fix(security): re-scope to owned release-audit items on current staging

Drops the response cap and crawl depth (landed in #9860), CONTRIBUTING (#9860), Firecrawl search sources (on hold), Databricks JSON caps (#9859), and the workflow middleware and route-policies cleanups (#9858). Drops the NO_PROXY entry-syntax docs line (owned by a separate NO_PROXY change). Generated files regenerated on current staging.

Author: waleedlatif1

.github/CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -140,22 +140,20 @@ Using clear and consistent commit messages makes it easier for everyone to under
 
 To set up your local development environment:
 
-### Option 1: Using the setup wizard (Simplest)
+### Option 1: Using the Setup Wizard (Simplest)
 
-The easiest way to run Sim locally is the `sim-setup` wizard:
+The easiest way to run Sim locally is the interactive setup wizard:
 
 ```bash
 npx sim-setup
 ```
 
-The wizard checks Docker, ports, memory, and disk space, generates the required secrets, writes `.env` and a Docker Compose file into a new `sim` directory, starts the containers, runs database migrations, and waits for the health checks to pass. When it finishes, open [http://localhost:3000/](http://localhost:3000/) in your browser.
+When it finishes, open [http://localhost:3000/](http://localhost:3000/) in your browser. Inside a cloned Sim repository, run `bun run sim-setup --mode dev` for the local development mode.
 
 #### Requirements
 
-- Node.js 20 or newer
-- Docker with the Compose plugin, installed and running
-
-See the [`sim-setup` README](../packages/sim-setup/README.md) for options and management commands.
+- Node.js 20+
+- Docker must be installed and running on your machine
 
 ### Option 2: Using Docker Compose
 

apps/docs/content/docs/integrations/firecrawl.mdx

@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ Crawl entire websites and extract structured content from all accessible pages
 | --------- | ---- | -------- | ----------- |
 | `url` | string | Yes | The website URL to crawl \(e.g., "https://example.com" or "https://docs.example.com/guide") |
 | `limit` | number | No | Maximum number of pages to crawl \(e.g., 50, 100, 500\). Default: 100 |
-| `maxDepth` | number | No | Maximum path depth below the starting URL \(e.g., 1 from /docs allows /docs/guide and /docs/guide/index.html\). Independent of link discovery depth |
+| `maxDepth` | number | No | Maximum URL path depth below the starting URL \(e.g., from /docs, 1 allows /docs/guide\). Independent of link discovery depth |
 | `formats` | json | No | Output formats for scraped content \(e.g., \["markdown"\], \["markdown", "html"\], \["markdown", "links"\]\) |
 | `prompt` | string | No | Natural-language crawl guidance supplied by existing configurations |
 | `excludePaths` | json | No | URL paths to exclude from crawling \(e.g., \["/blog/*", "/admin/*", "/*.pdf"\]\) |

apps/docs/content/docs/platform/self-hosting/networking.mdx

@@ -301,8 +301,6 @@ A request through the SSRF guard keeps its checks when it is proxied. Before eac
 
 Set `NO_PROXY` for every destination that is not on the public internet, not just model endpoints. The app reaches the realtime server (`SOCKET_SERVER_URL`), the Presidio PII service (`PII_URL`), and itself (`INTERNAL_API_BASE_URL`) over the same default `fetch`, alongside self-hosted Ollama, LiteLLM, and vLLM — so a proxy that cannot reach your internal network breaks live updates and PII redaction, not only inference. AWS clients and OTLP export follow the same rule, so also add an internal S3-compatible store such as MinIO, AWS VPC endpoints, and an in-cluster OpenTelemetry collector.
 
-Each entry is a hostname, a domain suffix (`.svc` or `*.svc`), or an IP address, optionally followed by `:port`. Bracket IPv6 addresses (`[::1]`). CIDR ranges are not supported. `*` disables the proxy only when it is the whole value.
-
 Set it in the application environment, not your shell — under `app.env` on Helm, or the service's `environment:` on Compose. On Helm the suffixes alone are not enough: the chart wires `SOCKET_SERVER_URL`, `PII_URL`, and `OLLAMA_URL` to bare Service names, which no domain suffix matches. Add those names too — `helm template` prints the rendered ones, and the prefix is the release name unless it already contains `sim`, in which case it is the release name alone:
 
