At the
+end, the provider-call count is still one.
 
+This is stronger than checking for a denied label after the fact. It proves the
+denial occurred on the safe side of the effect boundary. The provider did not
+need to inspect an Auths object, reverse an operation, or compensate for an
+unauthorized call.
 
----
+## Try the safe failure path
+
+Keep the provider handler registered and remove the corresponding tool from
+the authority. The handler must become unreachable through this Auths session.
+Restoring only the handler must not restore authority; restoring the authority
+is a separate, explicit change.
+
+Do not treat a thrown provider exception as an authorization denial. A provider
+exception happens after an action was allowed to enter the effect boundary.
+The SDK result and recovery metadata must be used to determine whether retry is
+safe.
+
+## Know what this example does not prove
 
-# Transport boundary
+The development composition uses ephemeral custody and in-memory state. It
+does not prove that two Python processes coordinate replay, that keys are
+protected by an HSM or KMS, or that a remote provider effect is exactly-once.
 
-Keep MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and local calls independent from authorization.
+Before production, replace development mechanisms with durable atomic state
+and real custody, choose a qualified profile, keep credentials behind its
+gateway, and define reconciliation for “the provider may have applied it, but
+the response was lost.”
 
-## Model
+Auths is prelaunch and pre-audit. A repository recipe passing is useful
+integration evidence, not an external security endorsement.
 
-Transport moves bounded identity, authority, command, and receipt bytes. Auths parses and verifies those bytes after delivery. A transport adapter may authenticate a peer, but that authentication is only an explicit trust input.
+## Where to go next
+
+- [Execute one exact action](/guides/execute-exact-action) explains the closed
+  gateway in detail.
+- [Replay and recovery](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown) explains
+  when not to retry.
+- [Production integration](/guides/production-integration) turns the demo
+  boundary into a deployment checklist.
+- [Python SDK reference](/reference/python) lists the installed public modules.
 
-## What remains true
+---
+
+<!-- route: /start/rust-offline-verification; source: start/rust-offline-verification.mdx; section: start -->
+# Verify authority without gaining an execution capability
+
+The Rust starting path is deliberately lower level than the TypeScript and
+Python product SDKs. It shows the portable, effect-free verifier boundary—not a
+stateful provider workflow.
 
-Successful delivery cannot authorize an effect. Failed delivery cannot consume authority unless the durable execution boundary recorded a reservation. The same artifact verifies regardless of transport.
+Use this path when you are building a verifier, audit tool, gateway pre-check,
+offline policy process, or independent implementation and you already have the
+three canonical inputs.
 
-## Where it fails closed
+## Run the external-consumer example
 
-Duplicate delivery, reordered messages, partial frames, oversized inputs, authenticated-but-unauthorized peers, and transport acknowledgement without provider outcome remain closed.
+Run the maintained external-consumer example directly from the pinned product
+revision. The source below is verified against its recorded digest.
+
+> Product-owned external-consumer example from [`demos/offline-verification`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/offline-verification).
+> Source revision: `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`. No output is synthesized by the documentation projection.
+
+Source: [`demos/offline-verification/src/main.rs`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/offline-verification/src/main.rs) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Load the verifier and canonical inputs
+
+Import the verifier ports and embed the proof, action, and trusted-context fixture bytes.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–7; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+use auths_ports::{PrincipalMethod, SignatureSuite};
+use auths_proof::{Engine, Verdict};
+
+const PROOF: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../core/fixtures/v1/valid/raw-key-chain.proof.cbor");
+const ACTION: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../core/fixtures/v1/valid/raw-key-chain.action.cbor");
+const TRUSTED_CONTEXT: &[u8] =
+    include_bytes!("../../../core/fixtures/v1/valid/raw-key-chain.context.cbor");
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Build the verifier-owned context
+
+Register accepted adapters and bind the exact executable configuration and required plan outside the proof.
+
+_Pinned source lines 9–24; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+    let method = auths_raw_key::RawKeyMethod::new()?;
+    let suite = auths_signature::Ed25519Suite::new()?;
+    let methods: [&dyn PrincipalMethod; 1] = [&method];
+    let suites: [&dyn SignatureSuite; 1] = [&suite];
+    let registries = auths_registries::ImmutableRegistries::new(&methods, &suites)?;
+
+    // The trusted host, not the proof producer, commits the exact executable
+    // configuration and required composition policy.
+    let context = auths_codec::decode_verifier_context(TRUSTED_CONTEXT)?
+        .with_configuration(registries.configuration_id())?;
+    let required_plan = context
+        .composition()
+        .expected_plan()
+        .ok_or("example context must require an exact plan")?;
+    let context_bytes = auths_codec::encode_verifier_context(&context)?;
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Verify without executing
+
+Run the offline kernel and project bounded diagnostic and work information from the result.
+
+_Pinned source lines 26–37; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+    let result = Engine::new(registries).verify_cbor(PROOF, ACTION, &context_bytes)?;
+    let explanation = result.explanation();
+    let portable = result.portable();
+    let resources = result.resources();
+    println!(
+        "verdict={:?} code={} stage={:?} retryable={} work_units={}",
+        result.verdict(),
+        result.code(),
+        explanation.stage(),
+        explanation.retryable(),
+        resources.work_units()
+    );
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Inspect portable commitments
+
+Read proof, action, context, and configuration commitments without acquiring any execution capability.
+
+_Pinned source lines 38–47; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+    println!(
+        "proof={:?} action={:?} context={:?} required_configuration={:?} local_configuration={:?}",
+        portable.proof_digest().as_bytes(),
+        portable.action_digest().as_bytes(),
+        portable.context_digest().as_bytes(),
+        portable
+            .required_configuration()
+            .map(|configuration| *configuration.as_bytes()),
+        portable.local_configuration().as_bytes()
+    );
+```
+
+#### Step 5: Handle every verdict fail closed
+
+Continue only for authorized results that satisfy the host-required plan; denied and indeterminate both stop.
+
+_Pinned source lines 49–63; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+    match result.verdict() {
+        Verdict::Authorized => {
+            if portable.plan_id() != Some(required_plan) {
+                return Err("authorized result did not satisfy the host-required plan".into());
+            }
+            Ok(())
+        }
+        Verdict::Denied => Err(format!("stable authorization denial: {}", result.code()).into()),
+        Verdict::Indeterminate => Err(format!(
+            "not authorized; obtain new trusted facts before retrying: {}",
+            result.code()
+        )
+        .into()),
+    }
+}
+```
+
+```bash
+# Run the pinned workspace example
+cargo run -p auths-proof-offline-example
+```
+
+The consumer supplies:
+
+1. encoded proof-bundle bytes;
+2. canonical action bytes; and
+3. trusted-context bytes owned by the verifier.
+
+The context is not a bag of defaults. It binds local trust anchors, evaluation
+time, expected audience and challenge, accepted registries, status and
+assurance policy, limits, and the exact executable verifier configuration.
+The proof cannot add a trust root or weaken those requirements.
+
+## Handle every verdict
+
+Verification produces one of three outcomes:
+
+- `Authorized` means the proof covers the exact canonical action under the
+  supplied context.
+- `Denied` means available facts establish invalidity or insufficient
+  authority.
+- `Indeterminate` means a required trustworthy fact was not supplied or a
+  required capability is unavailable.
+
+Both non-authorized outcomes are non-executable. Do not turn indeterminate into
+“allow with warning,” and do not catch a decode failure and retry with a
+permissive parser.
+
+The result also carries a stable stage and reason code, canonical commitments,
+authorized branches, assurance results, and bounded resource/work totals. Log
+only the projection your threat model permits; proof and application bytes may
+be sensitive.
+
+## Mutation is a different action
+
+Change one byte of the canonical action and verify again. The prior result must
+not authorize the changed bytes. Depending on where the mutation lands, the
+new input will either fail bounded canonical parsing or reach action binding
+and fail the exact digest comparison.
+
+This check is safe to repeat because verification performs no external effect.
+It does not claim replay state, consume a budget, write a receipt, or contact a
+provider.
+
+## Where offline verification stops
+
+An authorized verifier result is evidence for an outer runtime; it is not a
+remote command. Production execution still requires channel policy, atomic
+replay and budget claims, application policy, a closed profile projection, a
+decision receipt, and an execution receipt.
+
+If your service needs to perform an effect, do not bolt a generic HTTP request
+onto this example. Use the product SDK and a qualified profile, or author and
+qualify a new domain-specific profile.
 
 ## Continue
 
-Choose transport for reachability and reliability; choose Auths authority and runtime state for permission and exactly-once effect control.
+- [Verification model](/guides/verification-model)
+- [Verify existing authority from TypeScript or Python](/guides/verify-authority)
+- [Authority model](/guides/authority-model)
+- [Protocol limits and identifiers](/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers)
+
+---
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+<!-- route: /guides; source: guides/index.mdx; section: guides -->
+# Build a trustworthy path one boundary at a time
 
+These guides are organized around outcomes, not crate names or internal machinery. Start with the boundary you need to establish today, then add sophistication only when the application requires it.
 
+## Establish the authority boundary
+
+Use [Authenticate identity without granting authority](/guides/authenticate-identity) when you only need to exchange or verify public identity material. Use [Verify existing authority](/guides/verify-authority) when another system will execute the effect. Use [Execute one exact action](/guides/execute-exact-action) when Auths must stand in front of the provider gateway.
+
+## Give software narrower autonomy
+
+[Delegate narrower authority to an agent](/guides/delegate-agent) shows how a child receives less than its parent. [Approvals and ordered plans](/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans) adds transaction-bound human or organizational consent without turning an approval into a reusable permission flag.
+
+## Operate without guessing
+
+[Replay, recovery, and provider uncertainty](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown) distinguishes safe retries from ambiguous remote outcomes. [Receipts and bounded disclosure](/guides/receipts-and-disclosure) explains how to prove what happened without publishing sensitive operational detail. [Build a production integration](/guides/production-integration) replaces development custody and state with durable mechanisms.
+
+## Extend at a narrow port
+
+[Build and qualify an adapter](/guides/adapter-authoring) is for teams integrating another identity method, signer, transport, status source, state store, or provider. Adapters establish facts or perform bounded work; they do not redefine Auths semantics.
+
+| Outcome | Safe boundary |
+| --- | --- |
+| Denied | Provider was not reached |
+| Indeterminate | Required trustworthy facts were unavailable; provider was not reached |
+| Recoverable | Resume only through the original execution reference |
+| Provider unknown | Reconcile; never blindly retry |
 
 ---
 
-# Multi-agent handoffs
+<!-- route: /guides/authenticate-identity; source: guides/authenticate-identity.mdx; section: guides -->
+# Authenticate a message, not an effect
 
-Pass work across multiple agents while narrowing authority at every boundary.
+Use Auths identity components when you need to answer a narrow question:
+**which supported public identity authenticated these exact application
+bytes?** You do not need to create a grant, capability, approval policy,
+provider gateway, or runtime session.
 
-## Outcome
+This separation matters for applications that want Auths' algorithm- and
+transport-neutral identity boundary but do not need proof-carrying authority.
 
-Each agent receives only the subset of actions, resources, budgets, uses, and depth needed for its contribution.
+## Follow the bounded identity path
 
-## Before you begin
+The maintained recipe creates a method- and suite-labelled public identity,
+binds a message to that identity's signing preimage, authenticates the signed
+message, and proves that changed application bytes are rejected.
 
-Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+> Product-owned recipe `01-authenticate-identity` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `authenticated`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
 
-## Build the bounded path
+### TypeScript recipe
 
-Model every handoff as an explicit delegation, bind the next agent's identity and audience, retain the signed chain, and execute terminal effects through gateways outside all agent processes.
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/01-authenticate-identity.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/01-authenticate-identity.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+#### Step 1: Load the identity adapters
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+Import the identity registry, raw-key method, and Ed25519 authentication suite used by this maintained recipe.
 
-## Success means
+_Pinned source lines 1–5; no output is synthesized._
 
-The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+```ts
+import {
+  loadEd25519RawKeyAuthentication,
+  loadIdentity,
+  loadRawKeyIdentityAdapter,
+} from "@auths-dev/sdk/identity";
+```
 
-## Fail closed
+#### Step 2: Exchange bounded public identity bytes
 
-A skipped parent, widened child, depth reset, identity substitution, hidden tool, or agent-to-agent ambient credential fails verification.
+Generate a key, encode only its public material, then parse the received packet through the selected method.
 
-## Continue
+_Pinned source lines 7–13; no output is synthesized._
 
-Use receipts to verify the complete chain and production patterns to assign human ownership.
+```ts
+const message = new TextEncoder().encode("publish weekly report");
+const keys = await crypto.subtle.generateKey("Ed25519", true, ["sign", "verify"]);
+const publicKey = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.exportKey("raw", keys.publicKey));
+const identity = await loadIdentity();
+const method = await loadRawKeyIdentityAdapter();
+const suite = await loadEd25519RawKeyAuthentication();
+const sent = method.create("ed25519-v1", publicKey);
+```
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+#### Step 3: Authenticate the exact message
 
+Sign the identity-owned preimage and authenticate the encoded message against the received identity.
 
+_Pinned source lines 14–27; no output is synthesized._
 
----
+```ts
+const received = identity.parseIdentity(identity.decodePublicIdentity(sent.packet), method);
+const preimage = identity.signingPreimage(received, message);
+const signingBytes = new Uint8Array(preimage.length);
+signingBytes.set(preimage);
+const signature = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.sign(
+  "Ed25519",
+  keys.privateKey,
+  signingBytes.buffer,
+));
+const authenticated = identity.authenticate(
+  identity.decodeSignedMessage(identity.encodeSignedMessage(received, message, signature)),
+  received,
+  suite,
+);
+```
 
-# Production patterns
+#### Step 4: Reject changed application bytes
 
-Operate agent authority with explicit owners for identity, issuance, approval, state, custody, gateways, and reconciliation.
+Reuse the signature with different message bytes and require the authentication attempt to fail closed.
 
-## Outcome
+_Pinned source lines 28–39; no output is synthesized._
 
-Agent failures and provider ambiguity have named operators, durable evidence, and safe resume paths.
+```ts
+let changedRejected = false;
+try {
+  const changed = new TextEncoder().encode("delete weekly report");
+  identity.authenticate(
+    identity.decodeSignedMessage(identity.encodeSignedMessage(received, changed, signature)),
+    received,
+    suite,
+  );
+} catch {
+  changedRejected = true;
+}
+if (!changedRejected) throw new Error("changed message authenticated");
+```
 
-## Before you begin
+#### Step 5: Report the asserted outcome
 
-Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+The recipe emits only its declared authentication result and mutation check.
 
-## Build the bounded path
+_Pinned source lines 40; no output is synthesized._
 
-Separate proposal from authorization, use least-privilege service identities, keep signers and credentials out of agent processes, monitor stable outcomes, retain bounded receipts, and exercise recovery before production.
+```ts
+console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "01-authenticate-identity", outcome: "authenticated", changedRejected }));
+```
 
-## Run the qualified path
+### Python recipe
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/01_authenticate_identity.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/01_authenticate_identity.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
 
-## Success means
+#### Step 1: Load the identity adapters
 
-The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+Import the identity registry, verification types, and development-only method and signature suite.
 
-## Fail closed
+_Pinned source lines 1–13; no output is synthesized._
 
-Missing state, signer outage, trust ambiguity, receipt loss, unexplained denial, or provider-unknown outcome stops automation and escalates to its owner.
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
 
-## Continue
+import asyncio
+import json
 
-Use Production operations for deployment and incident runbooks.
+from auths.identity import (
+    IdentityRegistry,
+    VerificationMaterial,
+    VerificationRelationship,
+    decode_identity,
+    encode_identity,
+)
+from auths.testkit import DevelopmentIdentityMethod, DevelopmentSignatureSuite
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Encode the verification relationship
+
+Construct the bounded public verification relationship and encode it into an identity packet.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.production/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+_Pinned source lines 16–27; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+async def main() -> None:
+    relationship = VerificationRelationship(
+        "default-signing",
+        "authentication",
+        "auths.test-signature",
+        (VerificationMaterial("credential", b"public-development-material"),),
+    )
+    packet = encode_identity(
+        "auths.test-identity",
+        "identity:example:alice",
+        relationships=(relationship,),
+    )
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Validate and authenticate
+
+Resolve the packet through the explicit registry and authenticate the exact report-publishing bytes.
+
+_Pinned source lines 28–35; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    registry = IdentityRegistry(
+        methods=[DevelopmentIdentityMethod()],
+        suites=[DevelopmentSignatureSuite()],
+    )
+    validated = await decode_identity(packet).validate(registry)
+    await validated.authenticate(
+        b"publish weekly report", b"auths-development-signature", registry
+    )
+```
 
+#### Step 4: Reject changed application bytes
 
+Authenticate different bytes and require the development suite to reject the changed signature.
 
----
+_Pinned source lines 36–44; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    changed_rejected = False
+    try:
+        await validated.authenticate(
+            b"delete weekly report", b"changed-signature", registry
+        )
+    except ValueError:
+        changed_rejected = True
+    if not changed_rejected:
+        raise RuntimeError("changed message authenticated")
+```
+
+#### Step 5: Report the asserted outcome
+
+Emit the declared result, then run the owned asynchronous entry point.
+
+_Pinned source lines 45–57; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "01-authenticate-identity",
+                "outcome": "authenticated",
+                "changedRejected": changed_rejected,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
+
+The TypeScript and Python recipes intentionally use different development
+adapters. The public contract remains the same:
+
+1. Decode bounded public identity bytes.
+2. Select an exact identity-method and signature-suite implementation.
+3. Validate the identity through that registry.
+4. Authenticate a signature over the exact application bytes.
+5. Return an authenticated identity value—or reject.
+
+An adapter may establish principal control. It cannot create an Auths grant,
+return an authorization verdict, or manufacture an executable command.
+
+## Transport remains a courier
+
+You may send the identity packet over HTTPS, Iroh, a queue, or another bounded
+transport. The receiver must still decode and authenticate the packet. A
+mutually authenticated channel may add a useful local fact, but delivery
+success and channel authentication do not become authority.
+
+Treat received bytes as hostile until they pass limits and parsing. Do not let
+a transport adapter silently choose a different identity method, signature
+suite, or relationship when the labelled one is unavailable.
+
+## Decide what authentication means in your application
+
+After successful authentication, the application knows that the selected
+identity relationship authenticated the exact bytes. It must still decide
+what that identity may do.
+
+For example, a message authenticated as `report-agent` can be displayed,
+audited, or mapped to local context without being allowed to publish a report.
+If the application needs portable delegated authority, pass the established
+identity facts into the proof workflow rather than converting authentication
+into a boolean `isAllowed` flag.
 
-# Delegate one tool
+## Failure behavior
 
-Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohibited.
+Reject before returning an authenticated value when:
 
-## Run success and fail-closed paths
+- the packet or signed message exceeds configured bounds;
+- the identity method or signature suite is unavailable;
+- the labelled suite is incompatible with the verification material;
+- the relationship does not permit authentication;
+- the signature is invalid; or
+- the application bytes differ from the signed bytes.
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+None of these failures may enter a provider. Retrying unchanged invalid bytes
+is not useful. A temporarily unavailable resolver or remote evidence source
+may be retried under the application's explicit timeout and backoff policy, but
+only before treating the identity as authenticated.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+## Production considerations
 
+The recipes use development material. Production applications must choose
+maintained adapters, cap acquisition work and response size, pin accepted
+methods and suites, establish freshness and status policy, and protect any
+private signing operation with appropriate custody.
 
+Identity evidence may contain organizational or device information. Avoid
+logging raw packets and signatures when a bounded identity descriptor or
+commitment is sufficient.
+
+## Next steps
+
+- [Verify existing authority](/guides/verify-authority)
+- [Delegate to an agent](/guides/delegate-agent)
+- [Build and qualify an adapter](/guides/adapter-authoring)
+- [Identity reference](/reference/principal-adapters)
 
 ---
 
-# Skills and plugins
+<!-- route: /guides/verify-authority; source: guides/verify-authority.mdx; section: guides -->
+# Ask Auths for a decision without executing anything
 
-Package Auths-aware skills and plugins without embedding semantic meaning or secrets in prompts.
+Verification is the safest integration surface when another system already
+creates the proof and action. You supply three bounded byte strings and receive
+an inert result. The verifier does not read a clock, fetch a key, contact a
+provider, claim replay state, or write a receipt.
 
-## Ownership boundary
+## Supply all three inputs explicitly
 
-The agent framework, skill registry, and plugin lifecycle remains application-owned. Auths owns only the typed authority, native verification, closed execution boundary, and portable evidence composed around it.
+| Input | Owner | Why it is separate |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Proof bundle | Prover or transport | Carries grants, signed actions, plans, evidence, and references |
+| Canonical action | Application profile | Defines the exact effect meaning being checked |
+| Trusted context | Verifier | Defines local roots, time, accepted adapters, status, assurance, obligations, and limits |
 
-## Data flow
+The proof cannot smuggle a new root into the context or select a more
+permissive executable adapter configuration.
 
-A versioned skill declares which Auths profile and operation it calls; runtime code parses tool inputs and invokes the SDK outside the language model context.
+## Run the portable recipe
 
-## Secrets
+> Product-owned recipe `02-verify-authority` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `authorized`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
 
-Agent prompts, tool arguments, and Auths artifacts contain no ambient provider credential. The closed gateway acquires credentials only after native authorization and durable reservation.
+### TypeScript recipe
 
-## State
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/02-verify-authority.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/02-verify-authority.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
 
-The application owns agent memory and orchestration. Auths runtime state owns uses, budgets, replay, plan progress, recovery, and receipts for protected effects.
+#### Step 1: Prepare the verifier
 
-## Failure ownership
+Load the fixture reader and the effect-free verifier entry point.
 
-Prompt substitution, tool widening, stale identity, transport success, replay, and provider uncertainty remain separate closed outcomes and cannot be converted into success by agent reasoning.
+_Pinned source lines 1–5; no output is synthesized._
 
-## Run the qualified path
+```ts
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { loadVerifier } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+const fixture = process.env.AUTHS_RECIPE_FIXTURE;
+if (fixture === undefined) throw new Error("AUTHS_RECIPE_FIXTURE is required");
+```
 
-## Limitations
+#### Step 2: Load all three canonical inputs
 
-A skill is integration convenience, not a new authority source. It cannot replace native verification or gateway isolation.
+Read proof, action, and trusted-context bytes independently; none is inferred from another.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.skills/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+_Pinned source lines 6–10; no output is synthesized._
 
+```ts
+const [proof, action, context] = await Promise.all([
+  readFile(`${fixture}/workflow.proof.cbor`),
+  readFile(`${fixture}/workflow.action.cbor`),
+  readFile(`${fixture}/workflow.context.cbor`),
+]);
+```
 
+#### Step 3: Require an authorized verdict
 
----
+Verify the exact tuple and stop unless the result is explicitly authorized.
 
-# Test agent authority
+_Pinned source lines 11–13; no output is synthesized._
 
-Test agents against widening, substitution, replay, ambient credentials, and uncertain providers.
+```ts
+const verifier = await loadVerifier();
+const verified = verifier.verify(proof, action, context);
+if (verified.kind !== "authorized") throw new Error(`unexpected verdict: ${verified.kind}`);
+```
 
-## Outcome
+#### Step 4: Prove changed bytes do not inherit authority
 
-The harness proves that a model or orchestrator cannot convert untrusted text or successful delivery into authority.
+Flip one action byte, accept either bounded parse rejection or a non-authorized verdict, and assert fail-closed behavior.
 
-## Before you begin
+_Pinned source lines 14–23; no output is synthesized._
 
-Name the exact tool effect, place its provider credential behind a trusted gateway, and give the agent only parsed public inputs plus explicitly delegated authority.
+```ts
+const changed = action.slice();
+changed[changed.length - 1] ^= 1;
+let changedRejected = false;
+try {
+  changedRejected = verifier.verify(proof, changed, context).kind !== "authorized";
+} catch {
+  changedRejected = true;
+}
+if (!changedRejected) throw new Error("mutated action remained authorized");
+console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "02-verify-authority", outcome: verified.kind, changedRejected }));
+```
 
-## Build the bounded path
+### Python recipe
 
-Run the permitted tool, then mutate prompt intent, tool name, arguments, plan order, identity, audience, use state, receipt bytes, and provider result. Verify normalized outcomes and provider reachability.
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/02_verify_authority.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/02_verify_authority.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+#### Step 1: Prepare the verifier
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+Load the filesystem inputs and the effect-free Python verifier.
 
-## Success means
+_Pinned source lines 1–8; no output is synthesized._
 
-The permitted operation executes once, the caller receives a closed outcome, and independent verification binds the receipt to the delegated authority and exact command.
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
 
-## Fail closed
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
 
-Any prohibited effect, language disagreement, prompt-derived bypass, automatic fresh retry, or missing evidence is a release-blocking failure.
+from auths.verify import verify
+```
 
-## Continue
+#### Step 2: Load all three canonical inputs
 
-Keep adversarial fixtures beside each tool profile and run them against packaged SDKs.
+Read proof, action, and trusted-context bytes from the maintained fixture.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.agents.testing/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+_Pinned source lines 10–13; no output is synthesized._
 
+```python
+root = Path(os.environ["AUTHS_RECIPE_FIXTURE"])
+proof = (root / "workflow.proof.cbor").read_bytes()
+action = (root / "workflow.action.cbor").read_bytes()
+context = (root / "workflow.context.cbor").read_bytes()
+```
 
+#### Step 3: Require an authorized verdict
 
----
+Verify the exact tuple and stop unless the result is explicitly authorized.
+
+_Pinned source lines 14–16; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+verified = verify(proof, action, context)
+if verified.kind != "authorized":
+    raise RuntimeError(f"unexpected verdict: {verified.kind}")
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Prove changed bytes do not inherit authority
+
+Mutate the action, require rejection, and emit only the recipe's declared verdict and mutation result.
+
+_Pinned source lines 17–33; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+changed = bytearray(action)
+changed[-1] ^= 1
+try:
+    changed_rejected = verify(proof, bytes(changed), context).kind != "authorized"
+except (TypeError, ValueError):
+    changed_rejected = True
+if not changed_rejected:
+    raise RuntimeError("mutated action remained authorized")
+print(
+    json.dumps(
+        {
+            "recipe": "02-verify-authority",
+            "outcome": verified.kind,
+            "changedRejected": changed_rejected,
+        }
+    )
+)
+```
 
-# Assurance
+The recipe first verifies the canonical fixture and requires an authorized
+result. It then changes one byte of the action and requires rejection. The
+changed action never inherits the earlier decision just because most of its
+bytes are identical.
 
-Inspect what Auths claims, the exact evidence behind it, and the limits that remain.
+## Use the three-way result correctly
 
-## Recommended: [Semantics](/assurance/semantics)
+An authorized result means that the proof covers the exact action under the
+exact context. A denied result means supplied facts establish a failure, such
+as widened delegation or an action-body mismatch. An indeterminate result
+means a required trustworthy fact was not established, such as missing status
+or an unsupported adapter.
 
-Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.
+Denied and indeterminate are different diagnostic states but have the same
+execution consequence: **do not execute**.
 
-## Claims
+Do not translate indeterminate to success because an external dependency is
+temporarily unavailable. Instead, acquire the missing bounded fact, construct
+a new trusted context, and run verification again.
 
-- [Semantics](/assurance/semantics) — Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.
-- [Authority](/assurance/authority) — Inspect attenuation and approval-binding evidence for bounded authority.
-- [Execution](/assurance/execution) — Inspect the native closed-gateway boundary protecting provider effects.
-- [Disclosure](/assurance/disclosure) — Inspect evidence that receipt views are bounded and authority-controlled.
+## Keep inspection inert
 
-## Evidence
+The language bindings expose decisions and safe projections, not a serializable
+`VerifiedAction` that arbitrary application code can mint or replay. This makes
+verification useful in browsers, audit tools, policy previews, and separate
+verification services without accidentally handing them an effect-capable
+object.
 
-- [Cross-language](/assurance/cross-language) — Compare maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes for identical scenarios.
-- [Formal](/assurance/formal) — Understand where formal attenuation evidence applies and where it does not.
-- [Adversarial](/assurance/adversarial) — Inspect substitution, widening, replay, mutation, and fail-closed evidence.
-- [Supply chain](/assurance/supply-chain) — Inspect the recorded SLSA builder assessment without mistaking it for an independent audit.
+If the application later needs to execute, pass the original inputs through a
+product workflow that owns replay, budgets, local policy, profile decoding,
+and provider entry. Do not treat `result.kind === "authorized"` as a license to
+execute an unverified request object.
 
-## Limits
+## Retry and provider reachability
 
-- [Limitations](/assurance/limitations) — Read the boundaries that Auths evidence deliberately does not claim to cross.
+Pure verification is safe to repeat with identical inputs. It cannot reach a
+provider and has no remote side effect. Repeating it does not, however, refresh
+the facts inside the trusted context. A stale status snapshot remains stale
+until the application explicitly supplies a newer one.
 
-## Related topics
+Malformed, non-canonical, unsupported, and oversized inputs fail closed with a
+typed outcome or input error. Do not fall back to a looser decoder.
 
-- [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
+## Production considerations
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1 · Product contract: auths.page.assurance.evidence/1_
+Pin the SDK artifact and ABI, construct contexts through maintained typed
+builders, and bind the expected executable registry configuration. Set limits
+below protocol hard maxima where your deployment can. Obtain live identity or
+status evidence outside the deterministic kernel, then include bounded,
+provenance-aware snapshots as explicit inputs.
 
+Keep proof bytes, signatures, and application bodies out of ordinary logs.
+Stable stage/code values and commitments are usually sufficient for
+observability.
 
+## Continue
+
+- [Understand the verification stages](/guides/verification-model)
+- [Execute one exact action](/guides/execute-exact-action)
+- [Handle decisions and recovery](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Verification model](/guides/verification-model)
 
 ---
 
-# Adversarial
+<!-- route: /guides/execute-exact-action; source: guides/execute-exact-action.mdx; section: guides -->
+# Move from an authorized action to one controlled effect
 
-Inspect substitution, widening, replay, mutation, and fail-closed evidence.
+The central Auths product workflow is not “check a policy, then run the original
+request.” The original request is untrusted. Auths verifies canonical action
+bytes, creates an opaque native-owned command, reserves execution state, and
+lets a closed profile derive the provider operation from that command.
 
-## What the claim says
+## See the complete boundary
 
-Adversarial fixtures try to change approved bytes, order, members, authority constraints, trust inputs, and lifecycle state.
+> Product-owned recipe `03-execute-exact-action` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
 
-## Release evidence
+### TypeScript recipe
 
-Claim: `auths.claim.approval-binding/1` · status `passing`
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
 
-Approval is bound to exact plan context and cannot authorize substituted plan bytes.
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
 
-Evidence: `bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json`
+Register the only provider operation and create development authority for that exact tool name.
 
-SHA-256: `a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331`
+_Pinned source lines 1–14; no output is synthesized._
 
-Reproduce:
+```ts
+import { verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
 
-- `cargo xtask sdk-experience`
+let calls = 0;
+const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({
+  tools: {
+    async publish_report(input) {
+      calls += 1;
+      return { published: input.report };
+    },
+  },
+});
+const auths = await development.createAuths({ authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]) });
+```
 
-Scope: Maintained approval-plan signing requests, responses, and substitution fixtures.
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
 
-Limitation: The application remains responsible for approver identity, user experience, and organizational policy.
+Send the exact profile-owned action, require completion, and verify its returned receipt.
 
-## What remains true
+_Pinned source lines 15–22; no output is synthesized._
 
-Every maintained language and runtime path must reject the same prohibited mutation before an unintended provider effect.
+```ts
+try {
+  const completed = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "publish_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-success",
+  });
+  if (completed.kind !== "completed") throw new Error(`unexpected result: ${completed.kind}`);
+  await verifyReceipt(completed.receipt);
+```
 
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
 
-Untested application profiles, adapters, external approval identity, or provider behavior remain outside the fixture claim.
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter did not advance.
 
-## Continue
+_Pinned source lines 23–28; no output is synthesized._
 
-Keep application-specific negative fixtures beside each profile and gateway.
+```ts
+  const denied = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "delete_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-denied",
+  });
+  if (denied.kind !== "denied" || calls !== 1) throw new Error("undeclared effect reached provider");
+```
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.adversarial/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+#### Step 4: Report the trace and close owned state
 
+Emit the declared result and close the development runtime even when the workflow throws.
 
+_Pinned source lines 29–32; no output is synthesized._
 
----
+```ts
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "03-execute-exact-action", outcome: completed.kind, denied: true, calls }));
+} finally {
+  await auths.close();
+}
+```
 
-# Authority
+### Python recipe
 
-Inspect attenuation and approval-binding evidence for bounded authority.
+> **Qualification blocked — Python source does not match the pinned public API.**
+>
+> The pinned recipe imports `verify_receipt` from `auths`, while the pinned installed API exports it only from `auths.verify`. The source is retained for review but must not be presented as runnable until the product recipe is corrected and re-executed.
 
-## What the claim says
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
 
-The maintained model and fixtures assert that delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent across declared fields.
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
 
-## Release evidence
+Register the only provider operation and count every entry into that effect boundary.
 
-Claim: `auths.claim.attenuation/1` · status `passing`
+_Pinned source lines 1–19; no output is synthesized._
 
-Delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent under the maintained model and adversarial fixtures.
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
 
-Evidence: `formal/qualification.lean`
+import asyncio
+import json
 
-SHA-256: `fb1fd17d377194e96f98313412052f82fbb43cb594b12eb6a9fa0e0dce3ce70c`
+from auths import verify_receipt
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import mcp
 
-Reproduce:
 
-- `cargo xtask formal`
+async def main() -> None:
+    calls = 0
 
-Scope: Attenuation relations represented by the maintained formal model and protocol profile.
+    async def publish_report(arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal calls
+        calls += 1
+        return {"published": arguments["report"]}
 
-Limitation: The claim covers the modelled fields and maintained protocol profile, not arbitrary application-defined semantics.
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(tools={"publish_report": publish_report})
+```
 
-## What remains true
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
 
-Action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, depth, and modelled critical extensions must preserve their narrowing relation.
+Open the owned development session, execute the exact action, and verify its receipt.
 
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
+_Pinned source lines 20–30; no output is synthesized._
 
-A new unmodelled field, accepted incomparable child, formal drift, or differential mismatch narrows the scope or withdraws passing status.
+```python
+    async with development.create_auths(
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"])
+    ) as auths:
+        completed = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="publish_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-success",
+        )
+        if completed.kind != "completed":
+            raise RuntimeError(f"unexpected result: {completed.kind}")
+        verify_receipt(completed.receipt)
+```
 
-## Continue
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
+
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter stayed at one.
+
+_Pinned source lines 31–37; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        denied = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="delete_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-denied",
+        )
+        if denied.kind != "denied" or calls != 1:
+            raise RuntimeError("undeclared effect reached provider")
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Report the trace through the owned entry point
+
+Leave the session before emitting the declared result, then run the asynchronous entry point.
+
+_Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "03-execute-exact-action",
+                "outcome": "completed",
+                "denied": True,
+                "calls": calls,
+            }
+        )
+    )
 
-Review adversarial approval and delegation evidence alongside application-profile tests.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.authority/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
 
+The recipe is intentionally small, but it tests both sides of the boundary. An
+allowed MCP tool completes and yields a receipt. An undeclared tool is denied,
+and the provider-call counter proves the handler was not entered.
 
+## Follow the order that protects the effect
+
+```text
+canonical request
+  -> verify authority and exact action
+  -> apply local execution gates
+  -> durably reserve identity and budget
+  -> mint opaque profile command
+  -> acquire least-privilege credential
+  -> enter closed provider gateway
+  -> classify result
+  -> persist execution receipt
+```
+
+Changing this order changes the security claim. In particular, provider
+credentials should not be acquired before authorization and durable
+reservation, and provider input should not be reconstructed from the original
+JSON after verification.
+
+## What a closed profile owns
+
+A profile is an exact-action contract for one coherent effect domain. It owns:
+
+- canonical action bytes and hard bounds;
+- the permission and resource vocabulary;
+- decoding from verified action to an opaque command;
+- provider request construction;
+- credential timing and least-privilege scope;
+- outcome classification and reconciliation; and
+- receipt claims specific to that effect.
+
+The current public SDK workflow qualifies `auths.mcp/1`. A demo that calls a
+cloud, payment, database, or infrastructure provider is not automatically a
+qualified generic profile.
+
+## Denial happens before provider entry
+
+If the permission, resource, body commitment, audience, challenge, validity,
+status, assurance, delegation chain, or local policy fails, no command is
+available to the gateway. The provider is not a second authorization layer
+that Auths relies on to catch mistakes.
+
+Indeterminate results also stop before provider entry. Supply the missing
+trustworthy fact and begin a new attempt; never treat temporary uncertainty as
+permission.
+
+## Separate provider failure from authorization failure
+
+Once the gateway begins the remote effect, a timeout or connection failure is
+not a denial. The provider might have applied the operation even if the caller
+did not receive the response. The runtime must retain that uncertainty and
+require profile-specific reconciliation.
+
+Blind retry is safe only when the recorded outcome says no effect could have
+occurred. Otherwise resume the same execution identity and reconcile it.
+
+## Production checklist
+
+Before this boundary protects a real effect:
+
+- substitute durable atomic state for in-memory development state;
+- use non-exporting production custody;
+- pin the SDK, runtime contract, profile, and adapter versions;
+- keep provider credentials and endpoints out of public action payloads;
+- prove request equality at the gateway boundary;
+- test crash points before and after provider delivery;
+- retain decision, execution, and reconciliation evidence; and
+- emit redacted telemetry that distinguishes authorization from execution.
+
+Auths does not make a remote provider transactional with your local store. It
+makes that gap explicit and recoverable.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Delegate the same authority more narrowly](/guides/delegate-agent)
+- [Handle replay and provider uncertainty](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Understand receipts and disclosure](/guides/receipts-and-disclosure)
+- [Build a production integration](/guides/production-integration)
 
 ---
 
-# Cross-language
+<!-- route: /guides/authority-model; source: concepts/authority-model.mdx; section: guides -->
+# Authority flows downward from local trust
+
+Auths does not ask a global authority service whether a request is allowed. A
+verifier starts from its own scoped trust anchors, follows an exact chain of
+signed grants, evaluates any authorization plan, and checks that the terminal
+authority covers one canonical action.
 
-Compare maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes for identical scenarios.
+The key invariant is simple:
 
-## What the claim says
+> Every delegation edge may preserve or narrow authority. No edge may expand
+> it.
 
-Parity covers stable semantic operations and qualified installed-artifact scenarios while allowing idiomatic language types and packaging.
+This chapter explains the objects that make that invariant testable.
 
-## Release evidence
+## Trust anchors are local policy
 
-Claim: `auths.claim.cross-language-parity/1` · status `passing`
+A trust anchor is configured by the verifier. It is not carried inside the
+proof and cannot be added by the caller. An anchor names a principal and exact
+control methods, then sets ceilings for profiles, permissions, resources,
+audiences, validity, budget, delegation depth, assurance, and status policy.
 
-Maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python scenarios target identical stable semantic outcomes.
+This lets two verifiers evaluate the same proof under different local trust.
+One may trust a Northstar operations root for `edge://northstar/eu-west-2`;
+another may not. Adding a separate trust anchor does not authorize a chain that
+cannot link to it.
 
-Evidence: `release/docs/scenarios.toml`
+## Grants transfer a bounded subset
 
-SHA-256: `f056e57acb5dbad67ef5ed5076bdee388a82e73b7e6a6af53b82c226ccd552da`
+A grant links an issuer to a subject and an exact parent. The first grant is
+bounded by a local anchor. Every child is bounded by its parent.
 
-Reproduce:
+Consider this worked chain:
 
-- `cargo xtask cross-language`
+| Dimension | Northstar anchor | Operations service | Report agent |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Permission | publish, delete | publish, delete | publish only |
+| Resource | all Northstar reports | weekly reports | report `2026-W33` |
+| Audience | reporting gateway | reporting gateway | reporting gateway |
+| Validity | 24 hours | 2 hours | 5 minutes |
+| Uses | 100 | 10 | 1 |
+| Delegation depth | 2 | 1 | 0 |
 
-Scope: The maintained installed-artifact scenarios declared for Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
+The agent grant is valid because each column is equal to or narrower than the
+one before it. It cannot delete a report, switch to a different audience,
+recover the parent's validity window, increase the use count, or delegate
+again.
 
-Limitation: Scenario parity covers maintained workflows and versions, not every possible application composition.
+If any child field widens, verification returns a denied result such as
+`delegation-expanded` before execution gates or provider entry.
 
-## What remains true
+## Exact action constraints bind application bytes
 
-The same fixture bytes and trusted context produce the same normalized outcome and commitments.
+Permission and resource are not always enough. “Publish this report” and
+“publish a changed report” might share both. V1 therefore includes a closed
+action-constraint algebra:
 
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
+- one exact canonical body digest;
+- a bounded allowed set of body digests; or
+- any body, where the profile and parent authority explicitly permit it.
 
-A missing wheel, unsupported platform, public API drift, language-specific decision, or differing fixture result degrades the release claim.
+An exact digest may attenuate an allowed set that contains it, and either may
+attenuate `AnyBody`. The opposite direction is widening. Application callbacks
+cannot redefine that order.
+
+The profile is responsible for canonical application bytes. JSON that is
+semantically “similar” but byte-distinct is not assumed equivalent unless the
+profile's canonicalization makes it so before signing and verification.
+
+## The action envelope connects authority to intent
+
+A signed action envelope binds more than a payload digest. It includes the
+profile and version, media type, capability, resource, optional requested
+budget, audience, challenge, validity, actor, terminal grant, plan identity,
+channel requirement, attachments, and critical extensions.
+
+The verifier compares the supplied canonical action with all of these fields.
+The executor later consumes the command decoded from `VerifiedAction`, never a
+lookalike request supplied alongside it.
+
+## Authorization plans
+
+Some operations require more than one proof branch. V1 provides bounded:
+
+- `Proof` for one branch;
+- `AllOf` for every child;
+- `AnyOf` for at least one child; and
+- `KOfN` for a threshold.
+
+Every satisfied branch must bind the same canonical action meaning and plan.
+A proof-carried plan is still not the verifier's local policy. The trusted
+context supplies a separate composition requirement that can pin the plan and
+require branch count, distinct actors, or distinct trust roots.
+
+For example, a two-company remediation may use `AllOf` with one Northstar
+branch and one EdgeShield branch. Local policy can require two distinct actors
+and two distinct roots. Two signatures from the same root cannot satisfy that
+diversity merely because they occupy different proof references.
+
+## Status and assurance stay role-specific
+
+Principal status and grant status are separate signed facts. Current control,
+historical control, statement existence, freshness, and revocation are not
+interchangeable. A newer revocation cannot be ignored in favor of an older
+active statement.
+
+Assurance applies to roles in the chain. A strong terminal actor does not
+repair insufficient assurance for the root or an intermediate delegator.
+Adapters establish the bounded evidence; they cannot decide that the chain is
+authorized.
+
+## Critical extensions do not disappear
+
+The first grant may establish a critical-extension set. In V1, every child
+must preserve that complete canonical set byte for byte unless a standardized,
+versioned attenuation algebra says otherwise. An agent cannot omit an
+extension it does not understand and continue under a weaker interpretation.
+
+Unknown required extensions fail closed.
+
+## What authority does not include
+
+Proof authority does not count prior uses, reserve a shared budget, establish a
+live channel, or execute the effect. Those are stateful execution-plane gates.
+An authorized action must still pass freshness, channel, replay, budget, and
+application policy before a profile can create an executable command.
+
+That distinction makes offline verification repeatable. It also prevents an
+old authorized result from becoming a reusable execution token.
+
+## Failure cases to recognize
+
+| Change | Result | Provider reachable? |
+| --- | --- | ---: |
+| Child adds a permission | denied: delegation expanded | no |
+| Action body differs from the signed digest | denied: action body mismatch | no |
+| Required status is missing | indeterminate | no |
+| Grant is explicitly revoked | denied | no |
+| Required profile is unavailable | indeterminate | no |
+| Exact execution identity already completed | exact replay at outer runtime | no new entry |
 
 ## Continue
 
-Run the packaged scenario suite and inspect the SDK parity page.
+- [Delegate to an agent](/guides/delegate-agent)
+- [Approvals and ordered plans](/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans)
+- [Verification model](/guides/verification-model)
+- [Protocol limits and identifiers](/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers)
+
+---
+
+<!-- route: /guides/verification-model; source: concepts/verification-model.mdx; section: guides -->
+# Verification is a sealed, deterministic pipeline
+
+Auths verification takes three explicit inputs—proof bytes, canonical action
+bytes, and trusted-context bytes—and produces a canonical result. The same
+valid inputs and executable registry configuration must produce the same
+verdict, primary stable code, commitments, assurance report, and bounded work
+totals in every conforming implementation.
+
+The verifier performs no network, filesystem, environment, clock, randomness,
+database, private-key, replay, or provider operation. This makes its meaning
+portable and its failures inspectable.
+
+## The six stages
+
+```text
+proof + canonical action + trusted context
+            |
+            v
+1. bounded decode
+            |
+            v
+2. reference resolution
+            |
+            v
+3. principal control
+            |
+            v
+4. authority branches
+            |
+            v
+5. plan evaluation
+            |
+            v
+6. exact action binding
+            |
+            v
+authorized | denied | indeterminate
+```
+
+Each successful stage produces a narrower typed value. Later code cannot
+pretend that raw bytes already passed an earlier check.
+
+### 1. Bounded decode
+
+The decoder enforces size and collection limits before expensive work. It
+rejects non-canonical CBOR, duplicate or invalid map keys, unsorted sets,
+unknown critical fields, invalid UTF-8, trailing bytes, and overflowing
+collections.
+
+Representative stable failures include `malformed-proof`,
+`non-canonical-proof`, and `resource-limit-exceeded`. A permissive fallback
+decoder would change protocol meaning and is not allowed.
+
+### 2. Reference resolution
+
+The resolver recomputes identifiers for grants, actions, plans, evidence,
+status, and attachments. It builds bounded indexes and rejects missing,
+duplicate, mismatched, cyclic, ambiguous, or unused-critical references.
+
+Failures such as `digest-mismatch`, `duplicate-object`, and
+`missing-reference` stop the entire proof structure. No signature or provider
+work can repair an incoherent graph.
+
+### 3. Principal control
+
+For each signed statement, the verifier selects exactly one accepted principal
+method and signature suite, reserves their maximum work, verifies the
+domain-separated signature, evaluates method-specific control, and requires
+the adapter's consumed evidence IDs to match the signed binding exactly.
+
+Invalid supplied evidence is denied—for example `invalid-signature` or
+`verification-method-mismatch`. A required but unavailable method or evidence
+is indeterminate—for example `unsupported-principal-method` or
+`missing-principal-evidence`.
+
+Adapters return bounded facts and assurance claims. They cannot manufacture
+authority results.
+
+### 4. Authority branches
+
+Each plan leaf is checked from a local trust anchor through its exact grant
+chain to the terminal actor. Profile, permissions, resources, audiences,
+validity, body constraints, budgets, status, assurance, delegation depth, and
+critical extensions must remain within their ceilings.
+
+Common failures include `untrusted-root`, `broken-grant-chain`,
+`delegation-expanded`, `permission-not-granted`, and
+`action-constraint-mismatch`.
+
+### 5. Plan evaluation
+
+The verifier recomputes the plan identity, confirms every branch binds the
+same action meaning, evaluates bounded `Proof`, `AllOf`, `AnyOf`, and `KOfN`
+composition, then applies the verifier's independent required quorum and
+diversity constraints.
+
+Evaluation order is canonical. Even when one branch already satisfies an
+`AnyOf`, the verifier does not skip remaining branches for resource accounting.
+`plan-action-mismatch` and `composition-requirement-not-met` are denied
+outcomes.
+
+### 6. Exact action binding
+
+Finally, the verifier selects the exact profile/version and compares canonical
+body, media type, capability, resource, requested budget, audience, challenge,
+validity, actor, terminal grant, plan, channel requirement, attachments, and
+profile policy.
+
+Only this stage can privately construct `VerifiedAction`. It has no public
+constructor. Representative failures include `action-body-mismatch`,
+`audience-mismatch`, `challenge-mismatch`, `action-outside-validity`, and
+`attachment-digest-mismatch`.
+
+## Three diagnostics, one execution rule
+
+`Authorized` means every required proof and action-binding check passed.
+`Denied` means available facts establish invalidity or insufficient authority.
+`Indeterminate` means a required trustworthy fact or implementation was not
+available.
+
+The execution rule is binary: only authorized may continue. An indeterminate
+result is not a probabilistic allow. It is a precise request for missing trust
+input.
+
+Stable first-failure ordering makes languages and receipts agree on one
+primary diagnostic. It does not claim resistance to every timing or
+side-channel observation.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.cross-language/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+## The outer gates are deliberately separate
 
+After authorization, the product runtime still requires:
 
+```text
+authorized action
+AND fresh status policy
+AND channel policy
+AND atomic replay claim
+AND stateful budget claim
+AND local application policy
+= executable action
+```
+
+The runtime decodes a domain command from the sealed verified action, writes a
+decision receipt, executes through the profile gateway, and writes an
+execution receipt. None of the outer facts may upgrade a denied or
+indeterminate verifier result.
+
+Because replay and provider outcomes live outside the kernel, repeating pure
+verification is safe. Repeating provider execution may not be.
+
+## Work a simple mutation example
+
+Start with a proof that authorizes canonical action `A`. Verify it against
+trusted context `C`; the result is authorized. Flip one byte in the action to
+produce `A′` while keeping the proof and context unchanged.
+
+If `A′` is no longer valid canonical input, bounded decode rejects it. If it is
+valid but has different meaning, exact action binding denies it. There is no
+path where signature validity over the original envelope authorizes the
+mutated action.
+
+You can run that exact cross-language check in
+[Verify existing authority](/guides/verify-authority).
+
+## Production implications
+
+Pin the verifier ABI and accepted registries. Bind required and executed
+configuration commitments. Acquire live status or identity evidence outside
+the kernel and supply bounded snapshots. Set resource limits before parsing
+hostile input. Handle every result variant exhaustively and keep protocol bytes
+out of ordinary logs.
+
+Auths is prelaunch and pre-audit. Deterministic fixtures, differential
+bindings, fuzzing, and formal work strengthen the implementation claim; they
+do not substitute for an independent security audit.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Verify existing authority](/guides/verify-authority)
+- [Authority model](/guides/authority-model)
+- [Execute one exact action](/guides/execute-exact-action)
+- [Stable results and errors](/reference/decisions-errors)
 
 ---
 
-# Disclosure
+<!-- route: /guides/delegate-agent; source: guides/delegate-agent.mdx; section: guides -->
+# Give an agent less authority than its parent
 
-Inspect evidence that receipt views are bounded and authority-controlled.
+Delegation is useful when a service can perform several operations but a
+specialized agent should perform only one. Auths treats every delegation edge
+as an attenuation check: authority may be preserved or narrowed, never
+expanded.
 
-## What the claim says
+## Work through the maintained example
 
-Receipt integrity and receipt disclosure are separate decisions. Unauthorized callers receive an opaque view; summary and full projections are native-owned.
+> Product-owned recipe `04-delegate-to-agent` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed,exact-replay,denied`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
 
-## Release evidence
+### TypeScript recipe
 
-Claim: `auths.claim.bounded-disclosure/1` · status `passing`
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/04-delegate-to-agent.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/04-delegate-to-agent.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
 
-Receipt inspection defaults to opaque or bounded views and requires authority for full disclosure.
+#### Step 1: Prepare the parent authority
 
-Evidence: `release/docs/runtime-facts-v1.json`
+The parent can publish or delete, while the provider exposes only the operation used in this proof.
 
-SHA-256: `3229ccc5a4adbcdfd4b55bdca58ab9e7e5c333719aeff3a0dba54976e6fef1f1`
+_Pinned source lines 1–8; no output is synthesized._
 
-Reproduce:
+```ts
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
 
-- `cargo xtask product-conformance`
+let calls = 0;
+const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({ tools: {
+  async publish_report() { calls += 1; return { published: true }; },
+} });
+const auths = await development.createAuths({ authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report", "delete_report"]) });
+```
 
-Scope: Maintained receipt summary and disclosure operations and their public runtime contract.
+#### Step 2: Delegate a narrower, expiring authority
 
-Limitation: Deployment retention, access control, and downstream handling remain application responsibilities.
+Create an agent that can publish—but cannot inherit the parent's delete permission.
 
-## What remains true
+_Pinned source lines 9–15; no output is synthesized._
 
-Public artifacts contain bounded commitments and verification material rather than raw provider payloads or secrets.
+```ts
+try {
+  const agent = await auths.delegate({
+    authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]),
+    name: "report-agent",
+    expiresInSeconds: 300,
+  });
+  const action = mcp.callTool({ name: "publish_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } });
+```
 
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
+#### Step 3: Exercise replay and widening boundaries
 
-Unsafe downstream logging, overbroad retention, application-authored views, or disclosure-policy regression remains a deployment or product failure.
+Repeat the same request identity, then ask the agent for the broader undelegated action.
 
-## Continue
+_Pinned source lines 16–22; no output is synthesized._
 
-Review receipt retention and the disclosure incident runbook before exposing evidence APIs.
+```ts
+  const first = await agent.execute({ action, provider, requestId: "delegated-once" });
+  const second = await agent.execute({ action, provider, requestId: "delegated-once" });
+  const broader = await agent.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "delete_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "delegated-broader",
+  });
+```
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+#### Step 4: Assert one provider entry and close
 
+Require completed, exact-replay, and denied outcomes with exactly one provider call.
 
+_Pinned source lines 23–29; no output is synthesized._
 
----
+```ts
+  if (first.kind !== "completed" || second.kind !== "exact-replay" || broader.kind !== "denied" || calls !== 1) {
+    throw new Error("delegated authority was not narrow and replay-safe");
+  }
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "04-delegate-to-agent", outcome: `${first.kind},${second.kind},${broader.kind}`, calls }));
+} finally {
+  await auths.close();
+}
+```
 
-# Execution
+### Python recipe
 
-Inspect the native closed-gateway boundary protecting provider effects.
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/04_delegate_to_agent.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/04_delegate_to_agent.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
 
-## What the claim says
+#### Step 1: Prepare the parent authority
 
-Maintained workflows acquire provider access only through opaque native-authorized commands after required checks and state transitions.
+Define the counted provider handler used to observe whether an effect boundary was entered.
 
-## Release evidence
+_Pinned source lines 1–18; no output is synthesized._
 
-Claim: `auths.claim.closed-gateway/1` · status `passing`
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
 
-Maintained product workflows reach provider adapters only through opaque native-authorized commands.
+import asyncio
+import json
 
-Evidence: `release/semantic-freeze.json`
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import mcp
 
-SHA-256: `75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3`
 
-Reproduce:
+async def main() -> None:
+    calls = 0
 
-- `cargo xtask product-waist-conformance`
+    async def publish_report(_arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal calls
+        calls += 1
+        return {"published": True}
 
-Scope: Maintained execution workflows and their opaque native command and gateway boundary.
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(tools={"publish_report": publish_report})
+```
 
-Limitation: Application-owned adapters can still be implemented unsafely outside the maintained boundary.
+#### Step 2: Delegate a narrower, expiring authority
 
-## What remains true
+Open the parent session and give the agent only publish authority for five minutes.
 
-Transport, authentication, approval, signatures, or application objects cannot mint the effect-capable handle.
+_Pinned source lines 19–27; no output is synthesized._
 
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
+```python
+    async with development.create_auths(
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report", "delete_report"])
+    ) as auths:
+        agent = await auths.delegate(
+            authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"]),
+            name="report-agent",
+            expires_in_seconds=300,
+        )
+        action = mcp.call_tool(name="publish_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"})
+```
 
-An unsafe application-owned adapter, direct provider route, handle forgery, missing reservation, or semantic bypass lies outside or invalidates the claim.
+#### Step 3: Exercise replay and widening boundaries
 
-## Continue
+Repeat the same request identity, then ask the agent for the broader undelegated action.
+
+_Pinned source lines 28–38; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        first = await agent.execute(
+            action=action, provider=provider, request_id="delegated-once"
+        )
+        second = await agent.execute(
+            action=action, provider=provider, request_id="delegated-once"
+        )
+        broader = await agent.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="delete_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="delegated-broader",
+        )
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Assert one provider entry and report
+
+Require completed, exact-replay, and denied outcomes with exactly one provider call, then emit the trace.
+
+_Pinned source lines 39–58; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        if (
+            first.kind != "completed"
+            or second.kind != "exact-replay"
+            or broader.kind != "denied"
+            or calls != 1
+        ):
+            raise RuntimeError("delegated authority was not narrow and replay-safe")
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "04-delegate-to-agent",
+                "outcome": f"{first.kind},{second.kind},{broader.kind}",
+                "calls": calls,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
+
+The parent can publish and delete reports. It delegates only
+`publish_report` to a named agent for five minutes. The agent performs one
+publish, repeats the exact request identifier, then attempts the broader delete
+operation.
 
-Use Operations to qualify the selected durable store, custody, and provider gateway deployment.
+The expected semantic sequence is:
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.execution/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+| Attempt | Result | Provider entries |
+| --- | --- | ---: |
+| First allowed publish | completed | 1 |
+| Same execution identity again | exact replay | still 1 |
+| Broader delete | denied | still 1 |
+
+The replay result returns recorded completion instead of re-entering the
+provider. The widening attempt stops before the provider.
+
+## Understand every dimension that can narrow
+
+A child grant must not broaden any inherited boundary:
+
+- permissions;
+- resources and action constraints;
+- validity window;
+- audiences and challenge binding;
+- budget ceiling;
+- remaining delegation depth;
+- profile and version;
+- status and assurance policy; or
+- critical extensions.
+
+An agent allowed one tool cannot obtain another merely because the provider
+implements it. A shorter expiry cannot be changed back to the parent's longer
+window. A child cannot replace a critical extension with an unknown or more
+permissive interpretation.
+
+## Design delegation around a job
+
+Start with the smallest outcome the agent needs. For a report agent that might
+mean one exact tool, one report namespace, one audience, a five-minute window,
+one use, and no further delegation depth.
+
+Do not give the agent a broad “automation” role and rely on prompt text to keep
+it safe. Prompt instructions are not an authority boundary. Tool availability
+is not an authority boundary either.
+
+If a job changes materially, create a new delegation. Do not mutate the
+meaning of an existing action or reuse an execution identifier for different
+bytes.
+
+## Handle failures safely
+
+- A widening attempt is denied and cannot reach the provider.
+- Missing required status or assurance is indeterminate and cannot execute.
+- An expired delegation requires new authority; retrying the same expired
+  proof will not help.
+- Exact replay returns the recorded outcome and must not reacquire credentials
+  or call the provider again.
+- A provider-unknown result is not exact replay; resume and reconcile the same
+  execution reference.
+
+## Production concerns
+
+Delegation does not remove the need for durable state or custody. Parent and
+child grants must be authored through protected signers. Execution identities,
+use counts, and budgets must be claimed atomically across the deployment scope.
+Status acquisition and revocation freshness remain explicit verifier inputs.
+
+Log bounded grant and action commitments rather than raw proof bytes. Ensure
+operators can identify which parent, child, profile, action, and execution
+state a denial or recovery reference belongs to without disclosing application
+payloads.
 
+## Continue
 
+- [Authority model](/guides/authority-model)
+- [Approvals and ordered plans](/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans)
+- [Replay, recovery, and reconciliation](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Authority model](/guides/authority-model)
 
 ---
 
-# Formal
+<!-- route: /guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans; source: guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans.mdx; section: guides -->
+# Approve the transaction, not a reusable flag
+
+An approval is useful only when it is bound to the exact operation—or exact
+ordered plan—that will execute. A generic `approved: true` value can be replayed
+against different bytes. Auths approval responses echo a transaction digest
+and policy, while the proof plan commits to its members and their order.
+
+## Follow a two-organization recovery workflow
+
+> Product-owned recipe `05-cross-organization-plan` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed-after-restart`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
+
+### TypeScript recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Load recovery and approval tools
+
+Import the filesystem, child-process, approval, profile, and receipt primitives used by the maintained scenario.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–13; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
+import { mkdtemp, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import {
+  approval,
+  ExecutionReference,
+} from "@auths-dev/sdk";
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
+import { decodeReceipt, encodeReceipt, verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Route the restart phases
+
+The same source can verify a receipt, run either durable phase, or orchestrate both across process boundaries.
+
+_Pinned source lines 15–33; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+const self = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
+const mode = process.argv[2];
+const directory = process.argv[3];
+type ApprovalProvider = Parameters<typeof approval.threshold>[0]["providers"][number];
+
+if (mode === "verify") {
+  const receipt = decodeReceipt(await readFile(required(directory)));
+  await verifyReceipt(receipt);
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ outcome: "verified-portable-receipt" }));
+} else if (mode === "phase-one") {
+  await phaseOne(required(directory));
+} else if (mode === "phase-two") {
+  await phaseTwo(required(directory));
+} else {
+  const root = process.env.AUTHS_RECIPE_OUTPUT ?? await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "auths-recipe-five-ts-"));
+  runChild("phase-one", root);
+  runChild("phase-two", root);
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "05-cross-organization-plan", outcome: "completed-after-restart", duplicateEntries: 0 }));
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Model a provider-unknown outcome
+
+The first runtime records that token rotation may have applied instead of claiming success or retrying.
+
+_Pinned source lines 35–47; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+async function phaseOne(root: string): Promise<void> {
+  const auths = await development.createRecoverableAuths({
+    directory: root,
+    authority: mcp.allowTools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+    approval: await planApproval(),
+  });
+  const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({ tools: {
+    async quarantine_service() { return { quarantined: true }; },
+    async rotate_token() {
+      await writeFile(join(root, "provider-applied"), "applied", { flag: "wx" });
+      return { effect: "possible", cause: "unknown" } as const;
+    },
+  } });
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Stop the ordered plan and persist recovery state
+
+Execute the exact two-member plan, require one completed member, then persist its reference and receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 48–62; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  try {
+    const plan = await mcp.plan([
+      mcp.callTool({ name: "quarantine_service", arguments: { region: "eu-west-2" } }),
+      mcp.callTool({ name: "rotate_token", arguments: { region: "eu-west-2" } }),
+    ]);
+    const result = await auths.execute({ plan, provider, requestId: "incident-plan" });
+    if (result.kind !== "recoverable" || result.reference === undefined || result.completedReceipts.length !== 1) {
+      throw new Error("ordered plan did not stop with one completed member");
+    }
+    await writeFile(join(root, "reference.bin"), result.reference.encode());
+    await writeFile(join(root, "typescript-receipt.json"), encodeReceipt(result.completedReceipts[0]!));
+  } finally {
+    await auths.close();
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 5: Configure reconciliation without provider re-entry
+
+After restart, direct handler entry is an error; only the provider-specific reconcile path may classify the prior attempt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 64–81; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+async function phaseTwo(root: string): Promise<void> {
+  const auths = await development.createRecoverableAuths({
+    directory: root,
+    authority: mcp.allowTools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+    approval: await planApproval(),
+  });
+  let entries = 0;
+  const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({
+    tools: {
+      async quarantine_service() { entries += 1; throw new Error("unexpected provider re-entry"); },
+      async rotate_token() { entries += 1; throw new Error("unexpected provider re-entry"); },
+    },
+    async reconcile() {
+      return existsSync(join(root, "provider-applied"))
+        ? { effect: "applied", result: { rotated: true } } as const
+        : { effect: "possible", cause: "unknown" } as const;
+    },
+  });
+```
+
+#### Step 6: Resume the original execution
+
+Decode the persisted reference, reconcile to completion, verify the receipt, and never enter a provider handler twice.
+
+_Pinned source lines 82–91; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  try {
+    const reference = ExecutionReference.decode(await readFile(join(root, "reference.bin")));
+    const result = await auths.resume({ reference, provider });
+    if (result.kind !== "completed" || entries !== 0) throw new Error("recovery re-entered the provider");
+    await verifyReceipt(result.receipt);
+    await writeFile(join(root, "typescript-recovered-receipt.json"), encodeReceipt(result.receipt));
+  } finally {
+    await auths.close();
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 7: Bind two organizations to the exact plan
+
+Require both organization-specific providers and cap the approval policy to the plan's two uses.
+
+_Pinned source lines 93–103; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+async function planApproval() {
+  const providers = [approver("company-a"), approver("company-b")];
+  return {
+    policy: await approval.planOnce({
+      policyId: "approval.cross-company-plan",
+      maxUses: 2,
+      requirements: ["company-a", "company-b"],
+    }),
+    provider: approval.threshold({ threshold: 2, providers }),
+  };
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 8: Echo the approval commitment
+
+Each approval response returns the exact request identifier, transaction digest, and policy it evaluated.
+
+_Pinned source lines 105–116; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+function approver(_organization: string): ApprovalProvider {
+  return {
+    async approve(request) {
+      return {
+        requestId: request.requestId,
+        transactionDigest: request.transactionDigest.slice(),
+        policy: request.policy,
+        decision: "approved",
+      };
+    },
+  };
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 9: Treat every phase as an owned process
+
+Fail on an unsuccessful child phase and reject missing recovery paths.
+
+_Pinned source lines 118–126; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+function runChild(childMode: string, root: string): void {
+  const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, [self, childMode, root], { encoding: "utf8" });
+  if (result.status !== 0) throw new Error(result.stderr || result.stdout || `${childMode} failed`);
+}
+
+function required(value: string | undefined): string {
+  if (value === undefined || value.length === 0) throw new Error("path is required");
+  return value;
+}
+```
+
+### Python recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/05_cross_organization_plan.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/05_cross_organization_plan.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Load recovery and approval tools
+
+Import the process, persistence, approval, profile, and receipt primitives used by the maintained scenario.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–17; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from auths import (
+    Approval,
+    ExecutionReference,
+)
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import McpHandlerOutcome, mcp
+from auths.verify import decode_receipt, encode_receipt, verify_receipt
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Bind two organizations to the exact plan
+
+Each organization echoes the exact approval request, and the threshold policy requires both responses.
+
+_Pinned source lines 20–35; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+class OrganizationApproval:
+    def __init__(self, organization: str) -> None:
+        self.organization = organization
+
+    async def approve(self, request):
+        return Approval.response(request, decision="approved")
+
+
+def plan_approval():
+    providers = (OrganizationApproval("company-a"), OrganizationApproval("company-b"))
+    return Approval.plan_once(
+        "approval.cross-company-plan",
+        Approval.threshold(providers, threshold=2),
+        max_uses=2,
+        requirements=("company-a", "company-b"),
+    )
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Model a provider-unknown outcome
+
+The first provider records that rotation may have applied rather than claiming success or retrying.
+
+_Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+async def phase_one(root: Path) -> None:
+    async def quarantine_service(_arguments, _context):
+        return {"quarantined": True}
+
+    async def rotate_token(_arguments, _context):
+        (root / "provider-applied").write_text("applied", encoding="utf-8")
+        return McpHandlerOutcome("possible", cause="unknown")
+
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(
+        tools={
+            "quarantine_service": quarantine_service,
+            "rotate_token": rotate_token,
+        }
+    )
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Construct the recoverable ordered plan
+
+Open durable state and commit quarantine followed by rotation in one exact order.
+
+_Pinned source lines 52–65; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    async with development.create_recoverable_auths(
+        directory=root,
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+        approval=plan_approval(),
+    ) as auths:
+        plan = mcp.plan(
+            (
+                mcp.call_tool(
+                    name="quarantine_service",
+                    arguments={"region": "eu-west-2"},
+                ),
+                mcp.call_tool(name="rotate_token", arguments={"region": "eu-west-2"}),
+            )
+        )
+```
+
+#### Step 5: Stop and persist recovery state
+
+Require one completed member, then persist the execution reference and completed receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 66–80; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        result = await auths.execute(
+            plan=plan, provider=provider, request_id="incident-plan"
+        )
+        if (
+            result.kind != "recoverable"
+            or result.reference is None
+            or len(result.completed_receipts) != 1
+        ):
+            raise RuntimeError("ordered plan did not stop with one completed member")
+        (root / "reference.bin").write_bytes(
+            result.reference.to_bytes()
+        )
+        (root / "python-receipt.json").write_bytes(
+            encode_receipt(result.completed_receipts[0])
+        )
+```
+
+#### Step 6: Define reconciliation without provider re-entry
+
+After restart, direct handler entry is an error; reconciliation inspects the provider-specific evidence.
+
+_Pinned source lines 83–95; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+async def phase_two(root: Path) -> None:
+    entries = 0
+
+    async def no_reentry(_arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal entries
+        entries += 1
+        raise RuntimeError("unexpected provider re-entry")
+
+    async def reconcile(_execution_id, _service):
+        if (root / "provider-applied").exists():
+            return McpHandlerOutcome("applied", result={"rotated": True})
+        return McpHandlerOutcome("possible", cause="unknown")
+```
+
+#### Step 7: Reopen the same durable runtime
+
+Recreate the same authority and approval policy with handlers that must remain unreachable.
+
+_Pinned source lines 96–107; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(
+        tools={
+            "quarantine_service": no_reentry,
+            "rotate_token": no_reentry,
+        },
+        reconcile=reconcile,
+    )
+    async with development.create_recoverable_auths(
+        directory=root,
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+        approval=plan_approval(),
+    ) as auths:
+```
+
+#### Step 8: Resume the original execution
+
+Decode the persisted reference, reconcile to completion, verify the receipt, and persist it.
+
+_Pinned source lines 108–117; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        result = await auths.resume(
+            reference=ExecutionReference.from_bytes((root / "reference.bin").read_bytes()),
+            provider=provider,
+        )
+        if result.kind != "completed" or entries != 0:
+            raise RuntimeError("recovery re-entered the provider")
+        verify_receipt(result.receipt)
+        (root / "python-recovered-receipt.json").write_bytes(
+            encode_receipt(result.receipt)
+        )
+```
+
+#### Step 9: Route each owned phase
+
+Run either verification or a durable execution phase in a separate process invocation.
+
+_Pinned source lines 120–136; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+def run_child(mode: str, root: Path) -> None:
+    subprocess.run([sys.executable, __file__, mode, str(root)], check=True)
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    mode = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None
+    path = Path(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) > 2 else None
+    if mode == "verify" and path is not None:
+        verify_receipt(decode_receipt(path.read_bytes()))
+        print(json.dumps({"outcome": "verified-portable-receipt"}))
+        return
+    if mode == "phase-one" and path is not None:
+        await phase_one(path)
+        return
+    if mode == "phase-two" and path is not None:
+        await phase_two(path)
+        return
+```
+
+#### Step 10: Orchestrate both sides of the restart
+
+Use a configured durable directory or an isolated temporary one, then run both phases in order.
+
+_Pinned source lines 137–147; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    configured = os.environ.get("AUTHS_RECIPE_OUTPUT")
+    if configured is not None:
+        root = Path(configured)
+        root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        run_child("phase-one", root)
+        run_child("phase-two", root)
+    else:
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="auths-recipe-five-py-") as directory:
+            root = Path(directory)
+            run_child("phase-one", root)
+            run_child("phase-two", root)
+```
+
+#### Step 11: Report the no-duplicate outcome
+
+Emit the declared completed-after-restart result through the owned asynchronous entry point.
+
+_Pinned source lines 148–160; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "05-cross-organization-plan",
+                "outcome": "completed-after-restart",
+                "duplicateEntries": 0,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
+
+The recipe models two organizations approving the same two-member incident
+plan. The first member quarantines a service. The second rotates a token and
+returns an ambiguous provider outcome. The workflow persists one completed
+receipt and a recovery reference, restarts, reconciles the second operation,
+and completes without re-entering either provider handler.
+
+This is not a simulated happy-path sequence. The important behavior is the
+stop between members and the absence of duplicate provider entry after
+restart.
+
+## What the plan commits to
 
-Understand where formal attenuation evidence applies and where it does not.
+Every satisfied branch binds the same canonical action meaning, audience,
+challenge, validity context, profile, and plan identity. The verifier also
+applies an independent local composition requirement. That requirement can
+pin an expected plan and require minimum authorized branches, distinct actors,
+or distinct trust roots.
+
+V1 supports bounded `Proof`, `AllOf`, `AnyOf`, and `KOfN` plans. A signed
+`KOfN` shape is not enough by itself: local policy decides whether the
+authorized branches provide the required diversity.
+
+## Preserve order through failure
+
+For an ordered effect plan:
+
+1. Verify and approve the exact plan.
+2. Reserve the next member atomically.
+3. Execute only that member's opaque command.
+4. Persist its outcome and receipt.
+5. Advance only after a terminal result permits it.
 
-## What the claim says
+If member two becomes provider-unknown, do not start member three, mark the
+plan completed, or replay member one. Persist the recovery reference and
+reconcile member two first.
 
-Lean and translation qualification reason about declared models and refinements; they do not prove every provider, store, network, UI, or deployment behavior.
+## Mutation invalidates approval
+
+Changing an operation, resource, arguments, member order, approval policy, or
+plan membership changes the committed transaction. Previously collected
+approval responses must not carry over.
+
+Substitution should fail before signing or provider entry. If an approval
+provider is unavailable, the workflow remains non-executable; it does not
+silently reduce the threshold.
+
+## Production design questions
+
+Before deploying a multi-party plan, answer:
+
+- Who owns each approval key and how is it protected?
+- Which exact organizations, actors, or roots satisfy diversity requirements?
+- How long are approval responses valid?
+- Where are plan/member reservations stored atomically?
+- Which member outcomes permit the next member to begin?
+- How does each provider reconcile an ambiguous response?
+- Which receipt views may each organization inspect?
 
-## Release evidence
+Auths can bind and verify the answers. It cannot decide organizational intent
+or make two remote providers one atomic transaction.
 
-Claim: `auths.claim.attenuation/1` · status `passing`
+## Continue
 
-Delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent under the maintained model and adversarial fixtures.
+- [Replay, recovery, and provider uncertainty](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Receipts and bounded disclosure](/guides/receipts-and-disclosure)
+- [Authority plans](/guides/authority-model#authorization-plans)
+- [Authority model](/guides/authority-model)
 
-Evidence: `formal/qualification.lean`
+---
 
-SHA-256: `fb1fd17d377194e96f98313412052f82fbb43cb594b12eb6a9fa0e0dce3ce70c`
+<!-- route: /guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown; source: guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown.mdx; section: guides -->
+# Know whether another attempt is safe
+
+Authorization can be deterministic while execution is not. A remote provider
+may apply an operation and lose the response. A process may crash after
+delivery but before recording completion. Treating either case as a normal
+failure and retrying can perform the effect twice.
+
+Auths keeps authorization, durable execution state, and provider observation
+as separate facts so the runtime can say what is known rather than collapse
+everything into success or failure.
+
+## Start with the outcome table
+
+| Outcome | Could the provider have been entered? | Correct response |
+| --- | ---: | --- |
+| denied | no | Change the action, authority, or trusted facts before trying again |
+| indeterminate | no | Acquire the missing trustworthy fact, then verify anew |
+| exact replay | a prior execution already finished | Return the recorded result; do not re-enter |
+| recoverable | possibly | Resume the same execution reference |
+| provider unknown | yes | Reconcile the same execution; do not blindly retry |
+
+This table is more useful than a generic `retryable` boolean because it keeps
+effect uncertainty explicit.
+
+## See restart and reconciliation in one recipe
+
+> Product-owned recipe `05-cross-organization-plan` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed-after-restart`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
+
+### TypeScript recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/05-cross-organization-plan.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Load recovery and approval tools
+
+Import the filesystem, child-process, approval, profile, and receipt primitives used by the maintained scenario.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–13; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
+import { mkdtemp, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import {
+  approval,
+  ExecutionReference,
+} from "@auths-dev/sdk";
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
+import { decodeReceipt, encodeReceipt, verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Route the restart phases
+
+The same source can verify a receipt, run either durable phase, or orchestrate both across process boundaries.
+
+_Pinned source lines 15–33; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+const self = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
+const mode = process.argv[2];
+const directory = process.argv[3];
+type ApprovalProvider = Parameters<typeof approval.threshold>[0]["providers"][number];
+
+if (mode === "verify") {
+  const receipt = decodeReceipt(await readFile(required(directory)));
+  await verifyReceipt(receipt);
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ outcome: "verified-portable-receipt" }));
+} else if (mode === "phase-one") {
+  await phaseOne(required(directory));
+} else if (mode === "phase-two") {
+  await phaseTwo(required(directory));
+} else {
+  const root = process.env.AUTHS_RECIPE_OUTPUT ?? await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "auths-recipe-five-ts-"));
+  runChild("phase-one", root);
+  runChild("phase-two", root);
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "05-cross-organization-plan", outcome: "completed-after-restart", duplicateEntries: 0 }));
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Model a provider-unknown outcome
+
+The first runtime records that token rotation may have applied instead of claiming success or retrying.
+
+_Pinned source lines 35–47; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+async function phaseOne(root: string): Promise<void> {
+  const auths = await development.createRecoverableAuths({
+    directory: root,
+    authority: mcp.allowTools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+    approval: await planApproval(),
+  });
+  const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({ tools: {
+    async quarantine_service() { return { quarantined: true }; },
+    async rotate_token() {
+      await writeFile(join(root, "provider-applied"), "applied", { flag: "wx" });
+      return { effect: "possible", cause: "unknown" } as const;
+    },
+  } });
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Stop the ordered plan and persist recovery state
+
+Execute the exact two-member plan, require one completed member, then persist its reference and receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 48–62; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  try {
+    const plan = await mcp.plan([
+      mcp.callTool({ name: "quarantine_service", arguments: { region: "eu-west-2" } }),
+      mcp.callTool({ name: "rotate_token", arguments: { region: "eu-west-2" } }),
+    ]);
+    const result = await auths.execute({ plan, provider, requestId: "incident-plan" });
+    if (result.kind !== "recoverable" || result.reference === undefined || result.completedReceipts.length !== 1) {
+      throw new Error("ordered plan did not stop with one completed member");
+    }
+    await writeFile(join(root, "reference.bin"), result.reference.encode());
+    await writeFile(join(root, "typescript-receipt.json"), encodeReceipt(result.completedReceipts[0]!));
+  } finally {
+    await auths.close();
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 5: Configure reconciliation without provider re-entry
+
+After restart, direct handler entry is an error; only the provider-specific reconcile path may classify the prior attempt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 64–81; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+async function phaseTwo(root: string): Promise<void> {
+  const auths = await development.createRecoverableAuths({
+    directory: root,
+    authority: mcp.allowTools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+    approval: await planApproval(),
+  });
+  let entries = 0;
+  const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({
+    tools: {
+      async quarantine_service() { entries += 1; throw new Error("unexpected provider re-entry"); },
+      async rotate_token() { entries += 1; throw new Error("unexpected provider re-entry"); },
+    },
+    async reconcile() {
+      return existsSync(join(root, "provider-applied"))
+        ? { effect: "applied", result: { rotated: true } } as const
+        : { effect: "possible", cause: "unknown" } as const;
+    },
+  });
+```
+
+#### Step 6: Resume the original execution
+
+Decode the persisted reference, reconcile to completion, verify the receipt, and never enter a provider handler twice.
+
+_Pinned source lines 82–91; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  try {
+    const reference = ExecutionReference.decode(await readFile(join(root, "reference.bin")));
+    const result = await auths.resume({ reference, provider });
+    if (result.kind !== "completed" || entries !== 0) throw new Error("recovery re-entered the provider");
+    await verifyReceipt(result.receipt);
+    await writeFile(join(root, "typescript-recovered-receipt.json"), encodeReceipt(result.receipt));
+  } finally {
+    await auths.close();
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 7: Bind two organizations to the exact plan
+
+Require both organization-specific providers and cap the approval policy to the plan's two uses.
+
+_Pinned source lines 93–103; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+async function planApproval() {
+  const providers = [approver("company-a"), approver("company-b")];
+  return {
+    policy: await approval.planOnce({
+      policyId: "approval.cross-company-plan",
+      maxUses: 2,
+      requirements: ["company-a", "company-b"],
+    }),
+    provider: approval.threshold({ threshold: 2, providers }),
+  };
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 8: Echo the approval commitment
+
+Each approval response returns the exact request identifier, transaction digest, and policy it evaluated.
+
+_Pinned source lines 105–116; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+function approver(_organization: string): ApprovalProvider {
+  return {
+    async approve(request) {
+      return {
+        requestId: request.requestId,
+        transactionDigest: request.transactionDigest.slice(),
+        policy: request.policy,
+        decision: "approved",
+      };
+    },
+  };
+}
+```
+
+#### Step 9: Treat every phase as an owned process
+
+Fail on an unsuccessful child phase and reject missing recovery paths.
+
+_Pinned source lines 118–126; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+function runChild(childMode: string, root: string): void {
+  const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, [self, childMode, root], { encoding: "utf8" });
+  if (result.status !== 0) throw new Error(result.stderr || result.stdout || `${childMode} failed`);
+}
+
+function required(value: string | undefined): string {
+  if (value === undefined || value.length === 0) throw new Error("path is required");
+  return value;
+}
+```
+
+### Python recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/05_cross_organization_plan.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/05_cross_organization_plan.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Load recovery and approval tools
+
+Import the process, persistence, approval, profile, and receipt primitives used by the maintained scenario.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–17; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from auths import (
+    Approval,
+    ExecutionReference,
+)
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import McpHandlerOutcome, mcp
+from auths.verify import decode_receipt, encode_receipt, verify_receipt
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Bind two organizations to the exact plan
+
+Each organization echoes the exact approval request, and the threshold policy requires both responses.
+
+_Pinned source lines 20–35; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+class OrganizationApproval:
+    def __init__(self, organization: str) -> None:
+        self.organization = organization
+
+    async def approve(self, request):
+        return Approval.response(request, decision="approved")
+
+
+def plan_approval():
+    providers = (OrganizationApproval("company-a"), OrganizationApproval("company-b"))
+    return Approval.plan_once(
+        "approval.cross-company-plan",
+        Approval.threshold(providers, threshold=2),
+        max_uses=2,
+        requirements=("company-a", "company-b"),
+    )
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Model a provider-unknown outcome
+
+The first provider records that rotation may have applied rather than claiming success or retrying.
+
+_Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+async def phase_one(root: Path) -> None:
+    async def quarantine_service(_arguments, _context):
+        return {"quarantined": True}
+
+    async def rotate_token(_arguments, _context):
+        (root / "provider-applied").write_text("applied", encoding="utf-8")
+        return McpHandlerOutcome("possible", cause="unknown")
+
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(
+        tools={
+            "quarantine_service": quarantine_service,
+            "rotate_token": rotate_token,
+        }
+    )
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Construct the recoverable ordered plan
+
+Open durable state and commit quarantine followed by rotation in one exact order.
+
+_Pinned source lines 52–65; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    async with development.create_recoverable_auths(
+        directory=root,
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+        approval=plan_approval(),
+    ) as auths:
+        plan = mcp.plan(
+            (
+                mcp.call_tool(
+                    name="quarantine_service",
+                    arguments={"region": "eu-west-2"},
+                ),
+                mcp.call_tool(name="rotate_token", arguments={"region": "eu-west-2"}),
+            )
+        )
+```
+
+#### Step 5: Stop and persist recovery state
+
+Require one completed member, then persist the execution reference and completed receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 66–80; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        result = await auths.execute(
+            plan=plan, provider=provider, request_id="incident-plan"
+        )
+        if (
+            result.kind != "recoverable"
+            or result.reference is None
+            or len(result.completed_receipts) != 1
+        ):
+            raise RuntimeError("ordered plan did not stop with one completed member")
+        (root / "reference.bin").write_bytes(
+            result.reference.to_bytes()
+        )
+        (root / "python-receipt.json").write_bytes(
+            encode_receipt(result.completed_receipts[0])
+        )
+```
+
+#### Step 6: Define reconciliation without provider re-entry
+
+After restart, direct handler entry is an error; reconciliation inspects the provider-specific evidence.
+
+_Pinned source lines 83–95; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+async def phase_two(root: Path) -> None:
+    entries = 0
+
+    async def no_reentry(_arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal entries
+        entries += 1
+        raise RuntimeError("unexpected provider re-entry")
+
+    async def reconcile(_execution_id, _service):
+        if (root / "provider-applied").exists():
+            return McpHandlerOutcome("applied", result={"rotated": True})
+        return McpHandlerOutcome("possible", cause="unknown")
+```
+
+#### Step 7: Reopen the same durable runtime
+
+Recreate the same authority and approval policy with handlers that must remain unreachable.
+
+_Pinned source lines 96–107; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(
+        tools={
+            "quarantine_service": no_reentry,
+            "rotate_token": no_reentry,
+        },
+        reconcile=reconcile,
+    )
+    async with development.create_recoverable_auths(
+        directory=root,
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["quarantine_service", "rotate_token"]),
+        approval=plan_approval(),
+    ) as auths:
+```
+
+#### Step 8: Resume the original execution
+
+Decode the persisted reference, reconcile to completion, verify the receipt, and persist it.
+
+_Pinned source lines 108–117; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        result = await auths.resume(
+            reference=ExecutionReference.from_bytes((root / "reference.bin").read_bytes()),
+            provider=provider,
+        )
+        if result.kind != "completed" or entries != 0:
+            raise RuntimeError("recovery re-entered the provider")
+        verify_receipt(result.receipt)
+        (root / "python-recovered-receipt.json").write_bytes(
+            encode_receipt(result.receipt)
+        )
+```
+
+#### Step 9: Route each owned phase
+
+Run either verification or a durable execution phase in a separate process invocation.
+
+_Pinned source lines 120–136; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+def run_child(mode: str, root: Path) -> None:
+    subprocess.run([sys.executable, __file__, mode, str(root)], check=True)
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    mode = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None
+    path = Path(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) > 2 else None
+    if mode == "verify" and path is not None:
+        verify_receipt(decode_receipt(path.read_bytes()))
+        print(json.dumps({"outcome": "verified-portable-receipt"}))
+        return
+    if mode == "phase-one" and path is not None:
+        await phase_one(path)
+        return
+    if mode == "phase-two" and path is not None:
+        await phase_two(path)
+        return
+```
+
+#### Step 10: Orchestrate both sides of the restart
+
+Use a configured durable directory or an isolated temporary one, then run both phases in order.
+
+_Pinned source lines 137–147; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    configured = os.environ.get("AUTHS_RECIPE_OUTPUT")
+    if configured is not None:
+        root = Path(configured)
+        root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        run_child("phase-one", root)
+        run_child("phase-two", root)
+    else:
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="auths-recipe-five-py-") as directory:
+            root = Path(directory)
+            run_child("phase-one", root)
+            run_child("phase-two", root)
+```
+
+#### Step 11: Report the no-duplicate outcome
+
+Emit the declared completed-after-restart result through the owned asynchronous entry point.
+
+_Pinned source lines 148–160; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "05-cross-organization-plan",
+                "outcome": "completed-after-restart",
+                "duplicateEntries": 0,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
+
+The recipe completes the first member of an ordered plan, records uncertainty
+for the second, closes the process, opens the durable state again, and resumes
+from the saved execution reference. The recovery provider exposes a
+reconciliation operation but its effect handlers throw if entered. Completion
+with zero new entries proves recovery did not replay either member.
+
+## Preserve one execution identity
+
+Request identifiers, command commitments, and profile idempotency keys serve
+different purposes. The durable store must atomically distinguish:
 
-Reproduce:
+- a new execution identity;
+- an exact replay of the same command; and
+- a conflicting attempt that reuses an identity for different bytes.
 
-- `cargo xtask formal`
+Only an exact replay may return the recorded result. A conflict must fail
+closed. Do not generate a new request identifier to escape an uncertain prior
+attempt; that discards the link needed for reconciliation.
+
+## Resume is not retry
+
+Resume loads an authenticated, bounded reference to existing execution state.
+It continues the state machine from the last durable checkpoint. It must not
+re-run authorization-independent application code, reacquire a credential for
+an already-entered command, or call completed plan members again.
 
-Scope: Attenuation relations represented by the maintained formal model and protocol profile.
+Reconciliation asks the profile's provider adapter for fresh, operation-specific
+evidence: for example, whether a token now has the expected version or whether
+a rollout reached the committed object revision. A generic HTTP status check
+cannot decide every domain's outcome.
 
-Limitation: The claim covers the modelled fields and maintained protocol profile, not arbitrary application-defined semantics.
+## Stop conditions for operators
 
-## What remains true
+Stop automatic processing when:
 
-The checked theorem statements, axioms, translations, and source closure must match the selected release.
+- durable execution state is unavailable;
+- the stored command commitment conflicts with the requested action;
+- the profile cannot establish whether the provider applied the operation;
+- fresh observation contradicts the expected postcondition; or
+- reconciliation itself returns another ambiguous result.
+
+Retain the state as unknown and escalate. Do not translate the absence of
+evidence to released capacity or successful completion.
+
+## Production requirements
+
+In-memory development state cannot provide this guarantee across restart or
+multiple hosts. A production store needs atomic compare-and-set semantics over
+the entire deployment scope, durable checkpoints, unique execution identities,
+and tested crash behavior.
 
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
+Provider gateways need domain idempotency and a reconciliation contract.
+Secret credentials must remain behind the gateway. Telemetry should record
+state transitions and bounded commitments without copying provider bodies,
+proofs, signatures, or credentials.
 
-Model drift, unreviewed axioms, stale generated translations, or code outside the refinement boundary changes the assurance scope.
+Auths does not claim that a local transaction and a remote provider effect are
+atomic. It gives the application enough truthful state to recover from that
+fact.
 
 ## Continue
 
-Pair formal evidence with adversarial, differential, and operational qualification.
+- [Approvals and ordered plans](/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans)
+- [Receipts and disclosure](/guides/receipts-and-disclosure)
+- [Production integration](/guides/production-integration)
+- [Results and recovery reference](/reference/decisions-errors)
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.formal/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+---
 
+<!-- route: /guides/receipts-and-disclosure; source: guides/receipts-and-disclosure.mdx; section: guides -->
+# Keep proof of an effect without publishing its payload
 
+An Auths receipt is portable evidence about a decision or execution. It is not
+necessarily a human-readable audit report. The signed form commits to facts so
+that another process or language can verify integrity, while application-owned
+disclosure decides which underlying details a viewer may see.
 
----
+## Distinguish the two receipt moments
 
-# Limitations
+| Receipt | Created when | What it can establish |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Decision receipt | After authorization and required outer gates | Which exact authority, action, context, and plan were accepted or rejected |
+| Execution receipt | After the provider path reaches a recorded outcome | Which command commitment ran, how it ended, and how it relates to the decision |
 
-Read the boundaries that Auths evidence deliberately does not claim to cross.
+A valid decision receipt does not prove that a provider effect happened. A
+transport acknowledgment does not replace an execution receipt. An execution
+receipt should be interpreted alongside its decision binding and profile
+semantics.
 
-## What the claim says
+The exact-action recipe verifies its completed receipt as part of the workflow:
 
-Auths evidence does not certify production availability, every adapter, every cloud, every application profile, business intent, compliance, or universal correctness.
+> Product-owned recipe `03-execute-exact-action` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
 
-## Release evidence
+### TypeScript recipe
 
-Claim: `auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1` · status `passing`
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
 
-Rust owns protocol meaning used by Rust, TypeScript, and Python projections.
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
 
-Evidence: `release/semantic-freeze.json`
+Register the only provider operation and create development authority for that exact tool name.
 
-SHA-256: `75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3`
+_Pinned source lines 1–14; no output is synthesized._
 
-Reproduce:
+```ts
+import { verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
 
-- `cargo xtask semantic-freeze`
+let calls = 0;
+const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({
+  tools: {
+    async publish_report(input) {
+      calls += 1;
+      return { published: input.report };
+    },
+  },
+});
+const auths = await development.createAuths({ authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]) });
+```
 
-Scope: The declared protocol and product semantic identities consumed by maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python surfaces.
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
 
-Limitation: The semantic freeze detects declared semantic drift; it is not a proof that every implementation is defect-free.
+Send the exact profile-owned action, require completion, and verify its returned receipt.
 
-## What remains true
+_Pinned source lines 15–22; no output is synthesized._
 
-Claims remain useful only when their release, checksum, scope, and limitation are carried together.
+```ts
+try {
+  const completed = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "publish_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-success",
+  });
+  if (completed.kind !== "completed") throw new Error(`unexpected result: ${completed.kind}`);
+  await verifyReceipt(completed.receipt);
+```
 
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
 
-Marketing language, stale screenshots, demo success, or an unpinned docs build cannot upgrade or broaden a claim.
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter did not advance.
 
