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feat: merge-train/spartan-v5#24596

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AztecBot merged 2 commits into
v5-nextfrom
merge-train/spartan-v5
Jul 8, 2026
Merged

feat: merge-train/spartan-v5#24596
AztecBot merged 2 commits into
v5-nextfrom
merge-train/spartan-v5

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@AztecBot AztecBot commented Jul 7, 2026

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BEGIN_COMMIT_OVERRIDE
chore(prover-client): demote empty addTxs log from warn to verbose (#24593)
docs: threat model for node (#24465)
END_COMMIT_OVERRIDE

…24593)

`CheckpointSubTreeOrchestrator.addTxs` logs `Provided no txs to addTxs.`
at **warn** level, but this path is expected control flow, not an
anomaly: `checkpoint-prover.ts` calls `this.subTree.addTxs(processed)`
unconditionally for every block in the checkpoint, so every empty block
hits this early return (the empty block is then finalized via
`setBlockCompleted`). On low-traffic networks this fires constantly —
~100 times in 4h on staging-internal — polluting warn-level log reviews
with noise.

Demote it to `verbose`. No behavior change; no tests assert on this
message.

Replaces #24591 and #24592 (closed), per request to land this as a
single PR via the spartan-v5 merge train.

Spotted during a staging-internal log review requested by @spalladino in
Slack.

---
*Created by
[claudebox](https://claudebox.work/v2/sessions/ac050bae673edac4) ·
group: `slackbot`*
Adds a new `THREAT_MODEL.md` doc. This document describes the threat
model of the Aztec L2 network: how transactions flow from users into the
proven chain, what each participant can and cannot do, and the
properties the implementation must uphold. It is intended as a guideline
for the security of the node implementation (`yarn-project`) and its
interaction with the L1 rollup contracts (`l1-contracts`).

**In scope**: transaction dissemination and the mempool, the p2p layer,
block and checkpoint production, committee attestation, L1 checkpoint
submission and sync, epoch proving, slashing, and the escape hatch.

**Out of scope**: client-side private execution and proving (PXE,
wallets), hardening of a node's public RPC interface, the cryptographic
soundness of the proving system itself (treated as an assumption below),
and L1 governance internals.

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🤖 Auto-approved

@AztecBot AztecBot added this pull request to the merge queue Jul 8, 2026
@AztecBot

AztecBot commented Jul 8, 2026

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🤖 Auto-merge enabled after 4 hours of inactivity. This PR will be merged automatically once all checks pass.

Merged via the queue into v5-next with commit d2f4c4d Jul 8, 2026
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3 participants