   ```yaml

apps/sim/app/api/resume/[workflowId]/[executionId]/[contextId]/route.ts

@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ export const GET = withRouteHandler(
     }
   ) => {
     const { workflowId: requestedWorkflowId } = await context.params
-    const access = await validateWorkflowAccess(request, requestedWorkflowId)
+    const access = await validateWorkflowAccess(request, requestedWorkflowId, false)
     if (access.error) {
       return NextResponse.json({ error: access.error.message }, { status: access.error.status })
     }

apps/sim/app/api/workflows/[id]/executions/[executionId]/route.ts

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ export const GET = withRouteHandler(
     const { id: workflowId, executionId } = parsed.data.params
     const { includeOutput, selectedOutputs } = parsed.data.query
 
-    const access = await validateWorkflowAccess(request, workflowId)
+    const access = await validateWorkflowAccess(request, workflowId, false)
     if (access.error) {
       return NextResponse.json({ error: access.error.message }, { status: access.error.status })
     }

apps/sim/app/api/workflows/[id]/paused/route.ts

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ export const GET = withRouteHandler(
     if (!parsed.success) return parsed.response
     const { id: workflowId } = parsed.data.params
 
-    const access = await validateWorkflowAccess(request, workflowId)
+    const access = await validateWorkflowAccess(request, workflowId, false)
     if (access.error) {
       return NextResponse.json({ error: access.error.message }, { status: access.error.status })
     }

apps/sim/app/api/workflows/middleware.test.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+/**
+ * Tests for workflow access middleware — focused on the workspace-scoped
+ * API key boundary check in the `requireDeployment=false` branch.
+ */
+
 import {
   hybridAuthMockFns,
   workflowAuthzMockFns,
@@ -8,6 +13,10 @@ import { NextRequest } from 'next/server'
 import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
 
 vi.mock('@/lib/workflows/utils', () => workflowsUtilsMock)
+vi.mock('@/lib/api-key/service', () => ({
+  authenticateApiKeyFromHeader: vi.fn(),
+  updateApiKeyLastUsed: vi.fn(),
+}))
 
 import { WORKSPACE_KEY_SCOPE_DENIED } from '@/lib/api-key/policy-messages'
 import { validateWorkflowAccess } from '@/app/api/workflows/middleware'
@@ -16,11 +25,12 @@ function makeRequest() {
   return new NextRequest(new URL('https://example.com/api/workflows/wf-1'))
 }
 
-describe('validateWorkflowAccess', () => {
+describe('validateWorkflowAccess (requireDeployment=false)', () => {
   beforeEach(() => {
     workflowsUtilsMockFns.mockGetWorkflowById.mockResolvedValue({
       id: 'wf-1',
       workspaceId: 'ws-A',
+      isDeployed: true,
     })
     workflowAuthzMockFns.mockAuthorizeWorkflowByWorkspacePermission.mockResolvedValue({
       allowed: true,
@@ -38,7 +48,7 @@ describe('validateWorkflowAccess', () => {
       workspaceId: 'ws-B',
     })
 
-    const result = await validateWorkflowAccess(makeRequest(), 'wf-1')
+    const result = await validateWorkflowAccess(makeRequest(), 'wf-1', false)
 
     expect(result.error).toEqual({
       message: WORKSPACE_KEY_SCOPE_DENIED,
@@ -60,7 +70,7 @@ describe('validateWorkflowAccess', () => {
       message: 'Access denied',
     })
 
-    const result = await validateWorkflowAccess(makeRequest(), 'wf-1')
+    const result = await validateWorkflowAccess(makeRequest(), 'wf-1', false)
 
     expect(result.error).toEqual({ message: 'Access denied', status: 403 })
   })

apps/sim/app/api/workflows/middleware.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,11 @@ import { createLogger } from '@sim/logger'
 import { authorizeWorkflowByWorkspacePermission } from '@sim/platform-authz/workflow'
 import type { NextRequest } from 'next/server'
 import { WORKSPACE_KEY_SCOPE_DENIED } from '@/lib/api-key/policy-messages'
+import {
+  type ApiKeyAuthResult,
+  authenticateApiKeyFromHeader,
+  updateApiKeyLastUsed,
+} from '@/lib/api-key/service'
 import { type AuthResult, checkHybridAuth } from '@/lib/auth/hybrid'
 import { getWorkflowById } from '@/lib/workflows/utils'
 
@@ -15,7 +20,8 @@ export interface ValidationResult {
 
 export async function validateWorkflowAccess(
   request: NextRequest,
-  workflowId: string
+  workflowId: string,
+  requireDeployment = true
 ): Promise<ValidationResult> {
   try {
     const workflow = await getWorkflowById(workflowId)
@@ -38,40 +44,95 @@ export async function validateWorkflowAccess(
       }
     }
 
-    const auth = await checkHybridAuth(request, { requireWorkflowId: false })
-    if (!auth.success || !auth.userId) {
-      return {
-        error: {
-          message: auth.error || 'Unauthorized',
-          status: 401,
-        },
+    if (!requireDeployment) {
+      const auth = await checkHybridAuth(request, { requireWorkflowId: false })
+      if (!auth.success || !auth.userId) {
+        return {
+          error: {
+            message: auth.error || 'Unauthorized',
+            status: 401,
