diff --git a/docs/deployment-consistency.md b/docs/deployment-consistency.md
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+# Deployment consistency model
+
+Weaver Kernel is an **in-process enforcement runtime**, not a distributed authorization service. Some state is deliberately local to a Kernel/process unless the deployment supplies a shared backend.
+
+This matters because signed capability tokens are partly stateless while revocation, rate limiting, handles and other runtime state can be local. A multi-worker deployment can therefore have different semantics from a single process even when every worker uses the same signing secret.
+
+The current behavior is pinned by [`tests/test_multi_worker_consistency.py`](../tests/test_multi_worker_consistency.py).
+
+## Current matrix
+
+| Component | Default state | Two workers sharing the same secret | Consequence |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| capability-token signature verification | stateless HMAC | token issued by A verifies in B | expected and useful |
+| token revocation | in-memory store unless replaced | revoking in A does not revoke in B | revocation is not globally consistent by default |
+| rate-limit windows | in-memory | each worker has an independent window | an effective deployment-wide limit can scale with worker count |
+| handles / expanded results | in-memory `HandleStore` | handle created in A is unknown in B | requests that move workers cannot expand that handle |
+| in-memory traces | process-local | each worker sees its own trace store | audit history fragments unless a shared/durable store is used |
+| budget/runtime counters | process-local where backed by in-memory state | counters can diverge | deployment-wide budgets require a shared coordination model |
+
+## Reproducible evidence
+
+The test suite demonstrates four load-bearing facts through public/component APIs:
+
+1. two `HMACTokenProvider` instances with the same secret accept the same valid signed token;
+2. revoking that token in worker A does not alter worker B's independent in-memory revocation store;
+3. two `RateLimiter` instances have independent windows for the same logical principal/capability key;
+4. two `HandleStore` instances do not share handle payloads.
+
+Run:
+
+```bash
+pytest -q tests/test_multi_worker_consistency.py
+```
+
+These tests are intentionally documentation-as-code: if the implementation changes, the deployment claim must change with it.
+
+## Supported deployment guidance today
+
+### Single process
+
+A single process gives the clearest semantics for the default in-memory stores. It is the easiest deployment profile to reason about when evaluating the library.
+
+### Multiple workers with only a shared signing secret
+
+Do **not** interpret a shared `WEAVER_KERNEL_SECRET` as shared authorization state. It lets workers verify the same token signatures; it does not by itself synchronize revocation, limits, handles or traces.
+
+If a security requirement depends on immediate global revocation, one deployment-wide rate limit, portable handles or one authoritative audit history, the default independent in-memory stores are insufficient.
+
+### Shared/durable stores
+
+Use an available shared/durable backend where one exists and validate its consistency properties for the deployment. A durable backend solves only the state it actually owns; it should not be described as making every Kernel subsystem distributed automatically.
+
+For example, sharing trace storage does not automatically share rate-limit windows or handles.
+
+## Architectural decision before a sidecar
+
+The existence of process-local state does **not** by itself justify building a remote Kernel service.
+
+The sequence should be:
+
+1. identify which guarantees real adopters need across workers;
+2. determine whether a small shared-store protocol is sufficient;
+3. measure the latency/failure/operational cost of shared state;
+4. use a sidecar/remote Kernel only if it materially simplifies the required consistency or trust boundary.
+
+This is why the remote-mode proposal (#227) is intentionally lower priority than documenting and validating this consistency model.
+
+## Security claim language
+
+Prefer:
+
+> “With the default in-memory stores, revocation, rate limits and handles are process-local. Signed tokens can verify across workers that share the signing secret.”
+
+Avoid:
+
+> “Workers share Kernel authorization state because they use the same secret.”
+
+Also avoid describing Kernel as a distributed policy service unless the deployed backends and topology actually establish those semantics.
+
+## Follow-up decisions
+
+The evidence here should inform, rather than pre-decide:
+
+- whether revocation needs a first-class shared-store recommendation;
+- whether invocation limits need deployment-wide state after #170/PR #259 settles their semantics;
+- whether handles should ever be portable across workers or should remain intentionally sticky/local;
+- whether audit stores need a recommended production backend;
+- whether #227 earns its complexity from actual adopter requirements.
