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chore(deps): update dependency vite to v7.3.7 [security] - #44
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This PR updates Vite from 7.3.1 to 7.3.7 in the dependency lockfiles and refreshes related dependency resolutions. The pnpm lock also updates Nitro and its server dependencies. 1 of 2 changed files was too large to include in full.
Fix with agent prompt### Issue 1
pnpm-lock.yaml:6535
**launch-editor 2.14.1 remains vulnerable through devtools**
This lock entry still resolves `@tanstack/devtools-bundler-core` with `launch-editor@2.14.1` (which `npm audit` flags for the Windows path/UNC advisories), even though Vite's own copy is updated. The `devtools()` plugin is enabled in `vite.config.ts:4` and its server-side `open-source` handler calls this package, so an exposed development server retains the vulnerable editor path; resolve this copy to 2.14.2 or newer as well.
### Issue 2
pnpm-lock.yaml:94
**pnpm's Vite specifier no longer matches package.json**
The root manifest still specifies `vite: ^7.1.7` (`package.json:47`), but this importer now specifies `^7.3.7`. `corepack pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` fails with `ERR_PNPM_OUTDATED_LOCKFILE`, so frozen installs using this lockfile cannot proceed until the manifest and lockfile are brought back in sync.
### Issue 3
package-lock.json:11305-11308
**npm ci cannot install the updated lockfile**
`npm ci` fails with `Missing: lru-cache@11.5.3 from lock file`, so a clean npm install cannot reproduce this dependency graph and the build/tests cannot run from it. Regenerate the npm lockfile with a complete, consistent dependency tree.
---
For each issue above, determine whether it is valid and should be fixed. If so, fix it directly.📂 Walkthrough · 2
⏳ Still open from earlier reviews · 2
Reviewed |
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Lines 11305-11308 · GitHub does not show this file's diff, so this comment is on the file.
npm ci cannot install the updated lockfile
npm ci fails with Missing: lru-cache@11.5.3 from lock file, so a clean npm install cannot reproduce this dependency graph and the build/tests cannot run from it. Regenerate the npm lockfile with a complete, consistent dependency tree.
Prompt To Fix With AI
This is a comment left during a code review.
Path: package-lock.json
Line: 11305-11308
Comment:
**npm ci cannot install the updated lockfile**
`npm ci` fails with `Missing: lru-cache@11.5.3 from lock file`, so a clean npm install cannot reproduce this dependency graph and the build/tests cannot run from it. Regenerate the npm lockfile with a complete, consistent dependency tree.
---
For each issue above, determine whether it is valid and should be fixed. If so, fix it directly.🟠 Major · error-handling · Reply if this doesn't apply.
| vite: | ||
| specifier: ^7.1.7 | ||
| version: 7.3.1(@types/node@22.19.13)(jiti@2.7.0)(lightningcss@1.33.0)(tsx@4.21.0) | ||
| specifier: ^7.3.7 |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
pnpm's Vite specifier no longer matches package.json
The root manifest still specifies vite: ^7.1.7 (package.json:47), but this importer now specifies ^7.3.7. corepack pnpm install --frozen-lockfile fails with ERR_PNPM_OUTDATED_LOCKFILE, so frozen installs using this lockfile cannot proceed until the manifest and lockfile are brought back in sync.
Prompt To Fix With AI
This is a comment left during a code review.
Path: pnpm-lock.yaml
Line: 94
Comment:
**pnpm's Vite specifier no longer matches package.json**
The root manifest still specifies `vite: ^7.1.7` (`package.json:47`), but this importer now specifies `^7.3.7`. `corepack pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` fails with `ERR_PNPM_OUTDATED_LOCKFILE`, so frozen installs using this lockfile cannot proceed until the manifest and lockfile are brought back in sync.
---
For each issue above, determine whether it is valid and should be fixed. If so, fix it directly.🟠 Major · bug · Reply if this doesn't apply.
