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Floor certifi and pip for emSign CA compromise (GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2) - #75
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certifi < 2026.10.19 trusts the compromised emSign/eMudhra roots, so a MITM could forge a kaggle.com cert and steal users' API tokens. requests only pulls certifi in without a minimum, so declare an explicit floor to force upgraded installs onto the fixed bundle. The CI/CD image also gets patched pip/certifi and refreshed OS ca-certificates; it takes effect once tools/cicd/cloudbuild.yaml is rerun. The repo has no uv usage, lock files, or changelog to update. BUG=b/575927270 Co-authored-by: kaggle-agent <kaggle-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
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…1227) certifi releases before 2026.10.19 trust the compromised emSign/eMudhra roots (GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2), so a MITM could forge a kaggle.com cert and steal API tokens. #1223 pinned certifi only in requirements.lock and tools/releases/requirements.txt, which pip ignores for `pip install kaggle`. kaggle pulled certifi only via requests, which sets no floor, so existing installs could keep a vulnerable bundle. This adds the floor to the published dependencies, and refreshes the OS ca-certificates and pip in the CI image, mirroring Kaggle/kagglehub#318 and Kaggle/kaggle-sdk-python#75. Co-authored-by: kaggle-agent <kaggle-agent@users.noreply.github.com> --- Task: [limagoog-20261021171115-e67bc133](https://agents.dev.kaggle.net/tasks/limagoog-20261021171115-e67bc133) Trajectory: [view agent transcript](https://agents.dev.kaggle.net/agent-trajectory?path=sloppy/tasks/limagoog-20261021171115-e67bc133) Context: https://chat.kaggle.net/kaggle/pl/mr3z3gn3b7dipfx66ai5kmpqkh Co-authored-by: limagoog <limagoog@google.com> Co-authored-by: kaggle-agent <kaggle-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
stevemessick
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Oct 21, 2026
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certifi < 2026.10.19 trusts the compromised emSign/eMudhra roots, so a
MITM could forge a kaggle.com cert and steal users' API tokens. requests
only pulls certifi in without a minimum, so declare an explicit floor to
force upgraded installs onto the fixed bundle. The CI/CD image also gets
patched pip/certifi and refreshed OS ca-certificates; it takes effect
once tools/cicd/cloudbuild.yaml is rerun. The repo has no uv usage, lock
files, or changelog to update.
BUG=b/575927270
Co-authored-by: kaggle-agent kaggle-agent@users.noreply.github.com
Task: sohier-20261021160122-007f1f59
Trajectory: view agent transcript
Context: https://chat.kaggle.net/kaggle/pl/gafqk3y76inhzjfsusdhsxotew