+
+See the [Security Contract](security-contract.md) and [Roadmap](../ROADMAP.md) for the broader product/security gates.
diff --git a/tests/test_multi_worker_consistency.py b/tests/test_multi_worker_consistency.py
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+"""Executable documentation for current process-local consistency semantics (#226)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+
+from weaver_kernel import HandleStore, HMACTokenProvider, TokenRevoked
+from weaver_kernel.rate_limit import RateLimiter
+
+_SECRET = "multi-worker-consistency-test-secret"
+
+
+def _run_fresh_python(source: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    """Run a probe in a separate Python process and return its stdout."""
+    completed = subprocess.run(
+        [sys.executable, "-c", source],
+        input=json.dumps(payload),
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=True,
+    )
+    return completed.stdout.strip()
+
+
+def test_token_signature_verifies_across_processes_that_share_a_secret() -> None:
+    worker_a = HMACTokenProvider(secret=_SECRET)
+    token = worker_a.issue("tickets.read", "alice")
+
+    result = _run_fresh_python(
+        """
+import json
+import sys
+from weaver_kernel import CapabilityToken, HMACTokenProvider
+
+payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
+token = CapabilityToken.from_dict(payload["token"])
+provider = HMACTokenProvider(secret=payload["secret"])
+provider.verify(
+    token,
+    expected_principal_id="alice",
+    expected_capability_id="tickets.read",
+)
+print("verified")
+""",
+        {"secret": _SECRET, "token": token.to_dict()},
+    )
+
+    assert result == "verified"
+
+
+def test_in_memory_revocation_does_not_propagate_to_fresh_process() -> None:
+    worker_a = HMACTokenProvider(secret=_SECRET)
+    token = worker_a.issue("tickets.read", "alice")
+    worker_a.revoke(token.token_id)
+
+    with pytest.raises(TokenRevoked):
+        worker_a.verify(
+            token,
+            expected_principal_id="alice",
+            expected_capability_id="tickets.read",
+        )
+
+    result = _run_fresh_python(
+        """
+import json
+import sys
+from weaver_kernel import CapabilityToken, HMACTokenProvider
+
+payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
+token = CapabilityToken.from_dict(payload["token"])
+provider = HMACTokenProvider(secret=payload["secret"])
+provider.verify(
+    token,
+    expected_principal_id="alice",
+    expected_capability_id="tickets.read",
+)
+print("verified")
+""",
+        {"secret": _SECRET, "token": token.to_dict()},
+    )
+
+    assert result == "verified"
+
+
+def test_rate_limit_windows_are_process_local() -> None:
+    def fixed_clock() -> float:
+        return 100.0
+
+    worker_a = RateLimiter(clock=fixed_clock)
+    key = "alice:tickets.read"
+
+    assert worker_a.check(key, limit=1, window_seconds=60.0)
+    worker_a.record(key)
+    assert not worker_a.check(key, limit=1, window_seconds=60.0)
+
+    result = _run_fresh_python(
+        """
+import json
+import sys
+from weaver_kernel.rate_limit import RateLimiter
+
+payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
+limiter = RateLimiter(clock=lambda: 100.0)
+print("allowed" if limiter.check(payload["key"], limit=1, window_seconds=60.0) else "blocked")
+""",
+        {"key": key},
+    )
+
+    assert result == "allowed"
+
+
+def test_default_handle_store_is_not_portable_to_fresh_process() -> None:
+    worker_a = HandleStore()
+    handle = worker_a.store(
+        "tickets.read",
+        [{"id": 1, "title": "Example"}],
+        principal_id="alice",
+    )
+    assert worker_a.get(handle.handle_id) == [{"id": 1, "title": "Example"}]
+
+    result = _run_fresh_python(
+        """
+import json
+import sys
+from weaver_kernel import HandleNotFound, HandleStore
+
+payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
+try:
+    HandleStore().get(payload["handle_id"])
+except HandleNotFound:
+    print("missing")
+else:
+    print("found")
+""",
+        {"handle_id": handle.handle_id},
+    )
+
+    assert result == "missing"