This document states trust boundaries for running attack-macOS maintainer tooling in pipelines, labs, or integrations, and separates controls implemented in this repository from controls expected in the deployment environment.

The project owner and contributors disclaim responsibility for misuse of any script, YAML procedure, builder output, or documentation in this repository—including unauthorized access to systems, violation of law, or breach of policy.

Use this project only in environments you control or where you have explicit, documented authorization. A short public notice also appears in the root README.md under Disclaimer (authorized use only).

1. The organization operating the tooling controls access to the repository checkout (clone integrity, branch protection, and review before merge).
2. Pipeline and lab hosts are patched, least-privilege accounts are used for jobs, and network egress is restricted according to organizational policy.
3. Operators who invoke cicd/ fetch or convert commands are authorized for those actions within their environment.
4. Maintainer Python applies CLI input checks documented in docs/CICD/python_cli_security.md and cicd/validate_input.py where wired; those checks reduce misuse of URLs and path tokens but do not replace host-level integrity controls.

Security teams, DevOps engineers, and auditors evaluating how attack-macOS should run in controlled environments.

In scope: repository-supplied maintainer scripts, documented CLI safety expectations, and deployment assumptions for integrity and isolation.

Out of scope: Organizational SOC2, ISO, or incident-response programs; configuration of specific commercial CI products.

• cicd/validate_input.py and related patterns restrict URL schemes and token shapes for selected maintainer CLIs.
• docs/CICD/python_cli_security.md documents expectations (for example, avoiding shell=True with user-controlled strings).

• Checkout integrity and protected branches.
• Runner or container isolation, secrets management, and egress rules for steps that fetch third-party content (Atomic Red Team, LOOBins, and similar).
• Identity and access management for operators and service accounts.

Many teams run CI steps in containers or ephemeral VMs with read-only roots and network policies. Runtime choice (for example Docker, Kubernetes, or containerd-backed stacks) is an organizational decision.

• Projects that vendor or repackage this repository may impose additional controls not listed here.

• README.md — public disclaimer and credits.
• docs/CICD/python_cli_security.md
• docs/Shipped_procedures_upstream_sources_and_maintainer_scripts.md
• docs/Standards/README.md
• cicd/README.md

Last modified: 2026-05-15
Last modified by: Documentation maintainers
Version: 1.2.0