+          },
+        }
       }
-    }
 
-    if (auth.apiKeyType === 'workspace' && auth.workspaceId !== workflow.workspaceId) {
-      return {
-        error: {
-          message: WORKSPACE_KEY_SCOPE_DENIED,
-          status: 403,
-        },
+      if (auth.apiKeyType === 'workspace' && auth.workspaceId !== workflow.workspaceId) {
+        return {
+          error: {
+            message: WORKSPACE_KEY_SCOPE_DENIED,
+            status: 403,
+          },
+        }
       }
-    }
 
-    const authorization = await authorizeWorkflowByWorkspacePermission({
-      workflowId,
-      userId: auth.userId,
-      action: 'read',
-    })
-    if (!authorization.allowed) {
-      return {
-        error: {
-          message: authorization.message || 'Access denied',
-          status: authorization.status,
-        },
+      const authorization = await authorizeWorkflowByWorkspacePermission({
+        workflowId,
+        userId: auth.userId,
+        action: 'read',
+      })
+      if (!authorization.allowed) {
+        return {
+          error: {
+            message: authorization.message || 'Access denied',
+            status: authorization.status,
+          },
+        }
       }
+
+      return { workflow, auth }
     }
 
-    return { workflow, auth }
+    if (requireDeployment) {
+      if (!workflow.isDeployed) {
+        return {
+          error: {
+            message: 'Workflow is not deployed',
+            status: 403,
+          },
+        }
+      }
+
+      let apiKeyHeader = null
+      for (const [key, value] of request.headers.entries()) {
+        if (key.toLowerCase() === 'x-api-key' && value) {
+          apiKeyHeader = value
+          break
+        }
+      }
+
+      if (!apiKeyHeader) {
+        return {
+          error: {
+            message: 'Unauthorized: API key required',
+            status: 401,
+          },
+        }
+      }
+
+      let validResult: ApiKeyAuthResult | null = null
+
+      const workspaceResult = await authenticateApiKeyFromHeader(apiKeyHeader, {
+        workspaceId: workflow.workspaceId as string,
+        keyTypes: ['workspace', 'personal'],
+      })
+
+      if (workspaceResult.success) {
+        validResult = workspaceResult
+      }
+
+      if (!validResult) {
+        return {
+          error: {
+            message: 'Unauthorized: Invalid API key',
+            status: 401,
+          },
+        }
+      }
+
+      if (validResult.keyId) {
+        updateApiKeyLastUsed(validResult.keyId)
+      }
+    }
+    return { workflow }
   } catch (error) {
     logger.error('Validation error:', { error })
     return {

apps/sim/bootstrap.ts

@@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
 /**
- * Container entrypoint. Hydrates `process.env` from the runtime secret before
- * loading the Next.js standalone server, so application modules that read env at
- * import time see the full configuration. See `@sim/runtime-secrets`.
+ * Container entrypoint. Hydrates `process.env` from the runtime secret and drops Next's route
+ * cache when an earlier build wrote it, before loading the Next.js standalone server, so
+ * application modules that read env at import time see the full configuration. See
+ * `@sim/runtime-secrets`.
  */
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
 import { loadRuntimeSecrets } from '@sim/runtime-secrets'
+import { clearRouteCacheFromOtherBuild } from '@/lib/core/utils/route-cache'
 
 await loadRuntimeSecrets()
+await clearRouteCacheFromOtherBuild(fileURLToPath(new URL('./.next', import.meta.url)))
 // `server.js` is the Next standalone build artifact, a sibling of this file in
 // the image; it does not exist at type-check time, so the specifier is held in a
 // variable to keep it out of static module resolution.

apps/sim/lib/core/network/environment-proxy.server.test.ts

@@ -207,18 +207,23 @@ describe('guarded requests under HTTPS_PROXY', () => {
     ])
   })
 
-  it('caps an uncompressed plain-http body forwarded by the proxy', async () => {
-    const pinned = createPinnedFetchWithDispatcher('1.1.1.1', {
+  it('caps a forwarded plain-http response at maxResponseSize', async () => {
+    const guarded = createSsrfGuardedFetchWithDispatcher({
+      ...options,
       profile: 'selfHostedService',
       maxResponseSize: 4,
     })
     try {
-      const response = await pinned.fetch('http://origin.invalid/plain')
-      await expect(response.text()).rejects.toThrow(/max size/i)
+      const response = await guarded.fetch('http://origin.invalid/plain')
+      await expect(response.text()).rejects.toMatchObject({
+        code: 'UND_ERR_RES_EXCEEDED_MAX_SIZE',
+      })
     } finally {
-      await pinned.dispatcher.destroy()
+      await guarded.dispatcher.destroy()
     }
-    expect(forwarded.map((request) => request.url)).toEqual(['http://origin.invalid/plain'])
+    expect(forwarded).toEqual([
+      { url: 'http://origin.invalid/plain', authorization: PROXY_AUTHORIZATION },
+    ])
   })
 
   it('connects directly, still pinned, when NO_PROXY names the host', async () => {