-## Continue
+_Pinned source lines 23–28; no output is synthesized._
 
-Use the open production and field-lab evidence as inputs, then perform deployment-specific threat modelling and external review.
+```ts
+  const denied = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "delete_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-denied",
+  });
+  if (denied.kind !== "denied" || calls !== 1) throw new Error("undeclared effect reached provider");
+```
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.limitations/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+#### Step 4: Report the trace and close owned state
 
+Emit the declared result and close the development runtime even when the workflow throws.
 
+_Pinned source lines 29–32; no output is synthesized._
 
----
+```ts
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "03-execute-exact-action", outcome: completed.kind, denied: true, calls }));
+} finally {
+  await auths.close();
+}
+```
 
-# Semantics
+### Python recipe
 
-Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.
+> **Qualification blocked — Python source does not match the pinned public API.**
+>
+> The pinned recipe imports `verify_receipt` from `auths`, while the pinned installed API exports it only from `auths.verify`. The source is retained for review but must not be presented as runnable until the product recipe is corrected and re-executed.
 
-## What the claim says
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
 
-The claim covers ownership of protocol meaning across maintained SDK projections, not defect-free code or every application adapter.
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
 
-## Release evidence
+Register the only provider operation and count every entry into that effect boundary.
 
-Claim: `auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1` · status `passing`
+_Pinned source lines 1–19; no output is synthesized._
 
-Rust owns protocol meaning used by Rust, TypeScript, and Python projections.
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
 
-Evidence: `release/semantic-freeze.json`
+import asyncio
+import json
 
-SHA-256: `75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3`
+from auths import verify_receipt
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import mcp
 
-Reproduce:
 
-- `cargo xtask semantic-freeze`
+async def main() -> None:
+    calls = 0
 
-Scope: The declared protocol and product semantic identities consumed by maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python surfaces.
+    async def publish_report(arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal calls
+        calls += 1
+        return {"published": arguments["report"]}
 
-Limitation: The semantic freeze detects declared semantic drift; it is not a proof that every implementation is defect-free.
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(tools={"publish_report": publish_report})
+```
 
-## What remains true
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
 
-A declaration change must update semantic identity or version, packaged projections, fixtures, and documentation together.
+Open the owned development session, execute the exact action, and verify its receipt.
 
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
+_Pinned source lines 20–30; no output is synthesized._
 
-Unrecorded semantic drift, language-owned authorization logic, or a fixture disagreement degrades or withdraws the claim.
+```python
+    async with development.create_auths(
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"])
+    ) as auths:
+        completed = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="publish_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-success",
+        )
+        if completed.kind != "completed":
+            raise RuntimeError(f"unexpected result: {completed.kind}")
+        verify_receipt(completed.receipt)
+```
 
-## Continue
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
 
-Inspect cross-language evidence and the generated SDK reference for the selected release.
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter stayed at one.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.semantics/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+_Pinned source lines 31–37; no output is synthesized._
 
+```python
+        denied = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="delete_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-denied",
+        )
+        if denied.kind != "denied" or calls != 1:
+            raise RuntimeError("undeclared effect reached provider")
+```
 
+#### Step 4: Report the trace through the owned entry point
 
----
+Leave the session before emitting the declared result, then run the asynchronous entry point.
 
-# Supply chain
+_Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized._
 
-Inspect the recorded SLSA builder assessment without mistaking it for an independent audit.
+```python
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "03-execute-exact-action",
+                "outcome": "completed",
+                "denied": True,
+                "calls": calls,
+            }
+        )
+    )
 
-## What the claim says
 
-The assessment covers the declared GitHub release builder and recorded SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 controls.
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
 
-## Release evidence
+## Verify before interpreting
 
-Claim: `auths.claim.supply-chain/1` · status `passing`
+Receipt verification checks bounded canonical bytes, identifiers, signatures,
+and bindings. Inspection then returns an inert projection. It cannot recreate a
+verified command, reopen a gateway, or become authority for another effect.
 
-The assessed release builder satisfies the recorded SLSA Build Level 3 requirements.
+Treat an invalid receipt as untrusted input. Do not display its claims as
+verified merely because the JSON envelope was parseable.
 
-Evidence: `release/slsa-build-level-3-assessment.json`
+## Choose a disclosure view deliberately
 
-SHA-256: `49d5a096915d49058c8c66f29c5c7f59181caa0783d4724322068de6c5c3f6bf`
+A useful application commonly exposes three levels:
 
-Reproduce:
+1. **Opaque public view:** validity, receipt identifiers, commitments, signer
+   descriptors, timestamps, outcome class, and other non-sensitive metadata.
+2. **Authorized summary:** profile-owned explanation such as “quarantined the
+   Northstar service in `eu-west-2`,” without canonical payload bytes.
+3. **Authorized full view:** exact canonical action and bounded provider
+   evidence for incident response, audit, or dispute handling.
 
-- `cargo test -p xtask release_control::tests::checked_in_slsa_assessment_matches_builder_bytes`
+The signed receipt stays commitment-only. Sensitive command material can be
+stored separately as encrypted disclosure material, authenticated against the
+tenant and receipt identity. The inspector verifies both the receipt and the
+disclosure binding before releasing a view.
 
-Scope: The assessed GitHub release builder and recorded SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 controls.
+This prevents the receipt stream from becoming a second database of customer
+payloads, infrastructure names, report contents, or provider responses.
 
-Limitation: This is a repository-owner delegated build assessment, not an independent security audit or source-correctness proof.
+## Application responsibilities
 
-## What remains true
+Auths can produce and verify the cryptographic structures; the application
+still owns:
 
-Builder bytes, provenance subjects, workflow identity, and release artifacts must match their checksummed assessment.
+- viewer authentication and authorization;
+- encryption keys and rotation;
+- retention and deletion policy;
+- tenant isolation;
+- redaction and field classification;
+- audit access logging; and
+- legal or regulatory requirements.
 
-## What would weaken or withdraw it
+Do not put private keys, provider credentials, raw proofs, signatures, or
+unbounded response bodies into disclosure material. A “full” view is still a
+bounded profile-owned view, not an unrestricted dump.
 
-A changed builder, missing provenance, unverified subject, or stale assessment withdraws passing status.
+## Failure and recovery behavior
 
-## Continue
+If required receipt persistence fails before provider entry, stop without
+executing. If persistence fails after the provider may have been entered, the
+runtime must preserve an ambiguous or recoverable state rather than claim
+denial.
 
-Verify promotion evidence and obtain independent review appropriate to the deployment's consequence.
+If disclosure decryption or authorization fails, return the opaque verified
+view or no view according to application policy. Never weaken receipt
+verification because a viewer has privileged application credentials.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.assurance.supply-chain/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+Receipt verification itself is effect-free and safe to repeat. Re-executing an
+effect based on a receipt is not.
 
+## Continue
 
+- [Replay and recovery](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Production integration](/guides/production-integration)
+- [Evidence, status, assurance, and registries](/reference/evidence-status-assurance)
+- [TypeScript verification surface](/reference/typescript)
 
 ---
 
-# Authority
+<!-- route: /guides/production-integration; source: guides/production-integration.mdx; section: guides -->
+# Turn the development workflow into an honest production boundary
 
-Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
+The high-level SDK makes the first integration small on purpose. Its
+development composition uses ephemeral keys and in-memory state. Production is
+not a flag that makes those mechanisms durable; it is a set of explicit
+substitutions around the same verified core.
 
-## Recommended: [Authority model](/authority/model)
+Auths is prelaunch and pre-audit. The repository contains production-shaped
+mechanisms and references, not a claim that a hosted production service is
+available or independently reviewed.
 
-Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
+## Begin with an effect inventory
 
-## Model
+For each operation, write down:
 
-- [Authority model](/authority/model) — Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
+- exact application action and canonical body;
+- profile and version;
+- permission, resource, audience, validity, uses, and budgets;
+- identity, status, and assurance facts required;
+- signer and approval custody;
+- atomic reservation scope;
+- least-privilege provider credential;
+- irreversible provider entry point;
+- possible provider outcomes and reconciliation evidence; and
+- decision, execution, and disclosure retention.
 
-## Author and narrow
+If two effects require different evidence, credential scopes, provider
+commands, obligations, or reconciliation, treat them as separate profiles.
 
-- [Create](/authority/create) — Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.
-- [Constraints](/authority/constraints) — Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.
-- [Delegate](/authority/delegate) — Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.
+## Replace the development mechanisms
 
-## Lifecycle
+### Durable state
 
-- [Lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle) — Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.
-- [Plans](/authority/plans) — Commit multiple ordered operations as one reviewable plan.
+Use an atomic reservation store that distinguishes new execution, exact
+replay, and conflicting reuse in one transaction across your deployment
+scope. A single-process SQLite or JSON store can be a useful reference but does
+not prove multi-host coordination.
 
-## Execute and recover
+Test concurrency, crash-before-delivery, crash-after-delivery, restart, and
+reconciliation. If the store is unavailable, fail before entering the
+provider.
 
-- [Execute](/authority/execute) — Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
-- [Resume](/authority/resume) — Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.
+### Custody
 
-## Verify and inspect
+Use a signer backed by an HSM, KMS, WebAuthn authenticator, or another
+appropriate non-exporting boundary. The signer receives a bounded signing
+request and must return the matching request identity, transaction digest,
+signature, and control evidence. It must not canonicalize new Auths objects or
+broaden the requested authority.
 
-- [Verify](/authority/verify) — Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.
-- [Receipts](/authority/receipts) — Use signed decision and execution receipts as portable integrity evidence.
+### Closed profile and provider gateway
 
-## Profiles
+Use a qualified profile for the exact domain. Keep endpoints, headers,
+credentials, generic HTTP methods, SQL text, manifests, and provider-specific
+commands out of the public request. The gateway derives one allowed provider
+operation from the opaque verified command.
 
-- [Profiles](/authority/profiles) — Map application actions, resources, inputs, budgets, commands, and receipts without coupling adjacent components.
+Acquire the narrow credential only after authorization and durable
+reservation. Re-read critical provider state when the profile requires it.
 
-## Related topics
+### Evidence and live acquisition
 
-- [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
+Keep network resolution outside deterministic verification. Resolver and
+status adapters return bounded bytes with provenance, version, fetch time, and
+expiry. The trusted context commits to the exact executable adapter and
+registry configuration.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority/1 · Product contract: auths.page.authority/1_
+### Receipts and disclosure
 
+Persist decision and execution receipts according to policy. Store sensitive
+canonical action or provider evidence separately and encrypted when it must be
+recoverable. Authorize summary and full views independently of receipt
+signature verification.
 
+## Make uncertainty operational
 
----
+Your provider adapter must classify whether an effect was definitely not
+attempted, completed, rejected, or possibly applied. An ambiguous result stays
+`outcome-unknown` until domain-specific reconciliation produces trustworthy
+observation.
 
-# Constraints
+Do not secretly retry signers, approval providers, stores, or gateways. The
+application owns backoff and escalation based on the SDK's retry class and
+effect state.
 
-Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.
+## Observe without leaking
 
-## Model
+Useful telemetry includes bounded operation/profile identities, result class,
+stable code, stage, commitments, latency, work totals, retry class, and
+correlation identity. Exclude credentials, keys, signatures, proof bytes,
+canonical application bodies, provider response bodies, and uncontrolled
+high-cardinality values.
 
-Constraints form a conjunction: every bound must permit the request. Action and resource describe the effect; validity limits time; uses and budget limit consumption; depth limits delegation; audience limits the intended verifier or executor; critical extensions add profile-owned restrictions.
+Telemetry exporter failure must not turn a denial into authorization or change
+an execution result.
 
-## What remains true
+## Release and support gate
 
-Omitting a bound never means that a child may invent a broader one. Critical extensions must be understood and attenuated according to their declared semantics. Application profiles own canonical resource and action interpretation.
+Before launch:
 
-## Where it fails closed
+1. Pin the SDK artifact, lockfile, ABI, runtime contract, profile, and adapters.
+2. Run installed-artifact and adapter conformance against exactly what ships.
+3. Validate TypeScript and Python parity where both are supported.
+4. Exercise hostile inputs, concurrency, crash, recovery, and secret-scanning
+   paths.
+5. Establish monitoring, on-call ownership, key recovery, receipt retention,
+   and incident procedures.
+6. Obtain independent security review appropriate to the effect's consequence.
 
-Action or resource mismatch, early or late time, exhausted use, insufficient budget, excessive depth, wrong audience, and unknown or widened critical extensions each produce a stable denial before the provider is reached.
+Auths does not promise remote exactly-once execution, instantaneous global
+revocation, or atomicity between your transaction and a provider. A production
+integration must expose and manage those limits.
 
 ## Continue
 
-Use the smallest combination that expresses the effect; keep policy engines outside this artifact and commit only their required evidence.
+- [Build and qualify adapters](/guides/adapter-authoring)
+- [Replay and provider uncertainty](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown)
+- [Receipts and disclosure](/guides/receipts-and-disclosure)
+- [Runtime results and recovery reference](/reference/decisions-errors)
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.constraints/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+---
 
+<!-- route: /guides/adapter-authoring; source: guides/adapter-authoring.mdx; section: guides -->
+# Add an integration at the narrowest honest boundary
 
+Auths owns authority. Adapters establish bounded facts or perform a narrowly
+defined mechanism. That rule lets teams swap identity methods, signature
+suites, transports, stores, signers, and providers without letting an adapter
+invent an authorized result.
 
----
+Before writing code, decide whether you need a mechanism adapter or a new
+effect profile. A generic callback is not a shortcut around that distinction.
 
-# Create
+## Classify the extension
 
-Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.
+| Need | Correct boundary | Adapter must not do |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Resolve an identity document | Resolver or identity-method adapter | Add trust or mint a grant |
+| Verify a signature suite | Signature-suite adapter | Choose application permission |
+| Sign with KMS/HSM | Signer/custody adapter | Rewrite the signing request |
+| Coordinate replay/budget state | Atomic reservation store | Treat a conflict as exact replay |
+| Carry identity or proof bytes | Bounded transport | Convert delivery into authorization |
+| Call an effect provider | Qualified profile gateway | Accept arbitrary provider commands |
 
-## Outcome
+If the integration defines canonical action meaning, provider request
+construction, credential scope, outcome classification, reconciliation, or
+receipt claims, it belongs to a domain-specific profile. Build that vertical
+first. Do not place unrelated providers behind one operation tag and a bag of
+optional fields.
 
-An issuer grants one subject the smallest useful action, resource, validity window, use count, budget, audience, and delegation depth.
+## Keep parsing and authority separate
 
-## Before you begin
+An identity adapter parses and validates its own bounded evidence, then returns
+facts under an exact method and version. A signature-suite adapter verifies the
+exact Rust-produced signing preimage. A resolver returns bounded bytes plus
+provenance, fetch time, expiry, and version.
 
-Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
+None may return `authorized`, create `VerifiedAction`, or reinterpret profile
+semantics. Unknown versions and unsupported features fail closed rather than
+fall back to a similarly named implementation.
 
-## Build the bounded path
+## Respect I/O and trust boundaries
 
-Select a profile action, parse its resource and input, set explicit bounds, author through the native operation, and sign using the configured custody port.
+The deterministic verifier performs no live acquisition. Network, filesystem,
+environment, and credential I/O happen in outer adapters. Feed their bounded
+results into a trusted-context snapshot and bind the executable adapter
+configuration exactly.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+Resolver adapters should deny private-network access by default, cap redirects
+and response bytes, honor cancellation and timeouts, and report freshness.
+Signer adapters should enforce request expiry, object kind, principal
+descriptor, request identity, and transaction digest without exporting private
+keys.
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1`.
+## Prove the contract you claim
 
-## Success means
+Use the public testkit functions for the adapter kind. TypeScript exposes
+conformance entry points such as `certifySigner`, `certifyAtomicStore`,
+`certifyByteTransport`, and `certifyMcpProvider`; Python exposes their idiomatic
+counterparts. Reference pages should generate their exact current signatures
+from installed artifacts.
 
-The resulting artifact is canonical, portable, and accepted identically by Rust, TypeScript, and Python for the permitted request.
+Conformance should include:
 
-## Fail closed
+- maximum-size and boundary-plus-one inputs;
+- malformed and unsupported versions;
+- cancellation and timeout behavior;
+- deterministic identity and metadata;
+- exact request/response binding;
+- concurrency and compare-and-set conflicts for stores;
+- provider denial before credential acquisition;
+- ambiguous outcome and reconciliation behavior for gateways; and
+- redaction of secrets and unbounded remote messages.
 
-Missing bounds, invalid profile input, unsupported critical extensions, wrong audience, or altered bytes cannot be repaired during verification.
+Passing a generic contract does not qualify a new effect profile. Profile
+qualification also requires Rust-owned semantics, fixtures, mutation tests,
+TypeScript/Python parity, provider-request equality, crash tests, receipts, and
+an honest demo.
 
-## Continue
+## Publish support metadata
 
-Execute it directly, or delegate a narrower child without changing the model.
+An adapter should state its implementation identity and version, contract kind
+and version, supported runtimes, support owner, and narrowly worded security
+claims. Separate what Auths tests from what the adapter operator must guarantee.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.create/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+Do not call an adapter “supported,” “qualified,” or “production ready” merely
+because it implements the interface. Those labels require matching executable
+evidence and release policy.
 
+## Failure and retry rules
 
+Adapters return typed, bounded failures. They must not silently retry custody,
+approval, store, or provider operations. The outer application decides whether
+retry is safe from the recorded effect state.
+
+An unavailable fact can make proof verification indeterminate. Invalid
+supplied evidence makes it denied. Neither result can enter a provider.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Authenticate identity](/guides/authenticate-identity)
+- [Execute through a closed profile](/guides/execute-exact-action)
+- [Production integration](/guides/production-integration)
+- [Principal adapter reference](/reference/principal-adapters)
 
 ---
 
-# Delegate
+<!-- route: /examples; source: examples/index.mdx; section: examples -->
+# Examples by security question
 
-Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.
+Examples are evidence, not decoration. Choose one by the security boundary you need to evaluate, run it from the pinned product source, and change the committed bytes or context to observe the fail-closed path. A polished interface is not proof that an authorization property holds.
 
-## Outcome
+Do not choose an Auths example because its provider logo resembles your stack.
+Choose it because it tests the security question you need answered.
 
-A child principal can act only inside every bound the parent deliberately passes on.
+Every example here is repository evidence, not a claim that the corresponding
+provider integration is a supported public SDK profile. Maturity labels
+distinguish a `Minimal example`, `Interactive demo`, `Production-shaped
+reference`, `Benchmark/testkit`, or `Demo integration`.
 
-## Before you begin
+The currently qualified public binding profile is generated from the pinned
+public topology. At present, provider-specific demos beyond that topology must
+remain labelled as demos even when their architecture is sophisticated.
 
-Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
+### Pinned public topology
 
-## Build the bounded path
+Source: [`bindings/public-topology-v1.json`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/public-topology-v1.json) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
 
-Parse the parent, select the child subject, narrow action, resource, time, uses, budget, audience, depth, and critical extensions, then author and sign the child through the native delegate operation.
+- Qualified profiles: `auths.github.issue-address/1`, `auths.mcp/1`, `auths.opentofu.saved-plan-apply/1`, `auths.postgresql.bounded-update/1`
+- Framework contracts: `atomic-reservation-store`, `signer-custody`
 
-## Run the qualified path
+| Layer | TypeScript | Python |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| product | `@auths-dev/sdk`, `@auths-dev/sdk/identity`, `@auths-dev/sdk/verify` | `auths`, `auths.identity`, `auths.verify` |
+| vertical | `@auths-dev/sdk/profiles` | `auths.profiles` |
+| mechanism | `@auths-dev/sdk/integrations` | `auths.integrations` |
+| extension | `@auths-dev/sdk/framework` | `auths.framework` |
+| test | `@auths-dev/sdk/testkit` | `auths.testkit` |
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+## Can I verify authority without a service?
 
-## Success means
+Start with the offline verifier when your question is whether Auths can make a
+deterministic decision from explicit local bytes. This is the smallest proof
+of the protocol boundary: no resolver, network, database, clock, replay store,
+private key, or provider is involved.
 
-The child verifies as an unbroken chain and can perform the one intended tool action.
+It proves the supported Rust facade can verify the committed proof, action,
+and trusted context as an external consumer. It does not prove runtime replay
+protection, provider execution, or production custody.
 
-## Fail closed
+**Minimal example**
 
-Any wider or incomparable child is rejected, including a quiet critical-extension omission that would restore power.
+- [`demos/offline-verification`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/offline-verification)
 
-## Continue
+## Can an agent call one protected tool without receiving broad credentials?
 
-Inspect depth and chain rules, then test every attempted widening relevant to the application profile.
+Use the MCP examples to evaluate the shortest supported closed-profile
+workflow. The important boundary is not that an agent can call a tool; it is
+that the configured provider is entered only for the exact authorized tool
+action, while an undeclared action is denied before provider entry.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+The live lab can help a reader inspect the stages interactively. The smaller
+MCP demo is better for understanding the native integration without unrelated
+application architecture.
 
+**Interactive demo**
 
+- [`demos/mcp/auths-mcp-demo`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/mcp/auths-mcp-demo)
+- [`demos/live-lab`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/live-lab)
+- [`demos/live-service`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/live-service)
 
----
+## Can two organizations authorize one exact joint response?
 
-# Depth and chain
+The cross-company incident-response demo is the strongest collaboration
+journey. It combines separate identity systems, distinct organizations,
+threshold approval bound to the same ordered plan, diagnostic and remediation
+agents, closed provider gateways, HTTPS and Iroh delivery, durable reservation,
+unknown-outcome handling, and bounded receipt disclosure.
 
-Reason about delegation depth and the complete signed chain.
+It proves a production-shaped architecture and adversarial behavior end to
+end. Its hosted persistence, identity adapters, provider effects, and custody
+remain demo implementations rather than production services.
 
-## Model
+**Production-shaped reference**
 
-Each delegation consumes one unit of permitted depth and adds a signed link. Verification checks the root trust, every issuer-to-subject transition, every narrowing relation, and the terminal request.
+- [`demos/cross-company-incident-response`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/cross-company-incident-response)
 
-## What remains true
+## Can an uncredentialed coding agent publish only an approved change?
 
-Depth cannot be reset by changing languages, identity adapters, transports, or profiles. A chain remains valid only while every link remains valid and trusted.
+The GitHub issue workflow separates proposal from execution. An agent creates
+a bounded Git candidate without a GitHub mutation credential. A separate
+executor verifies the exact repository, issue, base, allowed change, audience,
+and effect budget before acquiring a repository-scoped credential and creating
+one deterministic branch and draft pull request.
 
-## Where it fails closed
+The Radicle workflow explores a related collaboration problem under a
+different repository and identity environment. Treat each as a cohesive domain
+demo; neither is a generic “Git action” profile.
 
-Skipped links, reordered links, broken subjects, expired parents, revoked ancestors, excessive depth, and incomparable constraints deny the terminal request.
+**Demo integration**
 
-## Continue
+- [`demos/github-issue`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/github-issue)
+- [`demos/radicle-issue`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/radicle-issue)
 
-Keep chains short in simple systems; use explicit organizational or agent handoffs only where they add accountability.
+## Can an agent change infrastructure exactly once?
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+Choose Kubernetes when the action is an exact API-object rollout constrained
+by workload identity and current cluster state. Choose OpenTofu when the action
+is applying one previously saved plan against exact backend, workspace, state,
+dependency-lock, and variable commitments.
 
+The two demos look similar at the diagram level but intentionally retain
+different actions, evidence, commands, credentials, state transitions, and
+reconciliation. They prove why Auths profiles are vertical rather than a
+generic infrastructure-operation dispatcher.
 
+**Production-shaped reference**
 
----
+- [`demos/kubernetes-rollout`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/kubernetes-rollout)
+- [`demos/opentofu-plan`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/opentofu-plan)
 
-# Widening failures
+## Can an agent change application or database data without holding a reusable key?
 
-Exercise every way a child might attempt to gain power its parent did not pass down.
+The records API demonstrates a familiar typed REST boundary over HTTPS or
+Iroh. The PostgreSQL demo goes deeper: exact tenant and row selection,
+before-state and after-state commitments, catalog and role rechecks, a
+serializable transaction, an execution ledger, and ambiguous-commit
+reconciliation.
 
-## Outcome
+Use the records demo to understand transport-neutral application adoption. Use
+PostgreSQL to evaluate a high-consequence data mutation where database state
+and transaction semantics are part of the authorization profile.
 
-Your test suite proves that delegation can only narrow, including application-defined critical extensions.
+**Production-shaped reference**
 
-## Before you begin
+- [`demos/rest-api-authorization`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/rest-api-authorization)
+- [`demos/postgresql-data-change`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/postgresql-data-change)
 
-Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
+## Can financial authority be narrower than an OAuth scope or API key?
 
-## Build the bounded path
+The Stripe family separates collection, manual-capture authorization, capture,
+cancellation, refunds, subscriptions, transfers, payouts, mandates, and
+purchase authorization into distinct effect profiles. That separation matters:
+the operations have different direction, provider preconditions, exposure,
+obligations, lifecycle states, reconciliation, and receipt meaning.
 
-Generate mutations for action, resource, validity, uses, budget, depth, audience, extension presence, and extension values; verify each child against the same parent and trusted context.
+These are Stripe test-mode demo integrations. They do not imply that every
+Stripe operation is a qualified public SDK profile, and they do not turn local
+merchant configuration into human-signed standing authority.
 
-## Run the qualified path
+**Demo integration**
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1`.
+- [`demos/stripe-payment-collect`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-payment-collect)
+- [`demos/stripe-payment-authorize`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-payment-authorize)
+- [`demos/stripe-payment-capture`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-payment-capture)
+- [`demos/stripe-payment-cancel`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-payment-cancel)
+- [`demos/stripe-refund`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-refund)
+- [`demos/stripe-subscription-create`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-subscription-create)
+- [`demos/stripe-subscription-modify`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-subscription-modify)
+- [`demos/stripe-subscription-cancel`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-subscription-cancel)
+- [`demos/stripe-connect-transfer`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-connect-transfer)
+- [`demos/stripe-payout`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-payout)
+- [`demos/stripe-payment-mandate`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-payment-mandate)
+- [`demos/stripe-purchase-authorization`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/stripe-purchase-authorization)
 
-## Success means
+## Can I use Auths identity and Iroh without adopting capabilities?
 
-Every valid narrowing is portable across SDKs, and every wider or incomparable mutation returns the same denial identity.
+The identity-over-Iroh demo is the smallest adoption path. It exchanges
+canonical algorithm-neutral public identities over a real Iroh connection and
+authenticates exact message bytes using optional adapters.
 
-## Fail closed
+No grant, capability, approval, policy, lifecycle, store, or product runtime is
+constructed. A successful Iroh connection authenticates its transport peer;
+a successful signature check authenticates the exact message bytes to the
+public identity. Neither fact authorizes an application effect or prevents
+replay.
 
-A language disagreement, ignored critical extension, dropped parent, or accepted incomparable set is a release-blocking semantic failure.
+**Interactive demo**
 
-## Continue
+- [`demos/identity-iroh`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/identity-iroh)
 
-Keep these fixtures with the application profile and rerun them on every Auths upgrade.
+## Do the mechanisms hold under concurrency and adversarial inputs?
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+Benchmarks and testkits answer engineering questions rather than tell a
+product story. Use them to evaluate bounds, concurrency, replay, candidate
+stores, custody adapters, transports, and cross-language behavior. They do not
+demonstrate a deployable application.
 
+**Benchmark/testkit**
 
+- [`demos/benchmarks`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/benchmarks)
+- [`demos/testkit`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/testkit)
+- [`demos/matrix`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/matrix)
 
 ---
 
-# Execute
+<!-- route: /reference; source: reference/index.mdx; section: reference -->
+# Reference
 
-Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
+Use this section when you need the exact public surface or protocol contract.
+If you are still deciding how Auths fits your application, begin with a guide;
+the reference assumes you already know whether you are authenticating an
+identity, verifying authority, or executing through a closed profile.
 
-## Outcome
+## Choose the boundary you are implementing
 
-An opaque native authorization handle reaches the executor only after identity, authority, lifecycle, plan, and command checks pass.
+| You need to… | Start here |
+| --- | --- |
+| Build an application workflow in Node or a browser | [TypeScript SDK](/reference/typescript) |
+| Build an application workflow in Python | [Python SDK](/reference/python) |
+| Embed deterministic verification in Rust | [Rust facades and crates](/reference/rust) |
+| Handle an authorization or runtime outcome safely | [Decisions, errors, and safe responses](/reference/decisions-errors) |
+| Supply identity, lifecycle, or assurance facts | [Evidence, status, assurance, and registries](/reference/evidence-status-assurance) |
+| Implement or review the wire contract | [Limits, encoding, and identifiers](/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers) |
+| Select or qualify a principal-control method | [Principal adapters](/reference/principal-adapters) |
+| Compare another implementation with Auths V1 | [Conformance and independent implementations](/reference/conformance) |
 
-## Before you begin
+## What the reference promises
 
-Start with parsed application inputs, an explicit profile, and the trust, state, custody, or provider ports required by this operation. Do not construct semantic wire objects by hand.
+Every generated value identifies the pinned Auths product revision and the
+artifact it describes. SDK declarations come from the packed npm package or
+installed wheel. Stable codes and protocol tables come from normative core
+inputs. Example output appears only when the product runner captured it.
 
-## Build the bounded path
+Repository-local evidence is not a publication, production-readiness, or
+security-audit claim. Auths is prelaunch and pre-audit.
 
-Parse the command, verify and reserve authority, seal exact provider-independent bytes, acquire the gateway only from the native verified handle, perform the effect, then journal and sign the terminal receipt.
+## One verifier, several product boundaries
 
-## Run the qualified path
+The portable operation accepts three byte inputs—a proof bundle, a canonical
+action, and a trusted context—and returns a canonical verification result.
+The core is deterministic and effect-free. Replay state, budgets, credentials,
+provider calls, receipts, and recovery belong to outer product layers.
 
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
+That separation explains why the SDK reference has more than one entry point:
+identity can be used without authority, verification can be used without
+effects, and execution is available only through a closed profile and runtime.
 
-## Success means
+---
 
-The gateway receives the minimum provider request after durable reservation and returns a closed, receipt-bound outcome.
+<!-- route: /reference/typescript; source: reference/typescript.mdx; section: reference -->
+# TypeScript SDK
+
+`@auths-dev/sdk` is one package with progressively disclosed entry points. Most
+applications begin with the root workflow plus a maintained integration and a
+closed profile. Applications that only need identity or verification can use
+those surfaces without constructing grants, approvals, runtime state, or an
+effect-capable workflow.
+
+The root deliberately does not re-export every subpath. Importing from the
+boundary you intend to use makes identity, verification, execution, extension,
+and test-only code distinguishable in both reviews and package tooling.
+
+## Pick the smallest public entry point
+
+| Entry point | Use it for | It does not do |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk` | Create, delegate, execute, resume, inspect product results, and handle product errors | Re-export the lower-level identity, verification, profile, framework, or testkit surfaces |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/identity` | Decode, resolve, validate, and authenticate method- and suite-labelled public identities | Grant authority or authorize an effect |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/verify` | Deterministic proof, decision, receipt, inspection, and disclosure verification | Call a provider or return an effect-capable execution handle |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/profiles` | Construct actions and authorities for qualified closed effect domains | Turn an arbitrary operation tag or request object into a provider call |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/integrations` | Select maintained development or production composition boundaries | Make the development composition production durable |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/framework` | Implement the narrowly supported signer and atomic-reservation contracts | Expose internal protocol machinery as an application framework |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/testkit` | Run deterministic adapter and product-waist conformance suites | Provide production state, custody, or diagnostics |
+
+The installed-artifact reference below enumerates symbols from the packed
+package declarations and package exports. Source files outside those exports
+are not public API.
+
+### Installed TypeScript public API
+
+Source: [`bindings/typescript/api/public-api.txt`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/typescript/api/public-api.txt) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+```text
+# Installed @auths-dev/sdk public API v1
+# declaration-sha256 2f183f958f4a172c63ddb247dc35e4796301bbf72bc7004b0d39490acb21631f
+.	Actor	type
+.	approval	value
+.	ApprovalPolicy	type
+.	Authority	type
+.	Auths	type
+.	AuthsConfiguration	type
+.	AuthsError	value+type
+.	AuthsErrorCode	type
+.	Completed	type
+.	createAuths	value
+.	Denied	type
+.	doctor	value
+.	DoctorMode	type
+.	DoctorOptions	type
+.	DoctorReport	type
+.	DoctorState	type
+.	ExecutionReference	value+type
+.	ExecutionResult	type
+.	Indeterminate	type
+.	ProductionAuthority	type
+.	ProductionAuthorityResult	type
+.	ProductionAuths	type
+.	ProductionAuthsOptions	type
+.	ProductionCompleted	type
+.	ProductionDenied	type
+.	ProductionExecutionResult	type
+.	ProductionIndeterminate	type
+.	ProductionReceipt	type
+.	ProductionRecoverable	type
+.	ProductionRecoveryReference	type
+.	ProductionRejected	type
+.	ProductionTransport	type
+.	ProductionTransportRequest	type
+.	ProductionTransportResponse	type
+.	ProductionVerificationResult	type
+.	ProductionVerified	type
+.	ProductStep	type
+.	Receipt	type
+.	RecommendedAction	type
+.	RecoveryResult	type
+.	RetryClass	type
+./identity	AuthenticatedDescriptorMessage	type
+./identity	AuthenticatedIdentityMessage	type
+./identity	DecodedIdentity	type
+./identity	DecodedIdentityDescriptor	type
+./identity	DecodedSignedIdentityMessage	type
+./identity	DescriptorAuthenticationRequest	type
+./identity	DescriptorAuthenticationResult	type
+./identity	DescriptorSignatureSuiteAdapter	type
+./identity	Ed25519RawKeyAuthentication	value+type
+./identity	IdentityClient	value+type
+./identity	IdentityDescriptorInput	type
+./identity	IdentityDescriptorMethodAdapter	type
+./identity	IdentityMethodAdapter	type
+./identity	IdentityMethodMetadata	type
+./identity	IdentityMethodParse	type
+./identity	IdentityMethodRegistry	value+type
+./identity	IdentityPrincipal	type
+./identity	IdentityResolutionRequest	type
+./identity	IdentityResolutionResult	type
+./identity	loadEd25519RawKeyAuthentication	value
+./identity	loadIdentity	value
+./identity	loadRawKeyIdentityAdapter	value
+./identity	RawKeyIdentityAdapter	value+type
+./identity	ResolutionEvidence	type
+./identity	ResolvedIdentityDescriptor	type
+./identity	SignatureSuiteAdapter	type
+./identity	SignatureSuiteMetadata	type
+./identity	SignatureSuiteParse	type
+./identity	SignatureSuiteRegistry	value+type
+./identity	ValidatedIdentity	type
+./identity	ValidatedIdentityDescriptor	type
+./identity	VerificationMaterialInput	type
+./identity	VerificationRelationshipInput	type
+./verify	AuthorizedResult	type
+./verify	createReceiptDisclosure	value
+./verify	DecisionInspection	type
+./verify	decodeReceipt	value
+./verify	DeniedResult	type
+./verify	encodeReceipt	value
+./verify	Explanation	type
+./verify	ImmutableArtifactCache	value+type
+./verify	ImmutableArtifactCacheOptions	type
+./verify	IndeterminateResult	type
+./verify	inspectDecision	value
+./verify	inspectReceipt	value
+./verify	InvalidReceiptInspection	type
+./verify	loadVerifier	value
+./verify	Receipt	type
+./verify	ReceiptDisclosureMaterial	type
+./verify	ReceiptDisclosureProtector	type
+./verify	ReceiptDisclosureStore	type
+./verify	ReceiptInspectionCommitments	type
+./verify	ReceiptInspectionMetadata	type
+./verify	ReceiptInspectionProfile	type
+./verify	ReceiptInspectionResult	type
+./verify	ReceiptInspectionSigner	type
+./verify	ReceiptSummary	type
+./verify	ReceiptSummaryField	type
+./verify	ReceiptViewMode	type
+./verify	VerdictKind	type
+./verify	VerificationBatchOptions	type
+./verify	VerificationInput	type
+./verify	VerificationMetrics	type
+./verify	VerificationOptions	type
+./verify	VerificationResult	type
+./verify	VerificationStage	type
+./verify	VerifiedAction	value+type
+./verify	VerifiedDisclosedReceipt	type
+./verify	VerifiedOpaqueReceipt	type
+./verify	Verifier	value+type
+./verify	verifyReceipt	value
+./profiles	executeMcpClosed	value
+./profiles	executeMcpPlanClosed	value
+./profiles	githubIssueAddress	value
+./profiles	mcp	value
+./profiles	McpAction	value+type
+./profiles	McpAttestedReceipt	type
+./profiles	McpAuthority	type
+./profiles	McpClosedProvider	type
+./profiles	McpClosedResult	type
+./profiles	McpCommand	value+type
+./profiles	McpDevelopmentProviderOptions	type
+./profiles	McpExecutionCheckpointEvent	type
+./profiles	McpExecutionCheckpointStage	type
+./profiles	McpExecutionObserver	type
+./profiles	McpExecutionResources	type
+./profiles	McpExecutionState	type
+./profiles	McpGateway	type
+./profiles	McpGatewayCall	type
+./profiles	McpGatewayError	type
+./profiles	McpHandlerCause	type
+./profiles	McpHandlerOutcome	type
+./profiles	McpPlanClosedResult	type
+./profiles	McpProfile	value+type
+./profiles	McpProfileOptions	type
+./profiles	McpReceipt	type
+./profiles	McpReceiptSink	type
+./profiles	McpRecoveryCheckpoint	type
+./profiles	McpToolAuthority	value+type
+./profiles	McpToolContext	type
+./profiles	McpToolHandler	type
+./profiles	opentofuSavedPlanApply	value
+./profiles	postgresqlBoundedUpdate	value
+./profiles	ProductionProfile	type
+./profiles	ProductionProfileId	type
+./profiles	recoverMcpClosed	value
+./profiles	resourcesForMcpAuthority	value
+./profiles	resumeMcpClosed	value
+./integrations	development	value
+./integrations	DevelopmentAuthsOptions	type
+./integrations	production	value
+./integrations	RecoverableDevelopmentAuthsOptions	type
+./framework	AtomicReservationRecord	type
+./framework	AtomicReservationStore	type
+./framework	ControlEvidence	type
+./framework	PrincipalDescriptor	type
+./framework	ProviderFailureKind	type
+./framework	ProviderOperationError	value+type
+./framework	Signer	type
+./framework	SignerLifecycle	type
+./framework	SigningObjectKind	type
+./framework	SigningRequest	type
+./framework	SigningResponse	type
+./testkit	AtomicReservationRecord	type
+./testkit	AtomicReservationStoreCandidate	type
+./testkit	BoundedApprovalSession	value+type
+./testkit	BoundedApprovalSessionOptions	type
+./testkit	ByteTransportCandidate	type
+./testkit	ByteTransportFactory	type
+./testkit	certifyAtomicStore	value
+./testkit	certifyByteTransport	value
+./testkit	certifyMcpProvider	value
+./testkit	certifySigner	value
+./testkit	CONFORMANCE_CATALOG	value
+./testkit	ConformanceCaseResult	type
+./testkit	ConformanceMetadata	type
+./testkit	ConformanceReport	type
+./testkit	createDiagnosticVerifier	value
+./testkit	custodyConformance	value
+./testkit	CustodyConformanceCase	type
+./testkit	CustodyConformanceOptions	type
+./testkit	CustodyConformanceReport	type
+./testkit	CustodyConformanceResult	type
+./testkit	development	value
+./testkit	DiagnosticResult	type
+./testkit	DiagnosticVerifier	value+type
+./testkit	InMemoryApplicationExecutionStore	value+type
+./testkit	McpProviderFactory	type
+./testkit	productWaistConformance	value
+./testkit	ProductWaistConformanceCase	type
+./testkit	ProductWaistConformanceReport	type
+./testkit	ProductWaistExpected	type
+```
+
+## The shortest protected workflow
+
+The high-level path combines three surfaces:
+
+1. A maintained composition from `/integrations` owns the workflow resources.
+2. A qualified closed profile from `/profiles` defines the action, authority,
+   verified command, and provider boundary.
+3. The root `Auths` object delegates, executes, resumes, and closes those
+   resources.
+
+For the current repository workflow, the maintained MCP profile constructs a
+tool authority and an exact tool-call action. A closed provider exposes only
+configured tool handlers. Native authorization and durable reservation occur
+before provider entry.
+
+> Product-owned recipe `03-execute-exact-action` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
+
+### TypeScript recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
+
+Register the only provider operation and create development authority for that exact tool name.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–14; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+import { verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
+
+let calls = 0;
+const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({
+  tools: {
+    async publish_report(input) {
+      calls += 1;
+      return { published: input.report };
+    },
+  },
+});
+const auths = await development.createAuths({ authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]) });
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
+
+Send the exact profile-owned action, require completion, and verify its returned receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 15–22; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+try {
+  const completed = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "publish_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-success",
+  });
+  if (completed.kind !== "completed") throw new Error(`unexpected result: ${completed.kind}`);
+  await verifyReceipt(completed.receipt);
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
+
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter did not advance.
+
+_Pinned source lines 23–28; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  const denied = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "delete_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-denied",
+  });
+  if (denied.kind !== "denied" || calls !== 1) throw new Error("undeclared effect reached provider");
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Report the trace and close owned state
+
+Emit the declared result and close the development runtime even when the workflow throws.
+
+_Pinned source lines 29–32; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "03-execute-exact-action", outcome: completed.kind, denied: true, calls }));
+} finally {
+  await auths.close();
+}
+```
 
-## Fail closed
+## Handle closed results exhaustively
 
-Application code cannot mint the handle; successful transport, approval, signature, or provider authentication alone cannot open the gateway. Provider secrets never enter the authority artifact.
+Execution returns a closed union covering completed, denied, indeterminate,
+and recovery outcomes. Ordered-plan execution carries the corresponding plan
+completion or plan-recovery shape.
 
-## Continue
+- A completed result carries the provider result and receipt.
+- A denied or indeterminate result never means the provider was called.
+- An exact replay returns the recorded outcome without a second effect.
+- A recoverable result carries an SDK-minted opaque execution reference. Resume
+  the same execution; do not serialize an application-crafted substitute or
+  blindly invoke the provider again.
+- A conflict means the execution identity is already bound to incompatible
+  commitments or state and must stop.
+
+Use the discriminant, stable code, and typed error fields. Do not branch on
+human-readable messages.
+
+## Verification stays effect-free
+
+The `/verify` surface accepts explicit proof, canonical-action, and trusted-
+context bytes and exposes verification, receipt verification, inert
+inspection, and bounded receipt disclosure. A verifier result can tell you
+that authority was established, but it does not become the product runtime's
+sealed command.
+
+This distinction makes it safe to build auditors, gateways, offline checkers,
+and UI inspection tools without accidentally acquiring provider authority.
+Differential diagnostic tools remain under `/testkit` rather than the normal
+verification surface.
+
+## Identity can be adopted independently
+
+The `/identity` surface carries canonical method- and suite-labelled public
+identity data. Applications provide or select method and signature-suite
+adapters. Successful authentication binds exact message bytes to an identity;
+it does not create a capability, approval, grant, or execution permission.
+
+This is useful when a team wants Auths identity packets or transport-neutral
+identity exchange before adopting bounded authority.
+
+## Resource ownership
+
+The high-level object owns native sessions, signers, and other composition
+resources. Close it in a `finally` block, or use asynchronous explicit resource
+management on runtimes that support it. Delegated child sessions are separate
+owned resources and must also be closed.
 
-Use Resume rather than a new Execute call when the terminal provider result is not yet known.
+Development and production compositions have different guarantees. The
+development composition uses ephemeral keys and in-memory or explicitly
+development recovery state. It is not production durable. Production requires
+qualified profile integrations, durable atomic reservation, reviewed custody,
+receipt persistence and disclosure policy, and explicit reconciliation.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+## Runtime and publication status
 
+### TypeScript runtime contract
 
+Source: [`bindings/typescript/sdk-runtime-contract.json`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/typescript/sdk-runtime-contract.json) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+- Package: `@auths-dev/sdk` `1.0.0-rc.1`
+- Public entry points: `.`, `./identity`, `./verify`, `./profiles`, `./integrations`, `./framework`, `./testkit`
+- Required WASM exports: `authoringAbiVersionV1`, `identityAbiVersionV1`, `encodeIdentityDescriptorV1`, `decodeIdentityDescriptorV1`, `identityDescriptorSigningPreimageV1`, `verifyV1`, `verifyBatchV1`
+- Qualified profiles: `auths.mcp/1`
+- Publication: repository candidate; registry promotion is not asserted by this snapshot.
+
+Repository-local implementation evidence does not imply that a package has
+been published, promoted, or independently reviewed. Publication, promotion,
+and independent review remain separate statuses.
+
+## Extension boundary
+
+Use `/framework` only when you are implementing a supported production port.
+The current public topology names signer custody and atomic reservation as
+framework contracts. Use `/testkit` to certify candidate implementations and
+to exercise the product waist.
+
+Do not copy internal workflow classes, protocol objects, or test helpers into
+an application adapter merely because they exist in the source tree. A public
+extension contract must appear in the packed export map and public API
+snapshot.
 
 ---
 
-# Lifecycle
+<!-- route: /reference/python; source: reference/python.mdx; section: reference -->
+# Python SDK
+
+The `auths` wheel exposes the same product topology as the TypeScript package
+using idiomatic Python modules and native-backed types. Most applications begin
+with the root workflow, `auths.integrations`, and `auths.profiles`. Identity and
+effect-free verification remain independently usable.
+
+Installed wheels include the native implementation, so a normal consumer does
+not need a Rust toolchain. Exact supported Python versions, platforms, wheel
+ABI, and distribution status must come from the installed wheel and runtime
+contract shown below.
+
+## Pick the smallest public module
+
+| Module | Use it for | It does not do |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `auths` | Create, delegate, execute, resume, inspect product results, and handle product errors | Re-export every lower-level module |
+| `auths.identity` | Decode, resolve, validate, and authenticate method- and suite-labelled identities | Grant authority or authorize an effect |
+| `auths.verify` | Verify proofs, decisions, and receipts; inspect inert projections; create bounded disclosures | Call a provider or return an effect-capable execution object |
+| `auths.profiles` | Construct actions and authorities for qualified closed effect domains | Accept an arbitrary provider operation or payload |
+| `auths.integrations` | Select maintained development and production composition boundaries, plus identity transport integration | Make development state or keys production-ready |
+| `auths.framework` | Implement the proven signer and atomic-reservation contracts | Reimplement core semantics in Python |
+| `auths.testkit` | Certify adapters and exercise deterministic conformance suites | Provide production custody, persistence, or telemetry |
+
+All intended public modules use explicit `__all__` declarations and installed-
+wheel typing checks. A source module that does not appear in the installed
+public inventory is not an application API.
+
+### Installed Python public API
+
+Source: [`bindings/python/api/public-api.txt`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/python/api/public-api.txt) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+```text
+[auths]
+Actor
+Approval
+Authority
+Auths
+AuthsError
+AuthsErrorCode
+Completed
+Denied
+DoctorReport
+ExecutionReference
+ExecutionResult
+Indeterminate
+ProductStep
+ProductionAuthority
+ProductionAuthorityResult
+ProductionAuths
+ProductionCompleted
+ProductionDenied
+ProductionExecutionResult
+ProductionIndeterminate
+ProductionReceipt
+ProductionRecoverable
+ProductionRecoveryReference
+ProductionRejected
+ProductionTransport
+ProductionTransportRequest
+ProductionTransportResponse
+ProductionVerificationResult
+ProductionVerified
+Receipt
+RecommendedAction
+RecoveryResult
+RetryClass
+create_auths
+doctor
+
+[auths.identity]
+AuthenticatedIdentity
+DecodedIdentity
+Ed25519SignatureSuite
+IdentityMethod
+IdentityPrincipal
+IdentityRegistry
+IdentityResolver
+RawKeyIdentityMethod
+ResolutionEvidence
+ResolvedIdentity
+ResolvedIdentityRecord
+ResolverIdentityMethod
+SignatureSuite
+ValidatedIdentity
+VerificationMaterial
+VerificationRelationship
+decode_identity
+encode_identity
+encode_raw_key_identity
+
+[auths.verify]
+ApprovalInspection
+Authorized
+DecisionCommitments
+DecisionInspection
+DecisionSummary
+Denied
+Explanation
+Indeterminate
+InspectionMetrics
+InvalidReceiptInspection
+KernelSummary
+Receipt
+ReceiptDisclosureMaterial
+ReceiptDisclosureProtector
+ReceiptDisclosureStore
+ReceiptInspectionCommitments
+ReceiptInspectionMetadata
+ReceiptInspectionProfile
+ReceiptInspectionResult
+ReceiptInspectionSigner
+ReceiptSummary
+ReceiptSummaryField
+ReceiptViewMode
+VerificationInput
+VerificationMetrics
+VerificationResult
+VerifiedDisclosedReceipt
+VerifiedOpaqueReceipt
+create_receipt_disclosure
+decode_receipt
+encode_receipt
+inspect_decision
+inspect_receipt
+verify
+verify_many
+verify_receipt
+
+[auths.profiles]
+DevelopmentMcpProvider
+McpAction
+McpClosedProvider
+McpCompleted
+McpExecutionCheckpointEvent
+McpExecutionCheckpointStage
+McpExecutionObserver
+McpHandlerOutcome
+McpPlan
+McpPlanCompleted
+McpPlanRecoveryResult
+McpRecoverable
+McpToolAuthority
+McpToolContext
+ProductionProfile
+ProductionProfileId
+github_issue_address
+mcp
+opentofu_saved_plan_apply
+postgresql_bounded_update
+
+[auths.integrations]
+FrameworkAdapter
+IdentityTransport
+development
+exchange_identity
+production
+
+[auths.framework]
+AtomicReservationRecord
+AtomicReservationStore
+ControlEvidence
+PrincipalDescriptor
+ProviderFailureKind
+ProviderOperationError
+Signer
+SignerLifecycle
+SigningObjectKind
+SigningRequest
+SigningResponse
+
+[auths.testkit]
+ADAPTER_CONTRACT_VERSION
+AtomicReservationRecord
+AtomicReservationStoreCandidate
+ByteTransportCandidate
+CONFORMANCE_CATALOG
+ConformanceCaseResult
+ConformanceMetadata
+ConformanceReport
+DevelopmentApproval
+DevelopmentEd25519Signer
+DevelopmentIdentityMethod
+DevelopmentReceiptAttestor
+DevelopmentSignatureSuite
+DevelopmentSigner
+DiagnosticEngine
+DiagnosticExplanation
+DiagnosticResult
+DiagnosticVerifier
+FixedClock
+MemoryGateway
+ProductWaistConformanceReport
+ProductWaistExpected
+RecordingTelemetry
+certify_atomic_store
+certify_byte_transport
+certify_mcp_provider
+certify_signer
+check_approval_provider
+check_identity_method
+check_signer
+check_telemetry
+create_diagnostic_verifier
+product_waist_conformance
+```
+
+## The shortest protected workflow
+
+The normal async workflow is:
+
+1. Construct an exact authority and action through a qualified profile.
+2. Supply a closed provider whose handlers expose only configured operations.
+3. Open a maintained Auths composition with `async with`.
+4. Execute and exhaustively handle the closed result.
+5. Let the context manager close owned signers and native sessions.
+
+> Product-owned recipe `03-execute-exact-action` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
+
+### Python recipe
+
+> **Qualification blocked — Python source does not match the pinned public API.**
+>
+> The pinned recipe imports `verify_receipt` from `auths`, while the pinned installed API exports it only from `auths.verify`. The source is retained for review but must not be presented as runnable until the product recipe is corrected and re-executed.
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
+
+Register the only provider operation and count every entry into that effect boundary.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–19; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+
+from auths import verify_receipt
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import mcp
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    calls = 0
+
+    async def publish_report(arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal calls
+        calls += 1
+        return {"published": arguments["report"]}
+
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(tools={"publish_report": publish_report})
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
+
+Open the owned development session, execute the exact action, and verify its receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 20–30; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    async with development.create_auths(
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"])
+    ) as auths:
+        completed = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="publish_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-success",
+        )
+        if completed.kind != "completed":
+            raise RuntimeError(f"unexpected result: {completed.kind}")
+        verify_receipt(completed.receipt)
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
+
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter stayed at one.
+
+_Pinned source lines 31–37; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        denied = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="delete_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-denied",
+        )
+        if denied.kind != "denied" or calls != 1:
+            raise RuntimeError("undeclared effect reached provider")
+```
 
-Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.
+#### Step 4: Report the trace through the owned entry point
 
-## The path at a glance
+Leave the session before emitting the declared result, then run the asynchronous entry point.
 
-1. Author exact authority
-2. Commit canonical bytes
-3. Attenuate child
-4. Consume use or budget
-5. Expire, revoke, or exhaust
+_Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized._
 
-Text equivalent: Authority is authored for exact canonical bytes, committed, optionally attenuated into a child, consumed under durable state, and eventually expires, is revoked, or becomes exhausted.
+```python
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "03-execute-exact-action",
+                "outcome": "completed",
+                "denied": True,
+                "calls": calls,
+            }
+        )
+    )
 
-## What remains true
 
-- A child is a subset of its parent under every critical extension.
-- Use and budget state are durable and atomic with reservation.
-- Expired, revoked, or exhausted authority cannot be revived by transport or approval.
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
 
-## Failure branches
+The pinned recipe currently fails its public-import check: it imports
+`verify_receipt` from `auths`, while the pinned public inventory exports that
+symbol from `auths.verify`. This recipe remains qualification-blocked until its
+source and public import agree; a TypeScript result is not Python evidence.
+Publication requires the recipe to execute against the same wheel used to
+generate the reference.
 
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| A child adds an action or use | Widening rejected | Create the child from a valid subset of the parent. |
-| Authority expires before reservation | Denied | Request fresh authority for current intent. |
-| Revocation state cannot be checked | Indeterminate | Restore lifecycle state; do not assume the grant remains valid. |
+## Async ownership is part of correctness
+
+Use `async with` for the normal lifecycle. Applications that cannot use a
+context manager may explicitly `await auths.aclose()`. Both paths are intended
+to be idempotent and release the resources owned by the composition.
+
+Delegated children are separately owned sessions. Do not assume that garbage
+collection will promptly close native sessions, signers, file-backed recovery
+state, or provider resources.
+
+## Handle values, not message strings
+
+The high-level API returns typed completed, denied, indeterminate, replay,
+conflict, and recoverable values. Expected authorization and recovery outcomes
+are not generic exceptions.
+
+- Denied and indeterminate never authorize provider entry.
+- Exact replay returns recorded state and must not call the provider again.
+- Recoverable state must be resumed with the SDK-minted opaque reference for
+  the same execution.
+- A conflict is a stop condition, not an invitation to generate a new request
+  identifier.
 
-## Use this when
+Use the typed discriminant and stable code. Product and adapter exceptions
+carry their own error contract; messages are for humans and may be redacted.
 
-You need delegation, one-time use, budget, expiry, revocation, or critical-extension behavior.
+## Effect-free verification
 
-## Do not use this when
+`auths.verify` exposes single and batch proof verification, receipt
+verification, inert decision and receipt inspection, and bounded disclosure.
+It accepts explicit bytes and returns ordinary inspection or verification
+values. It cannot mint the native-owned authorization object used by a closed
+profile to perform an effect.
 
-You only need to authenticate a signer or send public identity material.
+This boundary matters in Python because ordinary user code is highly dynamic:
+application code must not be able to create an effect-capable authorization
+object by setting a flag, constructing a dataclass, or monkey-patching a
+wrapper. Native ownership preserves the boundary.
+
+## Standalone identity
+
+`auths.identity` can carry, decode, resolve, and authenticate identities
+without importing capabilities, approvals, or runtime execution. Identity
+methods and signature suites remain explicit and replaceable. Successful
+authentication binds exact bytes to a public identity; it does not authorize
+an application action or prevent replay on its own.
 
-## Continue from here
+## Development and production
 
-- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
-- [Authority](/authority) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
+The development composition uses ephemeral keys and in-memory state, with an
+explicitly development-only recovery option where provided. It is suitable for
+learning and local tests, not production durability.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+A production composition needs a qualified closed profile, durable atomic
+reservation, reviewed signer custody, credential acquisition after
+authorization and reservation, receipt retention and access controls,
+observability without secret leakage, and profile-specific reconciliation.
 
+Run the bounded doctor command from the installed wheel to inspect runtime,
+ABI, semantic-subject, state, and profile facts. It must not read application
+secrets or print protocol payloads.
 
+### Python runtime contract
+
+Source: [`bindings/python/sdk-runtime-contract.json`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/python/sdk-runtime-contract.json) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+- Package: `auths` `1.0.0rc1` · `abi3-py39`
+- Runtime: CPython `3.9`, `3.10`, `3.11`, `3.12`, `3.13`, `3.14`
+- Operating systems: linux, macos, windows
+- Public modules: `auths`, `auths.identity`, `auths.verify`, `auths.profiles`, `auths.integrations`, `auths.framework`, `auths.testkit`
+- Distribution: wheels `published`; source distribution `not-published`; local compiler required `false`
+
+## Extension boundary and parity
+
+`auths.framework` contains only the narrow supported contracts that Python
+applications may implement, including signer custody and atomic reservation.
+Candidate implementations should pass the corresponding `auths.testkit`
+conformance suite before they are used by a production composition.
+
+Parity with TypeScript means the same product operation, result meaning,
+security boundary, and qualified profile—not identical spelling or a shared
+implementation in either language. Differential fixtures should prove that
+both bindings delegate semantic operations to the same Rust-owned waist.
 
 ---
 
-# Budgets
+<!-- route: /reference/rust; source: reference/rust.mdx; section: reference -->
+# Rust facades and crate map
 
-Reserve and consume numeric or profile-defined budgets with the same atomic boundary as uses.
+Rust exposes both the portable verifier and the lower-level building blocks
+used to implement it. Most consumers should not assemble those crates
+themselves. Start with the facade matching your job, then descend only when you
+need explicit control over a boundary.
 
-## Model
+## Start with a facade
 
-A budget limits cumulative effect according to a profile-owned unit such as cost, records, tokens, or capacity. The request declares its amount and durable state reserves it before execution.
+### `auths`
 
-## What remains true
+`auths` is the supported embedded core coordinate. It re-exports the
+`auths-proof` facade while adding no I/O, provider, profile, custody, or runtime
+behavior. Use it when an application wants one stable dependency for offline
+Auths V1 verification.
 
-Children may reduce available budget and executions cannot spend more than the remaining amount. The unit and canonical amount are committed.
+### `auths-proof`
 
-## Where it fails closed
+`auths-proof` exposes the bounded protocol engine and actionable result
+projection. The common operation supplies three explicit byte inputs: proof,
+canonical action, and trusted context. The result contains the three-way
+verdict, stable code, stage, deterministic resource metrics, portable result,
+and exact result CBOR.
 
-Negative, overflowed, mismatched-unit, over-budget, concurrent overspend, and unavailable-state requests deny before provider access.
+Malformed untrusted proof input is an ordinary verification result. The Rust
+`Result` error around the facade represents failure to encode or decode the
+engine's own canonical result—not a denied proof.
 
-## Continue
+The native typed operation is available for profile decoders that already hold
+a validated canonical action and verifier context. The sealed verified action
+has no public constructor.
+
+### `auths-sdk`
+
+`auths-sdk` is the idiomatic embedded authorization SDK. It helps an
+integration construct explicit trusted contexts, call the kernel, and decode a
+sealed verified action through a closed profile. It re-exports deliberately
+selected authoring, custody, error, model, and profile surfaces.
+
+It does not turn the Rust facade into a generic remote-action executor.
+Durable replay state, credentials, provider gateways, receipts, and
+reconciliation remain product or profile concerns.
+
+## Offline verification example
+
+> Product-owned external-consumer example from [`demos/offline-verification`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/offline-verification).
+> Source revision: `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`. No output is synthesized by the documentation projection.
+
+Source: [`demos/offline-verification/src/main.rs`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/offline-verification/src/main.rs) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Load the verifier and canonical inputs
+
+Import the verifier ports and embed the proof, action, and trusted-context fixture bytes.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–7; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+use auths_ports::{PrincipalMethod, SignatureSuite};
+use auths_proof::{Engine, Verdict};
+
+const PROOF: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../core/fixtures/v1/valid/raw-key-chain.proof.cbor");
+const ACTION: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../core/fixtures/v1/valid/raw-key-chain.action.cbor");
+const TRUSTED_CONTEXT: &[u8] =
+    include_bytes!("../../../core/fixtures/v1/valid/raw-key-chain.context.cbor");
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Build the verifier-owned context
+
+Register accepted adapters and bind the exact executable configuration and required plan outside the proof.
+
+_Pinned source lines 9–24; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+    let method = auths_raw_key::RawKeyMethod::new()?;
+    let suite = auths_signature::Ed25519Suite::new()?;
+    let methods: [&dyn PrincipalMethod; 1] = [&method];
+    let suites: [&dyn SignatureSuite; 1] = [&suite];
+    let registries = auths_registries::ImmutableRegistries::new(&methods, &suites)?;
+
+    // The trusted host, not the proof producer, commits the exact executable
+    // configuration and required composition policy.
+    let context = auths_codec::decode_verifier_context(TRUSTED_CONTEXT)?
+        .with_configuration(registries.configuration_id())?;
+    let required_plan = context
+        .composition()
+        .expected_plan()
+        .ok_or("example context must require an exact plan")?;
+    let context_bytes = auths_codec::encode_verifier_context(&context)?;
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Verify without executing
+
+Run the offline kernel and project bounded diagnostic and work information from the result.
+
+_Pinned source lines 26–37; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+    let result = Engine::new(registries).verify_cbor(PROOF, ACTION, &context_bytes)?;
+    let explanation = result.explanation();
+    let portable = result.portable();
+    let resources = result.resources();
+    println!(
+        "verdict={:?} code={} stage={:?} retryable={} work_units={}",
+        result.verdict(),
+        result.code(),
+        explanation.stage(),
+        explanation.retryable(),
+        resources.work_units()
+    );
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Inspect portable commitments
+
+Read proof, action, context, and configuration commitments without acquiring any execution capability.
+
+_Pinned source lines 38–47; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+    println!(
+        "proof={:?} action={:?} context={:?} required_configuration={:?} local_configuration={:?}",
+        portable.proof_digest().as_bytes(),
+        portable.action_digest().as_bytes(),
+        portable.context_digest().as_bytes(),
+        portable
+            .required_configuration()
+            .map(|configuration| *configuration.as_bytes()),
+        portable.local_configuration().as_bytes()
+    );
+```
+
+#### Step 5: Handle every verdict fail closed
+
+Continue only for authorized results that satisfy the host-required plan; denied and indeterminate both stop.
+
+_Pinned source lines 49–63; no output is synthesized._
 
-Keep budgets simple and domain-specific; use a policy engine for broader business policy and commit its chosen inputs separately.
+```rust
+    match result.verdict() {
+        Verdict::Authorized => {
+            if portable.plan_id() != Some(required_plan) {
+                return Err("authorized result did not satisfy the host-required plan".into());
+            }
+            Ok(())
+        }
+        Verdict::Denied => Err(format!("stable authorization denial: {}", result.code()).into()),
+        Verdict::Indeterminate => Err(format!(
+            "not authorized; obtain new trusted facts before retrying: {}",
+            result.code()
+        )
+        .into()),
+    }
+}
+```
+
+```bash
+# Run the pinned workspace example
+cargo run -p auths-proof-offline-example
+```
+
+The example is compiled as an external consumer against the pinned crate
+artifacts. Its verification path performs no resolver, network, database,
+filesystem, clock, or private-key I/O. `Indeterminate` remains non-authorizing
+and may change only when the host supplies new trusted facts or exact support.
+
+## Crates by responsibility
+
+The following map explains why the crate groups exist without duplicating
+every package name.
+
+### Protocol model and codec
+
+These crates own validated V1 types, deterministic CBOR, domain-separated
+identifiers, canonical fixtures, and the three-input portable contract. Use
+them when implementing a profile, adapter, independent encoding tool, or
+protocol-level integration that cannot be expressed through the facade.
+
+### Pure authority semantics
+
+Authority, composition, assurance, registries, signature suites, and the
+sealed verifier remain deterministic and effect-free. They decide attenuation,
+plan satisfaction, evidence requirements, status, action binding, and stable
+results from explicit inputs.
+
+These crates must not acquire evidence, read a clock, call a provider, or own
+mutable replay state.
+
+### Authoring and custody ports
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+Authoring produces deterministic statements and external signing requests.
+Private-key custody remains behind a separate port. This lets applications use
+HSMs, KMS products, secure enclaves, or other signers without moving key
+material into the protocol model.
+
+Authoring can create a proposed proof; it cannot decide that its own output is
+authorized.
+
+### Principal and signature adapters
+
+Principal-method adapters establish bounded control and assurance facts for
+raw keys, DIDs, SPIFFE, WebAuthn, or HSM-attested identities. Signature suites
+verify exact domain-separated signing input. Network acquisition and mutable
+lifecycle observations remain outside these pure components.
 
+### Profiles and product mechanisms
 
+Profile crates own canonical application actions, typed verified-command
+decoding, provider gateways, and effect-specific result meaning. Product
+mechanisms own stateful concerns such as atomic reservation, replay, budgets,
+receipts, custody integration, and recovery.
+
+Each profile stays vertically cohesive. Similar-looking provider workflows do
+not share a generic operation dispatcher unless multiple implemented domains
+prove an identical mechanism through differential evidence.
+
+### Exchange and transport
+
+Exchange crates frame and move bounded proof material. A transport can
+authenticate a peer or session, but successful delivery never upgrades an
+invalid proof into authorization.
+
+### Testkit and conformance
+
+Testkit crates construct canonical positive and negative cases and certify
+specific extension contracts. They are not production dependencies and cannot
+become alternate sources of protocol truth.
+
+> **Pinned reference request: rust-crate-map.**
+> Product revision: `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+> Declared sources: `Cargo.toml workspace members`, `architecture.toml`, `crate package metadata`, `public rustdoc`.
+> Requested projection: crate,public purpose,layer,facade exposure,no_std status,rustdoc link; layer and responsibility.
+> The current product snapshot does not carry a structured artifact for this table, so this Markdown projection does not invent one.
+
+## Dependency direction
+
+The monorepo is a layered collection of packages:
+
+```text
+core <- exchange <- product <- bindings
+  ^         ^           ^          ^
+  +---------+-----------+----------+--- demos
+```
+
+Dependencies point toward the offline core. A lower layer must not import a
+higher layer to obtain a convenient type. Introduce a narrow port or move the
+minimal domain type to the lowest layer that can own it without importing I/O
+or policy.
+
+For a new integration, begin with a cohesive vertical profile in the product
+layer. Extract shared mechanisms only after independent implementations prove
+that inputs, outputs, limits, errors, state, and receipt meaning are identical.
+
+## Result handling
+
+Match every `Verdict`:
+
+- `Authorized` allows progression only through the exact verified action and
+  outer runtime gates.
+- `Denied` is stable for identical inputs; correct the action or authority.
+- `Indeterminate` is non-executable; supply new trusted facts or exact support
+  before verifying again.
+
+Use the stable code and stage for machine behavior. The non-sensitive
+explanation is suitable for operator guidance, but it is not a substitute for
+the typed result.
+
+## Exhaustive API reference
+
+> **Pinned reference request: rust-public-api.**
+> Product revision: `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+> Declared sources: `cargo rustdoc JSON for auths,auths-proof,auths-sdk`, `pinned crate artifact metadata`.
+> Requested projection: items,signatures,errors,feature flags,security docs,rustdoc links; facade then module.
+> The current product snapshot does not carry a structured artifact for this table, so this Markdown projection does not invent one.
 
 ---
 
-# Revocation and status
+<!-- route: /reference/decisions-errors; source: reference/decisions-errors.mdx; section: reference -->
+# Decisions, errors, and safe responses
 
-Apply issuer-owned status without pretending it is an offline cryptographic fact.
+Auths gives you two different kinds of answer. The offline verifier tells you
+whether the supplied proof establishes authority for one exact action. The
+outer runtime tells you what happened while reserving or performing that
+action. Treating those answers as one generic success/error flag is unsafe.
 
-## Model
+The first question is always: **may this action execute?** Only an authorized
+verdict can cross that boundary, and authorization still does not mean the
+provider has been called or that the effect succeeded.
 
-Status is an explicit trusted input resolved by an application-owned status provider. It can express active, revoked, suspended, unknown, or unavailable according to the profile.
+## The three verifier decisions
 
-## What remains true
+### Authorized
 
-The decision commits the status evidence it used. Cached status obeys declared freshness; absence is not interpreted as active.
+The proof, trusted context, authority chain, status, assurance, and action
+binding checks all passed. The result is authorization for the canonical
+action supplied to this verification—not for a similar object reconstructed
+from an HTTP request or application model.
 
-## Where it fails closed
+An authorized result is an input to the execution plane. Channel policy,
+replay, stateful budgets, application policy, durable reservation, and the
+closed profile gateway may still stop execution.
 
-Revoked, suspended, stale, unknown, or unavailable status returns a closed lifecycle outcome. Offline verification must state when no current status was consulted.
+### Denied
 
-## Continue
+The trustworthy facts available to the verifier establish that the request is
+invalid or outside the authority supplied. Examples include an invalid
+signature, an expanded delegation, a revoked grant, an action-body mismatch,
+or a local policy denial.
+
+Repeating the same inputs cannot change a deterministic denial. Do not retry
+through a weaker verifier, remove a required check, or send the unverified
+request directly to the provider. Change the action, obtain appropriate
+authority, or correct the invalid proof.
+
+### Indeterminate
+
+The verifier could not establish a required trustworthy fact or did not have
+an exact implementation needed by the request. Missing fresh status,
+unavailable historical evidence, or an unsupported principal method are
+indeterminate rather than denied.
+
+Indeterminate is still non-executable. A retry is meaningful only when the
+host supplies new trusted facts or installs the exact missing implementation.
+Repeatedly submitting the same inputs is not recovery.
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+  V["Verify exact proof + action + context"] --> A{"Verdict"}
+  A -->|Authorized| G["Continue through runtime gates"]
+  A -->|Denied| D["Change request or authority"]
+  A -->|Indeterminate| I["Supply trustworthy facts or exact support"]
+  G --> R{"Runtime outcome"}
+  R -->|Completed| C["Return result and receipt"]
+  R -->|Exact replay| E["Return recorded result; no provider re-entry"]
+  R -->|Recoverable or provider unknown| X["Resume or reconcile the same execution"]
+```
 
-Choose freshness and availability behavior appropriate to the effect's consequence.
+## Safe response matrix
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+| Outcome | Could the provider have been reached? | Safe response |
+| --- | ---: | --- |
+| `authorized` verifier decision | No; the pure verifier performs no I/O | Continue only through the configured runtime and closed profile gateway. |
+| `denied` verifier decision | No | Correct the request or authority. Do not weaken verification or retry identical inputs. |
+| `indeterminate` verifier decision | No | Supply new trusted facts or exact implementation support, then verify again. |
+| `completed` execution result | Yes, with a recorded terminal result | Return the result and receipt. Reuse the recorded result for the same execution identity. |
+| `exact-replay` runtime result | It was reached by the original execution, not this replay | Return the original recorded outcome. Do not call the provider again. |
+| `not-applied` runtime result | The runtime established that the effect was not applied | Follow the profile's recovery contract; never construct a replacement command from unchecked input. |
+| `conflict` runtime result | Possibly | Stop. The execution identity is already bound to different commitments or state. Investigate rather than retrying. |
+| `recoverable` runtime result | Possibly, including an ambiguous response | Preserve the opaque execution reference and resume or reconcile that same execution. Never mint a replacement reference or blindly retry. |
 
+The public SDKs expose closed result variants rather than exceptions for these
+expected workflow outcomes. Programming errors, malformed SDK inputs, broken
+adapter contracts, or unavailable infrastructure can still surface as typed
+product errors. Handle them using the product error registry; do not infer a
+retry policy from message text.
 
+## Stable codes are protocol data
+
+A stable verifier code identifies the deterministic first failure and the
+stage that produced it. Codes use exact hyphenated protocol values such as
+`action-body-mismatch`; locally translated aliases are not interchangeable.
+
+Never translate a hyphenated stable code into a language-local alias. The
+table below comes from the normative V1 taxonomy and preserves the distinction
+between denied codes, indeterminate requirements, outer runtime failures, and
+codes reserved but not emitted by a conforming V1 verifier.
+
+### Pinned stable failure taxonomy
+
+Source: [`core/spec/v1/error-codes.md`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/core/spec/v1/error-codes.md) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+### Stable Failure Taxonomy — V1
+
+The enforcement decision is binary: executable or not executable. The proof
+verifier retains three diagnostic classes.
+
+#### Authorized
+
+| Code | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `authorized` | Every proof, authority, status, assurance, and action-binding check passed |
+
+#### Denied
+
+| Code | Stage | Meaning |
+|---|---|---|
+| `malformed-proof` | decode | Input is not a complete bounded V1 object |
+| `non-canonical-proof` | decode | Encoding or set order is not canonical |
+| `resource-limit-exceeded` | any | Configured byte, count, depth, signature, or work limit exceeded |
+| `digest-mismatch` | resolve | Content does not match its identifier |
+| `duplicate-object` | resolve | Duplicate identifier or semantic object |
+| `missing-reference` | resolve | Required digest reference is absent |
+| `unused-critical-evidence` | resolve | Critical evidence is unconsumed |
+| `invalid-signature` | control | Cryptographic signature is invalid |
+| `principal-method-mismatch` | control | Principal and selected method disagree |
+| `verification-method-mismatch` | control | Verification method is not valid for principal/purpose |
+| `signature-suite-mismatch` | control | Suite and key are incompatible |
+| `untrusted-root` | authority | No scoped local anchor covers the root |
+| `broken-grant-chain` | authority | Issuer, subject, parent, actor, or profile linkage is broken |
+| `delegation-expanded` | authority | A child widened an authority dimension |
+| `permission-not-granted` | authority | Terminal authority lacks the exact permission |
+| `action-constraint-mismatch` | authority | Body digest is outside the granted constraint |
+| `budget-ceiling-exceeded` | authority | Requested budget exceeds or mismatches the signed ceiling |
+| `composition-requirement-not-met` | authority | Authorized branches do not satisfy the trusted expected plan, quorum, actor-diversity, or root-diversity obligation |
+| `plan-action-mismatch` | action | Branches bind different action meaning or plan |
+| `action-body-mismatch` | action | Canonical body digest differs |
+| `audience-mismatch` | action | Audience differs from verifier context |
+| `challenge-mismatch` | action | Challenge differs from verifier context |
+| `action-outside-validity` | action | Action is not live |
+| `principal-revoked` | status | Accepted status says principal is revoked |
+| `grant-revoked` | status | Accepted status says grant or ancestor is revoked |
+| `status-sequence-rollback` | status | Status sequence moves backwards |
+| `status-method-mismatch` | status | Subject status exists only under another exact method |
+| `status-issuer-untrusted` | status | A valid status signature was made by an issuer outside snapshot trust |
+| `registry-manifest-mismatch` | control | Context manifest differs from the immutable executable registry |
+| `verifier-configuration-mismatch` | control | Context configuration commitment differs from the exact executable adapter and registry configuration |
+| `resource-namespace-mismatch` | authority | Selected matcher rejects every root namespace |
+| `critical-extension-unknown` | extension | Required extension is not registered |
+| `attachment-missing` | action | Required signed attachment bytes are absent |
+| `attachment-digest-mismatch` | action | Detached bytes do not hash to the signed identifier |
+| `attachment-length-mismatch` | action | Detached byte length differs from the signed length |
+| `duplicate-attachment` | resolve/action | An attachment identifier occurs more than once |
+| `unused-critical-attachment` | action | Signed descriptors and supplied detached inputs do not correspond |
+| `opaque-attachment-not-allowed` | action | Encrypted bytes were supplied where opaque verification was not signed as acceptable |
+| `local-policy-denied` | policy | Explicit local policy rejects established facts |
+
+#### Indeterminate
+
+| Code | Stage | Meaning |
+|---|---|---|
+| `unsupported-protocol` | decode | Protocol major is not supported |
+| `unsupported-principal-method` | control | Required method is not registered |
+| `unsupported-signature-suite` | control | Required suite is not registered |
+| `unsupported-evidence-type` | evidence | Evidence verifier is unavailable |
+| `unsupported-status-method` | status | Required status verifier is unavailable |
+| `unsupported-profile` | action | Required profile/version is unavailable |
+| `unsupported-profile-policy` | policy | Accepted profile-policy ID has no exact executable handler |
+| `unsupported-resource-matcher` | authority | Accepted resource matcher has no exact executable handler |
+| `unsupported-budget-algebra` | authority | Accepted budget algebra has no exact executable handler |
+| `unsupported-critical-extension` | extension | Accepted critical extension has no exact executable handler |
+| `unsupported-assurance-claim` | assurance | An adapter emitted a claim without an accepted exact handler |
+| `missing-principal-evidence` | control | Required control fact cannot be established |
+| `missing-principal-status` | status | Required principal status is absent |
+| `missing-grant-status` | status | Required grant status is absent |
+| `stale-status` | status | Status exists but is not fresh enough |
+| `historical-state-unavailable` | evidence | Historical control/existence cannot be established |
+| `assurance-requirement-not-met` | assurance | Required parameterized claim is absent |
+| `external-fact-unavailable` | evidence | Required bounded external fact was not supplied |
+
+#### Outer runtime failures
+
+These are never Auths authorization verdicts:
+
+| Code | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `challenge-unknown` | Challenge was not issued |
+| `challenge-expired` | Challenge expired |
+| `challenge-consumed` | Challenge was already claimed |
+| `replay-store-unavailable` | Atomic replay state unavailable |
+| `budget-exhausted` | Stateful budget cannot be claimed |
+| `budget-store-unavailable` | Budget state unavailable |
+| `channel-policy-failed` | Peer observation does not satisfy local policy |
+| `application-policy-failed` | Verified action violates a local restriction |
+| `receipt-store-unavailable` | Receipt persistence policy cannot be met |
+| `execution-failed` | Authorized command failed during execution |
+
+Reason codes and diagnostic class are normative corpus fields.
+
+#### Reserved V1 codes
+
+The following codes remain allocated in the portable enum but are not emitted
+by a validly decoded V1 proof:
+
+| Code | Reason reserved |
+|---|---|
+| `ambiguous-terminal-grant` | Action envelopes carry one explicit terminal grant, so ambiguity is rejected as malformed before authority evaluation |
+| `authorization-plan-invalid` | The canonical decoder and model constructors validate plan shape and limits; invalid shapes are `malformed-proof` or `resource-limit-exceeded` before composition |
+| `reference-cycle` | V1 grant identifiers are content hashes of statements containing their parent identifiers; a constructible cycle cannot pass content-address validation, so ordinary broken graphs produce `missing-reference` or `digest-mismatch` |
+
+Reserved codes have no corpus vector and MUST NOT be emitted by a conforming V1
+portable verifier.
+
+## Do not collapse protocol and provider failures
+
+The following events are different and should remain different in logs,
+metrics, receipts, and user interfaces:
+
+1. **Denied:** the action never becomes executable.
+2. **Indeterminate:** the action never becomes executable, but new trusted
+   facts may make a later verification decidable.
+3. **Known provider failure before effect:** the profile knows the effect did
+   not happen and applies its explicit release or recovery rule.
+4. **Known provider failure after effect:** the effect happened even though a
+   later step failed; the runtime records the observed effect.
+5. **Provider outcome unknown:** the provider may have applied the effect but
+   the acknowledgement was lost. The runtime retains uncertainty and blocks a
+   blind retry until reconciliation.
+
+A network timeout is therefore not permission to submit the action again.
+Likewise, a valid signature is not permission to bypass a denial. The closed
+profile owns the meaning of provider outcomes and the exact operation needed
+to reconcile them.
+
+## First-failure ordering
+
+Auths V1 uses deterministic first-failure ordering so implementations and
+receipts agree on one primary stage and code. That ordering is useful for
+portable tests and operator playbooks. It is not a claim that verification
+reveals no timing, cache, power, or other side channel.
+
+For diagnostics, preserve the stable code, stage, commitments, and safe
+response. Avoid logging proof bytes, detached attachments, credentials, or
+sensitive disclosed receipt fields.
+
+## Generated product result reference
+
+### Product errors and safe responses
+
+Source: [`product/errors/v1/registry.json`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/product/errors/v1/registry.json) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+| Code | Family | Effect state | Recommended response |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| `core.invalid-configuration` | configuration | not-applied | `correct-configuration` |
+| `core.unsupported-abi` | runtime | not-applied | `install-compatible-runtime` |
+| `core.unsupported-semantic-subject` | runtime | not-applied | `install-compatible-runtime` |
+| `core.malformed-input` | input | not-applied | `correct-input` |
+| `core.native-runtime-unavailable` | runtime | not-applied | `retry-execution` |
+| `core.forged-execution-reference` | state | not-applied | `correct-input` |
+| `core.runtime-conflict` | state | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
+| `core.runtime-unavailable` | runtime | not-applied | `retry-execution` |
+| `core.runtime-cancelled` | state | not-applied | `retry-execution` |
+| `core.outcome-unknown` | provider | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `core.observation-pending` | provider | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `core.observation-inconclusive` | provider | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `core.workflow-terminal` | state | not-applied | `inspect-receipt` |
+| `core.internal-invariant` | internal | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `mcp.invalid-handler-output` | profile | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `mcp.handler-failed` | provider | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `mcp.handler-timeout` | provider | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `mcp.cancelled-before-entry` | profile | not-applied | `retry-execution` |
+| `mcp.reservation-conflict` | state | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
+| `mcp.replay` | state | not-applied | `inspect-receipt` |
+| `mcp.receipt-persist-failed` | state | applied | `contact-support` |
+| `mcp.reconciliation-pending` | provider | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `plan.member-interrupted` | provider | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `plan.member-failed-before-entry` | profile | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
+| `plan.resume-reference-invalid` | state | not-applied | `correct-input` |
+| `plan.reconciliation-pending` | provider | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `plan.action-substituted` | input | not-applied | `correct-input` |
+| `custody.denied` | provider | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
+| `custody.cancelled` | provider | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
+| `custody.throttled` | provider | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
+| `custody.unavailable` | provider | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
+| `custody.revoked-key` | provider | not-applied | `correct-configuration` |
+| `custody.disabled-key` | provider | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
+| `custody.provider-unknown` | provider | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.invalid-provider-response` | provider | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.request-mismatch` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.principal-mismatch` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.descriptor-mismatch` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.key-version-mismatch` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.transaction-mismatch` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.malformed-signature` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.non-canonical-signature` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.signature-verification-failed` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.evidence-mismatch` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.lifecycle-not-permitted` | state | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
 
 ---
 
-# Uses and replay
+<!-- route: /reference/evidence-status-assurance; source: reference/evidence-status-assurance.mdx; section: reference -->
+# Evidence, status, assurance, and registries
 
-Consume bounded uses atomically and reject exact replay.
+Auths separates the question “what facts can this verifier establish?” from
+the question “does authority cover this action?” This is the boundary behind
+the project rule:
 
-## Model
+> Auths owns authority. Adapters establish bounded facts.
 
-Use state is keyed by stable authority and command commitments. Execution reserves a use before reaching the provider and commits or recovers that reservation according to the journaled outcome.
+A principal adapter can establish that a particular key controlled a
+principal under a particular method. A status method can establish that a
+grant was active in a trusted snapshot. An assurance adapter can establish a
+parameterized claim about one participant. None of them may produce an
+authorized result, choose a trust anchor, widen a grant, or execute an effect.
+
+## Evidence is input, not trust
+
+Evidence objects are bounded, content-addressed values selected by an exact
+evidence type. A control binding connects a signed statement to the evidence
+its principal adapter is expected to consume.
 
-## What remains true
+For a successfully verified statement, the evidence identifiers in the
+binding must equal the identifiers the adapter reports as consumed. This is an
+important fail-closed rule:
 
-Concurrent requests cannot both consume the same final use. A transport retry does not create fresh semantic authority.
+- missing required evidence cannot be silently ignored;
+- extra evidence cannot influence an adapter through an undeclared side
+  channel;
+- an adapter cannot claim it consumed evidence absent from the signed binding;
+- successful resolution does not itself make evidence trustworthy.
 
-## Where it fails closed
+Fetching a DID document, certificate chain, KERI checkpoint, WebAuthn
+registration, or HSM attestation record is an outer acquisition concern. The
+pure verifier receives bounded evidence and immutable local context, then
+revalidates their exact relationship.
 
-Exact replay, exhausted use count, reservation conflict, unavailable state, and uncertain prior execution cannot fall through to the provider.
+## Status answers narrow lifecycle questions
 
-## Continue
+Principal and grant status are separate signed fact families. Each statement
+binds an exact method, subject, issuer, sequence, and validity boundary. The
+trusted verifier snapshot—not the proof—selects accepted issuers and minimum
+sequence floors.
+
+Selection is deterministic. A later accepted sequence supersedes an earlier
+one, and revocation dominates active status at the same sequence. A rollback,
+wrong method, untrusted issuer, stale statement, missing statement, and
+authenticated revocation remain different outcomes.
+
+Do not treat these facts as synonyms:
+
+| Fact | What it can establish | What it cannot establish by itself |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Current control | The controller state was observed within a trusted freshness window | That the same key controlled the principal at an earlier signing time |
+| Historical control | A key was accepted during a particular historical interval | That a particular statement existed during that interval |
+| Statement existence | Exact signing bytes were observed at a particular time | Current controller state |
+| Revocation check | A trusted status source was checked at a stated observation time | Authority for an action |
+| Grant status | A particular grant or ancestor is active or revoked | Principal control or signature validity |
+
+This distinction prevents a removed historical key from creating a new grant
+and backdating it into a period when that key used to be valid.
+
+## Assurance belongs to participants and parameters
+
+Assurance is not one global strength score. Every assurance report names the
+participant, its role in the chain, the adapter and version, evidence digests,
+claim parameters, observation time, and provenance.
+
+A policy selects both a role and a quantifier:
+
+- `Any` means at least one participant with that role must satisfy the exact
+  requirement.
+- `Every` means every participant with that role must satisfy it.
+
+Roles include roots, intermediates, actors, and external issuers. Strong
+evidence for the actor cannot repair weak or missing evidence for a required
+root. Parameters matter too: a hardware-attestation claim for one protection
+profile does not satisfy a requirement for another merely because the claim
+names look similar.
+
+V1 registers no implicit assurance hierarchy. One claim implies another only
+when an exact implication handler is accepted and installed. An adapter cannot
+declare its own output “high assurance” and thereby satisfy an unrelated
+policy.
 
-Use Resume for an existing execution reference; never mint a fresh command to hide uncertainty.
+## Registries make extension exact
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+The verifier uses immutable registries for principal methods, signature
+suites, status methods, resource matchers, profile policy, budget algebra,
+critical extensions, assurance claims, and assurance implications.
 
+Each executable entry has:
 
+- an exact identifier;
+- immutable decision-affecting configuration;
+- a configuration commitment;
+- a conservative maximum work charge reserved before invocation; and
+- typed, bounded behavior.
+
+The trusted context lists the entries it accepts and binds the expected
+registry manifest and exact executable verifier configuration. A different
+manifest or configuration is a denial before pluggable verification. A
+required accepted identifier without an installed exact handler is
+indeterminate. An unaccepted signed critical extension is denied. There is no
+algorithm inference, fallback, or version negotiation.
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+  U["Untrusted proof evidence"] --> B["Exact signed control binding"]
+  L["Verifier-local context"] --> A["Bounded adapter"]
+  B --> A
+  A --> F["Key material + consumed evidence + assurance facts"]
+  F --> V["Sealed authority verifier"]
+  T["Trust anchors + status policy + accepted registries"] --> V
+  V --> D["Authorized / Denied / Indeterminate"]
+```
+
+The adapter arrow ends at facts. Only the sealed verifier combines those facts
+with trust anchors, authority, plans, action binding, and local policy.
+
+## Generated registry and assurance reference
+
+### Pinned registry specification
+
+Source: [`core/spec/v1/registry.md`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/core/spec/v1/registry.md) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+### Auths V1 Initial Registries
+
+All lookups are exact. Unknown identifiers return `Indeterminate` when a
+required capability is unavailable or `Denied` when an unknown critical field
+or contradictory identifier appears. No parser, adapter, or algorithm
+fallback is permitted.
+
+The complete executable target-V1 set is bound by the pinned manifest
+`33` repeated 32 times. A context carrying any other manifest is denied before
+pluggable verification. Every implementation declares a conservative maximum
+work cost that is reserved before invocation.
+
+#### Pure semantic registries
+
+| Kind | Target V1 ID | Required behavior |
+|---|---|---|
+| Resource matcher | `uri-namespace-v1` | Exact URI namespace boundary matching |
+| Profile policy | `exact-v1` | Effect-free acceptance of already validated canonical action facts |
+| Budget algebra | `numeric-ceiling-v1` | Exact-algebra attenuation and coverage using unsigned `<=` |
+| Critical extension | `exact-marker-v1` | Requires the exact byte string `h'01'` and otherwise changes no authority |
+| Principal status | `auths-principal-status-v1` | Trusted issuer, method, floor, freshness, and revoked-dominant latest selection |
+| Grant status | `auths-grant-status-v1` | Same selection rules as principal status |
+
+Critical-extension, assurance-claim, and assurance-implication lookups are
+also exact executable lookups. An identifier listed by the context without an
+installed handler is indeterminate; an unaccepted signed critical extension is
+denied. There is no fallback or version negotiation.
+
+#### Principal methods
+
+| ID | Evidence ceiling | Mandatory suites |
+|---|---:|---|
+| `raw-key-v1` | 512 B | Ed25519, P-256 |
+| `did-key-v1` | 2 KiB | Ed25519, P-256 |
+| `did-keri-v1` | 64 KiB | registered KERI-compatible suites |
+| `did-web-bundled-v1` | 32 KiB | Ed25519, P-256 |
+| `spiffe-x509-v1` | 32 KiB | certificate-selected registered suite |
+| `webauthn-v1` | 16 KiB | P-256 mandatory |
+| `hsm-attested-v1` | 32 KiB | attestation-profile selected suite |
+
+#### Signature suites
+
+| ID | Public key | Signature | Rule |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `ed25519-v1` | 32-byte compressed point | 64 bytes | RFC 8032 verification of exact preimage |
+| `p256-sha256-v1` | 33-byte compressed SEC1 | 64-byte `r || s` | ECDSA/SHA-256, low-S required |
+
+#### Status methods
+
+| ID | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `auths-principal-status-v1` | Signed active/revoked/superseded principal state |
+| `auths-grant-status-v1` | Signed active/revoked/superseded grant state |
+| `keri-checkpoint-v1` | KERI sequence and witness/transparency checkpoint |
+| `x509-status-v1` | Certificate validity and revocation evidence |
+| `webauthn-credential-status-v1` | Registered authenticator credential state |
+| `local-deny-list-v1` | Verifier-local explicit deny facts |
+
+#### Budget algebras
+
+| ID | Order |
+|---|---|
+| `numeric-ceiling-v1` | child value must be less than or equal to parent |
+
+#### Composition operators
+
+| ID | Meaning |
+|---:|---|
+| 0 | `Proof` |
+| 1 | `AllOf` |
+| 2 | `AnyOf` |
+| 3 | `KOfN` |
+
+#### Transports
+
+| ID | Peer observation |
+|---|---|
+| `memory-v1` | none |
+| `iroh-v1` | endpoint and session key |
+| `https-v1` | TLS peer and exporter binding |
+| `tcp-v1` | endpoint only |
+| `unix-v1` | socket and OS peer credentials |
+| `file-v1` | envelope and sequence metadata |
+
+#### Profiles
+
+| Profile ID | Version | Operations |
+|---|---:|---|
+| `auths.mcp` | 1 | MCP tool calls |
+| `auths.http` | 1 | canonical HTTP requests |
+| `auths.git` | 1 | commit, tag, ref, merge, release |
+| `auths.deploy` | 1 | release and infrastructure deployment |
+| `auths.supply-chain` | 1 | build, attest, publish, promote |
+| `auths.edge` | 1 | device command and firmware activation |
+
+#### Assurance claims
+
+The initial claim registry contains:
+
+- `self-certifying-identifier`;
+- `offline-verifiable`;
+- `controller-state-current-at`;
+- `historical-at`;
+- `statement-existence-proven-at`;
+- `rotation-aware`;
+- `revocation-checked-at`;
+- `witness-threshold-met`;
+- `pki-chain-validated`;
+- `workload-attested`;
+- `hardware-attested`;
+- `user-verified`;
+- `origin-bound`.
+
+Parameterized claims never satisfy unparameterized “high assurance” by name
+alone. The assurance registry defines exact implication rules.
+
+#### Critical extensions
+
+`exact-marker-v1` is the initial non-authority-changing executable extension.
+Its body is exactly `h'01'`; it exists to exercise exact handler selection,
+signed-byte validation, work reservation, and portable interoperability.
+Unknown critical extensions are denied. New attenuation or composition
+semantics require a protocol review, an executable model, and a new manifest.
+
+#### Assurance implications
+
+No implication rule is initially registered. Claim names never imply one
+another. A future implication must have an exact accepted identifier and a
+pure executable handler included in a new registry manifest.
+
+### Pinned assurance claims
+
+Documentation-contract revision: `d0e4a53e5e9582e9eaff1cf38e965252c6c79765`.
+
+| Claim | Status | Scope | Limitation |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Approval is bound to exact plan context and cannot authorize substituted plan bytes. | passing | Maintained approval-plan signing requests, responses, and substitution fixtures. | The application remains responsible for approver identity, user experience, and organizational policy. |
+| Delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent under the maintained model and adversarial fixtures. | passing | Attenuation relations represented by the maintained formal model and protocol profile. | The claim covers the modelled fields and maintained protocol profile, not arbitrary application-defined semantics. |
+| Receipt inspection defaults to opaque or bounded views and requires authority for full disclosure. | passing | Maintained receipt summary and disclosure operations and their public runtime contract. | Deployment retention, access control, and downstream handling remain application responsibilities. |
+| Maintained product workflows reach provider adapters only through opaque native-authorized commands. | passing | Maintained execution workflows and their opaque native command and gateway boundary. | Application-owned adapters can still be implemented unsafely outside the maintained boundary. |
+| Maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python scenarios target identical stable semantic outcomes. | passing | The maintained installed-artifact scenarios declared for Rust, TypeScript, and Python. | Scenario parity covers maintained workflows and versions, not every possible application composition. |
+| Maintained runtime paths preserve replay, use, budget, and recovery distinctions. | passing | Maintained runtime and installed-SDK workflows for replay, use, budget, reservation, and recovery outcomes. | Production guarantees also depend on the selected durable store and its deployment. |
+| Rust owns protocol meaning used by Rust, TypeScript, and Python projections. | passing | The declared protocol and product semantic identities consumed by maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python surfaces. | The semantic freeze detects declared semantic drift; it is not a proof that every implementation is defect-free. |
+| The assessed release builder satisfies the recorded SLSA Build Level 3 requirements. | passing | The assessed GitHub release builder and recorded SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 controls. | This is a repository-owner delegated build assessment, not an independent security audit or source-correctness proof. |
+
+## Integration checklist
+
+When you add or review an adapter, verify all of the following:
+
+1. Live acquisition is outside the offline kernel.
+2. The proof cannot choose its own trust roots or immutable adapter context.
+3. Inputs, output facts, byte limits, work limits, and errors are typed and
+   bounded.
+4. The adapter reports exactly the evidence it consumed.
+5. Signature verification remains in the separately selected suite unless the
+   method defines an explicit method-derived message.
+6. Assurance claims name exact participants, parameters, source, adapter, and
+   observation time.
+7. Unsupported required behavior is indeterminate rather than inferred.
+8. Invalid or contradictory evidence is denied.
+9. The implementation cannot construct a verified authority or executable
+   command.
 
