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fix: Bedrock proxy env, Bedrock guardrail 4xx tag, caller-refusal error class, chat audio tokens - #1328
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The smithy HTTP client Bedrock runs on defaults to no proxy, so Bedrock runtime calls, the Bedrock guardrail's ApplyGuardrail and the STS / credential-chain calls made on that client connected directly while every reqwest-based upstream client honoured HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY / ALL_PROXY / NO_PROXY. The shared AWS client now reads the same variables through the same hyper-util matcher reqwest uses.
AccessDeniedException, ValidationException, ResourceNotFoundException and any other non-429 4xx from ApplyGuardrail were bucketed as bedrock_5xx, the tag for a server-side or transport failure. They now record bedrock_config_error, like every other remote guardrail kind's _config_error; 5xx and transport failures stay bedrock_5xx and a 429 is bedrock_throttled.
…lid_request_error BridgeError::InvalidRequest and BridgeError::RequestTooLarge recorded error_class / error_kind invalid_config, the class for a target that is configured in a way that cannot work. They now record invalid_request_error, the class the gateway's own refusals of a request already record and the error.type the caller is sent. InvalidUpstreamConfig stays invalid_config.
The chat renderer dropped prompt_tokens_details.audio_tokens and completion_tokens_details.audio_tokens although the usage record kept them. Both are now emitted, on the non-streamed body and the stream's usage chunk, exactly when the upstream reported them.
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| Check name | Status | Explanation | Resolution |
|---|---|---|---|
| E2e Test Quality Review |  |
The standing E2E coverage failure remains unresolved. The new chat test uses ZERO_USAGE with unrelated zero counters (cached_tokens, reasoning_tokens, and prediction counters) and only asserts b… |
Add separate streamed and non-streamed audio-only-zero fixtures. Assert the exact rendered detail objects, including omission of cached_tokens when audio is the only detail. Add a Bedrock guardrail 429 ThrottlingException scenario and a… |
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Check name Status Explanation Description Check Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled. Title check The title clearly identifies the four primary fixes addressed by the pull request: Bedrock proxy handling, guardrail 4xx tagging, caller refusal classification, and chat audio tokens. Linked Issues check Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. Out of Scope Changes check Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. Security Check No security-check failure is introduced by the reviewed diff. (1) No new logging or response path exposes API keys, tokens, headers, or credential objects; AWS auth Debug remains redacted, and the new… Full details: Security Check
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Explanation
No security-check failure is introduced by the reviewed diff. (1) No new logging or response path exposes API keys, tokens, headers, or credential objects; AWS auth Debug remains redacted, and the new guardrail logs retain existing SDK error detail behavior. (2) No database persistence changes. (3) No mutating endpoint or permission-check changes. (4) No cross-resource access changes. (5) AWS TLS keeps certificate verification enabled by default and uses the existing trust-store path; proxy routing does not disable verification. (6) No shared-resource deletion or isolation changes. (7) No $env:// or $secret:// reference handling changes. The credential endpoint bypass is limited to the AWS credential-chain client, while Bedrock and STS use the environment-proxied client in crates/aisix-gateway/src/upstream_tls.rs and crates/aisix-gateway/src/aws_auth.rs.
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Full details: E2e Test Quality Review
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Explanation
The standing E2E coverage failure remains unresolved. The new chat test uses
ZERO_USAGEwith unrelated zero counters (cached_tokens,reasoning_tokens, and prediction counters) and only asserts both detail objects are absent; it does not cover audio-onlyaudio_tokens: 0or assert thatcached_tokensis omitted when an audio-only detail object exists. The new Bedrock guardrail test covers 400, 403, 404, and 500, but no 429ThrottlingExceptioncase. Therefore it does not verifybedrock_throttledor zerobedrock_5xxandbedrock_config_errordeltas.Resolution
Add separate streamed and non-streamed audio-only-zero fixtures. Assert the exact rendered detail objects, including omission of
cached_tokenswhen audio is the only detail. Add a Bedrock guardrail 429ThrottlingExceptionscenario and assert exactly onebedrock_throttledbypass with zerobedrock_5xxandbedrock_config_errordeltas.
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Review comments at @tests/e2e/src/cases/bedrock-env-proxy-e2e.test.ts:
- Around line 225-240: Move the envproxy guardrail creation into beforeAll
before seed.createApiKey, relying on the existing /v1/models readiness gate for
propagation. In the test around chat("envproxy-direct"), make one request and
assert its status, guardrail!.paths.length, and proxy!.seen directly instead of
polling with waitConfigPropagation; leave the other tests unchanged.
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📒 Files selected for processing: 9
crates/aisix-gateway/src/bridge.rscrates/aisix-gateway/src/upstream_tls.rscrates/aisix-guardrails/src/bedrock.rscrates/aisix-proxy/src/attempt.rscrates/aisix-proxy/src/render.rstests/e2e/src/cases/bedrock-env-proxy-e2e.test.tstests/e2e/src/cases/bedrock-guardrail-failure-tag-e2e.test.tstests/e2e/src/cases/caller-shape-refusal-message-e2e.test.tstests/e2e/src/cases/chat-usage-audio-tokens-e2e.test.ts
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…_config_error A role the gateway may not assume, or a default chain with no credentials, fails before ApplyGuardrail is signed and surfaced as bedrock_5xx. The credential provider's own verdict is now read from the error's source chain, the same two variants the provider bridge treats as a credential problem.
