Merge tag 'ipsec-2023-06-20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec

ipsec-2023-06-20

Author: davem330

include/net/xfrm.h

@@ -1054,6 +1054,7 @@ struct xfrm_offload {
 struct sec_path {
 	int			len;
 	int			olen;
+	int			verified_cnt;
 
 	struct xfrm_state	*xvec[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
 	struct xfrm_offload	ovec[XFRM_MAX_OFFLOAD_DEPTH];

net/ipv4/esp4_offload.c

@@ -340,6 +340,9 @@ static int esp_xmit(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb,  netdev_features_
 
 	secpath_reset(skb);
 
+	if (skb_needs_linearize(skb, skb->dev->features) &&
+	    __skb_linearize(skb))
+		return -ENOMEM;
 	return 0;
 }
 

net/ipv4/xfrm4_input.c

@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ int xfrm4_udp_encap_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	kfree_skb(skb);
 	return 0;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm4_udp_encap_rcv);
 
 int xfrm4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {

net/ipv6/esp6_offload.c

@@ -374,6 +374,9 @@ static int esp6_xmit(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb,  netdev_features
 
 	secpath_reset(skb);
 
+	if (skb_needs_linearize(skb, skb->dev->features) &&
+	    __skb_linearize(skb))
+		return -ENOMEM;
 	return 0;
 }
 

net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c

@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ int xfrm6_udp_encap_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	__be32 *udpdata32;
 	__u16 encap_type = up->encap_type;
 
+	if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+		return xfrm4_udp_encap_rcv(sk, skb);
+
 	/* if this is not encapsulated socket, then just return now */
 	if (!encap_type)
 		return 1;

net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c

@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ struct sec_path *secpath_set(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memset(sp->ovec, 0, sizeof(sp->ovec));
 	sp->olen = 0;
 	sp->len = 0;
+	sp->verified_cnt = 0;
 
 	return sp;
 }
@@ -330,11 +331,10 @@ xfrm_inner_mode_encap_remove(struct xfrm_state *x,
 {
 	switch (x->props.mode) {
 	case XFRM_MODE_BEET:
-		switch (XFRM_MODE_SKB_CB(skb)->protocol) {
-		case IPPROTO_IPIP:
-		case IPPROTO_BEETPH:
+		switch (x->sel.family) {
+		case AF_INET:
 			return xfrm4_remove_beet_encap(x, skb);
-		case IPPROTO_IPV6:
+		case AF_INET6:
 			return xfrm6_remove_beet_encap(x, skb);
 		}
 		break;

net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c

@@ -310,6 +310,52 @@ static void xfrmi_scrub_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, bool xnet)
 	skb->mark = 0;
 }
 
+static int xfrmi_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi,
+		       int encap_type, unsigned short family)
+{
+	struct sec_path *sp;
+
+	sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
+	if (sp && (sp->len || sp->olen) &&
+	    !xfrm_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb, family))
+		goto discard;
+
+	XFRM_SPI_SKB_CB(skb)->family = family;
+	if (family == AF_INET) {
+		XFRM_SPI_SKB_CB(skb)->daddroff = offsetof(struct iphdr, daddr);
+		XFRM_TUNNEL_SKB_CB(skb)->tunnel.ip4 = NULL;
+	} else {
+		XFRM_SPI_SKB_CB(skb)->daddroff = offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, daddr);
+		XFRM_TUNNEL_SKB_CB(skb)->tunnel.ip6 = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return xfrm_input(skb, nexthdr, spi, encap_type);
+discard:
+	kfree_skb(skb);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int xfrmi4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return xfrmi_input(skb, ip_hdr(skb)->protocol, 0, 0, AF_INET);
+}
+
+static int xfrmi6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return xfrmi_input(skb, skb_network_header(skb)[IP6CB(skb)->nhoff],
+			   0, 0, AF_INET6);
+}
+
+static int xfrmi4_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
+{
+	return xfrmi_input(skb, nexthdr, spi, encap_type, AF_INET);
+}
+
+static int xfrmi6_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
+{
+	return xfrmi_input(skb, nexthdr, spi, encap_type, AF_INET6);
+}
+
 static int xfrmi_rcv_cb(struct sk_buff *skb, int err)
 {
 	const struct xfrm_mode *inner_mode;
@@ -945,8 +991,8 @@ static struct pernet_operations xfrmi_net_ops = {
 };
 
 static struct xfrm6_protocol xfrmi_esp6_protocol __read_mostly = {
-	.handler	=	xfrm6_rcv,
-	.input_handler	=	xfrm_input,
+	.handler	=	xfrmi6_rcv,
+	.input_handler	=	xfrmi6_input,
 	.cb_handler	=	xfrmi_rcv_cb,
 	.err_handler	=	xfrmi6_err,
 	.priority	=	10,
@@ -996,8 +1042,8 @@ static struct xfrm6_tunnel xfrmi_ip6ip_handler __read_mostly = {
 #endif
 
 static struct xfrm4_protocol xfrmi_esp4_protocol __read_mostly = {
-	.handler	=	xfrm4_rcv,
-	.input_handler	=	xfrm_input,
+	.handler	=	xfrmi4_rcv,
+	.input_handler	=	xfrmi4_input,
 	.cb_handler	=	xfrmi_rcv_cb,
 	.err_handler	=	xfrmi4_err,
 	.priority	=	10,

net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c

@@ -1831,6 +1831,7 @@ int xfrm_policy_flush(struct net *net, u8 type, bool task_valid)
 
 		__xfrm_policy_unlink(pol, dir);
 		spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
+		xfrm_dev_policy_delete(pol);
 		cnt++;
 		xfrm_audit_policy_delete(pol, 1, task_valid);
 		xfrm_policy_kill(pol);
@@ -1869,6 +1870,7 @@ int xfrm_dev_policy_flush(struct net *net, struct net_device *dev,
 
 		__xfrm_policy_unlink(pol, dir);
 		spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
+		xfrm_dev_policy_delete(pol);
 		cnt++;
 		xfrm_audit_policy_delete(pol, 1, task_valid);
 		xfrm_policy_kill(pol);
@@ -3349,6 +3351,13 @@ xfrm_policy_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct sec_path *sp, int star
 		if (xfrm_state_ok(tmpl, sp->xvec[idx], family, if_id))
 			return ++idx;
 		if (sp->xvec[idx]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) {
+			if (idx < sp->verified_cnt) {
+				/* Secpath entry previously verified, consider optional and
+				 * continue searching
+				 */
+				continue;
+			}
+
 			if (start == -1)
 				start = -2-idx;
 			break;
@@ -3723,6 +3732,9 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		 * Order is _important_. Later we will implement
 		 * some barriers, but at the moment barriers
 		 * are implied between each two transformations.
+		 * Upon success, marks secpath entries as having been
+		 * verified to allow them to be skipped in future policy
+		 * checks (e.g. nested tunnels).
 		 */
 		for (i = xfrm_nr-1, k = 0; i >= 0; i--) {
 			k = xfrm_policy_ok(tpp[i], sp, k, family, if_id);
@@ -3741,6 +3753,8 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		}
 
 		xfrm_pols_put(pols, npols);
+		sp->verified_cnt = k;
+
 		return 1;
 	}
 	XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINPOLBLOCK);