This repository is the Android client. It talks to a Harmony instance over that instance's HTTP API, with the person's own token, and it holds that token and their drafts on the device.
Please do not open a public issue for a security problem. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository: Security → Advisories → Report a vulnerability. That keeps the report private until a fix ships.
Please include:
- what the issue is and what it lets an attacker do;
- steps to reproduce, or a proof of concept;
- the app version and commit, and the Android version and device;
- any mitigation you can suggest.
- The app:
app/src/main/java/lol/mony/harmony/, its manifest, resources and Gradle build. - The stored session and any secret the app keeps on the device.
- How the app handles an instance's data: rendering, links, intents, notifications and the WebView-free UI.
- The release tooling in
scripts/and the workflows in.github/workflows/, where a flaw could make a published APK be something other than what was built.
- The Harmony server. Its federation, database policies, encryption and admin surface are a different project. Report those to that project's own security contact.
- An instance's configuration. A self-hosted instance is its operator's responsibility.
- Issues that need physical access to an unlocked device, or a rooted device with the app's data already readable.
- A dependency with a published advisory that a
./gradlew dependencyUpdates-style bump fixes: open a normal issue or a pull request for the bump.
These are the properties to check a report against. If the app breaks one, that is a bug.
- No admin key. The app carries the instance's public anon key and the signed-in person's token. It never holds a service-role or admin key.
- The session is sealed. The access and refresh tokens are encrypted with a key in the
Android Keystore, in a file excluded from backup (
allowBackup="false"and the data extraction rules). Signing out clears them. - Row-level security is the instance's. The app never reports a write the instance rejected as a success, and it does not cache around a denial.
- Cleartext is loopback only. The network security config permits cleartext to the emulator's host gateway for local testing; anything else requires HTTPS.
- A notification carries a destination, not a URL. A tapped notification opens a screen the app itself named; the intent carries no arbitrary link to follow.
- No third-party typeface or script is loaded. The app draws with the device's own face and does not execute instance-supplied code, CSS or HTML.
Stated plainly so a report is not spent on it:
- End-to-end encryption is not implemented. The app refuses to pretend it has it: an encrypted channel is not silently sent plaintext, but the app also cannot read or write one. See docs/parity-audit.md (B03, B04).
- Push is not implemented. There is no FCM or UnifiedPush integration, so there is no push token on the device.
- Attachment uploads are not implemented. The app does not send a file anywhere.
Please coordinate disclosure through the private vulnerability report. Reporters who follow this policy are credited in the advisory and in the commit that fixes it, unless they prefer to stay anonymous.
The app is free software under the GNU GPL v3 or later; see LICENSE. A security report is not affected by the licence, and reporting one does not license your work to us.