fix(deps): update dependency sanitize-html to v2.17.5 [security]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
sanitize-html (source)	2.17.4 → 2.17.5

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sanitize-html has incomplete URI scheme validation in that allows javascript: URIs through action, formaction, data, poster, and background attributes

CVE-2026-53606 / GHSA-vccv-cmxp-4j9h

More information

Details

Summary

sanitize-html uses allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes (default: ['href', 'src', 'cite']) to gate the naughtyHref() function that blocks dangerous URI schemes like javascript: and vbscript:. The HTML specification defines 10+ attributes that accept URIs (action, formaction, data, poster, background, ping, xlink:href, dynsrc, lowsrc), but none of these are included in the default gate list. When a developer allows any of these attributes in their configuration, javascript: URIs pass through completely unmodified, enabling XSS.

The library has zero awareness of these URI-bearing attributes — none appear anywhere in the 854-line source file (verified by grep). No warning mechanism exists, and the README provides no security guidance about expanding allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes when allowing form or media attributes.

Severity

Exploitation requires non-default configuration: the developer must explicitly allow a non-default tag (e.g., form) AND a non-default attribute (e.g., action). Default configuration is NOT vulnerable. However, this is a common configuration pattern for CMS platforms, form builders, and rich content editors.

Affected Versions

All versions of sanitize-html from v1.18.0 (which introduced allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes) through at least v2.17.2. The default list has been ['href', 'src', 'cite'] since introduction and has never been expanded.

Root Cause

File: index.js:329 (sanitize-html 2.10.0, confirmed same in 2.17.x)

// Line 329 — The gate that controls scheme validation
if (options.allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes.indexOf(a) >= 0) {
    if (naughtyHref(name, value)) {
        delete frame.attribs[a];
        return;
    }
}

Default list at line 829:

allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes: ['href', 'src', 'cite'],

The naughtyHref() function (lines 627-667) correctly blocks javascript:, vbscript:, and other dangerous schemes. However, it has exactly 2 call sites in the entire codebase (lines 330 and 395), both inside the indexOf gate. There is no ungated path.

When attribute name is action, formaction, data, poster, background, etc.:

• indexOf('action') returns -1
• The if block is skipped entirely
• naughtyHref() is never called
• javascript:alert(1) passes through unmodified

The escapeHtml() function at line 464 provides no defense — it only encodes & < > " characters, which are not present in javascript:alert(1).

Data Flow:

Attacker input: <form action="javascript:alert(document.cookie)">
1. htmlparser2 parses → tag='form', attribs={action:'javascript:alert(document.cookie)'}
2. index.js:298 → allowedAttributes check: 'action' in developer config → PASS
3. index.js:329 → ['href','src','cite'].indexOf('action') → -1 → SKIP naughtyHref()
4. index.js:464 → escapeHtml('javascript:alert(document.cookie)') → unchanged
5. OUTPUT: <form action="javascript:alert(document.cookie)">

Steps to Reproduce

const sanitize = require('sanitize-html');

// ===== VECTOR 1: form action (100% reliable, all modern browsers) =====
const v1 = sanitize(
    '<form action="javascript:alert(document.cookie)"><button>Submit</button></form>',
    {
        allowedTags: ['form', 'button'],
        allowedAttributes: { form: ['action'] }
    }
);
console.log('V1 (action):', v1);
// OUTPUT: <form action="javascript:alert(document.cookie)"><button>Submit</button></form>
// XSS triggers when user submits the form

// ===== VECTOR 2: button formaction (100% reliable) =====
const v2 = sanitize(
    '<button formaction="javascript:alert(1)">Click</button>',
    {
        allowedTags: ['button'],
        allowedAttributes: { button: ['formaction'] }
    }
);
console.log('V2 (formaction):', v2);
// OUTPUT: <button formaction="javascript:alert(1)">Click</button>

// ===== VECTOR 3: object data =====
const v3 = sanitize(
    '<object data="javascript:alert(1)"></object>',
    {
        allowedTags: ['object'],
        allowedAttributes: { object: ['data'] }
    }
);
console.log('V3 (data):', v3);
// OUTPUT: <object data="javascript:alert(1)"></object>

// ===== CONTROL: href IS scheme-checked (expected behavior) =====
const ctrl = sanitize(
    '<a href="javascript:alert(1)">click</a>',
    {
        allowedTags: ['a'],
        allowedAttributes: { a: ['href'] }
    }
);
console.log('Control (href):', ctrl);
// OUTPUT: <a>click</a>   ← href correctly stripped by naughtyHref()

Observed behavior: javascript: preserved on action/formaction/data but correctly stripped on href.

Expected behavior: javascript: should be stripped on ALL URI-bearing attributes, or at minimum, the library should warn developers when they allow URI-bearing attributes not covered by scheme validation.

Impact

An attacker can achieve XSS in applications that use sanitize-html with non-default configurations allowing URI-bearing attributes:

• <form action="javascript:..."> — XSS on form submission (all modern browsers)
• <button formaction="javascript:..."> — per-button XSS override (all modern browsers)
• <object data="javascript:..."> — object load XSS (Chrome, Firefox)
• <video poster="javascript:..."> — limited browser support but spec-valid

Common vulnerable configurations:

• CMS platforms allowing form elements for user-generated content
• Form builder applications
• Rich text editors with extended tag allowlists
• Email template editors allowing media/embed tags

Mitigating factors:

• Default configuration is NOT vulnerable
• Requires double opt-in: non-default tag + non-default attribute
• CSP form-action directive mitigates form-based vectors
• Developers CAN manually add attributes to allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes

Remediation

Option 1 (Recommended): Expand the default allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes list:

// index.js line 829, change from:
allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes: ['href', 'src', 'cite'],

// to:
allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes: [
    'href', 'src', 'cite', 'action', 'formaction',
    'data', 'poster', 'background', 'ping',
    'xlink:href', 'dynsrc', 'lowsrc'
],

Option 2: Apply naughtyHref() to ALL attributes by default (invert the gate logic).

Option 3: Add a runtime warning when developers allow URI-bearing attributes not in allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes (analogous to vulnerableTags warning for script/style at lines 124-129).

Reporter

Kevin Lee (Changseon Lee)
OPCIA Corp. / PeanutAI Inc.
Seoul, South Korea
GitHub: crattack

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.4 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-vccv-cmxp-4j9h
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53606
• https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/pull/5464
• https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/5a88e9630cbbdde33154ef8abe7557ddf7be418b
• https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/releases/tag/sanitize-html@2.17.5
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vccv-cmxp-4j9h

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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Release Notes

apostrophecms/apostrophe (sanitize-html)

v2.17.5

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