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| '@tanstack/devtools-vite@0.8.5(vite@7.3.1(@types/node@22.19.13)(jiti@2.7.0)(lightningcss@1.33.0)(tsx@4.21.0))': | ||
| '@tanstack/devtools-vite@0.8.5(vite@7.3.7(@types/node@22.19.13)(jiti@2.7.0)(lightningcss@1.33.0)(tsx@4.21.0))': |
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launch-editor 2.14.1 remains vulnerable through devtools
This lock entry still resolves @tanstack/devtools-bundler-core with launch-editor@2.14.1 (which npm audit flags for the Windows path/UNC advisories), even though Vite's own copy is updated. The devtools() plugin is enabled in vite.config.ts:4 and its server-side open-source handler calls this package, so an exposed development server retains the vulnerable editor path; resolve this copy to 2.14.2 or newer as well.
Prompt To Fix With AI
This is a comment left during a code review.
Path: pnpm-lock.yaml
Line: 6535
Comment:
**launch-editor 2.14.1 remains vulnerable through devtools**
This lock entry still resolves `@tanstack/devtools-bundler-core` with `launch-editor@2.14.1` (which `npm audit` flags for the Windows path/UNC advisories), even though Vite's own copy is updated. The `devtools()` plugin is enabled in `vite.config.ts:4` and its server-side `open-source` handler calls this package, so an exposed development server retains the vulnerable editor path; resolve this copy to 2.14.2 or newer as well.
---
For each issue above, determine whether it is valid and should be fixed. If so, fix it directly.🟡 Minor · security · Reply if this doesn't apply.
|
Superseded by #49. |
This PR contains the following updates:
7.3.1→7.3.7Vite Vulnerable to Path Traversal in Optimized Deps
.mapHandlingCVE-2026-39365 / GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9
More information
Details
Summary
Any files ending with
.mapeven out side the project can be returned to the browser.Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
--hostorserver.hostconfig option).mapand the path is predictableDetails
In Vite v7.3.1, the dev server’s handling of
.maprequests for optimized dependencies resolves file paths and callsreadFilewithout restricting../segments in the URL. As a result, it is possible to bypass theserver.fs.strictallow list and retrieve.mapfiles located outside the project root, provided they can be parsed as valid source map JSON.PoC
/@fsaccess is blocked bystrict(returns 403)../segments under the optimized deps.mapURL prefix to reach/tmp/poc.mapSeverity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Vite Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read via Vite Dev Server WebSocket
CVE-2026-39363 / GHSA-p9ff-h696-f583
More information
Details
Summary
server.fscheck was not enforced to thefetchModulemethod that is exposed in Vite dev server's WebSocket.Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
--hostorserver.hostconfig option)server.ws: falseArbitrary files on the server (development machine, CI environment, container, etc.) can be exposed.
Details
If it is possible to connect to the Vite dev server’s WebSocket without an
Originheader, an attacker can invokefetchModulevia the custom WebSocket eventvite:invokeand combinefile://...with?raw(or?inline) to retrieve the contents of arbitrary files on the server as a JavaScript string (e.g.,export default "...").The access control enforced in the HTTP request path (such as
server.fs.allow) is not applied to this WebSocket-based execution path.PoC
Start the dev server on the target
Example (used during validation with this repository):
pnpm -C playground/alias exec vite --host 0.0.0.0 --port 5173Confirm that access is blocked via the HTTP path (example: arbitrary file)
curl -i 'http://localhost:5173/@fs/etc/passwd?raw'Result:

403 Restricted(outside the allow list)Confirm that the same file can be retrieved via the WebSocket path
By connecting to the HMR WebSocket without an
Originheader and sending avite:invokerequest that callsfetchModulewith afile://...URL and?raw, the file contents are returned as a JavaScript module.Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Vite:
server.fs.denybypassed with queriesCVE-2026-39364 / GHSA-v2wj-q39q-566r
More information
Details
Summary
The contents of files that are specified by
server.fs.denycan be returned to the browser.Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
--hostorserver.hostconfig option)server.fs.allowserver.fs.denyDetails
On the Vite dev server, files that should be blocked by
server.fs.deny(e.g.,.env,*.crt) can be retrieved with HTTP 200 responses when query parameters such as?raw,?import&raw, or?import&url&inlineare appended.PoC
pnpm exec vite root --host 127.0.0.1 --port 5175 --strictPortserver.fs.denyis enforced (expect 403):curl -i http://127.0.0.1:5175/src/.env | head -n 20Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
vite:
server.fs.denybypass on Windows alternate pathsCVE-2026-53571 / GHSA-fx2h-pf6j-xcff