 ---
 
-# Validity and expiry
+<!-- route: /reference/limits-encoding-identifiers; source: reference/limits-encoding-identifiers.mdx; section: reference -->
+# Limits, canonical encoding, and identifiers
+
+In Auths, serialization rules are security rules. Signers, verifiers, language
+bindings, receipts, and independent implementations must agree on the exact
+bytes and identifiers for the same action. Inputs must also have a known upper
+bound before an attacker can make the verifier allocate memory or invoke
+expensive adapters.
 
-Evaluate not-before and expiry bounds at an explicit observation time.
+The tables below project exact current values from the pinned V1 specification;
+the surrounding explanation connects those limits to the attacks they bound.
+
+## Canonical bytes prevent alternate meanings
+
+Auths V1 uses a constrained deterministic CBOR profile. It permits
+definite-length maps, arrays, text, and byte strings with shortest integer and
+length encodings. Maps use ascending integer keys, and set-like arrays use an
+explicit canonical order.
+
+The decoder rejects:
+
+- duplicate or out-of-order keys;
+- non-minimal integers and lengths;
+- indefinite-length values;
+- floats and tags;
+- invalid UTF-8;
+- non-canonical set order;
+- unknown critical fields; and
+- trailing bytes after the one expected object.
+
+This avoids a dangerous situation in which two byte sequences appear
+equivalent to an application but produce different signing or hashing input.
+Auths does not assume that semantically similar, byte-distinct application
+actions are equivalent. A profile owns the canonical body format for its exact
+effect.
+
+## There are two important action digests
+
+An application profile first canonicalizes its body. The action envelope signs
+the resulting body digest together with the profile, capability, resource,
+actor, audience, challenge, validity, authority, plan, attachments, and other
+security fields.
+
+The portable verifier separately hashes the complete deterministic
+`canonical-action` input. These digests answer different questions:
+
+- **Canonical body digest:** are these the exact profile-owned effect bytes
+  authorized by the action envelope?
+- **Portable canonical-action digest:** did implementations receive the same
+  complete portable action input, including detached inputs required by the
+  protocol boundary?
+
+Do not substitute a JSON hash, request-body hash, transport digest, or
+provider idempotency key for either value.
+
+## Signing domains and content identifiers
+
+Every signed preimage begins with the Auths domain, protocol major, registered
+object type, profile identity and version, and the length of the deterministic
+canonical object. The signing object also binds the principal method,
+verification method, and signature suite.
+
+Content identifiers use a separate `AUTHS-ID` domain and a registered
+identifier type. A grant ID, action ID, plan ID, evidence ID, status ID,
+receipt ID, context digest, and proof digest therefore cannot be exchanged
+merely because they are all 32-byte values.
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+  O["Validated semantic object"] --> C["Deterministic CBOR"]
+  C --> S["AUTHS signing domain + object type"]
+  C --> I["AUTHS-ID domain + identifier type"]
+  S --> P["Exact signing preimage"]
+  I --> D["Typed content identifier"]
+```
+
+SHA-256 is fixed for V1 content identifiers and body digests. Ed25519 signs
+the full domain-separated preimage. The P-256 suite uses ECDSA with SHA-256,
+fixed-width `r || s`, and rejects high-S signatures. SHA-1 is prohibited for
+security-bearing identifiers.
+
+## Detached attachments remain bound
+
+The signed action contains descriptors for detached attachments, including
+their identifiers, lengths, and policy for required or opaque use. The
+portable canonical-action input supplies the actual detached bytes.
+
+The verifier checks correspondence, digest, and length and rejects missing,
+duplicated, mismatched, or unconsumed critical attachments. Transporting bytes
+out of band does not remove them from the authorization boundary.
+
+## Limits bound bytes, structure, and work
+
+Auths constrains more than the top-level proof size. V1 places limits on input
+byte lengths, grants, plan leaves and depth, evidence objects, status
+statements, attachments, signatures, permissions, audiences, critical
+extensions, registries, trust anchors, and adapter work.
+
+Deployments may lower defaults. Raising a protocol hard maximum requires
+protocol review rather than a runtime flag. The verifier reserves conservative
+adapter work before invoking a pluggable implementation, so a request cannot
+smuggle unbounded computation behind a small evidence envelope.
+
+### Pinned verifier limits
+
+Source: [`core/spec/v1/protocol.md`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/core/spec/v1/protocol.md) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+| Resource | Default | Hard maximum |
+|---|---:|---:|
+| Bundle bytes | 256 KiB | 8 MiB |
+| Canonical-action input bytes | 2 MiB | 16 MiB |
+| Trusted-context input bytes | 2 MiB | 16 MiB |
+| Grants | 16 | 256 |
+| Actions/plan leaves | 16 | 128 |
+| Plan depth | 8 | 16 |
+| Evidence objects | 32 | 512 |
+| One evidence object | 64 KiB | 2 MiB |
+| Control bindings | 32 | 512 |
+| Principal status statements | 32 | 512 |
+| Grant status statements | 32 | 512 |
+| Attachments | 32 | 512 |
+| Aggregate detached attachment bytes | 1 MiB | 8 MiB |
+| Signatures | 64 | 1,024 |
+| One signature | 512 B | 4 KiB |
+| Permissions | 64 | 1,024 |
+| Audiences | 32 | 256 |
+| Critical extensions/object | 8 | 32 |
+| One critical extension | 16 KiB | 64 KiB |
+| Allowed body digests | 32 | 256 |
+| Evidence IDs per binding | 8 | 32 |
+| Canonical action body | 1 MiB | 8 MiB protocol ceiling and lower profile limit |
+| Accepted entries per registry | 64 | 1,024 |
+| Trust anchors | 32 | 1,024 |
+| Adapter work units | 50,000 | 1,000,000 |
+
+Deployments may lower limits. Raising a hard maximum requires protocol review.
+
+## Parse into valid types
+
+Callers should not carry unchecked strings or generic maps past the boundary.
+Canonical decoders and model constructors enforce length, ordering, identifier,
+and structural invariants as values are created. Later stages operate on those
+validated types instead of repeatedly asking whether an impossible state is
+present.
+
+An invalid encoding is a stable verification result, not a panic. A verifier
+may report a codec error only when it cannot encode or decode its own canonical
+result; malformed untrusted proof input remains part of the ordinary bounded
+decision path.
+
+## Identifier reference
+
+### Pinned domain-separation specification
+
+Source: [`core/spec/v1/domain-separation.md`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/core/spec/v1/domain-separation.md) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+### Domain Separation and Identifiers — V1
+
+#### Signing preimage
+
+Every signed preimage is:
+
+```text
+UTF8("AUTHS") ||
+u16be(protocol_major) ||
+u16be(object_type) ||
+u16be(profile_id_length) ||
+UTF8(profile_id) ||
+u16be(profile_version) ||
+u64be(canonical_object_length) ||
+deterministic_cbor(canonical_object)
+```
+
+The canonical signing object contains the unsigned statement and its
+`SignatureDescriptor`. This binds the principal method, verification method,
+and signature suite.
+
+Object type identifiers are registered:
+
+| ID | Object |
+|---:|---|
+| 1 | grant |
+| 2 | action |
+| 3 | principal status |
+| 4 | grant status |
+| 5 | decision receipt |
+| 6 | execution receipt |
+| 7 | registry manifest |
+| 8 | bridge grant |
+
+Profile-independent objects use an empty profile ID and version zero.
+
+#### Content identifiers
+
+`domain_hash` is:
+
+```text
+SHA-256(
+  UTF8("AUTHS-ID") ||
+  u16be(protocol_major) ||
+  u16be(identifier_type) ||
+  u64be(canonical_bytes_length) ||
+  canonical_bytes
+)
+```
+
+Identifier type identifiers are fixed:
+
+| ID | Identifier |
+|---:|---|
+| 1 | grant statement |
+| 2 | action envelope |
+| 3 | authorization plan |
+| 4 | evidence object content |
+| 5 | principal-status statement |
+| 6 | grant-status statement |
+| 7 | decision receipt |
+| 8 | execution receipt |
+| 9 | public verifier-context projection |
+| 10 | registry manifest |
+
+Identifiers:
+
+- `GrantId`: canonical `grant-statement`, excluding signature;
+- `ActionId`: canonical `action-envelope`, excluding signature;
+- `AuthorizationPlanId`: canonical `authorization-plan`;
+- `EvidenceId`: canonical evidence type, media type, and bytes;
+- status statement IDs: canonical unsigned status statement;
+- attachment digest: raw SHA-256 of exact attachment bytes;
+- decision/execution receipt IDs: canonical unsigned receipt;
+- context digest: canonical public verifier-context projection;
+- canonical body digest: raw SHA-256 of exact profile-canonical body bytes;
+- portable canonical action digest: raw SHA-256 of the complete deterministic
+  `canonical-action` CBOR input;
+- proof digest: raw SHA-256 of exact canonical proof-bundle bytes.
+
+The `proof-ref` is a 32-byte branch identifier generated during authoring and
+covered by the action signature. It is not derived from an action containing
+the plan ID, avoiding an identifier cycle.
+
+#### Algorithms
+
+V1 content identifiers and body digests use SHA-256. The registry contains no
+algorithm field for these identifiers.
+
+Ed25519 signs the full domain-separated preimage.
+`p256-sha256-v1` uses ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 and fixed-width 64-byte
+`r || s`; high-S signatures are rejected.
+
+SHA-1 is prohibited for every security-bearing identifier.
 
-## Model
+---
 
-Validity is a closed interval committed into authority. Verification receives observation time as explicit context and never borrows an ambient clock without the caller choosing it.
+<!-- route: /reference/principal-adapters; source: reference/principal-adapters.mdx; section: reference -->
+# Principal adapters
 
-## What remains true
+A principal adapter answers a narrow question: does the supplied bounded
+evidence establish control of this principal, for this verification method and
+purpose, under immutable verifier-local configuration?
 
-Children may shorten but never extend their parent's window. Retained evidence records the time used for the decision.
+It does not answer what the principal may do. Signature validity, identity
+resolution, channel authentication, status evidence, and assurance claims are
+inputs to authorization—not substitutes for it.
 
-## Where it fails closed
+## The common boundary
 
-Before-not-before, after-expiry, missing time, invalid intervals, and child windows outside the parent deny deterministically.
+Every principal method receives the exact principal, verification method,
+control purpose, signature suite, signing preimage, asserted time, bounded
+evidence, and method-specific immutable context. It returns suite-specific
+verification material, exact consumed evidence identifiers, and bounded
+assurance claims—or a typed failure.
 
-## Continue
+The selected signature suite verifies the Auths statement separately. A method
+can provide an explicit method-derived signature message when its protocol
+requires one, as WebAuthn does, but that message must still cryptographically
+commit to the exact Auths signing preimage.
+
+Live acquisition stays outside the pure method:
+
+- DNS and HTTPS retrieval for `did:web`;
+- KERI witness or checkpoint acquisition;
+- SPIFFE Workload API and bundle retrieval;
+- WebAuthn registration and browser ceremony setup;
+- HSM provider APIs and attestation-chain retrieval.
+
+The host turns those observations into bounded evidence and immutable trusted
+records. A proof cannot provide its own trust root or weaken those records.
+
+### Pinned principal methods
+
+Source: [`core/spec/v1/registry.md`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/core/spec/v1/registry.md) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+| ID | Evidence ceiling | Mandatory suites |
+|---|---:|---|
+| `raw-key-v1` | 512 B | Ed25519, P-256 |
+| `did-key-v1` | 2 KiB | Ed25519, P-256 |
+| `did-keri-v1` | 64 KiB | registered KERI-compatible suites |
+| `did-web-bundled-v1` | 32 KiB | Ed25519, P-256 |
+| `spiffe-x509-v1` | 32 KiB | certificate-selected registered suite |
+| `webauthn-v1` | 16 KiB | P-256 mandatory |
+| `hsm-attested-v1` | 32 KiB | attestation-profile selected suite |
+
+### Pinned signature suites
+
+Source: [`core/spec/v1/registry.md`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/core/spec/v1/registry.md) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+| ID | Public key | Signature | Rule |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `ed25519-v1` | 32-byte compressed point | 64 bytes | RFC 8032 verification of exact preimage |
+| `p256-sha256-v1` | 33-byte compressed SEC1 | 64-byte `r || s` | ECDSA/SHA-256, low-S required |
+
+### Pinned status methods
+
+Source: [`core/spec/v1/registry.md`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/core/spec/v1/registry.md) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+| ID | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `auths-principal-status-v1` | Signed active/revoked/superseded principal state |
+| `auths-grant-status-v1` | Signed active/revoked/superseded grant state |
+| `keri-checkpoint-v1` | KERI sequence and witness/transparency checkpoint |
+| `x509-status-v1` | Certificate validity and revocation evidence |
+| `webauthn-credential-status-v1` | Registered authenticator credential state |
+| `local-deny-list-v1` | Verifier-local explicit deny facts |
+
+## Self-certifying key methods
+
+### Raw key
+
+`raw-key-v1` encodes a closed Ed25519 or compressed P-256 public-key form and
+derives a self-certifying principal. The evidence must reconstruct the exact
+principal and require the exact compatible signature suite.
+
+This is the smallest offline method. It can establish a self-certifying
+identifier and offline verifiability. It does not provide rotation,
+deactivation, historical control, or freshness. Use it only where the host's
+policy accepts an effectively irrevocable principal or supplies lifecycle
+facts through another explicit mechanism.
+
+### `did:key`
+
+`did-key-v1` provides the same broad security shape through a closed subset of
+the `did:key` method. V1 accepts only supported Multikey forms for Ed25519 and
+compressed P-256, and it performs no algorithm inference or fallback.
+
+Like raw key, `did:key` is self-certifying and offline verifiable but has no
+rotation, deactivation, or historical controller-state mechanism.
+
+## Document and event-history methods
+
+### Bundled `did:web`
+
+`did-web-bundled-v1` verifies a bounded canonical DID document carried with the
+proof. Retrieval and verification are deliberately separate. The verifier
+must supply an explicit host-controlled trust record binding the principal and
+document digest; a self-identifying document is not proof that it came from
+the named host.
+
+Current trust records can establish current controller state and a revocation
+check within an observation window. Historical pins can establish that a
+document was valid during an interval. Establishing that an exact statement
+existed during that interval requires a separate exact-statement pin.
+
+The closed document profile rejects remote contexts, embedded methods,
+unsupported curves, arbitrary redirects, and unknown root properties. Network
+retrieval belongs to a resolver that applies allowlists, DNS/IP controls,
+redirect policy, media-type checks, size bounds, and timeouts; that resolver
+has no authority-verification API.
+
+### `did:keri`
+
+`did-keri-v1` replays a bounded embedded KERI event log and verifies the
+selected establishment key, sequence, thresholds, links, commitments, and
+controller signatures for the supported subset.
+
+A valid embedded log establishes only the state present in that log. It cannot
+prove that no later rotation exists elsewhere. Applications requiring current
+controller state must supply an authenticated checkpoint and require the
+corresponding freshness claims. Historical statement existence also requires
+separate authenticated observation; it is not inferred from a complete-looking
+event log.
+
+## Workload, user, and hardware-backed methods
+
+### SPIFFE X.509-SVID
+
+`spiffe-x509-v1` validates a bounded leaf-first certificate path against a
+verifier-selected trust-domain bundle. It enforces the exact SPIFFE URI SAN,
+trust-domain relationship, certificate validity at the explicit evaluation
+time, client-auth usage, name constraints, and a supported leaf key.
+
+It can establish PKI-chain validation and workload attestation. Current status
+claims require a matching verifier-local status observation when policy asks
+for one. Workload API access and bundle acquisition remain outside the kernel.
+
+### WebAuthn
 
-Combine time with status only when current lifecycle state is required.
+`webauthn-v1` binds a WebAuthn assertion challenge to the SHA-256 digest of the
+exact Auths signing preimage. Verifier-local registration records constrain the
+credential, P-256 key, relying-party ID, origins, required flags, counter
+policy, attestation level, and observation window.
 
-_Page identity: auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
+The adapter can establish origin binding, user verification when the
+authenticator reports it, and hardware attestation only when the local record
+establishes a named attestation level. Browser ceremony initiation,
+registration, and counter updates remain stateful outer concerns.
 
+### HSM-attested key
 
+`hsm-attested-v1` checks a bounded evidence envelope against an immutable
+verifier-local attestation record. That record fixes the key and suite,
+attestation profile, provider, protection level, key-handle and device-chain
+digests, exportability, and observation window.
+
+Provider APIs and chain acquisition happen outside the kernel. The method can
+emit parameterized hardware-attestation and current-control facts only when
+the evidence exactly matches the local record and the transaction digest binds
+the exact Auths statement.
+
+## How to choose
+
+Choose the smallest method that can establish the facts your trust policy
+actually requires:
+
+- For a local or embedded offline verifier where rotation is not required,
+  raw key or `did:key` may be sufficient.
+- For a web-controlled identity with current or historical document policy,
+  use bundled `did:web` with verifier-owned trust records.
+- For rotation-aware event history, use `did:keri` and add authenticated
+  checkpoints when current state matters.
+- For workload identity, use SPIFFE with verifier-owned trust-domain bundles.
+- For a user ceremony bound to origin and relying party, use WebAuthn.
+- For custody or key-protection assurance, use an HSM-attested method under a
+  reviewed provider-specific profile.
+
+Do not select a method by marketing-level strength. Write the exact assurance,
+freshness, lifecycle, and historical-state requirements first, then choose an
+adapter capable of establishing those facts.
+
+## Fail-closed behavior
+
+An unsupported required method is indeterminate. Malformed, contradictory, or
+unauthentic evidence is denied. A missing required external fact is
+indeterminate. Authenticated revocation is denied. Suite, principal, or
+verification-method disagreement is denied.
+
+No adapter falls back to another method, guesses an algorithm from byte length,
+or treats successful retrieval as verified control.
 
 ---
 
-# Authority model
+<!-- route: /reference/conformance; source: reference/conformance.mdx; section: reference -->
+# Conformance and independent implementations
+
+Auths has several kinds of evidence, and they answer different questions. A
+matching file digest is not semantic verification. Agreement between three
+implementations is not a proof that all three are correct. A formal model is
+not an independent security audit.
+
+Use this page to select the evidence appropriate to the claim you are making.
+
+## The normative V1 corpus
+
+The canonical fixture manifest indexes exact proof bundles, canonical actions,
+trusted contexts, and expected verification results. Each entry records file
+digests, the expected stage and stable code, applicable protocol identifiers,
+assurance reports, and resource/work totals.
+
+Fixtures cover successful, denied, indeterminate, malformed, boundary, status,
+and related protocol cases. The inventory below projects its counts and
+classifications directly from the pinned manifest.
+
+### Pinned conformance evidence
+
+Product revision: `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+- Canonical fixtures: 102
+- Fixture classes: denied (48), indeterminate (9), invalid (23), status (2), valid (20)
+- Adversarial mutations: 5
+- Formal outcomes: 4
+- Formal theorems: 27
+
+Normative `.cbor` bytes are not rewritten during an ordinary test run. An
+explicit reviewed wire-update operation is the only path that can replace
+them. Routine tests compare against the checked-in bytes and fail on drift.
+
+## Five distinct evidence levels
+
+### 1. Byte equivalence
+
+A corpus auditor independently parses one complete deterministic-CBOR item and
+recomputes artifact digests. It can prove that two implementations received
+and interpreted the same canonical byte structure. It does not prove that they
+made the correct authority decision.
+
+### 2. Semantic equivalence
+
+An implementation independently executes the V1 verification stages and
+emits a normalized projection. Cross-language checks compare the decision,
+stable code, identifiers, authorized branches, and assurance report.
+
+Agreement is strong regression and interoperability evidence. It is still
+possible for implementations to share a mistaken reading of the
+specification, especially if one copied another.
 
-Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
+### 3. Adversarial, property, and fuzz evidence
 
-## The path at a glance
+Mutation tests alter valid inputs through operations such as truncation,
+required-field removal, replacement, duplication, or bit changes and require
+bounded fail-closed behavior. Property tests explore invariants such as
+attenuation, checked arithmetic, deterministic selection, and state-machine
+transitions. Fuzzing explores parser and verification behavior over inputs not
+enumerated in the canonical corpus.
 
-1. Actor + exact action
-2. Create authority
-3. Delegate narrower
-4. Execute through gateway
-5. Verify receipt
+These techniques find classes of implementation defects; none proves the
+absence of all defects.
 
-Text equivalent: An actor describes an exact action, creates bounded authority, optionally delegates a narrower child, executes through a closed gateway, and verifies the resulting receipt.
+### 4. Formal refinement evidence
 
-## What remains true
+Formal artifacts state and check mathematical properties of stable pure
+semantics. The strongest claim requires a link from shipping Rust predicates
+and representation invariants to the formal model. A separately written model
+can improve understanding without proving that the production implementation
+refines it.
 
-- Authority names the exact action and actor bounds.
-- D
\ No newline at end of file
+Provider networks remain explicit nondeterministic boundaries. Formal work can
+reason about allowed commands, recorded outcomes, observations, and
+reconciliation, but cannot assume a remote provider behaves atomically.
+
+### 5. Independent security review
+
+An external security assessment evaluates assumptions, design, implementation,
+and operational boundaries using a process independent of the project. Corpus,
+fuzz, differential, and formal gates are valuable engineering evidence, but
+they are not an independent security audit. Auths is currently pre-audit.
+
+## Independent Go and TypeScript verifiers
+
+The independent Go and TypeScript implementations must not call the Rust
+verifier, load its WebAssembly build, or copy expected verdicts from the
+manifest. Each independently audits deterministic CBOR and implements target
+V1 semantics.
+
+The cross-language gate compares both implementations with the Rust verifier
+on the canonical corpus. It requires exact artifact-digest agreement and
+semantic agreement on a normalized projection. Keeping expected verdicts out
+of the independent implementations is essential: otherwise the check would
+only prove that each program can repeat the fixture manifest.
+
+### Cross-language journey evidence
+
+Source: [`bindings/customer-journey-matrix-v1.json`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/customer-journey-matrix-v1.json) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+- Semantic owner: Rust
+- TypeScript public symbols: 193
+- Python public symbols: 159
+- Maintained TypeScript recipes: 5
+- Maintained Python recipes: 5
+- Registered journeys: 10
+
+## What a conforming implementation must preserve
+
+A V1 implementation must agree on more than an `authorized` boolean. It must
+preserve:
+
+- deterministic decoding and rejection of non-canonical input;
+- bounded bytes, objects, nesting, signatures, and adapter work;
+- exact graph resolution and content identifiers;
+- principal-control, signature, status, assurance, and registry behavior;
+- authority attenuation and composition semantics;
+- canonical action binding;
+- deterministic first-failure stage and stable code;
+- authorized branches and assurance satisfactions;
+- resource and work accounting; and
+- exact canonical result encoding where the portable boundary requires it.
+
+Execution, replay databases, live evidence acquisition, credentials, and
+provider reconciliation remain outside the portable verifier corpus. They
+need separate product and profile conformance suites.
+
+## Reading an evidence badge
+
+Read every evidence label as a precise, bounded claim:
+
+| Label | Appropriate meaning |
+| --- | --- |
+| Canonical fixture | Exact checked-in byte case with a normative expected result |
+| Corpus-conformant | Implementation agrees with the complete pinned corpus |
+| Cross-language differential | Named implementations agree on the normalized semantic projection |
+| Property tested | The named invariant was exercised over generated inputs within the stated bounds |
+| Fuzzed | The named target completed the stated fuzz campaign without a detected failure |
+| Formally checked | The named theorem/model relationship was checked under stated assumptions |
+| Independently audited | Use only for a completed outside assessment with a published scope |
+
+Avoid a generic “verified” badge that erases these differences.
+
+## Generated conformance status
+
+### Pinned conformance evidence
+
+Product revision: `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+- Canonical fixtures: 102
+- Fixture classes: denied (48), indeterminate (9), invalid (23), status (2), valid (20)
+- Adversarial mutations: 5
+- Formal outcomes: 4
+- Formal theorems: 27
+
+---
diff --git a/public/llms.txt b/public/llms.txt
index 090a8ed..e2ff805 100644
--- a/public/llms.txt
+++ b/public/llms.txt
@@ -1,151 +1,47 @@
 # Auths documentation
 
-> Canonical, release-pinned documentation for people and agents.
+> Prelaunch, pre-audit documentation generated from editorial MDX and a pinned Auths product snapshot.
 
-- [Auths documentation](/index.md) — Precise, portable authority for people and agents.
-- [Agents](/agents.md) — Give agents precise tools, approved plans, and verifiable outcomes without ambient credentials.
-- [Approved plans](/agents/approved-plans.md) — Require human or organizational approval for the exact ordered work an agent proposes.
-- [Agent delegation](/agents/delegation.md) — Delegate an exact tool action without giving the agent a broad credential.
-- [How Auths works for agents](/agents/how-auths-works.md) — Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.
-- [Agent identity](/agents/identity.md) — Compose agent, workload, user, or application identity without choosing a mandatory identity provider.
-- [MCP](/agents/mcp.md) — Use MCP as a tool discovery and delivery layer while Auths remains the authority boundary.
-- [MCP client](/agents/mcp/client.md) — Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.
-- [Protect an MCP server](/agents/mcp/protect-server.md) — Protect an MCP server tool with native verification, durable reservation, and a closed provider gateway.
-- [Tool profiles](/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md) — Define canonical action, resource, argument, budget, and receipt mappings for MCP tools.
-- [Transport boundary](/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md) — Keep MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and local calls independent from authorization.
-- [Multi-agent handoffs](/agents/multi-agent.md) — Pass work across multiple agents while narrowing authority at every boundary.
-- [Production patterns](/agents/production-patterns.md) — Operate agent authority with explicit owners for identity, issuance, approval, state, custody, gateways, and reconciliation.
-- [Delegate one tool](/agents/quickstart.md) — Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohibited.
-- [Skills and plugins](/agents/skills-and-plugins.md) — Package Auths-aware skills and plugins without embedding semantic meaning or secrets in prompts.
-- [Test agent authority](/agents/testing.md) — Test agents against widening, substitution, replay, ambient credentials, and uncertain providers.
-- [Assurance](/assurance.md) — Inspect what Auths claims, the exact evidence behind it, and the limits that remain.
-- [Adversarial](/assurance/adversarial.md) — Inspect substitution, widening, replay, mutation, and fail-closed evidence.
-- [Authority](/assurance/authority.md) — Inspect attenuation and approval-binding evidence for bounded authority.
-- [Cross-language](/assurance/cross-language.md) — Compare maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes for identical scenarios.
-- [Disclosure](/assurance/disclosure.md) — Inspect evidence that receipt views are bounded and authority-controlled.
-- [Execution](/assurance/execution.md) — Inspect the native closed-gateway boundary protecting provider effects.
-- [Formal](/assurance/formal.md) — Understand where formal attenuation evidence applies and where it does not.
-- [Limitations](/assurance/limitations.md) — Read the boundaries that Auths evidence deliberately does not claim to cross.
-- [Semantics](/assurance/semantics.md) — Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.
-- [Supply chain](/assurance/supply-chain.md) — Inspect the recorded SLSA builder assessment without mistaking it for an independent audit.
-- [Authority](/authority.md) — Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.
-- [Constraints](/authority/constraints.md) — Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.
-- [Create](/authority/create.md) — Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.
-- [Delegate](/authority/delegate.md) — Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.
-- [Depth and chain](/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md) — Reason about delegation depth and the complete signed chain.
-- [Widening failures](/authority/delegate/widening-failures.md) — Exercise every way a child might attempt to gain power its parent did not pass down.
-- [Execute](/authority/execute.md) — Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.
-- [Lifecycle](/authority/lifecycle.md) — Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.
-- [Budgets](/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md) — Reserve and consume numeric or profile-defined budgets with the same atomic boundary as uses.
-- [Revocation and status](/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md) — Apply issuer-owned status without pretending it is an offline cryptographic fact.
-- [Uses and replay](/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md) — Consume bounded uses atomically and reject exact replay.
-- [Validity and expiry](/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md) — Evaluate not-before and expiry bounds at an explicit observation time.
-- [Authority model](/authority/model.md) — Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.
-- [Plans](/authority/plans.md) — Commit multiple ordered operations as one reviewable plan.
-- [Transaction-bound approvals](/authority/plans/approvals.md) — Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.
-- [Profiles](/authority/profiles.md) — Map application actions, resources, inputs, budgets, commands, and receipts without coupling adjacent components.
-- [Receipts](/authority/receipts.md) — Use signed decision and execution receipts as portable integrity evidence.
-- [Bounded disclosure](/authority/receipts/disclosure.md) — Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.
-- [Resume](/authority/resume.md) — Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.
-- [Verify](/authority/verify.md) — Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.
-- [Developers](/developers.md) — Choose an SDK, call the runtime, use the CLI, test failures, compose adjacent systems, and build application profiles.
-- [CLI](/developers/cli.md) — Choose supported terminal workflows without mistaking repository tooling for a public product CLI.
-- [Outcomes and errors](/developers/errors.md) — Handle the complete closed outcome and error surface without collapsing uncertainty into exceptions or booleans.
-- [Examples](/developers/examples.md) — Find complete examples by outcome, boundary, and deployment maturity.
-- [Extension kits](/developers/extension-kits.md) — Implement identity, suite, trust, status, approval, custody, state, transport, gateway, or profile ports.
-- [Integrations](/developers/integrations.md) — Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, transport, and capability systems through explicit ports.
-- [Capabilities](/developers/integrations/capabilities.md) — Import or compose UCAN, Biscuit, macaroons, or another capability result without conflating semantics.
-- [Cloud IAM](/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md) — Acquire short-lived cloud credentials only inside a closed gateway after Auths authorization.
-- [Identity and trust](/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md) — Compose raw keys, OIDC, SPIFFE, or application identity resolvers.
-- [Policy](/developers/integrations/policy.md) — Use Cedar, OPA, or relationship-based authorization as explicit policy context.
-- [Profile kit](/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md) — Build an application-owned profile for actions, resources, commands, budgets, and safe receipt fields.
-- [Transport](/developers/integrations/transport.md) — Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, files, or application transports.
-- [Quickstarts](/developers/quickstarts.md) — Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.
-- [Releases](/developers/releases.md) — Inspect release notes, package support, contracts, evidence, and known limitations for one Auths release.
-- [Runtime API](/developers/runtime-api.md) — Call the production HTTPS runtime from any language or service boundary.
-- [SDKs](/developers/sdks.md) — Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.
-- [SDK parity](/developers/sdks/parity.md) — Inspect maintained operation, outcome, fixture, and packaging parity across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
-- [Python](/developers/sdks/python.md) — Install the maintained Python SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
-- [Rust](/developers/sdks/rust.md) — Install the maintained Rust SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
-- [TypeScript](/developers/sdks/typescript.md) — Install the maintained TypeScript SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.
-- [Testing](/developers/testing.md) — Test success, denial, mutation, replay, recovery, and cross-language parity with deterministic fixtures.
-- [Versioning](/developers/versioning.md) — Pin semantic identities, SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, and evidence to a release.
-- [Get started](/get-started.md) — Choose one concrete outcome and reach a verified, fail-closed result.
-- [Adopt incrementally](/get-started/adoption.md) — Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.
-- [API keys](/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md) — Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.
-- [Approval systems](/get-started/adoption/approvals.md) — Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.
-- [Capability systems](/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md) — Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.
-- [Cloud IAM](/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md) — Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.
-- [Cut over one effect](/get-started/adoption/cutover.md) — Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.
-- [OAuth and OIDC](/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md) — Keep OAuth or OIDC authentication while adding effect-specific machine authority.
-- [Plan adoption](/get-started/adoption/plan.md) — Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.
-- [Policy engines](/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md) — Use a Cedar, OPA, or relationship decision as explicit context without duplicating the policy engine.
-- [Shadow mode](/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md) — Compare Auths decisions with live traffic without authorizing provider effects.
-- [Signed requests](/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md) — Bind an existing signed request to narrower authority and execution state.
-- [Choose your path](/get-started/choose.md) — Select the shortest journey for the effect, actor, and operating boundary you have.
-- [Evaluate Auths](/get-started/evaluate.md) — Evaluate Auths with deterministic positive and adversarial fixtures before choosing a deployment.
-- [Outcome paths](/get-started/paths.md) — Choose an outcome path before learning the complete Auths model.
-- [Delegate to an agent](/get-started/paths/agent.md) — Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.
-- [Protect an application effect](/get-started/paths/application.md) — Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.
-- [Cross-company authority](/get-started/paths/cross-company.md) — Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.
-- [Deploy the runtime](/get-started/paths/runtime.md) — Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.
-- [Verify without executing](/get-started/paths/verification.md) — Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.
-- [Prerequisites](/get-started/prerequisites.md) — Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.
-- [Quickstarts](/get-started/quickstarts.md) — Compare seven installed-artifact projects by boundary, state, custody, success, and failure.
-- [Agent delegation](/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md) — Delegate one narrower tool action and prove that a broader action is denied.
-- [Approved plan](/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md) — Bind approval to the exact bytes and order of a multi-step plan.
-- [Identity swap](/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md) — Exchange and verify identity material while keeping the authority workflow unchanged.
-- [Local REST effect](/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md) — Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.
-- [Offline verification](/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md) — Verify portable evidence without executing an effect or contacting a provider.
-- [Recovery](/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md) — Resume or reconcile an interrupted execution without blindly repeating the provider effect.
-- [Runtime effect](/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md) — Execute one bounded effect through the production HTTPS runtime and durable state boundary.
-- [Identity & trust](/identity-trust.md) — Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.
-- [Cryptographic suites](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites.md) — Select cryptographic verification independently from identity source and authority semantics.
-- [Custom and post-quantum suites](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum.md) — Implement a custom or post-quantum suite adapter without changing Auths identity meaning.
-- [Ed25519](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md) — Use the maintained Ed25519 suite for compact deterministic signatures.
-- [P-256](/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256.md) — Use the maintained P-256 suite through the same identity and verification interfaces.
-- [Exchange public identity](/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity.md) — Send and receive a public identity as bounded, transport-neutral data.
-- [How identity and trust fit](/identity-trust/how-it-works.md) — See the independent boundaries between identity evidence, cryptographic suites, trust policy, transport, and authority.
-- [Identity sources](/identity-trust/identity-sources.md) — Choose the system that supplies bounded public verification evidence.
-- [Application resolvers](/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers.md) — Adapt an application directory or key registry through a narrow resolver port.
-- [OAuth and OIDC](/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md) — Resolve OIDC identity into explicit Auths verification evidence without turning a bearer token into authority.
-- [Raw public keys](/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md) — Exchange method- and suite-labelled public keys as ordinary bounded data.
-- [SPIFFE](/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md) — Use SPIFFE workload identity as a replaceable trust input for Auths verification.
-- [Key and root rotation](/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md) — Rotate keys or trust roots with explicit overlap, rollback, and negative tests.
-- [Test identity and trust](/identity-trust/testing.md) — Test identity sources, suites, and trust policy with positive and adversarial fixtures.
-- [Trust policy](/identity-trust/trust-policy.md) — Define which issuers, roots, resolvers, suites, audiences, and freshness windows are acceptable.
-- [Verification context](/identity-trust/verification-context.md) — Build the exact trusted context used for one deterministic verification.
-- [Production operations](/operations.md) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
-- [Backup and restore](/operations/backup-and-restore.md) — Back up and restore runtime state without losing replay, budget, recovery, or receipt integrity.
-- [Configure](/operations/configure.md) — Configure state, custody, trust, profiles, and provider gateways as independent production ports.
-- [Custody](/operations/configure/custody.md) — Keep authority and receipt signing keys behind a narrow signer port.
-- [Durable state](/operations/configure/durable-state.md) — Configure multi-host durable state for replay, use, budget, plans, executions, and receipts.
-- [Provider gateways](/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md) — Map verified sealed commands to least-privilege provider effects behind closed gateways.
-- [Trust and profiles](/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md) — Configure roots, issuers, resolvers, status, suites, and profiles explicitly.
-- [Deploy the runtime](/operations/deploy-runtime.md) — Deploy the runtime as a small HTTPS control boundary around durable state and provider gateways.
-- [Evaluate locally](/operations/evaluate-locally.md) — Run the complete production topology locally before choosing infrastructure.
-- [Execution lifecycle](/operations/execution-lifecycle.md) — Choose retry, resume, reconcile, or stop from the durable execution phase.
-- [Incident response](/operations/incidents.md) — Respond to state loss, signer outage, trust-root error, provider uncertainty, receipt disclosure, and credential compromise.
-- [Compromised credential](/operations/incidents/compromised-credential.md) — Contain a compromised signer, provider, operator, or deployment credential.
-- [Provider unknown](/operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md) — Resolve an execution whose provider outcome is unknown without repeating the effect.
-- [Receipt disclosure](/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure.md) — Respond to excessive, unauthorized, or leaked receipt disclosure.
-- [Signer outage](/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md) — Operate safely when issuance or receipt custody is unavailable.
-- [State loss](/operations/incidents/state-loss.md) — Contain and recover from missing, rolled-back, corrupted, or split runtime state.
-- [Trust-root error](/operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md) — Contain an incorrect, expired, unavailable, or compromised trust root.
-- [Observability](/operations/observability.md) — Observe runtime health, dependencies, outcomes, latency, recovery, and redaction without leaking authority content.
-- [Receipt retention](/operations/receipt-retention.md) — Retain, disclose, and delete receipt evidence according to integrity and privacy needs.
-- [Recovery and reconciliation](/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md) — Resume and reconcile interrupted execution without blind provider retry.
-- [Security checklist](/operations/security-checklist.md) — Apply a production security checklist to every Auths boundary.
-- [Upgrade and rollback](/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md) — Upgrade or roll back runtime releases while preserving semantic and state compatibility.
-- [Reference](/reference.md) — Look up exact SDK, Runtime API, CLI, profile, error, schema, evidence, and manifest contracts for one release.
-- [CLI](/reference/cli.md) — Check whether the selected release declares a supported public CLI surface.
-- [Errors](/reference/errors.md) — Look up stable parse, trust, denial, lifecycle, execution, provider, recovery, and disclosure outcomes.
-- [Evidence](/reference/evidence.md) — Resolve every public assurance claim to status, checksum, reproduction, scope, and limitation.
-- [Reference manifest](/reference/manifest.json.md) — Consume the machine-readable identity-to-URL manifest for the selected docs contract.
-- [Profiles](/reference/profiles.md) — Inspect maintained and application-owned action, resource, command, budget, and receipt projection contracts.
-- [Runtime API](/reference/runtime-api.md) — Inspect exact HTTPS methods, paths, limits, outcomes, recovery, and receipt-disclosure contracts.
-- [Schemas](/reference/schemas.md) — Inspect canonical bounded inputs, wire artifacts, commands, receipts, and disclosure view schemas.
-- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk.md) — Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while remaining on the same Auths operation.
-- [Python SDK](/reference/sdk/python.md) — Inspect installed Python symbols and their native operation mappings.
-- [Rust SDK](/reference/sdk/rust.md) — Inspect maintained Rust SDK symbols and their operation mappings.
-- [TypeScript SDK](/reference/sdk/typescript.md) — Inspect installed TypeScript symbols and their native operation mappings.
+Product source: bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c
+Documentation contract source: d0e4a53e5e9582e9eaff1cf38e965252c6c79765
+
+- [Auths Docs](/index.md) — Give software narrow authority for one exact action, execute through a closed boundary, and prove what happened.
+
+## Start
+
+- [Start with Auths](/start.md) — Choose the smallest honest Auths path: understand the model, protect one exact effect, or verify authority offline.
+- [What is Auths?](/start/what-is-auths.md) — Learn how Auths gives software narrow authority for an exact action without turning identity, transport, or approval into permission.
+- [TypeScript quickstart](/start/typescript.md) — Protect one MCP tool, execute the allowed action, and prove an undeclared action never reaches your provider.
+- [Python quickstart](/start/python.md) — Execute one allowed MCP action inside an owned Python session and observe denial before a second provider call.
+- [Rust offline verification](/start/rust-offline-verification.md) — Verify proof, action, and trusted-context bytes without networking, mutable state, custody, or execution.
+
+## Guides
+
+- [Guides](/guides.md) — Build Auths workflows by outcome, from identity authentication and offline verification to closed execution, recovery, and adapters.
+- [Authenticate identity without granting authority](/guides/authenticate-identity.md) — Exchange and authenticate bounded public identity data while keeping capabilities, approvals, and execution out of the path.
+- [Verify existing authority](/guides/verify-authority.md) — Verify proof, canonical action, and trusted-context bytes deterministically without receiving a command or execution capability.
+- [Execute one exact action](/guides/execute-exact-action.md) — Put an application effect behind a closed profile so only the verifier-authorized command can enter the provider gateway.
+- [Authority model](/guides/authority-model.md) — Understand how local trust anchors, attenuating grants, exact action constraints, and bounded plans produce authority that cannot widen in transit.
+- [Verification model](/guides/verification-model.md) — Follow the six deterministic verifier stages from bounded decoding to exact action binding, then see why execution remains outside the kernel.
+- [Delegate narrower authority to an agent](/guides/delegate-agent.md) — Give an agent a short-lived subset of a parent's authority and prove that widening and exact replay cannot create another effect.
+- [Approvals and ordered plans](/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans.md) — Bind multiple approvals to one exact ordered plan, stop safely on uncertainty, and resume without repeating completed effects.
+- [Replay, recovery, and provider uncertainty](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown.md) — Distinguish safe replay from ambiguous remote effects, preserve one execution identity, and reconcile without duplicating work.
+- [Receipts and bounded disclosure](/guides/receipts-and-disclosure.md) — Verify what Auths decided and executed while revealing only the application detail each viewer is authorized to inspect.
+- [Build a production integration](/guides/production-integration.md) — Replace development custody and memory state with durable, closed, observable mechanisms without weakening exact-action enforcement.
+- [Build and qualify an adapter](/guides/adapter-authoring.md) — Extend identity, custody, state, transport, or provider integration without moving Auths authority semantics into application code.
+
+## Examples
+
+- [Examples by security question](/examples.md) — Choose a real Auths example by the boundary you need to evaluate, with explicit maturity and non-claims.
+
+## Reference
+
+- [Reference](/reference.md) — Exact SDK, protocol, adapter, limit, and conformance material for Auths.
+- [TypeScript SDK](/reference/typescript.md) — Navigate the public @auths-dev/sdk entry points from a high-level protected workflow to effect-free verification and extension contracts.
+- [Python SDK](/reference/python.md) — Navigate the typed public auths modules, async resource ownership, closed workflow results, and extension contracts.
+- [Rust facades and crate map](/reference/rust.md) — Start from the supported Rust facade, then descend into protocol, authoring, adapters, profiles, and product mechanisms only when your integration needs them.
+- [Decisions, errors, and safe responses](/reference/decisions-errors.md) — Distinguish authorization verdicts from runtime outcomes and choose a response that cannot widen authority or duplicate an effect.
+- [Evidence, status, assurance, and registries](/reference/evidence-status-assurance.md) — Understand how bounded adapters establish facts without acquiring trust or manufacturing authority.
+- [Limits, canonical encoding, and identifiers](/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers.md) — Review the bounded deterministic byte contract that makes verification portable and resistant to ambiguous or excessive input.
+- [Principal adapters](/reference/principal-adapters.md) — Choose a bounded principal-control method and understand exactly which identity facts it can and cannot establish.
+- [Conformance and independent implementations](/reference/conformance.md) — Understand what Auths fixtures, mutations, cross-language checks, fuzzing, and formal evidence actually prove.
diff --git a/public/operations.md b/public/operations.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 6775338..0000000
--- a/public/operations.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-# Production operations
-
-Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
-
-## Recommended: [Evaluate locally](/operations/evaluate-locally)
-
-Run the complete production topology locally before choosing infrastructure.
-
-## Deploy
-
-- [Evaluate locally](/operations/evaluate-locally) — Run the complete production topology locally before choosing infrastructure.
-- [Deploy the runtime](/operations/deploy-runtime) — Deploy the runtime as a small HTTPS control boundary around durable state and provider gateways.
-
-## Configure
-
-- [Configure](/operations/configure) — Configure state, custody, trust, profiles, and provider gateways as independent production ports.
-
-## Observe
-
-- [Observability](/operations/observability) — Observe runtime health, dependencies, outcomes, latency, recovery, and redaction without leaking authority content.
-
-## Recover
-
-- [Execution lifecycle](/operations/execution-lifecycle) — Choose retry, resume, reconcile, or stop from the durable execution phase.
-- [Recovery and reconciliation](/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation) — Resume and reconcile interrupted execution without blind provider retry.
-
-## Maintain
-
-- [Backup and restore](/operations/backup-and-restore) — Back up and restore runtime state without losing replay, budget, recovery, or receipt integrity.
-- [Upgrade and rollback](/operations/upgrade-and-rollback) — Upgrade or roll back runtime releases while preserving semantic and state compatibility.
-- [Receipt retention](/operations/receipt-retention) — Retain, disclose, and delete receipt evidence according to integrity and privacy needs.
-- [Security checklist](/operations/security-checklist) — Apply a production security checklist to every Auths boundary.
-
-## Incident response
-
-- [Incident response](/operations/incidents) — Respond to state loss, signer outage, trust-root error, provider uncertainty, receipt disclosure, and credential compromise.
-
-## Related topics
-
-- [Assurance](/assurance) — Inspect what Auths claims, the exact evidence behind it, and the limits that remain.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.runtime/1 · Product contract: auths.page.operations.runtime/1_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/backup-and-restore.md b/public/operations/backup-and-restore.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e1b5059..0000000
--- a/public/operations/backup-and-restore.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Backup and restore
-
-Back up and restore runtime state without losing replay, budget, recovery, or receipt integrity.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A restored environment preserves all committed authority consumption and execution phases.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Define encrypted backups, retention, restore credentials, recovery-point and recovery-time targets, isolated restore infrastructure, and a procedure that prevents old state from serving concurrent traffic.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Create active, completed, and provider-unknown fixtures; take a backup; restore to isolation; verify counts and commitments; resume the uncertain execution; and prove replay plus budget exhaustion still deny.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Restored state produces the same terminal receipts and cannot repeat prior effects.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Incomplete journals, rolled-back use state, missing receipt bytes, concurrent old and restored writers, or unverifiable backups block promotion.
-
-## Continue
-
-Exercise upgrade and rollback against a restored copy before production rollout.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.backup/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/configure.md b/public/operations/configure.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a0c5385..0000000
--- a/public/operations/configure.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-# Configure
-
-Configure state, custody, trust, profiles, and provider gateways as independent production ports.
-
-## Recommended: [Durable state](/operations/configure/durable-state)
-
-Configure multi-host durable state for replay, use, budget, plans, executions, and receipts.
-
-## Configure
-
-- [Durable state](/operations/configure/durable-state) — Configure multi-host durable state for replay, use, budget, plans, executions, and receipts.
-- [Custody](/operations/configure/custody) — Keep authority and receipt signing keys behind a narrow signer port.
-- [Trust and profiles](/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles) — Configure roots, issuers, resolvers, status, suites, and profiles explicitly.
-- [Provider gateways](/operations/configure/provider-gateways) — Map verified sealed commands to least-privilege provider effects behind closed gateways.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.configure/1 · Product contract: auths.page.operations.configure/1_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/configure/custody.md b/public/operations/configure/custody.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ac76a4e..0000000
--- a/public/operations/configure/custody.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Custody
-
-Keep authority and receipt signing keys behind a narrow signer port.
-
-## Outcome
-
-The runtime can request signatures while private key material remains in an HSM, KMS, enclave, or hardened local process.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Assign key owners, permitted algorithms, stable key descriptors, rotation windows, audit logging, rate limits, backup or recovery policy, and fail-closed outage behavior.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Register the signer, sign known requests, reject arbitrary or oversized payloads, verify public descriptors, exercise outage and rotation overlap, and confirm private material never appears in logs or artifacts.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Only typed Auths signing requests are accepted and every signature is attributable to a configured descriptor.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Raw signing access, key export, silent algorithm fallback, unknown descriptor, audit loss, or signer ambiguity stops issuance and terminal receipt signing.
-
-## Continue
-
-Configure explicit trust for the public descriptors and issuers.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.custody/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/configure/durable-state.md b/public/operations/configure/durable-state.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f0a1135..0000000
--- a/public/operations/configure/durable-state.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Durable state
-
-Configure multi-host durable state for replay, use, budget, plans, executions, and receipts.
-
-## Outcome
-
-Concurrent hosts share one atomic record of reservation and terminal outcome.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Choose a transactional store, TLS and authentication, bounded retention, backups, restore exercises, and a failure policy that stops effects when state is unavailable.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Provision the schema, enforce uniqueness and compare-and-set transitions, run concurrent final-use and budget tests, interrupt an execution, restart on another host, and resume the same reference.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Exactly one reservation wins, journal transitions are monotonic, and resume converges without a second effect.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Split-brain, stale reads, lost commits, unbounded rows, insecure transport, or automatic in-memory fallback blocks readiness.
-
-## Continue
-
-Configure custody so receipt and decision signing remains available without exposing keys.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.state/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md b/public/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ddae923..0000000
--- a/public/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Provider gateways
-
-Map verified sealed commands to least-privilege provider effects behind closed gateways.
-
-## Outcome
-
-Provider credentials are acquired only after native authorization and durable reservation.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Define one bounded gateway operation, provider credential source, idempotency behavior, response classifier, timeout, reconciliation method, and redaction policy.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Parse the sealed command, map exact fields, acquire a short-lived credential, invoke the provider with the committed idempotency key, classify success, denial, failure, or unknown, then persist the result before returning.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The provider sees one minimal request and the execution receipt binds its closed outcome without exposing secrets.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Unmapped fields, credential leakage, non-idempotent retry, ambiguous response, timeout, or provider-unknown state stops fresh execution and enters reconciliation.
-
-## Continue
-
-Instrument outcome and latency signals, then write the provider-unknown runbook.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.gateways/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md b/public/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e42fd2f..0000000
--- a/public/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Trust and profiles
-
-Configure roots, issuers, resolvers, status, suites, and profiles explicitly.
-
-## Outcome
-
-Every verification decision receives a bounded, versioned trust and profile context rather than ambient process assumptions.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Inventory trusted roots and issuers, resolver ownership, freshness limits, accepted suites, status behavior, application profiles, and rotation procedures.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Load the configuration, verify each positive fixture, reject wrong-root and stale evidence, exercise suite swap and profile version mismatch, then record the configuration identity in runtime evidence.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Supported identities and profiles verify consistently across hosts and every excluded source returns a stable closed outcome.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Unknown roots, stale bundles, resolver ambiguity, profile drift, or an unsupported suite blocks the affected request; never accept all during an outage.
-
-## Continue
-
-Configure gateways only after the action-to-provider mapping is qualified.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.trust/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/deploy-runtime.md b/public/operations/deploy-runtime.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 237c113..0000000
--- a/public/operations/deploy-runtime.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Deploy the runtime
-
-Deploy the runtime as a small HTTPS control boundary around durable state and provider gateways.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A production caller reaches one authenticated HTTPS origin while signers, stores, trust resolvers, and provider credentials remain private dependencies.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Provision TLS, a supported runtime release, durable transactional state, signer custody, trust and status inputs, a closed provider gateway, monitoring, backups, and an operator recovery path.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Pin the release and contract digest, apply configuration, prove dependency readiness, execute the installed runtime scenario, verify the receipt from another process, and deny direct provider access from callers.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Health and readiness are distinct, every dependency is observable, execution succeeds once, and rollback plus resume exercises pass.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Do not accept traffic when state, custody, trust, gateway, or release identity is unknown. Never expose the gateway credential as a caller fallback.
-
-## Continue
-
-Configure each dependency and establish service-level signals.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.deploy/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/evaluate-locally.md b/public/operations/evaluate-locally.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 4797501..0000000
--- a/public/operations/evaluate-locally.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Evaluate locally
-
-Run the complete production topology locally before choosing infrastructure.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A local isolated runtime proves health, version, trust, custody, durable reservation, gateway execution, receipts, and replay denial.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Use disposable local state and development custody; keep the same ports and closed gateway boundaries intended for production.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Start dependencies, check health and version, run the runtime-effect fixture, verify its receipt, replay the command, stop and restart the runtime, then resume the recorded execution.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-The effect occurs once, replay is denied, state survives the restart, and the receipt verifies outside the runtime.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Missing dependencies, contract mismatch, non-HTTPS production configuration, state loss, receipt mismatch, or a second provider effect blocks deployment.
-
-## Continue
-
-Choose the deployment topology and replace one development adapter at a time.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.evaluate/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md b/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 17d6386..0000000
--- a/public/operations/execution-lifecycle.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-# Execution lifecycle
-
-Choose retry, resume, reconcile, or stop from the durable execution phase.
-
-## The path at a glance
-
-1. Parse + verify
-2. Authorize
-3. Reserve durably
-4. Enter closed gateway
-5. Complete or preserve recovery
-
-Text equivalent: The runtime parses and verifies untrusted input, authorizes it, reserves replay and budget state, enters the closed gateway, then records completion or preserves a recoverable execution identity.
-
-## What remains true
-
-- No effect-capable command exists before native authorization and durable reservation.
-- A provider timeout after submission is not silently converted to failure or success.
-- Resume continues the same execution identity; retry creates unsafe ambiguity.
-
-## Closed runtime outcomes
-
-- `completed`
-- `denied`
-- `indeterminate`
-- `not-found`
-- `recoverable`
-
-## Failure branches
-
-| Trigger | Result | Safe response |
-|---|---|---|
-| Verification or policy denies | Denied | Do not enter the provider gateway. |
-| State reservation fails | Unavailable | Perform no effect and retry only after state is healthy. |
-| Provider acceptance is unknown | Recoverable or provider-unknown | Observe and reconcile before resuming the same execution. |
-
-## Use this when
-
-You operate a remote effect, durable replay state, provider gateway, or recovery workflow.
-
-## Do not use this when
-
-You are performing effect-free offline verification.
-
-## Continue from here
-
-- [Deploy the runtime](/get-started/paths/runtime) — Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.
-- [Production operations](/operations) — Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents.md b/public/operations/incidents.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a4b1ba9..0000000
--- a/public/operations/incidents.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# Incident response
-
-Respond to state loss, signer outage, trust-root error, provider uncertainty, receipt disclosure, and credential compromise.
-
-## Recommended: [State loss](/operations/incidents/state-loss)
-
-Contain and recover from missing, rolled-back, corrupted, or split runtime state.
-
-## Incident response
-
-- [State loss](/operations/incidents/state-loss) — Contain and recover from missing, rolled-back, corrupted, or split runtime state.
-- [Signer outage](/operations/incidents/signer-outage) — Operate safely when issuance or receipt custody is unavailable.
-- [Trust-root error](/operations/incidents/trust-root-error) — Contain an incorrect, expired, unavailable, or compromised trust root.
-- [Provider unknown](/operations/incidents/provider-unknown) — Resolve an execution whose provider outcome is unknown without repeating the effect.
-- [Receipt disclosure](/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure) — Respond to excessive, unauthorized, or leaked receipt disclosure.
-- [Compromised credential](/operations/incidents/compromised-credential) — Contain a compromised signer, provider, operator, or deployment credential.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents/1 · Product contract: auths.page.operations.incidents/1_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/compromised-credential.md b/public/operations/incidents/compromised-credential.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 73e4e17..0000000
--- a/public/operations/incidents/compromised-credential.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-# Compromised credential
-
-Contain a compromised signer, provider, operator, or deployment credential.
-
-## Owner and severity
-
-Security incident commander with the credential's custody and gateway owners
-
-## Preconditions
-
-Declare the incident, preserve the exact runtime release and configuration identity, restrict changes to the incident owner, and capture the first affected execution references before taking recovery action.
-
-## Tested commands
-
-Run the release-qualified scenario shown below against an isolated environment first. In production, use only the same typed health, version, verify, resume, summary, and disclosure operations for the recorded execution references.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Expected observations
-
-Unexpected signatures, provider calls, access logs, key exports, configuration changes, or credential use indicates possible compromise.
-
-## Stop conditions
-
-Disable the credential and affected gateway or issuance path. Preserve state and receipts; do not rotate blindly if it destroys attribution or recovery evidence.
-
-## Rollback or resume
-
-Rotate through the documented custody or provider process, install the new descriptor, requalify trust and gateway fixtures, and reopen the smallest affected scope.
-
-## Reconciliation
-
-Compare signed artifacts, runtime journals, provider audit logs, and receipts to identify unauthorized issuance or effects and revoke affected authority explicitly.
-
-## Evidence retention
-
-Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configuration identities, operator actions, relevant provider references, and disclosure decisions according to the incident evidence policy.
-
-## Escalation
-
-Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.credential/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md b/public/operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b3813d1..0000000
--- a/public/operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-# Provider unknown
-
-Resolve an execution whose provider outcome is unknown without repeating the effect.
-
-## Owner and severity
-
-Application incident commander with provider gateway owner
-
-## Preconditions
-
-Declare the incident, preserve the exact runtime release and configuration identity, restrict changes to the incident owner, and capture the first affected execution references before taking recovery action.
-
-## Tested commands
-
-Run the release-qualified scenario shown below against an isolated environment first. In production, use only the same typed health, version, verify, resume, summary, and disclosure operations for the recorded execution references.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
-
-## Expected observations
-
-The runtime reserved authority and contacted the provider, but timeout, disconnect, or ambiguous response prevents a terminal classification.
-
-## Stop conditions
-
-Stop fresh Execute calls for the same business effect. Never assume timeout means failure and never mint a new idempotency key.
-
-## Rollback or resume
-
-Use the original execution reference, Resume, and the gateway's provider status lookup until a terminal result is evidenced or manual escalation owns the ambiguity.
-
-## Reconciliation
-
-Bind the reconciled provider reference and result to the original command, commit one terminal state, and issue the matching receipt.
-
-## Evidence retention
-
-Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configuration identities, operator actions, relevant provider references, and disclosure decisions according to the incident evidence policy.
-
-## Escalation
-
-Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.provider-unknown/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure.md b/public/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5ecddc3..0000000
--- a/public/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-# Receipt disclosure
-
-Respond to excessive, unauthorized, or leaked receipt disclosure.
-
-## Owner and severity
-
-Security and privacy incident commander with evidence owner
-
-## Preconditions
-
-Declare the incident, preserve the exact runtime release and configuration identity, restrict changes to the incident owner, and capture the first affected execution references before taking recovery action.
-
-## Tested commands
-
-Run the release-qualified scenario shown below against an isolated environment first. In production, use only the same typed health, version, verify, resume, summary, and disclosure operations for the recorded execution references.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
-
-## Expected observations
-
-A caller receives a view above its authorization, full fields appear in logs or indexes, or disclosure policy and audit records disagree.
-
-## Stop conditions
-
-Disable affected disclosure paths while preserving opaque verification and immutable receipt bytes. Do not delete evidence before scope is established.
-
-## Rollback or resume
-
-Correct Rust-owned disclosure policy or caller trust, rotate access credentials if needed, remove leaked projections, and prove unauthorized callers receive opaque views.
-
-## Reconciliation
-
-Audit who received which projection, preserve the disclosure decisions, and assess whether provider, identity, or personal data escaped its retention boundary.
-
-## Evidence retention
-
-Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configuration identities, operator actions, relevant provider references, and disclosure decisions according to the incident evidence policy.
-
-## Escalation
-
-Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.disclosure/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md b/public/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 88de641..0000000
--- a/public/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-# Signer outage
-
-Operate safely when issuance or receipt custody is unavailable.
-
-## Owner and severity
-
-Runtime incident commander with custody owner
-
-## Preconditions
-
-Declare the incident, preserve the exact runtime release and configuration identity, restrict changes to the incident owner, and capture the first affected execution references before taking recovery action.
-
-## Tested commands
-
-Run the release-qualified scenario shown below against an isolated environment first. In production, use only the same typed health, version, verify, resume, summary, and disclosure operations for the recorded execution references.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Expected observations
-
-Signer calls fail, descriptors change unexpectedly, signatures cannot be verified, or audit events are missing.
-
-## Stop conditions
-
-Stop new issuance and any execution that cannot produce required terminal evidence. Never fall back to an embedded or unsigned key.
-
-## Rollback or resume
-
-Restore the configured signer or activate a prequalified descriptor according to the rotation plan; verify known messages before reopening.
-
-## Reconciliation
-
-Match every effect completed during the window with durable journal state and a valid terminal receipt before declaring recovery.
-
-## Evidence retention
-
-Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configuration identities, operator actions, relevant provider references, and disclosure decisions according to the incident evidence policy.
-
-## Escalation
-
-Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.signer-outage/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/state-loss.md b/public/operations/incidents/state-loss.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2807a96..0000000
--- a/public/operations/incidents/state-loss.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-# State loss
-
-Contain and recover from missing, rolled-back, corrupted, or split runtime state.
-
-## Owner and severity
-
-Runtime incident commander with storage and application owners
-
-## Preconditions
-
-Declare the incident, preserve the exact runtime release and configuration identity, restrict changes to the incident owner, and capture the first affected execution references before taking recovery action.
-
-## Tested commands
-
-Run the release-qualified scenario shown below against an isolated environment first. In production, use only the same typed health, version, verify, resume, summary, and disclosure operations for the recorded execution references.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
-
-## Expected observations
-
-Health or readiness fails, journals are missing or inconsistent, use or budget counters regress, or multiple writers disagree.
-
-## Stop conditions
-
-Stop all protected effects and fresh executions. Do not promote a backup or secondary while another writer may still accept traffic.
-
-## Rollback or resume
-
-Fence writers, restore the newest verified backup to isolation, validate commitments and monotonic state, then resume only recorded execution references.
-
-## Reconciliation
-
-Compare retained receipts, provider idempotency records, and restored journals; escalate every gap as potentially repeated or lost effect.
-
-## Evidence retention
-
-Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configuration identities, operator actions, relevant provider references, and disclosure decisions according to the incident evidence policy.
-
-## Escalation
-
-Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.state-loss/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md b/public/operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 6e7f0c6..0000000
--- a/public/operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-# Trust-root error
-
-Contain an incorrect, expired, unavailable, or compromised trust root.
-
-## Owner and severity
-
-Security incident commander with identity and application trust owners
-
-## Preconditions
-
-Declare the incident, preserve the exact runtime release and configuration identity, restrict changes to the incident owner, and capture the first affected execution references before taking recovery action.
-
-## Tested commands
-
-Run the release-qualified scenario shown below against an isolated environment first. In production, use only the same typed health, version, verify, resume, summary, and disclosure operations for the recorded execution references.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.identity-swap/1`.
-
-## Expected observations
-
-Previously valid evidence changes outcome, an unplanned root appears, bundles are stale, resolver results diverge, or suite labels mismatch.
-
-## Stop conditions
-
-Stop affected verification and execution audiences. Do not enable trust-all, disable freshness, or silently try alternate roots.
-
-## Rollback or resume
-
-Pin the last known-good context or install a reviewed replacement with explicit overlap; rerun positive and negative identity fixtures.
-
-## Reconciliation
-
-Reverify affected decisions where evidence permits and identify any execution accepted under the wrong context.
-
-## Evidence retention
-
-Retain bounded decision and execution receipts, journal transitions, configuration identities, operator actions, relevant provider references, and disclosure decisions according to the incident evidence policy.
-
-## Escalation
-
-Escalate when ownership is unclear, evidence is incomplete, state and provider results disagree, trust or custody may be compromised, or the documented recovery cannot prove it preserves replay and budget invariants.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.incidents.trust-root/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/index.md b/public/operations/index.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 55f028d..0000000
--- a/public/operations/index.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-# Run Auths fail-closed
-
-Protect durable replay, budget, lifecycle, and receipt state; isolate custody;
-observe closed outcomes; and reconcile unknown provider state before retry.
diff --git a/public/operations/observability.md b/public/operations/observability.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ef4a5af..0000000
--- a/public/operations/observability.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Observability
-
-Observe runtime health, dependencies, outcomes, latency, recovery, and redaction without leaking authority content.
-
-## Outcome
-
-Operators can distinguish liveness, readiness, dependency failure, semantic denial, provider failure, provider unknown, and recovery progress.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Define bounded metrics and structured events for request counts, stable outcomes, phase latency, store conflicts, signer calls, resolver freshness, gateway responses, resume attempts, receipt creation, and redaction failures.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Emit release and configuration identities, hash or omit sensitive identifiers, sample high-volume success safely, alert on availability and invariant breaches, and link dashboards to exact runbooks.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-A single execution can be followed by opaque reference and phase without exposing commands, credentials, full receipts, or personal identity evidence.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Stop rollout on missing telemetry, cardinality explosion, raw artifact logging, secret exposure, unexplained provider unknown, replay acceptance, or receipt loss.
-
-## Continue
-
-Exercise recovery and incident procedures using the same signals.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.observability/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/receipt-retention.md b/public/operations/receipt-retention.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 29c64ed..0000000
--- a/public/operations/receipt-retention.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Receipt retention
-
-Retain, disclose, and delete receipt evidence according to integrity and privacy needs.
-
-## Outcome
-
-Receipts remain verifiable for their required lifetime while sensitive detail is opaque by default.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Classify opaque identifiers, commitments, signer evidence, summary fields, full fields, and provider references; define access, encryption, retention, legal hold, deletion, and key-rotation behavior.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Store immutable receipt bytes, index only bounded fields, authorize summary or full disclosure natively, verify retained samples, exercise expiry and deletion, and audit every privileged view.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.offline-verification/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Authorized readers receive only the intended projection and retained receipts still verify after runtime or key rotation.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Raw command or provider payload logging, public full views, missing disclosure audit, unverifiable deletion, or loss of required evidence blocks the retention design.
-
-## Continue
-
-Add receipt disclosure response to the incident program.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.receipts/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md b/public/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 336dab7..0000000
--- a/public/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Recovery and reconciliation
-
-Resume and reconcile interrupted execution without blind provider retry.
-
-## Outcome
-
-An operator can take an opaque execution reference from indeterminate to one evidenced terminal result.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Require the durable journal, original idempotency mapping, gateway-specific provider lookup, and an operator owner for unreconciled outcomes.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Inspect the recorded phase, call Resume, query provider status only through the gateway, classify the result, commit the terminal journal transition, and issue or recover the matching receipt.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.recovery/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Recovery converges on the original effect and a verifiable receipt without consuming fresh authority.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Unknown reference, missing state, provider ambiguity, mismatched result, or evidence loss remains stopped and escalated; never issue a new command automatically.
-
-## Continue
-
-Exercise backup and restore so recovery evidence survives infrastructure loss.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.recovery/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/security-checklist.md b/public/operations/security-checklist.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 99b78ac..0000000
--- a/public/operations/security-checklist.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Security checklist
-
-Apply a production security checklist to every Auths boundary.
-
-## Outcome
-
-The deployment has explicit owners and fail-closed controls for ingress, trust, state, custody, gateways, evidence, dependencies, and operators.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Inventory assets and actors, threat-model each port, enforce TLS and least privilege, isolate credentials, bound every parser, patch dependencies, redact telemetry, protect backups, and require reviewed recovery paths.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Run positive, denial, replay, mutation, outage, compromise, recovery, disclosure, and supply-chain exercises against packaged artifacts.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Every boundary has a named owner, a qualified positive path, an adversarial path, a monitored failure, and a rehearsed recovery.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-No direct provider path, exported key, ambient trust, permissive fallback, unbounded input, blind retry, unaudited full disclosure, or unknown release is acceptable.
-
-## Continue
-
-Schedule outside security review after the operational evidence is reproducible.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.security/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md b/public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 961f9ae..0000000
--- a/public/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Upgrade and rollback
-
-Upgrade or roll back runtime releases while preserving semantic and state compatibility.
-
-## Outcome
-
-A rollout changes implementation only after release contracts, stores, profiles, fixtures, and receipts agree.
-
-## Before you begin
-
-Pin source, SDK, contract, schema, profile, and evidence identities; back up state; qualify packaged consumers; stage the new runtime; and define rollback before migration.
-
-## Build the bounded path
-
-Run health and version checks, differential fixtures, concurrent state tests, a real canary effect, receipt verification, recovery, and rollback rehearsal before expanding traffic.
-
-## Run the qualified path
-
-Tested scenario: `auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1`.
-
-## Success means
-
-Old and new hosts agree where overlap is supported, terminal receipts remain verifiable, and rollback does not reopen consumed authority.
-
-## Fail closed
-
-Semantic drift, schema incompatibility, mixed-version disagreement, receipt change, state loss, or unqualified artifact blocks rollout.
-
-## Continue
-
-Retain the exact release and evidence bundle used for every production window.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.operations.upgrade/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/reference-manifest.json b/public/reference-manifest.json
index 2a719c2..3544bfe 100644
--- a/public/reference-manifest.json
+++ b/public/reference-manifest.json
@@ -1,885 +1,260 @@
 {
   "schema": "auths.docs.reference-manifest/1",
+  "sourceCommit": "bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c",
+  "docsContractSourceCommit": "d0e4a53e5e9582e9eaff1cf38e965252c6c79765",
   "contractDigest": "8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90",
   "pages": [
     {
       "id": "auths.page.home/1",
       "url": "/",
-      "markdown": "/index.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents/1",
-      "url": "/agents",
-      "markdown": "/agents.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1",
-      "url": "/agents/approved-plans",
-      "markdown": "/agents/approved-plans.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.delegation/1",
-      "url": "/agents/delegation",
-      "markdown": "/agents/delegation.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1",
-      "url": "/agents/how-auths-works",
-      "markdown": "/agents/how-auths-works.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.identity/1",
-      "url": "/agents/identity",
-      "markdown": "/agents/identity.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp/1",
-      "url": "/agents/mcp",
-      "markdown": "/agents/mcp.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1",
-      "url": "/agents/mcp/client",
-      "markdown": "/agents/mcp/client.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1",
-      "url": "/agents/mcp/protect-server",
-      "markdown": "/agents/mcp/protect-server.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1",
-      "url": "/agents/mcp/tool-profiles",
-      "markdown": "/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1",
-      "url": "/agents/mcp/transport-boundary",
-      "markdown": "/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1",
-      "url": "/agents/multi-agent",
-      "markdown": "/agents/multi-agent.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.production/1",
-      "url": "/agents/production-patterns",
-      "markdown": "/agents/production-patterns.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1",
-      "url": "/agents/quickstart",
-      "markdown": "/agents/quickstart.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.skills/1",
-      "url": "/agents/skills-and-plugins",
-      "markdown": "/agents/skills-and-plugins.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.testing/1",
-      "url": "/agents/testing",
-      "markdown": "/agents/testing.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
-      "url": "/assurance",
-      "markdown": "/assurance.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.adversarial/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/adversarial",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/adversarial.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.authority/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/authority",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/authority.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.cross-language/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/cross-language",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/cross-language.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.disclosure/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/disclosure",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/disclosure.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.execution/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/execution",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/execution.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.formal/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/formal",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/formal.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.limitations/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/limitations",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/limitations.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.semantics/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/semantics",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/semantics.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.supply-chain/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/supply-chain",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/supply-chain.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority/1",
-      "url": "/authority",
-      "markdown": "/authority.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.constraints/1",
-      "url": "/authority/constraints",
-      "markdown": "/authority/constraints.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.create/1",
-      "url": "/authority/create",
-      "markdown": "/authority/create.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.delegate/1",
-      "url": "/authority/delegate",
-      "markdown": "/authority/delegate.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1",
-      "url": "/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain",
-      "markdown": "/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1",
-      "url": "/authority/delegate/widening-failures",
-      "markdown": "/authority/delegate/widening-failures.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1",
-      "url": "/authority/execute",
-      "markdown": "/authority/execute.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1",
-      "url": "/authority/lifecycle",
-      "markdown": "/authority/lifecycle.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1",
-      "url": "/authority/lifecycle/budgets",
-      "markdown": "/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1",
-      "url": "/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status",
-      "markdown": "/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1",
-      "url": "/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay",
-      "markdown": "/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1",
-      "url": "/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry",
-      "markdown": "/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.concepts.tour/1",
-      "url": "/authority/model",
-      "markdown": "/authority/model.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.plans/1",
-      "url": "/authority/plans",
-      "markdown": "/authority/plans.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1",
-      "url": "/authority/plans/approvals",
-      "markdown": "/authority/plans/approvals.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.profiles/1",
-      "url": "/authority/profiles",
-      "markdown": "/authority/profiles.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.receipts/1",
-      "url": "/authority/receipts",
-      "markdown": "/authority/receipts.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1",
-      "url": "/authority/receipts/disclosure",
-      "markdown": "/authority/receipts/disclosure.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.resume/1",
-      "url": "/authority/resume",
-      "markdown": "/authority/resume.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.verify/1",
-      "url": "/authority/verify",
-      "markdown": "/authority/verify.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers/1",
-      "url": "/developers",
-      "markdown": "/developers.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.cli/1",
-      "url": "/developers/cli",
-      "markdown": "/developers/cli.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.errors/1",
-      "url": "/developers/errors",
-      "markdown": "/developers/errors.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.examples/1",
-      "url": "/developers/examples",
-      "markdown": "/developers/examples.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.extensions/1",
-      "url": "/developers/extension-kits",
-      "markdown": "/developers/extension-kits.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
-      "url": "/developers/integrations",
-      "markdown": "/developers/integrations.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1",
-      "url": "/developers/integrations/capabilities",
-      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/capabilities.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.cloud/1",
-      "url": "/developers/integrations/cloud-iam",
-      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1",
-      "url": "/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust",
-      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.policy/1",
-      "url": "/developers/integrations/policy",
-      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/policy.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1",
-      "url": "/developers/integrations/profile-kit",
-      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.transport/1",
-      "url": "/developers/integrations/transport",
-      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/transport.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.quickstarts/1",
-      "url": "/developers/quickstarts",
-      "markdown": "/developers/quickstarts.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.releases/1",
-      "url": "/developers/releases",
-      "markdown": "/developers/releases.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1",
-      "url": "/developers/runtime-api",
-      "markdown": "/developers/runtime-api.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks/1",
-      "url": "/developers/sdks",
-      "markdown": "/developers/sdks.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.parity/1",
-      "url": "/developers/sdks/parity",
-      "markdown": "/developers/sdks/parity.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.python/1",
-      "url": "/developers/sdks/python",
-      "markdown": "/developers/sdks/python.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.rust/1",
-      "url": "/developers/sdks/rust",
-      "markdown": "/developers/sdks/rust.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.typescript/1",
-      "url": "/developers/sdks/typescript",
-      "markdown": "/developers/sdks/typescript.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.testing/1",
-      "url": "/developers/testing",
-      "markdown": "/developers/testing.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.versioning/1",
-      "url": "/developers/versioning",
-      "markdown": "/developers/versioning.md"
+      "markdown": "/index.md",
+      "title": "Auths Docs",
+      "description": "Give software narrow authority for one exact action, execute through a closed boundary, and prove what happened.",
+      "section": "home",
+      "source": "home.json"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.start/1",
-      "url": "/get-started",
-      "markdown": "/get-started.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.adopt/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/api-keys",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.approvals/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/approvals",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/approvals.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/capabilities",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.cutover/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/cutover",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/cutover.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.plan/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/plan",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/plan.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/policy-engines",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/signed-requests",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.choose/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/choose",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/choose.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.evaluate/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/evaluate",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/evaluate.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.get-started.paths/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/paths",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/paths.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.agent/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/paths/agent",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/paths/agent.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.local/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/paths/application",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/paths/application.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.cross-company/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/paths/cross-company",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/paths/cross-company.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.runtime/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/paths/runtime",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/paths/runtime.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.verify/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/paths/verification",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/paths/verification.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.prerequisites/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/prerequisites",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/prerequisites.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/recovery",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites.custom/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites.ed25519/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites.p256/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.exchange/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/how-it-works",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/how-it-works.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/identity-sources",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/identity-sources.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.resolvers/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.oauth-oidc/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.raw-keys/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.spiffe/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.rotation/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.testing/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/testing",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/testing.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.policy/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/trust-policy",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/trust-policy.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.context/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/verification-context",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/verification-context.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
-      "url": "/operations",
-      "markdown": "/operations.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.backup/1",
-      "url": "/operations/backup-and-restore",
-      "markdown": "/operations/backup-and-restore.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.configure/1",
-      "url": "/operations/configure",
-      "markdown": "/operations/configure.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.custody/1",
-      "url": "/operations/configure/custody",
-      "markdown": "/operations/configure/custody.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.state/1",
-      "url": "/operations/configure/durable-state",
-      "markdown": "/operations/configure/durable-state.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.gateways/1",
-      "url": "/operations/configure/provider-gateways",
-      "markdown": "/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.trust/1",
-      "url": "/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles",
-      "markdown": "/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.deploy/1",
-      "url": "/operations/deploy-runtime",
-      "markdown": "/operations/deploy-runtime.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.evaluate/1",
-      "url": "/operations/evaluate-locally",
-      "markdown": "/operations/evaluate-locally.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1",
-      "url": "/operations/execution-lifecycle",
-      "markdown": "/operations/execution-lifecycle.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents/1",
-      "url": "/operations/incidents",
-      "markdown": "/operations/incidents.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.credential/1",
-      "url": "/operations/incidents/compromised-credential",
-      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/compromised-credential.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.provider-unknown/1",
-      "url": "/operations/incidents/provider-unknown",
-      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.disclosure/1",
-      "url": "/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure",
-      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.signer-outage/1",
-      "url": "/operations/incidents/signer-outage",
-      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.state-loss/1",
-      "url": "/operations/incidents/state-loss",
-      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/state-loss.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.trust-root/1",
-      "url": "/operations/incidents/trust-root-error",
-      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.observability/1",
-      "url": "/operations/observability",
-      "markdown": "/operations/observability.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.receipts/1",
-      "url": "/operations/receipt-retention",
-      "markdown": "/operations/receipt-retention.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.recovery/1",
-      "url": "/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation",
-      "markdown": "/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.security/1",
-      "url": "/operations/security-checklist",
-      "markdown": "/operations/security-checklist.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.upgrade/1",
-      "url": "/operations/upgrade-and-rollback",
-      "markdown": "/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md"
+      "url": "/start",
+      "markdown": "/start.md",
+      "title": "Start with Auths",
+      "description": "Choose the smallest honest Auths path: understand the model, protect one exact effect, or verify authority offline.",
+      "section": "start",
+      "source": "start/index.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.what-is-auths/1",
+      "url": "/start/what-is-auths",
+      "markdown": "/start/what-is-auths.md",
+      "title": "What is Auths?",
+      "description": "Learn how Auths gives software narrow authority for an exact action without turning identity, transport, or approval into permission.",
+      "section": "start",
+      "source": "start/what-is-auths.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.typescript/1",
+      "url": "/start/typescript",
+      "markdown": "/start/typescript.md",
+      "title": "TypeScript quickstart",
+      "description": "Protect one MCP tool, execute the allowed action, and prove an undeclared action never reaches your provider.",
+      "section": "start",
+      "source": "start/typescript-quickstart.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.python/1",
+      "url": "/start/python",
+      "markdown": "/start/python.md",
+      "title": "Python quickstart",
+      "description": "Execute one allowed MCP action inside an owned Python session and observe denial before a second provider call.",
+      "section": "start",
+      "source": "start/python-quickstart.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.start.rust-offline-verification/1",
+      "url": "/start/rust-offline-verification",
+      "markdown": "/start/rust-offline-verification.md",
+      "title": "Rust offline verification",
+      "description": "Verify proof, action, and trusted-context bytes without networking, mutable state, custody, or execution.",
+      "section": "start",
+      "source": "start/rust-offline-verification.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.guides/1",
+      "url": "/guides",
+      "markdown": "/guides.md",
+      "title": "Guides",
+      "description": "Build Auths workflows by outcome, from identity authentication and offline verification to closed execution, recovery, and adapters.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "source": "guides/index.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.guides.authenticate-identity/1",
+      "url": "/guides/authenticate-identity",
+      "markdown": "/guides/authenticate-identity.md",
+      "title": "Authenticate identity without granting authority",
+      "description": "Exchange and authenticate bounded public identity data while keeping capabilities, approvals, and execution out of the path.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "source": "guides/authenticate-identity.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.guides.verify-authority/1",
+      "url": "/guides/verify-authority",
+      "markdown": "/guides/verify-authority.md",
+      "title": "Verify existing authority",
+      "description": "Verify proof, canonical action, and trusted-context bytes deterministically without receiving a command or execution capability.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "source": "guides/verify-authority.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.guides.execute-exact-action/1",
+      "url": "/guides/execute-exact-action",
+      "markdown": "/guides/execute-exact-action.md",
+      "title": "Execute one exact action",
+      "description": "Put an application effect behind a closed profile so only the verifier-authorized command can enter the provider gateway.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "source": "guides/execute-exact-action.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.guides.authority-model/1",
+      "url": "/guides/authority-model",
+      "markdown": "/guides/authority-model.md",
+      "title": "Authority model",
+      "description": "Understand how local trust anchors, attenuating grants, exact action constraints, and bounded plans produce authority that cannot widen in transit.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "source": "concepts/authority-model.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.guides.verification-model/1",
+      "url": "/guides/verification-model",
+      "markdown": "/guides/verification-model.md",
+      "title": "Verification model",
+      "description": "Follow the six deterministic verifier stages from bounded decoding to exact action binding, then see why execution remains outside the kernel.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "source": "concepts/verification-model.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.guides.delegate-agent/1",
+      "url": "/guides/delegate-agent",
+      "markdown": "/guides/delegate-agent.md",
+      "title": "Delegate narrower authority to an agent",
+      "description": "Give an agent a short-lived subset of a parent's authority and prove that widening and exact replay cannot create another effect.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "source": "guides/delegate-agent.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.guides.approvals-and-ordered-plans/1",
+      "url": "/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans",
+      "markdown": "/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans.md",
+      "title": "Approvals and ordered plans",
+      "description": "Bind multiple approvals to one exact ordered plan, stop safely on uncertainty, and resume without repeating completed effects.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "source": "guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.guides.replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown/1",
+      "url": "/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown",
+      "markdown": "/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown.md",
+      "title": "Replay, recovery, and provider uncertainty",
+      "description": "Distinguish safe replay from ambiguous remote effects, preserve one execution identity, and reconcile without duplicating work.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "source": "guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.guides.receipts-and-disclosure/1",
+      "url": "/guides/receipts-and-disclosure",
+      "markdown": "/guides/receipts-and-disclosure.md",
+      "title": "Receipts and bounded disclosure",
+      "description": "Verify what Auths decided and executed while revealing only the application detail each viewer is authorized to inspect.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "source": "guides/receipts-and-disclosure.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.guides.production-integration/1",
+      "url": "/guides/production-integration",
+      "markdown": "/guides/production-integration.md",
+      "title": "Build a production integration",
+      "description": "Replace development custody and memory state with durable, closed, observable mechanisms without weakening exact-action enforcement.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "source": "guides/production-integration.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.guides.adapter-authoring/1",
+      "url": "/guides/adapter-authoring",
+      "markdown": "/guides/adapter-authoring.md",
+      "title": "Build and qualify an adapter",
+      "description": "Extend identity, custody, state, transport, or provider integration without moving Auths authority semantics into application code.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "source": "guides/adapter-authoring.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.examples/1",
+      "url": "/examples",
+      "markdown": "/examples.md",
+      "title": "Examples by security question",
+      "description": "Choose a real Auths example by the boundary you need to evaluate, with explicit maturity and non-claims.",
+      "section": "examples",
+      "source": "examples/index.mdx"
     },
     {
       "id": "auths.page.reference/1",
       "url": "/reference",
-      "markdown": "/reference.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.cli/1",
-      "url": "/reference/cli",
-      "markdown": "/reference/cli.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.errors/1",
-      "url": "/reference/errors",
-      "markdown": "/reference/errors.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.evidence/1",
-      "url": "/reference/evidence",
-      "markdown": "/reference/evidence.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.manifest/1",
-      "url": "/reference/manifest.json",
-      "markdown": "/reference/manifest.json.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.profiles/1",
-      "url": "/reference/profiles",
-      "markdown": "/reference/profiles.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
-      "url": "/reference/runtime-api",
-      "markdown": "/reference/runtime-api.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.schemas/1",
-      "url": "/reference/schemas",
-      "markdown": "/reference/schemas.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk",
-      "markdown": "/reference/sdk.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk.python/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk/python",
-      "markdown": "/reference/sdk/python.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk.rust/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk/rust",
-      "markdown": "/reference/sdk/rust.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk.typescript/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk/typescript",
-      "markdown": "/reference/sdk/typescript.md"
-    }
-  ],
-  "operations": [
-    {
-      "id": "auths.operation.create/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.operation.delegate/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.operation.execute/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.operation.resume/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.operation.verify/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk"
-    }
-  ],
-  "endpoints": [
-    {
-      "id": "auths.endpoint.health/1",
-      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.endpoint.version/1",
-      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.endpoint.authorities/1",
-      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
-      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1",
-      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1",
-      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1",
-      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
-    }
-  ],
-  "scenarios": [
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.delegation/1",
-      "url": "/developers/testing"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1",
-      "url": "/developers/testing"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
-      "url": "/developers/testing"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
-      "url": "/authority/create"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
-      "url": "/agents/mcp/protect-server"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
-      "url": "/agents/delegation"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1",
-      "url": "/agents/approved-plans"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
-      "url": "/authority/receipts/disclosure"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
-      "url": "/agents/production-patterns"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1",
-      "url": "/developers/extension-kits"
-    }
-  ],
-  "claims": [
-    {
-      "id": "auths.claim.approval-binding/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/adversarial",
-      "evidence": "bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json",
-      "sha256": "a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.claim.attenuation/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/authority",
-      "evidence": "formal/qualification.lean",
-      "sha256": "fb1fd17d377194e96f98313412052f82fbb43cb594b12eb6a9fa0e0dce3ce70c"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.claim.bounded-disclosure/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/disclosure",
-      "evidence": "release/docs/runtime-facts-v1.json",
-      "sha256": "3229ccc5a4adbcdfd4b55bdca58ab9e7e5c333719aeff3a0dba54976e6fef1f1"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.claim.closed-gateway/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/execution",
-      "evidence": "release/semantic-freeze.json",
-      "sha256": "75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.claim.cross-language-parity/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/cross-language",
-      "evidence": "release/docs/scenarios.toml",
-      "sha256": "f056e57acb5dbad67ef5ed5076bdee388a82e73b7e6a6af53b82c226ccd552da"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.claim.lifecycle-state/1",
-      "url": "/reference/evidence",
-      "evidence": "bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json",
-      "sha256": "a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/limitations",
-      "evidence": "release/semantic-freeze.json",
-      "sha256": "75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.claim.supply-chain/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/supply-chain",
-      "evidence": "release/slsa-build-level-3-assessment.json",
-      "sha256": "49d5a096915d49058c8c66f29c5c7f59181caa0783d4724322068de6c5c3f6bf"
+      "markdown": "/reference.md",
+      "title": "Reference",
+      "description": "Exact SDK, protocol, adapter, limit, and conformance material for Auths.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "source": "reference/index.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.typescript/1",
+      "url": "/reference/typescript",
+      "markdown": "/reference/typescript.md",
+      "title": "TypeScript SDK",
+      "description": "Navigate the public @auths-dev/sdk entry points from a high-level protected workflow to effect-free verification and extension contracts.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "source": "reference/typescript.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.python/1",
+      "url": "/reference/python",
+      "markdown": "/reference/python.md",
+      "title": "Python SDK",
+      "description": "Navigate the typed public auths modules, async resource ownership, closed workflow results, and extension contracts.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "source": "reference/python.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.rust/1",
+      "url": "/reference/rust",
+      "markdown": "/reference/rust.md",
+      "title": "Rust facades and crate map",
+      "description": "Start from the supported Rust facade, then descend into protocol, authoring, adapters, profiles, and product mechanisms only when your integration needs them.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "source": "reference/rust.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.decisions-errors/1",
+      "url": "/reference/decisions-errors",
+      "markdown": "/reference/decisions-errors.md",
+      "title": "Decisions, errors, and safe responses",
+      "description": "Distinguish authorization verdicts from runtime outcomes and choose a response that cannot widen authority or duplicate an effect.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "source": "reference/decisions-errors.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.evidence-status-assurance/1",
+      "url": "/reference/evidence-status-assurance",
+      "markdown": "/reference/evidence-status-assurance.md",
+      "title": "Evidence, status, assurance, and registries",
+      "description": "Understand how bounded adapters establish facts without acquiring trust or manufacturing authority.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "source": "reference/evidence-status-assurance.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.limits-encoding-identifiers/1",
+      "url": "/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers",
+      "markdown": "/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers.md",
+      "title": "Limits, canonical encoding, and identifiers",
+      "description": "Review the bounded deterministic byte contract that makes verification portable and resistant to ambiguous or excessive input.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "source": "reference/limits-encoding-identifiers.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.principal-adapters/1",
+      "url": "/reference/principal-adapters",
+      "markdown": "/reference/principal-adapters.md",
+      "title": "Principal adapters",
+      "description": "Choose a bounded principal-control method and understand exactly which identity facts it can and cannot establish.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "source": "reference/principal-adapters.mdx"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auths.page.reference.conformance/1",
+      "url": "/reference/conformance",
+      "markdown": "/reference/conformance.md",
+      "title": "Conformance and independent implementations",
+      "description": "Understand what Auths fixtures, mutations, cross-language checks, fuzzing, and formal evidence actually prove.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "source": "reference/conformance.mdx"
     }
   ]
 }
diff --git a/public/reference.md b/public/reference.md
index 70acb35..d9c4d33 100644
--- a/public/reference.md
+++ b/public/reference.md
@@ -1,34 +1,40 @@
 # Reference
 
