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Yogayaojiarodrigovivi
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drm/xe: Add bounds check on pat_index to prevent OOB kernel read in madvise
When user provides a bogus pat_index value through the madvise IOCTL, the xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode() function performs an array access without validating bounds. This allows a malicious user to trigger an out-of-bounds kernel read from the xe->pat.table array. The vulnerability exists because the validation in madvise_args_are_sane() directly calls xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode(xe, args->pat_index.val) without first checking if pat_index is within [0, xe->pat.n_entries). Although xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode() has a WARN_ON to catch this in debug builds, it still performs the unsafe array access in production kernels. v2(Matthew Auld) - Using array_index_nospec() to mitigate spectre attacks when the value is used v3(Matthew Auld) - Put the declarations at the start of the block Fixes: ada7486 ("drm/xe: Implement madvise ioctl for xe") Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.18+ Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com> Cc: Shuicheng Lin <shuicheng.lin@intel.com> Cc: Himal Prasad Ghimiray <himal.prasad.ghimiray@intel.com> Cc: "Thomas Hellström" <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jia Yao <jia.yao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260205161529.1819276-1-jia.yao@intel.com (cherry picked from commit 944a332) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
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drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm_madvise.c

Lines changed: 6 additions & 1 deletion
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -291,8 +291,13 @@ static bool madvise_args_are_sane(struct xe_device *xe, const struct drm_xe_madv
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break;
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case DRM_XE_MEM_RANGE_ATTR_PAT:
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{
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u16 coh_mode = xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode(xe, args->pat_index.val);
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u16 pat_index, coh_mode;
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if (XE_IOCTL_DBG(xe, args->pat_index.val >= xe->pat.n_entries))
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return false;
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pat_index = array_index_nospec(args->pat_index.val, xe->pat.n_entries);
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coh_mode = xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode(xe, pat_index);
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if (XE_IOCTL_DBG(xe, !coh_mode))
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return false;
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