More information
Details
Summary
The contents of files that are specified by
server.fs.denycan be returned to the browser on Windows.Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
--hostorserver.hostconfig option)server.fs.allowDetails
Vite’s dev server denies direct access to sensitive files through
server.fs.deny, including entries such as.env,.env.*, and*.{crt,pem}. However, on Windows, the deny logic does not correctly normalize NTFS ADS path forms before access checks are applied.Because of this, requests such as
/.env::$DATA?raware treated as allowed paths, while Windows resolves them to the original file's default data stream.Similar to that, Windows allows accessing a file using a different name with the 8.3 short name compatibility feature. Vite did not reject accessing files via them.
PoC
$ npm create vite@latest $ cd vite-project/ $ npm install $ npm run devAccess via browser at

http://localhost:5173/.env::$DATA?rawExample expected result:
/.env::$DATA?rawreturns the contents of.env/tls.pem::$DATA?rawreturns the contents oftls.pemSeverity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
launch-editor: NTLMv2 hash disclosure via UNC path handling on Windows
CVE-2026-53632 / GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3
More information
Details
Summary
The
launch-editorNPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking.Impact
If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the
launch-editor:launch-editorlaunch-editoris runningThis would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems.
Details
launch-editoraccepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as:On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur.
If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password.
The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using
launch-editorto develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash.PoC
From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used Impacket's smbserver.py, but you could use something like Responder for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use
smbserver.pyhere.First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share.
Then, start the SMB server.
Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally (
vite).Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use
curlto achieve the same.Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of
smbserver.pyand see the NTLMv2 hash coming in.Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:HReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
launch-editor:
fs.existsSync()existence check can be bypassed on WindowsCVE-2026-112942 / GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm
More information
Details
Summary
launch-editorcheckedfs.existsSync(fileName)before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in\\..:line:column. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.Combined with the
%escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.Impact
Only apps that runs on Windows is affected.
Details
The earlier advisory assumed that
fs.existsSync()required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.A crafted value ending in
\\..:1:1is interpreted differently bylaunch-editor-middleware,launch-editor, and Windows:launch-editor-middlewarecallspath.resolve()while the final path component is..:1:1, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.launch-editortreats:1:1as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in\\...fs.existsSync()accepts the resulting path as the existing parent directory even though the attacker-controlled preceding component does not exist.Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows
CVE-2026-112943 / GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv
More information
Details
Summary
launch-editordid not escape%on Windows when passing an argument tocmd. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.Impact
Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:
&or%Details
Unlike
.shfiles,.bat/.cmdfiles on Windows cannot be called directly usingchild_process.spawnand requires passing them as an argument ofcmd.exe. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed tocmd.exe. Butlaunch-editordid not escape%which is used for environment variables.Because
launch-editorchecks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.&calc.exeto%ENV%) and calllaunchEditorwithsomething%ENV%.~-38%calc.exe), they can calllaunchEditorwithsomething %CMDCMDLINE:~-38%calc.exe.%CD%and the subcommand (e.g.&calc.exe), they can calllaunchEditorwith./%CD%Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Vite: Cross origin script execution through Vite custom middleware
CVE-2026-112945 / GHSA-9jrq-w75r-8gcw
More information
Details
Summary
When accessing a malicious site while a dev server using Vite is running, that site was able to load scripts in a page served by the dev server.
Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
server.transformIndexHtml: this is normally used forserver.middlewareMode: trueorappType: 'custom'. The internal call forappType: 'spa'andappType: 'mpa'does not match this.Details
Vite's SSR guide for 8.2.1 documents the affected setup. The application embeds Vite in middleware mode, reads trusted HTML, and passes the browser's unchanged request URL to the transform:
For a development server at
http://localhost:5173, an attacker can send this URL:In Vite 8.2.1,
createDevHtmlTransformFnandgetHtmlFilenameinindexHtml.tsuse the request URL as both the transformpathand the input topath.join. The value passed topath.joinstill includes its query text.Chromium preserves
/../../package.jsonbecause it follows?and is therefore query text. Vite treats the same characters as filesystem path components, so the..components resolve the derived filename to the existing projectpackage.json.The existing file branch in
indexHtml.tschecks that filename withfs.existsSync, then preserves thehtmlPathsupplied by the attacker asproxyModuleUrl. The inline module rewrite in the same file writes that value into the generatedsrc:The generated value is a valid URL. Its leading
//tells the browser to request the module fromevil.exampleusing the Vite page's scheme. The attacker returns JavaScript for that request, and Chromium executes it in the Vite page.PoC
Observed output on Vite 8.2.1:
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors
CVE-2026-112944 / GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxw
More information
Details
Summary
launch-editorforwarded file paths directly to editors without sanitization. If a path resembles a CLI flag, editors like Vim may interpret it as a command, potentially causing unintended file overwrites or command execution.Impact
Direct
launch-editorusersOnly apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:
+or-in the working directorylaunchEditorcan start with+or-or the user is using WSLlaunch-editor-middlewareusersOnly apps that match the following conditions are affected:
+or-in the working directoryVite users
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
+or-in the working directoryDetails
launchEditor(file)function passes the file name as-is to the editor if the file with that file name exists. If the file name starts with-(also+for Vim), the editor treats them as flags rather than positional arguments. For example, Vim treats arguments starting with+as an Ex command. As a result, an existing relative directory such as:is not treated as a filename when passed to Vim. Vim executes the embedded Ex command.
The following editor has a potentially destructive operation exposed to the CLI arguments:
launch-editor-middlewarev2.2.0+ converts the passed file path to an absolute path so those are not affected as long as the user is not using WSL. For WSL,launch-editorconverts the paths to relative paths internally, so those are still affected.Vite 2.0.0+ uses
launch-editor-middlewarev2.2.0+ so the WSL users are only affected.Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Vite: Files outside
server.fs.allowcould be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machineCVE-2026-112946 / GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22
More information
Details
Summary
The content of files outside
server.fssetting can be returned to the browser if the project imports a file path concatenated with theroot. For example, if the project references<path-to-project-root>/etc/hosts, the content of/etc/hostswas possible to be returned.The content of files outside the
server.fs.allowoption can be returned to the browser when a project imports a file whose root-relative path matches an absolute path on the host. For example, referencing<project-root>/etc/hostscould make Vite return the host's/etc/hostsfile.Impact
Only apps that meet all of the following conditions are affected:
--hostor theserver.hostoption)server.fs.denyDetails
When Vite analyzes an in-root import, it rewrites the resolved module ID to a browser URL such as
/etc/hostname. In affected versions, Vite converts that URL withfsPathFromUrland adds the result tosafeModulePaths. BecausefsPathFromUrlensures a leading slash without resolving the URL against the project root, the project URL/etc/hostnameis recorded as if it were the absolute filesystem path/etc/hostname.For a later request to
/@fs/etc/hostname, the raw-filesystem middleware interprets/etc/hostnameas an absolute path. The access check appliesserver.fs.deny, then accepts paths present insafeModulePathsbefore checkingserver.fs.allow. As a result, the request can return the host file instead of the project file that originally populatedsafeModulePaths.PoC
The following example requires Linux with a readable
/etc/hostname:In another terminal:
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
vitejs/vite (vite)
v7.3.7Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
v7.3.6Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
v7.3.5Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
v7.3.3Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
v7.3.2Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
Configuration
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