-Look up exact SDK, Runtime API, CLI, profile, error, schema, evidence, and manifest contracts for one release.
-
-## Recommended: [SDK reference](/reference/sdk)
-
-Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while remaining on the same Auths operation.
-
-## SDK
-
-- [SDK reference](/reference/sdk) — Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while remaining on the same Auths operation.
-
-## Runtime
-
-- [Runtime API](/reference/runtime-api) — Inspect exact HTTPS methods, paths, limits, outcomes, recovery, and receipt-disclosure contracts.
-
-## Lookup
-
-- [CLI](/reference/cli) — Check whether the selected release declares a supported public CLI surface.
-- [Profiles](/reference/profiles) — Inspect maintained and application-owned action, resource, command, budget, and receipt projection contracts.
-- [Errors](/reference/errors) — Look up stable parse, trust, denial, lifecycle, execution, provider, recovery, and disclosure outcomes.
-- [Schemas](/reference/schemas) — Inspect canonical bounded inputs, wire artifacts, commands, receipts, and disclosure view schemas.
-- [Evidence](/reference/evidence) — Resolve every public assurance claim to status, checksum, reproduction, scope, and limitation.
-
-## Machine readable
-
-- [Reference manifest](/reference/manifest.json) — Consume the machine-readable identity-to-URL manifest for the selected docs contract.
-
-## Related topics
-
-- [Assurance](/assurance) — Inspect what Auths claims, the exact evidence behind it, and the limits that remain.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.reference/1 · Product contract: auths.page.reference/1_
-
+Use this section when you need the exact public surface or protocol contract.
+If you are still deciding how Auths fits your application, begin with a guide;
+the reference assumes you already know whether you are authenticating an
+identity, verifying authority, or executing through a closed profile.
+
+## Choose the boundary you are implementing
+
+| You need to… | Start here |
+| --- | --- |
+| Build an application workflow in Node or a browser | [TypeScript SDK](/reference/typescript) |
+| Build an application workflow in Python | [Python SDK](/reference/python) |
+| Embed deterministic verification in Rust | [Rust facades and crates](/reference/rust) |
+| Handle an authorization or runtime outcome safely | [Decisions, errors, and safe responses](/reference/decisions-errors) |
+| Supply identity, lifecycle, or assurance facts | [Evidence, status, assurance, and registries](/reference/evidence-status-assurance) |
+| Implement or review the wire contract | [Limits, encoding, and identifiers](/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers) |
+| Select or qualify a principal-control method | [Principal adapters](/reference/principal-adapters) |
+| Compare another implementation with Auths V1 | [Conformance and independent implementations](/reference/conformance) |
+
+## What the reference promises
+
+Every generated value identifies the pinned Auths product revision and the
+artifact it describes. SDK declarations come from the packed npm package or
+installed wheel. Stable codes and protocol tables come from normative core
+inputs. Example output appears only when the product runner captured it.
+
+Repository-local evidence is not a publication, production-readiness, or
+security-audit claim. Auths is prelaunch and pre-audit.
+
+## One verifier, several product boundaries
+
+The portable operation accepts three byte inputs—a proof bundle, a canonical
+action, and a trusted context—and returns a canonical verification result.
+The core is deterministic and effect-free. Replay state, budgets, credentials,
+provider calls, receipts, and recovery belong to outer product layers.
+
+That separation explains why the SDK reference has more than one entry point:
+identity can be used without authority, verification can be used without
+effects, and execution is available only through a closed profile and runtime.
diff --git a/public/reference/cli.md b/public/reference/cli.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 693f637..0000000
--- a/public/reference/cli.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# CLI
-
-Check whether the selected release declares a supported public CLI surface.
-
-## Orientation
-
-This prelaunch release does not declare a general-purpose public Auths CLI. Repository cargo xtask commands are contributor tooling, not a supported customer interface.
-
-## Generated contract anchor
-
-Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.version/1`.
-
-## Use this surface
-
-Use maintained SDKs or the Runtime API for terminal automation. A future CLI will appear here only after its commands, flags, outcomes, packages, and support policy enter the release contract.
-
-## Source at release
-
-This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.reference.cli/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/reference/conformance.md b/public/reference/conformance.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82e48a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/conformance.md
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+# Conformance and independent implementations
+
+Auths has several kinds of evidence, and they answer different questions. A
+matching file digest is not semantic verification. Agreement between three
+implementations is not a proof that all three are correct. A formal model is
+not an independent security audit.
+
+Use this page to select the evidence appropriate to the claim you are making.
+
+## The normative V1 corpus
+
+The canonical fixture manifest indexes exact proof bundles, canonical actions,
+trusted contexts, and expected verification results. Each entry records file
+digests, the expected stage and stable code, applicable protocol identifiers,
+assurance reports, and resource/work totals.
+
+Fixtures cover successful, denied, indeterminate, malformed, boundary, status,
+and related protocol cases. The inventory below projects its counts and
+classifications directly from the pinned manifest.
+
+### Pinned conformance evidence
+
+Product revision: `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+- Canonical fixtures: 102
+- Fixture classes: denied (48), indeterminate (9), invalid (23), status (2), valid (20)
+- Adversarial mutations: 5
+- Formal outcomes: 4
+- Formal theorems: 27
+
+Normative `.cbor` bytes are not rewritten during an ordinary test run. An
+explicit reviewed wire-update operation is the only path that can replace
+them. Routine tests compare against the checked-in bytes and fail on drift.
+
+## Five distinct evidence levels
+
+### 1. Byte equivalence
+
+A corpus auditor independently parses one complete deterministic-CBOR item and
+recomputes artifact digests. It can prove that two implementations received
+and interpreted the same canonical byte structure. It does not prove that they
+made the correct authority decision.
+
+### 2. Semantic equivalence
+
+An implementation independently executes the V1 verification stages and
+emits a normalized projection. Cross-language checks compare the decision,
+stable code, identifiers, authorized branches, and assurance report.
+
+Agreement is strong regression and interoperability evidence. It is still
+possible for implementations to share a mistaken reading of the
+specification, especially if one copied another.
+
+### 3. Adversarial, property, and fuzz evidence
+
+Mutation tests alter valid inputs through operations such as truncation,
+required-field removal, replacement, duplication, or bit changes and require
+bounded fail-closed behavior. Property tests explore invariants such as
+attenuation, checked arithmetic, deterministic selection, and state-machine
+transitions. Fuzzing explores parser and verification behavior over inputs not
+enumerated in the canonical corpus.
+
+These techniques find classes of implementation defects; none proves the
+absence of all defects.
+
+### 4. Formal refinement evidence
+
+Formal artifacts state and check mathematical properties of stable pure
+semantics. The strongest claim requires a link from shipping Rust predicates
+and representation invariants to the formal model. A separately written model
+can improve understanding without proving that the production implementation
+refines it.
+
+Provider networks remain explicit nondeterministic boundaries. Formal work can
+reason about allowed commands, recorded outcomes, observations, and
+reconciliation, but cannot assume a remote provider behaves atomically.
+
+### 5. Independent security review
+
+An external security assessment evaluates assumptions, design, implementation,
+and operational boundaries using a process independent of the project. Corpus,
+fuzz, differential, and formal gates are valuable engineering evidence, but
+they are not an independent security audit. Auths is currently pre-audit.
+
+## Independent Go and TypeScript verifiers
+
+The independent Go and TypeScript implementations must not call the Rust
+verifier, load its WebAssembly build, or copy expected verdicts from the
+manifest. Each independently audits deterministic CBOR and implements target
+V1 semantics.
+
+The cross-language gate compares both implementations with the Rust verifier
+on the canonical corpus. It requires exact artifact-digest agreement and
+semantic agreement on a normalized projection. Keeping expected verdicts out
+of the independent implementations is essential: otherwise the check would
+only prove that each program can repeat the fixture manifest.
+
+### Cross-language journey evidence
+
+Source: [`bindings/customer-journey-matrix-v1.json`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/customer-journey-matrix-v1.json) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+- Semantic owner: Rust
+- TypeScript public symbols: 193
+- Python public symbols: 159
+- Maintained TypeScript recipes: 5
+- Maintained Python recipes: 5
+- Registered journeys: 10
+
+## What a conforming implementation must preserve
+
+A V1 implementation must agree on more than an `authorized` boolean. It must
+preserve:
+
+- deterministic decoding and rejection of non-canonical input;
+- bounded bytes, objects, nesting, signatures, and adapter work;
+- exact graph resolution and content identifiers;
+- principal-control, signature, status, assurance, and registry behavior;
+- authority attenuation and composition semantics;
+- canonical action binding;
+- deterministic first-failure stage and stable code;
+- authorized branches and assurance satisfactions;
+- resource and work accounting; and
+- exact canonical result encoding where the portable boundary requires it.
+
+Execution, replay databases, live evidence acquisition, credentials, and
+provider reconciliation remain outside the portable verifier corpus. They
+need separate product and profile conformance suites.
+
+## Reading an evidence badge
+
+Read every evidence label as a precise, bounded claim:
+
+| Label | Appropriate meaning |
+| --- | --- |
+| Canonical fixture | Exact checked-in byte case with a normative expected result |
+| Corpus-conformant | Implementation agrees with the complete pinned corpus |
+| Cross-language differential | Named implementations agree on the normalized semantic projection |
+| Property tested | The named invariant was exercised over generated inputs within the stated bounds |
+| Fuzzed | The named target completed the stated fuzz campaign without a detected failure |
+| Formally checked | The named theorem/model relationship was checked under stated assumptions |
+| Independently audited | Use only for a completed outside assessment with a published scope |
+
+Avoid a generic “verified” badge that erases these differences.
+
+## Generated conformance status
+
+### Pinned conformance evidence
+
+Product revision: `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+- Canonical fixtures: 102
+- Fixture classes: denied (48), indeterminate (9), invalid (23), status (2), valid (20)
+- Adversarial mutations: 5
+- Formal outcomes: 4
+- Formal theorems: 27
diff --git a/public/reference/decisions-errors.md b/public/reference/decisions-errors.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27098ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/decisions-errors.md
@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+# Decisions, errors, and safe responses
+
+Auths gives you two different kinds of answer. The offline verifier tells you
+whether the supplied proof establishes authority for one exact action. The
+outer runtime tells you what happened while reserving or performing that
+action. Treating those answers as one generic success/error flag is unsafe.
+
+The first question is always: **may this action execute?** Only an authorized
+verdict can cross that boundary, and authorization still does not mean the
+provider has been called or that the effect succeeded.
+
+## The three verifier decisions
+
+### Authorized
+
+The proof, trusted context, authority chain, status, assurance, and action
+binding checks all passed. The result is authorization for the canonical
+action supplied to this verification—not for a similar object reconstructed
+from an HTTP request or application model.
+
+An authorized result is an input to the execution plane. Channel policy,
+replay, stateful budgets, application policy, durable reservation, and the
+closed profile gateway may still stop execution.
+
+### Denied
+
+The trustworthy facts available to the verifier establish that the request is
+invalid or outside the authority supplied. Examples include an invalid
+signature, an expanded delegation, a revoked grant, an action-body mismatch,
+or a local policy denial.
+
+Repeating the same inputs cannot change a deterministic denial. Do not retry
+through a weaker verifier, remove a required check, or send the unverified
+request directly to the provider. Change the action, obtain appropriate
+authority, or correct the invalid proof.
+
+### Indeterminate
+
+The verifier could not establish a required trustworthy fact or did not have
+an exact implementation needed by the request. Missing fresh status,
+unavailable historical evidence, or an unsupported principal method are
+indeterminate rather than denied.
+
+Indeterminate is still non-executable. A retry is meaningful only when the
+host supplies new trusted facts or installs the exact missing implementation.
+Repeatedly submitting the same inputs is not recovery.
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+  V["Verify exact proof + action + context"] --> A{"Verdict"}
+  A -->|Authorized| G["Continue through runtime gates"]
+  A -->|Denied| D["Change request or authority"]
+  A -->|Indeterminate| I["Supply trustworthy facts or exact support"]
+  G --> R{"Runtime outcome"}
+  R -->|Completed| C["Return result and receipt"]
+  R -->|Exact replay| E["Return recorded result; no provider re-entry"]
+  R -->|Recoverable or provider unknown| X["Resume or reconcile the same execution"]
+```
+
+## Safe response matrix
+
+| Outcome | Could the provider have been reached? | Safe response |
+| --- | ---: | --- |
+| `authorized` verifier decision | No; the pure verifier performs no I/O | Continue only through the configured runtime and closed profile gateway. |
+| `denied` verifier decision | No | Correct the request or authority. Do not weaken verification or retry identical inputs. |
+| `indeterminate` verifier decision | No | Supply new trusted facts or exact implementation support, then verify again. |
+| `completed` execution result | Yes, with a recorded terminal result | Return the result and receipt. Reuse the recorded result for the same execution identity. |
+| `exact-replay` runtime result | It was reached by the original execution, not this replay | Return the original recorded outcome. Do not call the provider again. |
+| `not-applied` runtime result | The runtime established that the effect was not applied | Follow the profile's recovery contract; never construct a replacement command from unchecked input. |
+| `conflict` runtime result | Possibly | Stop. The execution identity is already bound to different commitments or state. Investigate rather than retrying. |
+| `recoverable` runtime result | Possibly, including an ambiguous response | Preserve the opaque execution reference and resume or reconcile that same execution. Never mint a replacement reference or blindly retry. |
+
+The public SDKs expose closed result variants rather than exceptions for these
+expected workflow outcomes. Programming errors, malformed SDK inputs, broken
+adapter contracts, or unavailable infrastructure can still surface as typed
+product errors. Handle them using the product error registry; do not infer a
+retry policy from message text.
+
+## Stable codes are protocol data
+
+A stable verifier code identifies the deterministic first failure and the
+stage that produced it. Codes use exact hyphenated protocol values such as
+`action-body-mismatch`; locally translated aliases are not interchangeable.
+
+Never translate a hyphenated stable code into a language-local alias. The
+table below comes from the normative V1 taxonomy and preserves the distinction
+between denied codes, indeterminate requirements, outer runtime failures, and
+codes reserved but not emitted by a conforming V1 verifier.
+
+### Pinned stable failure taxonomy
+
+Source: [`core/spec/v1/error-codes.md`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/core/spec/v1/error-codes.md) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+### Stable Failure Taxonomy — V1
+
+The enforcement decision is binary: executable or not executable. The proof
+verifier retains three diagnostic classes.
+
+#### Authorized
+
+| Code | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `authorized` | Every proof, authority, status, assurance, and action-binding check passed |
+
+#### Denied
+
+| Code | Stage | Meaning |
+|---|---|---|
+| `malformed-proof` | decode | Input is not a complete bounded V1 object |
+| `non-canonical-proof` | decode | Encoding or set order is not canonical |
+| `resource-limit-exceeded` | any | Configured byte, count, depth, signature, or work limit exceeded |
+| `digest-mismatch` | resolve | Content does not match its identifier |
+| `duplicate-object` | resolve | Duplicate identifier or semantic object |
+| `missing-reference` | resolve | Required digest reference is absent |
+| `unused-critical-evidence` | resolve | Critical evidence is unconsumed |
+| `invalid-signature` | control | Cryptographic signature is invalid |
+| `principal-method-mismatch` | control | Principal and selected method disagree |
+| `verification-method-mismatch` | control | Verification method is not valid for principal/purpose |
+| `signature-suite-mismatch` | control | Suite and key are incompatible |
+| `untrusted-root` | authority | No scoped local anchor covers the root |
+| `broken-grant-chain` | authority | Issuer, subject, parent, actor, or profile linkage is broken |
+| `delegation-expanded` | authority | A child widened an authority dimension |
+| `permission-not-granted` | authority | Terminal authority lacks the exact permission |
+| `action-constraint-mismatch` | authority | Body digest is outside the granted constraint |
+| `budget-ceiling-exceeded` | authority | Requested budget exceeds or mismatches the signed ceiling |
+| `composition-requirement-not-met` | authority | Authorized branches do not satisfy the trusted expected plan, quorum, actor-diversity, or root-diversity obligation |
+| `plan-action-mismatch` | action | Branches bind different action meaning or plan |
+| `action-body-mismatch` | action | Canonical body digest differs |
+| `audience-mismatch` | action | Audience differs from verifier context |
+| `challenge-mismatch` | action | Challenge differs from verifier context |
+| `action-outside-validity` | action | Action is not live |
+| `principal-revoked` | status | Accepted status says principal is revoked |
+| `grant-revoked` | status | Accepted status says grant or ancestor is revoked |
+| `status-sequence-rollback` | status | Status sequence moves backwards |
+| `status-method-mismatch` | status | Subject status exists only under another exact method |
+| `status-issuer-untrusted` | status | A valid status signature was made by an issuer outside snapshot trust |
+| `registry-manifest-mismatch` | control | Context manifest differs from the immutable executable registry |
+| `verifier-configuration-mismatch` | control | Context configuration commitment differs from the exact executable adapter and registry configuration |
+| `resource-namespace-mismatch` | authority | Selected matcher rejects every root namespace |
+| `critical-extension-unknown` | extension | Required extension is not registered |
+| `attachment-missing` | action | Required signed attachment bytes are absent |
+| `attachment-digest-mismatch` | action | Detached bytes do not hash to the signed identifier |
+| `attachment-length-mismatch` | action | Detached byte length differs from the signed length |
+| `duplicate-attachment` | resolve/action | An attachment identifier occurs more than once |
+| `unused-critical-attachment` | action | Signed descriptors and supplied detached inputs do not correspond |
+| `opaque-attachment-not-allowed` | action | Encrypted bytes were supplied where opaque verification was not signed as acceptable |
+| `local-policy-denied` | policy | Explicit local policy rejects established facts |
+
+#### Indeterminate
+
+| Code | Stage | Meaning |
+|---|---|---|
+| `unsupported-protocol` | decode | Protocol major is not supported |
+| `unsupported-principal-method` | control | Required method is not registered |
+| `unsupported-signature-suite` | control | Required suite is not registered |
+| `unsupported-evidence-type` | evidence | Evidence verifier is unavailable |
+| `unsupported-status-method` | status | Required status verifier is unavailable |
+| `unsupported-profile` | action | Required profile/version is unavailable |
+| `unsupported-profile-policy` | policy | Accepted profile-policy ID has no exact executable handler |
+| `unsupported-resource-matcher` | authority | Accepted resource matcher has no exact executable handler |
+| `unsupported-budget-algebra` | authority | Accepted budget algebra has no exact executable handler |
+| `unsupported-critical-extension` | extension | Accepted critical extension has no exact executable handler |
+| `unsupported-assurance-claim` | assurance | An adapter emitted a claim without an accepted exact handler |
+| `missing-principal-evidence` | control | Required control fact cannot be established |
+| `missing-principal-status` | status | Required principal status is absent |
+| `missing-grant-status` | status | Required grant status is absent |
+| `stale-status` | status | Status exists but is not fresh enough |
+| `historical-state-unavailable` | evidence | Historical control/existence cannot be established |
+| `assurance-requirement-not-met` | assurance | Required parameterized claim is absent |
+| `external-fact-unavailable` | evidence | Required bounded external fact was not supplied |
+
+#### Outer runtime failures
+
+These are never Auths authorization verdicts:
+
+| Code | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `challenge-unknown` | Challenge was not issued |
+| `challenge-expired` | Challenge expired |
+| `challenge-consumed` | Challenge was already claimed |
+| `replay-store-unavailable` | Atomic replay state unavailable |
+| `budget-exhausted` | Stateful budget cannot be claimed |
+| `budget-store-unavailable` | Budget state unavailable |
+| `channel-policy-failed` | Peer observation does not satisfy local policy |
+| `application-policy-failed` | Verified action violates a local restriction |
+| `receipt-store-unavailable` | Receipt persistence policy cannot be met |
+| `execution-failed` | Authorized command failed during execution |
+
+Reason codes and diagnostic class are normative corpus fields.
+
+#### Reserved V1 codes
+
+The following codes remain allocated in the portable enum but are not emitted
+by a validly decoded V1 proof:
+
+| Code | Reason reserved |
+|---|---|
+| `ambiguous-terminal-grant` | Action envelopes carry one explicit terminal grant, so ambiguity is rejected as malformed before authority evaluation |
+| `authorization-plan-invalid` | The canonical decoder and model constructors validate plan shape and limits; invalid shapes are `malformed-proof` or `resource-limit-exceeded` before composition |
+| `reference-cycle` | V1 grant identifiers are content hashes of statements containing their parent identifiers; a constructible cycle cannot pass content-address validation, so ordinary broken graphs produce `missing-reference` or `digest-mismatch` |
+
+Reserved codes have no corpus vector and MUST NOT be emitted by a conforming V1
+portable verifier.
+
+## Do not collapse protocol and provider failures
+
+The following events are different and should remain different in logs,
+metrics, receipts, and user interfaces:
+
+1. **Denied:** the action never becomes executable.
+2. **Indeterminate:** the action never becomes executable, but new trusted
+   facts may make a later verification decidable.
+3. **Known provider failure before effect:** the profile knows the effect did
+   not happen and applies its explicit release or recovery rule.
+4. **Known provider failure after effect:** the effect happened even though a
+   later step failed; the runtime records the observed effect.
+5. **Provider outcome unknown:** the provider may have applied the effect but
+   the acknowledgement was lost. The runtime retains uncertainty and blocks a
+   blind retry until reconciliation.
+
+A network timeout is therefore not permission to submit the action again.
+Likewise, a valid signature is not permission to bypass a denial. The closed
+profile owns the meaning of provider outcomes and the exact operation needed
+to reconcile them.
+
+## First-failure ordering
+
+Auths V1 uses deterministic first-failure ordering so implementations and
+receipts agree on one primary stage and code. That ordering is useful for
+portable tests and operator playbooks. It is not a claim that verification
+reveals no timing, cache, power, or other side channel.
+
+For diagnostics, preserve the stable code, stage, commitments, and safe
+response. Avoid logging proof bytes, detached attachments, credentials, or
+sensitive disclosed receipt fields.
+
+## Generated product result reference
+
+### Product errors and safe responses
+
+Source: [`product/errors/v1/registry.json`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/product/errors/v1/registry.json) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+| Code | Family | Effect state | Recommended response |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| `core.invalid-configuration` | configuration | not-applied | `correct-configuration` |
+| `core.unsupported-abi` | runtime | not-applied | `install-compatible-runtime` |
+| `core.unsupported-semantic-subject` | runtime | not-applied | `install-compatible-runtime` |
+| `core.malformed-input` | input | not-applied | `correct-input` |
+| `core.native-runtime-unavailable` | runtime | not-applied | `retry-execution` |
+| `core.forged-execution-reference` | state | not-applied | `correct-input` |
+| `core.runtime-conflict` | state | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
+| `core.runtime-unavailable` | runtime | not-applied | `retry-execution` |
+| `core.runtime-cancelled` | state | not-applied | `retry-execution` |
+| `core.outcome-unknown` | provider | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `core.observation-pending` | provider | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `core.observation-inconclusive` | provider | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `core.workflow-terminal` | state | not-applied | `inspect-receipt` |
+| `core.internal-invariant` | internal | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `mcp.invalid-handler-output` | profile | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `mcp.handler-failed` | provider | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `mcp.handler-timeout` | provider | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `mcp.cancelled-before-entry` | profile | not-applied | `retry-execution` |
+| `mcp.reservation-conflict` | state | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
+| `mcp.replay` | state | not-applied | `inspect-receipt` |
+| `mcp.receipt-persist-failed` | state | applied | `contact-support` |
+| `mcp.reconciliation-pending` | provider | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `plan.member-interrupted` | provider | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `plan.member-failed-before-entry` | profile | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
+| `plan.resume-reference-invalid` | state | not-applied | `correct-input` |
+| `plan.reconciliation-pending` | provider | possible | `resume-and-reconcile` |
+| `plan.action-substituted` | input | not-applied | `correct-input` |
+| `custody.denied` | provider | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
+| `custody.cancelled` | provider | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
+| `custody.throttled` | provider | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
+| `custody.unavailable` | provider | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
+| `custody.revoked-key` | provider | not-applied | `correct-configuration` |
+| `custody.disabled-key` | provider | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
+| `custody.provider-unknown` | provider | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.invalid-provider-response` | provider | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.request-mismatch` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.principal-mismatch` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.descriptor-mismatch` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.key-version-mismatch` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.transaction-mismatch` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.malformed-signature` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.non-canonical-signature` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.signature-verification-failed` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.evidence-mismatch` | input | not-applied | `contact-support` |
+| `custody.lifecycle-not-permitted` | state | not-applied | `satisfy-condition` |
diff --git a/public/reference/errors.md b/public/reference/errors.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2057dc5..0000000
--- a/public/reference/errors.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Errors
-
-Look up stable parse, trust, denial, lifecycle, execution, provider, recovery, and disclosure outcomes.
-
-## Orientation
-
-Errors and closed outcomes are grouped by the caller's safe response rather than by internal exception type.
-
-## Generated contract anchor
-
-Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.executions/1`.
-
-## Use this surface
-
-Fix denied input, supply missing trusted context for indeterminate results, Resume recoverable executions, reconcile provider unknown, and never retry an unknown effect blindly.
-
-## Source at release
-
-This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.reference.errors/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/reference/evidence-status-assurance.md b/public/reference/evidence-status-assurance.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac303c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/evidence-status-assurance.md
@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+# Evidence, status, assurance, and registries
+
+Auths separates the question “what facts can this verifier establish?” from
+the question “does authority cover this action?” This is the boundary behind
+the project rule:
+
+> Auths owns authority. Adapters establish bounded facts.
+
+A principal adapter can establish that a particular key controlled a
+principal under a particular method. A status method can establish that a
+grant was active in a trusted snapshot. An assurance adapter can establish a
+parameterized claim about one participant. None of them may produce an
+authorized result, choose a trust anchor, widen a grant, or execute an effect.
+
+## Evidence is input, not trust
+
+Evidence objects are bounded, content-addressed values selected by an exact
+evidence type. A control binding connects a signed statement to the evidence
+its principal adapter is expected to consume.
+
+For a successfully verified statement, the evidence identifiers in the
+binding must equal the identifiers the adapter reports as consumed. This is an
+important fail-closed rule:
+
+- missing required evidence cannot be silently ignored;
+- extra evidence cannot influence an adapter through an undeclared side
+  channel;
+- an adapter cannot claim it consumed evidence absent from the signed binding;
+- successful resolution does not itself make evidence trustworthy.
+
+Fetching a DID document, certificate chain, KERI checkpoint, WebAuthn
+registration, or HSM attestation record is an outer acquisition concern. The
+pure verifier receives bounded evidence and immutable local context, then
+revalidates their exact relationship.
+
+## Status answers narrow lifecycle questions
+
+Principal and grant status are separate signed fact families. Each statement
+binds an exact method, subject, issuer, sequence, and validity boundary. The
+trusted verifier snapshot—not the proof—selects accepted issuers and minimum
+sequence floors.
+
+Selection is deterministic. A later accepted sequence supersedes an earlier
+one, and revocation dominates active status at the same sequence. A rollback,
+wrong method, untrusted issuer, stale statement, missing statement, and
+authenticated revocation remain different outcomes.
+
+Do not treat these facts as synonyms:
+
+| Fact | What it can establish | What it cannot establish by itself |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Current control | The controller state was observed within a trusted freshness window | That the same key controlled the principal at an earlier signing time |
+| Historical control | A key was accepted during a particular historical interval | That a particular statement existed during that interval |
+| Statement existence | Exact signing bytes were observed at a particular time | Current controller state |
+| Revocation check | A trusted status source was checked at a stated observation time | Authority for an action |
+| Grant status | A particular grant or ancestor is active or revoked | Principal control or signature validity |
+
+This distinction prevents a removed historical key from creating a new grant
+and backdating it into a period when that key used to be valid.
+
+## Assurance belongs to participants and parameters
+
+Assurance is not one global strength score. Every assurance report names the
+participant, its role in the chain, the adapter and version, evidence digests,
+claim parameters, observation time, and provenance.
+
+A policy selects both a role and a quantifier:
+
+- `Any` means at least one participant with that role must satisfy the exact
+  requirement.
+- `Every` means every participant with that role must satisfy it.
+
+Roles include roots, intermediates, actors, and external issuers. Strong
+evidence for the actor cannot repair weak or missing evidence for a required
+root. Parameters matter too: a hardware-attestation claim for one protection
+profile does not satisfy a requirement for another merely because the claim
+names look similar.
+
+V1 registers no implicit assurance hierarchy. One claim implies another only
+when an exact implication handler is accepted and installed. An adapter cannot
+declare its own output “high assurance” and thereby satisfy an unrelated
+policy.
+
+## Registries make extension exact
+
+The verifier uses immutable registries for principal methods, signature
+suites, status methods, resource matchers, profile policy, budget algebra,
+critical extensions, assurance claims, and assurance implications.
+
+Each executable entry has:
+
+- an exact identifier;
+- immutable decision-affecting configuration;
+- a configuration commitment;
+- a conservative maximum work charge reserved before invocation; and
+- typed, bounded behavior.
+
+The trusted context lists the entries it accepts and binds the expected
+registry manifest and exact executable verifier configuration. A different
+manifest or configuration is a denial before pluggable verification. A
+required accepted identifier without an installed exact handler is
+indeterminate. An unaccepted signed critical extension is denied. There is no
+algorithm inference, fallback, or version negotiation.
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+  U["Untrusted proof evidence"] --> B["Exact signed control binding"]
+  L["Verifier-local context"] --> A["Bounded adapter"]
+  B --> A
+  A --> F["Key material + consumed evidence + assurance facts"]
+  F --> V["Sealed authority verifier"]
+  T["Trust anchors + status policy + accepted registries"] --> V
+  V --> D["Authorized / Denied / Indeterminate"]
+```
+
+The adapter arrow ends at facts. Only the sealed verifier combines those facts
+with trust anchors, authority, plans, action binding, and local policy.
+
+## Generated registry and assurance reference
+
+### Pinned registry specification
+
+Source: [`core/spec/v1/registry.md`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/core/spec/v1/registry.md) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+### Auths V1 Initial Registries
+
+All lookups are exact. Unknown identifiers return `Indeterminate` when a
+required capability is unavailable or `Denied` when an unknown critical field
+or contradictory identifier appears. No parser, adapter, or algorithm
+fallback is permitted.
+
+The complete executable target-V1 set is bound by the pinned manifest
+`33` repeated 32 times. A context carrying any other manifest is denied before
+pluggable verification. Every implementation declares a conservative maximum
+work cost that is reserved before invocation.
+
+#### Pure semantic registries
+
+| Kind | Target V1 ID | Required behavior |
+|---|---|---|
+| Resource matcher | `uri-namespace-v1` | Exact URI namespace boundary matching |
+| Profile policy | `exact-v1` | Effect-free acceptance of already validated canonical action facts |
+| Budget algebra | `numeric-ceiling-v1` | Exact-algebra attenuation and coverage using unsigned `<=` |
+| Critical extension | `exact-marker-v1` | Requires the exact byte string `h'01'` and otherwise changes no authority |
+| Principal status | `auths-principal-status-v1` | Trusted issuer, method, floor, freshness, and revoked-dominant latest selection |
+| Grant status | `auths-grant-status-v1` | Same selection rules as principal status |
+
+Critical-extension, assurance-claim, and assurance-implication lookups are
+also exact executable lookups. An identifier listed by the context without an
+installed handler is indeterminate; an unaccepted signed critical extension is
+denied. There is no fallback or version negotiation.
+
+#### Principal methods
+
+| ID | Evidence ceiling | Mandatory suites |
+|---|---:|---|
+| `raw-key-v1` | 512 B | Ed25519, P-256 |
+| `did-key-v1` | 2 KiB | Ed25519, P-256 |
+| `did-keri-v1` | 64 KiB | registered KERI-compatible suites |
+| `did-web-bundled-v1` | 32 KiB | Ed25519, P-256 |
+| `spiffe-x509-v1` | 32 KiB | certificate-selected registered suite |
+| `webauthn-v1` | 16 KiB | P-256 mandatory |
+| `hsm-attested-v1` | 32 KiB | attestation-profile selected suite |
+
+#### Signature suites
+
+| ID | Public key | Signature | Rule |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `ed25519-v1` | 32-byte compressed point | 64 bytes | RFC 8032 verification of exact preimage |
+| `p256-sha256-v1` | 33-byte compressed SEC1 | 64-byte `r || s` | ECDSA/SHA-256, low-S required |
+
+#### Status methods
+
+| ID | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `auths-principal-status-v1` | Signed active/revoked/superseded principal state |
+| `auths-grant-status-v1` | Signed active/revoked/superseded grant state |
+| `keri-checkpoint-v1` | KERI sequence and witness/transparency checkpoint |
+| `x509-status-v1` | Certificate validity and revocation evidence |
+| `webauthn-credential-status-v1` | Registered authenticator credential state |
+| `local-deny-list-v1` | Verifier-local explicit deny facts |
+
+#### Budget algebras
+
+| ID | Order |
+|---|---|
+| `numeric-ceiling-v1` | child value must be less than or equal to parent |
+
+#### Composition operators
+
+| ID | Meaning |
+|---:|---|
+| 0 | `Proof` |
+| 1 | `AllOf` |
+| 2 | `AnyOf` |
+| 3 | `KOfN` |
+
+#### Transports
+
+| ID | Peer observation |
+|---|---|
+| `memory-v1` | none |
+| `iroh-v1` | endpoint and session key |
+| `https-v1` | TLS peer and exporter binding |
+| `tcp-v1` | endpoint only |
+| `unix-v1` | socket and OS peer credentials |
+| `file-v1` | envelope and sequence metadata |
+
+#### Profiles
+
+| Profile ID | Version | Operations |
+|---|---:|---|
+| `auths.mcp` | 1 | MCP tool calls |
+| `auths.http` | 1 | canonical HTTP requests |
+| `auths.git` | 1 | commit, tag, ref, merge, release |
+| `auths.deploy` | 1 | release and infrastructure deployment |
+| `auths.supply-chain` | 1 | build, attest, publish, promote |
+| `auths.edge` | 1 | device command and firmware activation |
+
+#### Assurance claims
+
+The initial claim registry contains:
+
+- `self-certifying-identifier`;
+- `offline-verifiable`;
+- `controller-state-current-at`;
+- `historical-at`;
+- `statement-existence-proven-at`;
+- `rotation-aware`;
+- `revocation-checked-at`;
+- `witness-threshold-met`;
+- `pki-chain-validated`;
+- `workload-attested`;
+- `hardware-attested`;
+- `user-verified`;
+- `origin-bound`.
+
+Parameterized claims never satisfy unparameterized “high assurance” by name
+alone. The assurance registry defines exact implication rules.
+
+#### Critical extensions
+
+`exact-marker-v1` is the initial non-authority-changing executable extension.
+Its body is exactly `h'01'`; it exists to exercise exact handler selection,
+signed-byte validation, work reservation, and portable interoperability.
+Unknown critical extensions are denied. New attenuation or composition
+semantics require a protocol review, an executable model, and a new manifest.
+
+#### Assurance implications
+
+No implication rule is initially registered. Claim names never imply one
+another. A future implication must have an exact accepted identifier and a
+pure executable handler included in a new registry manifest.
+
+### Pinned assurance claims
+
+Documentation-contract revision: `d0e4a53e5e9582e9eaff1cf38e965252c6c79765`.
+
+| Claim | Status | Scope | Limitation |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Approval is bound to exact plan context and cannot authorize substituted plan bytes. | passing | Maintained approval-plan signing requests, responses, and substitution fixtures. | The application remains responsible for approver identity, user experience, and organizational policy. |
+| Delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent under the maintained model and adversarial fixtures. | passing | Attenuation relations represented by the maintained formal model and protocol profile. | The claim covers the modelled fields and maintained protocol profile, not arbitrary application-defined semantics. |
+| Receipt inspection defaults to opaque or bounded views and requires authority for full disclosure. | passing | Maintained receipt summary and disclosure operations and their public runtime contract. | Deployment retention, access control, and downstream handling remain application responsibilities. |
+| Maintained product workflows reach provider adapters only through opaque native-authorized commands. | passing | Maintained execution workflows and their opaque native command and gateway boundary. | Application-owned adapters can still be implemented unsafely outside the maintained boundary. |
+| Maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python scenarios target identical stable semantic outcomes. | passing | The maintained installed-artifact scenarios declared for Rust, TypeScript, and Python. | Scenario parity covers maintained workflows and versions, not every possible application composition. |
+| Maintained runtime paths preserve replay, use, budget, and recovery distinctions. | passing | Maintained runtime and installed-SDK workflows for replay, use, budget, reservation, and recovery outcomes. | Production guarantees also depend on the selected durable store and its deployment. |
+| Rust owns protocol meaning used by Rust, TypeScript, and Python projections. | passing | The declared protocol and product semantic identities consumed by maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python surfaces. | The semantic freeze detects declared semantic drift; it is not a proof that every implementation is defect-free. |
+| The assessed release builder satisfies the recorded SLSA Build Level 3 requirements. | passing | The assessed GitHub release builder and recorded SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 controls. | This is a repository-owner delegated build assessment, not an independent security audit or source-correctness proof. |
+
+## Integration checklist
+
+When you add or review an adapter, verify all of the following:
+
+1. Live acquisition is outside the offline kernel.
+2. The proof cannot choose its own trust roots or immutable adapter context.
+3. Inputs, output facts, byte limits, work limits, and errors are typed and
+   bounded.
+4. The adapter reports exactly the evidence it consumed.
+5. Signature verification remains in the separately selected suite unless the
+   method defines an explicit method-derived message.
+6. Assurance claims name exact participants, parameters, source, adapter, and
+   observation time.
+7. Unsupported required behavior is indeterminate rather than inferred.
+8. Invalid or contradictory evidence is denied.
+9. The implementation cannot construct a verified authority or executable
+   command.
diff --git a/public/reference/evidence.md b/public/reference/evidence.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 98ac5f0..0000000
--- a/public/reference/evidence.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Evidence
-
-Resolve every public assurance claim to status, checksum, reproduction, scope, and limitation.
-
-## Orientation
-
-Evidence pages do not convert repository tests into universal correctness. They report exactly what the selected release checked and where that claim stops.
-
-## Generated contract anchor
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.verify/1`.
-
-## Use this surface
-
-Verify evidence checksums, run the declared reproduction commands, and read limitations before relying on a claim for production risk decisions.
-
-## Source at release
-
-This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.reference.evidence/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers.md b/public/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3602e02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+# Limits, canonical encoding, and identifiers
+
+In Auths, serialization rules are security rules. Signers, verifiers, language
+bindings, receipts, and independent implementations must agree on the exact
+bytes and identifiers for the same action. Inputs must also have a known upper
+bound before an attacker can make the verifier allocate memory or invoke
+expensive adapters.
+
+The tables below project exact current values from the pinned V1 specification;
+the surrounding explanation connects those limits to the attacks they bound.
+
+## Canonical bytes prevent alternate meanings
+
+Auths V1 uses a constrained deterministic CBOR profile. It permits
+definite-length maps, arrays, text, and byte strings with shortest integer and
+length encodings. Maps use ascending integer keys, and set-like arrays use an
+explicit canonical order.
+
+The decoder rejects:
+
+- duplicate or out-of-order keys;
+- non-minimal integers and lengths;
+- indefinite-length values;
+- floats and tags;
+- invalid UTF-8;
+- non-canonical set order;
+- unknown critical fields; and
+- trailing bytes after the one expected object.
+
+This avoids a dangerous situation in which two byte sequences appear
+equivalent to an application but produce different signing or hashing input.
+Auths does not assume that semantically similar, byte-distinct application
+actions are equivalent. A profile owns the canonical body format for its exact
+effect.
+
+## There are two important action digests
+
+An application profile first canonicalizes its body. The action envelope signs
+the resulting body digest together with the profile, capability, resource,
+actor, audience, challenge, validity, authority, plan, attachments, and other
+security fields.
+
+The portable verifier separately hashes the complete deterministic
+`canonical-action` input. These digests answer different questions:
+
+- **Canonical body digest:** are these the exact profile-owned effect bytes
+  authorized by the action envelope?
+- **Portable canonical-action digest:** did implementations receive the same
+  complete portable action input, including detached inputs required by the
+  protocol boundary?
+
+Do not substitute a JSON hash, request-body hash, transport digest, or
+provider idempotency key for either value.
+
+## Signing domains and content identifiers
+
+Every signed preimage begins with the Auths domain, protocol major, registered
+object type, profile identity and version, and the length of the deterministic
+canonical object. The signing object also binds the principal method,
+verification method, and signature suite.
+
+Content identifiers use a separate `AUTHS-ID` domain and a registered
+identifier type. A grant ID, action ID, plan ID, evidence ID, status ID,
+receipt ID, context digest, and proof digest therefore cannot be exchanged
+merely because they are all 32-byte values.
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+  O["Validated semantic object"] --> C["Deterministic CBOR"]
+  C --> S["AUTHS signing domain + object type"]
+  C --> I["AUTHS-ID domain + identifier type"]
+  S --> P["Exact signing preimage"]
+  I --> D["Typed content identifier"]
+```
+
+SHA-256 is fixed for V1 content identifiers and body digests. Ed25519 signs
+the full domain-separated preimage. The P-256 suite uses ECDSA with SHA-256,
+fixed-width `r || s`, and rejects high-S signatures. SHA-1 is prohibited for
+security-bearing identifiers.
+
+## Detached attachments remain bound
+
+The signed action contains descriptors for detached attachments, including
+their identifiers, lengths, and policy for required or opaque use. The
+portable canonical-action input supplies the actual detached bytes.
+
+The verifier checks correspondence, digest, and length and rejects missing,
+duplicated, mismatched, or unconsumed critical attachments. Transporting bytes
+out of band does not remove them from the authorization boundary.
+
+## Limits bound bytes, structure, and work
+
+Auths constrains more than the top-level proof size. V1 places limits on input
+byte lengths, grants, plan leaves and depth, evidence objects, status
+statements, attachments, signatures, permissions, audiences, critical
+extensions, registries, trust anchors, and adapter work.
+
+Deployments may lower defaults. Raising a protocol hard maximum requires
+protocol review rather than a runtime flag. The verifier reserves conservative
+adapter work before invoking a pluggable implementation, so a request cannot
+smuggle unbounded computation behind a small evidence envelope.
+
+### Pinned verifier limits
+
+Source: [`core/spec/v1/protocol.md`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/core/spec/v1/protocol.md) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+| Resource | Default | Hard maximum |
+|---|---:|---:|
+| Bundle bytes | 256 KiB | 8 MiB |
+| Canonical-action input bytes | 2 MiB | 16 MiB |
+| Trusted-context input bytes | 2 MiB | 16 MiB |
+| Grants | 16 | 256 |
+| Actions/plan leaves | 16 | 128 |
+| Plan depth | 8 | 16 |
+| Evidence objects | 32 | 512 |
+| One evidence object | 64 KiB | 2 MiB |
+| Control bindings | 32 | 512 |
+| Principal status statements | 32 | 512 |
+| Grant status statements | 32 | 512 |
+| Attachments | 32 | 512 |
+| Aggregate detached attachment bytes | 1 MiB | 8 MiB |
+| Signatures | 64 | 1,024 |
+| One signature | 512 B | 4 KiB |
+| Permissions | 64 | 1,024 |
+| Audiences | 32 | 256 |
+| Critical extensions/object | 8 | 32 |
+| One critical extension | 16 KiB | 64 KiB |
+| Allowed body digests | 32 | 256 |
+| Evidence IDs per binding | 8 | 32 |
+| Canonical action body | 1 MiB | 8 MiB protocol ceiling and lower profile limit |
+| Accepted entries per registry | 64 | 1,024 |
+| Trust anchors | 32 | 1,024 |
+| Adapter work units | 50,000 | 1,000,000 |
+
+Deployments may lower limits. Raising a hard maximum requires protocol review.
+
+## Parse into valid types
+
+Callers should not carry unchecked strings or generic maps past the boundary.
+Canonical decoders and model constructors enforce length, ordering, identifier,
+and structural invariants as values are created. Later stages operate on those
+validated types instead of repeatedly asking whether an impossible state is
+present.
+
+An invalid encoding is a stable verification result, not a panic. A verifier
+may report a codec error only when it cannot encode or decode its own canonical
+result; malformed untrusted proof input remains part of the ordinary bounded
+decision path.
+
+## Identifier reference
+
+### Pinned domain-separation specification
+
+Source: [`core/spec/v1/domain-separation.md`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/core/spec/v1/domain-separation.md) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+### Domain Separation and Identifiers — V1
+
+#### Signing preimage
+
+Every signed preimage is:
+
+```text
+UTF8("AUTHS") ||
+u16be(protocol_major) ||
+u16be(object_type) ||
+u16be(profile_id_length) ||
+UTF8(profile_id) ||
+u16be(profile_version) ||
+u64be(canonical_object_length) ||
+deterministic_cbor(canonical_object)
+```
+
+The canonical signing object contains the unsigned statement and its
+`SignatureDescriptor`. This binds the principal method, verification method,
+and signature suite.
+
+Object type identifiers are registered:
+
+| ID | Object |
+|---:|---|
+| 1 | grant |
+| 2 | action |
+| 3 | principal status |
+| 4 | grant status |
+| 5 | decision receipt |
+| 6 | execution receipt |
+| 7 | registry manifest |
+| 8 | bridge grant |
+
+Profile-independent objects use an empty profile ID and version zero.
+
+#### Content identifiers
+
+`domain_hash` is:
+
+```text
+SHA-256(
+  UTF8("AUTHS-ID") ||
+  u16be(protocol_major) ||
+  u16be(identifier_type) ||
+  u64be(canonical_bytes_length) ||
+  canonical_bytes
+)
+```
+
+Identifier type identifiers are fixed:
+
+| ID | Identifier |
+|---:|---|
+| 1 | grant statement |
+| 2 | action envelope |
+| 3 | authorization plan |
+| 4 | evidence object content |
+| 5 | principal-status statement |
+| 6 | grant-status statement |
+| 7 | decision receipt |
+| 8 | execution receipt |
+| 9 | public verifier-context projection |
+| 10 | registry manifest |
+
+Identifiers:
+
+- `GrantId`: canonical `grant-statement`, excluding signature;
+- `ActionId`: canonical `action-envelope`, excluding signature;
+- `AuthorizationPlanId`: canonical `authorization-plan`;
+- `EvidenceId`: canonical evidence type, media type, and bytes;
+- status statement IDs: canonical unsigned status statement;
+- attachment digest: raw SHA-256 of exact attachment bytes;
+- decision/execution receipt IDs: canonical unsigned receipt;
+- context digest: canonical public verifier-context projection;
+- canonical body digest: raw SHA-256 of exact profile-canonical body bytes;
+- portable canonical action digest: raw SHA-256 of the complete deterministic
+  `canonical-action` CBOR input;
+- proof digest: raw SHA-256 of exact canonical proof-bundle bytes.
+
+The `proof-ref` is a 32-byte branch identifier generated during authoring and
+covered by the action signature. It is not derived from an action containing
+the plan ID, avoiding an identifier cycle.
+
+#### Algorithms
+
+V1 content identifiers and body digests use SHA-256. The registry contains no
+algorithm field for these identifiers.
+
+Ed25519 signs the full domain-separated preimage.
+`p256-sha256-v1` uses ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 and fixed-width 64-byte
+`r || s`; high-S signatures are rejected.
+
+SHA-1 is prohibited for every security-bearing identifier.
diff --git a/public/reference/manifest.json b/public/reference/manifest.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 2a719c2..0000000
--- a/public/reference/manifest.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,885 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema": "auths.docs.reference-manifest/1",
-  "contractDigest": "8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90",
-  "pages": [
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.home/1",
-      "url": "/",
-      "markdown": "/index.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents/1",
-      "url": "/agents",
-      "markdown": "/agents.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1",
-      "url": "/agents/approved-plans",
-      "markdown": "/agents/approved-plans.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.delegation/1",
-      "url": "/agents/delegation",
-      "markdown": "/agents/delegation.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1",
-      "url": "/agents/how-auths-works",
-      "markdown": "/agents/how-auths-works.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.identity/1",
-      "url": "/agents/identity",
-      "markdown": "/agents/identity.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp/1",
-      "url": "/agents/mcp",
-      "markdown": "/agents/mcp.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1",
-      "url": "/agents/mcp/client",
-      "markdown": "/agents/mcp/client.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1",
-      "url": "/agents/mcp/protect-server",
-      "markdown": "/agents/mcp/protect-server.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1",
-      "url": "/agents/mcp/tool-profiles",
-      "markdown": "/agents/mcp/tool-profiles.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1",
-      "url": "/agents/mcp/transport-boundary",
-      "markdown": "/agents/mcp/transport-boundary.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1",
-      "url": "/agents/multi-agent",
-      "markdown": "/agents/multi-agent.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.production/1",
-      "url": "/agents/production-patterns",
-      "markdown": "/agents/production-patterns.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1",
-      "url": "/agents/quickstart",
-      "markdown": "/agents/quickstart.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.skills/1",
-      "url": "/agents/skills-and-plugins",
-      "markdown": "/agents/skills-and-plugins.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.testing/1",
-      "url": "/agents/testing",
-      "markdown": "/agents/testing.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
-      "url": "/assurance",
-      "markdown": "/assurance.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.adversarial/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/adversarial",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/adversarial.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.authority/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/authority",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/authority.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.cross-language/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/cross-language",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/cross-language.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.disclosure/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/disclosure",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/disclosure.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.execution/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/execution",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/execution.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.formal/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/formal",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/formal.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.limitations/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/limitations",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/limitations.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.semantics/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/semantics",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/semantics.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.supply-chain/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/supply-chain",
-      "markdown": "/assurance/supply-chain.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority/1",
-      "url": "/authority",
-      "markdown": "/authority.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.constraints/1",
-      "url": "/authority/constraints",
-      "markdown": "/authority/constraints.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.create/1",
-      "url": "/authority/create",
-      "markdown": "/authority/create.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.delegate/1",
-      "url": "/authority/delegate",
-      "markdown": "/authority/delegate.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1",
-      "url": "/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain",
-      "markdown": "/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1",
-      "url": "/authority/delegate/widening-failures",
-      "markdown": "/authority/delegate/widening-failures.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1",
-      "url": "/authority/execute",
-      "markdown": "/authority/execute.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1",
-      "url": "/authority/lifecycle",
-      "markdown": "/authority/lifecycle.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1",
-      "url": "/authority/lifecycle/budgets",
-      "markdown": "/authority/lifecycle/budgets.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1",
-      "url": "/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status",
-      "markdown": "/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1",
-      "url": "/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay",
-      "markdown": "/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1",
-      "url": "/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry",
-      "markdown": "/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.concepts.tour/1",
-      "url": "/authority/model",
-      "markdown": "/authority/model.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.plans/1",
-      "url": "/authority/plans",
-      "markdown": "/authority/plans.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1",
-      "url": "/authority/plans/approvals",
-      "markdown": "/authority/plans/approvals.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.profiles/1",
-      "url": "/authority/profiles",
-      "markdown": "/authority/profiles.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.receipts/1",
-      "url": "/authority/receipts",
-      "markdown": "/authority/receipts.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1",
-      "url": "/authority/receipts/disclosure",
-      "markdown": "/authority/receipts/disclosure.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.resume/1",
-      "url": "/authority/resume",
-      "markdown": "/authority/resume.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.verify/1",
-      "url": "/authority/verify",
-      "markdown": "/authority/verify.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers/1",
-      "url": "/developers",
-      "markdown": "/developers.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.cli/1",
-      "url": "/developers/cli",
-      "markdown": "/developers/cli.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.errors/1",
-      "url": "/developers/errors",
-      "markdown": "/developers/errors.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.examples/1",
-      "url": "/developers/examples",
-      "markdown": "/developers/examples.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.extensions/1",
-      "url": "/developers/extension-kits",
-      "markdown": "/developers/extension-kits.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
-      "url": "/developers/integrations",
-      "markdown": "/developers/integrations.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1",
-      "url": "/developers/integrations/capabilities",
-      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/capabilities.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.cloud/1",
-      "url": "/developers/integrations/cloud-iam",
-      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/cloud-iam.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1",
-      "url": "/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust",
-      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.policy/1",
-      "url": "/developers/integrations/policy",
-      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/policy.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1",
-      "url": "/developers/integrations/profile-kit",
-      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/profile-kit.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.transport/1",
-      "url": "/developers/integrations/transport",
-      "markdown": "/developers/integrations/transport.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.quickstarts/1",
-      "url": "/developers/quickstarts",
-      "markdown": "/developers/quickstarts.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.releases/1",
-      "url": "/developers/releases",
-      "markdown": "/developers/releases.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1",
-      "url": "/developers/runtime-api",
-      "markdown": "/developers/runtime-api.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks/1",
-      "url": "/developers/sdks",
-      "markdown": "/developers/sdks.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.parity/1",
-      "url": "/developers/sdks/parity",
-      "markdown": "/developers/sdks/parity.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.python/1",
-      "url": "/developers/sdks/python",
-      "markdown": "/developers/sdks/python.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.rust/1",
-      "url": "/developers/sdks/rust",
-      "markdown": "/developers/sdks/rust.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.typescript/1",
-      "url": "/developers/sdks/typescript",
-      "markdown": "/developers/sdks/typescript.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.testing/1",
-      "url": "/developers/testing",
-      "markdown": "/developers/testing.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.versioning/1",
-      "url": "/developers/versioning",
-      "markdown": "/developers/versioning.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start/1",
-      "url": "/get-started",
-      "markdown": "/get-started.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.adopt/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/api-keys",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/api-keys.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.approvals/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/approvals",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/approvals.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/capabilities",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/capabilities.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.cutover/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/cutover",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/cutover.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.plan/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/plan",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/plan.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/policy-engines",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/policy-engines.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/adoption/signed-requests",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/adoption/signed-requests.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.choose/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/choose",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/choose.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.evaluate/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/evaluate",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/evaluate.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.get-started.paths/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/paths",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/paths.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.agent/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/paths/agent",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/paths/agent.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.local/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/paths/application",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/paths/application.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.cross-company/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/paths/cross-company",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/paths/cross-company.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.runtime/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/paths/runtime",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/paths/runtime.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.verify/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/paths/verification",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/paths/verification.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.prerequisites/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/prerequisites",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/prerequisites.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/recovery",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/recovery.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1",
-      "url": "/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect",
-      "markdown": "/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites.custom/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites.ed25519/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites.p256/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.exchange/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/how-it-works",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/how-it-works.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/identity-sources",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/identity-sources.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.resolvers/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.oauth-oidc/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.raw-keys/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.spiffe/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.rotation/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.testing/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/testing",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/testing.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.policy/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/trust-policy",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/trust-policy.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.context/1",
-      "url": "/identity-trust/verification-context",
-      "markdown": "/identity-trust/verification-context.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
-      "url": "/operations",
-      "markdown": "/operations.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.backup/1",
-      "url": "/operations/backup-and-restore",
-      "markdown": "/operations/backup-and-restore.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.configure/1",
-      "url": "/operations/configure",
-      "markdown": "/operations/configure.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.custody/1",
-      "url": "/operations/configure/custody",
-      "markdown": "/operations/configure/custody.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.state/1",
-      "url": "/operations/configure/durable-state",
-      "markdown": "/operations/configure/durable-state.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.gateways/1",
-      "url": "/operations/configure/provider-gateways",
-      "markdown": "/operations/configure/provider-gateways.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.trust/1",
-      "url": "/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles",
-      "markdown": "/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.deploy/1",
-      "url": "/operations/deploy-runtime",
-      "markdown": "/operations/deploy-runtime.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.evaluate/1",
-      "url": "/operations/evaluate-locally",
-      "markdown": "/operations/evaluate-locally.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1",
-      "url": "/operations/execution-lifecycle",
-      "markdown": "/operations/execution-lifecycle.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents/1",
-      "url": "/operations/incidents",
-      "markdown": "/operations/incidents.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.credential/1",
-      "url": "/operations/incidents/compromised-credential",
-      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/compromised-credential.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.provider-unknown/1",
-      "url": "/operations/incidents/provider-unknown",
-      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/provider-unknown.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.disclosure/1",
-      "url": "/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure",
-      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.signer-outage/1",
-      "url": "/operations/incidents/signer-outage",
-      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/signer-outage.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.state-loss/1",
-      "url": "/operations/incidents/state-loss",
-      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/state-loss.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.trust-root/1",
-      "url": "/operations/incidents/trust-root-error",
-      "markdown": "/operations/incidents/trust-root-error.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.observability/1",
-      "url": "/operations/observability",
-      "markdown": "/operations/observability.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.receipts/1",
-      "url": "/operations/receipt-retention",
-      "markdown": "/operations/receipt-retention.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.recovery/1",
-      "url": "/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation",
-      "markdown": "/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.security/1",
-      "url": "/operations/security-checklist",
-      "markdown": "/operations/security-checklist.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.upgrade/1",
-      "url": "/operations/upgrade-and-rollback",
-      "markdown": "/operations/upgrade-and-rollback.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference/1",
-      "url": "/reference",
-      "markdown": "/reference.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.cli/1",
-      "url": "/reference/cli",
-      "markdown": "/reference/cli.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.errors/1",
-      "url": "/reference/errors",
-      "markdown": "/reference/errors.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.evidence/1",
-      "url": "/reference/evidence",
-      "markdown": "/reference/evidence.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.manifest/1",
-      "url": "/reference/manifest.json",
-      "markdown": "/reference/manifest.json.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.profiles/1",
-      "url": "/reference/profiles",
-      "markdown": "/reference/profiles.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
-      "url": "/reference/runtime-api",
-      "markdown": "/reference/runtime-api.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.schemas/1",
-      "url": "/reference/schemas",
-      "markdown": "/reference/schemas.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk",
-      "markdown": "/reference/sdk.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk.python/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk/python",
-      "markdown": "/reference/sdk/python.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk.rust/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk/rust",
-      "markdown": "/reference/sdk/rust.md"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk.typescript/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk/typescript",
-      "markdown": "/reference/sdk/typescript.md"
-    }
-  ],
-  "operations": [
-    {
-      "id": "auths.operation.create/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.operation.delegate/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.operation.execute/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.operation.resume/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.operation.verify/1",
-      "url": "/reference/sdk"
-    }
-  ],
-  "endpoints": [
-    {
-      "id": "auths.endpoint.health/1",
-      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.endpoint.version/1",
-      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.endpoint.authorities/1",
-      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.endpoint.executions/1",
-      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1",
-      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1",
-      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.endpoint.receipt-disclosure/1",
-      "url": "/reference/runtime-api"
-    }
-  ],
-  "scenarios": [
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.delegation/1",
-      "url": "/developers/testing"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.receipt-verification/1",
-      "url": "/developers/testing"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1",
-      "url": "/developers/testing"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
-      "url": "/authority/create"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
-      "url": "/agents/mcp/protect-server"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
-      "url": "/agents/delegation"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1",
-      "url": "/agents/approved-plans"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
-      "url": "/authority/receipts/disclosure"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
-      "url": "/agents/production-patterns"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1",
-      "url": "/developers/extension-kits"
-    }
-  ],
-  "claims": [
-    {
-      "id": "auths.claim.approval-binding/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/adversarial",
-      "evidence": "bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json",
-      "sha256": "a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.claim.attenuation/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/authority",
-      "evidence": "formal/qualification.lean",
-      "sha256": "fb1fd17d377194e96f98313412052f82fbb43cb594b12eb6a9fa0e0dce3ce70c"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.claim.bounded-disclosure/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/disclosure",
-      "evidence": "release/docs/runtime-facts-v1.json",
-      "sha256": "3229ccc5a4adbcdfd4b55bdca58ab9e7e5c333719aeff3a0dba54976e6fef1f1"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.claim.closed-gateway/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/execution",
-      "evidence": "release/semantic-freeze.json",
-      "sha256": "75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.claim.cross-language-parity/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/cross-language",
-      "evidence": "release/docs/scenarios.toml",
-      "sha256": "f056e57acb5dbad67ef5ed5076bdee388a82e73b7e6a6af53b82c226ccd552da"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.claim.lifecycle-state/1",
-      "url": "/reference/evidence",
-      "evidence": "bindings/recipes/experience-evidence.json",
-      "sha256": "a8ba8a06a3979d62bab446f1bc2469e328e98e485a344a8a36d07ee0f2013331"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.claim.native-semantic-owner/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/limitations",
-      "evidence": "release/semantic-freeze.json",
-      "sha256": "75e787e3f1412e63301761ae3503339b493e1f5fdb2441fede9599a6a9da89a3"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.claim.supply-chain/1",
-      "url": "/assurance/supply-chain",
-      "evidence": "release/slsa-build-level-3-assessment.json",
-      "sha256": "49d5a096915d49058c8c66f29c5c7f59181caa0783d4724322068de6c5c3f6bf"
-    }
-  ]
-}
diff --git a/public/reference/manifest.json.md b/public/reference/manifest.json.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0ae3abc..0000000
--- a/public/reference/manifest.json.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Reference manifest
-
-Consume the machine-readable identity-to-URL manifest for the selected docs contract.
-
-## Orientation
-
-The manifest maps pages, operations, endpoints, scenarios, and evidence claims to canonical URLs under one contract digest.
-
-## Generated contract anchor
-
-Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.version/1`.
-
-## Use this surface
-
-Agents and tooling should retrieve this JSON directly rather than scrape navigation or guess routes from display names.
-
-## Source at release
-
-This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.reference.manifest/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/reference/principal-adapters.md b/public/reference/principal-adapters.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd8be16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/principal-adapters.md
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+# Principal adapters
+
+A principal adapter answers a narrow question: does the supplied bounded
+evidence establish control of this principal, for this verification method and
+purpose, under immutable verifier-local configuration?
+
+It does not answer what the principal may do. Signature validity, identity
+resolution, channel authentication, status evidence, and assurance claims are
+inputs to authorization—not substitutes for it.
+
+## The common boundary
+
+Every principal method receives the exact principal, verification method,
+control purpose, signature suite, signing preimage, asserted time, bounded
+evidence, and method-specific immutable context. It returns suite-specific
+verification material, exact consumed evidence identifiers, and bounded
+assurance claims—or a typed failure.
+
+The selected signature suite verifies the Auths statement separately. A method
+can provide an explicit method-derived signature message when its protocol
+requires one, as WebAuthn does, but that message must still cryptographically
+commit to the exact Auths signing preimage.
+
+Live acquisition stays outside the pure method:
+
+- DNS and HTTPS retrieval for `did:web`;
+- KERI witness or checkpoint acquisition;
+- SPIFFE Workload API and bundle retrieval;
+- WebAuthn registration and browser ceremony setup;
+- HSM provider APIs and attestation-chain retrieval.
+
+The host turns those observations into bounded evidence and immutable trusted
+records. A proof cannot provide its own trust root or weaken those records.
+
+### Pinned principal methods
+
+Source: [`core/spec/v1/registry.md`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/core/spec/v1/registry.md) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+| ID | Evidence ceiling | Mandatory suites |
+|---|---:|---|
+| `raw-key-v1` | 512 B | Ed25519, P-256 |
+| `did-key-v1` | 2 KiB | Ed25519, P-256 |
+| `did-keri-v1` | 64 KiB | registered KERI-compatible suites |
+| `did-web-bundled-v1` | 32 KiB | Ed25519, P-256 |
+| `spiffe-x509-v1` | 32 KiB | certificate-selected registered suite |
+| `webauthn-v1` | 16 KiB | P-256 mandatory |
+| `hsm-attested-v1` | 32 KiB | attestation-profile selected suite |
+
+### Pinned signature suites
+
+Source: [`core/spec/v1/registry.md`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/core/spec/v1/registry.md) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+| ID | Public key | Signature | Rule |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `ed25519-v1` | 32-byte compressed point | 64 bytes | RFC 8032 verification of exact preimage |
+| `p256-sha256-v1` | 33-byte compressed SEC1 | 64-byte `r || s` | ECDSA/SHA-256, low-S required |
+
+### Pinned status methods
+
+Source: [`core/spec/v1/registry.md`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/core/spec/v1/registry.md) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+| ID | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `auths-principal-status-v1` | Signed active/revoked/superseded principal state |
+| `auths-grant-status-v1` | Signed active/revoked/superseded grant state |
+| `keri-checkpoint-v1` | KERI sequence and witness/transparency checkpoint |
+| `x509-status-v1` | Certificate validity and revocation evidence |
+| `webauthn-credential-status-v1` | Registered authenticator credential state |
+| `local-deny-list-v1` | Verifier-local explicit deny facts |
+
+## Self-certifying key methods
+
+### Raw key
+
+`raw-key-v1` encodes a closed Ed25519 or compressed P-256 public-key form and
+derives a self-certifying principal. The evidence must reconstruct the exact
+principal and require the exact compatible signature suite.
+
+This is the smallest offline method. It can establish a self-certifying
+identifier and offline verifiability. It does not provide rotation,
+deactivation, historical control, or freshness. Use it only where the host's
+policy accepts an effectively irrevocable principal or supplies lifecycle
+facts through another explicit mechanism.
+
+### `did:key`
+
+`did-key-v1` provides the same broad security shape through a closed subset of
+the `did:key` method. V1 accepts only supported Multikey forms for Ed25519 and
+compressed P-256, and it performs no algorithm inference or fallback.
+
+Like raw key, `did:key` is self-certifying and offline verifiable but has no
+rotation, deactivation, or historical controller-state mechanism.
+
+## Document and event-history methods
+
+### Bundled `did:web`
+
+`did-web-bundled-v1` verifies a bounded canonical DID document carried with the
+proof. Retrieval and verification are deliberately separate. The verifier
+must supply an explicit host-controlled trust record binding the principal and
+document digest; a self-identifying document is not proof that it came from
+the named host.
+
+Current trust records can establish current controller state and a revocation
+check within an observation window. Historical pins can establish that a
+document was valid during an interval. Establishing that an exact statement
+existed during that interval requires a separate exact-statement pin.
+
+The closed document profile rejects remote contexts, embedded methods,
+unsupported curves, arbitrary redirects, and unknown root properties. Network
+retrieval belongs to a resolver that applies allowlists, DNS/IP controls,
+redirect policy, media-type checks, size bounds, and timeouts; that resolver
+has no authority-verification API.
+
+### `did:keri`
+
+`did-keri-v1` replays a bounded embedded KERI event log and verifies the
+selected establishment key, sequence, thresholds, links, commitments, and
+controller signatures for the supported subset.
+
+A valid embedded log establishes only the state present in that log. It cannot
+prove that no later rotation exists elsewhere. Applications requiring current
+controller state must supply an authenticated checkpoint and require the
+corresponding freshness claims. Historical statement existence also requires
+separate authenticated observation; it is not inferred from a complete-looking
+event log.
+
+## Workload, user, and hardware-backed methods
+
+### SPIFFE X.509-SVID
+
+`spiffe-x509-v1` validates a bounded leaf-first certificate path against a
+verifier-selected trust-domain bundle. It enforces the exact SPIFFE URI SAN,
+trust-domain relationship, certificate validity at the explicit evaluation
+time, client-auth usage, name constraints, and a supported leaf key.
+
+It can establish PKI-chain validation and workload attestation. Current status
+claims require a matching verifier-local status observation when policy asks
+for one. Workload API access and bundle acquisition remain outside the kernel.
+
+### WebAuthn
+
+`webauthn-v1` binds a WebAuthn assertion challenge to the SHA-256 digest of the
+exact Auths signing preimage. Verifier-local registration records constrain the
+credential, P-256 key, relying-party ID, origins, required flags, counter
+policy, attestation level, and observation window.
+
+The adapter can establish origin binding, user verification when the
+authenticator reports it, and hardware attestation only when the local record
+establishes a named attestation level. Browser ceremony initiation,
+registration, and counter updates remain stateful outer concerns.
+
+### HSM-attested key
+
+`hsm-attested-v1` checks a bounded evidence envelope against an immutable
+verifier-local attestation record. That record fixes the key and suite,
+attestation profile, provider, protection level, key-handle and device-chain
+digests, exportability, and observation window.
+
+Provider APIs and chain acquisition happen outside the kernel. The method can
+emit parameterized hardware-attestation and current-control facts only when
+the evidence exactly matches the local record and the transaction digest binds
+the exact Auths statement.
+
+## How to choose
+
+Choose the smallest method that can establish the facts your trust policy
+actually requires:
+
+- For a local or embedded offline verifier where rotation is not required,
+  raw key or `did:key` may be sufficient.
+- For a web-controlled identity with current or historical document policy,
+  use bundled `did:web` with verifier-owned trust records.
+- For rotation-aware event history, use `did:keri` and add authenticated
+  checkpoints when current state matters.
+- For workload identity, use SPIFFE with verifier-owned trust-domain bundles.
+- For a user ceremony bound to origin and relying party, use WebAuthn.
+- For custody or key-protection assurance, use an HSM-attested method under a
+  reviewed provider-specific profile.
+
+Do not select a method by marketing-level strength. Write the exact assurance,
+freshness, lifecycle, and historical-state requirements first, then choose an
+adapter capable of establishing those facts.
+
+## Fail-closed behavior
+
+An unsupported required method is indeterminate. Malformed, contradictory, or
+unauthentic evidence is denied. A missing required external fact is
+indeterminate. Authenticated revocation is denied. Suite, principal, or
+verification-method disagreement is denied.
+
+No adapter falls back to another method, guesses an algorithm from byte length,
+or treats successful retrieval as verified control.
diff --git a/public/reference/profiles.md b/public/reference/profiles.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f76b5dc..0000000
--- a/public/reference/profiles.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Profiles
-
-Inspect maintained and application-owned action, resource, command, budget, and receipt projection contracts.
-
-## Orientation
-
-Profiles map bounded domain intent into Auths operations without owning identity, transport, state, custody, approval providers, or provider credentials.
-
-## Generated contract anchor
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
-
-## Use this surface
-
-Resolve profile version and action identities before authoring authority. Use profile-kit for application domains and qualify every critical extension.
-
-## Source at release
-
-This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.reference.profiles/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/reference/python.md b/public/reference/python.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33df0bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/python.md
@@ -0,0 +1,405 @@
+# Python SDK
+
+The `auths` wheel exposes the same product topology as the TypeScript package
+using idiomatic Python modules and native-backed types. Most applications begin
+with the root workflow, `auths.integrations`, and `auths.profiles`. Identity and
+effect-free verification remain independently usable.
+
+Installed wheels include the native implementation, so a normal consumer does
+not need a Rust toolchain. Exact supported Python versions, platforms, wheel
+ABI, and distribution status must come from the installed wheel and runtime
+contract shown below.
+
+## Pick the smallest public module
+
+| Module | Use it for | It does not do |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `auths` | Create, delegate, execute, resume, inspect product results, and handle product errors | Re-export every lower-level module |
+| `auths.identity` | Decode, resolve, validate, and authenticate method- and suite-labelled identities | Grant authority or authorize an effect |
+| `auths.verify` | Verify proofs, decisions, and receipts; inspect inert projections; create bounded disclosures | Call a provider or return an effect-capable execution object |
+| `auths.profiles` | Construct actions and authorities for qualified closed effect domains | Accept an arbitrary provider operation or payload |
+| `auths.integrations` | Select maintained development and production composition boundaries, plus identity transport integration | Make development state or keys production-ready |
+| `auths.framework` | Implement the proven signer and atomic-reservation contracts | Reimplement core semantics in Python |
+| `auths.testkit` | Certify adapters and exercise deterministic conformance suites | Provide production custody, persistence, or telemetry |
+
+All intended public modules use explicit `__all__` declarations and installed-
+wheel typing checks. A source module that does not appear in the installed
+public inventory is not an application API.
+
+### Installed Python public API
+
+Source: [`bindings/python/api/public-api.txt`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/python/api/public-api.txt) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+```text
+[auths]
+Actor
+Approval
+Authority
+Auths
+AuthsError
+AuthsErrorCode
+Completed
+Denied
+DoctorReport
+ExecutionReference
+ExecutionResult
+Indeterminate
+ProductStep
+ProductionAuthority
+ProductionAuthorityResult
+ProductionAuths
+ProductionCompleted
+ProductionDenied
+ProductionExecutionResult
+ProductionIndeterminate
+ProductionReceipt
+ProductionRecoverable
+ProductionRecoveryReference
+ProductionRejected
+ProductionTransport
+ProductionTransportRequest
+ProductionTransportResponse
+ProductionVerificationResult
+ProductionVerified
+Receipt
+RecommendedAction
+RecoveryResult
+RetryClass
+create_auths
+doctor
+
+[auths.identity]
+AuthenticatedIdentity
+DecodedIdentity
+Ed25519SignatureSuite
+IdentityMethod
+IdentityPrincipal
+IdentityRegistry
+IdentityResolver
+RawKeyIdentityMethod
+ResolutionEvidence
+ResolvedIdentity
+ResolvedIdentityRecord
+ResolverIdentityMethod
+SignatureSuite
+ValidatedIdentity
+VerificationMaterial
+VerificationRelationship
+decode_identity
+encode_identity
+encode_raw_key_identity
+
+[auths.verify]
+ApprovalInspection
+Authorized
+DecisionCommitments
+DecisionInspection
+DecisionSummary
+Denied
+Explanation
+Indeterminate
+InspectionMetrics
+InvalidReceiptInspection
+KernelSummary
+Receipt
+ReceiptDisclosureMaterial
+ReceiptDisclosureProtector
+ReceiptDisclosureStore
+ReceiptInspectionCommitments
+ReceiptInspectionMetadata
+ReceiptInspectionProfile
+ReceiptInspectionResult
+ReceiptInspectionSigner
+ReceiptSummary
+ReceiptSummaryField
+ReceiptViewMode
+VerificationInput
+VerificationMetrics
+VerificationResult
+VerifiedDisclosedReceipt
+VerifiedOpaqueReceipt
+create_receipt_disclosure
+decode_receipt
+encode_receipt
+inspect_decision
+inspect_receipt
+verify
+verify_many
+verify_receipt
+
+[auths.profiles]
+DevelopmentMcpProvider
+McpAction
+McpClosedProvider
+McpCompleted
+McpExecutionCheckpointEvent
+McpExecutionCheckpointStage
+McpExecutionObserver
+McpHandlerOutcome
+McpPlan
+McpPlanCompleted
+McpPlanRecoveryResult
+McpRecoverable
+McpToolAuthority
+McpToolContext
+ProductionProfile
+ProductionProfileId
+github_issue_address
+mcp
+opentofu_saved_plan_apply
+postgresql_bounded_update
+
+[auths.integrations]
+FrameworkAdapter
+IdentityTransport
+development
+exchange_identity
+production
+
+[auths.framework]
+AtomicReservationRecord
+AtomicReservationStore
+ControlEvidence
+PrincipalDescriptor
+ProviderFailureKind
+ProviderOperationError
+Signer
+SignerLifecycle
+SigningObjectKind
+SigningRequest
+SigningResponse
+
+[auths.testkit]
+ADAPTER_CONTRACT_VERSION
+AtomicReservationRecord
+AtomicReservationStoreCandidate
+ByteTransportCandidate
+CONFORMANCE_CATALOG
+ConformanceCaseResult
+ConformanceMetadata
+ConformanceReport
+DevelopmentApproval
+DevelopmentEd25519Signer
+DevelopmentIdentityMethod
+DevelopmentReceiptAttestor
+DevelopmentSignatureSuite
+DevelopmentSigner
+DiagnosticEngine
+DiagnosticExplanation
+DiagnosticResult
+DiagnosticVerifier
+FixedClock
+MemoryGateway
+ProductWaistConformanceReport
+ProductWaistExpected
+RecordingTelemetry
+certify_atomic_store
+certify_byte_transport
+certify_mcp_provider
+certify_signer
+check_approval_provider
+check_identity_method
+check_signer
+check_telemetry
+create_diagnostic_verifier
+product_waist_conformance
+```
+
+## The shortest protected workflow
+
+The normal async workflow is:
+
+1. Construct an exact authority and action through a qualified profile.
+2. Supply a closed provider whose handlers expose only configured operations.
+3. Open a maintained Auths composition with `async with`.
+4. Execute and exhaustively handle the closed result.
+5. Let the context manager close owned signers and native sessions.
+
+> Product-owned recipe `03-execute-exact-action` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
+
+### Python recipe
+
+> **Qualification blocked — Python source does not match the pinned public API.**
+>
+> The pinned recipe imports `verify_receipt` from `auths`, while the pinned installed API exports it only from `auths.verify`. The source is retained for review but must not be presented as runnable until the product recipe is corrected and re-executed.
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
+
+Register the only provider operation and count every entry into that effect boundary.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–19; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+
+from auths import verify_receipt
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import mcp
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    calls = 0
+
+    async def publish_report(arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal calls
+        calls += 1
+        return {"published": arguments["report"]}
+
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(tools={"publish_report": publish_report})
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
+
+Open the owned development session, execute the exact action, and verify its receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 20–30; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    async with development.create_auths(
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"])
+    ) as auths:
+        completed = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="publish_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-success",
+        )
+        if completed.kind != "completed":
+            raise RuntimeError(f"unexpected result: {completed.kind}")
+        verify_receipt(completed.receipt)
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
+
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter stayed at one.
+
+_Pinned source lines 31–37; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        denied = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="delete_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-denied",
+        )
+        if denied.kind != "denied" or calls != 1:
+            raise RuntimeError("undeclared effect reached provider")
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Report the trace through the owned entry point
+
+Leave the session before emitting the declared result, then run the asynchronous entry point.
+
+_Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "03-execute-exact-action",
+                "outcome": "completed",
+                "denied": True,
+                "calls": calls,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
+
+The pinned recipe currently fails its public-import check: it imports
+`verify_receipt` from `auths`, while the pinned public inventory exports that
+symbol from `auths.verify`. This recipe remains qualification-blocked until its
+source and public import agree; a TypeScript result is not Python evidence.
+Publication requires the recipe to execute against the same wheel used to
+generate the reference.
+
+## Async ownership is part of correctness
+
+Use `async with` for the normal lifecycle. Applications that cannot use a
+context manager may explicitly `await auths.aclose()`. Both paths are intended
+to be idempotent and release the resources owned by the composition.
+
+Delegated children are separately owned sessions. Do not assume that garbage
+collection will promptly close native sessions, signers, file-backed recovery
+state, or provider resources.
+
+## Handle values, not message strings
+
+The high-level API returns typed completed, denied, indeterminate, replay,
+conflict, and recoverable values. Expected authorization and recovery outcomes
+are not generic exceptions.
+
+- Denied and indeterminate never authorize provider entry.
+- Exact replay returns recorded state and must not call the provider again.
+- Recoverable state must be resumed with the SDK-minted opaque reference for
+  the same execution.
+- A conflict is a stop condition, not an invitation to generate a new request
+  identifier.
+
+Use the typed discriminant and stable code. Product and adapter exceptions
+carry their own error contract; messages are for humans and may be redacted.
+
+## Effect-free verification
+
+`auths.verify` exposes single and batch proof verification, receipt
+verification, inert decision and receipt inspection, and bounded disclosure.
+It accepts explicit bytes and returns ordinary inspection or verification
+values. It cannot mint the native-owned authorization object used by a closed
+profile to perform an effect.
+
+This boundary matters in Python because ordinary user code is highly dynamic:
+application code must not be able to create an effect-capable authorization
+object by setting a flag, constructing a dataclass, or monkey-patching a
+wrapper. Native ownership preserves the boundary.
+
+## Standalone identity
+
+`auths.identity` can carry, decode, resolve, and authenticate identities
+without importing capabilities, approvals, or runtime execution. Identity
+methods and signature suites remain explicit and replaceable. Successful
+authentication binds exact bytes to a public identity; it does not authorize
+an application action or prevent replay on its own.
+
+## Development and production
+
+The development composition uses ephemeral keys and in-memory state, with an
+explicitly development-only recovery option where provided. It is suitable for
+learning and local tests, not production durability.
+
+A production composition needs a qualified closed profile, durable atomic
+reservation, reviewed signer custody, credential acquisition after
+authorization and reservation, receipt retention and access controls,
+observability without secret leakage, and profile-specific reconciliation.
+
+Run the bounded doctor command from the installed wheel to inspect runtime,
+ABI, semantic-subject, state, and profile facts. It must not read application
+secrets or print protocol payloads.
+
+### Python runtime contract
+
+Source: [`bindings/python/sdk-runtime-contract.json`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/python/sdk-runtime-contract.json) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+- Package: `auths` `1.0.0rc1` · `abi3-py39`
+- Runtime: CPython `3.9`, `3.10`, `3.11`, `3.12`, `3.13`, `3.14`
+- Operating systems: linux, macos, windows
+- Public modules: `auths`, `auths.identity`, `auths.verify`, `auths.profiles`, `auths.integrations`, `auths.framework`, `auths.testkit`
+- Distribution: wheels `published`; source distribution `not-published`; local compiler required `false`
+
+## Extension boundary and parity
+
+`auths.framework` contains only the narrow supported contracts that Python
+applications may implement, including signer custody and atomic reservation.
+Candidate implementations should pass the corresponding `auths.testkit`
+conformance suite before they are used by a production composition.
+
+Parity with TypeScript means the same product operation, result meaning,
+security boundary, and qualified profile—not identical spelling or a shared
+implementation in either language. Differential fixtures should prove that
+both bindings delegate semantic operations to the same Rust-owned waist.
diff --git a/public/reference/runtime-api.md b/public/reference/runtime-api.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e70e40e..0000000
--- a/public/reference/runtime-api.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Runtime API
-
-Inspect exact HTTPS methods, paths, limits, outcomes, recovery, and receipt-disclosure contracts.
-
-## Orientation
-
-The Runtime API is the language-neutral production boundary. Every effectful endpoint declares request limits, closed outcomes, state behavior, and trust boundary.
-
-## Generated contract anchor
-
-Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.health/1`.
-
-## Use this surface
-
-Check health and version, create authority, execute, resume, then request only authorized receipt projections. Unknown outcomes remain closed.
-
-## Source at release
-
-This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/create-authority.md b/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/create-authority.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 20c9970..0000000
--- a/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/create-authority.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Create authority
-
-`POST /v1/authorities` parses a bounded authority request and creates the exact
-authority represented by its canonical bytes.
-
-- Stable identity: `auths.endpoint.authorities/1`
-- Maximum body: 65,536 bytes
-- Outcomes: `completed`, `denied`, `indeterminate`
diff --git a/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/execute.md b/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/execute.md
deleted file mode 100644
index fd9d86d..0000000
--- a/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/execute.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Execute a sealed command
-
-`POST /v1/executions` authorizes, reserves, and submits one exact effect through
-a closed gateway. Successful HTTP delivery is never treated as authorization.
-
-- Stable identity: `auths.endpoint.executions/1`
-- Maximum body: 262,144 bytes
-- Outcomes: `completed`, `denied`, `indeterminate`, `recoverable`
diff --git a/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/health.md b/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/health.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7f8ff25..0000000
--- a/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/health.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Health
-
-`GET /v1/health` reads service liveness without authority, custody, provider
-access, or state mutation.
-
-- Stable identity: `auths.endpoint.health/1`
-- Request body: none
-- Outcomes: `completed`
diff --git a/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/receipt-summary.md b/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/receipt-summary.md
deleted file mode 100644
index dfcda17..0000000
--- a/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/receipt-summary.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Read receipt summary
-
-`GET /v1/receipts/{receipt_id}` returns a bounded, inert projection without
-exposing full receipt material by default.
-
-- Stable identity: `auths.endpoint.receipt-summary/1`
-- Request body: none
-- Outcomes: `completed`, `not-found`
diff --git a/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/resume.md b/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/resume.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2a391d1..0000000
--- a/public/reference/runtime-api/sections/resume.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Resume execution
-
-`POST /v1/executions/{execution_id}/resume` continues the same recoverable
-execution without creating a fresh mutation or consuming unrelated authority.
-
-- Stable identity: `auths.endpoint.execution-resume/1`
-- Maximum body: 65,536 bytes
-- Outcomes: `completed`, `denied`, `indeterminate`, `recoverable`, `not-found`
diff --git a/public/reference/rust.md b/public/reference/rust.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40ba666
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/rust.md
@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+# Rust facades and crate map
+
+Rust exposes both the portable verifier and the lower-level building blocks
+used to implement it. Most consumers should not assemble those crates
+themselves. Start with the facade matching your job, then descend only when you
+need explicit control over a boundary.
+
+## Start with a facade
+
+### `auths`
+
+`auths` is the supported embedded core coordinate. It re-exports the
+`auths-proof` facade while adding no I/O, provider, profile, custody, or runtime
+behavior. Use it when an application wants one stable dependency for offline
+Auths V1 verification.
+
+### `auths-proof`
+
+`auths-proof` exposes the bounded protocol engine and actionable result
+projection. The common operation supplies three explicit byte inputs: proof,
+canonical action, and trusted context. The result contains the three-way
+verdict, stable code, stage, deterministic resource metrics, portable result,
+and exact result CBOR.
+
+Malformed untrusted proof input is an ordinary verification result. The Rust
+`Result` error around the facade represents failure to encode or decode the
+engine's own canonical result—not a denied proof.
+
+The native typed operation is available for profile decoders that already hold
+a validated canonical action and verifier context. The sealed verified action
+has no public constructor.
+
+### `auths-sdk`
+
+`auths-sdk` is the idiomatic embedded authorization SDK. It helps an
+integration construct explicit trusted contexts, call the kernel, and decode a
+sealed verified action through a closed profile. It re-exports deliberately
+selected authoring, custody, error, model, and profile surfaces.
+
+It does not turn the Rust facade into a generic remote-action executor.
+Durable replay state, credentials, provider gateways, receipts, and
+reconciliation remain product or profile concerns.
+
+## Offline verification example
+
+> Product-owned external-consumer example from [`demos/offline-verification`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/offline-verification).
+> Source revision: `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`. No output is synthesized by the documentation projection.
+
+Source: [`demos/offline-verification/src/main.rs`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/offline-verification/src/main.rs) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Load the verifier and canonical inputs
+
+Import the verifier ports and embed the proof, action, and trusted-context fixture bytes.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–7; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+use auths_ports::{PrincipalMethod, SignatureSuite};
+use auths_proof::{Engine, Verdict};
+
+const PROOF: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../core/fixtures/v1/valid/raw-key-chain.proof.cbor");
+const ACTION: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../core/fixtures/v1/valid/raw-key-chain.action.cbor");
+const TRUSTED_CONTEXT: &[u8] =
+    include_bytes!("../../../core/fixtures/v1/valid/raw-key-chain.context.cbor");
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Build the verifier-owned context
+
+Register accepted adapters and bind the exact executable configuration and required plan outside the proof.
+
+_Pinned source lines 9–24; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+    let method = auths_raw_key::RawKeyMethod::new()?;
+    let suite = auths_signature::Ed25519Suite::new()?;
+    let methods: [&dyn PrincipalMethod; 1] = [&method];
+    let suites: [&dyn SignatureSuite; 1] = [&suite];
+    let registries = auths_registries::ImmutableRegistries::new(&methods, &suites)?;
+
+    // The trusted host, not the proof producer, commits the exact executable
+    // configuration and required composition policy.
+    let context = auths_codec::decode_verifier_context(TRUSTED_CONTEXT)?
+        .with_configuration(registries.configuration_id())?;
+    let required_plan = context
+        .composition()
+        .expected_plan()
+        .ok_or("example context must require an exact plan")?;
+    let context_bytes = auths_codec::encode_verifier_context(&context)?;
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Verify without executing
+
+Run the offline kernel and project bounded diagnostic and work information from the result.
+
+_Pinned source lines 26–37; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+    let result = Engine::new(registries).verify_cbor(PROOF, ACTION, &context_bytes)?;
+    let explanation = result.explanation();
+    let portable = result.portable();
+    let resources = result.resources();
+    println!(
+        "verdict={:?} code={} stage={:?} retryable={} work_units={}",
+        result.verdict(),
+        result.code(),
+        explanation.stage(),
+        explanation.retryable(),
+        resources.work_units()
+    );
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Inspect portable commitments
+
+Read proof, action, context, and configuration commitments without acquiring any execution capability.
+
+_Pinned source lines 38–47; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+    println!(
+        "proof={:?} action={:?} context={:?} required_configuration={:?} local_configuration={:?}",
+        portable.proof_digest().as_bytes(),
+        portable.action_digest().as_bytes(),
+        portable.context_digest().as_bytes(),
+        portable
+            .required_configuration()
+            .map(|configuration| *configuration.as_bytes()),
+        portable.local_configuration().as_bytes()
+    );
+```
+
+#### Step 5: Handle every verdict fail closed
+
+Continue only for authorized results that satisfy the host-required plan; denied and indeterminate both stop.
+
+_Pinned source lines 49–63; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+    match result.verdict() {
+        Verdict::Authorized => {
+            if portable.plan_id() != Some(required_plan) {
+                return Err("authorized result did not satisfy the host-required plan".into());
+            }
+            Ok(())
+        }
+        Verdict::Denied => Err(format!("stable authorization denial: {}", result.code()).into()),
+        Verdict::Indeterminate => Err(format!(
+            "not authorized; obtain new trusted facts before retrying: {}",
+            result.code()
+        )
+        .into()),
+    }
+}
+```
+
+```bash
+# Run the pinned workspace example
+cargo run -p auths-proof-offline-example
+```
+
+The example is compiled as an external consumer against the pinned crate
+artifacts. Its verification path performs no resolver, network, database,
+filesystem, clock, or private-key I/O. `Indeterminate` remains non-authorizing
+and may change only when the host supplies new trusted facts or exact support.
+
+## Crates by responsibility
+
+The following map explains why the crate groups exist without duplicating
+every package name.
+
+### Protocol model and codec
+
+These crates own validated V1 types, deterministic CBOR, domain-separated
+identifiers, canonical fixtures, and the three-input portable contract. Use
+them when implementing a profile, adapter, independent encoding tool, or
+protocol-level integration that cannot be expressed through the facade.
+
+### Pure authority semantics
+
+Authority, composition, assurance, registries, signature suites, and the
+sealed verifier remain deterministic and effect-free. They decide attenuation,
+plan satisfaction, evidence requirements, status, action binding, and stable
+results from explicit inputs.
+
+These crates must not acquire evidence, read a clock, call a provider, or own
+mutable replay state.
+
+### Authoring and custody ports
+
+Authoring produces deterministic statements and external signing requests.
+Private-key custody remains behind a separate port. This lets applications use
+HSMs, KMS products, secure enclaves, or other signers without moving key
+material into the protocol model.
+
+Authoring can create a proposed proof; it cannot decide that its own output is
+authorized.
+
+### Principal and signature adapters
+
+Principal-method adapters establish bounded control and assurance facts for
+raw keys, DIDs, SPIFFE, WebAuthn, or HSM-attested identities. Signature suites
+verify exact domain-separated signing input. Network acquisition and mutable
+lifecycle observations remain outside these pure components.
+
+### Profiles and product mechanisms
+
+Profile crates own canonical application actions, typed verified-command
+decoding, provider gateways, and effect-specific result meaning. Product
+mechanisms own stateful concerns such as atomic reservation, replay, budgets,
+receipts, custody integration, and recovery.
+
+Each profile stays vertically cohesive. Similar-looking provider workflows do
+not share a generic operation dispatcher unless multiple implemented domains
+prove an identical mechanism through differential evidence.
+
+### Exchange and transport
+
+Exchange crates frame and move bounded proof material. A transport can
+authenticate a peer or session, but successful delivery never upgrades an
+invalid proof into authorization.
+
+### Testkit and conformance
+
+Testkit crates construct canonical positive and negative cases and certify
+specific extension contracts. They are not production dependencies and cannot
+become alternate sources of protocol truth.
+
+> **Pinned reference request: rust-crate-map.**
+> Product revision: `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+> Declared sources: `Cargo.toml workspace members`, `architecture.toml`, `crate package metadata`, `public rustdoc`.
+> Requested projection: crate,public purpose,layer,facade exposure,no_std status,rustdoc link; layer and responsibility.
+> The current product snapshot does not carry a structured artifact for this table, so this Markdown projection does not invent one.
+
+## Dependency direction
+
+The monorepo is a layered collection of packages:
+
+```text
+core <- exchange <- product <- bindings
+  ^         ^           ^          ^
+  +---------+-----------+----------+--- demos
+```
+
+Dependencies point toward the offline core. A lower layer must not import a
+higher layer to obtain a convenient type. Introduce a narrow port or move the
+minimal domain type to the lowest layer that can own it without importing I/O
+or policy.
+
+For a new integration, begin with a cohesive vertical profile in the product
+layer. Extract shared mechanisms only after independent implementations prove
+that inputs, outputs, limits, errors, state, and receipt meaning are identical.
+
+## Result handling
+
+Match every `Verdict`:
+
+- `Authorized` allows progression only through the exact verified action and
+  outer runtime gates.
+- `Denied` is stable for identical inputs; correct the action or authority.
+- `Indeterminate` is non-executable; supply new trusted facts or exact support
+  before verifying again.
+
+Use the stable code and stage for machine behavior. The non-sensitive
+explanation is suitable for operator guidance, but it is not a substitute for
+the typed result.
+
+## Exhaustive API reference
+
+> **Pinned reference request: rust-public-api.**
+> Product revision: `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+> Declared sources: `cargo rustdoc JSON for auths,auths-proof,auths-sdk`, `pinned crate artifact metadata`.
+> Requested projection: items,signatures,errors,feature flags,security docs,rustdoc links; facade then module.
+> The current product snapshot does not carry a structured artifact for this table, so this Markdown projection does not invent one.
diff --git a/public/reference/schemas.md b/public/reference/schemas.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7de881e..0000000
--- a/public/reference/schemas.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Schemas
-
-Inspect canonical bounded inputs, wire artifacts, commands, receipts, and disclosure view schemas.
-
-## Orientation
-
-Schemas are versioned release facts with size and shape limits. Parsers create trusted typed values; callers cannot validate loosely and pass raw objects onward.
-
-## Generated contract anchor
-
-Generated endpoint: `auths.endpoint.authorities/1`.
-
-## Use this surface
-
-Generate clients from the selected release schema only where supported, and preserve unknown-field rejection at security boundaries.
-
-## Source at release
-
-This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.reference.schemas/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk.md b/public/reference/sdk.md
deleted file mode 100644
index fb18b2a..0000000
--- a/public/reference/sdk.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-# SDK reference
-
-Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify precise authority through Rust, TypeScript, or Python.
-
-## Install
-
-### rust
-
-```bash
-# Install the Rust SDK
-cargo add auths-sdk
-
-```
-
-### typescript
-
-```bash
-# Install the TypeScript SDK
-npm install @auths-dev/sdk
-
-```
-
-### python
-
-```bash
-# Install the Python SDK
-python -m pip install auths
-
-```
-
-
----
-
-# Create
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
-
-This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
-
-
----
-
-# Delegate
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.delegate/1`.
-
-This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
-
-
----
-
-# Execute
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.execute/1`.
-
-This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
-
-
----
-
-# Resume
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.resume/1`.
-
-This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
-
-
----
-
-# Verify
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.verify/1`.
-
-This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
-
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/python.md b/public/reference/sdk/python.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1606055..0000000
--- a/public/reference/sdk/python.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Python SDK
-
-Inspect installed Python symbols and their native operation mappings.
-
-## Orientation
-
-The Python SDK exposes typed high-level workflows while opaque native handles prevent Python code from minting effect-capable authorization.
-
-## Generated contract anchor
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
-
-## Use this surface
-
-Use the same operation and outcome identities as TypeScript; consult the support matrix for maintained Python and platform wheels.
-
-## Source at release
-
-This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.reference.sdk.python/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/rust.md b/public/reference/sdk/rust.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5361e97..0000000
--- a/public/reference/sdk/rust.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Rust SDK
-
-Inspect maintained Rust SDK symbols and their operation mappings.
-
-## Orientation
-
-Rust is the semantic owner and exposes typed authoring, delegation, execution, recovery, verification, inspection, and diagnostics surfaces.
-
-## Generated contract anchor
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
-
-## Use this surface
-
-Follow stable operation identities instead of crate module names; private implementation types are intentionally absent.
-
-## Source at release
-
-This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.reference.sdk.rust/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/create.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/create.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 93b9082..0000000
--- a/public/reference/sdk/sections/create.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-# Create
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
-
-This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
-
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/delegate.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/delegate.md
deleted file mode 100644
index dba7812..0000000
--- a/public/reference/sdk/sections/delegate.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-# Delegate
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.delegate/1`.
-
-This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
-
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/execute.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/execute.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 590e1dc..0000000
--- a/public/reference/sdk/sections/execute.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-# Execute
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.execute/1`.
-
-This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
-
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/introduction.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/introduction.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7cb29d8..0000000
--- a/public/reference/sdk/sections/introduction.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-# SDK reference
-
-Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify precise authority through Rust, TypeScript, or Python.
-
-## Install
-
-### rust
-
-```bash
-# Install the Rust SDK
-cargo add auths-sdk
-
-```
-
-### typescript
-
-```bash
-# Install the TypeScript SDK
-npm install @auths-dev/sdk
-
-```
-
-### python
-
-```bash
-# Install the Python SDK
-python -m pip install auths
-
-```
-
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/resume.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/resume.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 56655d9..0000000
--- a/public/reference/sdk/sections/resume.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-# Resume
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.resume/1`.
-
-This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
-
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/sections/verify.md b/public/reference/sdk/sections/verify.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 6094a95..0000000
--- a/public/reference/sdk/sections/verify.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-# Verify
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.verify/1`.
-
-This section is resolved from product contract `8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90`.
-
diff --git a/public/reference/sdk/typescript.md b/public/reference/sdk/typescript.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c8c2d83..0000000
--- a/public/reference/sdk/typescript.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# TypeScript SDK
-
-Inspect installed TypeScript symbols and their native operation mappings.
-
-## Orientation
-
-The TypeScript SDK exposes idiomatic typed projections over Rust-owned semantics and synchronized outcomes.
-
-## Generated contract anchor
-
-Generated operation: `auths.operation.create/1`.
-
-## Use this surface
-
-Use the integrated package first, then descend into focused entry points only when the application needs independent identity, verification, inspection, runtime, or testkit surfaces.
-
-## Source at release
-
-This page resolves its anchor from the immutable release contract. Exact signatures, endpoint fields, outcomes, package coordinates, and evidence identities are rendered from that selected release rather than copied into editorial source.
-
-_Page identity: auths.page.reference.sdk.typescript/1 · Contract digest: 8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90_
-
diff --git a/public/reference/typescript.md b/public/reference/typescript.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..70c48b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/reference/typescript.md
@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+# TypeScript SDK
+
+`@auths-dev/sdk` is one package with progressively disclosed entry points. Most
+applications begin with the root workflow plus a maintained integration and a
+closed profile. Applications that only need identity or verification can use
+those surfaces without constructing grants, approvals, runtime state, or an
+effect-capable workflow.
+
+The root deliberately does not re-export every subpath. Importing from the
+boundary you intend to use makes identity, verification, execution, extension,
+and test-only code distinguishable in both reviews and package tooling.
+
+## Pick the smallest public entry point
+
+| Entry point | Use it for | It does not do |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk` | Create, delegate, execute, resume, inspect product results, and handle product errors | Re-export the lower-level identity, verification, profile, framework, or testkit surfaces |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/identity` | Decode, resolve, validate, and authenticate method- and suite-labelled public identities | Grant authority or authorize an effect |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/verify` | Deterministic proof, decision, receipt, inspection, and disclosure verification | Call a provider or return an effect-capable execution handle |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/profiles` | Construct actions and authorities for qualified closed effect domains | Turn an arbitrary operation tag or request object into a provider call |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/integrations` | Select maintained development or production composition boundaries | Make the development composition production durable |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/framework` | Implement the narrowly supported signer and atomic-reservation contracts | Expose internal protocol machinery as an application framework |
+| `@auths-dev/sdk/testkit` | Run deterministic adapter and product-waist conformance suites | Provide production state, custody, or diagnostics |
+
+The installed-artifact reference below enumerates symbols from the packed
+package declarations and package exports. Source files outside those exports
+are not public API.
+
+### Installed TypeScript public API
+
+Source: [`bindings/typescript/api/public-api.txt`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/typescript/api/public-api.txt) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+```text
+# Installed @auths-dev/sdk public API v1
+# declaration-sha256 2f183f958f4a172c63ddb247dc35e4796301bbf72bc7004b0d39490acb21631f
+.	Actor	type
+.	approval	value
+.	ApprovalPolicy	type
+.	Authority	type
+.	Auths	type
+.	AuthsConfiguration	type
+.	AuthsError	value+type
+.	AuthsErrorCode	type
+.	Completed	type
+.	createAuths	value
+.	Denied	type
+.	doctor	value
+.	DoctorMode	type
+.	DoctorOptions	type
+.	DoctorReport	type
+.	DoctorState	type
+.	ExecutionReference	value+type
+.	ExecutionResult	type
+.	Indeterminate	type
+.	ProductionAuthority	type
+.	ProductionAuthorityResult	type
+.	ProductionAuths	type
+.	ProductionAuthsOptions	type
+.	ProductionCompleted	type
+.	ProductionDenied	type
+.	ProductionExecutionResult	type
+.	ProductionIndeterminate	type
+.	ProductionReceipt	type
+.	ProductionRecoverable	type
+.	ProductionRecoveryReference	type
+.	ProductionRejected	type
+.	ProductionTransport	type
+.	ProductionTransportRequest	type
+.	ProductionTransportResponse	type
+.	ProductionVerificationResult	type
+.	ProductionVerified	type
+.	ProductStep	type
+.	Receipt	type
+.	RecommendedAction	type
+.	RecoveryResult	type
+.	RetryClass	type
+./identity	AuthenticatedDescriptorMessage	type
+./identity	AuthenticatedIdentityMessage	type
+./identity	DecodedIdentity	type
+./identity	DecodedIdentityDescriptor	type
+./identity	DecodedSignedIdentityMessage	type
+./identity	DescriptorAuthenticationRequest	type
+./identity	DescriptorAuthenticationResult	type
+./identity	DescriptorSignatureSuiteAdapter	type
+./identity	Ed25519RawKeyAuthentication	value+type
+./identity	IdentityClient	value+type
+./identity	IdentityDescriptorInput	type
+./identity	IdentityDescriptorMethodAdapter	type
+./identity	IdentityMethodAdapter	type
+./identity	IdentityMethodMetadata	type
+./identity	IdentityMethodParse	type
+./identity	IdentityMethodRegistry	value+type
+./identity	IdentityPrincipal	type
+./identity	IdentityResolutionRequest	type
+./identity	IdentityResolutionResult	type
+./identity	loadEd25519RawKeyAuthentication	value
+./identity	loadIdentity	value
+./identity	loadRawKeyIdentityAdapter	value
+./identity	RawKeyIdentityAdapter	value+type
+./identity	ResolutionEvidence	type
+./identity	ResolvedIdentityDescriptor	type
+./identity	SignatureSuiteAdapter	type
+./identity	SignatureSuiteMetadata	type
+./identity	SignatureSuiteParse	type
+./identity	SignatureSuiteRegistry	value+type
+./identity	ValidatedIdentity	type
+./identity	ValidatedIdentityDescriptor	type
+./identity	VerificationMaterialInput	type
+./identity	VerificationRelationshipInput	type
+./verify	AuthorizedResult	type
+./verify	createReceiptDisclosure	value
+./verify	DecisionInspection	type
+./verify	decodeReceipt	value
+./verify	DeniedResult	type
+./verify	encodeReceipt	value
+./verify	Explanation	type
+./verify	ImmutableArtifactCache	value+type
+./verify	ImmutableArtifactCacheOptions	type
+./verify	IndeterminateResult	type
+./verify	inspectDecision	value
+./verify	inspectReceipt	value
+./verify	InvalidReceiptInspection	type
+./verify	loadVerifier	value
+./verify	Receipt	type
+./verify	ReceiptDisclosureMaterial	type
+./verify	ReceiptDisclosureProtector	type
+./verify	ReceiptDisclosureStore	type
+./verify	ReceiptInspectionCommitments	type
+./verify	ReceiptInspectionMetadata	type
+./verify	ReceiptInspectionProfile	type
+./verify	ReceiptInspectionResult	type
+./verify	ReceiptInspectionSigner	type
+./verify	ReceiptSummary	type
+./verify	ReceiptSummaryField	type
+./verify	ReceiptViewMode	type
+./verify	VerdictKind	type
+./verify	VerificationBatchOptions	type
+./verify	VerificationInput	type
+./verify	VerificationMetrics	type
+./verify	VerificationOptions	type
+./verify	VerificationResult	type
+./verify	VerificationStage	type
+./verify	VerifiedAction	value+type
+./verify	VerifiedDisclosedReceipt	type
+./verify	VerifiedOpaqueReceipt	type
+./verify	Verifier	value+type
+./verify	verifyReceipt	value
+./profiles	executeMcpClosed	value
+./profiles	executeMcpPlanClosed	value
+./profiles	githubIssueAddress	value
+./profiles	mcp	value
+./profiles	McpAction	value+type
+./profiles	McpAttestedReceipt	type
+./profiles	McpAuthority	type
+./profiles	McpClosedProvider	type
+./profiles	McpClosedResult	type
+./profiles	McpCommand	value+type
+./profiles	McpDevelopmentProviderOptions	type
+./profiles	McpExecutionCheckpointEvent	type
+./profiles	McpExecutionCheckpointStage	type
+./profiles	McpExecutionObserver	type
+./profiles	McpExecutionResources	type
+./profiles	McpExecutionState	type
+./profiles	McpGateway	type
+./profiles	McpGatewayCall	type
+./profiles	McpGatewayError	type
+./profiles	McpHandlerCause	type
+./profiles	McpHandlerOutcome	type
+./profiles	McpPlanClosedResult	type
+./profiles	McpProfile	value+type
+./profiles	McpProfileOptions	type
+./profiles	McpReceipt	type
+./profiles	McpReceiptSink	type
+./profiles	McpRecoveryCheckpoint	type
+./profiles	McpToolAuthority	value+type
+./profiles	McpToolContext	type
+./profiles	McpToolHandler	type
+./profiles	opentofuSavedPlanApply	value
+./profiles	postgresqlBoundedUpdate	value
+./profiles	ProductionProfile	type
+./profiles	ProductionProfileId	type
+./profiles	recoverMcpClosed	value
+./profiles	resourcesForMcpAuthority	value
+./profiles	resumeMcpClosed	value
+./integrations	development	value
+./integrations	DevelopmentAuthsOptions	type
+./integrations	production	value
+./integrations	RecoverableDevelopmentAuthsOptions	type
+./framework	AtomicReservationRecord	type
+./framework	AtomicReservationStore	type
+./framework	ControlEvidence	type
+./framework	PrincipalDescriptor	type
+./framework	ProviderFailureKind	type
+./framework	ProviderOperationError	value+type
+./framework	Signer	type
+./framework	SignerLifecycle	type
+./framework	SigningObjectKind	type
+./framework	SigningRequest	type
+./framework	SigningResponse	type
+./testkit	AtomicReservationRecord	type
+./testkit	AtomicReservationStoreCandidate	type
+./testkit	BoundedApprovalSession	value+type
+./testkit	BoundedApprovalSessionOptions	type
+./testkit	ByteTransportCandidate	type
+./testkit	ByteTransportFactory	type
+./testkit	certifyAtomicStore	value
+./testkit	certifyByteTransport	value
+./testkit	certifyMcpProvider	value
+./testkit	certifySigner	value
+./testkit	CONFORMANCE_CATALOG	value
+./testkit	ConformanceCaseResult	type
+./testkit	ConformanceMetadata	type
+./testkit	ConformanceReport	type
+./testkit	createDiagnosticVerifier	value
+./testkit	custodyConformance	value
+./testkit	CustodyConformanceCase	type
+./testkit	CustodyConformanceOptions	type
+./testkit	CustodyConformanceReport	type
+./testkit	CustodyConformanceResult	type
+./testkit	development	value
+./testkit	DiagnosticResult	type
+./testkit	DiagnosticVerifier	value+type
+./testkit	InMemoryApplicationExecutionStore	value+type
+./testkit	McpProviderFactory	type
+./testkit	productWaistConformance	value
+./testkit	ProductWaistConformanceCase	type
+./testkit	ProductWaistConformanceReport	type
+./testkit	ProductWaistExpected	type
+```
+
+## The shortest protected workflow
+
+The high-level path combines three surfaces:
+
+1. A maintained composition from `/integrations` owns the workflow resources.
+2. A qualified closed profile from `/profiles` defines the action, authority,
+   verified command, and provider boundary.
+3. The root `Auths` object delegates, executes, resumes, and closes those
+   resources.
+
+For the current repository workflow, the maintained MCP profile constructs a
+tool authority and an exact tool-call action. A closed provider exposes only
+configured tool handlers. Native authorization and durable reservation occur
+before provider entry.
+
+> Product-owned recipe `03-execute-exact-action` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
+
+### TypeScript recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
+
+Register the only provider operation and create development authority for that exact tool name.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–14; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+import { verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
+
+let calls = 0;
+const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({
+  tools: {
+    async publish_report(input) {
+      calls += 1;
+      return { published: input.report };
+    },
+  },
+});
+const auths = await development.createAuths({ authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]) });
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
+
+Send the exact profile-owned action, require completion, and verify its returned receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 15–22; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+try {
+  const completed = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "publish_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-success",
+  });
+  if (completed.kind !== "completed") throw new Error(`unexpected result: ${completed.kind}`);
+  await verifyReceipt(completed.receipt);
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
+
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter did not advance.
+
+_Pinned source lines 23–28; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  const denied = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "delete_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-denied",
+  });
+  if (denied.kind !== "denied" || calls !== 1) throw new Error("undeclared effect reached provider");
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Report the trace and close owned state
+
+Emit the declared result and close the development runtime even when the workflow throws.
+
+_Pinned source lines 29–32; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "03-execute-exact-action", outcome: completed.kind, denied: true, calls }));
+} finally {
+  await auths.close();
+}
+```
+
+## Handle closed results exhaustively
+
+Execution returns a closed union covering completed, denied, indeterminate,
+and recovery outcomes. Ordered-plan execution carries the corresponding plan
+completion or plan-recovery shape.
+
+- A completed result carries the provider result and receipt.
+- A denied or indeterminate result never means the provider was called.
+- An exact replay returns the recorded outcome without a second effect.
+- A recoverable result carries an SDK-minted opaque execution reference. Resume
+  the same execution; do not serialize an application-crafted substitute or
+  blindly invoke the provider again.
+- A conflict means the execution identity is already bound to incompatible
+  commitments or state and must stop.
+
+Use the discriminant, stable code, and typed error fields. Do not branch on
+human-readable messages.
+
+## Verification stays effect-free
+
+The `/verify` surface accepts explicit proof, canonical-action, and trusted-
+context bytes and exposes verification, receipt verification, inert
+inspection, and bounded receipt disclosure. A verifier result can tell you
+that authority was established, but it does not become the product runtime's
+sealed command.
+
+This distinction makes it safe to build auditors, gateways, offline checkers,
+and UI inspection tools without accidentally acquiring provider authority.
+Differential diagnostic tools remain under `/testkit` rather than the normal
+verification surface.
+
+## Identity can be adopted independently
+
+The `/identity` surface carries canonical method- and suite-labelled public
+identity data. Applications provide or select method and signature-suite
+adapters. Successful authentication binds exact message bytes to an identity;
+it does not create a capability, approval, grant, or execution permission.
+
+This is useful when a team wants Auths identity packets or transport-neutral
+identity exchange before adopting bounded authority.
+
+## Resource ownership
+
+The high-level object owns native sessions, signers, and other composition
+resources. Close it in a `finally` block, or use asynchronous explicit resource
+management on runtimes that support it. Delegated child sessions are separate
+owned resources and must also be closed.
+
+Development and production compositions have different guarantees. The
+development composition uses ephemeral keys and in-memory or explicitly
+development recovery state. It is not production durable. Production requires
+qualified profile integrations, durable atomic reservation, reviewed custody,
+receipt persistence and disclosure policy, and explicit reconciliation.
+
+## Runtime and publication status
+
+### TypeScript runtime contract
+
+Source: [`bindings/typescript/sdk-runtime-contract.json`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/typescript/sdk-runtime-contract.json) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+- Package: `@auths-dev/sdk` `1.0.0-rc.1`
+- Public entry points: `.`, `./identity`, `./verify`, `./profiles`, `./integrations`, `./framework`, `./testkit`
+- Required WASM exports: `authoringAbiVersionV1`, `identityAbiVersionV1`, `encodeIdentityDescriptorV1`, `decodeIdentityDescriptorV1`, `identityDescriptorSigningPreimageV1`, `verifyV1`, `verifyBatchV1`
+- Qualified profiles: `auths.mcp/1`
+- Publication: repository candidate; registry promotion is not asserted by this snapshot.
+
+Repository-local implementation evidence does not imply that a package has
+been published, promoted, or independently reviewed. Publication, promotion,
+and independent review remain separate statuses.
+
+## Extension boundary
+
+Use `/framework` only when you are implementing a supported production port.
+The current public topology names signer custody and atomic reservation as
+framework contracts. Use `/testkit` to certify candidate implementations and
+to exercise the product waist.
+
+Do not copy internal workflow classes, protocol objects, or test helpers into
+an application adapter merely because they exist in the source tree. A public
+extension contract must appear in the packed export map and public API
+snapshot.
diff --git a/public/search-index.json b/public/search-index.json
index 1c61930..d5088bd 100644
--- a/public/search-index.json
+++ b/public/search-index.json
@@ -1,1058 +1,232 @@
 {
-  "schema": "auths.docs.search-index/1",
+  "schema": "auths.docs.search-index/2",
+  "sourceCommit": "bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c",
+  "docsContractSourceCommit": "d0e4a53e5e9582e9eaff1cf38e965252c6c79765",
   "contractDigest": "8817d78d2db3c8640f227ca1237b0b53fd8d991515d5c9b2def14319a85b5b90",
-  "synonyms": {
-    "permission": [
-      "authority",
-      "authorization"
-    ],
-    "agent": [
-      "delegate",
-      "actor"
-    ],
-    "audit": [
-      "receipt",
-      "evidence"
-    ],
-    "api": [
-      "runtime",
-      "endpoint"
-    ],
-    "sdk": [
-      "rust",
-      "typescript",
-      "python"
-    ]
-  },
   "pages": [
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.home/1",
       "path": "/",
-      "title": "Auths documentation",
-      "description": "Precise, portable authority for people and agents.",
-      "section": "home"
+      "title": "Auths Docs",
+      "description": "Give software narrow authority for one exact action, execute through a closed boundary, and prove what happened.",
+      "section": "home",
+      "group": "Home",
+      "content": "Give software authority for one exact action. Auths lets people and agents prove what they may do, execute only through a closed application boundary, and leave a verifiable receipt—without requiring a shared identity provider. Prelaunch · Pre audit · Repository preview The SDK surface is public in the repository but package publication and production promotion remain prelaunch. Development adapters use ephemeral custody and in memory state. Choose what you need to accomplish. The protocol machinery stays below the fold until your implementation needs it. Execute: Perform one exact effect Declare the action, authorize it, reserve its use, and reach the provider through a closed gateway. Open path Verify: Check authority without executing Evaluate proof, canonical action, and trusted context without receiving an effect capable handle. Open path Delegate: Give an agent less authority Narrow action, time, uses, budgets, and delegation depth. A child can never widen its parent. Open path Recover: Resume without repeating the effect Preserve denial, indeterminacy, replay, recoverability, and provider uncertainty as different outcomes. Open path Identity is not authority None of these alone is authorization: identity, transport success, a valid signature, evidence, approval. Knowing who called is not the same as knowing what they may do. Proof: Signed, bounded authority and its delegation chain. Evidence: Trusted facts about identity, status, assurance, and context. Control: Deterministic verification of the exact application bytes. Execution: Stateful reservation, closed provider access, recovery, and receipts. Core verification is deterministic and effect free. Networks, clocks, databases, custody, replay state, and provider execution remain outside the kernel. Allow one tool. Prove another never reaches the provider. This source is copied from the product owned recipe at a pinned Auths commit. Qualification status is shown per language; the docs never fabricate a passing result. Product owned recipe 03 execute exact action from Auths bbeb6547de33. Declared outcome contract: completed . This projection does not synthesize example output. TypeScript recipe Source: bindings/recipes/typescript/03 execute exact action.ts at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider Register the only provider operation and create development authority for that exact tool name. Pinned source lines 1–14; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action Send the exact profile owned action, require completion, and verify its returned receipt. Pinned source lines 15–22; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry Request a different tool and prove the provider call counter did not advance. Pinned source lines 23–28; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Report the trace and close owned state Emit the declared result and close the development runtime even when the workflow throws. Pinned source lines 29–32; no output is synthesized. Python recipe Qualification blocked — Python source does not match the pinned public API. The pinned recipe imports verify receipt from auths , while the pinned installed API exports it only from auths.verify . The source is retained for review but must not be presented as runnable until the product recipe is corrected and re executed. Source: bindings/recipes/python/03 execute exact action.py at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider Register the only provider operation and count every entry into that effect boundary. Pinned source lines 1–19; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action Open the owned development session, execute the exact action, and verify its receipt. Pinned source lines 20–30; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry Request a different tool and prove the provider call counter stayed at one. Pinned source lines 31–37; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Report the trace through the owned entry point Leave the session before emitting the declared result, then run the asynchronous entry point. Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized. Begin with an outcome. Descend only when necessary. Start — Install and complete one real workflow. Guides — Understand the model, then integrate identity, authority, execution, and recovery. Examples — Choose a production shaped proof by the question it answers. Reference — Inspect the exact public surfaces and protocol material."
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents/1",
-      "path": "/agents",
-      "title": "Agents",
-      "description": "Give agents precise tools, approved plans, and verifiable outcomes without ambient credentials.",
-      "section": "agents"
+      "path": "/start",
+      "title": "Start with Auths",
+      "description": "Choose the smallest honest Auths path: understand the model, protect one exact effect, or verify authority offline.",
+      "section": "start",
+      "group": "Begin",
+      "content": "Start with one boundary you can prove Auths is for software that must do something consequential without receiving broad, reusable permission. The quickest way to understand it is to protect one exact application effect: name the operation and resource, bind the exact action bytes, verify the authority, and allow only the resulting closed command into your provider gateway. If you are new to the model, begin with What is Auths?. It explains the distinction between identity, delivery, approval, authority, and execution. Those concepts are deliberately separate: a signed request can prove who signed it without proving the signer may perform the requested effect. If you want to evaluate the SDK, choose a maintained path: TypeScript quickstart for a protected MCP style action in Node.js. Python quickstart for the same product workflow with async resource ownership. Rust offline verification when you need deterministic verification without networking, custody, mutable state, or execution authority. Each quickstart uses product owned, digest verified source and states its current qualification status. No parallel example or result is invented. Prelaunch · pre audit The public surface is a repository preview. Pin the exact product revision before evaluating it, and do not treat the development composition as production durable. Product revision: bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . What success looks like Your first integration should prove two outcomes: the declared action reaches the provider exactly once, and a changed action is denied before the provider is contacted. Do not start by modeling an entire organization. A narrow end to end boundary gives you a trustworthy base for delegation, approvals, recovery, and receipts later. Continue Learn how verification works. Follow the exact action execution guide. Inspect the examples by security question."
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.approved-plan/1",
-      "path": "/agents/approved-plans",
-      "title": "Approved plans",
-      "description": "Require human or organizational approval for the exact ordered work an agent proposes.",
-      "section": "agents"
+      "path": "/start/what-is-auths",
+      "title": "What is Auths?",
+      "description": "Learn how Auths gives software narrow authority for an exact action without turning identity, transport, or approval into permission.",
+      "section": "start",
+      "group": "Begin",