OpenAI reports audio_tokens: 0 on every text request, which added a details object missing cached_tokens / reasoning_tokens to responses that never carried one. Audio counts are emitted only when non-zero, like the cache and reasoning counters, and an emitted details object always carries cached_tokens and reasoning_tokens as OpenAI sends them.
EC2 instance metadata (169.254.169.254, fd00:ec2::254), ECS task credentials (169.254.170.2) and EKS Pod Identity (169.254.170.23) are only reachable from the host, and were always reached directly before the AWS client honoured the proxy environment. The shared AWS client now routes a request for one of them through a never-proxied client and everything else -- Bedrock runtime, the Bedrock guardrail, every STS call -- through the proxy environment, so no NO_PROXY change is needed on upgrade.
…t is configured The always-direct set gains the EKS Pod Identity IPv6 endpoint [fd00:ec2::23]. Loopback hosts (a local credential agent named by AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_FULL_URI) and the configured FULL_URI host go direct too, and the default chain's instance-metadata client is built on the never-proxied client outright, so a custom IMDS endpoint (AWS_EC2_METADATA_SERVICE_ENDPOINT, the profile's ec2_metadata_service_endpoint, or the IPv6 endpoint mode) is direct however aws-config resolves it. STS, Bedrock runtime and guardrail calls still follow the proxy environment. The integration test now drives the production credential path: a custom IMDS endpoint on this machine's own address and a loopback credential agent are reached directly while a proxy is set, and the chain's STS call goes through the proxy. The bedrock proxy e2e mocks move off loopback, which the AWS client now always reaches directly.
The Bedrock provider bridge and the Bedrock guardrail both read a missing or refused credential as the configuration's to fix; they now share aws_auth::credentials_refused so the two cannot drift.
…l chain The always-direct routing now applies only to the client the default credential chain is built on; Bedrock runtime, the guardrail and the gateway's own STS calls use the plain proxy-environment client again, so a loopback Bedrock endpoint is proxied or not by NO_PROXY exactly as a reqwest upstream is. The hand-built chain reads the FIPS and dual-stack settings the loader used to pass it, and a profile's credential_source = Ec2InstanceMetadata uses the never-proxied instance-metadata client too. The integration test covers the chain's web-identity and profile-role STS calls through the proxy and the profile's metadata call reached directly; the source scan now requires the chain and the IMDS client to be built on their clients; the bedrock proxy e2e returns to loopback mocks with a NO_PROXY case.
Four gateway defects the 1.7.0 release QA turned up, one commit each.
Bedrock now goes through the proxy environment, except the link-local credential endpoints. The AWS SDK HTTP client that Bedrock runs on defaults to no proxy. So Bedrock runtime calls, the Bedrock guardrail's ApplyGuardrail, and the STS calls made on that client all connected directly. Meanwhile every reqwest-based upstream client, and media fetch since #1327, honoured
HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY/ALL_PROXY/NO_PROXY.upstream_tls::aws_http_clientnow builds its connector with the smithyProxyConfig::from_env(), which reads those variables through the same hyper-util matcher reqwest uses. A host is therefore proxied or not the same way on both stacks, with the sameNO_PROXYrules.The exception is what the default credential chain sends to its own credential endpoints. That traffic is always direct, whatever the proxy variables say, exactly as in 1.6.0, so a deployment needs no
NO_PROXYedit on upgrade. The chain is built on its own client,upstream_tls::aws_credential_chain_http_client, which shares the proxied client's pool. That client sends three kinds of request directly:169.254.169.254and[fd00:ec2::254], ECS task credentials169.254.170.2, and EKS Pod Identity169.254.170.23and[fd00:ec2::23].127.0.0.0/8,[::1],localhost), which is where a local credential agent named byAWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_FULL_URIlistens, and the host of that URI.credential_source = Ec2InstanceMetadatauses, is built on the never-proxied client outright, so a custom endpoint (AWS_EC2_METADATA_SERVICE_ENDPOINT, the profile'sec2_metadata_service_endpoint, or the IPv6 endpoint mode) is direct however aws-config resolves it.The chain's own STS calls (web identity, SSO, a profile role) name none of those hosts and stay on the proxy. Bedrock runtime, the guardrail and the gateway's AssumeRole use the plain proxy-environment client, so on those calls a loopback host is proxied or not by
NO_PROXY, exactly as it is for a reqwest upstream. The chain used to be built by the SDK config loader; it is now built by hand so it can take these clients, and it reads the FIPS and dual-stack settings the loader used to pass it.The smithy proxy setting cannot add hosts to the environment's
NO_PROXY: an environment config ignores.no_proxy(..), and an explicit config carries a single proxy URL. So the chain's client is a smallHttpClientbuilt only on the publicaws-smithy-runtime-apitraits, which routes by host between the proxied smithy client and a never-proxied one. Each inner client keeps its own per-settings connector cache, built withBuilder::build_with_connector_fnbecause the client-level builder has no proxy setting. A source scan requires the chain and the IMDS client to be built on their clients. Credential refusals are now classified by one shared helper,aws_auth::credentials_refused, which both the provider bridge and the guardrail call.Over an HTTPS proxy tunnel, the SDK's HTTP/1 client sends the absolute-form request target inside the tunnel. Servers must accept that form (RFC 9112 §3.2.2), and a live Bedrock Converse call through a CONNECT proxy succeeded with it, both streamed and not.
