Report privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting:
Report a vulnerability — or the Security tab → Report a vulnerability.
Do not open a public issue for a security report. Do not post it in Discord.
Include what you have: affected version (rekal version), platform, the
commands or config that trigger it, and what an attacker gains. A reproduction
is welcome but not required to file.
What to expect: acknowledgement within 3 business days, an assessment within 10, and a fix released before public disclosure. We will credit you in the advisory unless you ask us not to.
Only the latest release receives security fixes. Unreleased main is a development target, not a published security release. Upgrade before reporting against an older tag.
Rekal requires no hosted memory service or account and does not collect usage telemetry. Default capture and embeddings run locally. Git push/sync transfer eligible records through the configured Git remote. Release-update checks contact GitHub without sending conversation text. Opt-in HTTP embeddings send source text to the explicitly configured endpoint; that endpoint's handling is outside the local-only default.
Repository memory notes on unreleased main follow the same redaction and export
gate as conversations. Explicit local note sources stay in index.db and never
enter the ledger or wire. The gate concerns commit ancestry, not the semantic
sensitivity of a note: a note associated with a merged commit may still mention
private or unrelated work. See native memory.
Important attack surfaces include parsing untrusted records, protecting local files and preventing material intended to stay local from reaching the wire.
Report these. Severity is roughly in this order.
The orphan branch is pushed to a remote your whole team can read, and the wire format is append-only. Anything that reaches it is durable and distributed.
- Redaction failure.
scrub/misses a secret, credential, or token in a transcript and it lands indata.dband then on the branch. Highest severity — a leaked secret here is both shared and hard to retract. - Path anonymization failure. Local filesystem paths that should be anonymized survive into the wire frame.
- Merged-only gate bypass.
transport.filterMergedexports a checkpoint whose commit never merged to the default branch — unmerged or abandoned work reaching teammates. See docs/design/merged-only-sharing.md. - Cross-repo leakage. Sessions folded in by
local_import.goare index-only and structurally unpushable. A path that lets imported material reachdata.dbwould put other repositories' conversations on this repo's shared branch. - Local-note leakage. Explicit local memory sources reaching
data.db, checkpoint revisions or wire frames. Local note search must remain index-only. - Local-only records reaching the wire.
recall_edges,checkpoint_stateandmerge_gate_cacheare deliberately never wired.recall_edgesholds query text and access patterns; exporting it would publish what each developer searched for. - Config on the wire.
.rekal/config.jsonand~/.config/rekal/config.jsonare gitignored and local-only. They may hold an API key. Anything that commits, pushes, or syncs them is a vulnerability.
- An API key from the
embeddingconfig (including$VARexpansion andapi_key_env) appearing indata.db, a wire frame, a log,--explainoutput, or scoring-lineage NDJSON. - The opt-in HTTP embedding backend sending text anywhere when it has not been explicitly configured. Sending to a configured endpoint is the documented behavior of that opt-in; sending without configuration is a bug and a leak.
- Malicious wire frames.
rekal syncdecodes frames authored by whoever can push to the remote. Decompression bombs, allocation blowups, or memory unsafety incodec/decode paths are in scope. - Malicious transcripts. Session adapters parse JSON and JSONL written by agent tooling. Crashes are low severity; anything reaching outside the parse (file writes, path traversal on discovery, command execution) is not.
- Path traversal anywhere a stored path is used to read or write.
- Anything that writes to
data.dboutside the append-only path, or mutates a row already written. The ledger's immutability is a correctness property, and breaking it breaks the basis for trusting the record. - Insecure permissions or predictable paths on
.rekal/state —daemon.lock,embed.lock,recall-log.ndjson,embed-cache.db— that let another local user read or poison a store. - Anything that causes
rekal initto write outside the repository and~/.config/rekal/, orrekal cleanto leave credentials behind.
- Recall quality. Missing, irrelevant, or wrongly ranked results are bugs, not vulnerabilities. Open an issue.
- An agent acting on recalled content. Rekal returns your team's own past conversations. Deciding what to do with them belongs to the agent and its operator.
- Secrets already in your git history. Rekal captures conversations, not your repository's existing contents.
rekal query --sql. It executes SQL you supply against your own local index by design. That is the feature.- Requiring local machine access. An attacker who can already read your
filesystem can read
.rekal/the same as your source.
Be direct about the sequence, because immutability makes the usual instinct the wrong one:
- Rotate the credential first. Assume it is compromised. Everyone who fetched the branch has a copy, and no history rewrite changes that.
- Then clean the branch. The
rekal/<email>orphan branch is an ordinary git branch — it can be rewritten or deleted and force-pushed. Append-only is a guarantee of the wire format, not a technical bar to deleting a branch. Rewriting it is an exceptional remedy, not a routine operation. - Report the redaction gap through the process above, so the miss is fixed for everyone rather than for one store.
This policy covers the rekal binary and this repository, including the
setup-only Claude Code plugin under plugin/. Vulnerabilities in dependencies
(DuckDB, llama.cpp, the Go toolchain) should be reported upstream; tell us too
if Rekal's usage makes them exploitable in a way the upstream advisory does not
cover.