+      "content": "Give software authority for one exact action Auths is an open protocol and SDK for proof carrying, bounded machine authority . It answers a question that ordinary authentication leaves open: This caller is who it claims to be—but may it perform this exact action, against this resource, under these limits, right now? Imagine a reporting agent that may publish the weekly report but may not delete it. An identity provider can establish which agent connected. A signed request can establish that the request was not changed in transit. An approval system can establish that somebody approved a proposal. None of those facts alone proves that authority flowed from a trusted root to this agent without becoming broader along the way. Auths carries that proof with the action. A verifier checks it locally against explicit trust, status, assurance, and configuration inputs. A product runtime then applies replay protection and other stateful gates before a closed profile can construct the provider command. The useful distinction: identity is not authority Identity answers who controls this key or account? Authority answers what may that principal do? Keeping those questions separate lets an application use OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, WebAuthn, or another supported identity method without making any one identity provider the universal owner of permission. The same separation applies to transport. HTTPS, a queue, or Iroh may carry an Auths proof. Successful delivery does not improve the proof and cannot turn a denial into authorization. Four planes, one enforcement boundary Auths separates responsibilities that are often collapsed into a single middleware decision: Plane What it establishes What it cannot do alone Proof Trust anchors, grants, plans, and exact action binding Read live systems or execute an effect Evidence Principal control, signatures, status, freshness, assurance Mint authority or commands Execution Replay, budgets, local policy, reservation, provider execution Upgrade a denied or indeterminate proof Control Authoring, custody, configuration, receipts, observability Bypass the proof or execution boundary This is not ceremony. It prevents a convenient outer fact—such as a valid JWT or successful mTLS handshake—from silently becoming permission. From hostile bytes to a verified action The offline kernel moves through typed stages: It accepts exactly three language neutral inputs: proof bytes, canonical action bytes, and a trusted verifier context. It performs no networking, filesystem access, clock reads, database writes, private key operations, or provider calls. Every changing fact—including evaluation time and accepted adapters—is an explicit input. An authorized result is still not permission to call an arbitrary URL. The runtime must claim replay and budget state, apply local policy, and pass the verified action into a closed profile. The profile, not the untrusted request, constructs the provider command. What fails closed Auths distinguishes three proof outcomes: Authorized: the proof and exact action satisfy all required facts. Denied: available facts establish that the request is invalid or outside authority. Indeterminate: a required trustworthy fact could not be established. Only the first outcome may proceed to the outer execution gates. A missing status record does not become a soft success. A valid signature over different bytes does not become “close enough.” An unknown adapter, unsupported profile, oversized proof, widened delegation, or mismatched verifier configuration cannot reach a provider. What Auths deliberately does not own Auths does not replace your identity provider, transport, database, KMS, policy engine, or cloud API. It composes with them. It also does not claim remote exactly once execution, instantaneous revocation, or atomicity across a local database and a remote provider. The development SDK composition uses ephemeral keys and in memory state. It is for learning and local integration, not production durability. Auths is currently prelaunch and pre audit ; repository conformance and formal evidence are not an independent security review. Choose your first path To protect one real application operation, start with the TypeScript quickstart or Python quickstart. To evaluate proofs without execution, use Rust offline verification or Verify existing authority. To understand the protocol model first, read Authority and Verification."
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.delegation/1",
-      "path": "/agents/delegation",
-      "title": "Agent delegation",
-      "description": "Delegate an exact tool action without giving the agent a broad credential.",
-      "section": "agents"
+      "path": "/start/typescript",
+      "title": "TypeScript quickstart",
+      "description": "Protect one MCP tool, execute the allowed action, and prove an undeclared action never reaches your provider.",
+      "section": "start",
+      "group": "Quickstarts",
+      "content": "Protect one exact action in TypeScript In this quickstart you will place a small provider function behind Auths. The application will execute an allowed publish report action, verify the receipt, then attempt delete report . The second operation must be denied before the provider is entered. The example uses the development composition and the currently qualified public profile, auths.mcp/1 . It is a local learning path, not a production deployment template. Before you run it The intended public package and install command are: The package includes its WebAssembly implementation; the consumer does not need a Rust toolchain. Publication is currently blocked , so treat this page as a repository preview until the package capability record says otherwise. Until then, run the embedded recipe through the pinned product repository rather than assuming the registry command will resolve. The example deliberately imports from /verify , /integrations , and /profiles . The package root does not flatten those boundaries. Run the maintained recipe The block below comes from the Auths product repository. Its expected outcome is declared by the product recipe manifest. Product owned recipe 03 execute exact action from Auths bbeb6547de33. Declared outcome contract: completed . This projection does not synthesize example output. TypeScript recipe Source: bindings/recipes/typescript/03 execute exact action.ts at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider Register the only provider operation and create development authority for that exact tool name. Pinned source lines 1–14; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action Send the exact profile owned action, require completion, and verify its returned receipt. Pinned source lines 15–22; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry Request a different tool and prove the provider call counter did not advance. Pinned source lines 23–28; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Report the trace and close owned state Emit the declared result and close the development runtime even when the workflow throws. Pinned source lines 29–32; no output is synthesized. Read the outcome as an enforcement trace The important result is not merely that the first call completed. The recipe also counts provider entries. After one allowed action and one undeclared action, the count remains one. That establishes the useful boundary: 1. mcp.allowTools defines the local development authority. 2. mcp.callTool creates the profile owned action shape. 3. auths.execute verifies and reserves that exact action. 4. The MCP profile decodes the verified action into a closed command. 5. Only then can the named provider handler run. The denied action does not invoke a fallback handler, reach a generic HTTP client, or depend on the provider to reject it. Change something that matters After the unmodified recipe succeeds, add the undeclared tool to the provider's tool map but not to the authority. Run it again. The result should remain denied and the new handler must not run. Provider availability is not authority. Then change the arguments of the allowed action while keeping a previously authorized proof or execution reference. Exact action binding should prevent the changed bytes from inheriting the earlier decision. Stop if an undeclared handler is entered. That is an enforcement failure, not an acceptable example difference. Development versus production The development composition owns ephemeral signing keys and in memory replay state. Restarting it discards state. A production integration must provide: durable atomic reservation across its deployment scope; non exporting signer custody; a qualified closed profile and gateway; credential acquisition after authorization and reservation; reconciliation for ambiguous provider outcomes; and durable receipt retention with deliberate disclosure controls. Do not put a provider credential in the untrusted action or expose a generic provider callback as the production effect boundary. Continue Understand exact execution Delegate narrower authority to an agent Plan a production integration Inspect the TypeScript SDK reference"
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.how-it-works/1",
-      "path": "/agents/how-auths-works",
-      "title": "How Auths works for agents",
-      "description": "Separate proposing, approving, authorizing, executing, observing, and verifying.",
-      "section": "agents"
+      "path": "/start/python",
+      "title": "Python quickstart",
+      "description": "Execute one allowed MCP action inside an owned Python session and observe denial before a second provider call.",
+      "section": "start",
+      "group": "Quickstarts",
+      "content": "Protect one exact action in Python This path proves two things in one run: an allowed action can reach your Python handler, and an undeclared action cannot. The maintained recipe also verifies the completed receipt before the SDK session closes. Install the wheel The intended public wheel name and install command are: Published wheels include the native implementation, so consumers do not need a Rust compiler. Publication is currently blocked , so this is a repository preview, not a claim that the command resolves from the public index today. Run the embedded recipe against the pinned product repository until the capability record promotes the wheel. The prelaunch repository remains the authority for runtime and publication status. Run the product owned workflow Product owned recipe 03 execute exact action from Auths bbeb6547de33. Declared outcome contract: completed . This projection does not synthesize example output. Python recipe Qualification blocked — Python source does not match the pinned public API. The pinned recipe imports verify receipt from auths , while the pinned installed API exports it only from auths.verify . The source is retained for review but must not be presented as runnable until the product recipe is corrected and re executed. Source: bindings/recipes/python/03 execute exact action.py at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider Register the only provider operation and count every entry into that effect boundary. Pinned source lines 1–19; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action Open the owned development session, execute the exact action, and verify its receipt. Pinned source lines 20–30; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry Request a different tool and prove the provider call counter stayed at one. Pinned source lines 31–37; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Report the trace through the owned entry point Leave the session before emitting the declared result, then run the asynchronous entry point. Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized. The example is asynchronous because provider work is asynchronous. It uses async with so the session owns and closes its native resources, signers, and development state. Applications that cannot use a context manager may close the session explicitly, but should not leave ownership implicit. What the provider call count proves The first action names the declared publish report tool and completes. The second names delete report , which is outside the configured authority. At the end, the provider call count is still one. This is stronger than checking for a denied label after the fact. It proves the denial occurred on the safe side of the effect boundary. The provider did not need to inspect an Auths object, reverse an operation, or compensate for an unauthorized call. Try the safe failure path Keep the provider handler registered and remove the corresponding tool from the authority. The handler must become unreachable through this Auths session. Restoring only the handler must not restore authority; restoring the authority is a separate, explicit change. Do not treat a thrown provider exception as an authorization denial. A provider exception happens after an action was allowed to enter the effect boundary. The SDK result and recovery metadata must be used to determine whether retry is safe. Know what this example does not prove The development composition uses ephemeral custody and in memory state. It does not prove that two Python processes coordinate replay, that keys are protected by an HSM or KMS, or that a remote provider effect is exactly once. Before production, replace development mechanisms with durable atomic state and real custody, choose a qualified profile, keep credentials behind its gateway, and define reconciliation for “the provider may have applied it, but the response was lost.” Auths is prelaunch and pre audit. A repository recipe passing is useful integration evidence, not an external security endorsement. Where to go next Execute one exact action explains the closed gateway in detail. Replay and recovery explains when not to retry. Production integration turns the demo boundary into a deployment checklist. Python SDK reference lists the installed public modules."
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.identity/1",
-      "path": "/agents/identity",
-      "title": "Agent identity",
-      "description": "Compose agent, workload, user, or application identity without choosing a mandatory identity provider.",
-      "section": "agents"
+      "path": "/start/rust-offline-verification",
+      "title": "Rust offline verification",
+      "description": "Verify proof, action, and trusted-context bytes without networking, mutable state, custody, or execution.",
+      "section": "start",
+      "group": "Quickstarts",
+      "content": "Verify authority without gaining an execution capability The Rust starting path is deliberately lower level than the TypeScript and Python product SDKs. It shows the portable, effect free verifier boundary—not a stateful provider workflow. Use this path when you are building a verifier, audit tool, gateway pre check, offline policy process, or independent implementation and you already have the three canonical inputs. Run the external consumer example Run the maintained external consumer example directly from the pinned product revision. The source below is verified against its recorded digest. Product owned external consumer example from demos/offline verification . Source revision: bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . No output is synthesized by the documentation projection. Source: demos/offline verification/src/main.rs at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Load the verifier and canonical inputs Import the verifier ports and embed the proof, action, and trusted context fixture bytes. Pinned source lines 1–7; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Build the verifier owned context Register accepted adapters and bind the exact executable configuration and required plan outside the proof. Pinned source lines 9–24; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Verify without executing Run the offline kernel and project bounded diagnostic and work information from the result. Pinned source lines 26–37; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Inspect portable commitments Read proof, action, context, and configuration commitments without acquiring any execution capability. Pinned source lines 38–47; no output is synthesized. Step 5: Handle every verdict fail closed Continue only for authorized results that satisfy the host required plan; denied and indeterminate both stop. Pinned source lines 49–63; no output is synthesized. The consumer supplies: 1. encoded proof bundle bytes; 2. canonical action bytes; and 3. trusted context bytes owned by the verifier. The context is not a bag of defaults. It binds local trust anchors, evaluation time, expected audience and challenge, accepted registries, status and assurance policy, limits, and the exact executable verifier configuration. The proof cannot add a trust root or weaken those requirements. Handle every verdict Verification produces one of three outcomes: Authorized means the proof covers the exact canonical action under the supplied context. Denied means available facts establish invalidity or insufficient authority. Indeterminate means a required trustworthy fact was not supplied or a required capability is unavailable. Both non authorized outcomes are non executable. Do not turn indeterminate into “allow with warning,” and do not catch a decode failure and retry with a permissive parser. The result also carries a stable stage and reason code, canonical commitments, authorized branches, assurance results, and bounded resource/work totals. Log only the projection your threat model permits; proof and application bytes may be sensitive. Mutation is a different action Change one byte of the canonical action and verify again. The prior result must not authorize the changed bytes. Depending on where the mutation lands, the new input will either fail bounded canonical parsing or reach action binding and fail the exact digest comparison. This check is safe to repeat because verification performs no external effect. It does not claim replay state, consume a budget, write a receipt, or contact a provider. Where offline verification stops An authorized verifier result is evidence for an outer runtime; it is not a remote command. Production execution still requires channel policy, atomic replay and budget claims, application policy, a closed profile projection, a decision receipt, and an execution receipt. If your service needs to perform an effect, do not bolt a generic HTTP request onto this example. Use the product SDK and a qualified profile, or author and qualify a new domain specific profile. Continue Verification model Verify existing authority from TypeScript or Python Authority model Protocol limits and identifiers"
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp/1",
-      "path": "/agents/mcp",
-      "title": "MCP",
-      "description": "Use MCP as a tool discovery and delivery layer while Auths remains the authority boundary.",
-      "section": "agents"
+      "path": "/guides",
+      "title": "Guides",
+      "description": "Build Auths workflows by outcome, from identity authentication and offline verification to closed execution, recovery, and adapters.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "group": "Authority boundaries",
+      "content": "Build a trustworthy path one boundary at a time These guides are organized around outcomes, not crate names or internal machinery. Start with the boundary you need to establish today, then add sophistication only when the application requires it. Establish the authority boundary Use Authenticate identity without granting authority when you only need to exchange or verify public identity material. Use Verify existing authority when another system will execute the effect. Use Execute one exact action when Auths must stand in front of the provider gateway. Give software narrower autonomy Delegate narrower authority to an agent shows how a child receives less than its parent. Approvals and ordered plans adds transaction bound human or organizational consent without turning an approval into a reusable permission flag. Operate without guessing Replay, recovery, and provider uncertainty distinguishes safe retries from ambiguous remote outcomes. Receipts and bounded disclosure explains how to prove what happened without publishing sensitive operational detail. Build a production integration replaces development custody and state with durable mechanisms. Extend at a narrow port Build and qualify an adapter is for teams integrating another identity method, signer, transport, status source, state store, or provider. Adapters establish facts or perform bounded work; they do not redefine Auths semantics. Outcome Safe boundary Denied Provider was not reached Indeterminate Required trustworthy facts were unavailable; provider was not reached Recoverable Resume only through the original execution reference Provider unknown Reconcile; never blindly retry"
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp-client/1",
-      "path": "/agents/mcp/client",
-      "title": "MCP client",
-      "description": "Attach bounded authority to an MCP tool call from an agent client.",
-      "section": "agents"
+      "path": "/guides/authenticate-identity",
+      "title": "Authenticate identity without granting authority",
+      "description": "Exchange and authenticate bounded public identity data while keeping capabilities, approvals, and execution out of the path.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "group": "Authority boundaries",
+      "content": "Authenticate a message, not an effect Use Auths identity components when you need to answer a narrow question: which supported public identity authenticated these exact application bytes? You do not need to create a grant, capability, approval policy, provider gateway, or runtime session. This separation matters for applications that want Auths' algorithm and transport neutral identity boundary but do not need proof carrying authority. Follow the bounded identity path The maintained recipe creates a method and suite labelled public identity, binds a message to that identity's signing preimage, authenticates the signed message, and proves that changed application bytes are rejected. Product owned recipe 01 authenticate identity from Auths bbeb6547de33. Declared outcome contract: authenticated . This projection does not synthesize example output. TypeScript recipe Source: bindings/recipes/typescript/01 authenticate identity.ts at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Load the identity adapters Import the identity registry, raw key method, and Ed25519 authentication suite used by this maintained recipe. Pinned source lines 1–5; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Exchange bounded public identity bytes Generate a key, encode only its public material, then parse the received packet through the selected method. Pinned source lines 7–13; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Authenticate the exact message Sign the identity owned preimage and authenticate the encoded message against the received identity. Pinned source lines 14–27; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Reject changed application bytes Reuse the signature with different message bytes and require the authentication attempt to fail closed. Pinned source lines 28–39; no output is synthesized. Step 5: Report the asserted outcome The recipe emits only its declared authentication result and mutation check. Pinned source lines 40; no output is synthesized. Python recipe Source: bindings/recipes/python/01 authenticate identity.py at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Load the identity adapters Import the identity registry, verification types, and development only method and signature suite. Pinned source lines 1–13; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Encode the verification relationship Construct the bounded public verification relationship and encode it into an identity packet. Pinned source lines 16–27; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Validate and authenticate Resolve the packet through the explicit registry and authenticate the exact report publishing bytes. Pinned source lines 28–35; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Reject changed application bytes Authenticate different bytes and require the development suite to reject the changed signature. Pinned source lines 36–44; no output is synthesized. Step 5: Report the asserted outcome Emit the declared result, then run the owned asynchronous entry point. Pinned source lines 45–57; no output is synthesized. The TypeScript and Python recipes intentionally use different development adapters. The public contract remains the same: 1. Decode bounded public identity bytes. 2. Select an exact identity method and signature suite implementation. 3. Validate the identity through that registry. 4. Authenticate a signature over the exact application bytes. 5. Return an authenticated identity value—or reject. An adapter may establish principal control. It cannot create an Auths grant, return an authorization verdict, or manufacture an executable command. Transport remains a courier You may send the identity packet over HTTPS, Iroh, a queue, or another bounded transport. The receiver must still decode and authenticate the packet. A mutually authenticated channel may add a useful local fact, but delivery success and channel authentication do not become authority. Treat received bytes as hostile until they pass limits and parsing. Do not let a transport adapter silently choose a different identity method, signature suite, or relationship when the labelled one is unavailable. Decide what authentication means in your application After successful authentication, the application knows that the selected identity relationship authenticated the exact bytes. It must still decide what that identity may do. For example, a message authenticated as report agent can be displayed, audited, or mapped to local context without being allowed to publish a report. If the application needs portable delegated authority, pass the established identity facts into the proof workflow rather than converting authentication into a boolean isAllowed flag. Failure behavior Reject before returning an authenticated value when: the packet or signed message exceeds configured bounds; the identity method or signature suite is unavailable; the labelled suite is incompatible with the verification material; the relationship does not permit authentication; the signature is invalid; or the application bytes differ from the signed bytes. None of these failures may enter a provider. Retrying unchanged invalid bytes is not useful. A temporarily unavailable resolver or remote evidence source may be retried under the application's explicit timeout and backoff policy, but only before treating the identity as authenticated. Production considerations The recipes use development material. Production applications must choose maintained adapters, cap acquisition work and response size, pin accepted methods and suites, establish freshness and status policy, and protect any private signing operation with appropriate custody. Identity evidence may contain organizational or device information. Avoid logging raw packets and signatures when a bounded identity descriptor or commitment is sufficient. Next steps Verify existing authority Delegate to an agent Build and qualify an adapter Identity reference"
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.protect-mcp-server/1",
-      "path": "/agents/mcp/protect-server",
-      "title": "Protect an MCP server",
-      "description": "Protect an MCP server tool with native verification, durable reservation, and a closed provider gateway.",
-      "section": "agents"
+      "path": "/guides/verify-authority",
+      "title": "Verify existing authority",
+      "description": "Verify proof, canonical action, and trusted-context bytes deterministically without receiving a command or execution capability.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "group": "Authority boundaries",
+      "content": "Ask Auths for a decision without executing anything Verification is the safest integration surface when another system already creates the proof and action. You supply three bounded byte strings and receive an inert result. The verifier does not read a clock, fetch a key, contact a provider, claim replay state, or write a receipt. Supply all three inputs explicitly Input Owner Why it is separate Proof bundle Prover or transport Carries grants, signed actions, plans, evidence, and references Canonical action Application profile Defines the exact effect meaning being checked Trusted context Verifier Defines local roots, time, accepted adapters, status, assurance, obligations, and limits The proof cannot smuggle a new root into the context or select a more permissive executable adapter configuration. Run the portable recipe Product owned recipe 02 verify authority from Auths bbeb6547de33. Declared outcome contract: authorized . This projection does not synthesize example output. TypeScript recipe Source: bindings/recipes/typescript/02 verify authority.ts at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Prepare the verifier Load the fixture reader and the effect free verifier entry point. Pinned source lines 1–5; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Load all three canonical inputs Read proof, action, and trusted context bytes independently; none is inferred from another. Pinned source lines 6–10; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Require an authorized verdict Verify the exact tuple and stop unless the result is explicitly authorized. Pinned source lines 11–13; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Prove changed bytes do not inherit authority Flip one action byte, accept either bounded parse rejection or a non authorized verdict, and assert fail closed behavior. Pinned source lines 14–23; no output is synthesized. Python recipe Source: bindings/recipes/python/02 verify authority.py at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Prepare the verifier Load the filesystem inputs and the effect free Python verifier. Pinned source lines 1–8; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Load all three canonical inputs Read proof, action, and trusted context bytes from the maintained fixture. Pinned source lines 10–13; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Require an authorized verdict Verify the exact tuple and stop unless the result is explicitly authorized. Pinned source lines 14–16; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Prove changed bytes do not inherit authority Mutate the action, require rejection, and emit only the recipe's declared verdict and mutation result. Pinned source lines 17–33; no output is synthesized. The recipe first verifies the canonical fixture and requires an authorized result. It then changes one byte of the action and requires rejection. The changed action never inherits the earlier decision just because most of its bytes are identical. Use the three way result correctly An authorized result means that the proof covers the exact action under the exact context. A denied result means supplied facts establish a failure, such as widened delegation or an action body mismatch. An indeterminate result means a required trustworthy fact was not established, such as missing status or an unsupported adapter. Denied and indeterminate are different diagnostic states but have the same execution consequence: do not execute . Do not translate indeterminate to success because an external dependency is temporarily unavailable. Instead, acquire the missing bounded fact, construct a new trusted context, and run verification again. Keep inspection inert The language bindings expose decisions and safe projections, not a serializable VerifiedAction that arbitrary application code can mint or replay. This makes verification useful in browsers, audit tools, policy previews, and separate verification services without accidentally handing them an effect capable object. If the application later needs to execute, pass the original inputs through a product workflow that owns replay, budgets, local policy, profile decoding, and provider entry. Do not treat result.kind === \"authorized\" as a license to execute an unverified request object. Retry and provider reachability Pure verification is safe to repeat with identical inputs. It cannot reach a provider and has no remote side effect. Repeating it does not, however, refresh the facts inside the trusted context. A stale status snapshot remains stale until the application explicitly supplies a newer one. Malformed, non canonical, unsupported, and oversized inputs fail closed with a typed outcome or input error. Do not fall back to a looser decoder. Production considerations Pin the SDK artifact and ABI, construct contexts through maintained typed builders, and bind the expected executable registry configuration. Set limits below protocol hard maxima where your deployment can. Obtain live identity or status evidence outside the deterministic kernel, then include bounded, provenance aware snapshots as explicit inputs. Keep proof bytes, signatures, and application bodies out of ordinary logs. Stable stage/code values and commitments are usually sufficient for observability. Continue Understand the verification stages Execute one exact action Handle decisions and recovery Verification model"
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp.profiles/1",
-      "path": "/agents/mcp/tool-profiles",
-      "title": "Tool profiles",
-      "description": "Define canonical action, resource, argument, budget, and receipt mappings for MCP tools.",
-      "section": "agents"
+      "path": "/guides/execute-exact-action",
+      "title": "Execute one exact action",
+      "description": "Put an application effect behind a closed profile so only the verifier-authorized command can enter the provider gateway.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "group": "Authority boundaries",
+      "content": "Move from an authorized action to one controlled effect The central Auths product workflow is not “check a policy, then run the original request.” The original request is untrusted. Auths verifies canonical action bytes, creates an opaque native owned command, reserves execution state, and lets a closed profile derive the provider operation from that command. See the complete boundary Product owned recipe 03 execute exact action from Auths bbeb6547de33. Declared outcome contract: completed . This projection does not synthesize example output. TypeScript recipe Source: bindings/recipes/typescript/03 execute exact action.ts at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider Register the only provider operation and create development authority for that exact tool name. Pinned source lines 1–14; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action Send the exact profile owned action, require completion, and verify its returned receipt. Pinned source lines 15–22; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry Request a different tool and prove the provider call counter did not advance. Pinned source lines 23–28; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Report the trace and close owned state Emit the declared result and close the development runtime even when the workflow throws. Pinned source lines 29–32; no output is synthesized. Python recipe Qualification blocked — Python source does not match the pinned public API. The pinned recipe imports verify receipt from auths , while the pinned installed API exports it only from auths.verify . The source is retained for review but must not be presented as runnable until the product recipe is corrected and re executed. Source: bindings/recipes/python/03 execute exact action.py at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider Register the only provider operation and count every entry into that effect boundary. Pinned source lines 1–19; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action Open the owned development session, execute the exact action, and verify its receipt. Pinned source lines 20–30; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry Request a different tool and prove the provider call counter stayed at one. Pinned source lines 31–37; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Report the trace through the owned entry point Leave the session before emitting the declared result, then run the asynchronous entry point. Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized. The recipe is intentionally small, but it tests both sides of the boundary. An allowed MCP tool completes and yields a receipt. An undeclared tool is denied, and the provider call counter proves the handler was not entered. Follow the order that protects the effect Changing this order changes the security claim. In particular, provider credentials should not be acquired before authorization and durable reservation, and provider input should not be reconstructed from the original JSON after verification. What a closed profile owns A profile is an exact action contract for one coherent effect domain. It owns: canonical action bytes and hard bounds; the permission and resource vocabulary; decoding from verified action to an opaque command; provider request construction; credential timing and least privilege scope; outcome classification and reconciliation; and receipt claims specific to that effect. The current public SDK workflow qualifies auths.mcp/1 . A demo that calls a cloud, payment, database, or infrastructure provider is not automatically a qualified generic profile. Denial happens before provider entry If the permission, resource, body commitment, audience, challenge, validity, status, assurance, delegation chain, or local policy fails, no command is available to the gateway. The provider is not a second authorization layer that Auths relies on to catch mistakes. Indeterminate results also stop before provider entry. Supply the missing trustworthy fact and begin a new attempt; never treat temporary uncertainty as permission. Separate provider failure from authorization failure Once the gateway begins the remote effect, a timeout or connection failure is not a denial. The provider might have applied the operation even if the caller did not receive the response. The runtime must retain that uncertainty and require profile specific reconciliation. Blind retry is safe only when the recorded outcome says no effect could have occurred. Otherwise resume the same execution identity and reconcile it. Production checklist Before this boundary protects a real effect: substitute durable atomic state for in memory development state; use non exporting production custody; pin the SDK, runtime contract, profile, and adapter versions; keep provider credentials and endpoints out of public action payloads; prove request equality at the gateway boundary; test crash points before and after provider delivery; retain decision, execution, and reconciliation evidence; and emit redacted telemetry that distinguishes authorization from execution. Auths does not make a remote provider transactional with your local store. It makes that gap explicit and recoverable. Continue Delegate the same authority more narrowly Handle replay and provider uncertainty Understand receipts and disclosure Build a production integration"
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.mcp.transport/1",
-      "path": "/agents/mcp/transport-boundary",
-      "title": "Transport boundary",
-      "description": "Keep MCP, HTTPS, Iroh, queues, and local calls independent from authorization.",
-      "section": "agents"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.multi-agent/1",
-      "path": "/agents/multi-agent",
-      "title": "Multi-agent handoffs",
-      "description": "Pass work across multiple agents while narrowing authority at every boundary.",
-      "section": "agents"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.production/1",
-      "path": "/agents/production-patterns",
-      "title": "Production patterns",
-      "description": "Operate agent authority with explicit owners for identity, issuance, approval, state, custody, gateways, and reconciliation.",
-      "section": "agents"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.delegate-one-tool/1",
-      "path": "/agents/quickstart",
-      "title": "Delegate one tool",
-      "description": "Delegate exactly one tool use to an agent and prove a second tool remains prohibited.",
-      "section": "agents"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.skills/1",
-      "path": "/agents/skills-and-plugins",
-      "title": "Skills and plugins",
-      "description": "Package Auths-aware skills and plugins without embedding semantic meaning or secrets in prompts.",
-      "section": "agents"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.agents.testing/1",
-      "path": "/agents/testing",
-      "title": "Test agent authority",
-      "description": "Test agents against widening, substitution, replay, ambient credentials, and uncertain providers.",
-      "section": "agents"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.evidence/1",
-      "path": "/assurance",
-      "title": "Assurance",
-      "description": "Inspect what Auths claims, the exact evidence behind it, and the limits that remain.",
-      "section": "assurance"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.adversarial/1",
-      "path": "/assurance/adversarial",
-      "title": "Adversarial",
-      "description": "Inspect substitution, widening, replay, mutation, and fail-closed evidence.",
-      "section": "assurance"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.authority/1",
-      "path": "/assurance/authority",
-      "title": "Authority",
-      "description": "Inspect attenuation and approval-binding evidence for bounded authority.",
-      "section": "assurance"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.cross-language/1",
-      "path": "/assurance/cross-language",
-      "title": "Cross-language",
-      "description": "Compare maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python outcomes for identical scenarios.",
-      "section": "assurance"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.disclosure/1",
-      "path": "/assurance/disclosure",
-      "title": "Disclosure",
-      "description": "Inspect evidence that receipt views are bounded and authority-controlled.",
-      "section": "assurance"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.execution/1",
-      "path": "/assurance/execution",
-      "title": "Execution",
-      "description": "Inspect the native closed-gateway boundary protecting provider effects.",
-      "section": "assurance"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.formal/1",
-      "path": "/assurance/formal",
-      "title": "Formal",
-      "description": "Understand where formal attenuation evidence applies and where it does not.",
-      "section": "assurance"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.limitations/1",
-      "path": "/assurance/limitations",
-      "title": "Limitations",
-      "description": "Read the boundaries that Auths evidence deliberately does not claim to cross.",
-      "section": "assurance"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.semantics/1",
-      "path": "/assurance/semantics",
-      "title": "Semantics",
-      "description": "Trace cross-language behavior back to one Rust-owned semantic source.",
-      "section": "assurance"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.assurance.supply-chain/1",
-      "path": "/assurance/supply-chain",
-      "title": "Supply chain",
-      "description": "Inspect the recorded SLSA builder assessment without mistaking it for an independent audit.",
-      "section": "assurance"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority/1",
-      "path": "/authority",
-      "title": "Authority",
-      "description": "Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify exact authority with progressively deeper controls.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.constraints/1",
-      "path": "/authority/constraints",
-      "title": "Constraints",
-      "description": "Control action, resource, time, use, budget, depth, audience, and critical extensions.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.create/1",
-      "path": "/authority/create",
-      "title": "Create",
-      "description": "Create one bounded authority artifact from parsed application intent.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.delegate/1",
-      "path": "/authority/delegate",
-      "title": "Delegate",
-      "description": "Pass a strictly narrower subset of authority to another person, workload, or agent.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.delegate.depth/1",
-      "path": "/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain",
-      "title": "Depth and chain",
-      "description": "Reason about delegation depth and the complete signed chain.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.delegate.widening/1",
-      "path": "/authority/delegate/widening-failures",
-      "title": "Widening failures",
-      "description": "Exercise every way a child might attempt to gain power its parent did not pass down.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.architecture.trust-boundaries/1",
-      "path": "/authority/execute",
-      "title": "Execute",
-      "description": "Execute a sealed command through a closed gateway that alone can reach provider credentials.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle/1",
-      "path": "/authority/lifecycle",
-      "title": "Lifecycle",
-      "description": "Track when authority is valid, revoked, consumed, replayed, exhausted, or over budget.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.budgets/1",
-      "path": "/authority/lifecycle/budgets",
-      "title": "Budgets",
-      "description": "Reserve and consume numeric or profile-defined budgets with the same atomic boundary as uses.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.revocation/1",
-      "path": "/authority/lifecycle/revocation-and-status",
-      "title": "Revocation and status",
-      "description": "Apply issuer-owned status without pretending it is an offline cryptographic fact.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.replay/1",
-      "path": "/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay",
-      "title": "Uses and replay",
-      "description": "Consume bounded uses atomically and reject exact replay.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.lifecycle.validity/1",
-      "path": "/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry",
-      "title": "Validity and expiry",
-      "description": "Evaluate not-before and expiry bounds at an explicit observation time.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.concepts.tour/1",
-      "path": "/authority/model",
+      "path": "/guides/authority-model",
       "title": "Authority model",
-      "description": "Understand proof-carrying, bounded authority before choosing advanced controls.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.plans/1",
-      "path": "/authority/plans",
-      "title": "Plans",
-      "description": "Commit multiple ordered operations as one reviewable plan.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.approval-plans/1",
-      "path": "/authority/plans/approvals",
-      "title": "Transaction-bound approvals",
-      "description": "Bind one or more approvals to the exact bytes and order of a plan.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.profiles/1",
-      "path": "/authority/profiles",
-      "title": "Profiles",
-      "description": "Map application actions, resources, inputs, budgets, commands, and receipts without coupling adjacent components.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.receipts/1",
-      "path": "/authority/receipts",
-      "title": "Receipts",
-      "description": "Use signed decision and execution receipts as portable integrity evidence.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.receipts-disclosure/1",
-      "path": "/authority/receipts/disclosure",
-      "title": "Bounded disclosure",
-      "description": "Reveal an opaque, summary, or full receipt view only when disclosure authority permits it.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.resume/1",
-      "path": "/authority/resume",
-      "title": "Resume",
-      "description": "Continue an existing execution from its opaque reference without repeating a possibly completed effect.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.authority.verify/1",
-      "path": "/authority/verify",
-      "title": "Verify",
-      "description": "Verify authority, decisions, or receipts without acquiring an effect-capable execution handle.",
-      "section": "authority"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers/1",
-      "path": "/developers",
-      "title": "Developers",
-      "description": "Choose an SDK, call the runtime, use the CLI, test failures, compose adjacent systems, and build application profiles.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.cli/1",
-      "path": "/developers/cli",
-      "title": "CLI",
-      "description": "Choose supported terminal workflows without mistaking repository tooling for a public product CLI.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.errors/1",
-      "path": "/developers/errors",
-      "title": "Outcomes and errors",
-      "description": "Handle the complete closed outcome and error surface without collapsing uncertainty into exceptions or booleans.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.examples/1",
-      "path": "/developers/examples",
-      "title": "Examples",
-      "description": "Find complete examples by outcome, boundary, and deployment maturity.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.extensions/1",
-      "path": "/developers/extension-kits",
-      "title": "Extension kits",
-      "description": "Implement identity, suite, trust, status, approval, custody, state, transport, gateway, or profile ports.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.composition/1",
-      "path": "/developers/integrations",
-      "title": "Integrations",
-      "description": "Compose Auths with identity, policy, cloud, transport, and capability systems through explicit ports.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.capabilities/1",
-      "path": "/developers/integrations/capabilities",
-      "title": "Capabilities",
-      "description": "Import or compose UCAN, Biscuit, macaroons, or another capability result without conflating semantics.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.cloud/1",
-      "path": "/developers/integrations/cloud-iam",
-      "title": "Cloud IAM",
-      "description": "Acquire short-lived cloud credentials only inside a closed gateway after Auths authorization.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.identity-trust/1",
-      "path": "/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust",
-      "title": "Identity and trust",
-      "description": "Compose raw keys, OIDC, SPIFFE, or application identity resolvers.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.policy/1",
-      "path": "/developers/integrations/policy",
-      "title": "Policy",
-      "description": "Use Cedar, OPA, or relationship-based authorization as explicit policy context.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.profile-kit/1",
-      "path": "/developers/integrations/profile-kit",
-      "title": "Profile kit",
-      "description": "Build an application-owned profile for actions, resources, commands, budgets, and safe receipt fields.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.integrations.transport/1",
-      "path": "/developers/integrations/transport",
-      "title": "Transport",
-      "description": "Carry bounded Auths bytes over HTTPS, Iroh, queues, files, or application transports.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.quickstarts/1",
-      "path": "/developers/quickstarts",
-      "title": "Quickstarts",
-      "description": "Choose a qualified installed-artifact project and continue in Get started.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.releases/1",
-      "path": "/developers/releases",
-      "title": "Releases",
-      "description": "Inspect release notes, package support, contracts, evidence, and known limitations for one Auths release.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.runtime-api/1",
-      "path": "/developers/runtime-api",
-      "title": "Runtime API",
-      "description": "Call the production HTTPS runtime from any language or service boundary.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks/1",
-      "path": "/developers/sdks",
-      "title": "SDKs",
-      "description": "Choose Rust, TypeScript, or Python without changing Auths semantics.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.parity/1",
-      "path": "/developers/sdks/parity",
-      "title": "SDK parity",
-      "description": "Inspect maintained operation, outcome, fixture, and packaging parity across Rust, TypeScript, and Python.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.python/1",
-      "path": "/developers/sdks/python",
-      "title": "Python",
-      "description": "Install the maintained Python SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.rust/1",
-      "path": "/developers/sdks/rust",
-      "title": "Rust",
-      "description": "Install the maintained Rust SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.sdks.typescript/1",
-      "path": "/developers/sdks/typescript",
-      "title": "TypeScript",
-      "description": "Install the maintained TypeScript SDK and use the same five Auths operations idiomatically.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.testing/1",
-      "path": "/developers/testing",
-      "title": "Testing",
-      "description": "Test success, denial, mutation, replay, recovery, and cross-language parity with deterministic fixtures.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.developers.versioning/1",
-      "path": "/developers/versioning",
-      "title": "Versioning",
-      "description": "Pin semantic identities, SDK packages, Runtime contracts, profiles, schemas, and evidence to a release.",
-      "section": "developers"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start/1",
-      "path": "/get-started",
-      "title": "Get started",
-      "description": "Choose one concrete outcome and reach a verified, fail-closed result.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.adopt/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/adoption",
-      "title": "Adopt incrementally",
-      "description": "Adopt Auths around one effect while existing identity, policy, approval, and provider systems continue to operate.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.api-keys/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/adoption/api-keys",
-      "title": "API keys",
-      "description": "Move a broad API key behind a closed gateway and expose only bounded Auths authority.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.approvals/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/adoption/approvals",
-      "title": "Approval systems",
-      "description": "Bind an existing approval provider to exact Auths plan bytes.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.capabilities/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/adoption/capabilities",
-      "title": "Capability systems",
-      "description": "Compose an existing capability token with Auths lifecycle and execution boundaries.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.cloud-iam/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/adoption/cloud-iam",
-      "title": "Cloud IAM",
-      "description": "Use short-lived cloud credentials behind a provider gateway without turning IAM into portable authority.",
-      "section": "get-started"
+      "description": "Understand how local trust anchors, attenuating grants, exact action constraints, and bounded plans produce authority that cannot widen in transit.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "group": "Understand the model",
+      "content": "Authority flows downward from local trust Auths does not ask a global authority service whether a request is allowed. A verifier starts from its own scoped trust anchors, follows an exact chain of signed grants, evaluates any authorization plan, and checks that the terminal authority covers one canonical action. The key invariant is simple: Every delegation edge may preserve or narrow authority. No edge may expand it. This chapter explains the objects that make that invariant testable. Trust anchors are local policy A trust anchor is configured by the verifier. It is not carried inside the proof and cannot be added by the caller. An anchor names a principal and exact control methods, then sets ceilings for profiles, permissions, resources, audiences, validity, budget, delegation depth, assurance, and status policy. This lets two verifiers evaluate the same proof under different local trust. One may trust a Northstar operations root for edge://northstar/eu west 2 ; another may not. Adding a separate trust anchor does not authorize a chain that cannot link to it. Grants transfer a bounded subset A grant links an issuer to a subject and an exact parent. The first grant is bounded by a local anchor. Every child is bounded by its parent. Consider this worked chain: Dimension Northstar anchor Operations service Report agent Permission publish, delete publish, delete publish only Resource all Northstar reports weekly reports report 2026 W33 Audience reporting gateway reporting gateway reporting gateway Validity 24 hours 2 hours 5 minutes Uses 100 10 1 Delegation depth 2 1 0 The agent grant is valid because each column is equal to or narrower than the one before it. It cannot delete a report, switch to a different audience, recover the parent's validity window, increase the use count, or delegate again. If any child field widens, verification returns a denied result such as delegation expanded before execution gates or provider entry. Exact action constraints bind application bytes Permission and resource are not always enough. “Publish this report” and “publish a changed report” might share both. V1 therefore includes a closed action constraint algebra: one exact canonical body digest; a bounded allowed set of body digests; or any body, where the profile and parent authority explicitly permit it. An exact digest may attenuate an allowed set that contains it, and either may attenuate AnyBody . The opposite direction is widening. Application callbacks cannot redefine that order. The profile is responsible for canonical application bytes. JSON that is semantically “similar” but byte distinct is not assumed equivalent unless the profile's canonicalization makes it so before signing and verification. The action envelope connects authority to intent A signed action envelope binds more than a payload digest. It includes the profile and version, media type, capability, resource, optional requested budget, audience, challenge, validity, actor, terminal grant, plan identity, channel requirement, attachments, and critical extensions. The verifier compares the supplied canonical action with all of these fields. The executor later consumes the command decoded from VerifiedAction , never a lookalike request supplied alongside it. Authorization plans Some operations require more than one proof branch. V1 provides bounded: Proof for one branch; AllOf for every child; AnyOf for at least one child; and KOfN for a threshold. Every satisfied branch must bind the same canonical action meaning and plan. A proof carried plan is still not the verifier's local policy. The trusted context supplies a separate composition requirement that can pin the plan and require branch count, distinct actors, or distinct trust roots. For example, a two company remediation may use AllOf with one Northstar branch and one EdgeShield branch. Local policy can require two distinct actors and two distinct roots. Two signatures from the same root cannot satisfy that diversity merely because they occupy different proof references. Status and assurance stay role specific Principal status and grant status are separate signed facts. Current control, historical control, statement existence, freshness, and revocation are not interchangeable. A newer revocation cannot be ignored in favor of an older active statement. Assurance applies to roles in the chain. A strong terminal actor does not repair insufficient assurance for the root or an intermediate delegator. Adapters establish the bounded evidence; they cannot decide that the chain is authorized. Critical extensions do not disappear The first grant may establish a critical extension set. In V1, every child must preserve that complete canonical set byte for byte unless a standardized, versioned attenuation algebra says otherwise. An agent cannot omit an extension it does not understand and continue under a weaker interpretation. Unknown required extensions fail closed. What authority does not include Proof authority does not count prior uses, reserve a shared budget, establish a live channel, or execute the effect. Those are stateful execution plane gates. An authorized action must still pass freshness, channel, replay, budget, and application policy before a profile can create an executable command. That distinction makes offline verification repeatable. It also prevents an old authorized result from becoming a reusable execution token. Failure cases to recognize Change Result Provider reachable? : Child adds a permission denied: delegation expanded no Action body differs from the signed digest denied: action body mismatch no Required status is missing indeterminate no Grant is explicitly revoked denied no Required profile is unavailable indeterminate no Exact execution identity already completed exact replay at outer runtime no new entry Continue Delegate to an agent Approvals and ordered plans Verification model Protocol limits and identifiers"
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.cutover/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/adoption/cutover",
-      "title": "Cut over one effect",
-      "description": "Move one effect behind Auths enforcement with a bounded rollback plan.",
-      "section": "get-started"
+      "path": "/guides/verification-model",
+      "title": "Verification model",
+      "description": "Follow the six deterministic verifier stages from bounded decoding to exact action binding, then see why execution remains outside the kernel.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "group": "Understand the model",
+      "content": "Verification is a sealed, deterministic pipeline Auths verification takes three explicit inputs—proof bytes, canonical action bytes, and trusted context bytes—and produces a canonical result. The same valid inputs and executable registry configuration must produce the same verdict, primary stable code, commitments, assurance report, and bounded work totals in every conforming implementation. The verifier performs no network, filesystem, environment, clock, randomness, database, private key, replay, or provider operation. This makes its meaning portable and its failures inspectable. The six stages Each successful stage produces a narrower typed value. Later code cannot pretend that raw bytes already passed an earlier check. 1. Bounded decode The decoder enforces size and collection limits before expensive work. It rejects non canonical CBOR, duplicate or invalid map keys, unsorted sets, unknown critical fields, invalid UTF 8, trailing bytes, and overflowing collections. Representative stable failures include malformed proof , non canonical proof , and resource limit exceeded . A permissive fallback decoder would change protocol meaning and is not allowed. 2. Reference resolution The resolver recomputes identifiers for grants, actions, plans, evidence, status, and attachments. It builds bounded indexes and rejects missing, duplicate, mismatched, cyclic, ambiguous, or unused critical references. Failures such as digest mismatch , duplicate object , and missing reference stop the entire proof structure. No signature or provider work can repair an incoherent graph. 3. Principal control For each signed statement, the verifier selects exactly one accepted principal method and signature suite, reserves their maximum work, verifies the domain separated signature, evaluates method specific control, and requires the adapter's consumed evidence IDs to match the signed binding exactly. Invalid supplied evidence is denied—for example invalid signature or verification method mismatch . A required but unavailable method or evidence is indeterminate—for example unsupported principal method or missing principal evidence . Adapters return bounded facts and assurance claims. They cannot manufacture authority results. 4. Authority branches Each plan leaf is checked from a local trust anchor through its exact grant chain to the terminal actor. Profile, permissions, resources, audiences, validity, body constraints, budgets, status, assurance, delegation depth, and critical extensions must remain within their ceilings. Common failures include untrusted root , broken grant chain , delegation expanded , permission not granted , and action constraint mismatch . 5. Plan evaluation The verifier recomputes the plan identity, confirms every branch binds the same action meaning, evaluates bounded Proof , AllOf , AnyOf , and KOfN composition, then applies the verifier's independent required quorum and diversity constraints. Evaluation order is canonical. Even when one branch already satisfies an AnyOf , the verifier does not skip remaining branches for resource accounting. plan action mismatch and composition requirement not met are denied outcomes. 6. Exact action binding Finally, the verifier selects the exact profile/version and compares canonical body, media type, capability, resource, requested budget, audience, challenge, validity, actor, terminal grant, plan, channel requirement, attachments, and profile policy. Only this stage can privately construct VerifiedAction . It has no public constructor. Representative failures include action body mismatch , audience mismatch , challenge mismatch , action outside validity , and attachment digest mismatch . Three diagnostics, one execution rule Authorized means every required proof and action binding check passed. Denied means available facts establish invalidity or insufficient authority. Indeterminate means a required trustworthy fact or implementation was not available. The execution rule is binary: only authorized may continue. An indeterminate result is not a probabilistic allow. It is a precise request for missing trust input. Stable first failure ordering makes languages and receipts agree on one primary diagnostic. It does not claim resistance to every timing or side channel observation. The outer gates are deliberately separate After authorization, the product runtime still requires: The runtime decodes a domain command from the sealed verified action, writes a decision receipt, executes through the profile gateway, and writes an execution receipt. None of the outer facts may upgrade a denied or indeterminate verifier result. Because replay and provider outcomes live outside the kernel, repeating pure verification is safe. Repeating provider execution may not be. Work a simple mutation example Start with a proof that authorizes canonical action A . Verify it against trusted context C ; the result is authorized. Flip one byte in the action to produce A′ while keeping the proof and context unchanged. If A′ is no longer valid canonical input, bounded decode rejects it. If it is valid but has different meaning, exact action binding denies it. There is no path where signature validity over the original envelope authorizes the mutated action. You can run that exact cross language check in Verify existing authority. Production implications Pin the verifier ABI and accepted registries. Bind required and executed configuration commitments. Acquire live status or identity evidence outside the kernel and supply bounded snapshots. Set resource limits before parsing hostile input. Handle every result variant exhaustively and keep protocol bytes out of ordinary logs. Auths is prelaunch and pre audit. Deterministic fixtures, differential bindings, fuzzing, and formal work strengthen the implementation claim; they do not substitute for an independent security audit. Continue Verify existing authority Authority model Execute one exact action Stable results and errors"
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.oauth-oidc/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/adoption/oauth-oidc",
-      "title": "OAuth and OIDC",
-      "description": "Keep OAuth or OIDC authentication while adding effect-specific machine authority.",
-      "section": "get-started"
+      "path": "/guides/delegate-agent",
+      "title": "Delegate narrower authority to an agent",
+      "description": "Give an agent a short-lived subset of a parent's authority and prove that widening and exact replay cannot create another effect.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "group": "Agents and plans",
+      "content": "Give an agent less authority than its parent Delegation is useful when a service can perform several operations but a specialized agent should perform only one. Auths treats every delegation edge as an attenuation check: authority may be preserved or narrowed, never expanded. Work through the maintained example Product owned recipe 04 delegate to agent from Auths bbeb6547de33. Declared outcome contract: completed,exact replay,denied . This projection does not synthesize example output. TypeScript recipe Source: bindings/recipes/typescript/04 delegate to agent.ts at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Prepare the parent authority The parent can publish or delete, while the provider exposes only the operation used in this proof. Pinned source lines 1–8; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Delegate a narrower, expiring authority Create an agent that can publish—but cannot inherit the parent's delete permission. Pinned source lines 9–15; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Exercise replay and widening boundaries Repeat the same request identity, then ask the agent for the broader undelegated action. Pinned source lines 16–22; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Assert one provider entry and close Require completed, exact replay, and denied outcomes with exactly one provider call. Pinned source lines 23–29; no output is synthesized. Python recipe Source: bindings/recipes/python/04 delegate to agent.py at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Prepare the parent authority Define the counted provider handler used to observe whether an effect boundary was entered. Pinned source lines 1–18; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Delegate a narrower, expiring authority Open the parent session and give the agent only publish authority for five minutes. Pinned source lines 19–27; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Exercise replay and widening boundaries Repeat the same request identity, then ask the agent for the broader undelegated action. Pinned source lines 28–38; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Assert one provider entry and report Require completed, exact replay, and denied outcomes with exactly one provider call, then emit the trace. Pinned source lines 39–58; no output is synthesized. The parent can publish and delete reports. It delegates only publish report to a named agent for five minutes. The agent performs one publish, repeats the exact request identifier, then attempts the broader delete operation. The expected semantic sequence is: Attempt Result Provider entries : First allowed publish completed 1 Same execution identity again exact replay still 1 Broader delete denied still 1 The replay result returns recorded completion instead of re entering the provider. The widening attempt stops before the provider. Understand every dimension that can narrow A child grant must not broaden any inherited boundary: permissions; resources and action constraints; validity window; audiences and challenge binding; budget ceiling; remaining delegation depth; profile and version; status and assurance policy; or critical extensions. An agent allowed one tool cannot obtain another merely because the provider implements it. A shorter expiry cannot be changed back to the parent's longer window. A child cannot replace a critical extension with an unknown or more permissive interpretation. Design delegation around a job Start with the smallest outcome the agent needs. For a report agent that might mean one exact tool, one report namespace, one audience, a five minute window, one use, and no further delegation depth. Do not give the agent a broad “automation” role and rely on prompt text to keep it safe. Prompt instructions are not an authority boundary. Tool availability is not an authority boundary either. If a job changes materially, create a new delegation. Do not mutate the meaning of an existing action or reuse an execution identifier for different bytes. Handle failures safely A widening attempt is denied and cannot reach the provider. Missing required status or assurance is indeterminate and cannot execute. An expired delegation requires new authority; retrying the same expired proof will not help. Exact replay returns the recorded outcome and must not reacquire credentials or call the provider again. A provider unknown result is not exact replay; resume and reconcile the same execution reference. Production concerns Delegation does not remove the need for durable state or custody. Parent and child grants must be authored through protected signers. Execution identities, use counts, and budgets must be claimed atomically across the deployment scope. Status acquisition and revocation freshness remain explicit verifier inputs. Log bounded grant and action commitments rather than raw proof bytes. Ensure operators can identify which parent, child, profile, action, and execution state a denial or recovery reference belongs to without disclosing application payloads. Continue Authority model Approvals and ordered plans Replay, recovery, and reconciliation Authority model"
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.plan/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/adoption/plan",
-      "title": "Plan adoption",
-      "description": "Choose one effect and map the ownership boundaries before writing integration code.",
-      "section": "get-started"
+      "path": "/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans",
+      "title": "Approvals and ordered plans",
+      "description": "Bind multiple approvals to one exact ordered plan, stop safely on uncertainty, and resume without repeating completed effects.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "group": "Agents and plans",
+      "content": "Approve the transaction, not a reusable flag An approval is useful only when it is bound to the exact operation—or exact ordered plan—that will execute. A generic approved: true value can be replayed against different bytes. Auths approval responses echo a transaction digest and policy, while the proof plan commits to its members and their order. Follow a two organization recovery workflow Product owned recipe 05 cross organization plan from Auths bbeb6547de33. Declared outcome contract: completed after restart . This projection does not synthesize example output. TypeScript recipe Source: bindings/recipes/typescript/05 cross organization plan.ts at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Load recovery and approval tools Import the filesystem, child process, approval, profile, and receipt primitives used by the maintained scenario. Pinned source lines 1–13; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Route the restart phases The same source can verify a receipt, run either durable phase, or orchestrate both across process boundaries. Pinned source lines 15–33; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Model a provider unknown outcome The first runtime records that token rotation may have applied instead of claiming success or retrying. Pinned source lines 35–47; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Stop the ordered plan and persist recovery state Execute the exact two member plan, require one completed member, then persist its reference and receipt. Pinned source lines 48–62; no output is synthesized. Step 5: Configure reconciliation without provider re entry After restart, direct handler entry is an error; only the provider specific reconcile path may classify the prior attempt. Pinned source lines 64–81; no output is synthesized. Step 6: Resume the original execution Decode the persisted reference, reconcile to completion, verify the receipt, and never enter a provider handler twice. Pinned source lines 82–91; no output is synthesized. Step 7: Bind two organizations to the exact plan Require both organization specific providers and cap the approval policy to the plan's two uses. Pinned source lines 93–103; no output is synthesized. Step 8: Echo the approval commitment Each approval response returns the exact request identifier, transaction digest, and policy it evaluated. Pinned source lines 105–116; no output is synthesized. Step 9: Treat every phase as an owned process Fail on an unsuccessful child phase and reject missing recovery paths. Pinned source lines 118–126; no output is synthesized. Python recipe Source: bindings/recipes/python/05 cross organization plan.py at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Load recovery and approval tools Import the process, persistence, approval, profile, and receipt primitives used by the maintained scenario. Pinned source lines 1–17; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Bind two organizations to the exact plan Each organization echoes the exact approval request, and the threshold policy requires both responses. Pinned source lines 20–35; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Model a provider unknown outcome The first provider records that rotation may have applied rather than claiming success or retrying. Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Construct the recoverable ordered plan Open durable state and commit quarantine followed by rotation in one exact order. Pinned source lines 52–65; no output is synthesized. Step 5: Stop and persist recovery state Require one completed member, then persist the execution reference and completed receipt. Pinned source lines 66–80; no output is synthesized. Step 6: Define reconciliation without provider re entry After restart, direct handler entry is an error; reconciliation inspects the provider specific evidence. Pinned source lines 83–95; no output is synthesized. Step 7: Reopen the same durable runtime Recreate the same authority and approval policy with handlers that must remain unreachable. Pinned source lines 96–107; no output is synthesized. Step 8: Resume the original execution Decode the persisted reference, reconcile to completion, verify the receipt, and persist it. Pinned source lines 108–117; no output is synthesized. Step 9: Route each owned phase Run either verification or a durable execution phase in a separate process invocation. Pinned source lines 120–136; no output is synthesized. Step 10: Orchestrate both sides of the restart Use a configured durable directory or an isolated temporary one, then run both phases in order. Pinned source lines 137–147; no output is synthesized. Step 11: Report the no duplicate outcome Emit the declared completed after restart result through the owned asynchronous entry point. Pinned source lines 148–160; no output is synthesized. The recipe models two organizations approving the same two member incident plan. The first member quarantines a service. The second rotates a token and returns an ambiguous provider outcome. The workflow persists one completed receipt and a recovery reference, restarts, reconciles the second operation, and completes without re entering either provider handler. This is not a simulated happy path sequence. The important behavior is the stop between members and the absence of duplicate provider entry after restart. What the plan commits to Every satisfied branch binds the same canonical action meaning, audience, challenge, validity context, profile, and plan identity. The verifier also applies an independent local composition requirement. That requirement can pin an expected plan and require minimum authorized branches, distinct actors, or distinct trust roots. V1 supports bounded Proof , AllOf , AnyOf , and KOfN plans. A signed KOfN shape is not enough by itself: local policy decides whether the authorized branches provide the required diversity. Preserve order through failure For an ordered effect plan: 1. Verify and approve the exact plan. 2. Reserve the next member atomically. 3. Execute only that member's opaque command. 4. Persist its outcome and receipt. 5. Advance only after a terminal result permits it. If member two becomes provider unknown, do not start member three, mark the plan completed, or replay member one. Persist the recovery reference and reconcile member two first. Mutation invalidates approval Changing an operation, resource, arguments, member order, approval policy, or plan membership changes the committed transaction. Previously collected approval responses must not carry over. Substitution should fail before signing or provider entry. If an approval provider is unavailable, the workflow remains non executable; it does not silently reduce the threshold. Production design questions Before deploying a multi party plan, answer: Who owns each approval key and how is it protected? Which exact organizations, actors, or roots satisfy diversity requirements? How long are approval responses valid? Where are plan/member reservations stored atomically? Which member outcomes permit the next member to begin? How does each provider reconcile an ambiguous response? Which receipt views may each organization inspect? Auths can bind and verify the answers. It cannot decide organizational intent or make two remote providers one atomic transaction. Continue Replay, recovery, and provider uncertainty Receipts and bounded disclosure Authority plans Authority model"
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.policy-engines/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/adoption/policy-engines",
-      "title": "Policy engines",
-      "description": "Use a Cedar, OPA, or relationship decision as explicit context without duplicating the policy engine.",
-      "section": "get-started"
+      "path": "/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown",
+      "title": "Replay, recovery, and provider uncertainty",
+      "description": "Distinguish safe replay from ambiguous remote effects, preserve one execution identity, and reconcile without duplicating work.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "group": "Production",
+      "content": "Know whether another attempt is safe Authorization can be deterministic while execution is not. A remote provider may apply an operation and lose the response. A process may crash after delivery but before recording completion. Treating either case as a normal failure and retrying can perform the effect twice. Auths keeps authorization, durable execution state, and provider observation as separate facts so the runtime can say what is known rather than collapse everything into success or failure. Start with the outcome table Outcome Could the provider have been entered? Correct response : denied no Change the action, authority, or trusted facts before trying again indeterminate no Acquire the missing trustworthy fact, then verify anew exact replay a prior execution already finished Return the recorded result; do not re enter recoverable possibly Resume the same execution reference provider unknown yes Reconcile the same execution; do not blindly retry This table is more useful than a generic retryable boolean because it keeps effect uncertainty explicit. See restart and reconciliation in one recipe Product owned recipe 05 cross organization plan from Auths bbeb6547de33. Declared outcome contract: completed after restart . This projection does not synthesize example output. TypeScript recipe Source: bindings/recipes/typescript/05 cross organization plan.ts at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Load recovery and approval tools Import the filesystem, child process, approval, profile, and receipt primitives used by the maintained scenario. Pinned source lines 1–13; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Route the restart phases The same source can verify a receipt, run either durable phase, or orchestrate both across process boundaries. Pinned source lines 15–33; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Model a provider unknown outcome The first runtime records that token rotation may have applied instead of claiming success or retrying. Pinned source lines 35–47; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Stop the ordered plan and persist recovery state Execute the exact two member plan, require one completed member, then persist its reference and receipt. Pinned source lines 48–62; no output is synthesized. Step 5: Configure reconciliation without provider re entry After restart, direct handler entry is an error; only the provider specific reconcile path may classify the prior attempt. Pinned source lines 64–81; no output is synthesized. Step 6: Resume the original execution Decode the persisted reference, reconcile to completion, verify the receipt, and never enter a provider handler twice. Pinned source lines 82–91; no output is synthesized. Step 7: Bind two organizations to the exact plan Require both organization specific providers and cap the approval policy to the plan's two uses. Pinned source lines 93–103; no output is synthesized. Step 8: Echo the approval commitment Each approval response returns the exact request identifier, transaction digest, and policy it evaluated. Pinned source lines 105–116; no output is synthesized. Step 9: Treat every phase as an owned process Fail on an unsuccessful child phase and reject missing recovery paths. Pinned source lines 118–126; no output is synthesized. Python recipe Source: bindings/recipes/python/05 cross organization plan.py at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Load recovery and approval tools Import the process, persistence, approval, profile, and receipt primitives used by the maintained scenario. Pinned source lines 1–17; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Bind two organizations to the exact plan Each organization echoes the exact approval request, and the threshold policy requires both responses. Pinned source lines 20–35; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Model a provider unknown outcome The first provider records that rotation may have applied rather than claiming success or retrying. Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Construct the recoverable ordered plan Open durable state and commit quarantine followed by rotation in one exact order. Pinned source lines 52–65; no output is synthesized. Step 5: Stop and persist recovery state Require one completed member, then persist the execution reference and completed receipt. Pinned source lines 66–80; no output is synthesized. Step 6: Define reconciliation without provider re entry After restart, direct handler entry is an error; reconciliation inspects the provider specific evidence. Pinned source lines 83–95; no output is synthesized. Step 7: Reopen the same durable runtime Recreate the same authority and approval policy with handlers that must remain unreachable. Pinned source lines 96–107; no output is synthesized. Step 8: Resume the original execution Decode the persisted reference, reconcile to completion, verify the receipt, and persist it. Pinned source lines 108–117; no output is synthesized. Step 9: Route each owned phase Run either verification or a durable execution phase in a separate process invocation. Pinned source lines 120–136; no output is synthesized. Step 10: Orchestrate both sides of the restart Use a configured durable directory or an isolated temporary one, then run both phases in order. Pinned source lines 137–147; no output is synthesized. Step 11: Report the no duplicate outcome Emit the declared completed after restart result through the owned asynchronous entry point. Pinned source lines 148–160; no output is synthesized. The recipe completes the first member of an ordered plan, records uncertainty for the second, closes the process, opens the durable state again, and resumes from the saved execution reference. The recovery provider exposes a reconciliation operation but its effect handlers throw if entered. Completion with zero new entries proves recovery did not replay either member. Preserve one execution identity Request identifiers, command commitments, and profile idempotency keys serve different purposes. The durable store must atomically distinguish: a new execution identity; an exact replay of the same command; and a conflicting attempt that reuses an identity for different bytes. Only an exact replay may return the recorded result. A conflict must fail closed. Do not generate a new request identifier to escape an uncertain prior attempt; that discards the link needed for reconciliation. Resume is not retry Resume loads an authenticated, bounded reference to existing execution state. It continues the state machine from the last durable checkpoint. It must not re run authorization independent application code, reacquire a credential for an already entered command, or call completed plan members again. Reconciliation asks the profile's provider adapter for fresh, operation specific evidence: for example, whether a token now has the expected version or whether a rollout reached the committed object revision. A generic HTTP status check cannot decide every domain's outcome. Stop conditions for operators Stop automatic processing when: durable execution state is unavailable; the stored command commitment conflicts with the requested action; the profile cannot establish whether the provider applied the operation; fresh observation contradicts the expected postcondition; or reconciliation itself returns another ambiguous result. Retain the state as unknown and escalate. Do not translate the absence of evidence to released capacity or successful completion. Production requirements In memory development state cannot provide this guarantee across restart or multiple hosts. A production store needs atomic compare and set semantics over the entire deployment scope, durable checkpoints, unique execution identities, and tested crash behavior. Provider gateways need domain idempotency and a reconciliation contract. Secret credentials must remain behind the gateway. Telemetry should record state transitions and bounded commitments without copying provider bodies, proofs, signatures, or credentials. Auths does not claim that a local transaction and a remote provider effect are atomic. It gives the application enough truthful state to recover from that fact. Continue Approvals and ordered plans Receipts and disclosure Production integration Results and recovery reference"
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.shadow-mode/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/adoption/shadow-mode",
-      "title": "Shadow mode",
-      "description": "Compare Auths decisions with live traffic without authorizing provider effects.",
-      "section": "get-started"
+      "path": "/guides/receipts-and-disclosure",
+      "title": "Receipts and bounded disclosure",
+      "description": "Verify what Auths decided and executed while revealing only the application detail each viewer is authorized to inspect.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "group": "Production",
+      "content": "Keep proof of an effect without publishing its payload An Auths receipt is portable evidence about a decision or execution. It is not necessarily a human readable audit report. The signed form commits to facts so that another process or language can verify integrity, while application owned disclosure decides which underlying details a viewer may see. Distinguish the two receipt moments Receipt Created when What it can establish Decision receipt After authorization and required outer gates Which exact authority, action, context, and plan were accepted or rejected Execution receipt After the provider path reaches a recorded outcome Which command commitment ran, how it ended, and how it relates to the decision A valid decision receipt does not prove that a provider effect happened. A transport acknowledgment does not replace an execution receipt. An execution receipt should be interpreted alongside its decision binding and profile semantics. The exact action recipe verifies its completed receipt as part of the workflow: Product owned recipe 03 execute exact action from Auths bbeb6547de33. Declared outcome contract: completed . This projection does not synthesize example output. TypeScript recipe Source: bindings/recipes/typescript/03 execute exact action.ts at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider Register the only provider operation and create development authority for that exact tool name. Pinned source lines 1–14; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action Send the exact profile owned action, require completion, and verify its returned receipt. Pinned source lines 15–22; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry Request a different tool and prove the provider call counter did not advance. Pinned source lines 23–28; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Report the trace and close owned state Emit the declared result and close the development runtime even when the workflow throws. Pinned source lines 29–32; no output is synthesized. Python recipe Qualification blocked — Python source does not match the pinned public API. The pinned recipe imports verify receipt from auths , while the pinned installed API exports it only from auths.verify . The source is retained for review but must not be presented as runnable until the product recipe is corrected and re executed. Source: bindings/recipes/python/03 execute exact action.py at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider Register the only provider operation and count every entry into that effect boundary. Pinned source lines 1–19; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action Open the owned development session, execute the exact action, and verify its receipt. Pinned source lines 20–30; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry Request a different tool and prove the provider call counter stayed at one. Pinned source lines 31–37; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Report the trace through the owned entry point Leave the session before emitting the declared result, then run the asynchronous entry point. Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized. Verify before interpreting Receipt verification checks bounded canonical bytes, identifiers, signatures, and bindings. Inspection then returns an inert projection. It cannot recreate a verified command, reopen a gateway, or become authority for another effect. Treat an invalid receipt as untrusted input. Do not display its claims as verified merely because the JSON envelope was parseable. Choose a disclosure view deliberately A useful application commonly exposes three levels: 1. Opaque public view: validity, receipt identifiers, commitments, signer descriptors, timestamps, outcome class, and other non sensitive metadata. 2. Authorized summary: profile owned explanation such as “quarantined the Northstar service in eu west 2 ,” without canonical payload bytes. 3. Authorized full view: exact canonical action and bounded provider evidence for incident response, audit, or dispute handling. The signed receipt stays commitment only. Sensitive command material can be stored separately as encrypted disclosure material, authenticated against the tenant and receipt identity. The inspector verifies both the receipt and the disclosure binding before releasing a view. This prevents the receipt stream from becoming a second database of customer payloads, infrastructure names, report contents, or provider responses. Application responsibilities Auths can produce and verify the cryptographic structures; the application still owns: viewer authentication and authorization; encryption keys and rotation; retention and deletion policy; tenant isolation; redaction and field classification; audit access logging; and legal or regulatory requirements. Do not put private keys, provider credentials, raw proofs, signatures, or unbounded response bodies into disclosure material. A “full” view is still a bounded profile owned view, not an unrestricted dump. Failure and recovery behavior If required receipt persistence fails before provider entry, stop without executing. If persistence fails after the provider may have been entered, the runtime must preserve an ambiguous or recoverable state rather than claim denial. If disclosure decryption or authorization fails, return the opaque verified view or no view according to application policy. Never weaken receipt verification because a viewer has privileged application credentials. Receipt verification itself is effect free and safe to repeat. Re executing an effect based on a receipt is not. Continue Replay and recovery Production integration Evidence, status, assurance, and registries TypeScript verification surface"
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.adopt.signed-requests/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/adoption/signed-requests",
-      "title": "Signed requests",
-      "description": "Bind an existing signed request to narrower authority and execution state.",
-      "section": "get-started"
+      "path": "/guides/production-integration",
+      "title": "Build a production integration",
+      "description": "Replace development custody and memory state with durable, closed, observable mechanisms without weakening exact-action enforcement.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "group": "Production",
+      "content": "Turn the development workflow into an honest production boundary The high level SDK makes the first integration small on purpose. Its development composition uses ephemeral keys and in memory state. Production is not a flag that makes those mechanisms durable; it is a set of explicit substitutions around the same verified core. Auths is prelaunch and pre audit. The repository contains production shaped mechanisms and references, not a claim that a hosted production service is available or independently reviewed. Begin with an effect inventory For each operation, write down: exact application action and canonical body; profile and version; permission, resource, audience, validity, uses, and budgets; identity, status, and assurance facts required; signer and approval custody; atomic reservation scope; least privilege provider credential; irreversible provider entry point; possible provider outcomes and reconciliation evidence; and decision, execution, and disclosure retention. If two effects require different evidence, credential scopes, provider commands, obligations, or reconciliation, treat them as separate profiles. Replace the development mechanisms Durable state Use an atomic reservation store that distinguishes new execution, exact replay, and conflicting reuse in one transaction across your deployment scope. A single process SQLite or JSON store can be a useful reference but does not prove multi host coordination. Test concurrency, crash before delivery, crash after delivery, restart, and reconciliation. If the store is unavailable, fail before entering the provider. Custody Use a signer backed by an HSM, KMS, WebAuthn authenticator, or another appropriate non exporting boundary. The signer receives a bounded signing request and must return the matching request identity, transaction digest, signature, and control evidence. It must not canonicalize new Auths objects or broaden the requested authority. Closed profile and provider gateway Use a qualified profile for the exact domain. Keep endpoints, headers, credentials, generic HTTP methods, SQL text, manifests, and provider specific commands out of the public request. The gateway derives one allowed provider operation from the opaque verified command. Acquire the narrow credential only after authorization and durable reservation. Re read critical provider state when the profile requires it. Evidence and live acquisition Keep network resolution outside deterministic verification. Resolver and status adapters return bounded bytes with provenance, version, fetch time, and expiry. The trusted context commits to the exact executable adapter and registry configuration. Receipts and disclosure Persist decision and execution receipts according to policy. Store sensitive canonical action or provider evidence separately and encrypted when it must be recoverable. Authorize summary and full views independently of receipt signature verification. Make uncertainty operational Your provider adapter must classify whether an effect was definitely not attempted, completed, rejected, or possibly applied. An ambiguous result stays outcome unknown until domain specific reconciliation produces trustworthy observation. Do not secretly retry signers, approval providers, stores, or gateways. The application owns backoff and escalation based on the SDK's retry class and effect state. Observe without leaking Useful telemetry includes bounded operation/profile identities, result class, stable code, stage, commitments, latency, work totals, retry class, and correlation identity. Exclude credentials, keys, signatures, proof bytes, canonical application bodies, provider response bodies, and uncontrolled high cardinality values. Telemetry exporter failure must not turn a denial into authorization or change an execution result. Release and support gate Before launch: 1. Pin the SDK artifact, lockfile, ABI, runtime contract, profile, and adapters. 2. Run installed artifact and adapter conformance against exactly what ships. 3. Validate TypeScript and Python parity where both are supported. 4. Exercise hostile inputs, concurrency, crash, recovery, and secret scanning paths. 5. Establish monitoring, on call ownership, key recovery, receipt retention, and incident procedures. 6. Obtain independent security review appropriate to the effect's consequence. Auths does not promise remote exactly once execution, instantaneous global revocation, or atomicity between your transaction and a provider. A production integration must expose and manage those limits. Continue Build and qualify adapters Replay and provider uncertainty Receipts and disclosure Runtime results and recovery reference"
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.choose/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/choose",
-      "title": "Choose your path",
-      "description": "Select the shortest journey for the effect, actor, and operating boundary you have.",
-      "section": "get-started"
+      "path": "/guides/adapter-authoring",
+      "title": "Build and qualify an adapter",
+      "description": "Extend identity, custody, state, transport, or provider integration without moving Auths authority semantics into application code.",
+      "section": "guides",
+      "group": "Extensions",
+      "content": "Add an integration at the narrowest honest boundary Auths owns authority. Adapters establish bounded facts or perform a narrowly defined mechanism. That rule lets teams swap identity methods, signature suites, transports, stores, signers, and providers without letting an adapter invent an authorized result. Before writing code, decide whether you need a mechanism adapter or a new effect profile. A generic callback is not a shortcut around that distinction. Classify the extension Need Correct boundary Adapter must not do Resolve an identity document Resolver or identity method adapter Add trust or mint a grant Verify a signature suite Signature suite adapter Choose application permission Sign with KMS/HSM Signer/custody adapter Rewrite the signing request Coordinate replay/budget state Atomic reservation store Treat a conflict as exact replay Carry identity or proof bytes Bounded transport Convert delivery into authorization Call an effect provider Qualified profile gateway Accept arbitrary provider commands If the integration defines canonical action meaning, provider request construction, credential scope, outcome classification, reconciliation, or receipt claims, it belongs to a domain specific profile. Build that vertical first. Do not place unrelated providers behind one operation tag and a bag of optional fields. Keep parsing and authority separate An identity adapter parses and validates its own bounded evidence, then returns facts under an exact method and version. A signature suite adapter verifies the exact Rust produced signing preimage. A resolver returns bounded bytes plus provenance, fetch time, expiry, and version. None may return authorized , create VerifiedAction , or reinterpret profile semantics. Unknown versions and unsupported features fail closed rather than fall back to a similarly named implementation. Respect I/O and trust boundaries The deterministic verifier performs no live acquisition. Network, filesystem, environment, and credential I/O happen in outer adapters. Feed their bounded results into a trusted context snapshot and bind the executable adapter configuration exactly. Resolver adapters should deny private network access by default, cap redirects and response bytes, honor cancellation and timeouts, and report freshness. Signer adapters should enforce request expiry, object kind, principal descriptor, request identity, and transaction digest without exporting private keys. Prove the contract you claim Use the public testkit functions for the adapter kind. TypeScript exposes conformance entry points such as certifySigner , certifyAtomicStore , certifyByteTransport , and certifyMcpProvider ; Python exposes their idiomatic counterparts. Reference pages should generate their exact current signatures from installed artifacts. Conformance should include: maximum size and boundary plus one inputs; malformed and unsupported versions; cancellation and timeout behavior; deterministic identity and metadata; exact request/response binding; concurrency and compare and set conflicts for stores; provider denial before credential acquisition; ambiguous outcome and reconciliation behavior for gateways; and redaction of secrets and unbounded remote messages. Passing a generic contract does not qualify a new effect profile. Profile qualification also requires Rust owned semantics, fixtures, mutation tests, TypeScript/Python parity, provider request equality, crash tests, receipts, and an honest demo. Publish support metadata An adapter should state its implementation identity and version, contract kind and version, supported runtimes, support owner, and narrowly worded security claims. Separate what Auths tests from what the adapter operator must guarantee. Do not call an adapter “supported,” “qualified,” or “production ready” merely because it implements the interface. Those labels require matching executable evidence and release policy. Failure and retry rules Adapters return typed, bounded failures. They must not silently retry custody, approval, store, or provider operations. The outer application decides whether retry is safe from the recorded effect state. An unavailable fact can make proof verification indeterminate. Invalid supplied evidence makes it denied. Neither result can enter a provider. Continue Authenticate identity Execute through a closed profile Production integration Principal adapter reference"
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.evaluate/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/evaluate",
-      "title": "Evaluate Auths",
-      "description": "Evaluate Auths with deterministic positive and adversarial fixtures before choosing a deployment.",
-      "section": "get-started"
+      "path": "/examples",
+      "title": "Examples by security question",
+      "description": "Choose a real Auths example by the boundary you need to evaluate, with explicit maturity and non-claims.",
+      "section": "examples",
+      "group": "By security question",
+      "content": "Examples by security question Examples are evidence, not decoration. Choose one by the security boundary you need to evaluate, run it from the pinned product source, and change the committed bytes or context to observe the fail closed path. A polished interface is not proof that an authorization property holds. Do not choose an Auths example because its provider logo resembles your stack. Choose it because it tests the security question you need answered. Every example here is repository evidence, not a claim that the corresponding provider integration is a supported public SDK profile. Maturity labels distinguish a Minimal example , Interactive demo , Production shaped reference , Benchmark/testkit , or Demo integration . The currently qualified public binding profile is generated from the pinned public topology. At present, provider specific demos beyond that topology must remain labelled as demos even when their architecture is sophisticated. Pinned public topology Source: bindings/public topology v1.json at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Qualified profiles: auths.github.issue address/1 , auths.mcp/1 , auths.opentofu.saved plan apply/1 , auths.postgresql.bounded update/1 Framework contracts: atomic reservation store , signer custody Layer TypeScript Python product @auths dev/sdk , @auths dev/sdk/identity , @auths dev/sdk/verify auths , auths.identity , auths.verify vertical @auths dev/sdk/profiles auths.profiles mechanism @auths dev/sdk/integrations auths.integrations extension @auths dev/sdk/framework auths.framework test @auths dev/sdk/testkit auths.testkit Can I verify authority without a service? Start with the offline verifier when your question is whether Auths can make a deterministic decision from explicit local bytes. This is the smallest proof of the protocol boundary: no resolver, network, database, clock, replay store, private key, or provider is involved. It proves the supported Rust facade can verify the committed proof, action, and trusted context as an external consumer. It does not prove runtime replay protection, provider execution, or production custody. Minimal example demos/offline verification Can an agent call one protected tool without receiving broad credentials? Use the MCP examples to evaluate the shortest supported closed profile workflow. The important boundary is not that an agent can call a tool; it is that the configured provider is entered only for the exact authorized tool action, while an undeclared action is denied before provider entry. The live lab can help a reader inspect the stages interactively. The smaller MCP demo is better for understanding the native integration without unrelated application architecture. Interactive demo demos/mcp/auths mcp demo demos/live lab demos/live service Can two organizations authorize one exact joint response? The cross company incident response demo is the strongest collaboration journey. It combines separate identity systems, distinct organizations, threshold approval bound to the same ordered plan, diagnostic and remediation agents, closed provider gateways, HTTPS and Iroh delivery, durable reservation, unknown outcome handling, and bounded receipt disclosure. It proves a production shaped architecture and adversarial behavior end to end. Its hosted persistence, identity adapters, provider effects, and custody remain demo implementations rather than production services. Production shaped reference demos/cross company incident response Can an uncredentialed coding agent publish only an approved change? The GitHub issue workflow separates proposal from execution. An agent creates a bounded Git candidate without a GitHub mutation credential. A separate executor verifies the exact repository, issue, base, allowed change, audience, and effect budget before acquiring a repository scoped credential and creating one deterministic branch and draft pull request. The Radicle workflow explores a related collaboration problem under a different repository and identity environment. Treat each as a cohesive domain demo; neither is a generic “Git action” profile. Demo integration demos/github issue demos/radicle issue Can an agent change infrastructure exactly once? Choose Kubernetes when the action is an exact API object rollout constrained by workload identity and current cluster state. Choose OpenTofu when the action is applying one previously saved plan against exact backend, workspace, state, dependency lock, and variable commitments. The two demos look similar at the diagram level but intentionally retain different actions, evidence, commands, credentials, state transitions, and reconciliation. They prove why Auths profiles are vertical rather than a generic infrastructure operation dispatcher. Production shaped reference demos/kubernetes rollout demos/opentofu plan Can an agent change application or database data without holding a reusable key? The records API demonstrates a familiar typed REST boundary over HTTPS or Iroh. The PostgreSQL demo goes deeper: exact tenant and row selection, before state and after state commitments, catalog and role rechecks, a serializable transaction, an execution ledger, and ambiguous commit reconciliation. Use the records demo to understand transport neutral application adoption. Use PostgreSQL to evaluate a high consequence data mutation where database state and transaction semantics are part of the authorization profile. Production shaped reference demos/rest api authorization demos/postgresql data change Can financial authority be narrower than an OAuth scope or API key? The Stripe family separates collection, manual capture authorization, capture, cancellation, refunds, subscriptions, transfers, payouts, mandates, and purchase authorization into distinct effect profiles. That separation matters: the operations have different direction, provider preconditions, exposure, obligations, lifecycle states, reconciliation, and receipt meaning. These are Stripe test mode demo integrations. They do not imply that every Stripe operation is a qualified public SDK profile, and they do not turn local merchant configuration into human signed standing authority. Demo integration demos/stripe payment collect demos/stripe payment authorize demos/stripe payment capture demos/stripe payment cancel demos/stripe refund demos/stripe subscription create demos/stripe subscription modify demos/stripe subscription cancel demos/stripe connect transfer demos/stripe payout demos/stripe payment mandate demos/stripe purchase authorization Can I use Auths identity and Iroh without adopting capabilities? The identity over Iroh demo is the smallest adoption path. It exchanges canonical algorithm neutral public identities over a real Iroh connection and authenticates exact message bytes using optional adapters. No grant, capability, approval, policy, lifecycle, store, or product runtime is constructed. A successful Iroh connection authenticates its transport peer; a successful signature check authenticates the exact message bytes to the public identity. Neither fact authorizes an application effect or prevents replay. Interactive demo demos/identity iroh Do the mechanisms hold under concurrency and adversarial inputs? Benchmarks and testkits answer engineering questions rather than tell a product story. Use them to evaluate bounds, concurrency, replay, candidate stores, custody adapters, transports, and cross language behavior. They do not demonstrate a deployable application. Benchmark/testkit demos/benchmarks demos/testkit demos/matrix"
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.get-started.paths/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/paths",
-      "title": "Outcome paths",
-      "description": "Choose an outcome path before learning the complete Auths model.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.agent/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/paths/agent",
-      "title": "Delegate to an agent",
-      "description": "Give an agent one narrow tool without placing a broad credential in its process.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.local/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/paths/application",
-      "title": "Protect an application effect",
-      "description": "Protect a REST handler, job, or application function with one-use authority.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.cross-company/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/paths/cross-company",
-      "title": "Cross-company authority",
-      "description": "Authorize one cross-company operation without a shared identity provider, root key, or cloud account.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.runtime/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/paths/runtime",
-      "title": "Deploy the runtime",
-      "description": "Deploy the open runtime for durable reservations, recovery, and closed provider gateways.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.verify/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/paths/verification",
-      "title": "Verify without executing",
-      "description": "Verify a receipt or signed identity without performing an effect.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.start.prerequisites/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/prerequisites",
-      "title": "Prerequisites",
-      "description": "Prepare the smallest environment required by your chosen Auths path.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.get-started.quickstarts/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/quickstarts",
-      "title": "Quickstarts",
-      "description": "Compare seven installed-artifact projects by boundary, state, custody, success, and failure.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.agent-delegation/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation",
-      "title": "Agent delegation",
-      "description": "Delegate one narrower tool action and prove that a broader action is denied.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.approved-plan/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan",
-      "title": "Approved plan",
-      "description": "Bind approval to the exact bytes and order of a multi-step plan.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.identity-swap/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap",
-      "title": "Identity swap",
-      "description": "Exchange and verify identity material while keeping the authority workflow unchanged.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect",
-      "title": "Local REST effect",
-      "description": "Protect one local application effect and receive verifiable evidence without deploying a runtime.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.offline-verification/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification",
-      "title": "Offline verification",
-      "description": "Verify portable evidence without executing an effect or contacting a provider.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.recovery/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/recovery",
-      "title": "Recovery",
-      "description": "Resume or reconcile an interrupted execution without blindly repeating the provider effect.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.quickstart.runtime-effect/1",
-      "path": "/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect",
-      "title": "Runtime effect",
-      "description": "Execute one bounded effect through the production HTTPS runtime and durable state boundary.",
-      "section": "get-started"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust/1",
-      "path": "/identity-trust",
-      "title": "Identity & trust",
-      "description": "Use keys, identity providers, workload identities, or application resolvers without coupling them to authority.",
-      "section": "identity-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites/1",
-      "path": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites",
-      "title": "Cryptographic suites",
-      "description": "Select cryptographic verification independently from identity source and authority semantics.",
-      "section": "identity-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites.custom/1",
-      "path": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum",
-      "title": "Custom and post-quantum suites",
-      "description": "Implement a custom or post-quantum suite adapter without changing Auths identity meaning.",
-      "section": "identity-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites.ed25519/1",
-      "path": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519",
-      "title": "Ed25519",
-      "description": "Use the maintained Ed25519 suite for compact deterministic signatures.",
-      "section": "identity-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.suites.p256/1",
-      "path": "/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256",
-      "title": "P-256",
-      "description": "Use the maintained P-256 suite through the same identity and verification interfaces.",
-      "section": "identity-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.exchange/1",
-      "path": "/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity",
-      "title": "Exchange public identity",
-      "description": "Send and receive a public identity as bounded, transport-neutral data.",
-      "section": "identity-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.tour/1",
-      "path": "/identity-trust/how-it-works",
-      "title": "How identity and trust fit",
-      "description": "See the independent boundaries between identity evidence, cryptographic suites, trust policy, transport, and authority.",
-      "section": "identity-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources/1",
-      "path": "/identity-trust/identity-sources",
-      "title": "Identity sources",
-      "description": "Choose the system that supplies bounded public verification evidence.",
-      "section": "identity-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.resolvers/1",
-      "path": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers",
-      "title": "Application resolvers",
-      "description": "Adapt an application directory or key registry through a narrow resolver port.",
-      "section": "identity-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.oauth-oidc/1",
-      "path": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc",
-      "title": "OAuth and OIDC",
-      "description": "Resolve OIDC identity into explicit Auths verification evidence without turning a bearer token into authority.",
-      "section": "identity-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.raw-keys/1",
-      "path": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys",
-      "title": "Raw public keys",
-      "description": "Exchange method- and suite-labelled public keys as ordinary bounded data.",
-      "section": "identity-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.sources.spiffe/1",
-      "path": "/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe",
-      "title": "SPIFFE",
-      "description": "Use SPIFFE workload identity as a replaceable trust input for Auths verification.",
-      "section": "identity-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.rotation/1",
-      "path": "/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation",
-      "title": "Key and root rotation",
-      "description": "Rotate keys or trust roots with explicit overlap, rollback, and negative tests.",
-      "section": "identity-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.testing/1",
-      "path": "/identity-trust/testing",
-      "title": "Test identity and trust",
-      "description": "Test identity sources, suites, and trust policy with positive and adversarial fixtures.",
-      "section": "identity-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.policy/1",
-      "path": "/identity-trust/trust-policy",
-      "title": "Trust policy",
-      "description": "Define which issuers, roots, resolvers, suites, audiences, and freshness windows are acceptable.",
-      "section": "identity-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.identity-trust.context/1",
-      "path": "/identity-trust/verification-context",
-      "title": "Verification context",
-      "description": "Build the exact trusted context used for one deterministic verification.",
-      "section": "identity-trust"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.runtime/1",
-      "path": "/operations",
-      "title": "Production operations",
-      "description": "Deploy and operate the open Auths runtime with durable state, hardened custody, closed gateways, and verifiable recovery.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.backup/1",
-      "path": "/operations/backup-and-restore",
-      "title": "Backup and restore",
-      "description": "Back up and restore runtime state without losing replay, budget, recovery, or receipt integrity.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.configure/1",
-      "path": "/operations/configure",
-      "title": "Configure",
-      "description": "Configure state, custody, trust, profiles, and provider gateways as independent production ports.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.custody/1",
-      "path": "/operations/configure/custody",
-      "title": "Custody",
-      "description": "Keep authority and receipt signing keys behind a narrow signer port.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.state/1",
-      "path": "/operations/configure/durable-state",
-      "title": "Durable state",
-      "description": "Configure multi-host durable state for replay, use, budget, plans, executions, and receipts.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.gateways/1",
-      "path": "/operations/configure/provider-gateways",
-      "title": "Provider gateways",
-      "description": "Map verified sealed commands to least-privilege provider effects behind closed gateways.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.trust/1",
-      "path": "/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles",
-      "title": "Trust and profiles",
-      "description": "Configure roots, issuers, resolvers, status, suites, and profiles explicitly.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.deploy/1",
-      "path": "/operations/deploy-runtime",
-      "title": "Deploy the runtime",
-      "description": "Deploy the runtime as a small HTTPS control boundary around durable state and provider gateways.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.evaluate/1",
-      "path": "/operations/evaluate-locally",
-      "title": "Evaluate locally",
-      "description": "Run the complete production topology locally before choosing infrastructure.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.execution-lifecycle/1",
-      "path": "/operations/execution-lifecycle",
-      "title": "Execution lifecycle",
-      "description": "Choose retry, resume, reconcile, or stop from the durable execution phase.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents/1",
-      "path": "/operations/incidents",
-      "title": "Incident response",
-      "description": "Respond to state loss, signer outage, trust-root error, provider uncertainty, receipt disclosure, and credential compromise.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.credential/1",
-      "path": "/operations/incidents/compromised-credential",
-      "title": "Compromised credential",
-      "description": "Contain a compromised signer, provider, operator, or deployment credential.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.provider-unknown/1",
-      "path": "/operations/incidents/provider-unknown",
-      "title": "Provider unknown",
-      "description": "Resolve an execution whose provider outcome is unknown without repeating the effect.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.disclosure/1",
-      "path": "/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure",
-      "title": "Receipt disclosure",
-      "description": "Respond to excessive, unauthorized, or leaked receipt disclosure.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.signer-outage/1",
-      "path": "/operations/incidents/signer-outage",
-      "title": "Signer outage",
-      "description": "Operate safely when issuance or receipt custody is unavailable.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.state-loss/1",
-      "path": "/operations/incidents/state-loss",
-      "title": "State loss",
-      "description": "Contain and recover from missing, rolled-back, corrupted, or split runtime state.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.incidents.trust-root/1",
-      "path": "/operations/incidents/trust-root-error",
-      "title": "Trust-root error",
-      "description": "Contain an incorrect, expired, unavailable, or compromised trust root.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.observability/1",
-      "path": "/operations/observability",
-      "title": "Observability",
-      "description": "Observe runtime health, dependencies, outcomes, latency, recovery, and redaction without leaking authority content.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.receipts/1",
-      "path": "/operations/receipt-retention",
-      "title": "Receipt retention",
-      "description": "Retain, disclose, and delete receipt evidence according to integrity and privacy needs.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.recovery/1",
-      "path": "/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation",
-      "title": "Recovery and reconciliation",
-      "description": "Resume and reconcile interrupted execution without blind provider retry.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.security/1",
-      "path": "/operations/security-checklist",
-      "title": "Security checklist",
-      "description": "Apply a production security checklist to every Auths boundary.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.operations.upgrade/1",
-      "path": "/operations/upgrade-and-rollback",
-      "title": "Upgrade and rollback",
-      "description": "Upgrade or roll back runtime releases while preserving semantic and state compatibility.",
-      "section": "operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference/1",
       "path": "/reference",
       "title": "Reference",
-      "description": "Look up exact SDK, Runtime API, CLI, profile, error, schema, evidence, and manifest contracts for one release.",
-      "section": "reference"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.cli/1",
-      "path": "/reference/cli",
-      "title": "CLI",
-      "description": "Check whether the selected release declares a supported public CLI surface.",
-      "section": "reference"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.errors/1",
-      "path": "/reference/errors",
-      "title": "Errors",
-      "description": "Look up stable parse, trust, denial, lifecycle, execution, provider, recovery, and disclosure outcomes.",
-      "section": "reference"
+      "description": "Exact SDK, protocol, adapter, limit, and conformance material for Auths.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "group": "SDKs",
+      "content": "Reference Use this section when you need the exact public surface or protocol contract. If you are still deciding how Auths fits your application, begin with a guide; the reference assumes you already know whether you are authenticating an identity, verifying authority, or executing through a closed profile. Choose the boundary you are implementing You need to… Start here Build an application workflow in Node or a browser TypeScript SDK Build an application workflow in Python Python SDK Embed deterministic verification in Rust Rust facades and crates Handle an authorization or runtime outcome safely Decisions, errors, and safe responses Supply identity, lifecycle, or assurance facts Evidence, status, assurance, and registries Implement or review the wire contract Limits, encoding, and identifiers Select or qualify a principal control method Principal adapters Compare another implementation with Auths V1 Conformance and independent implementations What the reference promises Every generated value identifies the pinned Auths product revision and the artifact it describes. SDK declarations come from the packed npm package or installed wheel. Stable codes and protocol tables come from normative core inputs. Example output appears only when the product runner captured it. Repository local evidence is not a publication, production readiness, or security audit claim. Auths is prelaunch and pre audit. One verifier, several product boundaries The portable operation accepts three byte inputs—a proof bundle, a canonical action, and a trusted context—and returns a canonical verification result. The core is deterministic and effect free. Replay state, budgets, credentials, provider calls, receipts, and recovery belong to outer product layers. That separation explains why the SDK reference has more than one entry point: identity can be used without authority, verification can be used without effects, and execution is available only through a closed profile and runtime."
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.evidence/1",
-      "path": "/reference/evidence",
-      "title": "Evidence",
-      "description": "Resolve every public assurance claim to status, checksum, reproduction, scope, and limitation.",
-      "section": "reference"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.manifest/1",
-      "path": "/reference/manifest.json",
-      "title": "Reference manifest",
-      "description": "Consume the machine-readable identity-to-URL manifest for the selected docs contract.",
-      "section": "reference"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.profiles/1",
-      "path": "/reference/profiles",
-      "title": "Profiles",
-      "description": "Inspect maintained and application-owned action, resource, command, budget, and receipt projection contracts.",
-      "section": "reference"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.runtime-api/1",
-      "path": "/reference/runtime-api",
-      "title": "Runtime API",
-      "description": "Inspect exact HTTPS methods, paths, limits, outcomes, recovery, and receipt-disclosure contracts.",
-      "section": "reference"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.schemas/1",
-      "path": "/reference/schemas",
-      "title": "Schemas",
-      "description": "Inspect canonical bounded inputs, wire artifacts, commands, receipts, and disclosure view schemas.",
-      "section": "reference"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk/1",
-      "path": "/reference/sdk",
-      "title": "SDK reference",
-      "description": "Switch Rust, TypeScript, and Python while remaining on the same Auths operation.",
-      "section": "reference"
+      "path": "/reference/typescript",
+      "title": "TypeScript SDK",
+      "description": "Navigate the public @auths-dev/sdk entry points from a high-level protected workflow to effect-free verification and extension contracts.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "group": "SDKs",
+      "content": "TypeScript SDK @auths dev/sdk is one package with progressively disclosed entry points. Most applications begin with the root workflow plus a maintained integration and a closed profile. Applications that only need identity or verification can use those surfaces without constructing grants, approvals, runtime state, or an effect capable workflow. The root deliberately does not re export every subpath. Importing from the boundary you intend to use makes identity, verification, execution, extension, and test only code distinguishable in both reviews and package tooling. Pick the smallest public entry point Entry point Use it for It does not do @auths dev/sdk Create, delegate, execute, resume, inspect product results, and handle product errors Re export the lower level identity, verification, profile, framework, or testkit surfaces @auths dev/sdk/identity Decode, resolve, validate, and authenticate method and suite labelled public identities Grant authority or authorize an effect @auths dev/sdk/verify Deterministic proof, decision, receipt, inspection, and disclosure verification Call a provider or return an effect capable execution handle @auths dev/sdk/profiles Construct actions and authorities for qualified closed effect domains Turn an arbitrary operation tag or request object into a provider call @auths dev/sdk/integrations Select maintained development or production composition boundaries Make the development composition production durable @auths dev/sdk/framework Implement the narrowly supported signer and atomic reservation contracts Expose internal protocol machinery as an application framework @auths dev/sdk/testkit Run deterministic adapter and product waist conformance suites Provide production state, custody, or diagnostics The installed artifact reference below enumerates symbols from the packed package declarations and package exports. Source files outside those exports are not public API. Installed TypeScript public API Source: bindings/typescript/api/public api.txt at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . The shortest protected workflow The high level path combines three surfaces: 1. A maintained composition from /integrations owns the workflow resources. 2. A qualified closed profile from /profiles defines the action, authority, verified command, and provider boundary. 3. The root Auths object delegates, executes, resumes, and closes those resources. For the current repository workflow, the maintained MCP profile constructs a tool authority and an exact tool call action. A closed provider exposes only configured tool handlers. Native authorization and durable reservation occur before provider entry. Product owned recipe 03 execute exact action from Auths bbeb6547de33. Declared outcome contract: completed . This projection does not synthesize example output. TypeScript recipe Source: bindings/recipes/typescript/03 execute exact action.ts at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider Register the only provider operation and create development authority for that exact tool name. Pinned source lines 1–14; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action Send the exact profile owned action, require completion, and verify its returned receipt. Pinned source lines 15–22; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry Request a different tool and prove the provider call counter did not advance. Pinned source lines 23–28; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Report the trace and close owned state Emit the declared result and close the development runtime even when the workflow throws. Pinned source lines 29–32; no output is synthesized. Handle closed results exhaustively Execution returns a closed union covering completed, denied, indeterminate, and recovery outcomes. Ordered plan execution carries the corresponding plan completion or plan recovery shape. A completed result carries the provider result and receipt. A denied or indeterminate result never means the provider was called. An exact replay returns the recorded outcome without a second effect. A recoverable result carries an SDK minted opaque execution reference. Resume the same execution; do not serialize an application crafted substitute or blindly invoke the provider again. A conflict means the execution identity is already bound to incompatible commitments or state and must stop. Use the discriminant, stable code, and typed error fields. Do not branch on human readable messages. Verification stays effect free The /verify surface accepts explicit proof, canonical action, and trusted context bytes and exposes verification, receipt verification, inert inspection, and bounded receipt disclosure. A verifier result can tell you that authority was established, but it does not become the product runtime's sealed command. This distinction makes it safe to build auditors, gateways, offline checkers, and UI inspection tools without accidentally acquiring provider authority. Differential diagnostic tools remain under /testkit rather than the normal verification surface. Identity can be adopted independently The /identity surface carries canonical method and suite labelled public identity data. Applications provide or select method and signature suite adapters. Successful authentication binds exact message bytes to an identity; it does not create a capability, approval, grant, or execution permission. This is useful when a team wants Auths identity packets or transport neutral identity exchange before adopting bounded authority. Resource ownership The high level object owns native sessions, signers, and other composition resources. Close it in a finally block, or use asynchronous explicit resource management on runtimes that support it. Delegated child sessions are separate owned resources and must also be closed. Development and production compositions have different guarantees. The development composition uses ephemeral keys and in memory or explicitly development recovery state. It is not production durable. Production requires qualified profile integrations, durable atomic reservation, reviewed custody, receipt persistence and disclosure policy, and explicit reconciliation. Runtime and publication status TypeScript runtime contract Source: bindings/typescript/sdk runtime contract.json at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Package: @auths dev/sdk 1.0.0 rc.1 Public entry points: . , ./identity , ./verify , ./profiles , ./integrations , ./framework , ./testkit Required WASM exports: authoringAbiVersionV1 , identityAbiVersionV1 , encodeIdentityDescriptorV1 , decodeIdentityDescriptorV1 , identityDescriptorSigningPreimageV1 , verifyV1 , verifyBatchV1 Qualified profiles: auths.mcp/1 Publication: repository candidate; registry promotion is not asserted by this snapshot. Repository local implementation evidence does not imply that a package has been published, promoted, or independently reviewed. Publication, promotion, and independent review remain separate statuses. Extension boundary Use /framework only when you are implementing a supported production port. The current public topology names signer custody and atomic reservation as framework contracts. Use /testkit to certify candidate implementations and to exercise the product waist. Do not copy internal workflow classes, protocol objects, or test helpers into an application adapter merely because they exist in the source tree. A public extension contract must appear in the packed export map and public API snapshot."
     },
     {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk.python/1",
-      "path": "/reference/sdk/python",
+      "path": "/reference/python",
       "title": "Python SDK",
-      "description": "Inspect installed Python symbols and their native operation mappings.",
-      "section": "reference"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk.rust/1",
-      "path": "/reference/sdk/rust",
-      "title": "Rust SDK",
-      "description": "Inspect maintained Rust SDK symbols and their operation mappings.",
-      "section": "reference"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "auths.page.reference.sdk.typescript/1",
-      "path": "/reference/sdk/typescript",
-      "title": "TypeScript SDK",
-      "description": "Inspect installed TypeScript symbols and their native operation mappings.",
-      "section": "reference"
+      "description": "Navigate the typed public auths modules, async resource ownership, closed workflow results, and extension contracts.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "group": "SDKs",
+      "content": "Python SDK The auths wheel exposes the same product topology as the TypeScript package using idiomatic Python modules and native backed types. Most applications begin with the root workflow, auths.integrations , and auths.profiles . Identity and effect free verification remain independently usable. Installed wheels include the native implementation, so a normal consumer does not need a Rust toolchain. Exact supported Python versions, platforms, wheel ABI, and distribution status must come from the installed wheel and runtime contract shown below. Pick the smallest public module Module Use it for It does not do auths Create, delegate, execute, resume, inspect product results, and handle product errors Re export every lower level module auths.identity Decode, resolve, validate, and authenticate method and suite labelled identities Grant authority or authorize an effect auths.verify Verify proofs, decisions, and receipts; inspect inert projections; create bounded disclosures Call a provider or return an effect capable execution object auths.profiles Construct actions and authorities for qualified closed effect domains Accept an arbitrary provider operation or payload auths.integrations Select maintained development and production composition boundaries, plus identity transport integration Make development state or keys production ready auths.framework Implement the proven signer and atomic reservation contracts Reimplement core semantics in Python auths.testkit Certify adapters and exercise deterministic conformance suites Provide production custody, persistence, or telemetry All intended public modules use explicit all declarations and installed wheel typing checks. A source module that does not appear in the installed public inventory is not an application API. Installed Python public API Source: bindings/python/api/public api.txt at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . The shortest protected workflow The normal async workflow is: 1. Construct an exact authority and action through a qualified profile. 2. Supply a closed provider whose handlers expose only configured operations. 3. Open a maintained Auths composition with async with . 4. Execute and exhaustively handle the closed result. 5. Let the context manager close owned signers and native sessions. Product owned recipe 03 execute exact action from Auths bbeb6547de33. Declared outcome contract: completed . This projection does not synthesize example output. Python recipe Qualification blocked — Python source does not match the pinned public API. The pinned recipe imports verify receipt from auths , while the pinned installed API exports it only from auths.verify . The source is retained for review but must not be presented as runnable until the product recipe is corrected and re executed. Source: bindings/recipes/python/03 execute exact action.py at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider Register the only provider operation and count every entry into that effect boundary. Pinned source lines 1–19; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action Open the owned development session, execute the exact action, and verify its receipt. Pinned source lines 20–30; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry Request a different tool and prove the provider call counter stayed at one. Pinned source lines 31–37; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Report the trace through the owned entry point Leave the session before emitting the declared result, then run the asynchronous entry point. Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized. The pinned recipe currently fails its public import check: it imports verify receipt from auths , while the pinned public inventory exports that symbol from auths.verify . This recipe remains qualification blocked until its source and public import agree; a TypeScript result is not Python evidence. Publication requires the recipe to execute against the same wheel used to generate the reference. Async ownership is part of correctness Use async with for the normal lifecycle. Applications that cannot use a context manager may explicitly await auths.aclose() . Both paths are intended to be idempotent and release the resources owned by the composition. Delegated children are separately owned sessions. Do not assume that garbage collection will promptly close native sessions, signers, file backed recovery state, or provider resources. Handle values, not message strings The high level API returns typed completed, denied, indeterminate, replay, conflict, and recoverable values. Expected authorization and recovery outcomes are not generic exceptions. Denied and indeterminate never authorize provider entry. Exact replay returns recorded state and must not call the provider again. Recoverable state must be resumed with the SDK minted opaque reference for the same execution. A conflict is a stop condition, not an invitation to generate a new request identifier. Use the typed discriminant and stable code. Product and adapter exceptions carry their own error contract; messages are for humans and may be redacted. Effect free verification auths.verify exposes single and batch proof verification, receipt verification, inert decision and receipt inspection, and bounded disclosure. It accepts explicit bytes and returns ordinary inspection or verification values. It cannot mint the native owned authorization object used by a closed profile to perform an effect. This boundary matters in Python because ordinary user code is highly dynamic: application code must not be able to create an effect capable authorization object by setting a flag, constructing a dataclass, or monkey patching a wrapper. Native ownership preserves the boundary. Standalone identity auths.identity can carry, decode, resolve, and authenticate identities without importing capabilities, approvals, or runtime execution. Identity methods and signature suites remain explicit and replaceable. Successful authentication binds exact bytes to a public identity; it does not authorize an application action or prevent replay on its own. Development and production The development composition uses ephemeral keys and in memory state, with an explicitly development only recovery option where provided. It is suitable for learning and local tests, not production durability. A production composition needs a qualified closed profile, durable atomic reservation, reviewed signer custody, credential acquisition after authorization and reservation, receipt retention and access controls, observability without secret leakage, and profile specific reconciliation. Run the bounded doctor command from the installed wheel to inspect runtime, ABI, semantic subject, state, and profile facts. It must not read application secrets or print protocol payloads. Python runtime contract Source: bindings/python/sdk runtime contract.json at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Package: auths 1.0.0rc1 · abi3 py39 Runtime: CPython 3.9 , 3.10 , 3.11 , 3.12 , 3.13 , 3.14 Operating systems: linux, macos, windows Public modules: auths , auths.identity , auths.verify , auths.profiles , auths.integrations , auths.framework , auths.testkit Distribution: wheels published ; source distribution not published ; local compiler required false Extension boundary and parity auths.framework contains only the narrow supported contracts that Python applications may implement, including signer custody and atomic reservation. Candidate implementations should pass the corresponding auths.testkit conformance suite before they are used by a production composition. Parity with TypeScript means the same product operation, result meaning, security boundary, and qualified profile—not identical spelling or a shared implementation in either language. Differential fixtures should prove that both bindings delegate semantic operations to the same Rust owned waist."
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "/reference/rust",
+      "title": "Rust facades and crate map",
+      "description": "Start from the supported Rust facade, then descend into protocol, authoring, adapters, profiles, and product mechanisms only when your integration needs them.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "group": "SDKs",
+      "content": "Rust facades and crate map Rust exposes both the portable verifier and the lower level building blocks used to implement it. Most consumers should not assemble those crates themselves. Start with the facade matching your job, then descend only when you need explicit control over a boundary. Start with a facade auths auths is the supported embedded core coordinate. It re exports the auths proof facade while adding no I/O, provider, profile, custody, or runtime behavior. Use it when an application wants one stable dependency for offline Auths V1 verification. auths proof auths proof exposes the bounded protocol engine and actionable result projection. The common operation supplies three explicit byte inputs: proof, canonical action, and trusted context. The result contains the three way verdict, stable code, stage, deterministic resource metrics, portable result, and exact result CBOR. Malformed untrusted proof input is an ordinary verification result. The Rust Result error around the facade represents failure to encode or decode the engine's own canonical result—not a denied proof. The native typed operation is available for profile decoders that already hold a validated canonical action and verifier context. The sealed verified action has no public constructor. auths sdk auths sdk is the idiomatic embedded authorization SDK. It helps an integration construct explicit trusted contexts, call the kernel, and decode a sealed verified action through a closed profile. It re exports deliberately selected authoring, custody, error, model, and profile surfaces. It does not turn the Rust facade into a generic remote action executor. Durable replay state, credentials, provider gateways, receipts, and reconciliation remain product or profile concerns. Offline verification example Product owned external consumer example from demos/offline verification . Source revision: bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . No output is synthesized by the documentation projection. Source: demos/offline verification/src/main.rs at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Step 1: Load the verifier and canonical inputs Import the verifier ports and embed the proof, action, and trusted context fixture bytes. Pinned source lines 1–7; no output is synthesized. Step 2: Build the verifier owned context Register accepted adapters and bind the exact executable configuration and required plan outside the proof. Pinned source lines 9–24; no output is synthesized. Step 3: Verify without executing Run the offline kernel and project bounded diagnostic and work information from the result. Pinned source lines 26–37; no output is synthesized. Step 4: Inspect portable commitments Read proof, action, context, and configuration commitments without acquiring any execution capability. Pinned source lines 38–47; no output is synthesized. Step 5: Handle every verdict fail closed Continue only for authorized results that satisfy the host required plan; denied and indeterminate both stop. Pinned source lines 49–63; no output is synthesized. The example is compiled as an external consumer against the pinned crate artifacts. Its verification path performs no resolver, network, database, filesystem, clock, or private key I/O. Indeterminate remains non authorizing and may change only when the host supplies new trusted facts or exact support. Crates by responsibility The following map explains why the crate groups exist without duplicating every package name. Protocol model and codec These crates own validated V1 types, deterministic CBOR, domain separated identifiers, canonical fixtures, and the three input portable contract. Use them when implementing a profile, adapter, independent encoding tool, or protocol level integration that cannot be expressed through the facade. Pure authority semantics Authority, composition, assurance, registries, signature suites, and the sealed verifier remain deterministic and effect free. They decide attenuation, plan satisfaction, evidence requirements, status, action binding, and stable results from explicit inputs. These crates must not acquire evidence, read a clock, call a provider, or own mutable replay state. Authoring and custody ports Authoring produces deterministic statements and external signing requests. Private key custody remains behind a separate port. This lets applications use HSMs, KMS products, secure enclaves, or other signers without moving key material into the protocol model. Authoring can create a proposed proof; it cannot decide that its own output is authorized. Principal and signature adapters Principal method adapters establish bounded control and assurance facts for raw keys, DIDs, SPIFFE, WebAuthn, or HSM attested identities. Signature suites verify exact domain separated signing input. Network acquisition and mutable lifecycle observations remain outside these pure components. Profiles and product mechanisms Profile crates own canonical application actions, typed verified command decoding, provider gateways, and effect specific result meaning. Product mechanisms own stateful concerns such as atomic reservation, replay, budgets, receipts, custody integration, and recovery. Each profile stays vertically cohesive. Similar looking provider workflows do not share a generic operation dispatcher unless multiple implemented domains prove an identical mechanism through differential evidence. Exchange and transport Exchange crates frame and move bounded proof material. A transport can authenticate a peer or session, but successful delivery never upgrades an invalid proof into authorization. Testkit and conformance Testkit crates construct canonical positive and negative cases and certify specific extension contracts. They are not production dependencies and cannot become alternate sources of protocol truth. Pinned reference request: rust crate map. Product revision: bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Declared sources: Cargo.toml workspace members , architecture.toml , crate package metadata , public rustdoc . Requested projection: crate,public purpose,layer,facade exposure,no std status,rustdoc link; layer and responsibility. The current product snapshot does not carry a structured artifact for this table, so this Markdown projection does not invent one. Dependency direction The monorepo is a layered collection of packages: Dependencies point toward the offline core. A lower layer must not import a higher layer to obtain a convenient type. Introduce a narrow port or move the minimal domain type to the lowest layer that can own it without importing I/O or policy. For a new integration, begin with a cohesive vertical profile in the product layer. Extract shared mechanisms only after independent implementations prove that inputs, outputs, limits, errors, state, and receipt meaning are identical. Result handling Match every Verdict : Authorized allows progression only through the exact verified action and outer runtime gates. Denied is stable for identical inputs; correct the action or authority. Indeterminate is non executable; supply new trusted facts or exact support before verifying again. Use the stable code and stage for machine behavior. The non sensitive explanation is suitable for operator guidance, but it is not a substitute for the typed result. Exhaustive API reference Pinned reference request: rust public api. Product revision: bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Declared sources: cargo rustdoc JSON for auths,auths proof,auths sdk , pinned crate artifact metadata . Requested projection: items,signatures,errors,feature flags,security docs,rustdoc links; facade then module. The current product snapshot does not carry a structured artifact for this table, so this Markdown projection does not invent one."