A Bedrock guardrail's non-429 4xx is now
bedrock_config_error.AccessDeniedException,ValidationException,ResourceNotFoundExceptionand every other non-429 4xx from ApplyGuardrail used to be taggedbedrock_5xx, the tag for a server-side or transport failure. They are now taggedbedrock_config_error, the same as the other remote kinds'_config_error. The same tag covers credentials the provider chain reports as missing or refused before the call is signed, for example arole_arnthat STS will not let the gateway assume or a default chain with no credentials. 5xx and transport failures staybedrock_5xx. A 429 is nowbedrock_throttledwhatever its exception name. A payload AWS refuses for its size is stillbedrock_too_large. The new tag appears inguardrail_bypassed_reason, inaisix_guardrail_bypasses_total{reason}, in theerror_typelabel ofaisix_guardrail_latency_seconds, in the fail-closed refusal message (bedrock unavailable (bedrock_config_error)), and in the failure log'sfailure_tag. Gateways at 1.6.x and earlier report these failures asbedrock_5xx.A bridge's refusal of the caller's request is now classed
invalid_request_error.BridgeError::InvalidRequest(a request shape the provider's translation cannot express) andBridgeError::RequestTooLarge(the body plus downloaded media overproxy.request_body_limit_bytes) used to recorderror_class/error_kindinvalid_config. That class means the target is configured in a way that cannot work. They now recordinvalid_request_error, which is the class the gateway's own refusals of a request already record and theerror.typethe caller is sent.InvalidUpstreamConfigstaysinvalid_config, and the client-facingerror.typedoes not change. Every record goes throughattempt::routing_error_class/attempt::error_class, so the access log, the per-attempt and terminal usage events, and the exporters (OTLPaisix.error_class, SLS, Datadog) all change together. These refusals are raised before the upstream is reached, so they never fed theaisix_deployment_*families. Upgrade impact: on 1.6.x these refusals wereinvalid_config. A dashboard or alert keyed oninvalid_configstops seeing them and should matchinvalid_request_error.Chat responses carry the upstream's audio-token counts. The UsageEvent already kept
prompt_tokens_details.audio_tokens/completion_tokens_details.audio_tokens, but the chat renderer dropped them. They are now emitted under OpenAI's names, on the non-streamed body and on the stream's usage chunk, whenever the upstream reported a non-zero count. Zeros are left out, the same rule the cache and reasoning counters already follow. OpenAI reportsaudio_tokens: 0on every text request, so emitting zeros would add a details object to responses that have never carried one. Whenever a details object is emitted, it carriescached_tokens/reasoning_tokensthe way OpenAI sends them. A text-only response is therefore byte-for-byte unchanged. The other renderers that re-render usage are the Responses bridge, Anthropic Messages and Decisions. Their wire shapes have no audio-token field, so they are unchanged. Passthrough and legacy/v1/completionsrelay the upstream body verbatim.Tests (each fails on
mainand passes here):aws_credential_endpoints_direct(Rust integration test inaisix-gateway, through the productionaws_auth::resolve) setsHTTP_PROXYwith aNO_PROXYthat covers none of the endpoints. Each assertion fails when its mechanism is removed. It checks that:credential_sourceisEc2InstanceMetadata, and a loopback credential agent are each reached directly;This path is tested in Rust rather than e2e because a test cannot bind the fixed link-local addresses, and each configurable case needs the chain's environment set per scenario. A unit test pins the five fixed addresses, the loopback matching, and how the container-credentials URI host is read.
bedrock-env-proxy-e2e: a Bedrock runtime call overhttp://, anhttps://call tunnelled with CONNECT (private CA throughupstream.tls.ca_file), the STS AssumeRole for arole_arn, and a Bedrock guardrail call each go through a forward proxy, and a hostNO_PROXYcovers is reached directly.bedrock-guardrail-failure-tag-e2e: 403 / 400 / 404 and an STS-refused role fail open asbedrock_config_error, and a 500 staysbedrock_5xx, read fromaisix_guardrail_bypasses_total.caller-shape-refusal-message-e2e: every case now also asserts the access log'serror_kindisinvalid_request_error, across chat (streamed and not),/v1/messagesand/v1/responses, on Vertex, Bedrock and Anthropic.chat-usage-audio-tokens-e2e: reported audio counts reach the caller on the non-streamed body and the stream's usage chunk, inside the details objects OpenAI sends. No count is invented for an upstream that did not report one, and an all-zero OpenAI breakdown adds no details objects.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
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New Features
Bug Fixes