What happened?
create_signature_verifier's verification loop (src/a2a/utils/signing.py:139-159) only catches PyJWTError:
for agent_card_signature in agent_card.signatures:
try:
protected_header_json = base64url_decode(
agent_card_signature.protected.encode('utf-8')
).decode('utf-8') # may raise binascii.Error / UnicodeDecodeError
protected_header = json.loads(protected_header_json) # may raise JSONDecodeError
...
verification_key = key_provider(kid, jku) # may raise anything (e.g. network errors)
jwt.decode(...)
break
except PyJWTError:
continue
agent_card_signature.protected is an attacker-controlled field. A malformed value makes base64url_decode raise a raw binascii.Error, which escapes the verifier entirely — violating the module's own contract: the canonicalization step just above explicitly converts failures to InvalidSignaturesError "so every failure on this path is a SignatureVerificationError", but the per-signature loop does not.
It also breaks the documented multi-signature semantic ("succeeds if at least one signature is valid"): a card holding [malformed_signature, valid_signature] raises instead of verifying.
Additionally, any exception raised by key_provider (e.g. a network failure while fetching the JKU) aborts the whole loop for the same reason.
Reproduction
from a2a.types.a2a_pb2 import AgentCard, AgentCardSignature
from a2a.utils.signing import (
SignatureVerificationError,
create_signature_verifier,
)
verifier = create_signature_verifier(
key_provider=lambda kid, jku: b'dummy-key',
algorithms=['RS256'],
)
card = AgentCard(
name='t',
version='1.0',
signatures=[
AgentCardSignature(protected='!!!not-base64url!!!', signature='aaa')
],
)
try:
verifier(card)
except SignatureVerificationError as e:
print(f'contract respected: {type(e).__name__}: {e}')
except Exception as e:
print(f'CONTRACT BROKEN -> {type(e).__name__}: {e}')
Observed output:
CONTRACT BROKEN -> Error: Invalid base64-encoded string: number of data characters (13) cannot be 1 more than a multiple of 4
Expected behavior
Every failure on the verification path should surface as SignatureVerificationError (per the contract established at signing.py:124-128), and a malformed signature should count as "invalid" so remaining signatures are still attempted.
Suggested fix
Widen the per-signature except clause, e.g.:
except (PyJWTError, ValueError, binascii.Error, UnicodeDecodeError):
continue
or wrap the loop body so parse/key-provider failures are logged and treated as an invalid signature. This is non-breaking for correct inputs and only converts escapes into the documented error type.
Happy to submit a PR with tests.
Code of Conduct
What happened?
create_signature_verifier's verification loop (src/a2a/utils/signing.py:139-159) only catchesPyJWTError:agent_card_signature.protectedis an attacker-controlled field. A malformed value makesbase64url_decoderaise a rawbinascii.Error, which escapes the verifier entirely — violating the module's own contract: the canonicalization step just above explicitly converts failures toInvalidSignaturesError"so every failure on this path is a SignatureVerificationError", but the per-signature loop does not.It also breaks the documented multi-signature semantic ("succeeds if at least one signature is valid"): a card holding
[malformed_signature, valid_signature]raises instead of verifying.Additionally, any exception raised by
key_provider(e.g. a network failure while fetching the JKU) aborts the whole loop for the same reason.Reproduction
Observed output:
Expected behavior
Every failure on the verification path should surface as
SignatureVerificationError(per the contract established atsigning.py:124-128), and a malformed signature should count as "invalid" so remaining signatures are still attempted.Suggested fix
Widen the per-signature
exceptclause, e.g.:or wrap the loop body so parse/key-provider failures are logged and treated as an invalid signature. This is non-breaking for correct inputs and only converts escapes into the documented error type.
Happy to submit a PR with tests.
Code of Conduct