devpi-process is a Python library that starts a throwaway devpi server, creates indexes on it, and uploads packages, for use in tests. This policy says how to report a security problem and how we decide whether a report is one.

Do not open a public issue for a security problem. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting. If you do not have a GitHub account, or you are a Tidelift subscriber, report through the Tidelift security contact instead; Tidelift coordinates the fix and the disclosure with us. If neither works for you, email gaborjbernat@gmail.com.

Include what the attacker controls and what they gain, the steps or a proof of concept, and the versions and platform you tested. Write the report yourself; unreviewed tool or model output takes longer to triage.

Volunteers maintain devpi-process, with no on-call rotation. We aim to acknowledge a report within 5 working days and assess it within 15 working days. Fixes are developed in a private fork attached to the draft advisory, ship in a new release, and the advisory, with a CVE requested through GitHub, goes out with that release. The default embargo is 90 days from the report; we agree any change with the reporter. We credit reporters in the advisory under the name they choose, or not at all. There is no bug bounty.

Only the latest release receives fixes. Confirm the problem reproduces on it before reporting.

A report is a vulnerability when an attacker who controls only an input that the threat model lists as untrusted breaks a guarantee devpi-process makes. A report that first needs control of something the threat model trusts, such as the test code that drives it or the devpi tools it runs, is a bug: we fix it in the open and publish no advisory. Classify by who supplies the dangerous input, not by how bad the outcome sounds.

In scope

• devpi-process starting the server on an interface other than localhost when the caller passes no start_args.
• devpi-process running a program other than the devpi-init, devpi-server and devpi in the interpreter's scripts directory, or passing caller data to them as anything but separate arguments.
• Server data written outside the directory the caller passed.

Out of scope

• Using devpi-process as a production package index: it is a test helper.
• Other local users reaching the server's port or reading its command line on a shared machine (see accepted risks).
• Vulnerabilities in devpi itself; report them to devpi.

If you cannot tell which side a finding falls on, report it privately and we will decide.