Reflex is development tooling. Its trust model:
- macOS/Linux sessions listen on a Unix socket readable only by their owner (
0600, in a directory that must be0700). Anyone who can open it can drive the app. - Windows sessions use mutually authenticated, encrypted named pipes. A fresh 32-byte session secret is stored in REFLEX_DIR with a checked ACL allowing only the current user, SYSTEM and Administrators. Existing shared storage is refused, wherever REFLEX_DIR is located; user-profile placement alone is not a guarantee. Trusted ancestors are required. Other users cannot read or originate authenticated frames without the secret; they may deny service. Same-user processes, administrators and SYSTEM, and principals with OS impersonation/debug/backup privileges are trusted. The Node-compatible API cannot set a client impersonation level; authentication does not contain a privileged malicious pipe server. See ADR 0012 for the exact ACL, handshake, encryption and threat model. Windows mode bits are not used as access control.
- The device bridge listens on loopback unless
--hostsays otherwise, and admits an app only with the 32-byte token in.reflex/device.token. Traffic is plainws://: binding to a network interface exposes it to that network. Apps must load the bridge only in development builds, behind__DEV__, asapps/mobile/app/_layout.tsxdoes; production builds then contain neither the bridge nor the token. - The MCP server runs only when started, over stdio, and opens no listener. A client
given its tools can run any action the app exposes, unless the server was started with
a narrower
--access. - Access policies. A connection can be limited to observing, or to named actions
(ADR 0013). Sessions enforce a connection's
accessoption themselves. The CLI's--accessand the MCP server's are guards for the process that runs them, not boundaries: anything that can open the session's socket can connect with full control. To hold an agent to a policy, give it the MCP server and not a shell.
Please report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting rather than in a public issue.