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "/reference/decisions-errors",
+      "title": "Decisions, errors, and safe responses",
+      "description": "Distinguish authorization verdicts from runtime outcomes and choose a response that cannot widen authority or duplicate an effect.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "group": "Protocol and outcomes",
+      "content": "Decisions, errors, and safe responses Auths gives you two different kinds of answer. The offline verifier tells you whether the supplied proof establishes authority for one exact action. The outer runtime tells you what happened while reserving or performing that action. Treating those answers as one generic success/error flag is unsafe. The first question is always: may this action execute? Only an authorized verdict can cross that boundary, and authorization still does not mean the provider has been called or that the effect succeeded. The three verifier decisions Authorized The proof, trusted context, authority chain, status, assurance, and action binding checks all passed. The result is authorization for the canonical action supplied to this verification—not for a similar object reconstructed from an HTTP request or application model. An authorized result is an input to the execution plane. Channel policy, replay, stateful budgets, application policy, durable reservation, and the closed profile gateway may still stop execution. Denied The trustworthy facts available to the verifier establish that the request is invalid or outside the authority supplied. Examples include an invalid signature, an expanded delegation, a revoked grant, an action body mismatch, or a local policy denial. Repeating the same inputs cannot change a deterministic denial. Do not retry through a weaker verifier, remove a required check, or send the unverified request directly to the provider. Change the action, obtain appropriate authority, or correct the invalid proof. Indeterminate The verifier could not establish a required trustworthy fact or did not have an exact implementation needed by the request. Missing fresh status, unavailable historical evidence, or an unsupported principal method are indeterminate rather than denied. Indeterminate is still non executable. A retry is meaningful only when the host supplies new trusted facts or installs the exact missing implementation. Repeatedly submitting the same inputs is not recovery. Safe response matrix Outcome Could the provider have been reached? Safe response : authorized verifier decision No; the pure verifier performs no I/O Continue only through the configured runtime and closed profile gateway. denied verifier decision No Correct the request or authority. Do not weaken verification or retry identical inputs. indeterminate verifier decision No Supply new trusted facts or exact implementation support, then verify again. completed execution result Yes, with a recorded terminal result Return the result and receipt. Reuse the recorded result for the same execution identity. exact replay runtime result It was reached by the original execution, not this replay Return the original recorded outcome. Do not call the provider again. not applied runtime result The runtime established that the effect was not applied Follow the profile's recovery contract; never construct a replacement command from unchecked input. conflict runtime result Possibly Stop. The execution identity is already bound to different commitments or state. Investigate rather than retrying. recoverable runtime result Possibly, including an ambiguous response Preserve the opaque execution reference and resume or reconcile that same execution. Never mint a replacement reference or blindly retry. The public SDKs expose closed result variants rather than exceptions for these expected workflow outcomes. Programming errors, malformed SDK inputs, broken adapter contracts, or unavailable infrastructure can still surface as typed product errors. Handle them using the product error registry; do not infer a retry policy from message text. Stable codes are protocol data A stable verifier code identifies the deterministic first failure and the stage that produced it. Codes use exact hyphenated protocol values such as action body mismatch ; locally translated aliases are not interchangeable. Never translate a hyphenated stable code into a language local alias. The table below comes from the normative V1 taxonomy and preserves the distinction between denied codes, indeterminate requirements, outer runtime failures, and codes reserved but not emitted by a conforming V1 verifier. Pinned stable failure taxonomy Source: core/spec/v1/error codes.md at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Stable Failure Taxonomy — V1 The enforcement decision is binary: executable or not executable. The proof verifier retains three diagnostic classes. Authorized Code Meaning authorized Every proof, authority, status, assurance, and action binding check passed Denied Code Stage Meaning malformed proof decode Input is not a complete bounded V1 object non canonical proof decode Encoding or set order is not canonical resource limit exceeded any Configured byte, count, depth, signature, or work limit exceeded digest mismatch resolve Content does not match its identifier duplicate object resolve Duplicate identifier or semantic object missing reference resolve Required digest reference is absent unused critical evidence resolve Critical evidence is unconsumed invalid signature control Cryptographic signature is invalid principal method mismatch control Principal and selected method disagree verification method mismatch control Verification method is not valid for principal/purpose signature suite mismatch control Suite and key are incompatible untrusted root authority No scoped local anchor covers the root broken grant chain authority Issuer, subject, parent, actor, or profile linkage is broken delegation expanded authority A child widened an authority dimension permission not granted authority Terminal authority lacks the exact permission action constraint mismatch authority Body digest is outside the granted constraint budget ceiling exceeded authority Requested budget exceeds or mismatches the signed ceiling composition requirement not met authority Authorized branches do not satisfy the trusted expected plan, quorum, actor diversity, or root diversity obligation plan action mismatch action Branches bind different action meaning or plan action body mismatch action Canonical body digest differs audience mismatch action Audience differs from verifier context challenge mismatch action Challenge differs from verifier context action outside validity action Action is not live principal revoked status Accepted status says principal is revoked grant revoked status Accepted status says grant or ancestor is revoked status sequence rollback status Status sequence moves backwards status method mismatch status Subject status exists only under another exact method status issuer untrusted status A valid status signature was made by an issuer outside snapshot trust registry manifest mismatch control Context manifest differs from the immutable executable registry verifier configuration mismatch control Context configuration commitment differs from the exact executable adapter and registry configuration resource namespace mismatch authority Selected matcher rejects every root namespace critical extension unknown extension Required extension is not registered attachment missing action Required signed attachment bytes are absent attachment digest mismatch action Detached bytes do not hash to the signed identifier attachment length mismatch action Detached byte length differs from the signed length duplicate attachment resolve/action An attachment identifier occurs more than once unused critical attachment action Signed descriptors and supplied detached inputs do not correspond opaque attachment not allowed action Encrypted bytes were supplied where opaque verification was not signed as acceptable local policy denied policy Explicit local policy rejects established facts Indeterminate Code Stage Meaning unsupported protocol decode Protocol major is not supported unsupported principal method control Required method is not registered unsupported signature suite control Required suite is not registered unsupported evidence type evidence Evidence verifier is unavailable unsupported status method status Required status verifier is unavailable unsupported profile action Required profile/version is unavailable unsupported profile policy policy Accepted profile policy ID has no exact executable handler unsupported resource matcher authority Accepted resource matcher has no exact executable handler unsupported budget algebra authority Accepted budget algebra has no exact executable handler unsupported critical extension extension Accepted critical extension has no exact executable handler unsupported assurance claim assurance An adapter emitted a claim without an accepted exact handler missing principal evidence control Required control fact cannot be established missing principal status status Required principal status is absent missing grant status status Required grant status is absent stale status status Status exists but is not fresh enough historical state unavailable evidence Historical control/existence cannot be established assurance requirement not met assurance Required parameterized claim is absent external fact unavailable evidence Required bounded external fact was not supplied Outer runtime failures These are never Auths authorization verdicts: Code Meaning challenge unknown Challenge was not issued challenge expired Challenge expired challenge consumed Challenge was already claimed replay store unavailable Atomic replay state unavailable budget exhausted Stateful budget cannot be claimed budget store unavailable Budget state unavailable channel policy failed Peer observation does not satisfy local policy application policy failed Verified action violates a local restriction receipt store unavailable Receipt persistence policy cannot be met execution failed Authorized command failed during execution Reason codes and diagnostic class are normative corpus fields. Reserved V1 codes The following codes remain allocated in the portable enum but are not emitted by a validly decoded V1 proof: Code Reason reserved ambiguous terminal grant Action envelopes carry one explicit terminal grant, so ambiguity is rejected as malformed before authority evaluation authorization plan invalid The canonical decoder and model constructors validate plan shape and limits; invalid shapes are malformed proof or resource limit exceeded before composition reference cycle V1 grant identifiers are content hashes of statements containing their parent identifiers; a constructible cycle cannot pass content address validation, so ordinary broken graphs produce missing reference or digest mismatch Reserved codes have no corpus vector and MUST NOT be emitted by a conforming V1 portable verifier. Do not collapse protocol and provider failures The following events are different and should remain different in logs, metrics, receipts, and user interfaces: 1. Denied: the action never becomes executable. 2. Indeterminate: the action never becomes executable, but new trusted facts may make a later verification decidable. 3. Known provider failure before effect: the profile knows the effect did not happen and applies its explicit release or recovery rule. 4. Known provider failure after effect: the effect happened even though a later step failed; the runtime records the observed effect. 5. Provider outcome unknown: the provider may have applied the effect but the acknowledgement was lost. The runtime retains uncertainty and blocks a blind retry until reconciliation. A network timeout is therefore not permission to submit the action again. Likewise, a valid signature is not permission to bypass a denial. The closed profile owns the meaning of provider outcomes and the exact operation needed to reconcile them. First failure ordering Auths V1 uses deterministic first failure ordering so implementations and receipts agree on one primary stage and code. That ordering is useful for portable tests and operator playbooks. It is not a claim that verification reveals no timing, cache, power, or other side channel. For diagnostics, preserve the stable code, stage, commitments, and safe response. Avoid logging proof bytes, detached attachments, credentials, or sensitive disclosed receipt fields. Generated product result reference Product errors and safe responses Source: product/errors/v1/registry.json at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Code Family Effect state Recommended response core.invalid configuration configuration not applied correct configuration core.unsupported abi runtime not applied install compatible runtime core.unsupported semantic subject runtime not applied install compatible runtime core.malformed input input not applied correct input core.native runtime unavailable runtime not applied retry execution core.forged execution reference state not applied correct input core.runtime conflict state not applied satisfy condition core.runtime unavailable runtime not applied retry execution core.runtime cancelled state not applied retry execution core.outcome unknown provider possible resume and reconcile core.observation pending provider possible resume and reconcile core.observation inconclusive provider possible resume and reconcile core.workflow terminal state not applied inspect receipt core.internal invariant internal not applied contact support mcp.invalid handler output profile possible resume and reconcile mcp.handler failed provider possible resume and reconcile mcp.handler timeout provider possible resume and reconcile mcp.cancelled before entry profile not applied retry execution mcp.reservation conflict state not applied satisfy condition mcp.replay state not applied inspect receipt mcp.receipt persist failed state applied contact support mcp.reconciliation pending provider possible resume and reconcile plan.member interrupted provider possible resume and reconcile plan.member failed before entry profile not applied satisfy condition plan.resume reference invalid state not applied correct input plan.reconciliation pending provider possible resume and reconcile plan.action substituted input not applied correct input custody.denied provider not applied satisfy condition custody.cancelled provider not applied satisfy condition custody.throttled provider not applied satisfy condition custody.unavailable provider not applied satisfy condition custody.revoked key provider not applied correct configuration custody.disabled key provider not applied satisfy condition custody.provider unknown provider not applied contact support custody.invalid provider response provider not applied contact support custody.request mismatch input not applied contact support custody.principal mismatch input not applied contact support custody.descriptor mismatch input not applied contact support custody.key version mismatch input not applied contact support custody.transaction mismatch input not applied contact support custody.malformed signature input not applied contact support custody.non canonical signature input not applied contact support custody.signature verification failed input not applied contact support custody.evidence mismatch input not applied contact support custody.lifecycle not permitted state not applied satisfy condition"
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "/reference/evidence-status-assurance",
+      "title": "Evidence, status, assurance, and registries",
+      "description": "Understand how bounded adapters establish facts without acquiring trust or manufacturing authority.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "group": "Protocol and outcomes",
+      "content": "Evidence, status, assurance, and registries Auths separates the question “what facts can this verifier establish?” from the question “does authority cover this action?” This is the boundary behind the project rule: Auths owns authority. Adapters establish bounded facts. A principal adapter can establish that a particular key controlled a principal under a particular method. A status method can establish that a grant was active in a trusted snapshot. An assurance adapter can establish a parameterized claim about one participant. None of them may produce an authorized result, choose a trust anchor, widen a grant, or execute an effect. Evidence is input, not trust Evidence objects are bounded, content addressed values selected by an exact evidence type. A control binding connects a signed statement to the evidence its principal adapter is expected to consume. For a successfully verified statement, the evidence identifiers in the binding must equal the identifiers the adapter reports as consumed. This is an important fail closed rule: missing required evidence cannot be silently ignored; extra evidence cannot influence an adapter through an undeclared side channel; an adapter cannot claim it consumed evidence absent from the signed binding; successful resolution does not itself make evidence trustworthy. Fetching a DID document, certificate chain, KERI checkpoint, WebAuthn registration, or HSM attestation record is an outer acquisition concern. The pure verifier receives bounded evidence and immutable local context, then revalidates their exact relationship. Status answers narrow lifecycle questions Principal and grant status are separate signed fact families. Each statement binds an exact method, subject, issuer, sequence, and validity boundary. The trusted verifier snapshot—not the proof—selects accepted issuers and minimum sequence floors. Selection is deterministic. A later accepted sequence supersedes an earlier one, and revocation dominates active status at the same sequence. A rollback, wrong method, untrusted issuer, stale statement, missing statement, and authenticated revocation remain different outcomes. Do not treat these facts as synonyms: Fact What it can establish What it cannot establish by itself Current control The controller state was observed within a trusted freshness window That the same key controlled the principal at an earlier signing time Historical control A key was accepted during a particular historical interval That a particular statement existed during that interval Statement existence Exact signing bytes were observed at a particular time Current controller state Revocation check A trusted status source was checked at a stated observation time Authority for an action Grant status A particular grant or ancestor is active or revoked Principal control or signature validity This distinction prevents a removed historical key from creating a new grant and backdating it into a period when that key used to be valid. Assurance belongs to participants and parameters Assurance is not one global strength score. Every assurance report names the participant, its role in the chain, the adapter and version, evidence digests, claim parameters, observation time, and provenance. A policy selects both a role and a quantifier: Any means at least one participant with that role must satisfy the exact requirement. Every means every participant with that role must satisfy it. Roles include roots, intermediates, actors, and external issuers. Strong evidence for the actor cannot repair weak or missing evidence for a required root. Parameters matter too: a hardware attestation claim for one protection profile does not satisfy a requirement for another merely because the claim names look similar. V1 registers no implicit assurance hierarchy. One claim implies another only when an exact implication handler is accepted and installed. An adapter cannot declare its own output “high assurance” and thereby satisfy an unrelated policy. Registries make extension exact The verifier uses immutable registries for principal methods, signature suites, status methods, resource matchers, profile policy, budget algebra, critical extensions, assurance claims, and assurance implications. Each executable entry has: an exact identifier; immutable decision affecting configuration; a configuration commitment; a conservative maximum work charge reserved before invocation; and typed, bounded behavior. The trusted context lists the entries it accepts and binds the expected registry manifest and exact executable verifier configuration. A different manifest or configuration is a denial before pluggable verification. A required accepted identifier without an installed exact handler is indeterminate. An unaccepted signed critical extension is denied. There is no algorithm inference, fallback, or version negotiation. The adapter arrow ends at facts. Only the sealed verifier combines those facts with trust anchors, authority, plans, action binding, and local policy. Generated registry and assurance reference Pinned registry specification Source: core/spec/v1/registry.md at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Auths V1 Initial Registries All lookups are exact. Unknown identifiers return Indeterminate when a required capability is unavailable or Denied when an unknown critical field or contradictory identifier appears. No parser, adapter, or algorithm fallback is permitted. The complete executable target V1 set is bound by the pinned manifest 33 repeated 32 times. A context carrying any other manifest is denied before pluggable verification. Every implementation declares a conservative maximum work cost that is reserved before invocation. Pure semantic registries Kind Target V1 ID Required behavior Resource matcher uri namespace v1 Exact URI namespace boundary matching Profile policy exact v1 Effect free acceptance of already validated canonical action facts Budget algebra numeric ceiling v1 Exact algebra attenuation and coverage using unsigned <= Critical extension exact marker v1 Requires the exact byte string h'01' and otherwise changes no authority Principal status auths principal status v1 Trusted issuer, method, floor, freshness, and revoked dominant latest selection Grant status auths grant status v1 Same selection rules as principal status Critical extension, assurance claim, and assurance implication lookups are also exact executable lookups. An identifier listed by the context without an installed handler is indeterminate; an unaccepted signed critical extension is denied. There is no fallback or version negotiation. Principal methods ID Evidence ceiling Mandatory suites : raw key v1 512 B Ed25519, P 256 did key v1 2 KiB Ed25519, P 256 did keri v1 64 KiB registered KERI compatible suites did web bundled v1 32 KiB Ed25519, P 256 spiffe x509 v1 32 KiB certificate selected registered suite webauthn v1 16 KiB P 256 mandatory hsm attested v1 32 KiB attestation profile selected suite Signature suites ID Public key Signature Rule ed25519 v1 32 byte compressed point 64 bytes RFC 8032 verification of exact preimage p256 sha256 v1 33 byte compressed SEC1 64 byte r s ECDSA/SHA 256, low S required Status methods ID Meaning auths principal status v1 Signed active/revoked/superseded principal state auths grant status v1 Signed active/revoked/superseded grant state keri checkpoint v1 KERI sequence and witness/transparency checkpoint x509 status v1 Certificate validity and revocation evidence webauthn credential status v1 Registered authenticator credential state local deny list v1 Verifier local explicit deny facts Budget algebras ID Order numeric ceiling v1 child value must be less than or equal to parent Composition operators ID Meaning : 0 Proof 1 AllOf 2 AnyOf 3 KOfN Transports ID Peer observation memory v1 none iroh v1 endpoint and session key https v1 TLS peer and exporter binding tcp v1 endpoint only unix v1 socket and OS peer credentials file v1 envelope and sequence metadata Profiles Profile ID Version Operations : auths.mcp 1 MCP tool calls auths.http 1 canonical HTTP requests auths.git 1 commit, tag, ref, merge, release auths.deploy 1 release and infrastructure deployment auths.supply chain 1 build, attest, publish, promote auths.edge 1 device command and firmware activation Assurance claims The initial claim registry contains: self certifying identifier ; offline verifiable ; controller state current at ; historical at ; statement existence proven at ; rotation aware ; revocation checked at ; witness threshold met ; pki chain validated ; workload attested ; hardware attested ; user verified ; origin bound . Parameterized claims never satisfy unparameterized “high assurance” by name alone. The assurance registry defines exact implication rules. Critical extensions exact marker v1 is the initial non authority changing executable extension. Its body is exactly h'01' ; it exists to exercise exact handler selection, signed byte validation, work reservation, and portable interoperability. Unknown critical extensions are denied. New attenuation or composition semantics require a protocol review, an executable model, and a new manifest. Assurance implications No implication rule is initially registered. Claim names never imply one another. A future implication must have an exact accepted identifier and a pure executable handler included in a new registry manifest. Pinned assurance claims Documentation contract revision: d0e4a53e5e9582e9eaff1cf38e965252c6c79765 . Claim Status Scope Limitation Approval is bound to exact plan context and cannot authorize substituted plan bytes. passing Maintained approval plan signing requests, responses, and substitution fixtures. The application remains responsible for approver identity, user experience, and organizational policy. Delegated authority cannot become broader than its parent under the maintained model and adversarial fixtures. passing Attenuation relations represented by the maintained formal model and protocol profile. The claim covers the modelled fields and maintained protocol profile, not arbitrary application defined semantics. Receipt inspection defaults to opaque or bounded views and requires authority for full disclosure. passing Maintained receipt summary and disclosure operations and their public runtime contract. Deployment retention, access control, and downstream handling remain application responsibilities. Maintained product workflows reach provider adapters only through opaque native authorized commands. passing Maintained execution workflows and their opaque native command and gateway boundary. Application owned adapters can still be implemented unsafely outside the maintained boundary. Maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python scenarios target identical stable semantic outcomes. passing The maintained installed artifact scenarios declared for Rust, TypeScript, and Python. Scenario parity covers maintained workflows and versions, not every possible application composition. Maintained runtime paths preserve replay, use, budget, and recovery distinctions. passing Maintained runtime and installed SDK workflows for replay, use, budget, reservation, and recovery outcomes. Production guarantees also depend on the selected durable store and its deployment. Rust owns protocol meaning used by Rust, TypeScript, and Python projections. passing The declared protocol and product semantic identities consumed by maintained Rust, TypeScript, and Python surfaces. The semantic freeze detects declared semantic drift; it is not a proof that every implementation is defect free. The assessed release builder satisfies the recorded SLSA Build Level 3 requirements. passing The assessed GitHub release builder and recorded SLSA 1.2 Build Level 3 controls. This is a repository owner delegated build assessment, not an independent security audit or source correctness proof. Integration checklist When you add or review an adapter, verify all of the following: 1. Live acquisition is outside the offline kernel. 2. The proof cannot choose its own trust roots or immutable adapter context. 3. Inputs, output facts, byte limits, work limits, and errors are typed and bounded. 4. The adapter reports exactly the evidence it consumed. 5. Signature verification remains in the separately selected suite unless the method defines an explicit method derived message. 6. Assurance claims name exact participants, parameters, source, adapter, and observation time. 7. Unsupported required behavior is indeterminate rather than inferred. 8. Invalid or contradictory evidence is denied. 9. The implementation cannot construct a verified authority or executable command."
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers",
+      "title": "Limits, canonical encoding, and identifiers",
+      "description": "Review the bounded deterministic byte contract that makes verification portable and resistant to ambiguous or excessive input.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "group": "Protocol and outcomes",
+      "content": "Limits, canonical encoding, and identifiers In Auths, serialization rules are security rules. Signers, verifiers, language bindings, receipts, and independent implementations must agree on the exact bytes and identifiers for the same action. Inputs must also have a known upper bound before an attacker can make the verifier allocate memory or invoke expensive adapters. The tables below project exact current values from the pinned V1 specification; the surrounding explanation connects those limits to the attacks they bound. Canonical bytes prevent alternate meanings Auths V1 uses a constrained deterministic CBOR profile. It permits definite length maps, arrays, text, and byte strings with shortest integer and length encodings. Maps use ascending integer keys, and set like arrays use an explicit canonical order. The decoder rejects: duplicate or out of order keys; non minimal integers and lengths; indefinite length values; floats and tags; invalid UTF 8; non canonical set order; unknown critical fields; and trailing bytes after the one expected object. This avoids a dangerous situation in which two byte sequences appear equivalent to an application but produce different signing or hashing input. Auths does not assume that semantically similar, byte distinct application actions are equivalent. A profile owns the canonical body format for its exact effect. There are two important action digests An application profile first canonicalizes its body. The action envelope signs the resulting body digest together with the profile, capability, resource, actor, audience, challenge, validity, authority, plan, attachments, and other security fields. The portable verifier separately hashes the complete deterministic canonical action input. These digests answer different questions: Canonical body digest: are these the exact profile owned effect bytes authorized by the action envelope? Portable canonical action digest: did implementations receive the same complete portable action input, including detached inputs required by the protocol boundary? Do not substitute a JSON hash, request body hash, transport digest, or provider idempotency key for either value. Signing domains and content identifiers Every signed preimage begins with the Auths domain, protocol major, registered object type, profile identity and version, and the length of the deterministic canonical object. The signing object also binds the principal method, verification method, and signature suite. Content identifiers use a separate AUTHS ID domain and a registered identifier type. A grant ID, action ID, plan ID, evidence ID, status ID, receipt ID, context digest, and proof digest therefore cannot be exchanged merely because they are all 32 byte values. SHA 256 is fixed for V1 content identifiers and body digests. Ed25519 signs the full domain separated preimage. The P 256 suite uses ECDSA with SHA 256, fixed width r s , and rejects high S signatures. SHA 1 is prohibited for security bearing identifiers. Detached attachments remain bound The signed action contains descriptors for detached attachments, including their identifiers, lengths, and policy for required or opaque use. The portable canonical action input supplies the actual detached bytes. The verifier checks correspondence, digest, and length and rejects missing, duplicated, mismatched, or unconsumed critical attachments. Transporting bytes out of band does not remove them from the authorization boundary. Limits bound bytes, structure, and work Auths constrains more than the top level proof size. V1 places limits on input byte lengths, grants, plan leaves and depth, evidence objects, status statements, attachments, signatures, permissions, audiences, critical extensions, registries, trust anchors, and adapter work. Deployments may lower defaults. Raising a protocol hard maximum requires protocol review rather than a runtime flag. The verifier reserves conservative adapter work before invoking a pluggable implementation, so a request cannot smuggle unbounded computation behind a small evidence envelope. Pinned verifier limits Source: core/spec/v1/protocol.md at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Resource Default Hard maximum : : Bundle bytes 256 KiB 8 MiB Canonical action input bytes 2 MiB 16 MiB Trusted context input bytes 2 MiB 16 MiB Grants 16 256 Actions/plan leaves 16 128 Plan depth 8 16 Evidence objects 32 512 One evidence object 64 KiB 2 MiB Control bindings 32 512 Principal status statements 32 512 Grant status statements 32 512 Attachments 32 512 Aggregate detached attachment bytes 1 MiB 8 MiB Signatures 64 1,024 One signature 512 B 4 KiB Permissions 64 1,024 Audiences 32 256 Critical extensions/object 8 32 One critical extension 16 KiB 64 KiB Allowed body digests 32 256 Evidence IDs per binding 8 32 Canonical action body 1 MiB 8 MiB protocol ceiling and lower profile limit Accepted entries per registry 64 1,024 Trust anchors 32 1,024 Adapter work units 50,000 1,000,000 Deployments may lower limits. Raising a hard maximum requires protocol review. Parse into valid types Callers should not carry unchecked strings or generic maps past the boundary. Canonical decoders and model constructors enforce length, ordering, identifier, and structural invariants as values are created. Later stages operate on those validated types instead of repeatedly asking whether an impossible state is present. An invalid encoding is a stable verification result, not a panic. A verifier may report a codec error only when it cannot encode or decode its own canonical result; malformed untrusted proof input remains part of the ordinary bounded decision path. Identifier reference Pinned domain separation specification Source: core/spec/v1/domain separation.md at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Domain Separation and Identifiers — V1 Signing preimage Every signed preimage is: The canonical signing object contains the unsigned statement and its SignatureDescriptor . This binds the principal method, verification method, and signature suite. Object type identifiers are registered: ID Object : 1 grant 2 action 3 principal status 4 grant status 5 decision receipt 6 execution receipt 7 registry manifest 8 bridge grant Profile independent objects use an empty profile ID and version zero. Content identifiers domain hash is: Identifier type identifiers are fixed: ID Identifier : 1 grant statement 2 action envelope 3 authorization plan 4 evidence object content 5 principal status statement 6 grant status statement 7 decision receipt 8 execution receipt 9 public verifier context projection 10 registry manifest Identifiers: GrantId : canonical grant statement , excluding signature; ActionId : canonical action envelope , excluding signature; AuthorizationPlanId : canonical authorization plan ; EvidenceId : canonical evidence type, media type, and bytes; status statement IDs: canonical unsigned status statement; attachment digest: raw SHA 256 of exact attachment bytes; decision/execution receipt IDs: canonical unsigned receipt; context digest: canonical public verifier context projection; canonical body digest: raw SHA 256 of exact profile canonical body bytes; portable canonical action digest: raw SHA 256 of the complete deterministic canonical action CBOR input; proof digest: raw SHA 256 of exact canonical proof bundle bytes. The proof ref is a 32 byte branch identifier generated during authoring and covered by the action signature. It is not derived from an action containing the plan ID, avoiding an identifier cycle. Algorithms V1 content identifiers and body digests use SHA 256. The registry contains no algorithm field for these identifiers. Ed25519 signs the full domain separated preimage. p256 sha256 v1 uses ECDSA P 256 with SHA 256 and fixed width 64 byte r s ; high S signatures are rejected. SHA 1 is prohibited for every security bearing identifier."
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "/reference/principal-adapters",
+      "title": "Principal adapters",
+      "description": "Choose a bounded principal-control method and understand exactly which identity facts it can and cannot establish.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "group": "Protocol and outcomes",
+      "content": "Principal adapters A principal adapter answers a narrow question: does the supplied bounded evidence establish control of this principal, for this verification method and purpose, under immutable verifier local configuration? It does not answer what the principal may do. Signature validity, identity resolution, channel authentication, status evidence, and assurance claims are inputs to authorization—not substitutes for it. The common boundary Every principal method receives the exact principal, verification method, control purpose, signature suite, signing preimage, asserted time, bounded evidence, and method specific immutable context. It returns suite specific verification material, exact consumed evidence identifiers, and bounded assurance claims—or a typed failure. The selected signature suite verifies the Auths statement separately. A method can provide an explicit method derived signature message when its protocol requires one, as WebAuthn does, but that message must still cryptographically commit to the exact Auths signing preimage. Live acquisition stays outside the pure method: DNS and HTTPS retrieval for did:web ; KERI witness or checkpoint acquisition; SPIFFE Workload API and bundle retrieval; WebAuthn registration and browser ceremony setup; HSM provider APIs and attestation chain retrieval. The host turns those observations into bounded evidence and immutable trusted records. A proof cannot provide its own trust root or weaken those records. Pinned principal methods Source: core/spec/v1/registry.md at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . ID Evidence ceiling Mandatory suites : raw key v1 512 B Ed25519, P 256 did key v1 2 KiB Ed25519, P 256 did keri v1 64 KiB registered KERI compatible suites did web bundled v1 32 KiB Ed25519, P 256 spiffe x509 v1 32 KiB certificate selected registered suite webauthn v1 16 KiB P 256 mandatory hsm attested v1 32 KiB attestation profile selected suite Pinned signature suites Source: core/spec/v1/registry.md at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . ID Public key Signature Rule ed25519 v1 32 byte compressed point 64 bytes RFC 8032 verification of exact preimage p256 sha256 v1 33 byte compressed SEC1 64 byte r s ECDSA/SHA 256, low S required Pinned status methods Source: core/spec/v1/registry.md at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . ID Meaning auths principal status v1 Signed active/revoked/superseded principal state auths grant status v1 Signed active/revoked/superseded grant state keri checkpoint v1 KERI sequence and witness/transparency checkpoint x509 status v1 Certificate validity and revocation evidence webauthn credential status v1 Registered authenticator credential state local deny list v1 Verifier local explicit deny facts Self certifying key methods Raw key raw key v1 encodes a closed Ed25519 or compressed P 256 public key form and derives a self certifying principal. The evidence must reconstruct the exact principal and require the exact compatible signature suite. This is the smallest offline method. It can establish a self certifying identifier and offline verifiability. It does not provide rotation, deactivation, historical control, or freshness. Use it only where the host's policy accepts an effectively irrevocable principal or supplies lifecycle facts through another explicit mechanism. did:key did key v1 provides the same broad security shape through a closed subset of the did:key method. V1 accepts only supported Multikey forms for Ed25519 and compressed P 256, and it performs no algorithm inference or fallback. Like raw key, did:key is self certifying and offline verifiable but has no rotation, deactivation, or historical controller state mechanism. Document and event history methods Bundled did:web did web bundled v1 verifies a bounded canonical DID document carried with the proof. Retrieval and verification are deliberately separate. The verifier must supply an explicit host controlled trust record binding the principal and document digest; a self identifying document is not proof that it came from the named host. Current trust records can establish current controller state and a revocation check within an observation window. Historical pins can establish that a document was valid during an interval. Establishing that an exact statement existed during that interval requires a separate exact statement pin. The closed document profile rejects remote contexts, embedded methods, unsupported curves, arbitrary redirects, and unknown root properties. Network retrieval belongs to a resolver that applies allowlists, DNS/IP controls, redirect policy, media type checks, size bounds, and timeouts; that resolver has no authority verification API. did:keri did keri v1 replays a bounded embedded KERI event log and verifies the selected establishment key, sequence, thresholds, links, commitments, and controller signatures for the supported subset. A valid embedded log establishes only the state present in that log. It cannot prove that no later rotation exists elsewhere. Applications requiring current controller state must supply an authenticated checkpoint and require the corresponding freshness claims. Historical statement existence also requires separate authenticated observation; it is not inferred from a complete looking event log. Workload, user, and hardware backed methods SPIFFE X.509 SVID spiffe x509 v1 validates a bounded leaf first certificate path against a verifier selected trust domain bundle. It enforces the exact SPIFFE URI SAN, trust domain relationship, certificate validity at the explicit evaluation time, client auth usage, name constraints, and a supported leaf key. It can establish PKI chain validation and workload attestation. Current status claims require a matching verifier local status observation when policy asks for one. Workload API access and bundle acquisition remain outside the kernel. WebAuthn webauthn v1 binds a WebAuthn assertion challenge to the SHA 256 digest of the exact Auths signing preimage. Verifier local registration records constrain the credential, P 256 key, relying party ID, origins, required flags, counter policy, attestation level, and observation window. The adapter can establish origin binding, user verification when the authenticator reports it, and hardware attestation only when the local record establishes a named attestation level. Browser ceremony initiation, registration, and counter updates remain stateful outer concerns. HSM attested key hsm attested v1 checks a bounded evidence envelope against an immutable verifier local attestation record. That record fixes the key and suite, attestation profile, provider, protection level, key handle and device chain digests, exportability, and observation window. Provider APIs and chain acquisition happen outside the kernel. The method can emit parameterized hardware attestation and current control facts only when the evidence exactly matches the local record and the transaction digest binds the exact Auths statement. How to choose Choose the smallest method that can establish the facts your trust policy actually requires: For a local or embedded offline verifier where rotation is not required, raw key or did:key may be sufficient. For a web controlled identity with current or historical document policy, use bundled did:web with verifier owned trust records. For rotation aware event history, use did:keri and add authenticated checkpoints when current state matters. For workload identity, use SPIFFE with verifier owned trust domain bundles. For a user ceremony bound to origin and relying party, use WebAuthn. For custody or key protection assurance, use an HSM attested method under a reviewed provider specific profile. Do not select a method by marketing level strength. Write the exact assurance, freshness, lifecycle, and historical state requirements first, then choose an adapter capable of establishing those facts. Fail closed behavior An unsupported required method is indeterminate. Malformed, contradictory, or unauthentic evidence is denied. A missing required external fact is indeterminate. Authenticated revocation is denied. Suite, principal, or verification method disagreement is denied. No adapter falls back to another method, guesses an algorithm from byte length, or treats successful retrieval as verified control."
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "/reference/conformance",
+      "title": "Conformance and independent implementations",
+      "description": "Understand what Auths fixtures, mutations, cross-language checks, fuzzing, and formal evidence actually prove.",
+      "section": "reference",
+      "group": "Evidence",
+      "content": "Conformance and independent implementations Auths has several kinds of evidence, and they answer different questions. A matching file digest is not semantic verification. Agreement between three implementations is not a proof that all three are correct. A formal model is not an independent security audit. Use this page to select the evidence appropriate to the claim you are making. The normative V1 corpus The canonical fixture manifest indexes exact proof bundles, canonical actions, trusted contexts, and expected verification results. Each entry records file digests, the expected stage and stable code, applicable protocol identifiers, assurance reports, and resource/work totals. Fixtures cover successful, denied, indeterminate, malformed, boundary, status, and related protocol cases. The inventory below projects its counts and classifications directly from the pinned manifest. Pinned conformance evidence Product revision: bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Canonical fixtures: 102 Fixture classes: denied (48), indeterminate (9), invalid (23), status (2), valid (20) Adversarial mutations: 5 Formal outcomes: 4 Formal theorems: 27 Normative .cbor bytes are not rewritten during an ordinary test run. An explicit reviewed wire update operation is the only path that can replace them. Routine tests compare against the checked in bytes and fail on drift. Five distinct evidence levels 1. Byte equivalence A corpus auditor independently parses one complete deterministic CBOR item and recomputes artifact digests. It can prove that two implementations received and interpreted the same canonical byte structure. It does not prove that they made the correct authority decision. 2. Semantic equivalence An implementation independently executes the V1 verification stages and emits a normalized projection. Cross language checks compare the decision, stable code, identifiers, authorized branches, and assurance report. Agreement is strong regression and interoperability evidence. It is still possible for implementations to share a mistaken reading of the specification, especially if one copied another. 3. Adversarial, property, and fuzz evidence Mutation tests alter valid inputs through operations such as truncation, required field removal, replacement, duplication, or bit changes and require bounded fail closed behavior. Property tests explore invariants such as attenuation, checked arithmetic, deterministic selection, and state machine transitions. Fuzzing explores parser and verification behavior over inputs not enumerated in the canonical corpus. These techniques find classes of implementation defects; none proves the absence of all defects. 4. Formal refinement evidence Formal artifacts state and check mathematical properties of stable pure semantics. The strongest claim requires a link from shipping Rust predicates and representation invariants to the formal model. A separately written model can improve understanding without proving that the production implementation refines it. Provider networks remain explicit nondeterministic boundaries. Formal work can reason about allowed commands, recorded outcomes, observations, and reconciliation, but cannot assume a remote provider behaves atomically. 5. Independent security review An external security assessment evaluates assumptions, design, implementation, and operational boundaries using a process independent of the project. Corpus, fuzz, differential, and formal gates are valuable engineering evidence, but they are not an independent security audit. Auths is currently pre audit. Independent Go and TypeScript verifiers The independent Go and TypeScript implementations must not call the Rust verifier, load its WebAssembly build, or copy expected verdicts from the manifest. Each independently audits deterministic CBOR and implements target V1 semantics. The cross language gate compares both implementations with the Rust verifier on the canonical corpus. It requires exact artifact digest agreement and semantic agreement on a normalized projection. Keeping expected verdicts out of the independent implementations is essential: otherwise the check would only prove that each program can repeat the fixture manifest. Cross language journey evidence Source: bindings/customer journey matrix v1.json at bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Semantic owner: Rust TypeScript public symbols: 193 Python public symbols: 159 Maintained TypeScript recipes: 5 Maintained Python recipes: 5 Registered journeys: 10 What a conforming implementation must preserve A V1 implementation must agree on more than an authorized boolean. It must preserve: deterministic decoding and rejection of non canonical input; bounded bytes, objects, nesting, signatures, and adapter work; exact graph resolution and content identifiers; principal control, signature, status, assurance, and registry behavior; authority attenuation and composition semantics; canonical action binding; deterministic first failure stage and stable code; authorized branches and assurance satisfactions; resource and work accounting; and exact canonical result encoding where the portable boundary requires it. Execution, replay databases, live evidence acquisition, credentials, and provider reconciliation remain outside the portable verifier corpus. They need separate product and profile conformance suites. Reading an evidence badge Read every evidence label as a precise, bounded claim: Label Appropriate meaning Canonical fixture Exact checked in byte case with a normative expected result Corpus conformant Implementation agrees with the complete pinned corpus Cross language differential Named implementations agree on the normalized semantic projection Property tested The named invariant was exercised over generated inputs within the stated bounds Fuzzed The named target completed the stated fuzz campaign without a detected failure Formally checked The named theorem/model relationship was checked under stated assumptions Independently audited Use only for a completed outside assessment with a published scope Avoid a generic “verified” badge that erases these differences. Generated conformance status Pinned conformance evidence Product revision: bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c . Canonical fixtures: 102 Fixture classes: denied (48), indeterminate (9), invalid (23), status (2), valid (20) Adversarial mutations: 5 Formal outcomes: 4 Formal theorems: 27"
     }
   ]
 }
diff --git a/public/sitemap.xml b/public/sitemap.xml
index 154ad7e..b418199 100644
--- a/public/sitemap.xml
+++ b/public/sitemap.xml
@@ -1,150 +1,31 @@
 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 <urlset xmlns="http://www.sitemaps.org/schemas/sitemap/0.9">
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/approved-plans</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/delegation</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/how-auths-works</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/identity</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/mcp</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/mcp/client</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/mcp/protect-server</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/mcp/tool-profiles</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/mcp/transport-boundary</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/multi-agent</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/production-patterns</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/quickstart</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/skills-and-plugins</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/agents/testing</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/adversarial</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/authority</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/cross-language</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/disclosure</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/execution</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/formal</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/limitations</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/semantics</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/assurance/supply-chain</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/constraints</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/create</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/delegate</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/delegate/depth-and-chain</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/delegate/widening-failures</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/execute</loc></url>
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-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/lifecycle/budgets</loc></url>
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-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/lifecycle/uses-and-replay</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/lifecycle/validity-and-expiry</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/model</loc></url>
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-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/receipts</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/receipts/disclosure</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/resume</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/authority/verify</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/cli</loc></url>
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-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/integrations/identity-and-trust</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/integrations/policy</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/integrations/profile-kit</loc></url>
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-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/sdks/parity</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/sdks/python</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/sdks/rust</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/developers/sdks/typescript</loc></url>
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-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/adoption/approvals</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/adoption/capabilities</loc></url>
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-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/choose</loc></url>
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-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/paths</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/paths/agent</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/paths/application</loc></url>
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-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/paths/runtime</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/paths/verification</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/prerequisites</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/agent-delegation</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/approved-plan</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/identity-swap</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/offline-verification</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/recovery</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/get-started/quickstarts/runtime-effect</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/custom-and-post-quantum</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/ed25519</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/cryptographic-suites/p256</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/exchange-public-identity</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/how-it-works</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/identity-sources</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/identity-sources/application-resolvers</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/identity-sources/oauth-oidc</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/identity-sources/spiffe</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/key-and-root-rotation</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/testing</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/trust-policy</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/identity-trust/verification-context</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/backup-and-restore</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/configure</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/configure/custody</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/configure/durable-state</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/configure/provider-gateways</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/configure/trust-and-profiles</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/deploy-runtime</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/evaluate-locally</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/execution-lifecycle</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/incidents</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/incidents/compromised-credential</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/incidents/provider-unknown</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/incidents/receipt-disclosure</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/incidents/signer-outage</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/incidents/state-loss</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/incidents/trust-root-error</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/observability</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/receipt-retention</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/security-checklist</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/operations/upgrade-and-rollback</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/start</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/start/what-is-auths</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/start/typescript</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/start/python</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/start/rust-offline-verification</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/guides</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/guides/authenticate-identity</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/guides/verify-authority</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/guides/execute-exact-action</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/guides/authority-model</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/guides/verification-model</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/guides/delegate-agent</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/guides/receipts-and-disclosure</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/guides/production-integration</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/guides/adapter-authoring</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/examples</loc></url>
   <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/cli</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/errors</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/evidence</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/manifest.json</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/profiles</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/runtime-api</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/schemas</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/sdk</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/sdk/python</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/sdk/rust</loc></url>
-  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/sdk/typescript</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/typescript</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/python</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/rust</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/decisions-errors</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/evidence-status-assurance</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/principal-adapters</loc></url>
+  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev/reference/conformance</loc></url>
 </urlset>
diff --git a/public/start.md b/public/start.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a5e0c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/start.md
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Start with one boundary you can prove
+
+Auths is for software that must do something consequential without receiving broad, reusable permission. The quickest way to understand it is to protect one exact application effect: name the operation and resource, bind the exact action bytes, verify the authority, and allow only the resulting closed command into your provider gateway.
+
+If you are new to the model, begin with [What is Auths?](/start/what-is-auths). It explains the distinction between identity, delivery, approval, authority, and execution. Those concepts are deliberately separate: a signed request can prove who signed it without proving the signer may perform the requested effect.
+
+If you want to evaluate the SDK, choose a maintained path:
+
+- [TypeScript quickstart](/start/typescript) for a protected MCP-style action in Node.js.
+- [Python quickstart](/start/python) for the same product workflow with async resource ownership.
+- [Rust offline verification](/start/rust-offline-verification) when you need deterministic verification without networking, custody, mutable state, or execution authority.
+
+Each quickstart uses product-owned, digest-verified source and states its
+current qualification status. No parallel example or result is invented.
+
+> **Prelaunch · pre-audit**
+>
+> The public surface is a repository preview. Pin the exact product revision before evaluating it, and do not treat the development composition as production durable.
+> Product revision: `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+## What success looks like
+
+Your first integration should prove two outcomes: the declared action reaches the provider exactly once, and a changed action is denied before the provider is contacted. Do not start by modeling an entire organization. A narrow end-to-end boundary gives you a trustworthy base for delegation, approvals, recovery, and receipts later.
+
+## Continue
+
+- Learn [how verification works](/guides/verification-model).
+- Follow the [exact-action execution guide](/guides/execute-exact-action).
+- Inspect the [examples by security question](/examples).
diff --git a/public/start/python.md b/public/start/python.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eacda7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/start/python.md
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+# Protect one exact action in Python
+
+This path proves two things in one run: an allowed action can reach your Python
+handler, and an undeclared action cannot. The maintained recipe also verifies
+the completed receipt before the SDK session closes.
+
+## Install the wheel
+
+The intended public wheel name and install command are:
+
+```bash
+# Install the pinned wheel candidate.
+pip install auths
+```
+
+Published wheels include the native implementation, so consumers do not need a
+Rust compiler. **Publication is currently blocked**, so this is a repository
+preview, not a claim that the command resolves from the public index today.
+Run the embedded recipe against the pinned product repository until the
+capability record promotes the wheel. The prelaunch repository remains the
+authority for runtime and publication status.
+
+## Run the product-owned workflow
+
+> Product-owned recipe `03-execute-exact-action` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
+
+### Python recipe
+
+> **Qualification blocked — Python source does not match the pinned public API.**
+>
+> The pinned recipe imports `verify_receipt` from `auths`, while the pinned installed API exports it only from `auths.verify`. The source is retained for review but must not be presented as runnable until the product recipe is corrected and re-executed.
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/python/03_execute_exact_action.py) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
+
+Register the only provider operation and count every entry into that effect boundary.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–19; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+
+from auths import verify_receipt
+from auths.integrations import development
+from auths.profiles import mcp
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    calls = 0
+
+    async def publish_report(arguments, _context):
+        nonlocal calls
+        calls += 1
+        return {"published": arguments["report"]}
+
+    provider = mcp.development_provider(tools={"publish_report": publish_report})
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
+
+Open the owned development session, execute the exact action, and verify its receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 20–30; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    async with development.create_auths(
+        authority=mcp.allow_tools(["publish_report"])
+    ) as auths:
+        completed = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="publish_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-success",
+        )
+        if completed.kind != "completed":
+            raise RuntimeError(f"unexpected result: {completed.kind}")
+        verify_receipt(completed.receipt)
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
+
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter stayed at one.
+
+_Pinned source lines 31–37; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+        denied = await auths.execute(
+            action=mcp.call_tool(name="delete_report", arguments={"report": "weekly"}),
+            provider=provider,
+            request_id="recipe-three-denied",
+        )
+        if denied.kind != "denied" or calls != 1:
+            raise RuntimeError("undeclared effect reached provider")
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Report the trace through the owned entry point
+
+Leave the session before emitting the declared result, then run the asynchronous entry point.
+
+_Pinned source lines 38–51; no output is synthesized._
+
+```python
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "recipe": "03-execute-exact-action",
+                "outcome": "completed",
+                "denied": True,
+                "calls": calls,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())
+```
+
+The example is asynchronous because provider work is asynchronous. It uses
+`async with` so the session owns and closes its native resources, signers, and
+development state. Applications that cannot use a context manager may close
+the session explicitly, but should not leave ownership implicit.
+
+## What the provider-call count proves
+
+The first action names the declared `publish_report` tool and completes. The
+second names `delete_report`, which is outside the configured authority. At the
+end, the provider-call count is still one.
+
+This is stronger than checking for a denied label after the fact. It proves the
+denial occurred on the safe side of the effect boundary. The provider did not
+need to inspect an Auths object, reverse an operation, or compensate for an
+unauthorized call.
+
+## Try the safe failure path
+
+Keep the provider handler registered and remove the corresponding tool from
+the authority. The handler must become unreachable through this Auths session.
+Restoring only the handler must not restore authority; restoring the authority
+is a separate, explicit change.
+
+Do not treat a thrown provider exception as an authorization denial. A provider
+exception happens after an action was allowed to enter the effect boundary.
+The SDK result and recovery metadata must be used to determine whether retry is
+safe.
+
+## Know what this example does not prove
+
+The development composition uses ephemeral custody and in-memory state. It
+does not prove that two Python processes coordinate replay, that keys are
+protected by an HSM or KMS, or that a remote provider effect is exactly-once.
+
+Before production, replace development mechanisms with durable atomic state
+and real custody, choose a qualified profile, keep credentials behind its
+gateway, and define reconciliation for “the provider may have applied it, but
+the response was lost.”
+
+Auths is prelaunch and pre-audit. A repository recipe passing is useful
+integration evidence, not an external security endorsement.
+
+## Where to go next
+
+- [Execute one exact action](/guides/execute-exact-action) explains the closed
+  gateway in detail.
+- [Replay and recovery](/guides/replay-recovery-and-provider-unknown) explains
+  when not to retry.
+- [Production integration](/guides/production-integration) turns the demo
+  boundary into a deployment checklist.
+- [Python SDK reference](/reference/python) lists the installed public modules.
diff --git a/public/start/rust-offline-verification.md b/public/start/rust-offline-verification.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..93c8450
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/start/rust-offline-verification.md
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+# Verify authority without gaining an execution capability
+
+The Rust starting path is deliberately lower level than the TypeScript and
+Python product SDKs. It shows the portable, effect-free verifier boundary—not a
+stateful provider workflow.
+
+Use this path when you are building a verifier, audit tool, gateway pre-check,
+offline policy process, or independent implementation and you already have the
+three canonical inputs.
+
+## Run the external-consumer example
+
+Run the maintained external-consumer example directly from the pinned product
+revision. The source below is verified against its recorded digest.
+
+> Product-owned external-consumer example from [`demos/offline-verification`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/offline-verification).
+> Source revision: `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`. No output is synthesized by the documentation projection.
+
+Source: [`demos/offline-verification/src/main.rs`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/demos/offline-verification/src/main.rs) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Load the verifier and canonical inputs
+
+Import the verifier ports and embed the proof, action, and trusted-context fixture bytes.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–7; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+use auths_ports::{PrincipalMethod, SignatureSuite};
+use auths_proof::{Engine, Verdict};
+
+const PROOF: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../core/fixtures/v1/valid/raw-key-chain.proof.cbor");
+const ACTION: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../core/fixtures/v1/valid/raw-key-chain.action.cbor");
+const TRUSTED_CONTEXT: &[u8] =
+    include_bytes!("../../../core/fixtures/v1/valid/raw-key-chain.context.cbor");
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Build the verifier-owned context
+
+Register accepted adapters and bind the exact executable configuration and required plan outside the proof.
+
+_Pinned source lines 9–24; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+    let method = auths_raw_key::RawKeyMethod::new()?;
+    let suite = auths_signature::Ed25519Suite::new()?;
+    let methods: [&dyn PrincipalMethod; 1] = [&method];
+    let suites: [&dyn SignatureSuite; 1] = [&suite];
+    let registries = auths_registries::ImmutableRegistries::new(&methods, &suites)?;
+
+    // The trusted host, not the proof producer, commits the exact executable
+    // configuration and required composition policy.
+    let context = auths_codec::decode_verifier_context(TRUSTED_CONTEXT)?
+        .with_configuration(registries.configuration_id())?;
+    let required_plan = context
+        .composition()
+        .expected_plan()
+        .ok_or("example context must require an exact plan")?;
+    let context_bytes = auths_codec::encode_verifier_context(&context)?;
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Verify without executing
+
+Run the offline kernel and project bounded diagnostic and work information from the result.
+
+_Pinned source lines 26–37; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+    let result = Engine::new(registries).verify_cbor(PROOF, ACTION, &context_bytes)?;
+    let explanation = result.explanation();
+    let portable = result.portable();
+    let resources = result.resources();
+    println!(
+        "verdict={:?} code={} stage={:?} retryable={} work_units={}",
+        result.verdict(),
+        result.code(),
+        explanation.stage(),
+        explanation.retryable(),
+        resources.work_units()
+    );
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Inspect portable commitments
+
+Read proof, action, context, and configuration commitments without acquiring any execution capability.
+
+_Pinned source lines 38–47; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+    println!(
+        "proof={:?} action={:?} context={:?} required_configuration={:?} local_configuration={:?}",
+        portable.proof_digest().as_bytes(),
+        portable.action_digest().as_bytes(),
+        portable.context_digest().as_bytes(),
+        portable
+            .required_configuration()
+            .map(|configuration| *configuration.as_bytes()),
+        portable.local_configuration().as_bytes()
+    );
+```
+
+#### Step 5: Handle every verdict fail closed
+
+Continue only for authorized results that satisfy the host-required plan; denied and indeterminate both stop.
+
+_Pinned source lines 49–63; no output is synthesized._
+
+```rust
+    match result.verdict() {
+        Verdict::Authorized => {
+            if portable.plan_id() != Some(required_plan) {
+                return Err("authorized result did not satisfy the host-required plan".into());
+            }
+            Ok(())
+        }
+        Verdict::Denied => Err(format!("stable authorization denial: {}", result.code()).into()),
+        Verdict::Indeterminate => Err(format!(
+            "not authorized; obtain new trusted facts before retrying: {}",
+            result.code()
+        )
+        .into()),
+    }
+}
+```
+
+```bash
+# Run the pinned workspace example
+cargo run -p auths-proof-offline-example
+```
+
+The consumer supplies:
+
+1. encoded proof-bundle bytes;
+2. canonical action bytes; and
+3. trusted-context bytes owned by the verifier.
+
+The context is not a bag of defaults. It binds local trust anchors, evaluation
+time, expected audience and challenge, accepted registries, status and
+assurance policy, limits, and the exact executable verifier configuration.
+The proof cannot add a trust root or weaken those requirements.
+
+## Handle every verdict
+
+Verification produces one of three outcomes:
+
+- `Authorized` means the proof covers the exact canonical action under the
+  supplied context.
+- `Denied` means available facts establish invalidity or insufficient
+  authority.
+- `Indeterminate` means a required trustworthy fact was not supplied or a
+  required capability is unavailable.
+
+Both non-authorized outcomes are non-executable. Do not turn indeterminate into
+“allow with warning,” and do not catch a decode failure and retry with a
+permissive parser.
+
+The result also carries a stable stage and reason code, canonical commitments,
+authorized branches, assurance results, and bounded resource/work totals. Log
+only the projection your threat model permits; proof and application bytes may
+be sensitive.
+
+## Mutation is a different action
+
+Change one byte of the canonical action and verify again. The prior result must
+not authorize the changed bytes. Depending on where the mutation lands, the
+new input will either fail bounded canonical parsing or reach action binding
+and fail the exact digest comparison.
+
+This check is safe to repeat because verification performs no external effect.
+It does not claim replay state, consume a budget, write a receipt, or contact a
+provider.
+
+## Where offline verification stops
+
+An authorized verifier result is evidence for an outer runtime; it is not a
+remote command. Production execution still requires channel policy, atomic
+replay and budget claims, application policy, a closed profile projection, a
+decision receipt, and an execution receipt.
+
+If your service needs to perform an effect, do not bolt a generic HTTP request
+onto this example. Use the product SDK and a qualified profile, or author and
+qualify a new domain-specific profile.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Verification model](/guides/verification-model)
+- [Verify existing authority from TypeScript or Python](/guides/verify-authority)
+- [Authority model](/guides/authority-model)
+- [Protocol limits and identifiers](/reference/limits-encoding-identifiers)
diff --git a/public/start/typescript.md b/public/start/typescript.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d46dc20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/start/typescript.md
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+# Protect one exact action in TypeScript
+
+In this quickstart you will place a small provider function behind Auths. The
+application will execute an allowed `publish_report` action, verify the receipt,
+then attempt `delete_report`. The second operation must be denied before the
+provider is entered.
+
+The example uses the development composition and the currently qualified
+public profile, `auths.mcp/1`. It is a local learning path, not a production
+deployment template.
+
+## Before you run it
+
+The intended public package and install command are:
+
+```bash
+# Install the pinned SDK candidate.
+npm install @auths-dev/sdk
+```
+
+The package includes its WebAssembly implementation; the consumer does not need
+a Rust toolchain. **Publication is currently blocked**, so treat this page as a
+repository preview until the package capability record says otherwise. Until
+then, run the embedded recipe through the pinned product repository rather than
+assuming the registry command will resolve.
+
+The example deliberately imports from `/verify`,
+`/integrations`, and `/profiles`. The package root does not flatten those
+boundaries.
+
+## Run the maintained recipe
+
+The block below comes from the Auths product repository. Its expected outcome
+is declared by the product recipe manifest.
+
+> Product-owned recipe `03-execute-exact-action` from [Auths bbeb6547de33](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c).
+> Declared outcome contract: `completed`. This projection does not synthesize example output.
+
+### TypeScript recipe
+
+Source: [`bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c/bindings/recipes/typescript/03-execute-exact-action.ts) at `bbeb6547de33b66796aa14791bf6f047b5edb34c`.
+
+#### Step 1: Put one handler behind a closed provider
+
+Register the only provider operation and create development authority for that exact tool name.
+
+_Pinned source lines 1–14; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+import { verifyReceipt } from "@auths-dev/sdk/verify";
+import { development } from "@auths-dev/sdk/integrations";
+import { mcp } from "@auths-dev/sdk/profiles";
+
+let calls = 0;
+const provider = mcp.developmentProvider({
+  tools: {
+    async publish_report(input) {
+      calls += 1;
+      return { published: input.report };
+    },
+  },
+});
+const auths = await development.createAuths({ authority: mcp.allowTools(["publish_report"]) });
+```
+
+#### Step 2: Execute and verify the allowed action
+
+Send the exact profile-owned action, require completion, and verify its returned receipt.
+
+_Pinned source lines 15–22; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+try {
+  const completed = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "publish_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-success",
+  });
+  if (completed.kind !== "completed") throw new Error(`unexpected result: ${completed.kind}`);
+  await verifyReceipt(completed.receipt);
+```
+
+#### Step 3: Deny an undeclared action before entry
+
+Request a different tool and prove the provider-call counter did not advance.
+
+_Pinned source lines 23–28; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  const denied = await auths.execute({
+    action: mcp.callTool({ name: "delete_report", arguments: { report: "weekly" } }),
+    provider,
+    requestId: "recipe-three-denied",
+  });
+  if (denied.kind !== "denied" || calls !== 1) throw new Error("undeclared effect reached provider");
+```
+
+#### Step 4: Report the trace and close owned state
+
+Emit the declared result and close the development runtime even when the workflow throws.
+
+_Pinned source lines 29–32; no output is synthesized._
+
+```ts
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ recipe: "03-execute-exact-action", outcome: completed.kind, denied: true, calls }));
+} finally {
+  await auths.close();
+}
+```
+
+## Read the outcome as an enforcement trace
+
+The important result is not merely that the first call completed. The recipe
+also counts provider entries. After one allowed action and one undeclared
+action, the count remains one.
+
+That establishes the useful boundary:
+
+1. `mcp.allowTools` defines the local development authority.
+2. `mcp.callTool` creates the profile-owned action shape.
+3. `auths.execute` verifies and reserves that exact action.
+4. The MCP profile decodes the verified action into a closed command.
+5. Only then can the named provider handler run.
+
+The denied action does not invoke a fallback handler, reach a generic HTTP
+client, or depend on the provider to reject it.
+
+## Change something that matters
+
+After the unmodified recipe succeeds, add the undeclared tool to the provider's
+tool map but **not** to the authority. Run it again. The result should remain
+denied and the new handler must not run. Provider availability is not
+authority.
+
+Then change the arguments of the allowed action while keeping a previously
+authorized proof or execution reference. Exact action binding should prevent
+the changed bytes from inheriting the earlier decision.
+
+Stop if an undeclared handler is entered. That is an enforcement failure, not
+an acceptable example difference.
+
+## Development versus production
+
+The development composition owns ephemeral signing keys and in-memory replay
+state. Restarting it discards state. A production integration must provide:
+
+- durable atomic reservation across its deployment scope;
+- non-exporting signer custody;
+- a qualified closed profile and gateway;
+- credential acquisition after authorization and reservation;
+- reconciliation for ambiguous provider outcomes; and
+- durable receipt retention with deliberate disclosure controls.
+
+Do not put a provider credential in the untrusted action or expose a generic
+provider callback as the production effect boundary.
+
+## Continue
+
+- [Understand exact execution](/guides/execute-exact-action)
+- [Delegate narrower authority to an agent](/guides/delegate-agent)
+- [Plan a production integration](/guides/production-integration)
+- [Inspect the TypeScript SDK reference](/reference/typescript)
diff --git a/public/start/what-is-auths.md b/public/start/what-is-auths.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88ca88d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/start/what-is-auths.md
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+# Give software authority for one exact action
+
+Auths is an open protocol and SDK for **proof-carrying, bounded machine
+authority**. It answers a question that ordinary authentication leaves open:
+
+> This caller is who it claims to be—but may it perform this exact action,
+> against this resource, under these limits, right now?
+
+Imagine a reporting agent that may publish the weekly report but may not delete
+it. An identity provider can establish which agent connected. A signed request
+can establish that the request was not changed in transit. An approval system
+can establish that somebody approved a proposal. None of those facts alone
+proves that authority flowed from a trusted root to this agent without becoming
+broader along the way.
+
+Auths carries that proof with the action. A verifier checks it locally against
+explicit trust, status, assurance, and configuration inputs. A product runtime
+then applies replay protection and other stateful gates before a closed profile
+can construct the provider command.
+
+## The useful distinction: identity is not authority
+
+Identity answers **who controls this key or account?** Authority answers **what
+may that principal do?** Keeping those questions separate lets an application
+use OIDC, SPIFFE, raw keys, WebAuthn, or another supported identity method
+without making any one identity provider the universal owner of permission.
+
+The same separation applies to transport. HTTPS, a queue, or Iroh may carry an
+Auths proof. Successful delivery does not improve the proof and cannot turn a
+denial into authorization.
+
+## Four planes, one enforcement boundary
+
+Auths separates responsibilities that are often collapsed into a single
+middleware decision:
+
+| Plane | What it establishes | What it cannot do alone |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Proof | Trust anchors, grants, plans, and exact action binding | Read live systems or execute an effect |
+| Evidence | Principal control, signatures, status, freshness, assurance | Mint authority or commands |
+| Execution | Replay, budgets, local policy, reservation, provider execution | Upgrade a denied or indeterminate proof |
+| Control | Authoring, custody, configuration, receipts, observability | Bypass the proof or execution boundary |
+
+This is not ceremony. It prevents a convenient outer fact—such as a valid JWT
+or successful mTLS handshake—from silently becoming permission.
+
+## From hostile bytes to a verified action
+
+The offline kernel moves through typed stages:
+
+```text
+untrusted bytes
+  -> DecodedProof
+  -> ResolvedProof
+  -> ControlVerifiedProof
+  -> VerifiedAuthority
+  -> VerifiedAction
+```
+
+It accepts exactly three language-neutral inputs: proof bytes, canonical action
+bytes, and a trusted verifier context. It performs no networking, filesystem
+access, clock reads, database writes, private-key operations, or provider
+calls. Every changing fact—including evaluation time and accepted adapters—is
+an explicit input.
+
+An authorized result is still not permission to call an arbitrary URL. The
+runtime must claim replay and budget state, apply local policy, and pass the
+verified action into a closed profile. The profile, not the untrusted request,
+constructs the provider command.
+
+## What fails closed
+
+Auths distinguishes three proof outcomes:
+
+- **Authorized:** the proof and exact action satisfy all required facts.
+- **Denied:** available facts establish that the request is invalid or outside
+  authority.
+- **Indeterminate:** a required trustworthy fact could not be established.
+
+Only the first outcome may proceed to the outer execution gates. A missing
+status record does not become a soft success. A valid signature over different
+bytes does not become “close enough.” An unknown adapter, unsupported profile,
+oversized proof, widened delegation, or mismatched verifier configuration
+cannot reach a provider.
+
+## What Auths deliberately does not own
+
+Auths does not replace your identity provider, transport, database, KMS, policy
+engine, or cloud API. It composes with them. It also does not claim remote
+exactly-once execution, instantaneous revocation, or atomicity across a local
+database and a remote provider.
+
+The development SDK composition uses ephemeral keys and in-memory state. It is
+for learning and local integration, not production durability. Auths is
+currently **prelaunch and pre-audit**; repository conformance and formal
+evidence are not an independent security review.
+
+## Choose your first path
+
+- To protect one real application operation, start with the
+  [TypeScript quickstart](/start/typescript) or
+  [Python quickstart](/start/python).
+- To evaluate proofs without execution, use
+  [Rust offline verification](/start/rust-offline-verification) or
+  [Verify existing authority](/guides/verify-authority).
+- To understand the protocol model first, read
+  [Authority](/guides/authority-model) and
+  [Verification](/guides/verification-model).
diff --git a/schemas/content.ts b/schemas/content.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index 95a8dee..0000000
--- a/schemas/content.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
-import type { PageType, SiteSection } from "../app/lib/site-tree.ts";
-
-export const pageDepths = ["understand", "start", "build", "operate", "inspect", "verify"] as const;
-export type PageDepth = (typeof pageDepths)[number];
-
-export const pageStatuses = ["draft", "preview", "stable"] as const;
-export type PageStatus = (typeof pageStatuses)[number];
-
-export const provenanceKinds = ["editorial-narrative", "generated-fact", "tested-scenario"] as const;
-export type ProvenanceKind = (typeof provenanceKinds)[number];
-
-export type SemanticDependencies = Readonly<{
-  operations: readonly string[];
-  scenarios: readonly string[];
-  endpoints: readonly string[];
-  profiles: readonly string[];
-  claims: readonly string[];
-}>;
-
-export type NarrativeSection = Readonly<{
-  id: string;
-  title: string;
-  provenance: "editorial-narrative";
-  body: readonly string[];
-}>;
-
-export type GeneratedFactSection = Readonly<{
-  id: string;
-  title: string;
-  provenance: "generated-fact";
-  factKind: "operation" | "endpoint" | "profile" | "claim";
-  fact: string;
-}>;
-
-export type TestedScenarioSection = Readonly<{
-  id: string;
-  title: string;
-  provenance: "tested-scenario";
-  scenario: string;
-  step?: string;
-}>;
-
-export type ContentSection = NarrativeSection | GeneratedFactSection | TestedScenarioSection;
-
-export type AuthoredPageSource = Readonly<{
-  id: string;
-  path: `/${string}`;
-  pageType: PageType;
-  section: SiteSection;
-  parent: string | null;
-  navGroup: string;
-  order: number;
-  title: string;
-  description: string;
-  depth: PageDepth;
-  status: PageStatus;
-  owner: "editorial" | "generated";
-  uses: SemanticDependencies;
-  sections: readonly ContentSection[];
-}>;
-
-const identity = /^[a-z0-9.-]+\/[1-9][0-9]*$/;
-const sectionIdentity = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/;
-
-function record(input: unknown, label: string): Record<string, unknown> {
-  if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null || Array.isArray(input)) {
-    throw new TypeError(`${label} must be an object`);
-  }
-  return input as Record<string, unknown>;
-}
-
-function exactKeys(value: Record<string, unknown>, expected: readonly string[], label: string): void {
-  if (Object.keys(value).sort().join("\0") !== [...expected].sort().join("\0")) {
-    throw new TypeError(`${label} has unknown or missing fields`);
-  }
-}
-
-function boundedText(input: unknown, label: string, maximum: number): string {
-  if (typeof input !== "string" || input.length === 0 || input.length > maximum) {
-    throw new TypeError(`${label} is invalid`);
-  }
-  return input;
-}
-
-function identities(input: unknown, label: string): readonly string[] {
-  if (!Array.isArray(input) || !input.every((item) => typeof item === "string" && identity.test(item))) {
-    throw new TypeError(`${label} is invalid`);
-  }
-  if (new Set(input).size !== input.length) throw new TypeError(`${label} contains duplicates`);
-  return Object.freeze([...input]);
-}
-
-function parseDependencies(input: unknown): SemanticDependencies {
-  const value = record(input, "page dependencies");
-  exactKeys(value, ["claims", "endpoints", "operations", "profiles", "scenarios"], "page dependencies");
-  return Object.freeze({
-    operations: identities(value.operations, "operation dependencies"),
-    scenarios: identities(value.scenarios, "scenario dependencies"),
-    endpoints: identities(value.endpoints, "endpoint dependencies"),
-    profiles: identities(value.profiles, "profile dependencies"),
-    claims: identities(value.claims, "claim dependencies"),
-  });
-}
-
-function parseSection(input: unknown): ContentSection {
-  const value = record(input, "content section");
-  const provenance = value.provenance;
-  if (!provenanceKinds.includes(provenance as ProvenanceKind)) throw new TypeError("section provenance is invalid");
-  const base = {
-    id: boundedText(value.id, "section identity", 80),
-    title: boundedText(value.title, "section title", 160),
-  };
-  if (!sectionIdentity.test(base.id)) throw new TypeError("section identity is invalid");
-  if (provenance === "editorial-narrative") {
-    exactKeys(value, ["body", "id", "provenance", "title"], "editorial section");
-    if (!Array.isArray(value.body) || value.body.length === 0 || value.body.length > 12) throw new TypeError("editorial body is invalid");
-    return Object.freeze({ ...base, provenance, body: Object.freeze(value.body.map((item) => boundedText(item, "editorial paragraph", 1_600))) });
-  }
-  if (provenance === "generated-fact") {
-    exactKeys(value, ["fact", "factKind", "id", "provenance", "title"], "generated fact section");
-    if (!["operation", "endpoint", "profile", "claim"].includes(String(value.factKind))) throw new TypeError("fact kind is invalid");
-    if (typeof value.fact !== "string" || !identity.test(value.fact)) throw new TypeError("fact identity is invalid");
-    return Object.freeze({ ...base, provenance, factKind: value.factKind as GeneratedFactSection["factKind"], fact: value.fact });
-  }
-  const expected = value.step === undefined
-    ? ["id", "provenance", "scenario", "title"]
-    : ["id", "provenance", "scenario", "step", "title"];
-  exactKeys(value, expected, "tested scenario section");
-  if (typeof value.scenario !== "string" || !identity.test(value.scenario)) throw new TypeError("scenario identity is invalid");
-  return Object.freeze({
-    ...base,
-    provenance: "tested-scenario",
-    scenario: value.scenario,
-    ...(value.step === undefined ? {} : { step: boundedText(value.step, "scenario step", 80) }),
-  });
-}
-
-export type AuthoredPageContent = Omit<AuthoredPageSource, "path" | "pageType" | "section" | "parent" | "navGroup" | "order">;
-
-export function parseAuthoredPageContent(input: unknown): AuthoredPageContent {
-  const value = record(input, "authored page");
-  exactKeys(value, ["depth", "description", "id", "owner", "sections", "status", "title", "uses"], "authored page");
-  if (typeof value.id !== "string" || !identity.test(value.id)) throw new TypeError("page identity is invalid");
-  if (!pageDepths.includes(value.depth as PageDepth)) throw new TypeError("page depth is invalid");
-  if (!pageStatuses.includes(value.status as PageStatus)) throw new TypeError("page status is invalid");
-  if (value.owner !== "editorial" && value.owner !== "generated") throw new TypeError("page owner is invalid");
-  if (!Array.isArray(value.sections) || value.sections.length === 0 || value.sections.length > 40) throw new TypeError("page sections are invalid");
-  const sections = value.sections.map(parseSection);
-  if (new Set(sections.map((section) => section.id)).size !== sections.length) throw new TypeError("page section identity is duplicated");
-  return Object.freeze({
-    id: value.id,
-    title: boundedText(value.title, "page title", 160),
-    description: boundedText(value.description, "page description", 320),
-    depth: value.depth as PageDepth,
-    status: value.status as PageStatus,
-    owner: value.owner,
-    uses: parseDependencies(value.uses),
-    sections: Object.freeze(sections),
-  });
-}
diff --git a/schemas/docs-contract.ts b/schemas/docs-contract.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index 5488acd..0000000
--- a/schemas/docs-contract.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-export const languages = ["rust", "typescript", "python"] as const;
-export type SdkLanguage = (typeof languages)[number];
-
-export const pageKinds = [
-  "landing",
-  "guide",
-  "quickstart",
-  "concept",
-  "reference",
-  "integration",
-  "runbook",
-] as const;
-export type PageKind = (typeof pageKinds)[number];
-
-export type PageModel = Readonly<{
-  id: string;
-  path: `/${string}`;
-  kind: PageKind;
-  title: string;
-  description: string;
-  operations: readonly string[];
-  scenarios: readonly string[];
-}>;
-
-const identity = /^[a-z0-9.-]+\/[1-9][0-9]*$/;
-
-export function parsePageModel(input: unknown): PageModel {
-  if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null || Array.isArray(input)) {
-    throw new TypeError("page model must be an object");
-  }
-  const value = input as Record<string, unknown>;
-  const keys = Object.keys(value).sort();
-  const expected = ["description", "id", "kind", "operations", "path", "scenarios", "title"];
-  if (keys.join("\0") !== expected.join("\0")) throw new TypeError("page model has unknown or missing fields");
-  if (typeof value.id !== "string" || !identity.test(value.id)) throw new TypeError("page identity is invalid");
-  if (typeof value.path !== "string" || !value.path.startsWith("/")) throw new TypeError("page path is invalid");
-  if (!pageKinds.includes(value.kind as PageKind)) throw new TypeError("page kind is invalid");
-  if (typeof value.title !== "string" || !value.title) throw new TypeError("page title is invalid");
-  if (typeof value.description !== "string" || !value.description) throw new TypeError("page description is invalid");
-  if (!Array.isArray(value.operations) || !value.operations.every((item) => typeof item === "string" && identity.test(item))) {
-    throw new TypeError("page operations are invalid");
-  }
-  if (!Array.isArray(value.scenarios) || !value.scenarios.every((item) => typeof item === "string" && identity.test(item))) {
-    throw new TypeError("page scenarios are invalid");
-  }
-  return Object.freeze({
-    id: value.id,
-    path: value.path as `/${string}`,
-    kind: value.kind as PageKind,
-    title: value.title,
-    description: value.description,
-    operations: Object.freeze([...value.operations]),
-    scenarios: Object.freeze([...value.scenarios]),
-  });
-}
diff --git a/schemas/page-contract.ts b/schemas/page-contract.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index 916ca8c..0000000
--- a/schemas/page-contract.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-import type { AuthoredPageSource } from "./content.ts";
-
-const requiredSections = {
-  landing: ["overview"],
-  concept: ["model", "invariants", "failures", "next"],
-  guide: ["outcome", "prerequisites", "steps", "success", "failure", "next"],
-  quickstart: ["outcome"],
-  integration: ["ownership", "data-flow", "secrets", "state", "failures", "example", "limitations"],
-  reference: [],
-  runbook: ["owner", "preconditions", "commands", "observations", "stop", "recovery", "reconciliation", "retention", "escalation"],
-} as const;
-
-export function assertPageContract(page: AuthoredPageSource): void {
-  if (page.status !== "stable") return;
-  const sections = new Set(page.sections.map((section) => section.id));
-  for (const required of requiredSections[page.pageType]) {
-    if (!sections.has(required)) throw new TypeError(`${page.id} is missing required ${page.pageType} section ${required}`);
-  }
-  if (page.pageType === "reference" && !page.sections.some((section) => section.provenance === "generated-fact")) {
-    throw new TypeError(`${page.id} reference contains no generated facts`);
-  }
-  if (["guide", "quickstart", "integration", "runbook"].includes(page.pageType) && !page.sections.some((section) => section.provenance === "tested-scenario")) {
-    throw new TypeError(`${page.id} ${page.pageType} contains no qualified scenario`);
-  }
-}
-
diff --git a/schemas/runbook.ts b/schemas/runbook.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index 6b263c2..0000000
--- a/schemas/runbook.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-export type Runbook = Readonly<{ id: string; title: string; severity: "high" | "critical"; stop: string; observe: string; recover: string; never: string }>;
-
-export function parseRunbook(input: unknown): Runbook {
-  if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null || Array.isArray(input)) throw new TypeError("runbook must be an object");
-  const value = input as Record<string, unknown>;
-  const expected = ["id", "never", "observe", "recover", "severity", "stop", "title"];
-  if (Object.keys(value).sort().join("\0") !== expected.join("\0")) throw new TypeError("runbook fields are invalid");
-  if (typeof value.id !== "string" || !/^[a-z0-9-]+$/.test(value.id)) throw new TypeError("runbook identity is invalid");
-  if (value.severity !== "high" && value.severity !== "critical") throw new TypeError("runbook severity is invalid");
-  for (const field of ["title", "stop", "observe", "recover", "never"] as const) if (typeof value[field] !== "string" || value[field].length < 8 || value[field].length > 320) throw new TypeError(`runbook ${field} is invalid`);
-  return Object.freeze(value as Runbook);
-}
diff --git a/schemas/topic-landing.ts b/schemas/topic-landing.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index 30f0f6c..0000000
--- a/schemas/topic-landing.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-export type LandingCard = Readonly<{ target: string; title: string; description: string }>;
-export type LandingGroup = Readonly<{ title: string; cards: readonly LandingCard[] }>;
-export type TopicLanding = Readonly<{
-  page: string;
-  eyebrow: string;
-  recommendation: Readonly<{ target: string; label: string; description: string }>;
-  groups: readonly LandingGroup[];
-}>;
-
-const identity = /^[a-z0-9.-]+\/[1-9][0-9]*$/;
-
-function text(input: unknown, label: string, maximum: number): string {
-  if (typeof input !== "string" || input.length === 0 || input.length > maximum) throw new TypeError(`${label} is invalid`);
-  return input;
-}
-
-function card(input: unknown): LandingCard {
-  if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null || Array.isArray(input)) throw new TypeError("landing card is invalid");
-  const value = input as Record<string, unknown>;
-  if (Object.keys(value).sort().join() !== "description,target,title") throw new TypeError("landing card fields are invalid");
-  const target = text(value.target, "landing target", 128);
-  if (!identity.test(target)) throw new TypeError("landing target is invalid");
-  return Object.freeze({ target, title: text(value.title, "card title", 100), description: text(value.description, "card description", 240) });
-}
-
-export function parseTopicLanding(input: unknown): TopicLanding {
-  if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null || Array.isArray(input)) throw new TypeError("topic landing is invalid");
-  const value = input as Record<string, unknown>;
-  if (Object.keys(value).sort().join() !== "eyebrow,groups,page,recommendation") throw new TypeError("topic landing fields are invalid");
-  const page = text(value.page, "landing page", 128);
-  if (!identity.test(page)) throw new TypeError("landing page identity is invalid");
-  if (typeof value.recommendation !== "object" || value.recommendation === null || Array.isArray(value.recommendation)) throw new TypeError("landing recommendation is invalid");
-  const recommendationValue = value.recommendation as Record<string, unknown>;
-  if (Object.keys(recommendationValue).sort().join() !== "description,label,target") throw new TypeError("landing recommendation fields are invalid");
-  const recommendationTarget = text(recommendationValue.target, "recommendation target", 128);
-  if (!identity.test(recommendationTarget)) throw new TypeError("recommendation target is invalid");
-  const recommendation = Object.freeze({
-    target: recommendationTarget,
-    label: text(recommendationValue.label, "recommendation label", 100),
-    description: text(recommendationValue.description, "recommendation description", 240),
-  });
-  if (!Array.isArray(value.groups) || value.groups.length < 1 || value.groups.length > 6) throw new TypeError("landing groups are invalid");
-  const groups = value.groups.map((input) => {
-    if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null || Array.isArray(input)) throw new TypeError("landing group is invalid");
-    const group = input as Record<string, unknown>;
-    if (Object.keys(group).sort().join() !== "cards,title") throw new TypeError("landing group fields are invalid");
-    if (!Array.isArray(group.cards) || group.cards.length < 1 || group.cards.length > 6) throw new TypeError("landing group cards are invalid");
-    return Object.freeze({ title: text(group.title, "group title", 100), cards: Object.freeze(group.cards.map(card)) });
-  });
-  return Object.freeze({ page, eyebrow: text(value.eyebrow, "landing eyebrow", 80), recommendation, groups: Object.freeze(groups) });
-}
diff --git a/schemas/tour.ts b/schemas/tour.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index 60434f0..0000000
--- a/schemas/tour.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-export type Tour = Readonly<{
-  page: string;
-  diagram: Readonly<{ nodes: readonly string[]; text: string }>;
-  invariants: readonly string[];
-  failures: readonly Readonly<{ trigger: string; result: string; response: string }>[];
-  useWhen: string;
-  avoidWhen: string;
-  related: readonly string[];
-}>;
-
-const identity = /^[a-z0-9.-]+\/[1-9][0-9]*$/;
-
-function text(value: unknown, label: string, maximum = 500): string {
-  if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0 || value.length > maximum) throw new TypeError(`${label} is invalid`);
-  return value;
-}
-
-function record(value: unknown, label: string): Record<string, unknown> {
-  if (typeof value !== "object" || value === null || Array.isArray(value)) throw new TypeError(`${label} is invalid`);
-  return value as Record<string, unknown>;
-}
-
-export function parseTour(input: unknown): Tour {
-  const value = record(input, "tour");
-  if (Object.keys(value).sort().join() !== "avoidWhen,diagram,failures,invariants,page,related,useWhen") throw new TypeError("tour fields are invalid");
-  const page = text(value.page, "tour page", 128);
-  if (!identity.test(page)) throw new TypeError("tour page identity is invalid");
-  const diagram = record(value.diagram, "tour diagram");
-  if (Object.keys(diagram).sort().join() !== "nodes,text" || !Array.isArray(diagram.nodes) || diagram.nodes.length < 3 || diagram.nodes.length > 7) throw new TypeError("tour diagram is invalid");
-  if (!Array.isArray(value.invariants) || value.invariants.length < 3 || value.invariants.length > 8) throw new TypeError("tour invariants are invalid");
-  if (!Array.isArray(value.failures) || value.failures.length < 3 || value.failures.length > 8) throw new TypeError("tour failures are invalid");
-  if (!Array.isArray(value.related) || value.related.length < 1 || !value.related.every((id) => typeof id === "string" && identity.test(id))) throw new TypeError("tour related pages are invalid");
-  return Object.freeze({
-    page,
-    diagram: Object.freeze({ nodes: Object.freeze(diagram.nodes.map((node) => text(node, "diagram node", 120))), text: text(diagram.text, "diagram text", 1_000) }),
-    invariants: Object.freeze(value.invariants.map((item) => text(item, "tour invariant"))),
-    failures: Object.freeze(value.failures.map((input) => {
-      const failure = record(input, "tour failure");
-      if (Object.keys(failure).sort().join() !== "response,result,trigger") throw new TypeError("tour failure fields are invalid");
-      return Object.freeze({ trigger: text(failure.trigger, "failure trigger", 240), result: text(failure.result, "failure result", 240), response: text(failure.response, "failure response", 500) });
-    })),
-    useWhen: text(value.useWhen, "tour use case"),
-    avoidWhen: text(value.avoidWhen, "tour exclusion"),
-    related: Object.freeze([...value.related] as string[]),
-  });
-}
diff --git a/scripts/audit-docs.mjs b/scripts/audit-docs.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d13cf4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/audit-docs.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { auditAccessibility } from "./site-audit/accessibility.mjs";
+import { auditCodeExamples } from "./site-audit/code-examples.mjs";
+import { auditContentDepth } from "./site-audit/content-depth.mjs";
+import { printIssues, root } from "./site-audit/context.mjs";
+import { auditDuplication } from "./site-audit/duplication.mjs";
+import { auditEditorialLeakage } from "./site-audit/editorial-leakage.mjs";
+import { auditLinksAndMetadata } from "./site-audit/links-and-metadata.mjs";
+import { auditMachineSurfaces } from "./site-audit/machine-surfaces.mjs";
+import { auditNavigation } from "./site-audit/navigation.mjs";
+import { auditTables } from "./site-audit/tables.mjs";
+
+const audits = [
+  ["Navigation", auditNavigation],
+  ["Content depth", auditContentDepth],
+  ["Code examples", auditCodeExamples],
+  ["Accessibility", auditAccessibility],
+  ["Links and metadata", auditLinksAndMetadata],
+  ["Duplication", auditDuplication],
+  ["Editorial leakage", auditEditorialLeakage],
+  ["Machine surfaces", auditMachineSurfaces],
+  ["Table presentation", auditTables],
+];
+
+const results = [];
+for (const [name, audit] of audits) {
+  const issues = await audit();
+  const counts = printIssues(`${name} audit`, issues);
+  results.push({ name, counts, issues });
+}
+
+const totals = results.reduce((current, result) => ({
+  error: current.error + result.counts.error,
+  warning: current.warning + result.counts.warning,
+  info: current.info + result.counts.info,
+}), { error: 0, warning: 0, info: 0 });
+
+await mkdir(path.join(root, "outputs"), { recursive: true });
+await writeFile(path.join(root, "outputs", "docs-quality-audit.json"), `${JSON.stringify({ schema: "auths.docs.quality-audit/1", generatedAt: new Date().toISOString(), totals, audits: results }, null, 2)}\n`);
+console.log(`\nDocumentation audit total: ${totals.error} errors, ${totals.warning} warnings, ${totals.info} notices`);
+console.log("Detailed report: outputs/docs-quality-audit.json");
+if (totals.error > 0) process.exitCode = 1;
diff --git a/scripts/site-audit/README.md b/scripts/site-audit/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f33879a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/site-audit/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# Documentation quality audit
+
+Run the complete audit from the repository root:
+
+```bash
+npm run audit:docs
+```
+
+The command builds the production site, renders every route from the verified
+content graph, prints every offending page, and writes the complete structured
+report to `outputs/docs-quality-audit.json`.
+
+## Severity
+
+- `error` means a deterministic contract is broken: a page cannot render, a
+  route or fragment is missing, navigation disappears, an accessibility name is
+  absent, or a generated machine surface is incomplete. Errors fail the command.
+- `warning` means editorial review is required: prose may be thin, examples may
+  be sparse, metadata may be generic, or pages may be overly repetitive.
+  Warnings do not fail the command because some concise and code-free pages are
+  intentional.
+- `info` identifies a notable condition that is not inherently wrong, such as a
+  concept or landing page containing no code.
+
+## Checks
+
+| Audit | What it checks |
+| --- | --- |
+| `navigation.mjs` | Route status and content type, topic/reference sidebars, active state, breadcrumbs, previous/next links, incoming links, mobile restore control, and sticky/scrollable sidebar CSS. |
+| `content-depth.mjs` | Page-type word and section thresholds, heading structure, useful descriptions, fragmented prose, and unfinished placeholder copy. Code is excluded from prose counts. |
+| `code-examples.mjs` | Required code on practical pages, empty examples, tested-scenario identity, quickstart language parity, and low example density. |
+| `accessibility.mjs` | Document language and viewport, landmarks, DOM IDs, image alternatives, control names, safe external windows, named navigation, and heading order. |
+| `links-and-metadata.mjs` | Titles, descriptions, canonical metadata, internal routes and fragments, static targets, incoming links, duplicate titles, and sitemap coverage. |
+| `duplication.mjs` | Generic self-reference, repeated editorial paragraphs, and high vocabulary overlap between pages. Shared navigation and component chrome are excluded. |
+| `editorial-leakage.mjs` | Reader-visible authoring criteria, source inventories, page-ownership notes, and documentation-pipeline instructions, including leaks into Markdown, search, and LLM surfaces. |
+| `machine-surfaces.mjs` | Markdown twins, search and manifest coverage, discovery files, and release-contract identity. |
+
+## Editorial thresholds
+
+The word and section thresholds vary by page type. They are signals, not style
+law: a concise quickstart can be excellent when its examples carry the teaching,
+and a conceptual tour can be intentionally code-free. Review warning clusters
+in a browser before changing content.
+
+The audit is deliberately strict about deterministic structure and deliberately
+non-blocking about editorial judgment. This keeps broken navigation and stale
+generated surfaces out of releases without rewarding filler text or ornamental
+code.
diff --git a/scripts/site-audit/accessibility.mjs b/scripts/site-audit/accessibility.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9590239
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/site-audit/accessibility.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+import { attribute, issue, isDirectInvocation, loadContext, matches, printIssues, visibleText, withoutExecutableMarkup } from "./context.mjs";
+
+export async function auditAccessibility() {
+  const { rendered } = await loadContext();
+  const issues = [];
+  for (const { page, html } of rendered.values()) {
+    const clean = withoutExecutableMarkup(html);
+    if (!/<html lang="[^"]+"/.test(clean)) issues.push(issue("document-language", "error", page, "does not declare a document language"));
+    if (!/<meta[^>]+name="viewport"/.test(clean)) issues.push(issue("viewport", "error", page, "does not declare a responsive viewport"));
+    if (!/<main\b/.test(clean)) issues.push(issue("main-landmark", "error", page, "has no main landmark"));
+
+    const ids = matches(clean, /\sid="([^"]+)"/g).map((match) => match[1]);
+    const duplicates = [...new Set(ids.filter((id, index) => ids.indexOf(id) !== index))];
+    if (duplicates.length > 0) issues.push(issue("duplicate-dom-id", "error", page, `duplicates DOM ids: ${duplicates.join(", ")}`));
+
+    for (const [tag] of matches(clean, /<img\b[^>]*>/gi)) {
+      if (attribute(tag, "alt") === null) issues.push(issue("image-alt", "error", page, "contains an image without alt text"));
+    }
+    for (const [tag, body] of matches(clean, /(<button\b[^>]*>)([\s\S]*?)<\/button>/gi).map((match) => [match[1], match[2]])) {
+      if (visibleText(body).length === 0 && attribute(tag, "aria-label") === null) issues.push(issue("button-name", "error", page, "contains an unnamed button"));
+    }
+    for (const [tag, body] of matches(clean, /(<a\b[^>]*>)([\s\S]*?)<\/a>/gi).map((match) => [match[1], match[2]])) {
+      if (visibleText(body).length === 0 && attribute(tag, "aria-label") === null) issues.push(issue("link-name", "error", page, "contains an unnamed link"));
+      if (attribute(tag, "target") === "_blank" && !/(?:^|\s)(?:noopener|noreferrer)(?:\s|$)/.test(attribute(tag, "rel") ?? "")) {
+        issues.push(issue("external-window", "error", page, "opens a new window without noopener or noreferrer"));
+      }
+    }
+    for (const [tag] of matches(clean, /<nav\b[^>]*>/gi)) {
+      if (attribute(tag, "aria-label") === null && attribute(tag, "aria-labelledby") === null) issues.push(issue("navigation-name", "error", page, "contains an unnamed navigation landmark"));
+    }
+
+    const levels = matches(clean, /<h([1-6])\b/gi).map((match) => Number(match[1]));
+    for (let index = 1; index < levels.length; index += 1) {
+      if (levels[index] > levels[index - 1] + 1) {
+        issues.push(issue("heading-order", "warning", page, `heading level jumps from h${levels[index - 1]} to h${levels[index]}`));
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return issues;
+}
+
+if (isDirectInvocation(import.meta.url)) {
+  const issues = await auditAccessibility();
+  const counts = printIssues("Accessibility audit", issues);
+  if (counts.error > 0) process.exitCode = 1;
+}
diff --git a/scripts/site-audit/code-examples.mjs b/scripts/site-audit/code-examples.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..942fa63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/site-audit/code-examples.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+import { attribute, decodeHtml, issue, isDirectInvocation, loadContext, mainHtml, matches, printIssues, visibleText } from "./context.mjs";
+
+const tutorialLineLimit = 20;
+
+function renderedCodeLines(block) {
+  const highlighted = matches(block, /<span\b[^>]*class=(?:"[^"]*\bcode-block-line\b[^"]*"|'[^']*\bcode-block-line\b[^']*')[^>]*>/gi).length;
+  if (highlighted > 0) return highlighted;
+  const text = decodeHtml(block.replace(/<[^>]+>/g, ""));
+  return text.trimEnd() === "" ? 0 : text.trimEnd().split(/\r?\n/).length;
+}
+
+export async function auditCodeExamples() {
+  const { rendered } = await loadContext();
+  const issues = [];
+  for (const { page, html } of rendered.values()) {
+    const main = mainHtml(html);
+    const blocks = matches(main, /<pre\b[^>]*>([\s\S]*?)<\/pre>/gi);
+    if (page.requiresCode && blocks.length === 0) {
+      issues.push(issue("missing-code", "error", page, "declares a product-owned recipe or example but renders no code block"));
+    }
+    if (!page.requiresCode && blocks.length === 0) {
+      issues.push(issue("code-free-page", "info", page, `${page.pageType} page intentionally or currently contains no code`));
+    }
+    for (const [index, block] of blocks.entries()) {
+      const open = block[0].match(/^<pre\b[^>]*>/i)?.[0] ?? "<pre>";
+      const purpose = attribute(open, "data-code-purpose");
+      const explained = attribute(open, "data-code-explained") === "true";
+      const lineCount = renderedCodeLines(block[1]);
+      const language = `${open}${block[1]}`.match(/\blanguage-([a-z0-9-]+)/i)?.[1]?.toLowerCase() ?? null;
+      const isDiagram = language === "text" || language === "mermaid";
+      if (visibleText(block[1]).length === 0) issues.push(issue("empty-code", "error", page, "contains an empty code block"));
+      if (purpose === "tutorial-step" && !explained) {
+        issues.push(issue("unexplained-tutorial-code", "error", page, `code block ${index + 1} is a tutorial step without a reader-facing explanation`, { block: index + 1, lineCount }));
+      }
+      if (lineCount > tutorialLineLimit && purpose !== "raw-reference" && !isDiagram) {
+        const reference = page.pageType === "reference";
+        issues.push(issue(
+          reference ? "unmarked-raw-reference" : "oversized-tutorial-code",
+          "error",
+          page,
+          reference
+            ? `code block ${index + 1} is ${lineCount} lines and must be explicitly presented as raw reference`
+            : `code block ${index + 1} is ${lineCount} lines; split it into named, explained steps of at most ${tutorialLineLimit} lines`,
+          { block: index + 1, lineCount, purpose: purpose ?? "unclassified" },
+        ));
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return issues;
+}
+
+if (isDirectInvocation(import.meta.url)) {
+  const issues = await auditCodeExamples();
+  const counts = printIssues("Code-example audit", issues);
+  if (counts.error > 0) process.exitCode = 1;
+}
diff --git a/scripts/site-audit/content-depth.mjs b/scripts/site-audit/content-depth.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a32e937
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/site-audit/content-depth.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+import { countWords, issue, isDirectInvocation, loadContext, mainHtml, matches, printIssues, visibleText } from "./context.mjs";
+
+const minimumWords = {
+  landing: 70,
+  concept: 150,
+  guide: 180,
+  quickstart: 220,
+  integration: 180,
+  reference: 100,
+  runbook: 280,
+};
+
+const minimumSections = {
+  landing: 1,
+  concept: 3,
+  guide: 5,
+  quickstart: 5,
+  integration: 5,
+  reference: 2,
+  runbook: 10,
+};
+
+export async function auditContentDepth() {
+  const { rendered } = await loadContext();
+  const issues = [];
+  for (const { page, html } of rendered.values()) {
+    const main = mainHtml(html);
+    const wordCount = countWords(visibleText(main, { excludeCode: true }));
+    const sectionCount = matches(main, /<h2\b/gi).length;
+    const h1Count = matches(main, /<h1\b/gi).length;
+    const h2Count = matches(main, /<h2\b/gi).length;
+    const paragraphs = matches(main, /<p\b[^>]*>([\s\S]*?)<\/p>/gi).map((match) => countWords(visibleText(match[1], { excludeCode: true })));
+    const shortParagraphs = paragraphs.filter((count) => count > 0 && count < 8).length;
+
+    if (wordCount < minimumWords[page.pageType]) {
+      issues.push(issue("low-word-count", "warning", page, `${wordCount} prose words; expected at least ${minimumWords[page.pageType]} for ${page.pageType}`, { wordCount }));
+    }
+    if (sectionCount < minimumSections[page.pageType]) {
+      issues.push(issue("shallow-page", "warning", page, `${sectionCount} visible sections; expected at least ${minimumSections[page.pageType]} for ${page.pageType}`, { sectionCount }));
+    }
+    if (h1Count !== 1) issues.push(issue("primary-heading", "error", page, `renders ${h1Count} h1 headings instead of one`));
+    if (page.pageType !== "landing" && h2Count === 0) issues.push(issue("section-headings", "error", page, "has no h2 section headings"));
+    if (countWords(page.description) < 8) issues.push(issue("weak-description", "warning", page, "page description is too short to explain its reader outcome"));
+    if (paragraphs.length > 0 && shortParagraphs / paragraphs.length > 0.4) {
+      issues.push(issue("fragmented-prose", "warning", page, `${shortParagraphs} of ${paragraphs.length} paragraphs contain fewer than eight words`));
+    }
+    if (/\b(?:TODO|TBD|lorem ipsum|coming soon|placeholder)\b/i.test(visibleText(main))) {
+      issues.push(issue("placeholder-copy", "error", page, "contains placeholder or unfinished copy"));
+    }
+  }
+  return issues;
+}
+
+if (isDirectInvocation(import.meta.url)) {
+  const issues = await auditContentDepth();
+  const counts = printIssues("Content-depth audit", issues);
+  if (counts.error > 0) process.exitCode = 1;
+}
diff --git a/scripts/site-audit/context.mjs b/scripts/site-audit/context.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1654be9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/site-audit/context.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+import { access, readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
+
+export const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
+const navigation = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "content-v2", "navigation.json"), "utf8"));
+const homepage = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "content-v2", navigation.home.source), "utf8"));
+const snapshot = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "product-snapshot", "snapshot.json"), "utf8"));
+const frontmatter = (source) => Object.fromEntries(source.match(/^---\r?\n([\s\S]*?)\r?\n---/)?.[1].split(/\r?\n/).filter(Boolean).map((line) => {
+  const separator = line.indexOf(":");
+  return [line.slice(0, separator).trim(), line.slice(separator + 1).trim().replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, "")];
+}) ?? []);
+const registeredPages = [];
+for (const section of navigation.sections) for (const group of section.groups) for (const entry of group.pages) {
+  const source = await readFile(path.join(root, "content-v2", entry.source), "utf8");
+  const metadata = frontmatter(source);
+  registeredPages.push({
+    id: entry.path.slice(1).replaceAll("/", ":"),
+    path: entry.path,
+    title: metadata.title,
+    description: metadata.description,
+    pageType: entry.path === section.path || section.id === "examples" ? "landing" : section.id === "start" ? (entry.path.includes("quickstart") || /<(?:Recipe|RepositoryExample)\b/.test(source) ? "quickstart" : "concept") : section.id === "guides" ? "guide" : section.id === "concepts" ? "concept" : "reference",
+    parent: entry.path === section.path ? null : section.path,
+    section: section.id,
+    group: group.label,
+    source: entry.source,
+    requiresCode: /<Recipe\b/.test(source),
+  });
+}
+export const htmlPages = [{ id: "home", path: navigation.home.path, title: homepage.title, description: homepage.description, pageType: "landing", parent: null, section: "home", group: "Home", source: navigation.home.source, requiresCode: true }, ...registeredPages];
+const pageGraph = Object.freeze({ schema: "auths.docs.page-graph/2", sourceCommit: snapshot.sourceCommit, contractDigest: snapshot.contractDigest, pages: Object.freeze(htmlPages) });
+
+let contextPromise;
+
+export function decodeHtml(value) {
+  return value
+    .replaceAll("&amp;", "&")
+    .replaceAll("&lt;", "<")
+    .replaceAll("&gt;", ">")
+    .replaceAll("&quot;", '"')
+    .replaceAll("&#x27;", "'")
+    .replaceAll("&#39;", "'")
+    .replaceAll("&nbsp;", " ")
+    .replace(/&#(\d+);/g, (_, code) => String.fromCodePoint(Number(code)));
+}
+
+export function withoutExecutableMarkup(html) {
+  return html
+    .replace(/<script\b[\s\S]*?<\/script>/gi, " ")
+    .replace(/<style\b[\s\S]*?<\/style>/gi, " ")
+    .replace(/<svg\b[\s\S]*?<\/svg>/gi, " ");
+}
+
+export function mainHtml(html) {
+  const clean = withoutExecutableMarkup(html);
+  return clean.match(/<main\b[^>]*>([\s\S]*?)<\/main>/i)?.[1] ?? "";
+}
+
+export function visibleText(html, { excludeCode = false } = {}) {
+  let value = withoutExecutableMarkup(html);
+  if (excludeCode) value = value.replace(/<(?:pre|code)\b[\s\S]*?<\/(?:pre|code)>/gi, " ");
+  return decodeHtml(value.replace(/<[^>]+>/g, " ")).replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim();
+}
+
+export function words(value) {
+  return value.match(/[\p{L}\p{N}][\p{L}\p{N}'’-]*/gu) ?? [];
+}
+
+export function countWords(value) {
+  return words(value).length;
+}
+
+export function matches(html, expression) {
+  return [...html.matchAll(expression)];
+}
+
+export function attribute(tag, name) {
+  return tag.match(new RegExp(`\\s${name}=(?:"([^"]*)"|'([^']*)')`, "i"))?.slice(1).find((value) => value !== undefined) ?? null;
+}
+
+export function issue(check, severity, page, message, details = {}) {
+  return { check, severity, path: typeof page === "string" ? page : page.path, message, ...details };
+}
+
+export function printIssues(name, issues) {
+  const rank = { error: 0, warning: 1, info: 2 };
+  const ordered = [...issues].sort((left, right) => rank[left.severity] - rank[right.severity] || left.path.localeCompare(right.path) || left.check.localeCompare(right.check));
+  const counts = Object.fromEntries(["error", "warning", "info"].map((severity) => [severity, ordered.filter((item) => item.severity === severity).length]));
+  console.log(`\n${name}: ${counts.error} errors, ${counts.warning} warnings, ${counts.info} notices`);
+  if (ordered.length === 0) console.log("  no offending pages");
+  for (const item of ordered) console.log(`  [${item.severity.toUpperCase()}] ${item.path} — ${item.message}`);
+  return counts;
+}
+
+export function isDirectInvocation(metaUrl) {
+  return process.argv[1] !== undefined && pathToFileURL(path.resolve(process.argv[1])).href === metaUrl;
+}
+
+export async function fileExists(target) {
+  try {
+    await access(target);
+    return true;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+export async function loadContext() {
+  contextPromise ??= (async () => {
+    const workerPath = path.join(root, "dist", "server", "index.js");
+    if (!(await fileExists(workerPath))) throw new Error("built site is missing; run npm run build before the audit");
+    const workerUrl = pathToFileURL(workerPath);
+    workerUrl.searchParams.set("audit", `${process.pid}-${Date.now()}`);
+    const { default: worker } = await import(workerUrl.href);
+    const assets = { fetch: async () => new Response("Not found", { status: 404 }) };
+    const execution = { waitUntil() {}, passThroughOnException() {} };
+    const rendered = new Map();
+    for (const page of htmlPages) {
+      const response = await worker.fetch(new Request(`http://localhost${page.path}`, { headers: { accept: "text/html" } }), { ASSETS: assets }, execution);
+      rendered.set(page.path, { page, status: response.status, contentType: response.headers.get("content-type") ?? "", html: await response.text() });
+    }
+    return {
+      graph: pageGraph,
+      rendered,
+      stylesheet: await readFile(path.join(root, "app", "globals.css"), "utf8"),
+    };
+  })();
+  return contextPromise;
+}
diff --git a/scripts/site-audit/duplication.mjs b/scripts/site-audit/duplication.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..42f41f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/site-audit/duplication.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+import { countWords, issue, isDirectInvocation, loadContext, mainHtml, matches, printIssues, visibleText, words } from "./context.mjs";
+
+function normalized(value) {
+  return value.toLowerCase().replace(/[^\p{L}\p{N}\s]/gu, "").replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim();
+}
+
+function tokens(value) {
+  return new Set(words(value.toLowerCase()).filter((word) => word.length > 3));
+}
+
+function withoutSharedProductMessages(html) {
+  return html.replace(/<(aside|section)\b[^>]*class="[^"]*\b(?:product-recipe|product-warning|projection-pending)\b[^"]*"[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/\1>/gi, " ");
+}
+
+function jaccard(left, right) {
+  const intersection = [...left].filter((value) => right.has(value)).length;
+  return intersection / new Set([...left, ...right]).size;
+}
+
+export async function auditDuplication() {
+  const { rendered } = await loadContext();
+  const issues = [];
+  const paragraphs = new Map();
+  const pageTokens = [];
+
+  for (const { page, html } of rendered.values()) {
+    const main = withoutSharedProductMessages(mainHtml(html));
+    const pageParagraphs = matches(main, /<p\b[^>]*>([\s\S]*?)<\/p>/gi).map((match) => visibleText(match[1], { excludeCode: true }));
+    const prose = pageParagraphs.join(" ");
+    if (countWords(prose) >= 100) pageTokens.push({ page, tokens: tokens(prose) });
+    for (const paragraph of pageParagraphs) {
+      const text = normalized(paragraph);
+      if (countWords(text) < 12) continue;
+      const occurrences = paragraphs.get(text) ?? new Set();
+      occurrences.add(page.path);
+      paragraphs.set(text, occurrences);
+    }
+    if (/\b(?:this guide|this page) (?:shows|explains|covers)\b/i.test(prose)) issues.push(issue("generic-opening", "warning", page, "uses a generic self-referential explanation"));
+  }
+
+  for (const [text, routes] of paragraphs) {
+    if (routes.size < 3) continue;
+    for (const route of routes) issues.push(issue("repeated-paragraph", "warning", route, `repeats the same ${countWords(text)}-word paragraph across ${routes.size} pages`, { excerpt: text.slice(0, 140) }));
+  }
+
+  for (let left = 0; left < pageTokens.length; left += 1) {
+    for (let right = left + 1; right < pageTokens.length; right += 1) {
+      const score = jaccard(pageTokens[left].tokens, pageTokens[right].tokens);
+      if (score < 0.82) continue;
+      issues.push(issue("near-duplicate-page", "warning", pageTokens[left].page, `${Math.round(score * 100)}% vocabulary overlap with ${pageTokens[right].page.path}`));
+      issues.push(issue("near-duplicate-page", "warning", pageTokens[right].page, `${Math.round(score * 100)}% vocabulary overlap with ${pageTokens[left].page.path}`));
+    }
+  }
+  return issues;
+}
+
+if (isDirectInvocation(import.meta.url)) {
+  const issues = await auditDuplication();
+  const counts = printIssues("Duplication audit", issues);
+  if (counts.error > 0) process.exitCode = 1;
+}
diff --git a/scripts/site-audit/editorial-leakage.mjs b/scripts/site-audit/editorial-leakage.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..04bf99e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/site-audit/editorial-leakage.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { issue, isDirectInvocation, loadContext, mainHtml, printIssues, root, visibleText } from "./context.mjs";
+
+const leakPatterns = [
+  ["source-inventory", /\bsource and verification\b/i, "exposes an internal source-verification inventory"],
+  ["detail-page-criteria", /\bwhat every (?:detail )?page must answer\b/i, "exposes authoring criteria intended for editors"],
+  ["gallery-criteria", /\b(?:omit it from the public gallery|each card must show|gallery component must never expose)\b/i, "exposes gallery implementation or admission criteria"],
+  ["generated-content-instruction", /\b(?:rendered|generated) (?:recipe|panel|portions?|inventory|reference|table) (?:must|should)\b/i, "exposes a generated-content implementation instruction"],
+  ["projection-instruction", /\b(?:reference|table|inventory) below (?:must|should) be (?:generated|rendered|projected)\b/i, "exposes a projection implementation instruction"],
+  ["docs-pipeline-instruction", /\b(?:the )?(?:docs?|documentation)(?: repository)? (?:must|should|must not|should not|does not own|renders?|generates?|rebuilds?)\b/i, "exposes a documentation-pipeline instruction"],
+  ["page-ownership-note", /\b(?:this page owns|hand-maintained in this page|run commands must be generated)\b/i, "exposes an internal page-ownership or generation note"],
+];
+
+function excerpt(text, match) {
+  const start = Math.max(0, match.index - 80);
+  const end = Math.min(text.length, match.index + match[0].length + 80);
+  return text.slice(start, end).trim();
+}
+
+export async function auditEditorialLeakage() {
+  const { graph, rendered } = await loadContext();
+  const issues = [];
+  for (const { page, html } of rendered.values()) {
+    const text = visibleText(mainHtml(html), { excludeCode: true });
+    for (const [check, pattern, message] of leakPatterns) {
+      const match = pattern.exec(text);
+      if (match) issues.push(issue(check, "error", page, message, { excerpt: excerpt(text, match) }));
+    }
+  }
+
+  const machineFiles = [
+    ...graph.pages.map((page) => page.path === "/" ? "index.md" : `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`),
+    "llms.txt",
+    "llms-full.txt",
+    "search-index.json",
+  ];
+  for (const file of machineFiles) {
+    const target = `/${file}`;
+    const text = await readFile(path.join(root, "public", file), "utf8");
+    const comment = /\{\/\*|\*\/\}/.exec(text);
+    if (comment) issues.push(issue("editorial-comment-projection", "error", target, "projects an MDX editorial comment into a machine-readable surface", { excerpt: excerpt(text, comment) }));
+    for (const [check, pattern, message] of leakPatterns) {
+      const match = pattern.exec(text);
+      if (match) issues.push(issue(`${check}-projection`, "error", target, `${message} in a machine-readable surface`, { excerpt: excerpt(text, match) }));
+    }
+  }
+  return issues;
+}
+
+if (isDirectInvocation(import.meta.url)) {
+  const issues = await auditEditorialLeakage();
+  const counts = printIssues("Editorial-leakage audit", issues);
+  if (counts.error > 0) process.exitCode = 1;
+}
diff --git a/scripts/site-audit/links-and-metadata.mjs b/scripts/site-audit/links-and-metadata.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..62b7aaf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/site-audit/links-and-metadata.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+import { access, readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { decodeHtml, fileExists, issue, isDirectInvocation, loadContext, matches, printIssues, root, withoutExecutableMarkup } from "./context.mjs";
+
+export async function auditLinksAndMetadata() {
+  const { graph, rendered } = await loadContext();
+  const issues = [];
+  const pages = new Map(graph.pages.map((page) => [page.path, page]));
+  const titles = new Map();
+  const incoming = new Map(graph.pages.map((page) => [page.path, 0]));
+
+  for (const { page, html } of rendered.values()) {
+    const clean = withoutExecutableMarkup(html);
+    const title = decodeHtml(clean.match(/<title>([\s\S]*?)<\/title>/i)?.[1] ?? "").trim();
+    const description = clean.match(/<meta[^>]+name="description"[^>]+content="([^"]*)"/i)?.[1] ?? clean.match(/<meta[^>]+content="([^"]*)"[^>]+name="description"/i)?.[1] ?? "";
+    if (!title) issues.push(issue("page-title", "error", page, "has no document title"));
+    else {
+      const routes = titles.get(title) ?? [];
+      routes.push(page.path);
+      titles.set(title, routes);
+      if (page.path !== "/" && title === "Auths Documentation") issues.push(issue("generic-title", "warning", page, "uses the generic site title"));
+    }
+    if (!description) issues.push(issue("meta-description", "warning", page, "has no meta description"));
+    if (!/<link[^>]+rel="canonical"/.test(clean)) issues.push(issue("canonical-link", "warning", page, "has no canonical URL metadata"));
+
+    const targetIds = new Set(matches(clean, /\sid="([^"]+)"/g).map((match) => match[1]));
+    for (const [, rawHref] of matches(clean, /<a\b[^>]*\shref="([^"]+)"[^>]*>/gi)) {
+      const href = rawHref.replaceAll("&amp;", "&");
+      if (!href.startsWith("/")) continue;
+      const [target, fragment] = href.split("#", 2);
+      const pathname = target.split("?", 1)[0] || page.path;
+      if (pages.has(pathname)) {
+        incoming.set(pathname, incoming.get(pathname) + 1);
+        if (fragment && pathname === page.path && !targetIds.has(fragment)) issues.push(issue("broken-fragment", "error", page, `links to missing #${fragment}`));
+      } else if (/\.(?:md|json|xml|txt|png|svg|ico)$/.test(pathname) || pathname.startsWith("/.well-known/") || pathname.startsWith("/downloads/") || pathname.startsWith("/images/")) {
+        if (!(await fileExists(path.join(root, "public", pathname.slice(1))))) issues.push(issue("missing-static-target", "error", page, `links to missing ${pathname}`));
+      } else {
+        issues.push(issue("broken-route", "error", page, `links to non-canonical route ${pathname}`));
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (const [title, routes] of titles) {
+    if (routes.length > 1) for (const route of routes) issues.push(issue("duplicate-title", "warning", route, `shares document title “${title}” with ${routes.length - 1} other pages`));
+  }
+  for (const page of graph.pages) {
+    if (page.path !== "/" && page.path !== "/reference/manifest.json" && incoming.get(page.path) === 0) issues.push(issue("orphan-page", "error", page, "has no incoming internal link"));
+  }
+
+  const sitemap = await readFile(path.join(root, "public", "sitemap.xml"), "utf8");
+  for (const page of graph.pages.filter((candidate) => candidate.path !== "/reference/manifest.json")) {
+    if (!sitemap.includes(page.path === "/" ? "https://docs.auths.dev/" : `https://docs.auths.dev${page.path}`)) issues.push(issue("sitemap-coverage", "error", page, "is missing from sitemap.xml"));
+  }
+  await access(path.join(root, "public", "robots.txt"));
+  return issues;
+}
+
+if (isDirectInvocation(import.meta.url)) {
+  const issues = await auditLinksAndMetadata();
+  const counts = printIssues("Link and metadata audit", issues);
+  if (counts.error > 0) process.exitCode = 1;
+}
diff --git a/scripts/site-audit/machine-surfaces.mjs b/scripts/site-audit/machine-surfaces.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff3598c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/site-audit/machine-surfaces.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileExists, issue, isDirectInvocation, loadContext, printIssues, root } from "./context.mjs";
+
+export async function auditMachineSurfaces() {
+  const { graph } = await loadContext();
+  const issues = [];
+  const search = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "public", "search-index.json"), "utf8"));
+  const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "public", "reference-manifest.json"), "utf8"));
+  const discovery = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "public", ".well-known", "auths-docs.json"), "utf8"));
+  const ownership = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "public", ".auths-docs-generated.json"), "utf8"));
+  const searchPaths = new Set((search.pages ?? []).map((entry) => entry.path));
+  const manifestPaths = new Set((manifest.pages ?? []).map((entry) => entry.url));
+  const ownershipFiles = Array.isArray(ownership.files) ? ownership.files : [];
+  const ownedFiles = new Set(ownershipFiles);
+  if (!Array.isArray(ownership.files)) issues.push(issue("generated-ownership", "error", "/.auths-docs-generated.json", "does not contain a file inventory"));
+  if (ownedFiles.size !== ownershipFiles.length) issues.push(issue("generated-ownership", "error", "/.auths-docs-generated.json", "claims the same output more than once"));
+
+  for (const page of graph.pages) {
+    const markdownPath = page.path === "/" ? "/index.md" : `${page.path}.md`;
+    if (!(await fileExists(path.join(root, "public", markdownPath.slice(1))))) issues.push(issue("markdown-twin", "error", page, `is missing ${markdownPath}`));
+    if (!ownedFiles.has(markdownPath.slice(1))) issues.push(issue("generated-ownership", "error", page, `${markdownPath} is not owned by the v2 projector`));
+    if (!searchPaths.has(page.path)) issues.push(issue("search-coverage", "error", page, "is missing from search-index.json"));
+    if (!manifestPaths.has(page.path)) issues.push(issue("manifest-coverage", "error", page, "is missing from reference-manifest.json"));
+  }
+
+  for (const target of ["/.auths-docs-generated.json", "/.well-known/auths-docs.json", "/llms.txt", "/llms-full.txt", "/sitemap.xml", "/robots.txt", "/reference-manifest.json", "/search-index.json"]) {
+    if (!(await fileExists(path.join(root, "public", target.slice(1))))) issues.push(issue("discovery-file", "error", target, "required machine-readable surface is missing"));
+    if (!ownedFiles.has(target.slice(1))) issues.push(issue("generated-ownership", "error", target, "is not owned by the v2 projector"));
+  }
+  if (ownership.schema !== "auths.docs.generated-files/1") issues.push(issue("generated-ownership", "error", "/.auths-docs-generated.json", "uses an unsupported ownership schema"));
+  if (ownership.sourceCommit !== graph.sourceCommit || ownership.contractDigest !== graph.contractDigest) {
+    issues.push(issue("generated-ownership", "error", "/.auths-docs-generated.json", "does not identify the selected product snapshot"));
+  }
+  for (const file of ownedFiles) {
+    if (!(await fileExists(path.join(root, "public", file)))) issues.push(issue("generated-ownership", "error", `/${file}`, "is claimed by the projector but missing"));
+  }
+  if (discovery.contractDigest !== graph.contractDigest) issues.push(issue("contract-digest", "error", "/.well-known/auths-docs.json", "does not identify the selected release contract"));
+  if (!discovery.manifest || !discovery.search || !discovery.markdown) issues.push(issue("discovery-links", "error", "/.well-known/auths-docs.json", "does not link every machine-readable entry point"));
+  return issues;
+}
+
+if (isDirectInvocation(import.meta.url)) {
+  const issues = await auditMachineSurfaces();
+  const counts = printIssues("Machine-surface audit", issues);
+  if (counts.error > 0) process.exitCode = 1;
+}
diff --git a/scripts/site-audit/navigation.mjs b/scripts/site-audit/navigation.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0c3cac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/site-audit/navigation.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+import { issue, isDirectInvocation, loadContext, mainHtml, matches, printIssues } from "./context.mjs";
+
+export async function auditNavigation() {
+  const { graph, rendered, stylesheet } = await loadContext();
+  const issues = [];
+  const incoming = new Map(graph.pages.map((page) => [page.path, 0]));
+
+  for (const { page, status, contentType, html } of rendered.values()) {
+    if (status !== 200) issues.push(issue("route-status", "error", page, `rendered with HTTP ${status}`));
+    if (!/^text\/html\b/i.test(contentType)) issues.push(issue("route-content-type", "error", page, `rendered as ${contentType || "no content type"}`));
+
+    const isHome = page.path === "/";
+    if (!isHome && !/class="topic-navigation(?:\s|")/.test(html)) {
+      issues.push(issue("left-navigation", "error", page, "has no topic left-hand navigation"));
+    }
+    if (!isHome && !/class="topic-navigation-restore/.test(html)) {
+      issues.push(issue("navigation-restore", "error", page, "has no control to restore a collapsed or mobile navigation"));
+    }
+    if (!isHome && !/aria-label="Breadcrumb"/.test(html)) {
+      issues.push(issue("breadcrumbs", "error", page, "has no breadcrumb trail"));
+    }
+    if (!isHome && !/aria-current="page"/.test(html)) {
+      issues.push(issue("active-navigation", "error", page, "does not identify the active page"));
+    }
+    if (page.parent !== null && !/aria-label="Previous and next pages"/.test(html)) {
+      issues.push(issue("sequence-navigation", "error", page, "has no previous/next navigation"));
+    }
+
+    for (const [, href] of matches(mainHtml(html), /\shref="([^"]+)"/g)) {
+      const target = href.replaceAll("&amp;", "&").split(/[?#]/, 1)[0];
+      if (incoming.has(target)) incoming.set(target, incoming.get(target) + 1);
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (const page of graph.pages) {
+    if (page.path !== "/" && page.path !== "/reference/manifest.json" && incoming.get(page.path) === 0) {
+      issues.push(issue("orphan-page", "error", page, "has no incoming link from another page body"));
+    }
+  }
+
+  const siteFrame = stylesheet.match(/\.site-frame \{([\s\S]*?)\n\}/)?.[1] ?? "";
+  const topicNav = stylesheet.match(/\.topic-navigation \{([\s\S]*?)\n\}/)?.[1] ?? "";
+  if (!/position: sticky;/.test(topicNav)) issues.push(issue("sticky-navigation", "error", "<shared topic shell>", "left navigation is not sticky"));
+  if (!/height: calc\(100vh - var\(--header-height\)\);/.test(topicNav)) issues.push(issue("viewport-navigation", "error", "<shared topic shell>", "left navigation is not viewport-bounded"));
+  if (!/overflow-y: auto;/.test(topicNav)) issues.push(issue("navigation-overflow", "error", "<shared topic shell>", "long navigation cannot scroll independently"));
+  if (/overflow(?:-y)?: hidden;/.test(siteFrame)) issues.push(issue("sticky-ancestor", "error", "<shared site frame>", "ancestor overflow disables sticky navigation"));
+  if (!/@media \(max-width: 960px\)[\s\S]*?\.topic-navigation-restore[\s\S]*?display: inline-flex;/.test(stylesheet)) {
+    issues.push(issue("mobile-navigation", "error", "<shared topic shell>", "mobile navigation has no visible restore control"));
+  }
+  return issues;
+}
+
+if (isDirectInvocation(import.meta.url)) {
+  const issues = await auditNavigation();
+  const counts = printIssues("Navigation audit", issues);
+  if (counts.error > 0) process.exitCode = 1;
+}
diff --git a/scripts/site-audit/tables.mjs b/scripts/site-audit/tables.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3723d5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/site-audit/tables.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+import { readdir, readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { attribute, issue, isDirectInvocation, loadContext, matches, printIssues, root } from "./context.mjs";
+
+async function sourceFiles(directory) {
+  const entries = await readdir(directory, { withFileTypes: true });
+  const nested = await Promise.all(entries.map((entry) => {
+    const target = path.join(directory, entry.name);
+    return entry.isDirectory() ? sourceFiles(target) : [target];
+  }));
+  return nested.flat();
+}
+
+function authoredTableCount(source) {
+  const lines = source.split(/\r?\n/);
+  return lines.filter((line, index) => /^\s*\|.+\|\s*$/.test(line) && /^\s*\|(?:\s*:?-+:?\s*\|)+\s*$/.test(lines[index + 1] ?? "")).length;
+}
+
+export async function auditTables() {
+  const { rendered } = await loadContext();
+  const issues = [];
+
+  for (const { page, html } of rendered.values()) {
+    const tables = matches(html, /(<table\b[^>]*>)([\s\S]*?)<\/table>/gi);
+    const regions = matches(html, /<div\b[^>]*class="[^"]*\bdocs-table-region\b[^"]*"[^>]*>/gi);
+
+    for (const table of tables) {
+      const tag = table[1];
+      const body = table[2];
+      const classes = attribute(tag, "class")?.split(/\s+/) ?? [];
+      if (!classes.includes("docs-table") || attribute(tag, "data-docs-table") !== "true") {
+        issues.push(issue("unstyled-table", "error", page, "contains a table that bypasses the shared documentation table component"));
+      }
+      if (!/<thead\b/i.test(body) || !/<tbody\b/i.test(body)) {
+        issues.push(issue("table-sections", "error", page, "contains a table without explicit header and body sections"));
+      }
+      const headers = matches(body, /<th\b[^>]*>/gi).map((match) => match[0]);
+      if (headers.length === 0) {
+        issues.push(issue("table-headers", "error", page, "contains a table without semantic header cells"));
+      } else if (headers.some((header) => !["col", "row"].includes(attribute(header, "scope") ?? ""))) {
+        issues.push(issue("table-header-scope", "error", page, "contains a table header without an explicit col or row scope"));
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (regions.length !== tables.length) {
+      issues.push(issue("table-overflow-region", "error", page, `renders ${tables.length} tables but ${regions.length} labelled responsive table regions`));
+    }
+
+    if (page.source.endsWith(".mdx")) {
+      const authored = authoredTableCount(await readFile(path.join(root, "content-v2", page.source), "utf8"));
+      if (tables.length < authored) {
+        issues.push(issue("authored-table-rendering", "error", page, `authors ${authored} Markdown tables but renders only ${tables.length}`));
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (const file of (await sourceFiles(path.join(root, "app"))).filter((target) => /\.[jt]sx$/.test(target))) {
+    if (file.endsWith(path.join("docs", "DocsTable.tsx"))) continue;
+    const source = await readFile(file, "utf8");
+    if (/<table\b/.test(source)) {
+      issues.push(issue("table-component-bypass", "error", path.relative(root, file), "creates a raw table instead of using DocsTable"));
+    }
+  }
+
+  return issues;
+}
+
+if (isDirectInvocation(import.meta.url)) {
+  const issues = await auditTables();
+  const counts = printIssues("Table presentation audit", issues);
+  if (counts.error > 0) process.exitCode = 1;
+}
diff --git a/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs b/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs
index 6fef911..40347eb 100644
--- a/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs
+++ b/tests/rendered-html.test.mjs
@@ -2,11 +2,15 @@ import assert from "node:assert/strict";
 import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
 import test from "node:test";
 
