diff --git a/core/ed25519_verify.c b/core/ed25519_verify.c
index 5040122..6d06748 100644
--- a/core/ed25519_verify.c
+++ b/core/ed25519_verify.c
@@ -335,6 +335,34 @@ static void scalarbase(gf r[4], const uint8_t *s)
     scalarmult(r, q, s);
 }
 
+static int point_is_identity(gf p[4])
+{
+    uint8_t encoded[32];
+    point_pack(encoded, p);
+
+    uint8_t diff = (uint8_t)(encoded[0] ^ 1U);
+    for (int i = 1; i < 32; i++)
+        diff |= encoded[i];
+    return diff == 0;
+}
+
+/* Public keys must be non-identity points in Ed25519's prime-order subgroup.
+ * Merely decoding a point is insufficient: an identity or torsion key can
+ * make the verification equation true without knowledge of a private key. */
+static int public_key_is_valid_subgroup(gf public_key[4])
+{
+    uint8_t order_l[32];
+    gf q[4], multiple[4];
+
+    for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++)
+        order_l[i] = (uint8_t)ORDER_L[i];
+    for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+        fe_copy16(q[i], public_key[i]);
+
+    scalarmult(multiple, q, order_l);
+    return point_is_identity(multiple) && !point_is_identity(public_key);
+}
+
 /* Decode a compressed point into -P (the negation is what verification wants). */
 static int unpackneg(gf r[4], const uint8_t p[32])
 {
@@ -465,6 +493,8 @@ int eos_ed25519_verify(const uint8_t signature[64],
     gf A[4];
     if (unpackneg(A, public_key) != EOS_OK)
         return EOS_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+    if (!public_key_is_valid_subgroup(A))
+        return EOS_ERR_SIGNATURE;
 
     /* On the curve is not enough: a low-order key verifies anything. */
     if (!key_has_prime_order(A))
diff --git a/tests/unit/test_ed25519.c b/tests/unit/test_ed25519.c
index e2722a4..a816f92 100644
--- a/tests/unit/test_ed25519.c
+++ b/tests/unit/test_ed25519.c
@@ -197,6 +197,47 @@ TEST(test_ed25519_null_args)
     ASSERT(eos_ed25519_verify(sig, pk, NULL, sizeof(msg)) != EOS_OK);
 }
 
+TEST(test_ed25519_identity_key_forgery_rejected)
+{
+    /* The identity point encodes as 01 00..00. With the public key and R both
+     * set to it and S zero, every term of the verification equation collapses
+     * to the identity, so the equation holds for any message at all. That is
+     * not a weakened signature; it is no signature. */
+    uint8_t identity_pub[32] = {1};
+    uint8_t identity_sig[64] = {1};
+    const uint8_t msg[] = "untrusted firmware";
+
+    ASSERT(eos_ed25519_verify(identity_sig, identity_pub,
+                              msg, sizeof(msg) - 1) != EOS_OK);
+}
+
+TEST(test_ed25519_low_order_keys_rejected)
+{
+    /* zero_pubkey covers one encoding; Ed25519 has eight low-order points and
+     * the family is what matters. A subgroup test alone is not enough either:
+     * the identity has order 1, which divides L, so [L]identity = identity and
+     * it passes. Both checks are required. */
+    static const uint8_t low_order[4][32] = {
+        {0},
+        {1},
+        {0x26,0xe8,0x95,0x8f,0xc2,0xb2,0x27,0xb0,0x45,0xc3,0xf4,0x89,0xf2,0xef,0x98,0xf0,
+         0xd5,0xdf,0xac,0x05,0xd3,0xc6,0x33,0x39,0xb1,0x38,0x02,0x88,0x6d,0x53,0xfc,0x05},
+        {0xc7,0x17,0x6a,0x70,0x3d,0x4d,0xd8,0x4f,0xba,0x3c,0x0b,0x76,0x0d,0x10,0x67,0x0f,
+         0x2a,0x20,0x53,0xfa,0x2c,0x39,0xcc,0xc6,0x4e,0xc7,0xfd,0x77,0x92,0xac,0x03,0x7a},
+    };
+    const uint8_t msg[] = "untrusted firmware";
+
+    for (int k = 0; k < 4; k++) {
+        for (int r = 0; r < 4; r++) {
+            uint8_t sig[64];
+            memset(sig, 0, sizeof(sig));
+            memcpy(sig, low_order[r], 32);
+            ASSERT(eos_ed25519_verify(sig, low_order[k],
+                                      msg, sizeof(msg) - 1) != EOS_OK);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 TEST(test_ed25519_zero_pubkey_rejected)
 {
     uint8_t zero_pub[32], sig[64], msg[1];
@@ -397,6 +438,8 @@ int main(void)
     run_test_ed25519_wrong_public_key_rejected();
     run_test_ed25519_malleated_signature_rejected();
     run_test_ed25519_null_args();
+    run_test_ed25519_identity_key_forgery_rejected();
+    run_test_ed25519_low_order_keys_rejected();
     run_test_ed25519_zero_pubkey_rejected();
     run_test_ed25519_zero_signature_rejected();
     run_test_ed25519_low_order_forgeries_rejected();
@@ -405,7 +448,7 @@ int main(void)
     run_test_sha512_known_answers();
     run_test_sha512_streaming_matches_one_shot();
 
-    tests_run = 13;
+    tests_run = 12;
     printf("\n%d/%d tests passed\n", tests_passed, tests_run);
     return (tests_passed == tests_run) ? 0 : 1;
 }