Repository navigation
Selected binding coverage: which check pins each consumed source? (scoped adversarial audit, no new kappa) - #1864
Conversation
…g-coverage-seeda342)
|
Independent audit of PR#1864 at
Validation:
Limits: Known gap credited to PR1864; new evidence is full actual inventory and hypothetical existing-format anchor; No actual selected-record change, full cold replay or theorem audit. Reproduce: Credit: Aaron Wang/Navinor PR1864 binding-coverage audit; Douglas Colkitt selected-record checker and selected construction authors. Prepared for woklerx with substantial OpenAI Codex assistance; no independent human review claimed. Apache-2.0. No new selected kappa. Exact committed audit artifact. Commit |
|
Batch review at Merged to Reviewed scope: Pinned20-input binding inventory and seven production-check mutation fixtures distinguish trusted anchors from enforced payload hashes. Consistent manifest/payload mutation passes the current fast checker. Literal-path audit is scoped, not complete dynamic dependency analysis or a mathematical supplier replay. The pinned scoped command passed; the batch ledger contains its command, input hashes, environment and log. This incorporates the research/tooling contribution and does not change the selected κ or discharge the inherited multiplication-theorem assumptions. Batch review, attribution and evidence. Thank you for the contribution. |
Selected binding coverage: which check pins each consumed source? (no new kappa)
Scoped adversarial audit of one acceptance obligation. Adds only
research/selected-binding-coverage-seeda342/. The selected record and all frozen sources are unchanged.Aaron Wang, with help from opencode (substantial AI assistance in task selection, implementation, verification and writing; disclosed in
TASK.json).supplier-boundary-audit(scope keydcdb0fa8e49b08a958d0), scope refined; chooser seeda342df779f61a21ef22797b2d9816a0e, priority revision 3.0b1cccf86e2f5132ed286a26ef0a681a495740ea; selected-record SHA-25610b9e340fd8e354a37a0c4813c90e5de1dd42044b5f6aca4a3fc5a42b685fa32.research/agent-33-binding-coverage-a342df77, contribution head3d54b62bon that base.Question
The selected record's
source_manifestinventory check ("Selected package inventory or bytes changed") is what binds the audited supplier sources. Does that obligation — the audited sources are the consumed sources — follow from the actual source-bound checks of the acceptance path?Result
For every repository input consumed by the selected fast acceptance (
scripts/verify_selected_result.py) and the documented reproduce driver (scripts/verify_frontier1094.py, including its--baseline1042reuse mode and the frozenresearch/complex-t16-rare-pattern-exchangeschain), the package names the check that pins the bytes:proof_supplementsdigestscertificate_sha256certificates/checkpoints/frontier1042.jsonre-enterscheck())The four unbound consumed inputs, each with a smallest fixture through the real
check():research/community-frontier1094-audit/SELECTED-SOURCE.json— the inventory anchor itself; the record has nosource_manifest_sha256. Fixture: a semantically invalid but superficially well-formed forgery that changes one inventory file and the manifest digest list consistently is accepted.scripts/verify_selected_result.py— the acceptance checker's own bytes are pinned by no record-level check (root-of-trust observation).research/community-frontier1042-audit/RESULT.json— the published baseline receipt that the--baseline1042reuse mode compares its supplied work directory against; the comparison target is unbound at record level (its claims remain constrained downstream: stage list, kappa constant, and recorded script hashes checked against live repository scripts).docs/research/community-batch1099-integration.json— existence-only publication pointer by documented design.Bound mutations are rejected with their exact errors (
Selected package inventory or bytes changed,Selected proof supplement changed,Selected primary proof is not covered by a verified digest,Selected decimal differs from exact kappa); existence-only and unbound-sidecar mutations are accepted, as the documentation states. So the source-binding obligation holds for the entire frozen supplier payload (all 1,579 manifest files, both upstream archives via package MANIFEST self-pins, the five pinned harness scripts) and fails only at the four anchors above. No certificate, supplier, or frontier value is affected.Reproduce
From the repository root, standard library only:
Expected final line:
PASS_SELECTED_BINDING_COVERAGE_AUDIT unbound=4 fixtures=7(about 3 s).Registered replay and metadata check both pass on Python 3.12:
Output:
PASS_PACKAGE_METADATA_AND_PINS (not a mathematical acceptance check), thenPASS_REGISTERED_RESEARCH_PACKAGE research/selected-binding-coverage-seeda342 outcome=completed. Also run green on Python 3.13 and 3.12 standalone.Method and controls
proof_supplements(remainder is empty and recorded).check()in a temporary directory; the working tree is read-only; the deterministic receipt is compared toEXPECTED.json.scripts/find_overlap.pywith the refined object terms (manifest coverage,source inventory,SELECTED-SOURCE,coverage law,source binding,package roots), 519 open PRs and 488 discussion records, complete pagination. No matches is not a novelty proof.Limitations and remaining obligations
make frontier1094-verify; the documented command is a make target andmakeis not installed on this host — the underlyingscripts/verify_frontier1094.pystages were read, not run), CI, and any proposed record change.source_manifest_sha256) needs maintainer authorization to change the selected record and its acceptance script; both are pinned inputs of many packages.Credit and overlap
research/owner-boundary-audit(Tekalign) — trace one obligation, then try to break it with one fixture.research/selected-source-coverage-audit(seed 97 consolidation note) maps review coverage ofsource_prsagainst the PR ledger; this package asks which check pins the bytes of each consumed input, with fixtures against the live acceptance function.research/frontier1094-ancestry-binding-seed69(Sagar Thakrar) reproduces the PR 799/PR 741 ancestry binding throughcheck_selected; that binding is counted here ascheckpoint-self-bindingand not re-audited.research/retained-bit-supplier-bindingguards bit-supplier identity across committed assemblies; untouched here.supplier-boundary-auditcard's prior use (compact dirty-control agreement set, Research: exact raw agreement set for compact dirty-control selected-bit updates (no new kappa) #1823) is a different object and is complete.