-async function render(pathname = "/") {
-  const workerUrl = new URL("../dist/server/index.js", import.meta.url);
-  workerUrl.searchParams.set("test", `${process.pid}-${Date.now()}-${pathname}`);
-  const { default: worker } = await import(workerUrl.href);
+const navigation = JSON.parse(await readFile(new URL("../content-v2/navigation.json", import.meta.url), "utf8"));
+const codeWalkthroughs = JSON.parse(await readFile(new URL("../content-v2/code-walkthroughs.json", import.meta.url), "utf8"));
+const registeredRoutes = navigation.sections.flatMap((section) => section.groups.flatMap((group) => group.pages.map((page) => page.path)));
+
+let workerPromise;
 
+async function render(pathname = "/") {
+  workerPromise ??= import(new URL(`../dist/server/index.js?test=${process.pid}-${Date.now()}`, import.meta.url)).then(({ default: worker }) => worker);
+  const worker = await workerPromise;
   return worker.fetch(
     new Request(`http://localhost${pathname}`, { headers: { accept: "text/html" } }),
     { ASSETS: { fetch: async () => new Response("Not found", { status: 404 }) } },
@@ -14,92 +18,85 @@ async function render(pathname = "/") {
   );
 }
 
-test("renders the Auths documentation landing page", async () => {
+test("renders the honest Auths landing page", async () => {
   const response = await render();
   assert.equal(response.status, 200);
-  assert.match(response.headers.get("content-type") ?? "", /^text\/html\b/i);
-
   const html = await response.text();
-  assert.match(html, /<title>Auths Documentation<\/title>/i);
-  assert.match(html, /Authority for the exact thing/);
-  assert.match(html, /Protect your first effect/);
-  assert.match(html, /Rust/);
-  assert.match(html, /TypeScript/);
-  assert.match(html, /Python/);
-  assert.doesNotMatch(html, /codex-preview|react-loading-skeleton|Starter Project/i);
+  assert.match(html, /Give software authority for one exact action/);
+  assert.match(html, /Prelaunch/);
+  assert.match(html, /Pre-audit/);
+  assert.match(html, /Development adapters use ephemeral custody and in-memory state/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(html, /live authority|verified production/i);
 });
 
-test("renders the qualified technical quickstart with all language sources", async () => {
-  const response = await render("/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect");
-  assert.equal(response.status, 200);
-
-  const html = await response.text();
-  assert.match(html, /Protect one REST effect locally/);
-  assert.match(html, /cargo add auths-sdk/);
-  assert.match(html, /npm install @auths-dev\/sdk/);
-  assert.match(html, /python -m pip install auths/);
-  assert.match(html, /Perform the permitted effect/);
-  assert.match(html, /Try the prohibited variant/);
-  assert.match(html, /Copy for LLM/);
-  assert.match(html, /View as Markdown/);
-  assert.match(html, /Collapse Get started navigation/);
+test("every registered page renders through the shared documentation shell", async () => {
+  for (const route of registeredRoutes) {
+    const response = await render(route);
+    assert.equal(response.status, 200, route);
+    const html = await response.text();
+    assert.match(html, /class="topic-navigation/, route);
+    assert.match(html, /aria-label="Breadcrumb"/, route);
+    assert.match(html, /aria-current="page"/, route);
+    assert.match(html, /Copy for LLM/, route);
+    assert.match(html, new RegExp(`href="${route}\\.md"`), route);
+  }
 });
 
-test("renders the SDK reference with synchronized client examples", async () => {
-  const response = await render("/reference/sdk");
-  assert.equal(response.status, 200);
+test("quickstarts show pinned product recipes and qualification status", async () => {
+  const typescript = await (await render("/start/typescript")).text();
+  assert.match(typescript, /development\.createAuths/);
+  assert.match(typescript, /03-execute-exact-action/);
+  assert.match(typescript, /Product-owned executable recipe/);
 
-  const html = await response.text();
-  assert.match(html, /SDK Reference/);
-  assert.match(html, /Open an Auths session/);
-  assert.match(html, /Delegate narrower authority/);
-  assert.match(html, /Execute through a closed gateway/);
-  assert.match(html, /Resume without repeating the effect/);
-  assert.match(html, /Verify the proof locally/);
-  assert.match(html, /npm install @auths-dev\/sdk/);
-
-  assert.equal((html.match(/Copy for LLM/g) ?? []).length, 1);
-  assert.equal((html.match(/Copy section for LLM/g) ?? []).length, 5);
-  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/sdk\/sections\/introduction\.md/);
-  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/sdk\/sections\/create\.md/);
-  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/sdk\/sections\/delegate\.md/);
-  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/sdk\/sections\/execute\.md/);
-  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/sdk\/sections\/resume\.md/);
-  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/sdk\/sections\/verify\.md/);
-
-  const markdown = await readFile(new URL("../public/reference/sdk/sections/introduction.md", import.meta.url), "utf8");
-  assert.match(markdown, /cargo add auths-sdk/);
-  assert.match(markdown, /npm install @auths-dev\/sdk/);
-  assert.match(markdown, /python -m pip install auths/);
+  const python = await (await render("/start/python")).text();
+  assert.match(python, /Qualification blocked/);
+  assert.match(python, /verify_receipt/);
+  assert.match(python, /not currently runnable/);
 });
 
-test("renders the Runtime API with the shared reference layout", async () => {
-  const response = await render("/reference/runtime-api");
+test("decision reference renders the normative stable code taxonomy", async () => {
+  const response = await render("/reference/decisions-errors");
   assert.equal(response.status, 200);
-
   const html = await response.text();
-  assert.match(html, /Runtime API Reference/);
-  assert.match(html, /sdk-reference-shell/);
-  assert.match(html, /sdk-copy-column/);
-  assert.match(html, /sdk-code-column/);
-  assert.match(html, /sdk-code-sticky/);
-  assert.match(html, /Create authority/);
-  assert.match(html, /Execute a sealed command/);
-  assert.equal((html.match(/Copy for LLM/g) ?? []).length, 1);
-  assert.equal((html.match(/Copy section for LLM/g) ?? []).length, 5);
-  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/runtime-api\/sections\/health\.md/);
-  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/runtime-api\/sections\/create-authority\.md/);
-  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/runtime-api\/sections\/execute\.md/);
-  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/runtime-api\/sections\/resume\.md/);
-  assert.match(html, /\/reference\/runtime-api\/sections\/receipt-summary\.md/);
+  assert.match(html, /action-body-mismatch/);
+  assert.match(html, /provider outcome unknown/i);
+  assert.match(html, /Indeterminate/);
 });
 
-test("renders topic-local navigation and location context", async () => {
-  const response = await render("/agents");
-  assert.equal(response.status, 200);
-  const html = await response.text();
-  assert.match(html, /Agents navigation/);
-  assert.match(html, /Agents navigation/);
-  assert.match(html, /aria-label="Breadcrumb"/);
-  assert.match(html, /href="\/agents\/how-auths-works"/);
+test("product code is rendered as explained, bounded steps in HTML and Markdown", async () => {
+  const html = await (await render("/guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans")).text();
+  assert.match(html, /SDK language/);
+  assert.match(html, /data-code-purpose="tutorial-step"/);
+  for (const block of html.matchAll(/<pre\b[^>]*data-code-purpose="tutorial-step"[^>]*>([\s\S]*?)<\/pre>/g)) {
+    assert.match(block[0], /data-code-explained="true"/);
+    assert.ok([...block[1].matchAll(/code-block-line/g)].length <= 20);
+  }
+
+  const recipeRoutes = {
+    "01-authenticate-identity": "guides/authenticate-identity.md",
+    "02-verify-authority": "guides/verify-authority.md",
+    "03-execute-exact-action": "guides/execute-exact-action.md",
+    "04-delegate-to-agent": "guides/delegate-agent.md",
+    "05-cross-organization-plan": "guides/approvals-and-ordered-plans.md",
+  };
+  for (const [recipe, destination] of Object.entries(recipeRoutes)) {
+    const markdown = await readFile(new URL(`../public/${destination}`, import.meta.url), "utf8");
+    for (const steps of Object.values(codeWalkthroughs.recipes[recipe])) {
+      for (const step of steps) {
+        assert.match(markdown, new RegExp(`#### Step \\d+: ${escapeRegExp(step.title)}`));
+        assert.ok(markdown.includes(step.description));
+        const sourceRange = step.startLine === step.endLine ? `${step.startLine}` : `${step.startLine}–${step.endLine}`;
+        assert.ok(markdown.includes(`Pinned source lines ${sourceRange}; no output is synthesized`));
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  const rustMarkdown = await readFile(new URL("../public/start/rust-offline-verification.md", import.meta.url), "utf8");
+  for (const step of codeWalkthroughs.repositoryExamples["demos/offline-verification"].rust) {
+    assert.match(rustMarkdown, new RegExp(`#### Step \\d+: ${escapeRegExp(step.title)}`));
+    assert.ok(rustMarkdown.includes(step.description));
+  }
 });
+
+function escapeRegExp(value) {
+  return value.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&");
+}
diff --git a/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs b/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index 2d44559..0000000
--- a/tools/build-page-model/check.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { affectedPages, verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
-
-assert.ok(verifiedPageGraph.pages.length >= 12);
-assert.equal(new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.id)).size, verifiedPageGraph.pages.length);
-assert.equal(new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.path)).size, verifiedPageGraph.pages.length);
-for (const id of ["auths.page.home/1", "auths.page.quickstart.local-rest-effect/1", "auths.page.reference.sdk/1"]) {
-  assert.ok(verifiedPageGraph.pages.some((page) => page.id === id));
-}
-const delegationPages = affectedPages(["auths.operation.delegate/1"]).map((page) => page.id);
-for (const expected of ["auths.page.authority.delegate/1", "auths.page.agents.delegation/1"]) {
-  assert.ok(delegationPages.includes(expected));
-}
diff --git a/tools/build-reference/check.mjs b/tools/build-reference/check.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index e0830c0..0000000
--- a/tools/build-reference/check.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-
-const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(new URL("../../public/reference-manifest.json", import.meta.url), "utf8"));
-assert.equal(manifest.schema, "auths.docs.reference-manifest/1");
-assert.match(manifest.contractDigest, /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/);
-assert.equal(new Set(manifest.operations.map((item) => item.id)).size, 5);
-assert.equal(new Set(manifest.endpoints).size, manifest.endpoints.length);
-for (const value of [...manifest.operations, ...manifest.endpoints].map((item) => item.id)) assert.match(value, /^auths\.[a-z0-9.-]+\/[1-9][0-9]*$/);
-assert.ok(manifest.pages.length > 80);
-assert.equal(manifest.claims.length, 8);
diff --git a/tools/content/build.mjs b/tools/content/build.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0433c40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/content/build.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,1062 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { access, mkdir, readFile, readdir, unlink, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { assertRouteOwnership } from "./route-ownership.mjs";
+
+const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
+const contentDirectory = path.join(root, "content-v2");
+const navigationPath = path.join(contentDirectory, "navigation.json");
+const codeWalkthroughsPath = path.join(contentDirectory, "code-walkthroughs.json");
+const snapshotDirectory = path.join(root, "product-snapshot");
+const publicDirectory = path.join(root, "public");
+const ownershipPath = path.join(publicDirectory, ".auths-docs-generated.json");
+const canonicalOrigin = "https://docs.auths.dev";
+
+await assertRouteOwnership(root);
+const navigation = await readJson(navigationPath);
+const product = await loadProductSnapshot();
+const home = await loadHome(navigation);
+const contentPages = await loadPages(navigation, home.path);
+for (const page of contentPages) {
+  page.markdown = await projectMdx(page.body, page.source, product);
+  validateProjectedHeading(page);
+}
+home.markdown = projectHome(home.content, product);
+const pages = [home, ...contentPages];
+const generatedFiles = [
+  ...pages.map((page) => publicRelative(markdownDestination(page.path))),
+  ".auths-docs-generated.json",
+  ".well-known/auths-docs.json",
+  "llms-full.txt",
+  "llms.txt",
+  "reference-manifest.json",
+  "robots.txt",
+  "search-index.json",
+  "sitemap.xml",
+].sort();
+await cleanStaleGeneratedFiles(generatedFiles);
+
+for (const page of pages) {
+  const destination = markdownDestination(page.path);
+  await mkdir(path.dirname(destination), { recursive: true });
+  await writeFile(destination, ensureNewline(page.markdown));
+}
+
+await writeFile(path.join(publicDirectory, "search-index.json"), json({
+  schema: "auths.docs.search-index/2",
+  sourceCommit: product.snapshot.sourceCommit,
+  docsContractSourceCommit: product.bundleManifest.sourceCommit,
+  contractDigest: product.snapshot.contractDigest,
+  pages: pages.map((page) => ({
+    path: page.path,
+    title: page.frontmatter.title,
+    description: page.frontmatter.description,
+    section: page.section.id,
+    group: page.group.label,
+    content: plainText(page.markdown),
+  })),
+}));
+
+await writeFile(path.join(publicDirectory, "llms.txt"), ensureNewline([
+  "# Auths documentation",
+  "",
+  "> Prelaunch, pre-audit documentation generated from editorial MDX and a pinned Auths product snapshot.",
+  "",
+  `Product source: ${product.snapshot.sourceCommit}`,
+  `Documentation contract source: ${product.bundleManifest.sourceCommit}`,
+  "",
+  `- [${home.frontmatter.title}](${markdownUrl(home.path)}) — ${home.frontmatter.description}`,
+  "",
+  ...navigation.sections.flatMap((section) => [
+    `## ${section.title}`,
+    "",
+    ...contentPages
+      .filter((page) => page.section.id === section.id)
+      .map((page) => `- [${page.frontmatter.title}](${markdownUrl(page.path)}) — ${page.frontmatter.description}`),
+    "",
+  ]),
+].join("\n")));
+
+await writeFile(path.join(publicDirectory, "llms-full.txt"), ensureNewline([
+  "# Auths documentation — complete Markdown",
+  "",
+  `Product source: ${product.snapshot.sourceCommit}`,
+  `Documentation contract source: ${product.bundleManifest.sourceCommit}`,
+  "",
+  ...pages.flatMap((page) => [
+    `<!-- route: ${page.path}; source: ${page.source}; section: ${page.section.id} -->`,
+    page.markdown.trim(),
+    "",
+    "---",
+    "",
+  ]),
+].join("\n")));
+
+await writeFile(path.join(publicDirectory, "sitemap.xml"), ensureNewline([
+  '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>',
+  '<urlset xmlns="http://www.sitemaps.org/schemas/sitemap/0.9">',
+  ...pages.map((page) => `  <url><loc>${escapeXml(`${canonicalOrigin}${page.path}`)}</loc></url>`),
+  "</urlset>",
+].join("\n")));
+
+const referenceManifest = {
+  schema: "auths.docs.reference-manifest/1",
+  sourceCommit: product.snapshot.sourceCommit,
+  docsContractSourceCommit: product.bundleManifest.sourceCommit,
+  contractDigest: product.snapshot.contractDigest,
+  pages: pages.map((page) => ({
+    id: pageId(page.path),
+    url: page.path,
+    markdown: markdownUrl(page.path),
+    title: page.frontmatter.title,
+    description: page.frontmatter.description,
+    section: page.section.id,
+    source: page.source,
+  })),
+};
+await writeFile(path.join(publicDirectory, "reference-manifest.json"), json(referenceManifest));
+
+await mkdir(path.join(publicDirectory, ".well-known"), { recursive: true });
+await writeFile(path.join(publicDirectory, ".well-known", "auths-docs.json"), json({
+  schema: "auths.docs.discovery/1",
+  sourceCommit: product.snapshot.sourceCommit,
+  docsContractSourceCommit: product.bundleManifest.sourceCommit,
+  contractDigest: product.snapshot.contractDigest,
+  canonicalBase: canonicalOrigin,
+  manifest: "/reference-manifest.json",
+  search: "/search-index.json",
+  markdown: "/<route>.md",
+  markdownIndex: "/llms.txt",
+  fullMarkdown: "/llms-full.txt",
+  sitemap: "/sitemap.xml",
+}));
+
+await writeFile(path.join(publicDirectory, "robots.txt"), ensureNewline([
+  "User-agent: *",
+  "Allow: /",
+  "",
+  `Sitemap: ${canonicalOrigin}/sitemap.xml`,
+].join("\n")));
+
+await writeFile(ownershipPath, json({
+  schema: "auths.docs.generated-files/1",
+  generator: "tools/content/build.mjs",
+  sourceCommit: product.snapshot.sourceCommit,
+  docsContractSourceCommit: product.bundleManifest.sourceCommit,
+  contractDigest: product.snapshot.contractDigest,
+  files: generatedFiles,
+}));
+
+console.log(`Projected ${pages.length} Auths documentation pages from ${product.snapshot.sourceCommit}`);
+
+async function loadHome(registry) {
+  assertObject(registry, "navigation registry");
+  assertObject(registry.home, "homepage registry entry");
+  const route = validateRoute(registry.home.path, "homepage route");
+  if (route !== "/") fail("homepage route must be /");
+  if (registry.home.source !== "home.json") fail("homepage source must be home.json");
+  const content = await readJson(path.join(contentDirectory, registry.home.source));
+  validateHomeContent(content);
+  return {
+    path: route,
+    source: registry.home.source,
+    frontmatter: { title: content.title, description: content.description, status: "prelaunch" },
+    section: { id: "home", title: "Home", path: route },
+    group: { label: "Home" },
+    content,
+  };
+}
+
+async function loadPages(registry, homepagePath) {
+  assertObject(registry, "navigation registry");
+  if (!Array.isArray(registry.sections) || registry.sections.length === 0) {
+    fail("navigation registry must contain non-empty sections");
+  }
+
+  const discovered = new Set((await findMdxFiles(contentDirectory)).map((file) => path.resolve(file)));
+  const registeredSources = new Set();
+  const registeredRoutes = new Set([homepagePath]);
+  const sectionIds = new Set();
+  const sectionPaths = new Set();
+  const result = [];
+
+  for (const section of registry.sections) {
+    assertObject(section, "navigation section");
+    assertString(section.id, "section id");
+    assertString(section.title, `section ${section.id} title`);
+    if (section.navigation !== "primary" && section.navigation !== "utility") fail(`unsupported navigation placement in ${section.id}`);
+    const sectionPath = validateRoute(section.path, `section ${section.id} path`);
+    if (!/^[a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*$/.test(section.id)) fail(`invalid section id: ${section.id}`);
+    if (sectionIds.has(section.id)) fail(`duplicate section id: ${section.id}`);
+    if (sectionPaths.has(sectionPath)) fail(`duplicate section path: ${sectionPath}`);
+    sectionIds.add(section.id);
+    sectionPaths.add(sectionPath);
+    if (!Array.isArray(section.groups) || section.groups.length === 0) fail(`section ${section.id} has no groups`);
+
+    const groupLabels = new Set();
+    let containsLanding = false;
+    for (const group of section.groups) {
+      assertObject(group, `group in section ${section.id}`);
+      assertString(group.label, `group label in section ${section.id}`);
+      if (groupLabels.has(group.label)) fail(`duplicate group label in ${section.id}: ${group.label}`);
+      groupLabels.add(group.label);
+      if (!Array.isArray(group.pages) || group.pages.length === 0) fail(`group ${group.label} has no pages`);
+
+      for (const entry of group.pages) {
+        assertObject(entry, `page in ${section.id}/${group.label}`);
+        const route = validateRoute(entry.path, `route in ${section.id}/${group.label}`);
+        const source = validateSource(entry.source);
+        if (route === sectionPath) containsLanding = true;
+        if (sectionPath !== "/" && route !== sectionPath && !route.startsWith(`${sectionPath}/`)) {
+          fail(`route ${route} is outside section ${sectionPath}`);
+        }
+        if (registeredRoutes.has(route)) fail(`duplicate route: ${route}`);
+        registeredRoutes.add(route);
+
+        const absoluteSource = path.resolve(contentDirectory, source);
+        if (!isWithin(contentDirectory, absoluteSource)) fail(`source escapes content root: ${source}`);
+        if (!(await exists(absoluteSource))) fail(`registered source does not exist: ${source}`);
+        if (registeredSources.has(absoluteSource)) fail(`source is registered more than once: ${source}`);
+        registeredSources.add(absoluteSource);
+
+        const parsed = parseFrontmatter(await readFile(absoluteSource, "utf8"), source);
+        validateFrontmatter(parsed.frontmatter, source);
+        validateBody(parsed.body, source);
+        result.push({
+          path: route,
+          source,
+          absoluteSource,
+          frontmatter: parsed.frontmatter,
+          body: parsed.body,
+          section: { id: section.id, title: section.title, path: sectionPath },
+          group: { label: group.label },
+        });
+      }
+    }
+    if (!containsLanding) fail(`section ${section.id} does not register its landing route ${sectionPath}`);
+  }
+
+  const missing = [...discovered].filter((file) => !registeredSources.has(file));
+  const unknown = [...registeredSources].filter((file) => !discovered.has(file));
+  if (missing.length > 0 || unknown.length > 0) {
+    fail([
+      "navigation and MDX sources do not have one-to-one coverage",
+      ...missing.map((file) => `unregistered: ${relative(file)}`),
+      ...unknown.map((file) => `not discovered: ${relative(file)}`),
+    ].join("\n"));
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+
+function validateHomeContent(content) {
+  assertObject(content, "homepage content");
+  if (content.schema !== "auths.docs.home/1") fail("unsupported homepage content schema");
+  for (const [label, value] of [
+    ["homepage title", content.title],
+    ["homepage description", content.description],
+    ["homepage hero kicker", content.hero?.kicker],
+    ["homepage hero title", content.hero?.title],
+    ["homepage hero description", content.hero?.description],
+    ["homepage hero caveat", content.hero?.caveat],
+    ["homepage non-authorization title", content.nonAuthorization?.title],
+    ["homepage outcomes title", content.outcomes?.title],
+    ["homepage separation title", content.separation?.title],
+    ["homepage recipe id", content.recipe?.id],
+    ["homepage disclosure title", content.disclosure?.title],
+  ]) assertString(value, label);
+  for (const [label, value] of [
+    ["homepage status", content.status],
+    ["homepage actions", content.hero?.actions],
+    ["homepage non-authorization items", content.nonAuthorization?.items],
+    ["homepage outcomes", content.outcomes?.items],
+    ["homepage separation planes", content.separation?.planes],
+    ["homepage disclosure items", content.disclosure?.items],
+  ]) if (!Array.isArray(value) || value.length === 0) fail(`${label} must be a non-empty array`);
+  for (const action of content.hero.actions) {
+    assertString(action.label, "homepage action label");
+    validateRoute(action.href, "homepage action route");
+    if (action.kind !== "primary" && action.kind !== "quiet") fail(`unsupported homepage action kind: ${action.kind}`);
+  }
+  for (const collection of [content.outcomes.items, content.disclosure.items]) {
+    for (const item of collection) validateRoute(item.href, "homepage destination");
+  }
+}
+
+function projectHome(content, product) {
+  return [
+    `# ${content.hero.title}`,
+    "",
+    content.hero.description,
+    "",
+    `> **${content.status.join(" · ")}**`,
+    ">",
+    `> ${content.hero.caveat}`,
+    "",
+    `## ${content.outcomes.title}`,
+    "",
+    content.outcomes.description,
+    "",
+    ...content.outcomes.items.flatMap((item) => [
+      `### ${item.label}: ${item.title}`,
+      "",
+      item.description,
+      "",
+      `[Open path](${item.href})`,
+      "",
+    ]),
+    "## Identity is not authority",
+    "",
+    `${content.nonAuthorization.title} ${content.nonAuthorization.items.join(", ")}.`,
+    "",
+    `### ${content.separation.title}`,
+    "",
+    ...content.separation.planes.map((plane) => `- **${plane.title}:** ${plane.description}`),
+    "",
+    content.separation.rule,
+    "",
+    `## ${content.recipe.title}`,
+    "",
+    content.recipe.description,
+    "",
+    renderRecipe({ id: content.recipe.id }, product),
+    "",
+    `## ${content.disclosure.title}`,
+    "",
+    ...content.disclosure.items.map((item) => `- [${item.label}](${item.href}) — ${item.description}`),
+  ].join("\n").trim();
+}
+
+async function loadProductSnapshot() {
+  const snapshot = await readJson(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "snapshot.json"));
+  const bundleManifest = await readJson(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "bundle", "manifest.json"));
+  const recipeManifest = await readJson(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "recipes", "manifest.json"));
+  const codeWalkthroughs = await readJson(codeWalkthroughsPath);
+  assertObject(snapshot, "product snapshot");
+  if (snapshot.schema !== "auths.docs.product-snapshot/1") fail("unsupported product snapshot schema");
+  if (!/^[a-f0-9]{40}$/.test(snapshot.sourceCommit ?? "")) fail("product snapshot source commit is invalid");
+  if (snapshot.docsContractSourceCommit !== undefined && !/^[a-f0-9]{40}$/.test(snapshot.docsContractSourceCommit)) {
+    fail("documentation contract source commit is invalid");
+  }
+  if (!/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(snapshot.contractDigest ?? "")) fail("product snapshot contract digest is invalid");
+  if (bundleManifest.schema !== "auths.docs.bundle/1") fail("unsupported documentation bundle schema");
+  if (bundleManifest.sourceCommit !== (snapshot.docsContractSourceCommit ?? snapshot.sourceCommit)) {
+    fail("bundle source commit does not match the snapshot documentation-contract source");
+  }
+  if (bundleManifest.contractDigest !== snapshot.contractDigest) fail("bundle and snapshot contract digests differ");
+  if (recipeManifest.schema !== "auths.outcome-recipes/1") fail("unsupported recipe manifest schema");
+  if (codeWalkthroughs.schema !== "auths.docs.code-walkthroughs/1") fail("unsupported code walkthrough schema");
+
+  const productOwnedBundleOverrides = new Set([
+    "typescript-public-api.txt",
+    "python-public-api.txt",
+    "public-topology.json",
+  ]);
+  for (const file of bundleManifest.files) {
+    if (productOwnedBundleOverrides.has(file.path)) continue;
+    const filePath = path.join(snapshotDirectory, "bundle", file.path);
+    const bytes = await readFile(filePath);
+    if (bytes.byteLength !== file.bytes || sha256(bytes) !== file.sha256) {
+      fail(`product bundle file failed verification: ${file.path}`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  const recipes = new Map();
+  for (const recipe of recipeManifest.recipes) {
+    assertString(recipe.id, "recipe id");
+    if (recipes.has(recipe.id)) fail(`duplicate recipe id: ${recipe.id}`);
+    const sources = {};
+    for (const language of ["typescript", "python"]) {
+      assertString(recipe[language], `${recipe.id} ${language} source`);
+      const relativePath = recipe[language];
+      const expectedDigest = snapshot.recipeDigests?.[relativePath];
+      if (!/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(expectedDigest ?? "")) fail(`missing recipe digest: ${relativePath}`);
+      const sourcePath = path.resolve(snapshotDirectory, "recipes", relativePath);
+      if (!isWithin(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "recipes"), sourcePath)) fail(`recipe source escapes snapshot: ${relativePath}`);
+      const source = await readFile(sourcePath, "utf8");
+      if (sha256(source) !== expectedDigest) fail(`recipe source digest mismatch: ${relativePath}`);
+      sources[language] = { path: relativePath, source };
+    }
+    recipes.set(recipe.id, { ...recipe, sources });
+  }
+
+  const offlineVerificationFiles = {
+    readme: "offline-verification/README.md",
+    manifest: "offline-verification/Cargo.toml",
+    source: "offline-verification/src/main.rs",
+  };
+  const offlineVerificationExample = {};
+  for (const [name, relativePath] of Object.entries(offlineVerificationFiles)) {
+    const expectedDigest = snapshot.exampleDigests?.[relativePath];
+    if (!/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(expectedDigest ?? "")) fail(`missing example digest: ${relativePath}`);
+    const sourcePath = path.resolve(snapshotDirectory, "examples", relativePath);
+    if (!isWithin(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "examples"), sourcePath)) fail(`example source escapes snapshot: ${relativePath}`);
+    const source = await readFile(sourcePath, "utf8");
+    if (sha256(source) !== expectedDigest) fail(`example source digest mismatch: ${relativePath}`);
+    offlineVerificationExample[name] = source;
+  }
+
+  return {
+    snapshot,
+    bundleManifest,
+    contract: await readJson(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "bundle", "contract.json")),
+    recipeManifest,
+    recipes,
+    publicTopology: await readJson(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "bundle", "public-topology.json")),
+    typescriptPublicApi: await readFile(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "bundle", "typescript-public-api.txt"), "utf8"),
+    pythonPublicApi: await readFile(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "bundle", "python-public-api.txt"), "utf8"),
+    typescriptRuntime: await readJson(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "product", "typescript-runtime-contract.json")),
+    pythonRuntime: await readJson(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "product", "python-runtime-contract.json")),
+    errorRegistry: await readJson(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "product", "error-registry.json")),
+    journeyMatrix: await readJson(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "product", "customer-journey-matrix.json")),
+    fixtureManifest: await readJson(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "conformance", "fixtures.json")),
+    mutationManifest: await readJson(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "conformance", "mutations.json")),
+    formalManifest: await readJson(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "conformance", "formal-vectors.json")),
+    errorCodes: await readFile(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "protocol", "error-codes.md"), "utf8"),
+    protocol: await readFile(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "protocol", "protocol.md"), "utf8"),
+    registry: await readFile(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "protocol", "registry.md"), "utf8"),
+    domainSeparation: await readFile(path.join(snapshotDirectory, "protocol", "domain-separation.md"), "utf8"),
+    offlineVerificationExample,
+    codeWalkthroughs,
+  };
+}
+
+async function projectMdx(body, source, product) {
+  let markdown = body.replace(/\{\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\/\}/g, "");
+  markdown = markdown.replace(/<NextSteps>\s*([\s\S]*?)\s*<\/NextSteps>/g, (_match, children) => `## Continue\n\n${children.trim()}`);
+  markdown = replaceComponents(markdown, "ProductStatus", () => renderProductStatus(product));
+  markdown = replaceComponents(markdown, "OutcomeBoundary", renderOutcomeBoundary);
+  markdown = replaceComponents(markdown, "Recipe", (attributes) => renderRecipe(attributes, product));
+  markdown = replaceComponents(markdown, "RepositoryExample", (attributes) => renderRepositoryExample(attributes, product));
+  markdown = replaceComponents(markdown, "StableCodeTable", () => [
+    "### Pinned stable failure taxonomy",
+    "",
+    sourceLink("core/spec/v1/error-codes.md", product),
+    "",
+    demoteHeadings(product.errorCodes, 2).trim(),
+  ].join("\n"));
+  markdown = replaceComponents(markdown, "DemoGallery", (attributes) => renderDemoGallery(attributes, product));
+  markdown = replaceComponents(markdown, "GeneratedReference", (attributes) => renderGeneratedReference(attributes, product));
+  if (/<[A-Z][A-Za-z0-9]*\b/.test(markdown)) fail(`unsupported MDX component in ${source}`);
+  return markdown.trim();
+}
+
+function renderRecipe(attributes, product) {
+  const id = attributes.id;
+  assertString(id, "Recipe id");
+  const recipe = product.recipes.get(id);
+  if (!recipe) fail(`unknown Recipe id: ${id}`);
+  const languages = attributes.language === undefined ? ["typescript", "python"] : [attributes.language];
+  for (const language of languages) {
+    if (language !== "typescript" && language !== "python") fail(`unsupported Recipe language: ${language}`);
+  }
+  const rendered = [
+    `> Product-owned recipe \`${id}\` from [Auths ${shortCommit(product.snapshot.sourceCommit)}](${repositoryUrl("", product)}).`,
+    `> Declared outcome contract: \`${recipe.expected}\`. This projection does not synthesize example output.`,
+    "",
+  ];
+  for (const language of languages) {
+    const source = recipe.sources[language];
+    const qualification = language === "python" ? pythonRecipeQualification(recipe, product) : undefined;
+    rendered.push(
+      `### ${language === "typescript" ? "TypeScript" : "Python"} recipe`,
+      "",
+      ...(qualification === undefined ? [] : [
+        "> **Qualification blocked — Python source does not match the pinned public API.**",
+        ">",
+        `> ${qualification}`,
+        "",
+      ]),
+      sourceLink(`bindings/recipes/${source.path}`, product),
+      "",
+      ...renderCodeWalkthrough(codeSteps(product, "recipes", id, language, source.source), language === "typescript" ? "ts" : "python"),
+    );
+  }
+  return rendered.join("\n").trimEnd();
+}
+
+function pythonRecipeQualification(recipe, product) {
+  if (recipe.id !== "03-execute-exact-action") return undefined;
+  const source = recipe.sources.python.source;
+  const rootImport = source.match(/from\s+auths\s+import\s+(\([^)]*\)|[^\n]+)/s)?.[1] ?? "";
+  if (!/\bverify_receipt\b/.test(rootImport)) return undefined;
+  const exports = parsePythonPublicApi(product.pythonPublicApi);
+  const rootExports = exports.get("auths") ?? new Set();
+  const verifyExports = exports.get("auths.verify") ?? new Set();
+  if (!rootExports.has("verify_receipt") && verifyExports.has("verify_receipt")) {
+    return "The pinned recipe imports `verify_receipt` from `auths`, while the pinned installed API exports it only from `auths.verify`. The source is retained for review but must not be presented as runnable until the product recipe is corrected and re-executed.";
+  }
+  return undefined;
+}
+
+function parsePythonPublicApi(source) {
+  const modules = new Map();
+  let current;
+  for (const rawLine of source.split(/\r?\n/)) {
+    const line = rawLine.trim();
+    const heading = line.match(/^\[([^\]]+)\]$/);
+    if (heading) {
+      current = heading[1];
+      modules.set(current, new Set());
+    } else if (current !== undefined && line !== "" && !line.startsWith("#")) {
+      modules.get(current).add(line);
+    }
+  }
+  return modules;
+}
+
+function renderRepositoryExample(attributes, product) {
+  assertString(attributes.path, "RepositoryExample path");
+  if (attributes.path === "demos/offline-verification") {
+    return renderOfflineVerificationExample(product);
+  }
+  return [
+    `> Product-owned repository example: [\`${attributes.path}\`](${repositoryTreeUrl(attributes.path, product)}).`,
+    `> Source revision: \`${product.snapshot.sourceCommit}\`. No output is synthesized by the documentation projection.`,
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+function renderOfflineVerificationExample(product) {
+  return [
+    `> Product-owned external-consumer example from [\`demos/offline-verification\`](${repositoryTreeUrl("demos/offline-verification", product)}).`,
+    `> Source revision: \`${product.snapshot.sourceCommit}\`. No output is synthesized by the documentation projection.`,
+    "",
+    sourceLink("demos/offline-verification/src/main.rs", product),
+    "",
+    ...renderCodeWalkthrough(codeSteps(product, "repositoryExamples", "demos/offline-verification", "rust", product.offlineVerificationExample.source), "rust"),
+    "```bash",
+    "# Run the pinned workspace example",
+    "cargo run -p auths-proof-offline-example",
+    "```",
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+function codeSteps(product, section, id, language, source) {
+  const configured = product.codeWalkthroughs?.[section]?.[id]?.[language];
+  if (!Array.isArray(configured) || configured.length === 0) fail(`missing code walkthrough: ${section}/${id}/${language}`);
+  const lines = source.trimEnd().split("\n");
+  const covered = new Set();
+  let previousEnd = 0;
+  const steps = configured.map((step) => {
+    assertObject(step, `code walkthrough step ${section}/${id}/${language}`);
+    for (const field of ["id", "title", "description"]) assertString(step[field], `code walkthrough ${field}`);
+    if (!Number.isInteger(step.startLine) || !Number.isInteger(step.endLine) || step.startLine < 1 || step.endLine < step.startLine || step.endLine > lines.length) {
+      fail(`invalid code walkthrough range: ${section}/${id}/${language}/${step.id}`);
+    }
+    if (step.startLine <= previousEnd) fail(`overlapping or unordered code walkthrough range: ${section}/${id}/${language}/${step.id}`);
+    if (step.endLine - step.startLine + 1 > 20) fail(`oversized code walkthrough step: ${section}/${id}/${language}/${step.id}`);
+    previousEnd = step.endLine;
+    for (let line = step.startLine; line <= step.endLine; line += 1) covered.add(line);
+    const selected = lines.slice(step.startLine - 1, step.endLine);
+    while (selected[0]?.trim() === "") selected.shift();
+    while (selected.at(-1)?.trim() === "") selected.pop();
+    const code = selected.join("\n");
+    if (code === "") fail(`empty code walkthrough step: ${section}/${id}/${language}/${step.id}`);
+    return { ...step, code };
+  });
+  const omitted = lines.flatMap((line, index) => line.trim() !== "" && !covered.has(index + 1) ? [index + 1] : []);
+  if (omitted.length > 0) fail(`code walkthrough omits source lines: ${section}/${id}/${language} (${omitted.join(", ")})`);
+  return steps;
+}
+
+function renderCodeWalkthrough(steps, language) {
+  return steps.flatMap((step, index) => [
+    `#### Step ${index + 1}: ${step.title}`,
+    "",
+    step.description,
+    "",
+    `_Pinned source lines ${step.startLine}${step.startLine === step.endLine ? "" : `–${step.endLine}`}; no output is synthesized._`,
+    "",
+    `\`\`\`${language}`,
+    step.code,
+    "```",
+    "",
+  ]);
+}
+
+function renderProductStatus(product) {
+  return [
+    "> **Prelaunch · pre-audit**",
+    ">",
+    "> The public surface is a repository preview. Pin the exact product revision before evaluating it, and do not treat the development composition as production durable.",
+    `> Product revision: \`${product.snapshot.sourceCommit}\`.`,
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+function renderOutcomeBoundary() {
+  return [
+    "| Outcome | Safe boundary |",
+    "| --- | --- |",
+    "| Denied | Provider was not reached |",
+    "| Indeterminate | Required trustworthy facts were unavailable; provider was not reached |",
+    "| Recoverable | Resume only through the original execution reference |",
+    "| Provider unknown | Reconcile; never blindly retry |",
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+function renderDemoGallery(attributes, product) {
+  assertString(attributes.question, "DemoGallery question");
+  assertString(attributes.maturity, "DemoGallery maturity");
+  if (!Array.isArray(attributes.sources) || attributes.sources.length === 0) fail("DemoGallery sources must be a non-empty array");
+  return [
+    `**${attributes.maturity}**`,
+    "",
+    ...attributes.sources.map((source) => {
+      assertString(source, "DemoGallery source");
+      return `- [\`${source}\`](${repositoryTreeUrl(source, product)})`;
+    }),
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+function renderGeneratedReference(attributes, product) {
+  assertString(attributes.kind, "GeneratedReference kind");
+  if (attributes.kind === "typescript-sdk-symbols") {
+    return renderTextArtifact("Installed TypeScript public API", "bindings/typescript/api/public-api.txt", product.typescriptPublicApi, product);
+  }
+  if (attributes.kind === "python-sdk-symbols") {
+    return renderTextArtifact("Installed Python public API", "bindings/python/api/public-api.txt", product.pythonPublicApi, product);
+  }
+  if (attributes.kind === "executed-recipe") {
+    assertString(attributes.source, "executed-recipe source");
+    const match = [...product.recipes.values()].find((recipe) =>
+      ["typescript", "python"].some((language) => `bindings/recipes/${recipe.sources[language].path}` === attributes.source));
+    if (!match) fail(`executed-recipe source is not in the product snapshot: ${attributes.source}`);
+    const language = attributes.source.includes("/typescript/") ? "typescript" : "python";
+    return renderRecipe({ id: match.id, language }, product);
+  }
+  if (attributes.kind === "qualified-profile-status") return renderPublicTopology(product);
+  if (attributes.kind === "typescript-runtime-and-publication-status") return renderTypeScriptRuntime(product);
+  if (attributes.kind === "python-runtime-and-distribution-status") return renderPythonRuntime(product);
+  if (attributes.kind === "product-results-and-errors") return renderProductErrors(product);
+  if (attributes.kind === "canonical-fixture-inventory" || attributes.kind === "conformance-status") return renderConformanceStatus(product);
+  if (attributes.kind === "independent-implementation-inventory") return renderJourneyStatus(product);
+  if (attributes.kind === "verifier-limits") {
+    return renderExtractedSection("Pinned verifier limits", "core/spec/v1/protocol.md", product.protocol, "Default and hard limits", product);
+  }
+  if (attributes.kind === "domain-separated-identifiers") {
+    return renderMarkdownArtifact("Pinned domain-separation specification", "core/spec/v1/domain-separation.md", product.domainSeparation, product);
+  }
+  if (attributes.kind === "registry-inventory") {
+    return renderMarkdownArtifact("Pinned registry specification", "core/spec/v1/registry.md", product.registry, product);
+  }
+  if (attributes.kind === "assurance-claims-and-implications") return renderAssuranceClaims(product);
+  if (attributes.kind === "principal-adapter-matrix") {
+    return ["Principal methods", "Signature suites", "Status methods"]
+      .map((heading) => renderExtractedSection(`Pinned ${heading.toLowerCase()}`, "core/spec/v1/registry.md", product.registry, heading, product))
+      .join("\n\n");
+  }
+  if (attributes.kind === "compiled-rust-example") return renderOfflineVerificationExample(product);
+  return renderSourceBackedNotice(attributes, product);
+}
+
+function renderAssuranceClaims(product) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(product.contract.claims)) fail("documentation contract has no assurance claims");
+  return [
+    "### Pinned assurance claims",
+    "",
+    `Documentation-contract revision: \`${product.bundleManifest.sourceCommit}\`.`,
+    "",
+    "| Claim | Status | Scope | Limitation |",
+    "| --- | --- | --- | --- |",
+    ...product.contract.claims.map((claim) => `| ${escapeTableCell(claim.statement)} | ${escapeTableCell(claim.status)} | ${escapeTableCell(claim.scope)} | ${escapeTableCell(claim.limitation)} |`),
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+function escapeTableCell(value) {
+  return String(value).replaceAll("|", "\\|").replaceAll("\n", " ");
+}
+
+function renderTypeScriptRuntime(product) {
+  const runtime = product.typescriptRuntime;
+  if (runtime.schema !== "auths.runtime-contract/1") fail("unsupported TypeScript runtime contract schema");
+  return [
+    "### TypeScript runtime contract",
+    "",
+    sourceLink("bindings/typescript/sdk-runtime-contract.json", product),
+    "",
+    `- Package: \`${runtime.package}\` \`${runtime.sdkVersion}\``,
+    `- Public entry points: ${runtime.requiredSubpaths.map(code).join(", ")}`,
+    `- Required WASM exports: ${runtime.requiredWasmExports.map(code).join(", ")}`,
+    `- Qualified profiles: ${Object.entries(runtime.profiles).map(([name, version]) => code(`${name}/${version}`)).join(", ") || "none"}`,
+    "- Publication: repository candidate; registry promotion is not asserted by this snapshot.",
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+function renderPythonRuntime(product) {
+  const runtime = product.pythonRuntime;
+  if (runtime.schema !== "auths.python-runtime-contract/1") fail("unsupported Python runtime contract schema");
+  return [
+    "### Python runtime contract",
+    "",
+    sourceLink("bindings/python/sdk-runtime-contract.json", product),
+    "",
+    `- Package: \`${runtime.package.name}\` \`${runtime.package.version}\` · \`${runtime.package.wheelAbi}\``,
+    `- Runtime: ${runtime.runtime.implementation} ${runtime.runtime.versions.map(code).join(", ")}`,
+    `- Operating systems: ${runtime.runtime.operatingSystems.join(", ")}`,
+    `- Public modules: ${runtime.modules.map(code).join(", ")}`,
+    `- Distribution: wheels \`${runtime.distribution.wheels}\`; source distribution \`${runtime.distribution.sourceDistribution}\`; local compiler required \`${runtime.distribution.localCompilerRequired}\``,
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+function renderProductErrors(product) {
+  const registry = product.errorRegistry;
+  if (registry.schema !== "auths.error-registry/1" || !Array.isArray(registry.definitions)) fail("unsupported product error registry schema");
+  return [
+    "### Product errors and safe responses",
+    "",
+    sourceLink("product/errors/v1/registry.json", product),
+    "",
+    "| Code | Family | Effect state | Recommended response |",
+    "| --- | --- | --- | --- |",
+    ...registry.definitions.map((entry) => {
+      const effects = [...new Set(entry.outcomes.map((outcome) => outcome.effect))].join(", ");
+      return `| \`${entry.code}\` | ${entry.family} | ${effects} | \`${entry.recommendedAction}\` |`;
+    }),
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+function renderConformanceStatus(product) {
+  const fixtures = product.fixtureManifest.fixtures;
+  const mutations = product.mutationManifest.mutations;
+  const outcomes = product.formalManifest.outcomes;
+  const theorems = product.formalManifest.theorems;
+  if (!Array.isArray(fixtures) || !Array.isArray(mutations) || !Array.isArray(outcomes) || !Array.isArray(theorems)) {
+    fail("invalid conformance snapshot");
+  }
+  const classes = new Map();
+  for (const fixture of fixtures) {
+    const classification = fixture.class ?? fixture.fixture_class ?? "unclassified";
+    classes.set(classification, (classes.get(classification) ?? 0) + 1);
+  }
+  return [
+    "### Pinned conformance evidence",
+    "",
+    `Product revision: \`${product.snapshot.sourceCommit}\`.`,
+    "",
+    `- Canonical fixtures: ${fixtures.length}`,
+    `- Fixture classes: ${[...classes.entries()].sort(([left], [right]) => left.localeCompare(right)).map(([name, count]) => `${name} (${count})`).join(", ")}`,
+    `- Adversarial mutations: ${mutations.length}`,
+    `- Formal outcomes: ${outcomes.length}`,
+    `- Formal theorems: ${theorems.length}`,
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+function renderJourneyStatus(product) {
+  const matrix = product.journeyMatrix;
+  if (matrix.schema !== "auths.customer-journey-matrix/1") fail("unsupported customer journey matrix schema");
+  const baseline = matrix.experience?.baseline;
+  if (baseline === undefined) fail("customer journey matrix has no experience baseline");
+  return [
+    "### Cross-language journey evidence",
+    "",
+    sourceLink("bindings/customer-journey-matrix-v1.json", product),
+    "",
+    `- Semantic owner: ${matrix.semanticOwner}`,
+    `- TypeScript public symbols: ${baseline.typescriptPublicSymbols}`,
+    `- Python public symbols: ${baseline.pythonPublicSymbols}`,
+    `- Maintained TypeScript recipes: ${baseline.maintainedTypescriptRecipes}`,
+    `- Maintained Python recipes: ${baseline.maintainedPythonRecipes}`,
+    `- Registered journeys: ${matrix.journeys.length}`,
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+function renderPublicTopology(product) {
+  const topology = product.publicTopology;
+  if (topology.schema !== "auths.public-topology/1") fail("unsupported public-topology schema");
+  return [
+    "### Pinned public topology",
+    "",
+    sourceLink("bindings/public-topology-v1.json", product),
+    "",
+    `- Qualified profiles: ${topology.qualifiedProfiles.map((value) => `\`${value}\``).join(", ") || "none"}`,
+    `- Framework contracts: ${topology.frameworkContracts.map((value) => `\`${value}\``).join(", ") || "none"}`,
+    "",
+    "| Layer | TypeScript | Python |",
+    "| --- | --- | --- |",
+    ...topology.layers.map((layer) => `| ${layer.name} | ${layer.typescript.map(code).join(", ")} | ${layer.python.map(code).join(", ")} |`),
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+function renderTextArtifact(title, source, contents, product) {
+  return [
+    `### ${title}`,
+    "",
+    sourceLink(source, product),
+    "",
+    "```text",
+    contents.trimEnd(),
+    "```",
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+function renderMarkdownArtifact(title, source, contents, product) {
+  return [
+    `### ${title}`,
+    "",
+    sourceLink(source, product),
+    "",
+    demoteHeadings(contents, 2).trim(),
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+function renderExtractedSection(title, source, contents, heading, product) {
+  const pattern = new RegExp(`^## ${escapeRegex(heading)}\\s*$([\\s\\S]*?)(?=^## |(?![\\s\\S]))`, "m");
+  const match = contents.match(pattern);
+  if (!match) fail(`cannot find section ${heading} in ${source}`);
+  return [
+    `### ${title}`,
+    "",
+    sourceLink(source, product),
+    "",
+    match[1].trim(),
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+function renderSourceBackedNotice(attributes, product) {
+  const rawSources = attributes.sources ?? attributes.source;
+  const sources = Array.isArray(rawSources)
+    ? rawSources
+    : typeof rawSources === "string"
+      ? rawSources.split(";").map((source) => source.trim()).filter(Boolean)
+      : [];
+  const included = [attributes.include, attributes.show, attributes.groupBy].filter((value) => typeof value === "string");
+  return [
+    `> **Pinned reference request: ${attributes.kind}.**`,
+    `> Product revision: \`${product.snapshot.sourceCommit}\`.`,
+    ...(sources.length > 0 ? [`> Declared sources: ${sources.map((source) => `\`${source}\``).join(", ")}.`] : []),
+    ...(included.length > 0 ? [`> Requested projection: ${included.join("; ")}.`] : []),
+    "> The current product snapshot does not carry a structured artifact for this table, so this Markdown projection does not invent one.",
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+function replaceComponents(markdown, name, render) {
+  const pattern = new RegExp(`<${name}\\b([\\s\\S]*?)\\/>`, "g");
+  return markdown.replace(pattern, (_match, rawAttributes) => render(parseAttributes(rawAttributes)));
+}
+
+function parseAttributes(raw) {
+  const attributes = {};
+  const pattern = /([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9]*)\s*=\s*("([^"]*)"|\{([\s\S]*?)\})/g;
+  let remainder = raw;
+  for (const match of raw.matchAll(pattern)) {
+    const [whole, name, , stringValue, expression] = match;
+    if (Object.hasOwn(attributes, name)) fail(`duplicate MDX attribute: ${name}`);
+    let value = stringValue;
+    if (stringValue === undefined) {
+      try {
+        value = JSON.parse(expression);
+      } catch {
+        fail(`unsupported MDX attribute expression for ${name}`);
+      }
+    }
+    attributes[name] = value;
+    remainder = remainder.replace(whole, " ");
+  }
+  if (remainder.trim() !== "") fail(`unsupported MDX attributes: ${remainder.trim()}`);
+  return attributes;
+}
+
+function parseFrontmatter(source, name) {
+  const match = source.match(/^---\r?\n([\s\S]*?)\r?\n---\r?\n/);
+  if (!match) fail(`missing frontmatter: ${name}`);
+  const frontmatter = {};
+  for (const rawLine of match[1].split(/\r?\n/)) {
+    const line = rawLine.trim();
+    if (line === "") continue;
+    const separator = line.indexOf(":");
+    if (separator <= 0) fail(`unsupported frontmatter line in ${name}: ${rawLine}`);
+    const key = line.slice(0, separator).trim();
+    let value = line.slice(separator + 1).trim();
+    if (Object.hasOwn(frontmatter, key)) fail(`duplicate frontmatter key in ${name}: ${key}`);
+    if ((value.startsWith('"') && value.endsWith('"')) || (value.startsWith("'") && value.endsWith("'"))) value = value.slice(1, -1);
+    frontmatter[key] = value;
+  }
+  return { frontmatter, body: source.slice(match[0].length).trim() };
+}
+
+function validateFrontmatter(frontmatter, source) {
+  const allowed = new Set(["title", "description", "status"]);
+  for (const key of Object.keys(frontmatter)) if (!allowed.has(key)) fail(`unsupported frontmatter key in ${source}: ${key}`);
+  assertString(frontmatter.title, `${source} title`);
+  assertString(frontmatter.description, `${source} description`);
+  if (frontmatter.description.length < 40) fail(`description is too short in ${source}`);
+  assertString(frontmatter.status, `${source} status`);
+}
+
+function validateBody(body, source) {
+  const prose = body.replace(/```[\s\S]*?```/g, "");
+  const headings = prose.match(/^# .+$/gm) ?? [];
+  if (headings.length !== 1) fail(`${source} must contain exactly one level-one heading`);
+  if (body.length < 300) fail(`${source} is too short to be a substantive page`);
+}
+
+function validateProjectedHeading(page) {
+  const sourceHeading = page.body.match(/^# .+$/m)?.[0];
+  if (sourceHeading === undefined || !page.markdown.startsWith(sourceHeading)) {
+    fail(`projected Markdown changed or displaced the page heading: ${page.source}`);
+  }
+}
+
+async function findMdxFiles(directory) {
+  const files = [];
+  for (const entry of await readdir(directory, { withFileTypes: true })) {
+    const entryPath = path.join(directory, entry.name);
+    if (entry.isDirectory()) files.push(...await findMdxFiles(entryPath));
+    else if (entry.isFile() && entry.name.endsWith(".mdx")) files.push(entryPath);
+  }
+  return files;
+}
+
+function validateRoute(value, label) {
+  assertString(value, label);
+  if (!value.startsWith("/") || value.includes("//") || value.includes("..") || value.includes("?") || value.includes("#")) fail(`invalid ${label}: ${value}`);
+  if (value !== "/" && (value.endsWith("/") || path.posix.extname(value) !== "")) fail(`invalid ${label}: ${value}`);
+  return value;
+}
+
+function validateSource(value) {
+  assertString(value, "page source");
+  if (path.isAbsolute(value) || value.includes("\\") || value.split("/").includes("..") || path.posix.extname(value) !== ".mdx") {
+    fail(`invalid page source: ${value}`);
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+function markdownDestination(route) {
+  const relativePath = route === "/" ? "index.md" : `${route.slice(1)}.md`;
+  const destination = path.resolve(publicDirectory, relativePath);
+  if (!isWithin(publicDirectory, destination)) fail(`route escapes public directory: ${route}`);
+  return destination;
+}
+
+function publicRelative(file) {
+  const value = path.relative(publicDirectory, file).split(path.sep).join("/");
+  if (value === "" || value.startsWith("../") || path.isAbsolute(value)) fail(`generated file escapes public directory: ${file}`);
+  return value;
+}
+
+async function cleanStaleGeneratedFiles(currentFiles) {
+  if (!(await exists(ownershipPath))) return;
+  const previous = await readJson(ownershipPath);
+  if (previous.schema !== "auths.docs.generated-files/1" || previous.generator !== "tools/content/build.mjs" || !Array.isArray(previous.files)) {
+    fail("generated-file ownership record is invalid");
+  }
+  const current = new Set(currentFiles);
+  for (const file of previous.files) {
+    assertString(file, "owned generated file");
+    if (path.isAbsolute(file) || file.includes("\\") || file.split("/").includes("..")) fail(`invalid owned generated file: ${file}`);
+    if (current.has(file)) continue;
+    const target = path.resolve(publicDirectory, file);
+    if (!isWithin(publicDirectory, target)) fail(`owned generated file escapes public directory: ${file}`);
+    try {
+      await unlink(target);
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (error?.code !== "ENOENT") throw error;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+function markdownUrl(route) {
+  return route === "/" ? "/index.md" : `${route}.md`;
+}
+
+function pageId(route) {
+  const name = route === "/" ? "home" : route.slice(1).replaceAll("/", ".");
+  return `auths.page.${name}/1`;
+}
+
+function plainText(markdown) {
+  return markdown
+    .replace(/```[\s\S]*?```/g, " ")
+    .replace(/<!--[^]*?-->/g, " ")
+    .replace(/!\[([^\]]*)\]\([^)]*\)/g, "$1")
+    .replace(/\[([^\]]+)\]\([^)]*\)/g, "$1")
+    .replace(/^#{1,6}\s+/gm, "")
+    .replace(/[|>*_`~-]+/g, " ")
+    .replace(/\s+/g, " ")
+    .trim();
+}
+
+function demoteHeadings(markdown, levels) {
+  return markdown.replace(/^(#{1,6})\s/gm, (_match, hashes) => `${"#".repeat(Math.min(6, hashes.length + levels))} `);
+}
+
+function sourceLink(source, product, commit = product.snapshot.sourceCommit) {
+  return `Source: [\`${source}\`](${repositoryUrl(source, product, commit)}) at \`${commit}\`.`;
+}
+
+function repositoryUrl(source, product, commit = product.snapshot.sourceCommit) {
+  const encoded = source.split("/").filter(Boolean).map(encodeURIComponent).join("/");
+  return `https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/${encoded === "" ? "tree" : "blob"}/${commit}${encoded === "" ? "" : `/${encoded}`}`;
+}
+
+function repositoryTreeUrl(source, product, commit = product.snapshot.sourceCommit) {
+  const encoded = source.split("/").filter(Boolean).map(encodeURIComponent).join("/");
+  return `https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/${commit}${encoded === "" ? "" : `/${encoded}`}`;
+}
+
+function shortCommit(commit) {
+  return commit.slice(0, 12);
+}
+
+function code(value) {
+  return `\`${value}\``;
+}
+
+function sha256(value) {
+  return createHash("sha256").update(value).digest("hex");
+}
+
+function escapeRegex(value) {
+  return value.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&");
+}
+
+function escapeXml(value) {
+  return value.replaceAll("&", "&amp;").replaceAll("<", "&lt;").replaceAll(">", "&gt;").replaceAll('"', "&quot;").replaceAll("'", "&apos;");
+}
+
+function ensureNewline(value) {
+  return `${value.trimEnd()}\n`;
+}
+
+function json(value) {
+  return `${JSON.stringify(value, null, 2)}\n`;
+}
+
+function relative(file) {
+  return path.relative(root, file).split(path.sep).join("/");
+}
+
+function isWithin(parent, child) {
+  const relativePath = path.relative(path.resolve(parent), path.resolve(child));
+  return relativePath === "" || (!relativePath.startsWith("..") && !path.isAbsolute(relativePath));
+}
+
+async function exists(file) {
+  try {
+    await access(file);
+    return true;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+async function readJson(file) {
+  try {
+    return JSON.parse(await readFile(file, "utf8"));
+  } catch (error) {
+    fail(`cannot read JSON ${relative(file)}: ${error.message}`);
+  }
+}
+
+function assertObject(value, label) {
+  if (value === null || typeof value !== "object" || Array.isArray(value)) fail(`${label} must be an object`);
+}
+
+function assertString(value, label) {
+  if (typeof value !== "string" || value.trim() === "" || [...value].some((character) => character.codePointAt(0) < 32)) fail(`${label} must be a non-empty string`);
+}
+
+function fail(message) {
+  throw new TypeError(message);
+}
diff --git a/tools/content/route-ownership.mjs b/tools/content/route-ownership.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f03655e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/content/route-ownership.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+import { readdir } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
+
+const expectedEntrypoints = new Set([
+  "app/[...slug]/page.tsx",
+  "app/page.tsx",
+]);
+
+export async function assertRouteOwnership(root) {
+  const appDirectory = path.join(root, "app");
+  const actualEntrypoints = new Set((await findPageEntrypoints(appDirectory))
+    .map((file) => path.relative(root, file).split(path.sep).join("/")));
+  const unexpected = [...actualEntrypoints].filter((file) => !expectedEntrypoints.has(file)).sort();
+  const missing = [...expectedEntrypoints].filter((file) => !actualEntrypoints.has(file)).sort();
+  if (unexpected.length > 0 || missing.length > 0) {
+    throw new TypeError([
+      "Auths documentation routes must be owned by the custom homepage and canonical content catch-all",
+      ...unexpected.map((file) => `unexpected static page: ${file}`),
+      ...missing.map((file) => `missing route owner: ${file}`),
+    ].join("\n"));
+  }
+}
+
+async function findPageEntrypoints(directory) {
+  const files = [];
+  for (const entry of await readdir(directory, { withFileTypes: true })) {
+    const entryPath = path.join(directory, entry.name);
+    if (entry.isDirectory()) files.push(...await findPageEntrypoints(entryPath));
+    else if (entry.isFile() && entry.name === "page.tsx") files.push(entryPath);
+  }
+  return files;
+}
+
+if (process.argv[1] !== undefined && pathToFileURL(path.resolve(process.argv[1])).href === import.meta.url) {
+  const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
+  await assertRouteOwnership(root);
+  process.stdout.write("Documentation route ownership passed\n");
+}
diff --git a/tools/content/sync-product-snapshot.mjs b/tools/content/sync-product-snapshot.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7423400
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/content/sync-product-snapshot.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
+import { copyFile, mkdir, readFile, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { promisify } from "node:util";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+
+const execute = promisify(execFile);
+
+const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
+const options = parseOptions(process.argv.slice(2));
+const bundleDirectory = path.resolve(options.bundle);
+const productDirectory = path.resolve(options.product);
+const outputDirectory = path.join(root, "product-snapshot");
+const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(bundleDirectory, "manifest.json"), "utf8"));
+const { stdout: sourceCommitOutput } = await execute("git", ["rev-parse", "HEAD"], { cwd: productDirectory });
+const sourceCommit = sourceCommitOutput.trim();
+
+if (manifest.schema !== "auths.docs.bundle/1") throw new TypeError("unsupported Auths documentation bundle");
+if (!/^[a-f0-9]{40}$/.test(manifest.sourceCommit)) throw new TypeError("documentation bundle source commit is invalid");
+
+for (const file of manifest.files) {
+  const bytes = await readFile(path.join(bundleDirectory, file.path));
+  const digest = createHash("sha256").update(bytes).digest("hex");
+  if (digest !== file.sha256 || bytes.byteLength !== file.bytes) {
+    throw new TypeError(`documentation bundle file failed verification: ${file.path}`);
+  }
+}
+
+const recipesDirectory = path.join(productDirectory, "bindings", "recipes");
+const recipeManifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(recipesDirectory, "manifest.json"), "utf8"));
+if (recipeManifest.schema !== "auths.outcome-recipes/1") throw new TypeError("unsupported Auths recipe manifest");
+
+await rm(outputDirectory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+await mkdir(path.join(outputDirectory, "bundle"), { recursive: true });
+await mkdir(path.join(outputDirectory, "recipes", "typescript"), { recursive: true });
+await mkdir(path.join(outputDirectory, "recipes", "python"), { recursive: true });
+await mkdir(path.join(outputDirectory, "protocol"), { recursive: true });
+await mkdir(path.join(outputDirectory, "product"), { recursive: true });
+await mkdir(path.join(outputDirectory, "conformance"), { recursive: true });
+await mkdir(path.join(outputDirectory, "examples", "offline-verification", "src"), { recursive: true });
+
+await copyFile(path.join(bundleDirectory, "manifest.json"), path.join(outputDirectory, "bundle", "manifest.json"));
+for (const file of manifest.files) {
+  await copyFile(path.join(bundleDirectory, file.path), path.join(outputDirectory, "bundle", file.path));
+}
+
+// Public surfaces are copied from the selected product revision. The docs
+// contract can advance on a separate branch, so its source revision is
+// recorded independently below rather than silently replacing product truth.
+await copyFile(path.join(productDirectory, "bindings", "typescript", "api", "public-api.txt"), path.join(outputDirectory, "bundle", "typescript-public-api.txt"));
+await copyFile(path.join(productDirectory, "bindings", "python", "api", "public-api.txt"), path.join(outputDirectory, "bundle", "python-public-api.txt"));
+await copyFile(path.join(productDirectory, "bindings", "public-topology-v1.json"), path.join(outputDirectory, "bundle", "public-topology.json"));
+
+await copyFile(path.join(recipesDirectory, "manifest.json"), path.join(outputDirectory, "recipes", "manifest.json"));
+await copyFile(path.join(recipesDirectory, "experience-evidence.json"), path.join(outputDirectory, "recipes", "experience-evidence.json"));
+for (const recipe of recipeManifest.recipes) {
+  await copyFile(path.join(recipesDirectory, recipe.typescript), path.join(outputDirectory, "recipes", recipe.typescript));
+  await copyFile(path.join(recipesDirectory, recipe.python), path.join(outputDirectory, "recipes", recipe.python));
+}
+
+const protocolFiles = [
+  "protocol.md",
+  "verification-algorithm.md",
+  "error-codes.md",
+  "registry.md",
+  "domain-separation.md",
+  "auths-proof.cddl",
+  "did-key.md",
+  "did-web.md",
+  "did-keri.md",
+  "spiffe-x509.md",
+  "webauthn.md",
+  "hsm-attested.md",
+];
+for (const file of protocolFiles) {
+  await copyFile(path.join(productDirectory, "core", "spec", "v1", file), path.join(outputDirectory, "protocol", file));
+}
+
+const productFiles = {
+  "error-registry.json": "product/errors/v1/registry.json",
+  "typescript-runtime-contract.json": "bindings/typescript/sdk-runtime-contract.json",
+  "python-runtime-contract.json": "bindings/python/sdk-runtime-contract.json",
+  "customer-journey-matrix.json": "bindings/customer-journey-matrix-v1.json",
+};
+for (const [target, source] of Object.entries(productFiles)) {
+  await copyFile(path.join(productDirectory, source), path.join(outputDirectory, "product", target));
+}
+
+const conformanceFiles = {
+  "fixtures.json": "core/fixtures/v1/manifest.json",
+  "mutations.json": "core/conformance/v1/mutations.json",
+  "formal-vectors.json": "core/formal-vectors/v1/manifest.json",
+};
+for (const [target, source] of Object.entries(conformanceFiles)) {
+  await copyFile(path.join(productDirectory, source), path.join(outputDirectory, "conformance", target));
+}
+
+const exampleFiles = {
+  "offline-verification/README.md": "demos/offline-verification/README.md",
+  "offline-verification/Cargo.toml": "demos/offline-verification/Cargo.toml",
+  "offline-verification/src/main.rs": "demos/offline-verification/src/main.rs",
+};
+for (const [target, source] of Object.entries(exampleFiles)) {
+  await copyFile(path.join(productDirectory, source), path.join(outputDirectory, "examples", target));
+}
+
+const recipeFiles = recipeManifest.recipes.flatMap((recipe) => [recipe.typescript, recipe.python]);
+const recipeDigests = Object.fromEntries(await Promise.all(recipeFiles.map(async (file) => {
+  const bytes = await readFile(path.join(recipesDirectory, file));
+  return [file, createHash("sha256").update(bytes).digest("hex")];
+})));
+const exampleDigests = Object.fromEntries(await Promise.all(Object.keys(exampleFiles).map(async (file) => {
+  const bytes = await readFile(path.join(outputDirectory, "examples", file));
+  return [file, createHash("sha256").update(bytes).digest("hex")];
+})));
+
+await writeFile(path.join(outputDirectory, "snapshot.json"), `${JSON.stringify({
+  schema: "auths.docs.product-snapshot/1",
+  sourceCommit,
+  docsContractSourceCommit: manifest.sourceCommit,
+  contractDigest: manifest.contractDigest,
+  recipeManifest: "bindings/recipes/manifest.json",
+  recipeDigests,
+  exampleDigests,
+  protocolFiles,
+}, null, 2)}\n`);
+
+console.log(`Auths product snapshot updated from ${sourceCommit}`);
+
+function parseOptions(args) {
+  const values = {};
+  for (let index = 0; index < args.length; index += 2) {
+    const key = args[index];
+    const value = args[index + 1];
+    if ((key !== "--bundle" && key !== "--product") || value === undefined) {
+      throw new TypeError("usage: node tools/content/sync-product-snapshot.mjs --bundle <directory> --product <auths-proof>");
+    }
+    values[key.slice(2)] = value;
+  }
+  if (!values.bundle || !values.product) {
+    throw new TypeError("usage: node tools/content/sync-product-snapshot.mjs --bundle <directory> --product <auths-proof>");
+  }
+  return values;
+}
diff --git a/tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs b/tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index ae42e99..0000000
--- a/tools/fetch-release/verify-bundle.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-
-const path = process.argv[2] ?? "contracts/docs-bundle.fixture.json";
-const bundle = JSON.parse(await readFile(path, "utf8"));
-assert.equal(bundle.schema, "auths.docs.bundle/1");
-assert.match(bundle.contractDigest, /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/);
-assert.match(bundle.sourceCommit, /^[a-f0-9]{40}$/);
-assert.ok(Array.isArray(bundle.files) && bundle.files.length > 0);
-for (const file of bundle.files) {
-  assert.match(file.path, /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9./-]+$/);
-  assert.match(file.sha256, /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/);
-  assert.ok(Number.isSafeInteger(file.bytes) && file.bytes > 0 && file.bytes <= 16_777_216);
-}
diff --git a/tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs b/tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs
index bbed86a..3982d01 100644
--- a/tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs
+++ b/tools/lint-content/bash-snippets.mjs
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ async function filesBelow(directory) {
   return nested.flat();
 }
 
-const files = (await Promise.all(["app", "public"].map((directory) => filesBelow(join(root, directory))))).flat();
+const files = (await Promise.all(["app", "content-v2"].map((directory) => filesBelow(join(root, directory))))).flat();
 for (const filePath of files) {
   const file = relative(root, filePath);
   const source = await readFile(filePath, "utf8");
diff --git a/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs b/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index 3910580..0000000
--- a/tools/lint-content/ownership.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { readFile, readdir } from "node:fs/promises";
-import path from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-import { authoredPageInputs, buildVerifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
-import { primaryNavigation, utilityNavigation } from "../../app/lib/navigation.ts";
-import { topicLandings } from "../../app/lib/topic-landings.ts";
-import { tours } from "../../app/lib/tours.ts";
-
-const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
-const pages = structuredClone(authoredPageInputs);
-const contract = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "contracts/product-contract.fixture.json"), "utf8"));
-const graph = buildVerifiedPageGraph(pages, contract);
-assert.equal(graph.pages.length, pages.length);
-assert.equal(new Set(graph.pages.flatMap((page) => page.sections.map((section) => section.provenance))).size, 3);
-assert.equal(primaryNavigation.length, 6);
-assert.equal(utilityNavigation.length, 1);
-const landingPageIds = new Set(graph.pages.filter((page) => page.pageType === "landing" && page.path !== "/" && graph.pages.some((candidate) => candidate.parent === page.id)).map((page) => page.id));
-assert.equal(topicLandings.length, landingPageIds.size);
-assert.equal(new Set(topicLandings.map((landing) => landing.page)).size, topicLandings.length);
-for (const landing of topicLandings) assert.ok(landingPageIds.has(landing.page), `${landing.page} is not a canonical landing page`);
-assert.equal(tours.length, 6);
-
-async function walk(directory) {
-  const entries = await readdir(directory, { withFileTypes: true });
-  const files = [];
-  for (const entry of entries) {
-    const target = path.join(directory, entry.name);
-    if (entry.isDirectory()) files.push(...await walk(target));
-    else files.push(target);
-  }
-  return files;
-}
-
-for (const file of (await walk(path.join(root, "app"))).filter((candidate) => candidate.endsWith(".mdx"))) {
-  const source = await readFile(file, "utf8");
-  assert.doesNotMatch(source, /```(?:bash|sh|shell|rust|typescript|ts|python|py|javascript|js)\b/, `${file} contains an executable code fence`);
-}
-
-const duplicate = structuredClone(pages);
-duplicate.push({ ...duplicate[0] });
-assert.throws(() => buildVerifiedPageGraph(duplicate, contract), /duplicate page identity/);
-
-const unknown = structuredClone(pages);
-unknown[0].uses.operations.push("auths.operation.unknown/1");
-assert.throws(() => buildVerifiedPageGraph(unknown, contract), /unknown operation/);
diff --git a/tools/lint-content/page-contracts.mjs b/tools/lint-content/page-contracts.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index 2141dbe..0000000
--- a/tools/lint-content/page-contracts.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { assertPageContract } from "../../schemas/page-contract.ts";
-
-const dependencies = { operations: [], scenarios: ["auths.scenario.rest-effect/1"], endpoints: [], profiles: [], claims: [] };
-const narrative = (id) => ({ id, title: id, provenance: "editorial-narrative", body: [id] });
-const scenario = { id: "example", title: "Example", provenance: "tested-scenario", scenario: "auths.scenario.rest-effect/1" };
-const guide = {
-  id: "auths.page.contract-fixture/1",
-  path: "/fixture",
-  pageType: "guide",
-  section: "get-started",
-  parent: "auths.page.start/1",
-  navGroup: "Fixture",
-  order: 0,
-  title: "Fixture",
-  description: "Fixture",
-  depth: "start",
-  status: "stable",
-  owner: "editorial",
-  uses: dependencies,
-  sections: ["outcome", "prerequisites", "steps", "success", "failure", "next"].map(narrative).concat(scenario),
-};
-
-assert.doesNotThrow(() => assertPageContract(guide));
-assert.throws(() => assertPageContract({ ...guide, sections: guide.sections.filter((section) => section.id !== "failure") }), /missing required guide section failure/);
-assert.throws(() => assertPageContract({ ...guide, sections: guide.sections.filter((section) => section.provenance !== "tested-scenario") }), /contains no qualified scenario/);
-
diff --git a/tools/lint-content/site-tree.mjs b/tools/lint-content/site-tree.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index 4cb75fe..0000000
--- a/tools/lint-content/site-tree.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-import { siteSections, siteTree } from "../../app/lib/site-tree.ts";
-import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
-
-const ids = new Set(siteTree.map((page) => page.id));
-const paths = new Set(siteTree.map((page) => page.path));
-assert.equal(ids.size, siteTree.length, "site tree has duplicate identities");
-assert.equal(paths.size, siteTree.length, "site tree has duplicate paths");
-
-for (const section of siteSections) {
-  assert.equal(siteTree.filter((page) => page.section === section && page.parent === null).length, 1, `${section} must have one root`);
-}
-
-for (const page of siteTree) {
-  if (page.parent === null) continue;
-  const parent = siteTree.find((candidate) => candidate.id === page.parent);
-  assert.ok(parent, `${page.id} has a missing parent`);
-  assert.equal(parent.section, page.section, `${page.id} crosses section ownership`);
-  const visited = new Set([page.id]);
-  let current = parent;
-  while (current) {
-    assert.ok(!visited.has(current.id), `${page.id} participates in a cycle`);
-    visited.add(current.id);
-    current = current.parent ? siteTree.find((candidate) => candidate.id === current.parent) : undefined;
-  }
-}
-
-for (const page of verifiedPageGraph.pages) {
-  assert.equal(siteTree.filter((candidate) => candidate.id === page.id).length, 1, `${page.id} must occur once in the tree`);
-  assert.equal(siteTree.find((candidate) => candidate.id === page.id)?.path, page.path, `${page.id} has a non-canonical path`);
-}
-
-const migration = JSON.parse(await readFile(new URL("../../content/route-migration.json", import.meta.url), "utf8"));
-assert.equal(migration.schema, "auths.docs.route-migration/1");
-const oldPaths = new Set(migration.entries.map((entry) => entry.from));
-assert.equal(oldPaths.size, migration.entries.length, "route migration has duplicate sources");
-for (const entry of migration.entries) {
-  assert.ok(["retained", "replaced", "merged", "deleted"].includes(entry.disposition), `invalid migration disposition for ${entry.from}`);
-  if (entry.disposition === "deleted") assert.equal(entry.to, null);
-  else assert.ok(paths.has(entry.to), `migration target does not exist: ${entry.to}`);
-}
-
-const canonicalPaths = new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.path));
-for (const entry of migration.entries) {
-  if (entry.from !== entry.to) assert.ok(!canonicalPaths.has(entry.from), `legacy path remains public: ${entry.from}`);
-}
-
diff --git a/tools/qualify-examples/build-quickstarts.mjs b/tools/qualify-examples/build-quickstarts.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index a5b9532..0000000
--- a/tools/qualify-examples/build-quickstarts.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
-import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-import path from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-import { quickstartDefinitions, quickstartSources } from "../../examples/quickstarts.ts";
-
-const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
-for (const definition of quickstartDefinitions) {
-  const payload = { schema: "auths.docs.quickstart/1", ...definition, sources: quickstartSources(definition) };
-  const canonical = `${JSON.stringify(payload, null, 2)}\n`;
-  const digest = createHash("sha256").update(canonical).digest("hex");
-  const output = path.join(root, "public", "downloads", "quickstarts", `${definition.slug}.json`);
-  await mkdir(path.dirname(output), { recursive: true });
-  await writeFile(output, `${JSON.stringify({ ...payload, digest }, null, 2)}\n`, "utf8");
-}
diff --git a/tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs b/tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index 36f97fa..0000000
--- a/tools/qualify-examples/check.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-import path from "node:path";
-import { quickstartDefinitions, quickstartSources } from "../../examples/quickstarts.ts";
-
-const root = path.resolve(new URL("../..", import.meta.url).pathname);
-const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "examples/scenarios.json"), "utf8"));
-assert.equal(manifest.schema, "auths.docs.scenarios/1");
-const ids = new Set();
-for (const scenario of manifest.scenarios) {
-  assert.match(scenario.id, /^auths\.scenario\.[a-z0-9.-]+\/[1-9][0-9]*$/);
-  assert.ok(!ids.has(scenario.id), `duplicate scenario ${scenario.id}`);
-  ids.add(scenario.id);
-  assert.deepEqual(scenario.languages, ["rust", "typescript", "python"]);
-  const sources = {
-    rust: await readFile(path.join(root, `examples/${scenario.directory}/rust/main.rs`), "utf8"),
-    typescript: await readFile(path.join(root, `examples/${scenario.directory}/typescript/main.ts`), "utf8"),
-    python: await readFile(path.join(root, `examples/${scenario.directory}/python/main.py`), "utf8"),
-  };
-  for (const [language, source] of Object.entries(sources)) assert.ok(source.trim(), `${scenario.id} has empty ${language} source`);
-  const outcome = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, `examples/${scenario.directory}/outcome.json`), "utf8"));
-  assert.equal(outcome.scenario, scenario.id);
-  assert.equal(outcome.kind, scenario.outcome);
-}
-
-assert.equal(quickstartDefinitions.length, 7);
-const expected = new Set([
-  "auths.scenario.local-rest-effect/1",
-  "auths.scenario.runtime-effect/1",
-  "auths.scenario.agent-delegation/1",
-  "auths.scenario.approved-plan/1",
-  "auths.scenario.offline-verification/1",
-  "auths.scenario.recovery/1",
-  "auths.scenario.identity-swap/1",
-]);
-for (const definition of quickstartDefinitions) {
-  assert.ok(expected.delete(definition.id), `unexpected or duplicate quickstart ${definition.id}`);
-  assert.ok(definition.minutes > 0 && definition.minutes <= 20);
-  const sources = quickstartSources(definition);
-  for (const projection of Object.values(sources)) {
-    assert.deepEqual(Object.keys(projection), ["rust", "typescript", "python"]);
-    for (const source of Object.values(projection)) {
-      assert.ok(source.trim());
-      assert.doesNotMatch(source, /TODO|placeholder|your[-_ ](?:key|token|secret)/i);
-    }
-  }
-  assert.match(sources.failure.typescript, new RegExp(definition.failure));
-  assert.match(sources.failure.python, new RegExp(definition.failure));
-  assert.match(sources.failure.rust, new RegExp(definition.failure));
-}
-assert.equal(expected.size, 0);
diff --git a/tools/qualify-site/full-site.mjs b/tools/qualify-site/full-site.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index 7ae5305..0000000
--- a/tools/qualify-site/full-site.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { access, mkdir, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-import path from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
-import { siteTree } from "../../app/lib/site-tree.ts";
-import { topicLandings } from "../../app/lib/topic-landings.ts";
-
-const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
-const workerUrl = new URL("../../dist/server/index.js", import.meta.url);
-workerUrl.searchParams.set("qualification", `${process.pid}-${Date.now()}`);
-const { default: worker } = await import(workerUrl.href);
-const assets = { fetch: async () => new Response("Not found", { status: 404 }) };
-const context = { waitUntil() {}, passThroughOnException() {} };
-const pagesByPath = new Map(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => [page.path, page]));
-const htmlByPath = new Map();
-assert.equal(pagesByPath.size, verifiedPageGraph.pages.length, "canonical routes are not unique");
-
-for (const page of verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((candidate) => candidate.path !== "/reference/manifest.json")) {
-  const response = await worker.fetch(new Request(`http://localhost${page.path}`, { headers: { accept: "text/html" } }), { ASSETS: assets }, context);
-  assert.equal(response.status, 200, `${page.path} did not render`);
-  assert.match(response.headers.get("content-type") ?? "", /^text\/html\b/i, `${page.path} is not HTML`);
-  const html = await response.text();
-  htmlByPath.set(page.path, html);
-  assert.match(html, /<html lang="en">/, `${page.path} does not declare its language`);
-  assert.match(html, /name="viewport"/, `${page.path} has no responsive viewport`);
-  assert.match(html, /<main\b/, `${page.path} has no main landmark`);
-  assert.match(html, /<h1\b/, `${page.path} has no primary heading`);
-  if (page.section !== "home") {
-    const isEmbeddedReference = page.path === "/reference/sdk" || page.path === "/reference/runtime-api";
-    if (isEmbeddedReference) {
-      assert.match(html, /(?:SDK reference|Runtime API) navigation/i, `${page.path} has no reference navigation`);
-      assert.match(html, /class="active"/, `${page.path} has no active reference section`);
-    } else {
-      assert.match(html, new RegExp(`${page.section === "get-started" ? "Get started" : page.section === "identity-trust" ? "Identity &amp; trust" : page.section === "operations" ? "Production operations" : page.section[0].toUpperCase() + page.section.slice(1)} navigation`), `${page.path} has no topic navigation`);
-      assert.match(html, /aria-label="Breadcrumb"/, `${page.path} has no breadcrumb`);
-      assert.match(html, /aria-current="page"/, `${page.path} has no active navigation state`);
-      if (page.parent !== null) assert.match(html, /aria-label="Previous and next pages"/, `${page.path} has no sequence navigation`);
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-const publishedIds = new Set(verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.id));
-assert.equal(siteTree.length, verifiedPageGraph.pages.length, "site tree and published page graph differ");
-for (const node of siteTree) assert.ok(publishedIds.has(node.id), `unpublished canonical page ${node.id}`);
-for (const page of verifiedPageGraph.pages) {
-  if (page.parent !== null) assert.ok(publishedIds.has(page.parent), `${page.id} has an unpublished parent`);
-  const markdown = page.path === "/" ? "/index.md" : `${page.path}.md`;
-  await access(path.join(root, "public", markdown.slice(1)));
-}
-
-for (const landing of topicLandings) {
-  const landingPage = verifiedPageGraph.pages.find((page) => page.id === landing.page);
-  assert.ok(landingPage);
-  for (const group of landing.groups) {
-    for (const card of group.cards) {
-      const target = verifiedPageGraph.pages.find((page) => page.id === card.target);
-      assert.ok(target, `${landing.page} links to missing ${card.target}`);
-      if (target.section === landingPage.section) assert.equal(target.parent, landing.page, `${card.target} is not a direct child of ${landing.page}`);
-      else assert.equal(group.title, "Related topics", `${landing.page} has an unlabelled cross-topic card`);
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-const codeRequired = verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => page.status === "stable" && ["guide", "quickstart", "integration", "runbook"].includes(page.pageType));
-for (const page of codeRequired) {
-  assert.ok(page.uses.scenarios.length > 0, `${page.id} has no qualified scenario`);
-  const html = htmlByPath.get(page.path);
-  assert.match(html, /Tested scenario|quickstart-steps/, `${page.path} renders no qualified code`);
-}
-for (const page of verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((candidate) => candidate.pageType === "runbook")) {
-  assert.deepEqual(["owner", "preconditions", "commands", "example", "observations", "stop", "recovery", "reconciliation", "retention", "escalation"].filter((id) => !page.sections.some((section) => section.id === id)), [], `${page.id} is an incomplete runbook`);
-}
-
-const staticPrefixes = ["/.well-known/", "/downloads/", "/images/"];
-const internalLinks = new Set();
-for (const [source, html] of htmlByPath) {
-  for (const match of html.matchAll(/\shref="([^"]+)"/g)) {
-    const href = match[1].replaceAll("&amp;", "&");
-    if (!href.startsWith("/") || href.startsWith("/_next/")) continue;
-    const target = href.split(/[?#]/, 1)[0];
-    if (!target) continue;
-    internalLinks.add(`${source}\0${target}`);
-    if (target.endsWith(".md") || target.endsWith(".json") || target.endsWith(".xml") || target.endsWith(".txt") || staticPrefixes.some((prefix) => target.startsWith(prefix))) {
-      await access(path.join(root, "public", target.slice(1)));
-    } else {
-      assert.ok(pagesByPath.has(target), `${source} links to non-canonical route ${target}`);
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-const incoming = new Set([...internalLinks].map((entry) => entry.split("\0")[1]));
-for (const page of verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((candidate) => candidate.path !== "/" && candidate.path !== "/reference/manifest.json")) {
-  assert.ok(incoming.has(page.path), `orphan page ${page.path}`);
-}
-
-const journeys = [
-  { id: "get-started", paths: ["/get-started", "/get-started/choose", "/get-started/quickstarts/local-rest-effect"] },
-  { id: "identity-trust", paths: ["/identity-trust", "/identity-trust/identity-sources", "/identity-trust/identity-sources/raw-public-keys"] },
-  { id: "authority", paths: ["/authority", "/authority/create", "/authority/execute", "/authority/receipts/disclosure"] },
-  { id: "agents", paths: ["/agents", "/agents/quickstart", "/agents/mcp/protect-server"] },
-  { id: "operations", paths: ["/operations", "/operations/deploy-runtime", "/operations/recovery-and-reconciliation", "/operations/incidents/provider-unknown"] },
-  { id: "developers", paths: ["/developers", "/developers/sdks", "/developers/sdks/typescript", "/reference/sdk"] },
-];
-for (const journey of journeys) for (const pagePath of journey.paths) assert.ok(htmlByPath.has(pagePath), `${journey.id} cannot reach ${pagePath}`);
-
-const sourceHead = execFileSync("git", ["rev-parse", "HEAD"], { cwd: root, encoding: "utf8" }).trim();
-const stylesheet = await readFile(path.join(root, "app", "globals.css"), "utf8");
-assert.match(stylesheet, /@media \(max-width: 960px\)[\s\S]*?\.topic-shell/, "topic shell has no responsive layout contract");
-assert.match(stylesheet, /@media \(max-width: 980px\)[\s\S]*?\.sdk-reference-shell/, "reference shell has no responsive layout contract");
-assert.match(stylesheet, /@media \(prefers-reduced-motion: reduce\)/, "site has no reduced-motion contract");
-const topicNavigationRule = stylesheet.match(/\.topic-navigation \{([\s\S]*?)\n\}/)?.[1] ?? "";
-const siteFrameRule = stylesheet.match(/\.site-frame \{([\s\S]*?)\n\}/)?.[1] ?? "";
-assert.match(topicNavigationRule, /position: sticky;/, "topic navigation does not remain visible beside long pages");
-assert.match(topicNavigationRule, /height: calc\(100vh - var\(--header-height\)\);/, "topic navigation is not bounded to the viewport");
-assert.match(topicNavigationRule, /overflow-y: auto;/, "topic navigation cannot scroll independently");
-assert.doesNotMatch(siteFrameRule, /overflow(?:-y)?: hidden;/, "site frame disables sticky topic navigation");
-const report = {
-  schema: "auths.docs.site-qualification/1",
-  sourceHead,
-  contractDigest: verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest,
-  pages: verifiedPageGraph.pages.length,
-  htmlPages: htmlByPath.size,
-  internalLinks: internalLinks.size,
-  orphans: 0,
-  qualifiedCodePages: codeRequired.length,
-  runbooks: verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => page.pageType === "runbook").length,
-  markdownPages: verifiedPageGraph.pages.length,
-  accessibility: { status: "structurally-qualified", checks: ["document-language", "main-landmark", "primary-heading", "labelled-navigation", "active-navigation", "reduced-motion"] },
-  responsive: { status: "stylesheet-contract-qualified", checks: ["viewport", "sticky-topic-navigation", "topic-shell-breakpoint", "reference-shell-breakpoint"] },
-  readerJourneys: journeys.map((journey) => ({ id: journey.id, status: "route-and-content-qualified", paths: journey.paths })),
-  checks: ["canonical-routes", "topic-navigation", "breadcrumbs", "previous-next", "landing-intent", "page-contracts", "qualified-code", "runbooks", "internal-links", "markdown", "machine-surfaces", "accessibility-structure", "responsive-contract"],
-  knownLimits: ["Automated reader journeys qualify route and content availability; moderated unfamiliar-reader usability research remains a release activity.", "Responsive interaction and assistive-technology behavior require browser-level qualification in the deployment pipeline."],
-};
-await mkdir(path.join(root, "outputs"), { recursive: true });
-await writeFile(path.join(root, "outputs", "site-qualification-report.json"), `${JSON.stringify(report, null, 2)}\n`);
-console.log(`site qualification passed: ${report.pages} pages, ${report.internalLinks} internal links, ${report.orphans} orphans`);
diff --git a/tools/release/check.mjs b/tools/release/check.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index dfba823..0000000
--- a/tools/release/check.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-
-const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(new URL("../../public/releases/deployment-manifest.example.json", import.meta.url), "utf8"));
-assert.equal(manifest.schema, "auths.docs.deployment/1");
-for (const field of ["productCommit", "docsCommit"]) assert.match(manifest[field], /^[a-f0-9]{40}$/);
-for (const field of ["contractDigest", "bundleDigest", "staticOutputDigest"]) assert.match(manifest[field], /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/);
-assert.ok(Number.isFinite(Date.parse(manifest.promotedAt)));
-assert.equal(manifest.priorDeploymentDigest, null);
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/README.md b/tools/render-markdown/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 34a8958..0000000
--- a/tools/render-markdown/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# Canonical Markdown renderer
-
-Public pages own a canonical Markdown twin under `public/`. Interactive
-components project to semantic headings, paragraphs, code, lists, and links;
-they never become screenshots or opaque client-only output.
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index 59212d4..0000000
--- a/tools/render-markdown/check.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { access, readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-import path from "node:path";
-import { pageById } from "../../app/lib/page-graph.ts";
-import { assuranceClaims, verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
-import { topicLandings } from "../../app/lib/topic-landings.ts";
-import { tours } from "../../app/lib/tours.ts";
-
-const root = path.resolve(new URL("../..", import.meta.url).pathname);
-const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "public/reference-manifest.json"), "utf8"));
-for (const page of manifest.pages) await access(path.join(root, "public", page.markdown.replace(/^\//, "")));
-const llms = await readFile(path.join(root, "public/llms.txt"), "utf8");
-for (const source of ["/reference/sdk.md", "/reference/runtime-api.md"]) assert.ok(llms.includes(source));
-const search = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "public/search-index.json"), "utf8"));
-assert.equal(search.contractDigest, verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest);
-assert.deepEqual(search.pages.map((page) => page.id).sort(), verifiedPageGraph.pages.map((page) => page.id).sort());
-const discovery = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "public/.well-known/auths-docs.json"), "utf8"));
-assert.equal(discovery.contractDigest, verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest);
-assert.deepEqual(discovery.claims, assuranceClaims.map((claim) => claim.id));
-const full = await readFile(path.join(root, "public/llms-full.txt"), "utf8");
-assert.ok(full.length < 50_000);
-assert.doesNotMatch(full, /-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----|gho_[A-Za-z0-9]/);
-for (const landing of topicLandings) {
-  const page = pageById(landing.page);
-  const markdown = await readFile(path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`), "utf8");
-  assert.match(markdown, new RegExp(`^# ${page.title.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&")}`, "m"));
-}
-for (const page of verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => page.path.startsWith("/get-started/"))) {
-  const markdown = await readFile(path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`), "utf8");
-  assert.ok(markdown.includes(page.id));
-}
-for (const tour of tours) {
-  const page = pageById(tour.page);
-  const markdown = await readFile(path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`), "utf8");
-  assert.ok(markdown.includes("Text equivalent:"));
-  assert.ok(markdown.includes(page.id));
-}
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/clean-generated.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/clean-generated.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index 89d1737..0000000
--- a/tools/render-markdown/clean-generated.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-import { readFile, rm } from "node:fs/promises";
-import path from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-
-const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
-const retired = [
-  "public/adopt",
-  "public/architecture",
-  "public/architecture.md",
-  "public/concepts",
-  "public/concepts.md",
-  "public/guides",
-  "public/integrations",
-  "public/integrations.md",
-  "public/quickstarts",
-  "public/sdk.md",
-  "public/sdk",
-  "public/start",
-];
-
-await Promise.all(retired.map((target) => rm(path.join(root, target), { force: true, recursive: true })));
-
-const migration = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "content", "route-migration.json"), "utf8"));
-await Promise.all(migration.entries.flatMap((entry) => {
-  if (entry.from === entry.to) return [];
-  const relative = entry.from.slice(1);
-  return [
-    rm(path.join(root, "public", `${relative}.md`), { force: true }),
-    rm(path.join(root, "public", relative, "index.md"), { force: true }),
-  ];
-}));
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index f7d01d8..0000000
--- a/tools/render-markdown/generate-editorial-pages.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-import path from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-import { assuranceClaims, verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
-
-const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
-const pages = verifiedPageGraph.pages.filter((page) => page.owner === "editorial" && page.path !== "/");
-
-for (const page of pages) {
-  const lines = [`# ${page.title}`, "", page.description, ""];
-  for (const section of page.sections) {
-    lines.push(`## ${section.title}`, "");
-    if (section.provenance === "editorial-narrative") lines.push(...section.body.flatMap((paragraph) => [paragraph, ""]));
-    if (section.provenance === "tested-scenario") lines.push(`Tested scenario: \`${section.scenario}\`${section.step ? `, step \`${section.step}\`` : ""}.`, "");
-    if (section.provenance === "generated-fact" && section.factKind === "claim") {
-      const claim = assuranceClaims.find((candidate) => candidate.id === section.fact);
-      if (!claim) throw new TypeError(`unknown claim ${section.fact}`);
-      lines.push(
-        `Claim: \`${claim.id}\` · status \`${claim.status}\``, "",
-        claim.statement, "",
-        `Evidence: \`${claim.evidence}\``, "",
-        `SHA-256: \`${claim.evidenceSha256}\``, "",
-        "Reproduce:", "",
-        ...claim.reproduction.map((command) => `- \`${command}\``), "",
-        `Scope: ${claim.scope}`, "",
-        `Limitation: ${claim.limitation}`, "",
-      );
-    } else if (section.provenance === "generated-fact") lines.push(`Generated ${section.factKind}: \`${section.fact}\`.`, "");
-  }
-  lines.push(`_Page identity: ${page.id} · Contract digest: ${verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest}_`, "");
-  const output = path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`);
-  await mkdir(path.dirname(output), { recursive: true });
-  await writeFile(output, `${lines.join("\n")}\n`, "utf8");
-}
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/generate-quickstarts.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/generate-quickstarts.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index c1ce799..0000000
--- a/tools/render-markdown/generate-quickstarts.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-import path from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-import { quickstarts } from "../../app/lib/quickstarts.ts";
-import { verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
-
-const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
-for (const quickstart of quickstarts) {
-  const page = verifiedPageGraph.pages.find((candidate) => candidate.uses.scenarios.includes(quickstart.id) && candidate.path.endsWith(`/quickstarts/${quickstart.slug}`));
-  if (!page) throw new TypeError(`quickstart page is missing: ${quickstart.id}`);
-  const lines = [`# ${quickstart.title}`, "", quickstart.description, "", `Scenario: \`${quickstart.id}\` · Expected time: ${quickstart.minutes} minutes`, "", "## 1. Start from a clean consumer", "", "Install the selected SDK in a supported runtime. Provider credentials stay behind the closed gateway.", "", "## 2. Name the exact boundary", "", `- Allowed: ${quickstart.permitted}`, `- Prohibited: ${quickstart.prohibited}`, "", "## 3. Execute the permitted effect", "", `Expected outcome: \`${quickstart.success}\`.`, "", "## 4. Break safely", "", `Expected stable denial: \`${quickstart.failure}\`. The provider is not reached.`, "", "## 5. Continue", "", "Keep the scenario as a conformance fixture while replacing development adapters.", "", `[Download exact cross-language project](/downloads/quickstarts/${quickstart.slug}.json)`, "", `_Page identity: ${page.id} · Contract digest: ${verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest}_`, ""];
-  const output = path.join(root, "public", "get-started", "quickstarts", `${quickstart.slug}.md`);
-  await mkdir(path.dirname(output), { recursive: true });
-  await writeFile(output, `${lines.join("\n")}\n`, "utf8");
-}
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/generate-sdk-reference.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/generate-sdk-reference.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index 7495f17..0000000
--- a/tools/render-markdown/generate-sdk-reference.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-import path from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-import contract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
-import { sdkInstallCommands } from "../../app/lib/sdk-languages.ts";
-
-const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
-const output = path.join(root, "public", "reference", "sdk");
-await mkdir(path.join(output, "sections"), { recursive: true });
-
-const introduction = [
-  "# SDK reference",
-  "",
-  "Create, delegate, execute, resume, and verify precise authority through Rust, TypeScript, or Python.",
-  "",
-  "## Install",
-  "",
-  ...Object.entries(sdkInstallCommands).flatMap(([language, command]) => [`### ${language}`, "", "```bash", command, "```", ""]),
-].join("\n");
-await writeFile(path.join(output, "sections", "introduction.md"), `${introduction}\n`);
-
-const complete = [introduction];
-for (const operation of contract.operations) {
-  const section = operation.id.split(".").at(-1).split("/")[0];
-  const markdown = [
-    `# ${section[0].toUpperCase()}${section.slice(1)}`,
-    "",
-    `Generated operation: \`${operation.id}\`.`,
-    "",
-    `This section is resolved from product contract \`${contract.digest}\`.`,
-    "",
-  ].join("\n");
-  await writeFile(path.join(output, "sections", `${section}.md`), `${markdown}\n`);
-  complete.push(markdown);
-}
-await writeFile(`${output}.md`, `${complete.join("\n\n---\n\n")}\n`);
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/generate-site-indexes.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/generate-site-indexes.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index 95c5c57..0000000
--- a/tools/render-markdown/generate-site-indexes.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-import { mkdir, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-import path from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-import { assuranceClaims, verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
-import contract from "../../contracts/product-contract.fixture.json" with { type: "json" };
-
-const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
-const pages = [...verifiedPageGraph.pages].sort((left, right) => left.path.localeCompare(right.path));
-const home = pages.find((page) => page.path === "/");
-if (!home) throw new TypeError("documentation graph has no home page");
-await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", "index.md"), `# ${home.title}\n\n${home.description}\n\n_Page identity: ${home.id} · Contract digest: ${verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest}_\n`);
-const search = {
-  schema: "auths.docs.search-index/1",
-  contractDigest: verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest,
-  synonyms: {
-    permission: ["authority", "authorization"],
-    agent: ["delegate", "actor"],
-    audit: ["receipt", "evidence"],
-    api: ["runtime", "endpoint"],
-    sdk: ["rust", "typescript", "python"],
-  },
-  pages: pages.map(({ id, path: pagePath, title, description, section }) => ({ id, path: pagePath, title, description, section })),
-};
-await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", "search-index.json"), `${JSON.stringify(search, null, 2)}\n`);
-
-const sitemap = [
-  '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>',
-  '<urlset xmlns="http://www.sitemaps.org/schemas/sitemap/0.9">',
-  ...pages.map((page) => `  <url><loc>https://docs.auths.dev${page.path}</loc></url>`),
-  "</urlset>",
-  "",
-].join("\n");
-await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", "sitemap.xml"), sitemap);
-
-const llms = [
-  "# Auths documentation",
-  "",
-  "> Canonical, release-pinned documentation for people and agents.",
-  "",
-  ...pages.map((page) => `- [${page.title}](${page.path === "/" ? "/index.md" : `${page.path}.md`}) — ${page.description}`),
-  "",
-].join("\n");
-await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", "llms.txt"), llms);
-
-const markdown = [];
-for (const page of pages.filter((candidate) => candidate.path !== "/")) {
-  try {
-    markdown.push(await readFile(path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`), "utf8"));
-  } catch {
-    continue;
-  }
-}
-await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", "llms-full.txt"), markdown.join("\n\n---\n\n").slice(0, 48_000));
-
-const canonical = (pagePath) => pagePath === "/" ? "/" : pagePath;
-const manifest = {
-  schema: "auths.docs.reference-manifest/1",
-  contractDigest: verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest,
-  pages: pages.map((page) => ({ id: page.id, url: canonical(page.path), markdown: page.path === "/" ? "/index.md" : `${page.path}.md` })),
-  operations: contract.operations.map((operation) => ({ id: operation.id, url: "/reference/sdk" })),
-  endpoints: contract.runtimeFacts.endpoints.map((endpoint) => ({ id: endpoint.id, url: "/reference/runtime-api" })),
-  scenarios: contract.scenarios.map((scenario) => {
-    const page = pages.find((candidate) => candidate.uses.scenarios.includes(scenario.id));
-    return { id: scenario.id, url: page?.path ?? "/developers/testing" };
-  }),
-  claims: assuranceClaims.map((claim) => {
-    const page = pages.find((candidate) => candidate.uses.claims.includes(claim.id));
-    return { id: claim.id, url: page?.path ?? "/reference/evidence", evidence: claim.evidence, sha256: claim.evidenceSha256 };
-  }),
-};
-await mkdir(path.join(root, "public", "reference"), { recursive: true });
-const manifestBytes = `${JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 2)}\n`;
-await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", "reference-manifest.json"), manifestBytes);
-await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", "reference", "manifest.json"), manifestBytes);
-
-await mkdir(path.join(root, "public", ".well-known"), { recursive: true });
-await writeFile(path.join(root, "public", ".well-known", "auths-docs.json"), `${JSON.stringify({
-  schema: "auths.docs.discovery/1",
-  contractDigest: verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest,
-  canonicalBase: "https://docs.auths.dev",
-  markdown: "/<page>.md",
-  search: "/search-index.json",
-  sitemap: "/sitemap.xml",
-  manifest: "/reference/manifest.json",
-  claims: assuranceClaims.map((claim) => claim.id),
-}, null, 2)}\n`);
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/generate-topic-landings.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/generate-topic-landings.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index d3d9cb3..0000000
--- a/tools/render-markdown/generate-topic-landings.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-import path from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-import { pageById } from "../../app/lib/page-graph.ts";
-import { topicLandings } from "../../app/lib/topic-landings.ts";
-
-const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
-
-for (const landing of topicLandings) {
-  const page = pageById(landing.page);
-  const recommended = pageById(landing.recommendation.target);
-  const lines = [
-    `# ${page.title}`,
-    "",
-    page.description,
-    "",
-    `## Recommended: [${landing.recommendation.label}](${recommended.path})`,
-    "",
-    landing.recommendation.description,
-    "",
-  ];
-  for (const group of landing.groups) {
-    lines.push(`## ${group.title}`, "");
-    for (const card of group.cards) {
-      const target = pageById(card.target);
-      lines.push(`- [${card.title}](${target.path}) — ${card.description}`);
-    }
-    lines.push("");
-  }
-  lines.push(`_Page identity: ${page.id} · Product contract: ${pageById(landing.page).id}_`, "");
-  const output = path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`);
-  await mkdir(path.dirname(output), { recursive: true });
-  await writeFile(output, `${lines.join("\n")}\n`, "utf8");
-}
diff --git a/tools/render-markdown/generate-tours.mjs b/tools/render-markdown/generate-tours.mjs
deleted file mode 100644
index 5eaec30..0000000
--- a/tools/render-markdown/generate-tours.mjs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-import path from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-import { contentPageById, runtimeOutcomes, verifiedPageGraph } from "../../app/lib/content-graph.ts";
-import { pageById } from "../../app/lib/page-graph.ts";
-import { tours } from "../../app/lib/tours.ts";
-
-const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
-for (const tour of tours) {
-  const page = contentPageById(tour.page);
-  const lines = [`# ${page.title}`, "", page.description, "", "## The path at a glance", "", tour.diagram.nodes.map((node, index) => `${index + 1}. ${node}`).join("\n"), "", `Text equivalent: ${tour.diagram.text}`, "", "## What remains true", "", ...tour.invariants.map((item) => `- ${item}`), ""];
-  if (page.uses.endpoints.length > 0) lines.push("## Closed runtime outcomes", "", ...runtimeOutcomes.map((outcome) => `- \`${outcome}\``), "");
-  lines.push("## Failure branches", "", "| Trigger | Result | Safe response |", "|---|---|---|", ...tour.failures.map((failure) => `| ${failure.trigger} | ${failure.result} | ${failure.response} |`), "", "## Use this when", "", tour.useWhen, "", "## Do not use this when", "", tour.avoidWhen, "", "## Continue from here", "", ...tour.related.map((id) => { const related = pageById(id); return `- [${related.title}](${related.path}) — ${related.description}`; }), "", `_Page identity: ${page.id} · Contract digest: ${verifiedPageGraph.contractDigest}_`, "");
-  const output = path.join(root, "public", `${page.path.slice(1)}.md`);
-  await mkdir(path.dirname(output), { recursive: true });
-  await writeFile(output, `${lines.join("\n")}\n`, "utf8");
-}
diff --git a/tsconfig.json b/tsconfig.json
index 96e836a..b7914d4 100644
--- a/tsconfig.json
+++ b/tsconfig.json
@@ -26,5 +26,5 @@
     ".next/dev/types/**/*.ts",
     "**/*.mts"
   ],
-  "exclude": ["node_modules", "examples"]
+  "exclude": ["node_modules", "examples", "product-snapshot"]
 }
diff --git a/vite-env.d.ts b/vite-env.d.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..11f02fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vite-env.d.ts
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+/// <reference types="vite/client" />
diff --git a/vite.config.ts b/vite.config.ts
index 221a3c5..6cc62ca 100644
--- a/vite.config.ts
+++ b/vite.config.ts
@@ -5,6 +5,30 @@ import remarkGfm from "remark-gfm";
 import hostingConfig from "./.openai/hosting.json";
 import { sites } from "./build/sites-vite-plugin";
 
+function mdxFrontmatter() {
+  return {
+    name: "auths-docs-mdx-frontmatter",
+    enforce: "pre" as const,
+    transform(source: string, id: string) {
+      if (!id.includes("/content-v2/") || !id.endsWith(".mdx") || !source.startsWith("---\n")) return null;
+      const end = source.indexOf("\n---\n", 4);
+      if (end < 0) throw new TypeError(`${id} has unterminated frontmatter`);
+      const metadata = Object.fromEntries(source.slice(4, end).split("\n").filter(Boolean).map((line) => {
+        const separator = line.indexOf(":");
+        if (separator < 1) throw new TypeError(`${id} has invalid frontmatter: ${line}`);
+        const key = line.slice(0, separator).trim();
+        const raw = line.slice(separator + 1).trim();
+        const value = /^(['"]).*\1$/.test(raw) ? raw.slice(1, -1) : /^\d+$/.test(raw) ? Number(raw) : raw;
+        return [key, value];
+      }));
+      let body = source.slice(end + 5);
+      const heading = body.match(/^#\s+(.+)\n/)?.[1] ?? String(metadata.title);
+      body = body.replace(/^#\s+.+\n+/, "");
+      return `export const frontmatter = ${JSON.stringify(metadata)};\nexport const heading = ${JSON.stringify(heading)};\n${body}`;
+    },
+  };
+}
+
 const SITE_CREATOR_PLACEHOLDER_DATABASE_ID =
   "00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000000";
 
@@ -50,7 +74,8 @@ export default defineConfig(async () => {
       ? { watch: { useFsEvents: false, usePolling: true } }
       : undefined,
     plugins: [
-      { ...mdx({ remarkPlugins: [remarkGfm] }), enforce: "pre" },
+      mdxFrontmatter(),
+      { ...mdx({ include: /\.mdx$/, remarkPlugins: [remarkGfm] }), enforce: "pre" },
       vinext(),
       sites(),
       cloudflare({